The Moral Permissibility of Killing in War

An Experimental Approach to the Moral Judgment of Side-Effect and Defensive Killing

Dissertation for the award of the degree
"Doctor rerum naturalium" (Dr. rer. nat.)
of the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

within the doctoral program Behavior and Cognition (BeCog)
of the Georg-August University School of Science (GAUSS)



submitted
by

Juan Carlos Marulanda Hernández

from Bogotá D.C (Colombia)

Göttingen, 2022

Member of the Thesis Committee

Prof. Dr. Michael R. Waldmann, Georg-Elias-Mueller-Institute of Psychology, Department of Cognitive Science and Decision Making

Prof. Dr. Margarete Boos, Georg-Elias-Mueller-Institute of Psychology, Department of Social and Communication Psychology,

Dr. Arezoo Pooresmaeili. European Neuroscience Institute, Perception and Cognition Group

Members of the Examination Board

Reviewer: Prof. Dr. Michael R. Waldmann, Georg-Elias-Mueller-Institute of Psychology, Department of Cognitive Science and Decision Making

Second Reviewer: Prof. Dr. Margarete Boos, Georg-Elias-Mueller-Institute of Psychology, Department of Social and Communication Psychology

Member of Examination Board

Dr. Arezoo Pooresmaeili. European Neuroscience Institute, Perception and Cognition Group

Prof. Dr. Hannes Rakoczy, Georg-Elias-Mueller-Institute of Psychology, Department of Developmental Psychology

Prof. Dr. Annekathrin Schacht, Georg-Elias-Mueller-Institute of Psychology, Department of Affective Neuroscience and Psychophysiology

Prof. Dr. Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Georg-Elias-Mueller-Institute of Psychology, Department of Economic and Social Psychology

Day of the oral examination: 22nd of August 2022

Herewith, I declare that I have written this thesis independently. The assistance of third parties will only be accepted if scientifically justifiable and acceptable in regard to the examination regulation. All sources used have also been adequately quoted.

Göttingen, 23th of June 2022

Juan Carlos Marulanda-Hernández

Dedicado a mis abuelos María del Carmen y Gilberto,
tras su reciente partida.

A mis hijos Jonah y Elias,
tras su reciente llegada.

Γνώθι Σεαυτόν

Acknowledgements

This dissertation is the culmination of a challenging personal endeavor. In 2017 I left my family, friends, and country to pursue my passion for science and academic work, entering a new culture and languages. After almost five years, not only have I come to know myself better, but I have gone through different changes. I am entering a new phase of my life with a broader and more aware view of the world around me, combining my professional activity with a new life as a father. My heartfelt thanks to all those who have accompanied me on this journey and from whom I have learned a lot.

I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Michael R. Waldmann to this project. Thank you for allowing me to conduct research in your laboratory, providing support and resources, and guiding me through every step of my work. I would also like to thank Alex Wiegmann, who contributed significantly to the theoretical discussion, the design of the experiments, and the analysis of the results. I am very grateful for the knowledge gained from working with these two researchers while expressing my respect for their dedication and professionalism. I also to Neele, Simon and the other members of the Department of Cognitive and Decision Sciences for their professional support and collegiality during this time.

I express my special thanks to KAAD for the scholarship I was awarded to pursue my doctoral studies in Germany. I also appreciate that you have made me a part of your community and supported me constantly during my stay in this country. My thanks also to the Georg-August University School of Science (GAUSS) for the financial support provided for the completion and submission of my dissertation.

My gratitude to Margarete Boos for her advice and encouragement. Thank you for contributing to this project from the beginning and for the inspiring conversations. I also thank Jaime Yáñez-canal, my supervisor and mentor in Colombia, who, despite the distance, continued to share his experience and motivated me to achieve this objective. Thanks also to Arezoo Pooresmaeili for participating in my thesis committee and for her valuable feedback.

Agradecimientos Especiales

Esta disertación es la culminación de una desafiante aventura personal. En 2017 dejé mi familia, mis amigos y mi país para perseguir mi pasión por la ciencia y el trabajo académico, adentrándome en una nueva cultura e idiomas. Después de casi cinco años, no sólo he podido conocerme más profundamente sino transformado de distintas maneras. Entro en una nueva fase de mi vida con una visión más amplia y consciente del mundo que me rodea, combinando mi actividad profesional con una nueva vida como padre. Mi más sincero agradecimiento a todos los que me han acompañado en este largo recorrido y de quienes he aprendido de una forma u otra.

Este proyecto habría sido imposible sin el apoyo emocional y mental de Eva. Gracias por tu amor incondicional y por formar una familia conmigo. Todo mi amor y gratitud a mi abuela Zoraida, a mis padres, Juan Carlos y Maricel, a mi hermano y amigo Andrés Camilo, y a Maya y Camille, que siempre me han expresado su amor y alentado cada día aún en la distancia. Gracias a Mario, Laura, Maarit, Daniel, Lina, Daniel, Fernanda, Andrés y a la familia Hübner por su apoyo emocional y su amistad. Gracias por hacerme sentir como en casa en Alemania. Por último, gracias a toda mi familia y amigos en Colombia y en el extranjero, por estar ahí siempre que los he necesitado y por seguir formando parte de mi vida.

Summary

In wars combatants face situations that challenge their moral compass. They may, for example, have to decide whether to pursue military victories to protect their community at the cost of harming innocents. They must also consider how far they are allowed to push their moral limits to protect their own lives. The moral permissibility of acting in such situations can be determined in accordance with just war theory, an ethical framework that brings together principles concerning the legitimacy of the declaration of war and the morality of military conduct. The present dissertation draws on just war theory and moral psychology to investigate the cognitive factors and mechanisms influencing people's judgments of the moral permissibility of killing people under different circumstances. The dissertation seeks to establish whether people's moral judgments align with the principles of just war theory. The first set of experiments focused on whether causal features of actions influence the assessment of the moral permissibility of killing. Philosophers have sometimes claimed that harm to civilians is permissible only in limited circumstances, such as when the harm is a side-effect of legitimate military actions. However, this restriction may not apply to soldiers because of their duty to risk their lives to save others. To test this hypothesis, I investigated in a first set of experiments whether the causal features of acts of war interacts with the status as combatants versus civilians. The second set of experiments explored moral judgments about collective and individual defensive killing in war. Three experiments investigated whether people consider the collective reasons for waging war as a moral criterion for judging the moral permissibility of killing combatants and civilians on the enemy's side. The research also studied people's judgments about situations in which killing is carried out in self-defense.

Zusammenfassung

In Kriegen werden Soldaten mit Situationen konfrontiert, die ihren moralischen Kompass herausfordern. Zum Beispiel müssen sie sich entscheiden, ob sie militärische Siege anstreben wollen, um ihre Gemeinschaft zu schützen, auch wenn dabei Unschuldige zu Schaden kommen. Sie müssen auch abwägen, wie weit sie ihre moralischen Grenzen überschreiten dürfen, um ihr eigenes Leben zu schützen. Die moralische Zulässigkeit von Handlungen in solchen Situationen kann mit Hilfe der Theorie des gerechten Krieges ("just war theory") evaluiert werden. Diese Theorie formuliert ethische Richtlinien für Kriegssituationen. Sie befasst sich mit Prinzipien der Legitimität von Kriegserklärungen und der Zulässigkeit militärischer Handlungen. Meine Dissertation stützt sich auf die Theorie des gerechten Krieges und Ansätze der Moralpsychologie, um kognitive Faktoren und Mechanismen zu erforschen, die Urteilen über die moralische Zulässigkeit kriegerischer Handlungen zugrunde liegen. Dabei sollte untersucht werden, ob die moralischen Urteile mit Prinzipien der Theorie des gerechten Krieges kompatibel sind. Die erste Gruppe von Experimenten befasste sich mit der Rolle von kausalen Eigenschaften von Kriegshandlungen als potentiellen Einflussfaktoren moralischer Urteile. Einige Philosoph:innen haben behauptet, dass Verletzungen und Tötungen von Zivilisten nur unter bestimmten Umständen zulässig sind, z.B. wenn die Schädigung ein Nebeneffekt legitimer militärischer Aktionen ist. Demgegenüber wird diese Einschränkung für Soldaten allerdings in Frage gestellt, da diese verpflichtet sind, ihr Leben zu riskieren, um andere zu retten. Um diese Hypothesen zu testen, variierten die Experimente kausale Eigenschaften von Kriegshandlungen und den Status der potentiellen Opfer als Soldaten versus Zivilisten. Die zweite Gruppe von Experimenten erforschte moralische Urteile über kollektive und individuelle Notwehrhandlungen in Kriegssituationen. In drei Experimenten wurde untersucht, ob Menschen kollektive Legitimationen für das Führen eines Krieges als moralisches Kriterium für die Beurteilung der moralischen Zulässigkeit des Tötens von Soldaten und Zivilisten auf der gegnerischen Seite betrachten. Die Studie untersuchte zudem Urteile über Situationen, in welchen Töten in Notwehr stattfand.

Contents

List of Figures

General introduction

This dissertation addresses the question of the morality of killing in war. It draws on the background of moral philosophy and moral psychology to offer an experimental approach to people's moral judgments about the permissibility of killing. In contrast to other spheres of human life, killing in war occurs more frequently and on a larger scale. In fact, war is characterized by the development and use of the most varied and sophisticated methods of killing (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016). Most people would agree prima facie that killing is wrong, so talking of the morality of war and the right ways to kill may seem like an oxymoron. Others may think that war is a realm beyond morality, making any attempt to regulate or limit war useless and contrary to its purpose. This dissertation challenges these points of view. On the one hand, it assumes that our common sense about killing is not fixed and, therefore, accepts a variety of exceptions on moral grounds, both in everyday life and in war situations. On the other hand, this dissertation is in line with the claim that war's destruction and horror demand a moral consideration.

Morality implies an effort to guide our behavior by appealing to reasons concerning the welfare of other human or non-human beings (Rachels & Stuart, 2012). Thus, thinking morally would require defining what makes a behavior right or just or establishing the right or wrong ways to treat a person given different circumstances or contexts (Holmes, 1989). Since violence is the paradigmatic form of mistreatment and killing, an extreme expression of violence, the prohibition of killing often precedes other moral principles.

The prohibition of killing others can be considered as an absolute or presumptive principle (Fotion, 2007). Considering the principle as an absolute means that killing others is wrong in all circumstances, regardless of how it is done. However, this absolute conception often runs into several problems. For example, the meaning of "others" is ambiguous in determining to what extent the principle applies. Does it refer to other citizens, groups, or beings? The second problem is that it does not consider those circumstances in which the prohibition of killing conflicts with other duties or precepts, such as the duty to save others or provide a dignified life. In resolving moral dilemmas associated with cases such as abortion,

euthanasia, or humanitarian military intervention, holding an absolute prohibition of killing would cause more moral harm than it is intended to prevent.

The other alternative is to consider the prohibition of killing others as a presumptive principle. This means that there are still strong reasons to respect the principle in most cases. However, when this prohibition conflicts with other principles or duties, it is still possible to make exceptions (Fotion,2007; Kamm, 2007). Most discussions in moral philosophy about killing assume a presumptive conception of its prohibition, focusing mainly on the circumstances and conditions that would justify exceptions. One of these exceptions is that killing may be permissible if done as a side-effect of an action aimed at achieving a greater good. The philosophical principle establishing the conditions for this exception is the doctrine of double effect (DDE). Another exception refers to the permissibility of defensive killing, either in defense of one's own life or members of the same group.

The DDE allows exceptions to the prohibition of killing if two conditions are met (FitzPatrick, 2012; McIntyre, 2001): the good results of the action must outweigh the bad ones. The second condition is that the harmful consequences must be an unintended side-effect of a legitimate action. Influenced by discussions on the DDE, some moral psychologists have explored different factors accounting for people's moral judgments about the permissibility of side-effect killing (Crockett, 2013; Cushman & Young, 2011; Mikhail,2007). In experiments using hypothetical dilemmas, researchers have observed that most people judge that it is permissible to take action to save a group of people if it involves harming another person as an unintended side-effect. In contrast, people do not consider it permissible to harm someone to save others intentionally. According to these results, some researchers hold that people's judgments are aligned with the DDE's logic. That is, people evaluated the moral permissibility of harming others based on the distinction between means and unintentional side-effects.

Subsequent research has supported alternative models to the DDE, such as the locus of intervention theory. This model argues that people's judgment relies primarily on information about the locus on which the agent intervenes (Waldmann, Wiegmann, & Nagel, 2017; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010). For example, people consider it permissible to redirect a threat causing the death of a victim indirectly or as a side-effect. By contrast, targeting a

victim, for example, by redirecting her to stop the threat and save a majority, is generally deemed impermissible.

The permissibility of killing in self-defense has also been the subject of extensive analysis by philosophers. The legitimacy of defensive actions is given by assuming that the right not to be killed is directly and logically linked to the duty not to kill others (Rodin, 2004; Frowe, 2014). In other words, once the aggressor threatens the victim's life, he justifies the victim by exercising violence against him and even killing him if it is the only way to protect the victim's life. Defensive killing is also permissible since the intention guiding the victim's action is not to kill but to protect his or her life. In contrast to the moral permissibility of killing as a side-effect, there is still little empirical research in moral psychology on moral judgments about defensive killing.

As we turn to the realm of war, the question arises as to whether it makes sense to posit a moral prohibition against killing in war and, therefore, to consider exceptions to that prohibition. Even though killing is the defining practice of war, at first glance, there is no reason to think it cannot be limited or regulated. People have been prone to talking about killing in war in all cultures and times, distinguishing morally, for example, between those who can be killed and those who cannot (Orend, 2013; Traven, 2015, 2021; Walzer, 2015). Insofar as people consider moral limits to killing in war, they also admit circumstances that would justify making exceptions. Thus, the only difference between war and other spheres of social life is that its collective character, the magnitude of the conflict, and devastating consequences require a more careful decision-making process (Fotion, 2007).

Tackling war and other forms of armed conflict also involves considering additional moral criteria that respond to the unique conditions that war may offer. A first aspect to take into account is that in times of war or political violence, people act on behalf of their group, state, or political community. Thus, ordinary citizens become combatants and face circumstances in which respect for life or human dignity is subordinated to the defense of collectivity or its purposes (Marulanda & Yáñez-Canal, 2015; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). At the same time, as combatants, they are entitled to kill at the cost of being legitimately killed, losing a right that seems to be naturally granted to human beings. This fact establishes a distinction,

which is unusual in other spheres of human life, between those who can or cannot be killed.

The second factor has to do with the context of conflict among states or armed groups, which is different from common political relations in times of peace (Nussbaum, 2006). The main western moral theories have aimed to answer common problems related to the interaction among citizens and their capacity as independent agents to make moral agreements supported by the laws established in a sovereign state. Given that war occurs in the absence or weakness of a government or state, the moral conflicts arising in a war between moral obligations and military goals cannot be satisfactorily solved by traditional assumptions about morality and justice. Consequently, philosophers have formulated moral norms concerning the reasons that legitimize the declaration of war and have set specific limits on the conduct of armed forces. These norms are encompassed in an ethical framework for war, better known as the just war theory (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2006; Walzer, 2015).

In cases of war, the permissibility of killing as a side effect arises as an exception to the prohibition against killing innocents or civilians. In these cases, proponents of the just war theory have incorporated the DDE as a derogatory principle, adapting its criteria to be applied to the conditions of armed conflict (di Nucci, 2013, 2014; Scanlon, 2010; Kamm, 2011, 2012). Experiments in moral psychology using war scenarios have evidence that the distinction between means and side-effect drawn by the DDE may also account for people's moral judgment about the moral permissibility of killing in war (di Nucci, 2014; Watkins & Laham, 2019). Similarly, further evidence suggests that alternative models to DDE, such as the locus of intervention theory, can equally well be applied to war circumstances (Iliev, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). However, no previous research has explored whether people's moral intuitions based on causal distinctions might be mediated by differences in the moral status of potential victims in war. In other words, whether, for example, the difference between civilians and combatants is significant when judging the permissibility of killing as a side-effect of redirecting a threat or killing someone directly to stop a threat.

On the other hand, the just war theory considers legitimate self-defense as a moral criterion to either justify war and collective violence or to justify individual

action during military operations (McMahan, 2005; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Previous research on moral psychology has shown that people judge it as morally right that a soldier who acts to defend his group kills enemy soldiers. In contrast, people judge that those soldiers fighting an unjust war are not equally entitled to kill their enemies (Benbaji, Falk, & Feldman, 2015; Watkins & Goodwin, 2020; Watkins & Laham, 2020). However, there is a gap in research on individual self-defense in war. No relevant study has explored whether combatants and civilians on just and unjust sides have the same right to act in self-defense against attack by enemy combatants. Similarly, no previous research has established whether moral judgments about the permissibility of acting in collective and individual self-defense rely on the same moral criteria.

The project of investigating the moral judgment on killing in war, specifically focused on the permissibility of side-effect and defensive killings, gives continuity to the normative and empirical approaches already outlined. Two main questions are posed to be answered in this dissertation. The first main question relates to previous empirical findings in moral psychology. It is:1) which factors or psychological mechanisms account for people's moral judgments about the permissibility of killing in war?

The second question relates to the normative discussion of the permissibility of killing in war. It is: 2) Are people's moral judgments aligned with some of the principles within the ethical framework of war or the just war theory? In other words, it asks whether ordinary people's judgments rely on similar moral criteria and distinctions posed by philosophers when considering exceptions or justification for killing in war. According to the just war theory, the main principle determining the permissibility of harming and killing during war is the principle of discrimination or the requirement to morally distinguish between civilians and combatants. This principle gives rise to two secondary principles: the principle of civilian immunity, or the demand for civilian protection, and the principle of the moral equality of combatants, which holds combatants on both sides are equally legitimate military targets. The second question is mainly concerned with whether people's intuitions are aligned with one or another philosophical posture about the principle of discrimination and its derivative principles.

The two specific cases of killing in war addressed in this dissertation, as a side effect and in self-defense, raise some specific questions. Regarding side-effect killing, as mentioned above, the traditional version of DDE distinguishes between intended harm, which is prohibited, and foreseen harm, which may be acceptable under some circumstances. The alternative theory to the model based on the DDE, the locus of intervention theory, proposes that people focus primarily on the locus in which the agent intervenes, either on the victims or on the threat, to establish the permissibility of the action. Thus, unlike DDE, the locus of intervention theory predicts people's aversion to harming others in a broader range of cases beyond those in which the victim is used strictly as a means. Some questions emerging from this second model are: a) Does the effect of the locus of intervention account for moral judgments under circumstances of war? b) is the effect of the locus of intervention mediated by the difference in terms of victims, namely, soldiers and civilians or out-group vs in-group members.

Regarding defensive killing in war, the philosophical discussions raise three specific questions: c) are combatants fighting in collective self-defense and those who fight a war of aggression equally allowed to kill enemy combatants? d) Are combatants fighting in collective self-defense, which is a just cause of war, and those who fight a war of aggression, which is an unjust war, equally obligated to respect the lives of civilians on the other side? e) Do combatants and civilians on just and unjust sides equally retain their right to individual self-defense?

Although this dissertation is framed within empirical moral psychology, it adopts an interdisciplinary perspective that integrates philosophical discussions on the morality of war and empirical models and methodology. On the one hand, it draws on the philosophical debate on the permissibility of killing and its implications for war. In this way, just war theory serves as the primary reference to delimit some research questions while lending part of the conceptual language to describe people's moral judgments. On the other hand, our research has resorted to previous models and methods used in experimental moral psychology to analyze moral judgment.

Following an interdisciplinary perspective, the theoretical and empirical background of the present dissertation is presented in two initial chapters, one dealing with the philosophical discussion and the other with the research

background in psychology. Chapter 1 focuses on the ethical framework of war. This chapter aims to provide an introductory overview of the philosophical discussion of the morality of war. The second section of this chapter focuses on the emergence and development of the just war theory. Finally, it presents the principles or norms that constitute the just war theory. In this way, it serves as a preamble for the discussion in the following chapters.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of psychological theories and previous empirical findings on the morality of killing in war. This overview includes two central aspects. One, more general, concerns the interrelation between moral philosophy and psychology in dealing with the moral dimension of human relationships. The other aspect relates to research on the moral judgment of war from the perspective of moral psychology. This chapter describes the research on the moral judgment of war as an empirical approach that integrates the just war theory and experimental moral psychology. It also presents the main topics and research questions addressed in previous studies.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with two cases of interest concerning killing in war. These chapters describe the experiments carried out as part of this dissertation. Chapter 3 addresses the problem of the permissibility of killing as a side-effect. The research presented in this chapter comprises five experiments exploring the effect of the locus of intervention on moral judgments and how differences in the moral status of victims in war led to variations in such an effect.

Chapter 4 addresses the problem of the morality of killing as a collective and individual defense. It presents three experiments exploring the influence of the cause of the war that the agents fight, the identity of the victims, and the distinctions between regular and defensive killing on people's moral judgments. The philosophical discussion around the principle of discrimination and the moral equity of victims is the focus of the research conducted in this chapter.

The methodological approach of the research conducted for this dissertation follows the previous experimental research in moral psychology (Waldmann, Nagel & Wiegmann, 2012). It consists of a series of controlled experiments in which people are asked to evaluate the morality of an agent's action in hypothetical situations in war. We manipulate a set of variables or factors for each experiment, testing their effect on moral evaluations and their interaction mainly using

multifactorial designs. Thus, we created vignettes that vary slightly from one condition to another depending on manipulated factor.

Each chapter was written to be read without the need to return to previous ones. Hence, the reader will find that some topics or ideas are repeated across the manuscript. However, these topics are addressed differently depending on each chapter's problem or central question. For example, chapter 1 offers only an introductory overview of some principles that regulate killing in war, such as the principle of discrimination between combatants and civilians, the DDE, and the principle of the moral equality of combatants. The experiments presented in Chapters 3 and 4 refer to these principles, offering a more extensive discussion about them. The four chapters are followed by a general discussion of the most relevant findings and conclusions. This section analyzes the main findings according to the theoretical and empirical background, pointing out also how they contribute to solving the proposed questions and objectives.

The main objective of this dissertation has been to provide a conceptual framework and present the results of experimental research in moral psychology to contribute to debates about moral judgment, moral transgressions, and decision-making processes in times of war and political violence. This objective includes establishing an interdisciplinary approach that broadens our understanding of moral thinking and behavior in war or armed violence circumstances. It also aims to contribute to the normative debate about the moral permissibility of harming others and its implications for developing and implementing an ethical framework for war.

Chapter 1

The Morality of Killing in War: Philosophical Background

War is a space of confrontation between political units, which appeal to organized violence to exert political authority or manipulate the enemy's will (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016; Clausewitz, 2006). It is a space where political and military objectives conflict with the fundamental moral demands of respect for the lives and dignity of others. This conflict has been a subject of long-standing philosophical concern, giving rise to the ethical framework of war, better known as the just war theory (Bellamy, 2006; Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The just war theory encompasses principles to justify or condemn the use of armed violence in the international arena and regulate military actions in the course of the war. Thus, in addition to having influenced the development of international law, the just war theory is a primary reference for academics and researchers interested in studying war and other armed conflicts.

In recent years, the discussion surrounding the morality of war and the just war theory has attracted the attention of moral psychologists (Benbaji, Falk, & Feldman, 2015; Traven, 2015; Watkins, 2020). The just war theory has helped outline a research map and set forth the relevant questions to be asked, while providing a conceptual language for describing moral thinking and behavior in war. In line with previous research, the present dissertation on the moral judgment of killing in war begins by reviewing the just war theory and the moral criteria distinguishing right and wrong actions on the battlefield.

This first chapter presents an overview of the normative approach to the morality of war. It serves as a preamble to discuss the research on the moral psychology of war in the following chapter. The first section of this chapter discusses the relevance and need for a moral approach to war. The second section focuses on the just war theory. It begins with a brief review of the just war tradition and the emergence of the rules of war throughout the history of Western thought. The second part of this section addresses the structure and constitutive principles of the just war theory. Since the empirical studies in Chapters 3 and 4 concern some

principles within the just war theory, this presentation of the ethical framework of war provides only an overview of some features and principles that are discussed in more detail in those chapters.

1.1. Is it Possible to Morally Justify and Regulate War?

The nature of war is paradoxical. War has always engendered horror and destruction and, at the same time, has been socially and politically beneficial. On the one hand, once a war begins, women and men expect an imminent disaster (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016). They are aware that the well-being and survival of their community require breaking the moral imperative not to harm others. In the heat of battle, the most basic impulses will be unleashed, leading people to indulge in acts of cruelty and extreme violence that they might not otherwise be able to justify. War can make cruelty and atrocity seem normal and even rational in the worst cases.

On the other hand, despite the disaster that war causes, women and men resort to armed violence to defend or achieve collective ends. Unlike most forms of ordinary or impulsive violence, war violence is premeditated and involves a high level of social coordination and cooperation. War has thus driven the evolution of societies, shaped their hierarchical structures and defined the roles of their members (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016). Likewise, the development of military power has guaranteed the permanence and expansion of political, economic, and cultural patterns. Some armed conflicts, for example, played a decisive role in the emergence of modern states and the establishment of the current international order (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016; Luard, 1986). These more complex and organized societies transformed their way of waging war while benefiting from it. Modern warfare has been characterized by large-scale economic and political mobilization, which, in addition to increasing the military strength of modern states, has contributed to their strengthening and expansion (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016; Hobsbawm, 1994). Moreover, the search in modern societies for greater logistical and technological capacity for destruction has driven technological and scientific progress in other fields.

This paradoxical nature of war has raised the question of whether war can be the subject of moral inquiry. The philosophical discussion has mainly revolved around whether it is possible to justify or condemn warfare on moral grounds and

whether it is possible to establish an ethical framework to regulate the use of armed violence (Holmes, 1989; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Defenders of a moral approach to war begin by recognizing its paradoxical nature. They consider that the destruction and horror caused by war are always undesirable while admitting that war may be justified to defend a community's rights or prevent a greater evil (Fotion, 2007; Holmes, 1989; Walzer, 2015). In addition to distinguishing between moral and immoral reasons for waging war, a moral approach also assumes legitimate ways to exercise armed violence and minimize its catastrophic consequences (Bellamy, 2006; Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). This moral approach emerges as an alternative to pacifism and realism, two opposing positions primarily concerned with either the harmful or beneficial consequences of war.

For radical pacifists, the destructive potential of war outweighs any of its possible social benefits, leading to an absolute condemnation of any use of armed violence. Defenders of this radical pacifism also consider the prohibition of causing harm to others as a universal and absolute moral principle that should not be transgressed under any circumstances (Coates, 1997; Fotion, 2007; Holmes, 1989). Thus, they not only see war as the opposite of morality, but also refrain from any further moral reflection on war. Throughout history, few have defended such a radical vision. The early Roman Christians were radical pacifists considering violence contrary to Christian precepts (Bellamy, 2006). Other modern Christian movements and political organizations have held a similar position, such as the New England Resistance Society, led by William Lloyd Garrison (Coates, 1997; Holmes, 1989). Even so, radical pacifism has had little influence on the moral and legal debate on restrictions on the use of war.

Most forms of pacifism are moderate or contingent[1] (Coates, 1997; Dower, 2009; Holmes, 1989). Pacifists of this other kind admit that war may be necessary for collective self-defense. However, they still consider war to be opposed to morality, so the notion of just or moral wars should be rejected. On the same ground, they also rule out the proposal of an ethical framework to regulate military action.

[1] Despite its opposition to war, some proposals from contingent pacifism have been influential in the establishment of an ethical framework for war. Among them, the proposal of the Abbey of Saint-Pierre and Kant on the establishment of a community of states to establish peace in Europe. (Bellamy, 2006).

For example, in the writings of the modern pacifist Leo Tolstoy, the adoption of belligerent status and the distinction between civilians and combatants is seen as undermining moral sentiments. (Coates, 1997). Likewise, the military duties and commitments led to justify and even induce the transgression of moral principles. Thus, from this point of view, it is absurd to talk about moral conduct on the battlefield.

On the other extreme of pacifism are those who instead point out that the social advantages or necessity of waging war outweigh the evil it causes. This view is primarily advocated by political realism, a normative perspective that has dominated the debate on war and international relations for much of modern history[2] (Bellamy, 2006; Dower, 2009; Holmes, 1989; Morkevičius, 2018). For most realists, war is a world on its own, governed by its logic and purpose, which lies beyond any moral evaluation or constraint (Holmes, 1989; Walzer, 2015). A first argument to defend this point of view is the conception, inspired by thinkers such as Machiavelli or Hobbes[3], that violence is inherent to human nature and social relations dynamics (Bellamy, 2006; Berns, 1987; Strauss, 1987a; Walzer, 2015). This inherent violence in human nature can only be placated by a sovereign power that establishes a political order. However, such a power does not exist in the international space, so such violence manifests itself openly. Moreover, in the absence of such sovereign power, competition for resources and territory makes violent confrontation between groups necessary or even inevitable.

The main argument of the realists against any moral restriction of war lies in the historical and political purpose they attribute to war. The roots of this argument can be traced back to the philosophy of Hobbes, Hegel, and Clausewitz[4], who share the idea of war as a political instrument (Bellamy, 2006; Berns, 1987; Coates, 1997; Hassner, 1987a; Hegel. 2006; Holmes, 1989; Strauss, 1987a; Walzer, 2015). For Hegel (2006) war is the driving force of history, which allows the formation and permanence of the state by encouraging political unity. A moral

[2] Although political realism can be characterized as a form of belliccism, it should not be confused with some radical bellicist positions that see war as the realization of warrior or religious ideals beyond its social or political role (Coates, 1997; Holmes, 1989).

[3] While Machiavelli affirms a malevolent and selfish human nature, which makes the authority of a prince necessary, Hobbes believes in a state of nature prior to civil society where humans act out of a pure desire for self-preservation (Bellamy, 2006; Berns, 1987; Strauss, 1987a).

[4] For Clausewitz (2006) War has and elementary social function, namely, that of being "a continuation of politics by other means". This definition of war constitutes a paradigm in the various legal and moral debates on war in the 20th century.

restriction of war would be an obstacle to the progress of civilization (Bellamy, 2006; Hassner, 1987a). This aspect of Hegelian thought has transcended into Marxism and inspired the definition of war as an instrument for the vindication of the oppressed and the advance towards a new stage of history (Cropsey, 1987; Marx & Engels, 2006).

The realist conception of a warlike human nature and the political and historical purpose of war does not deny that people speak of war in moral terms. Instead, they argue that the meaning of such discourse is subjective and constantly manipulated to disguise political and economic interests[5] (Coates, 1997; Holmes, 1989; Walzer, 2015). Furthermore, when an armed conflict arises in the international sphere, such a moral discourse is quickly defeated by the rhetoric of nationalism and the exaltation of armed force. Since it makes no sense to justify or deny war morally, the proposal to establish moral restrictions on military behavior and killing would be nothing more than a useless or hypocritical initiative ignoring the reality on the battlefield. In Clausewitz's view (Bellamy, 2006; Clausewitz, 2006), this battlefield reality involves both sides doing everything possible to defeat and dominate the enemy by force. In some cases, the battle turns into an "absolute war" aimed at annihilating the enemy. Thus, for example, if success in battle depends on using all possible means, the distinctions between civilians and combatants would become irrelevant. Some modern realist positions support, at least in part, this view, considering that utilitarian calculus and military needs take precedence over moral constraints.

A moral justification and regulation of war require confronting the arguments of its detractors, both those who condemn war absolutely and those who see the moral approach as an obstacle to war's social and historical function. The first argument against radical pacifism is that a moral discussion of war cannot proceed from a narrow conception of morality limited to the separation of good and evil. Nor is it possible to approach the problem posed by war by considering moral principles as absolute universal statements. Even other crucial discussions on moral issues, such as abortion or euthanasia, start by assuming that moral principles have a presumptive status (Fotion, 2007; Holmes, 1989). In other words, there are

[5] This idea about the relativity of moral discourse stems from the Hobbesian consideration that moral terms vary in meaning from one individual to another according to their passions and particular experiences (Bern, 1987; Marulanda-Hernández, 2012)

compelling reasons to respect the principle in most cases. However, sometimes we must consider exceptions to the principle of not harming others to fulfill a duty to help or protect others or avoid more significant moral harm. For example, when dictators or terrorist groups threaten the life, dignity, or freedom of a community.

War indeed implies the violation of some people's rights, but this also occurs in many other scenarios (Fotion, 2007). For example, the distribution of organs to those in need of a transplant responds to allocation criteria that benefit some people while negatively affecting others, even though all of them claim the same right to protect their lives. Even the best moral alternatives of social or political action tend to impose sacrifices on citizens or violate their rights for the general good. An example of this was the government's lockdown and vaccination measures during the COVID-19 pandemic.

On the other hand, recognizing that war and a series of atrocities are committed does not imply that we should avoid a moral discussion or limit ourselves to pretending to establish moral codes that make violence less harmful. Therefore, when evaluating the decision to resort to arms, the question must be whether the protection of the rights of a community and its members in a given situation legitimizes the use of violence and makes war a lesser evil. Similarly, we must ask whether the right to defend one's own life or the duty to save the life of a majority justifies making an exception to the prohibition of killing. Confronted with these questions, for centuries, philosophers have drawn moral distinctions between wars fought in self-defense, in the name of peace and freedom, or to protect rights or dignity, and those wars fought for self-interest or perverse ends. They have also distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate ways of fighting for those just causes.

Like realists, defenders of a moral approach to war recognize that it has played a relevant role in the history and evolution of societies. However, this role does not imply that war has always been or will always be necessary. Moreover, in a contemporary world, with democratic states and international institutions capable of addressing conflicts without appealing to violence, the use of armed force should not be promoted or considered as the first alternative. Until now, war has not offered solutions to the problems it causes. On the contrary, over the last century, it has proven to be increasingly devastating (Coates, 1997; Dower, 2009; Holmes, 1989).

The threat of nuclear war, for example, is reason enough to limit the use of war to situations of supreme emergency and to set moral limits on how it is waged.

There is also no reason to accept the realist argument that war is a realm beyond morality, governed by its own norms. Other activities, such as economics or science, also have codes or ethical frameworks that respond to the particularities of their practice. Refusing a moral approach to war on that argument would also imply the impossibility of a moral approach to these other social activities. There is no doubt that war is a rational activity based on rules that guide the planning and coordination of military action. Likewise, the war dynamic depends on a hierarchical military organization whose immediate purpose is to defeat the enemy. However, since war is a social activity, it is also subject to and evaluated according to the group's interests (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Insofar as such interests relate to collective values or are subject to considerations of morality and legitimacy, the harm caused in wartime is also judged in terms of moral criteria.

Finally, the proposition that a moral discourse for war only serves to disguise economic or political interests contradicts the nature of moral discourse. Walzer (2015) points out that moral terms are part of a shared moral sense, a minimal morality, which is universal and independent of what the interests of a particular individual or society may dictate. Throughout history and in diverse cultures, people have made similar moral judgments regarding what is just or moral in war (Bellamy, 2006; Rengger, 2008; Traven, 2021; Walzer, 2015). For example, the right to legitimate self-defense and the norms demanding the protection of innocents or civilians are neither exclusive to the Western tradition of thought nor an invention of modern philosophy (Traven, 2015, 2021). As in other spheres of human life, shared intuitions about what is right or wrong in war remain even in a modern world susceptible to ideological manipulation. Such a shared minimum morality would explain why war tends to develop in varying degrees, maintaining a certain margin of violence and brutality in most cases. In summary, the moral discourse of war is neither relative, variable, nor subject to personal whims.

Only after the possibility and necessity of a moral approach to war has been established, it is possible to consider the idea of an ethical framework to state the legitimate reasons for waging war and regulate the conduct of armed forces. Philosophy has responded to this endeavor through the just war theory, a proposal that brings together moral and legal principles of norms that have emerged and

developed throughout cultures and epochs (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The just war theory not only provides a justificatory framework for war and a set of rules for fighting but also offers a language that politicians and the military can use to explain the legitimacy of their actions or evaluate the claims of others (Walzer, 2015). However, as we have already mentioned, the notion of just war is far from being a defense or an apology for war. Instead, the just war theory recognizes war as a social fact, which should be subject to moral reflection. In this way, this approach overcomes previous discourses in which war has been conceived as an opportunity to achieve heroic ideals or the progress of nations.

1.2. The Tradition of the Just War Theory and the Emergence of the Norms of War

Rather than a single theory, the just war theory encompasses a family of theories formulated throughout the history of moral and political philosophy (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008). Therefore, it would be more accurate to think of it as the just war tradition. The position and proposals in this tradition refer to the problems posed by war and its evolution throughout human history. The just war theory appears as a framework under permanent construction, with different positions that diverge moderately in terms of the criteria used to judge war but that share a common language.

Discussions of the just war theory are often divided into two dimensions or sets of moral principles (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015): The first, the *jus ad bellum*, which concerns the legitimacy of the declaration of war or the right intention motivating the recourse to armed violence; the other, *the jus in bello*, which deals with the morality of the means used to wage war and the conduct of armed forces. In the just war tradition, this distinction between the two dimensions of war was not always evident but rather characteristic of the discussion among modern thinkers. In fact, for many centuries, the debate focused primarily on the justice or legality of decisions on going to war, while only minor restrictions were established on the behavior of combatants (Bellamy, 2006; Rengger, 2008). As we shall see in the following, the discussion on the *jus in bello* and the establishment of the principles to protect civilians and limit armed violence will only come into force during the 20th century.

1.2.1. The Just War Theory in Ancient and Medieval Times

The discussion of the ethical framework of war and its application in international politics is usually considered an achievement of the Western philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, its roots go back much further in history and different cultures. Ancient civilizations, such as the Aztecs, Egyptians, Hindus and Chinese, had codes that guided combat strategy and limited the use of violence against innocents and enemy warriors (Bellamy, 2006; Traven, 2021). For example, the *Mahabharat* and the *Ramayana* describe the ideal of the Hindu warrior while offering rules about how the battle should be fought (Morkevičius, 2018). In ancient China, the *Lushi Chunqiu*, an official manual of the Qin dynasty, The *Seven Military Classics* and Sun Tzu's *Art of War* served a similar function (Traven, 2021).

Similarly, the ancient Greeks waged war following the warrior virtues archetype in Homeric poems (Bellamy, 2006; MacIntyre, 1985; Walzer, 2015). Some of the earliest documented treaties to restrict wars also date back to ancient Greece, although these treaties were restricted to wars between city-states (Bellamy, 2006; Walzer, 2015). The Greek heroic ideals and their way of waging war influenced the early normative debate about war and the reasons for setting moral limits in Greek philosophy. Many ideas that shaped Greek thinking about war came from other traditions through cultural and economic exchanges or emerged as part of a common imaginary shared with other ancient civilizations.

In the Greco-Roman tradition, Plato's Republic offers one of the first mentions of the distinction between just wars, those aimed at achieving peace, and unjust wars. (Strauss, 1987b; Swift, 1973). But it was the work of his disciple Aristotle that provided the basis for the subsequent just war tradition in Western thought (Bellamy, 2006; Lord, 1987; Orend, 2013). This philosopher explicitly formulates the first set of criteria for justifying war, including self-defense, revenge for damages, help to allies, acquisition of advantages for the polis, and the requirement to govern weak states. Centuries later, Cicero introduced the Aristotelian approach to the Roman laws of war (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Stewart, 2018). Cicero considers the Roman war as a model to follow, arguing that the conquest and expansion of the empire brought about justice and peace. He also introduces the notion of legitimate authority and discusses the need to respect the citizens of the conquered lands and the soldiers who had surrendered.

Throughout the medieval tradition, the theory of war developed within Christian thought. The early Roman Christians were radically pacifist until the conversion of Emperor Constantine, when the Christian position was reoriented towards the previous ideas of Aristotle and Cicero (Bellamy, 2006). The first influential thinker of the just war tradition within Christian thought was Augustine of Hippo (Bellamy, 2006; Holmes, 1989; Orend, 2013). His proposal focuses on the right intention as the main moral criterion for declaring war. Augustine of Hippo does not consider war as something evil itself, but only the intentions that motivate it. Thus, there is only justice in those wars driven by the desire to maintain or preserve justice and peace. Besides self-defense and punishment for harm caused, Augustine of Hippo posits divine ordination as a just cause for war. Because of this last criterion, it is difficult to distinguish the idea of just war from that of holy war in the proposal of the Christian philosopher.

In the late Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas' conception of the justice of war was based on Augustine's view (Bellamy, 2006; Fortin, 1987; Orend, 2013). For Thomas Aquinas, no war can be considered just, although it can be excused when the injustice caused constitutes a lesser evil than the good achieved. Unlike Augustine of Hippo, he demands war to be fought by limiting combat to the combatants and protecting the innocent. Following the idea that a lesser evil can be justified if there is a right intention to pursue the greater good, Thomas Aquinas is also considered the founder of the doctrine of double effect and the principle of self-defense, both included as part of the *jus in bello*[6].

1.2.2. The Just War Theory in Modern Philosophy

In the 16th century, the proposal of Thomas Aquinas was taken up by the neo-scholasticism of the school of Salamanca (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008). Its principal exponent, Francisco de Vitoria, was recognized as a vigorous critic of the actions of the Spanish monarchy in America and the Crusades. De Vitoria proposes a distinction between the objective and subjective character of

[6]Like Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas considered the intention behind acts as a primary moral criterion. Thus, his Doctrine of Side-Effect holds that killing is morally permissible as a side-effect since the act intends to achieve a good end. The legitimacy of defensive killing is linked with the permissibility of side-effect killing. The victim kills the aggressor primarily to save her or his life and not with the intention of killing (Fortin, 1987).
.

just cause (Orend, 2006; Bellamy, 2009). In a war, both sides act in good faith under the belief or subjective conception that their intention is just, whereas only God can objectively know on which side justice lies. Since neither side can know whether its war is just, they must act according to the principle of proportionality, weighing the damage caused and benefits of the war. De Vitoria also demands to wage war with moderation and respect for the innocents, allowing only harm to be done to them when it is an unintentional side-effect of legitimate actions. Because of these claims, he is arguably the first thinker to formulate a doctrine of *jus in bello* in modern times (Rengger, 2008).

Between the late 16th and 17th centuries, there was a constant war between Catholics and Protestants in Europe that culminate with the " Peace of Westphalia." During this period and the following history of modern philosophy, the just war tradition developed thanks to three currents of thought or sub-traditions: realism, legalism, and reformism (Bellamy, 2006).

As we have already noted, political realists have traditionally refused any moral limitation to war. However, several of its ideas have found a place in legal approaches. For example, the doctrine of raison d'état, i.e., the idea that the welfare and stability of the state are just reasons for waging war, is grounded in Hobbes' and Hegel's philosophy (Bellamy, 2006; Holmes, 1989). Likewise, these philosophers introduced the principle that only a legitimate authority can declare war. Although Hobbes and Hegel defend the existence of a state of nature in the international sphere, they consider that sovereigns can establish treaties with other states (Cropsey, 1987; Hassner, 1987a; Hegel, 2006; Holmes, 1989). The Hegelian influence is especially notable in the 17th century when justifications based on the pursuit of progress and civilization became a common motif in international politics. By then, technological advances provided better weapons and improved war logistics. The consequences of the French Revolution and the emergence of modern states defined new ways of doing battle. For example, large national armies formed by citizens replaced the small mercenary armies.

Legalism developed in parallel to realism in modern philosophy. Its major contribution was developing natural and positive laws in the international sphere. Ayala and Gentili were the first representatives of modern legalism (Bellamy, 2006). The first of these authors argues that war is just only if the sovereign authorities declare it. In that way, the problem of justice lies primarily in how the

combatants on each side should act. Similarly, Gentili believes that sovereigns are governed solely by natural and international law (Kelsay, 2018). For him, all strategies contributing directly to achieving the objective are valid. Despite this, Gentili also demands that the lives of prisoners and non-combatants on the enemy side be respected, as long as the opposing side does so as well.

In the 17th century, the thought of Francisco de Vitoria resurfaced in two other legalist authors, Grotius and Pufendorf (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008). Like other legalists, Grotius considers that the principal just cause of war is the response to an injury caused against a state within an international legal context. Thus, war assumes three different meanings: as a legal act, as litigation, and as the defense of the common good (Bellamy, 2006; Lang, 2018; Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008). For Grotius, the justice of war depends on fulfilling both moral and legal criteria, referring both to the relations of states and combatants' actions (Walzer, 2004, Bellamy, 2009). In that way, war can only be just if it meets the precepts of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Following Grotius, Pufendorf holds as legitimate causes the reparation of damage, the satisfaction of rights, the redress of grievances, and the maintenance of future peace. He also discusses the criterion of proportionality between the evil of war and the good achieved, thus elaborating a doctrine of *jus in bello* dependent on *just cause* and "humanitarian law" (Bellamy, 2009).

Finally, the third sub-tradition, reformism, presents a pacifist defense based on moral arguments that condemn the use of force. Kant's reformism emerged as a strong alternative despite the domination of realism and legalism in the debate in modern thought (Bellamy, 2006; Hassner, 1987b; Kant, 2006). Kant dismisses the idea of a just war, considering that it causes confusion and harm. However, his proposal of perpetual peace strongly influenced the just war tradition and other legal frameworks of the 20th century (Bellamy, 2006; Hassner, 1987b). For Kant, the only valid sources of law are customary practice, treaties, and opinions of legitimate authorities. His idea of a law of nations must be based on the voluntary agreement of states that generates an organization based on mutual recognition. In his essay *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, Kant (2006) argues that the destruction of war would lead men to seek peace rationally and create a confederation of states. He also formulates a set of rules orienting the relations within the confederation.

Moreover, Kant sees the establishment of commercial rights and the internalization of human rights as guarantors of peace.

1.2.3. The Just War Theory in the 20th century

Realism was still a dominant perspective in the early 20th century. Politicians, military leaders, and scholars argued based on the Hegelian perspective to defend the autonomy of states and reject the imposition of limitations on the decision to make war. (Bellamy, 2006; Hobsbawm, 1994; Holmes, 1989). However, the transformation and effects of modern warfare confronted the just war tradition with new moral dilemmas. The rhetoric of radical realism was replaced by moderate views that accepted the application of a system of international law, admitting moral arguments in some cases. The legalist tradition progressively gained acceptance and prompted the creation of agreements between states. For example, during the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the legal right of states to initiate war was tacitly accepted. However, there were attempts to limit this right with an arbitration system (Bellamy, 2006). After World War I, the participating states signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which established the illegality of any use of force other than self-defense (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013). Some years later, at the end of World War II, the Charter of the United Nations was promulgated. The Charter prohibits threats between nations, the obligation of sovereigns to justify to others the use of force, and the express prohibition of aggressive war, whatever its purpose (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013).

However, the most outstanding achievement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries regards the principles regulating military behavior or *jus in bello*. The creation of the International Red Cross at the first Geneva conference in 1863 counts as first important manifestation of the desire to humanize war was. The Red Cross is responsible not only for the care of victims and mediation in armed conflicts but also grants protection to medical personnel and wounded soldiers. Years later, during the peace conference of 1899 in The Hague, nations agreed on prohibiting poisonous gases and explosive bullets, along with practices such as bombing residential areas (Bellamy, 2006). At the beginning of the 20th century, the armed forces also had military codes that guided soldiers' actions and determined the immunity of civilians (Bellamy, 2006; Rengger, 2008). The most famous, the "Lieber Code," prohibited all unjustified violence under the criterion of

military necessity and subsequently provided the basis for the "Brussels Declaration."

The formulation of the principles of *jus in bello* reached its peak in the aftermath of the two world wars. World War I is considered the first "total war" in history, as the rise of industrial power and armament modernization allowed for unpredictable degrees of savagery and destruction (Hobsbawm, 1994; Holmes, 1989). After World War I, much of the discussion on the just war tradition focused on setting a normative framework that would limit military actions and protect noncombatants or civilians (Bellamy, 2006; Rengger, 2008).

However, it was not until World War II that the normative framework for combatants acquired legal relevance due to the creation of the UN and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Bellamy, 2006; Rengger, 2008; Traven, 2015, 2021). In the UN Charter, the states agreed to respect human rights during armed conflict. The additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 established a clear distinction between civilians and combatants, demanding the protection of civilians and establishing their duty to refrain from taking part in hostilities. These conventions facilitated the Red Cross Central Committee's project to create a convention that would apply to all forms of armed conflict. Today, the Geneva Conventions have the status of customary law, and violations of their principles are punishable worldwide (Bellamy, 2006; Rengger, 2008; Traven, 2021). This position was reaffirmed with the convention in 2000 and the creation of the international criminal court in 2002 (Bellamy, 2006; Rengger, 2008). Their main contribution was to create a positive law that obliges military forces to limit their attacks to purely military objectives. It also obliges soldiers to evaluate the proportionality of their attacks and refrain from any attack that seriously harms or involves the death of civilians.

1.3 The Contemporary Just War Theory

The contemporary just war theory emerged in North America amid the demonstrations of opposition to the armed intervention of the United States in Vietnam. Michael Walzer's work in the 1970s is the most influential in this contemporary version (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2004, 2007; 2015). The just war theory proposed by this philosopher is characterized mainly by the vindication of human rights as a criterion of moral judgment for modern warfare,

including armed interventions in other countries and sophisticated military practices. In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer (2015) argues that people rely on shared moral intuitions to judge war, manifested through common discourses throughout history. He draws on several historical examples, mainly from wars of 20th century, to support the moral principles that would constitute the ethical framework of war. However, Walzer does not claim that his theory is novel but rather that it is a continuation of the tradition of human rights and natural law that emerged in modern philosophy.

The contemporary discussion initiated by Walzer (2004, 2015) and continued by several other authors does not advocate war as the best alternative to resolve intergroup conflicts (Bellamy, 2006; Fotion, 2007; Holmes, 1989; Kamm, 2012; Orend, 2013). Instead, it considers war as a necessary and even morally required last resort after exhausting all other options for the protection and permanence of a political community. Besides justifying war in certain circumstances, the contemporary just war theory also sets limits to reduce the devastating consequences of its use. We could even say that its most significant effort has been developing a consistent framework guiding the conduct of warfare.

Both objectives, justifying war and reducing its devastating consequences, are embodied in the two normative systems or set of principles, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. These two sets of principles yield two kinds of moral judgment of war (Fotion, 2007; Kamm, 2012; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The first kind of judgment is an adjective judgment, which questions the decisions of politicians to take their nations to war and qualifies them as just, legitimate, or moral. The second type of judgment is adverbial, i.e., it distinguishes between just and unjust ways of waging war by defining the moral status of victims in the war and the moral restrictions on military behavior. In this sense, it refers to military strategies and objectives, focusing primarily on the question of the moral permissibility of causing harm and killing in the course of battle. Hereafter the exposition will focus on these two sets of principles.

1.3.1 The Right to Make War and the Just Cause (*Jus ad Bellum*)

The first question that has occupied the thinkers within the just war tradition is about the reasons or conditions allowing political communities or states to resort to the use of violence. In the contemporary just war theory, the right to wage war is defined from a legalistic approach to international relations, also known as the legalistic paradigm (Fotion, 2007; Holmes, 1989; Orend, 2013; Rawls, 1999; Walzer, 2007). This approach conceives the international community as analogous to domestic society, in which each state is defined as an individual entity endowed with rights. Just as the state arises from a social contract between its citizens to protect their rights, the international community arises from a contract between states to guarantee their role as protectors of individual rights (Rawls, 1999; Walzer, 2004). Thus, states' rights are regarded as an extension of their citizens' fundamental rights. In other words, individual rights, such as freedom, self-determination, or the right to have a territory to develop one's life, become collective rights within the international community. However, a state's role goes beyond protecting its citizens' lives. Its primary function is to defend the freedom, relationships, and forms of communal life (Rawls, 1999; Walzer, 2004). Therefore, the rights to territorial integrity and political self-determination, or sovereignty, become crucial as they allow for different forms of communal life within the states.

Following the domestic analogy, the legalistic paradigm defines the right to war as an extension of the individual right to self-defense in the collective sphere. Therefore, states are justified in declaring war against any military threat another state or group poses against their rights (Bellamy, 2006; May, 2008; McMahan, 2005; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2007, 2015). Moreover, according to the conception of positive international law, acts of threat or aggression against a state's rights are considered crimes. Thus, the legalistic paradigm justifies both wars in collective self-defense and military intervention by allies to confront aggression. In the same sense, anticipatory defense or preventive war is also legitimate, but only in cases where an aggressor has a clear intention to attack or pose a threat to its neighbors (Fotion, 2007; Orend; Walzer, 2004, 2007, 2015).

Finally, since the contemporary just war theory assumes a humanitarian approach, it justifies civil wars in defense of the rights of a minority or political community and humanitarian interventions (Bellamy, 2006; Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2004, 2015). As mentioned in the previous section, some

perspectives on the just war tradition have emphasized legitimate authority and the existence of a constituted state as necessary conditions for declaring war (Coates, 1997; Holmes, 1989). Likewise, for a long time, positive law in the international context regarded any military intervention in a state as a severe offense against the right to self-determination (Bellamy, 2006; Coates, 1997; Holmes, 1989; Luard, 1986). However, after the two world wars, the defense of human rights became a major concern in the international arena. Hence, humanitarian military interventions became a moral obligation for states, as they can be the only way to avoid or prevent ethnic extermination, massacres, or excessive violence against innocents (Bellamy, 2006; Fabre, 2014; Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). In these circumstances, the cost of intervening should not be greater than that of not intervening, i.e., it should come to aid those affected, taking care not to increase the damage already caused.

1.3.2 The War Convention and the Morality of Killing (*Jus in Bello*)

The moral norms that regulate the means used to wage war and the morality of killing in war, known as *just in bello* or war convention, bind military leaders and combatants (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). It comprises two different groups of rules. The first group of norms defines which means of armed violence are permitted and when they can be used. Regarding the means of armed violence, it prescribes, for example, the obligation to wear distinctive military uniforms and prohibits certain military weapons that cause intense and unnecessary suffering or have a highly devastating effect due to their low precision. These norms also define the characteristics of facilities or buildings that may be legitimate targets for military attacks. Regarding the times to make war, it proscribes military action in periods of truce to care for the wounded and protect the innocent in danger and the military action in times of negotiation between the warring parties.

The second group of norms is related to the morality of killing in war. These norms distinguish between legitimate killing and killing as a war crime (McMahan, 2011; Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008; Walzer, 2015). This distinction is mainly determined by the principle of discrimination between civilians and combatants. From a traditional perspective (Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008; Walzer, 2015), this principle gives rise to two secondary principles: the civilian immunity and the moral equality of combatants.

The Civilian Immunity

The convention of war requires that combat be limited to fighting between combatants, which excludes the general civilian population: children, the elderly, women, political figures, members of aid organizations (e.g., United Nations and Red Cross) and citizens of neutral states (Coates, 1997; Fabre, 2009, 2014; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The prohibition of military action on civilians lies in the fact that they do not belong to the armed forces and therefore do not actively participate in the battle. In this sense, the criterion defining civilians as innocent and excluding them as military targets is that they do not pose a threat to people on the enemy side. Consequently, the prohibition of military attack also includes wounded and captured combatants, as they cannot participate in the battle (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015).

Political and military leaders who advocate for realism have been critical of the war convention, considering such a proposal to be an abstract discourse that ignores the reality of war and the conditions combatants face on the battlefield (Coates, 1997; Holmes, 1989; Morkevičius, 2018). Instead, they argue in favor of the military necessity. Based on a utilitarian calculus, this criterion requires the military commander to weigh the advantages of military actions and their cost. Thus, political and military forces leaders can ensure victory over the demand not to harm innocents or other restrictions imposed by the war convention if doing so minimizes the costs and risks of combat. Similarly, other authors, such as Henry Sidgwick, suggest opting for a rule of proportionality, which states that any harm should be avoided unless it contributes to a quick victory (Walzer, 2015).

A way to reconcile the criterion of military necessity and respect for innocents' lives is with a ranking of legitimate military targets (Walzer, 2004, 2015). In other words, the permissibility of killing someone would be based on the importance of his death to victory and the degree of threat he represents. The first permissible target of an attack would be those soldiers engaged in combat. The next permissible target may be soldiers outside combat but could be called into action. Next, it is justified to attack civilians who contribute to the armed conflict or who may be involved in the war. Finally, innocent civilians or civilians who do not pose a threat should be excluded from any military action.

The Permissibility of Killing as a Side-effect in War

Not all proposals for exceptions to the principle of discrimination and civil immunity consider the achievement of a greater good, such as a significant military victory or reducing the harmful consequences of war, based on utilitarian calculations that disregard moral precepts. Some philosophers have considered circumstances of extreme urgency in which harm to innocents can be morally justified by appealing to alternative moral principles of everyday morality. Perhaps the most popular of these is the doctrine of double effect (DDE). Initially proposed by Aquinas and other medieval thinkers, this principle holds that it is permissible to cause harm as a mere unintended side-effect of a legitimate action to achieve a greater good (Fitzpatrick, 2014; Marquis, 1991, McIntyre, 2001). However, the same harm would be prohibited if it is intentionally caused as a means to achieve the same goal.

The DDE has often been put into practice in the context of war. Indeed, there is perhaps no other scenario like war confronting us so forcefully with the question of the permissibility of harming others to protect the life and rights of a community and its members. Thus, for example, just war theory appeals to DDE to resolve dilemmas involving harm to innocents while acting against a major threat or pursuing a significant military victory (di Nucci, 2013, 2014; Kamm, 2012; Scanlon, 2008; Walzer, 2015). Under the circumstances of war, the DDE solves the conflict between the legitimate conduct of military activity and the prohibition against attacking civilians. Consequently, it is only permitted to harm civilians if the following conditions are met: (1) the attack must be for military purposes, (2) the harm caused to civilians must be proportionate to the expected military utility, (3) the harm caused as civilians must not be a means to a military end, and (4) the combatant must try to minimize the harm caused to civilians as far as possible (Bellamy, 2006; Coates, 1997; Walzer, 2015).

Based on criteria posed by DDE, philosophers have considered permissible actions such as the bombing of the Vemork heavy water plant in Norway during World War II, to prevent the Germans from developing the atomic bomb, even though it caused the death of some civilians in the vicinity (Walzer, 2015). In this case, the bombing would be permissible since it aims to stop a military attack or any other major threat that jeopardizes the lives of a majority. Also appealing to the DDE, many philosophers have condemned actions such as the British bombings of

several German cities during the same war (Holmes, 1989; Walzer, 2015). These attacks would be impermissible because they target innocent people and treat them as means, for example, to undermine the morale of combatants or pressure the enemy to surrender quickly.

This distinction between tactical bombing and terror bombing has served as an example for some contemporary authors to propose reformulations to the DDE (di Nucci, 2014; Kamm, 2011, 2012; Scanlon, 2008). A central claim of DDE revisionists is that the agent's intention plays a secondary role, if not a null role, as a criterion of moral permissibility. Instead, the causal structure of the action, or the distinction between means and side-effect, would be the decisive factor. Regarding examples from war, Kamm (2012) argues that we must not only refute that causing harm and terror makes terrorist bombings impermissible but also that the mere intention to cause a greater good justifies killing civilians. Instead, it would be possible to solve even more complex dilemmas by considering the causal structure of events as a main moral criterion[7].

The Moral Equality of Combatants

The moral equality of combatants is another principle derived from the principle of discrimination between civilians and combatants (Barry & Christie, 2017; Fotion, 2007; McMahan, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). This principle states that all combatants have the same right to kill enemy combatants while waiving their right not to be killed. This condition applies regardless of whether the combatant fights a just or unjust war.

The moral equality of combatants relies on a traditional representation of their role (Bellamy, 2012a; Fotion, 2007; McMahan, 2004, 2011; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). A combatant is an ordinary man recruited by a military force, either compulsory or voluntary, who received special training to serve a state or political organization. This traditional representation of combatants also assumes that

[7] Kamm (2007, 2011, 2012) proposes other principles, such as the Principle of Secondary Permissibility and the Doctrine of Triple Effect, which involve more complex causal structures than the simple means/ side-effect distinction. The principle of secondary permissibility states that, in cases of supreme urgency, like those that happen during war time, when the right act is not always the option with the bets consequences, an intended wrong act that brings about a lesser damage could become permissible. The Doctrine of Triple Effect, on the other hand, considers that an agent is allowed to do something that causes a lesser evil as a side-effect if that causes as a third-effect a great good that the agent did not necessarily intend.

combatant behavior in war must be governed by a code of ethics that differs from governing relations between citizens in the domestic sphere (Bellamy, 2006; Walzer, 2015). These norms are transmitted through military codes, such as the war convention, which dictates respect for the adversary and proscribes specific military action. Since combatants are trained to fight and follow orders as part of military forces and are not usually involved in the decision to wage war, their actions should only be judged morally according to this military code.

In recent decades, some philosophers have questioned the principle of discrimination and its implications for the permissibility of killing combatants (Fabre, 2014; Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2011). These philosophers, better known as revisionists of the just war theory, have primarily challenged the traditional conceptions of *jus in bello* within the contemporary theory advanced by Walzer (McMahan, 2006, 2011; Rodin, 2008). Revisionists agree that killing in the war may be morally justifiable. However, unlike other authors, they rule out that such justification is detached from the cause of the war that killing benefits. In other words, since killing became permissible when protecting human life or collective rise, it is absurd to consider as morally equivalent the actions of combatants who fight in defense of justice and those who contribute to an unjust cause.

Like the traditional position of the just war theory and international conventions limiting military activity, revisionists argue that innocents should not be involved in combat or targeted for militant attack. However, they also believe that it is not the mere fact that someone poses a threat to their enemy that makes her a legitimate target, but rather that she has done nothing wrong to waive her right not to be killed (Fabre, 2009, 2014; Frowe, 2014; Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2011). Thus, combatants fighting for a just cause, such as defending their community from aggression, do nothing wrong and retain their right not to be killed. On the contrary, those combatants and civilians who contribute to unjust aggression are complicit in the war crime, becoming legitimate targets.

1.4. Summary and Conclusions

Different positions come into conflict when discussing the possibility of a moral approach to war. On the one hand, given the horror and destruction war causes, some pacifists advocate a radical condemnation of war. On the other hand, political realists refused any moral regulation of war, as it hinders its historical and

political role. In the middle of both positions are those who argue in favor of justifying and regulating war based on moral criteria (Fotion, 2007; Holmes, 1989; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015).

Defenders of a moral regulation of war admit that the destruction caused by war is always undesirable. However, they also think it is sometimes the only option to defend a community's life or protect its rights. This moral approach to war also considers that the increasingly destructive power of war requires setting limits on how it is waged. These limits are grouped within an ethical regulatory framework for warfare, known as the just war theory (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). This ethical framework of war has emerged and developed throughout different periods and cultures, capturing the common moral intuitions or minimum morality on which people rely to evaluate the actions of war (Bellamy, 2006; Traven, 2021; Walzer, 2015). In the Western tradition, norms for war have developed mainly from the Christian and liberal traditions (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008). This contemporary version divides the problems concerning morality in war into two dimensions or a set of norms: *jus ad bellum*, concerning the declaration of war or the legitimacy of the collective resort to force, and *jus in bello*, concerning the morality of the military means of waging war or the conduct of combatants (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The *jus ad bellum* is based on the idea of an international community in which each state is considered an individual entity endowed with rights. Aggression against these rights justifies collective defense, which would constitute the principal just cause for war.

On the other hand, moral distinctions concerning the morality of killing in war are determined by the principles of *jus in bello* or war convention. The main principle is the principle of discrimination between civilians and soldiers. This principle gives rise to two secondary principles, civilian immunity and the moral equality of soldiers. Furthermore, *jus in bello* includes other principles establishing exceptions to civil immunity, such as the doctrine of double effect. The questions related to *jus in bello* and its principles have explicitly served to map the current research on the moral psychology of war.

Chapter 2

The Morality of Killing in War: Psychological Perspectives and Empirical Findings

The starting point of this dissertation has been the philosophical debate on an ethical framework of war known as the just war theory. This ethical framework brings together principles concerning the just cause of war and the legitimate way to wage it. However, such a normative account captures only part of the spectrum of the morality of war. As we have already seen, it provides principles or norms that can be applied to meet the needs of different cultural and political conditions throughout history. These moral norms of war have an abstract, universal, and agent-neutral character, serving as a paradigm of war and international politics that may not always coincide with the real conditions of armed conflicts or the actors involved. Thus, such norms may conflict with ethical and political conceptions within some communities (Allen, 2006; Kelsay, 2006; Morkevičius, 2018; Traven, 2021). Likewise, the scope of such an ethical framework for war may be limited by the psychological conditions that allow people to understand and act following its moral norms (Benbaji et al., 2015; Fedyk, 2017; Traven, 2015, 2021; Watkins, 2020). These limitations raise the need for a complementary level of analysis that would provide insight into the conditions enabling the realization of the ethical framework of war. A descriptive scientific approach to the moral dimension of war could respond to this requirement.

This chapter offers a scientific approach to the morality of war from the perspective of moral psychology[8]. In contrast to the normative approach, which provides a prescriptive map of the morality of war, moral psychology is concerned with a descriptive analysis of the psychological knowledge and mechanisms underlying moral judgments (Benbaji et al., 2015; Traven, 2015; Watkins, 2020). Although descriptive and normative approaches focus on different aspects of the

[8] By moral psychology, I refer here to the research program in the cognitive sciences that empirically investigates the factors and mechanisms underlying moral thinking and behavior (Fedyk, 2017; Johnson, 1996). This research program incorporates different perspectives including evolutionary biology, neuroscience, linguistics, and moral philosophy. Another use of the term moral psychology refers to research in metaethics on the psychological presuppositions supporting some moral concepts, principles, and theories (Jacobs, 2008).

morality of war, they are interrelated and contribute to providing a broader picture of the subject at hand. This interrelation between the normative and descriptive approaches is not unique to the approach to the morality of war but something usual in the philosophical and psychological study of other moral issues.

The chapter then begins with a general discussion of the interrelation between philosophy and moral psychology, which will help us better understand the scientific approach and its contribution to human morality. After defining the role of moral psychology, the second section will focus on the theoretical and methodological aspects of the research on the moral judgment of war, also offering a comparison with other approaches in psychology. Finally, the chapter outlines some of the central research topics concerning the moral judgment of war.

2.1. Understanding Morality through the Interrelation between Moral Philosophy and Psychology

Humans are social beings. We depend on interaction and cooperation with others to survive and develop. Hence, we engage in all kinds of social contexts and participate in different collective activities throughout our lives. Each of these activities responds to a specific dynamic and purpose. Some of them are more cooperative than others, and some are better defined or structured than others. However, whatever the social activity, they all require a guide facilitating the coordination among its participants, that is, a cluster of rules or norms making it possible to anticipate and respond to others' behavior (Elster, 1989; Fedyk, 2017).

A norm is a special kind of rule differentiated from other rules by its public and agent-neutral character[9] (Elster, 1989; Fedyk, 2017). Although norms may refer to a specific social role that someone can play in a social activity, they are not intended for specific individuals and do not need to be continually modified to suit individual conditions. For example, while a rule might be expressed as "John must come to work first before his coworkers," a norm may only be expressed as "all workers must come at 8 a.m. to work." Thus, norms must be shared by other people and, at least in part, collectively approved or disapproved. The function of norms is to regulate social behavior by establishing limits and possibilities for action and

[9] In other words, the word rule refers to a broader category of statements that guide the course of action under certain conditions, with a norm being a rule with specific characteristics (Fedyk, 2017).

encouraging cooperation among agents. Thus, actions guided by social norms are not outcome-oriented (Elster, 1989). In other words, they are not expressed in terms of "if you want to achieve Y, then do X," but rather they are of the type "do " or do not do x." Although some people may invoke a particular norm for personal benefit or follow a norm in order to obtain a reward or avoid punishment, these conditions neither define the norm nor make it less effective.

A single norm establishing the performance of a given action can be included or applied to different social activities or contexts. Respect for authority, for instance, is a requirement for achieving objectives in military organizations, just as it is in the political system or the school. Nevertheless, it is not possible to perform any social activity using a single norm but requires a system of interwoven norms working together. A cluster of norms working together forms a regulatory or normative framework[10] (Fedyk, 2017). A regulatory framework specifies not only the rules to be followed by the people involved in an activity, but also the moment, strength, and logical conditions for putting these norms into practice during the realization of a social activity. Therefore, normative frameworks do not merely guide or regulate people's behavior but define the totality of social activity by providing a structure for its realization.

Human beings are also moral beings. To understand what characterizes this moral nature, we must first define morality and what it demands of us. There is no single definition of morality; rather, there are different conceptions according to different philosophical perspectives and rival moral theories[11] (Jacobs, 2008; MacIntyre, 1985; Nussbaum, 2007; Rachels & Stuart, 2012). However, it is possible to establish a minimal conception of morality or a starting point that at least any major moral theory would accept. Rachels and Stuart (2012) suggest as this minimal conception of morality the effort to guide our behavior for reasons, or do so because we have the best reasons, with an impartial concern for the interest or welfare of everyone. Thus, in expressing a moral judgment, we do not simply say that something is right or wrong by appealing to our feelings or preferences.

[10] Fedyk (2017) uses the term regulatory framework, highlighting the role played by such a framework in the realization of social activities. I prefer to use the term normative and ethical framework here to align it with discussions in other sections of this and other chapters.

[11] In the Western tradition, the three great families of theories are deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Within them, we can find moral theories, such as those proposed by Kant and Rawls within deontology, Mill and Singer within utilitarianism, or the Aristotelian view in virtue ethics, among others (MacIntyre, 1985; Nussbaum, 2007).

We adduce rather reasons or arguments concerning, for example, the good, protection, and dignity of all those who may be affected by an action. Finally, morality is not simply a matter of judgment or evaluation but involves thinking about what we *ought to do*. Moral considerations acquire thus an action-oriented character (Jacobs, 2008; Rachels & Stuart, 2012). Therefore, being moral implies the capacity to establish, follow, and judge our actions and those of others following moral norms.

Given the link between our moral nature and our natural inclination to engage in social activities and follow social norms, the realization of any social activity also requires ethical frameworks that regulate social interactions by setting limits on the behavior of the people involved (Elster, 1989; Fedyk, 2017; Rochat, 2021). An ethical framework is nothing more than a type of normative framework comprising a set of moral norms, namely those norms defining the right or wrong ways of treating a person (Holmes, 1989; Rachels & Stuart, 2012). Thus, an ethical framework would encompass, for example, norms forbidding the use of violence, the restriction of freedom and autonomy, or physical and psychological harm, among other forms of abuse or mistreatment.

Ethical frameworks are the subject of study in both moral philosophy and psychology. Although these two disciplines constitute autonomous research fields, they are interdependent and necessary to provide a complete picture of human morality (Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996; Johnson, 1996; Sauer, 2017; Voyer & Tarantola, 2017). On the one hand, the task of moral philosophy is essentially normative and evaluative. Moral philosophers are concerned, for example, with making explicit the set of principles or norms that regulate a given activity by establishing limits to the behavior of those who participate in it (Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996; Sauer, 2017). Therefore, normative discussions on morality involve the search for the best-justified structure and norms for a particular ethical framework.

At this point, it is important not to confuse ethical frameworks with moral or theories or systems, both being the subject of study of moral philosophy. Families of moral theories, such as deontology or consequentialism, and their specific theories, such as Kantian deontology and Mill's utilitarianism, put forward fundamental principles or a small number of them to configure different ethical

frameworks[12] (Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996; Jacobs, 2008; Kamm, 2007; MacIntyre, 1985; Nussbaum, 2007). Unlike the norms that make up an ethical framework, the principles of a moral theory need not be formulated as a direct or precise description to guide moral actions. Consequently, philosophers may resort to a specific principle, e.g., the Kantian categorical imperative, to derive or make explicit new principles or norms for a given framework (Fedyk, 2017; Jacobs, 2008). Similarly, they can extend or adapt those explicit principles to build different ethical frameworks that regulate other social activities.

Yet, those norms specified by a particular moral theory or ethical framework can be or not be realizable. The realization of a particular ethical framework is determined by the physical or psychological condition of those agents involved in a particular social activity (Fedyk, 2017). The psychological condition refers to the knowledge of the norms that allow people to act according to norms. That knowledge entails representations, ideas, beliefs, or other psychological content, which may differ qualitatively from the propositional content of a norm. Therefore, an ethical framework could be explored using different vocabularies (Fedyk, 2017): the conceptual vocabulary, which describes the propositional content of the normative framework, and the cognitive vocabulary, which refers to the knowledge that people have of the normative framework and that enables its realization. Moral philosophy provides the first type of vocabulary, while moral psychology is devoted to studying the second (Fedyk, 2017; Sauer, 2017; Voyer & Tarantola, 2017).

Psychology, however, is not reduced to the description of knowledge enabling the realization of an ethical framework. It is also concerned with the psychological factors or mechanisms that underlie the judgments and behavior of persons participating in a social activity regulated by an ethical framework (Fedyk, 2017; Johnson, 1996; Sauer, 2017). Following Mikhail (2013), the task of moral psychologists is to develop computational theories of moral competence, describing the neurological, evolutionary, and mental mechanisms underlying such competence. This task involves accounting for what constitutes a moral judgment, where it comes from, and how it is implemented. Thus, the moral psychologist must

[12] Throughout the dissertation I often use the terms "moral norms" and "moral principles" as interchangeable terms, even though it can be argued that moral principles have a more abstract and general character than moral norms. However, in both moral philosophy and moral psychology both terms seem to be essentially part of the same notion.

propose models or hypotheses that account for the mental state, innate or acquired, of a person who possesses moral knowledge and the set of rules and representations implicit in common moral intuitions. It is also a matter of generating a theory of moral action that accounts for the motivational force of moral knowledge. For example, to determine whether the fact that someone judges an action as correct implies an internal desire to comply with this judgment.

A distinction between the roles of moral psychology and philosophy does not imply that they are exclusively devoted to either a descriptive or a normative level of analysis. Regardless of its empirical or methodological approach, any research project in moral psychology must assume theoretical and conceptual postulates about morality that are usually derived from a moral theory in philosophy (Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996; Johnson, 1996; Marulanda-Hernández & Yáñez-Canal, 2015). Although normative postulates certainly cannot inform which psychological hypothesis is true, they can help the moral psychologist define the main problems and issues to be addressed (Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996; Sauer, 2017).

On the other hand, philosophy draws on scientific contributions or descriptions of societies and human behavior to propose moral principles or patterns of moral action. In the Western tradition, different philosophical systems founded or derived their ideas about morality and politics from assumptions about human beings' social and psychological nature (Fedyk, 2017; Jacobs, 2008; MacIntyre, 1985). However, drawing on such assumptions does not imply that the validity of philosophical postulates depends on individual psychological facts or the social conditions of a community (Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996, 2002). Nor is it true that it is part of the task of empirical research to say whether a specific ethical theory or moral principle is true or should be discredited. Because of that, some philosophers emphatically criticize those attempts to conclude from empirical data that consequentialism is a better alternative than deontology or that cultural disagreements about certain situations support moral relativism (Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996; Sauer, 2017). A more drastic philosophical argument holds that it is logically inconsistent to attempt to derive a normative assumption, an "ought," from an empirical description, a "is" (Johnson, 1996; Sauer, 2017).

Despite criticisms about how far empirical research can contribute to the normative debate, some philosophers still find it valid to ask whether a given moral theory can be put into practice (Benbaji et al., 2015; Fedyk, 2017; Held, 1996;

Johnson, 1996). In that way, empirical data can develop normative relevance as long as they provide insight into understanding norms or applying some moral norms. For example, moral psychology can help us know whether the psychological premises used by various moral philosophers are true (Held, 1996, 2002; Marulanda-Hernández & Yáñez-Canal, 2015; Quintelier et al., 2011). Similarly, it can ascertain the moral principles or norms that guide people's moral behavior and determine whether they are consistent with those principles envisaged for a moral theory. The possibilities offered by the collaboration between philosophy and moral psychology have led many contemporary philosophers to take seriously the empirical data collected rigorously and systematically. In contemporary moral philosophy, some proposals grant common moral intuitions a justifying status for moral principles or, at least, depart from these intuitions to raise such principles (Jacobs, 2008; Johnson, 1996; Kamm, 2007; Mikhail, 2013; Quintelier et al., 2011; Traven, 2021).

2.2. Experimental Research on War in Moral Psychology

The dynamics and limits of military activity in armed conflict have been regulated by ethical frameworks that have emerged and developed over different periods and cultures (Allen, 2006; Bellamy, 2006; Kelsay, 2006; Morkevičius, 2018; Nicholas Rengger, 2008; Traven, 2021). In the modern Western tradition, the norms for war have been grouped within the just war theory. The contemporary version of this theory is based primarily on the liberal and humanist perspective, justifying war as the only recourse for protecting human rights (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The current Geneva Conventions and international human rights law have been built partly on the just war theory, showing the predominance of the Western perspective in debates on international politics and modern warfare.

Current debates on the morality of war have attracted increasing attention from psychologists concerned with moral thinking and behavior. This interest has led some researchers to raise the need to provide a descriptive map of the moral dimension of war, combining the just war theory with the methodological and theoretical contributions of experimental moral psychology (Benbaji et al., 2015; Traven, 2015; Watkins, 2020). This approach to the morality of war, which I will henceforth refer to as research on the moral judgment of war, aims to delve into the

cognitive factors and mechanisms that would explain the emergence, evolution, and realization of the ethical framework of war.

Without implying a radical break with everyday morality, research on the moral judgment of war assumes that specific conditions morally distinguish war from other social activities. Thus, although the moral judgment of war may be influenced by relevant factors or distinctions from non-war contexts, such influence is conditioned by specific factors and distinctions related to intergroup conflict (Benbaji et al., 2015; Traven, 2015; Watkins, 2020). For example, a just cause for war or the distinction between civilians and combatants may elicit favorable evaluations of killings that differ from those made under non-war conditions. Since the just war theory is the ethical framework that brings together the criteria and distinctions that apply to the specific conditions of war, it becomes the primary reference for mapping out the relevant questions in the research on moral judgments of war. Some questions in that line might be: Do people distinguish between right and wrong reasons to make war? Does the difference between a legitimate and illegitimate military objective influence judgments about the sacrifice of war? What factors differentiate such military objectives? Is it permissible in extreme circumstances to attack illegitimate targets, or is it permissible to do so as an unintended side-effect? Does self-defense in war differ from that in other contexts? Is the cause of war, or collective intent, relevant in assessing the legitimacy of killing or other military actions? As Watkins (2020) suggests, drawing on the ethical framework of war and studying it as a context with conditions that differ from everyday life makes it possible to discover empirically continuities and discontinuities between these two contexts.

Research on the moral judgment of war not only draws on just war theory to delimit its questions, but also adopts its language to account for such moral judgments. As we have seen, this language has emerged after many centuries of collective debates capturing common moral intuitions about war (Traven, 2015, 2021). This particular language gives researchers an advantage in designing their experiments and classifying and interpreting responses. It also allows for comparing people's judgments across different historical periods, contexts, and cultures (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins, 2020). Appealing to some concepts within just war theory, we could discuss, for example, distinctions between judgments referring to *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Furthermore, we could discuss the effect of just or

unjust causes, or the moral status of the victims (e.g., civilians or combatants), on moral evaluations. It is even possible to contrast response patterns by appealing to categories referring to different normative positions (e.g., realism, traditionalism, revisionism). The language of the just war theory also helps create a bridge between moral psychology research and the normative and legal debate about war, facilitating contributions between different levels of research or analysis (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins, 2020).

Experiments with moral dilemmas have become a standard methodology in experimental moral psychology, as they make it possible to disentangle and control potentially relevant factors driving human moral judgment (Christensen et al., 2014; Kahane & Shackel, 2010). In that way, the research methodology on the moral judgment of war has been based primarily on the design of controlled experiments, in which participants are presented with vignettes depicting actions during military operations or moral dilemmas of war (Waldmann, et al., 2012). These types of dilemmas describing war scenarios are not new in moral psychology. Some studies preceding research on the moral judgment of war have turned to war situations to construct more realistic scenarios in contrast to other hypothetical examples, such as the trolley problem (Greene et al., 2004; Iliev et al., 2012; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). However, war dilemmas have not been explicitly used to explore the moral dimension of war but rather to investigate the factors that influence moral judgments in general. In some studies, on moral judgment in war, the moral dilemmas of war describe situations analogous to those in the non-war context (Watkins & Laham, 2019). Most of the studies attempt to describe instead unique situations of war context in which participants must place themselves in the shoes of soldiers or military commanders (Benbaji et al., 2015) or evaluate actions from the position of an impartial third party (Watkins & Goodwin, 2019; Watkins & Laham, 2020).

As noted in the previous section, the dialogue between philosophy and psychology is central to addressing moral issues. On the one hand, as discussed so far, research on the moral judgment of war draws on normative discussions and perspectives on war. On the other hand, empirical findings may contribute to the academic and public debate on war. First, knowledge about ordinary people's views on the morality of war would feed arguments in defense of the establishment and justification of the ethical framework of war. As discussed below, a recent proposal

argues that the norms of war are grounded in shared cognitive and emotional mechanisms, which we must consider when explaining and justifying the implementation of an ethical framework for war (Traven, 2015, 2021). Furthermore, the psychological account of the moral judgment of war becomes relevant for commenting on and eventually reformulating the just war theory and other related normative frameworks, such as international humanitarian law or the international legal system (Watkins, 2020).

Understanding what people judge as morally right or wrong in war can also have implications in the public sphere, particularly in decision-making in the political and legal context. On the one hand, understanding the factors influencing ordinary people's judgment would help predict support for the decision to declare war or military intervention. Likewise, research on people's judgments about moral responsibility and blame would provide a glimpse into the course that public debate would take about the decisions of military commanders or the actions of combatants.

On the other hand, knowledge of prevailing moral intuitions about war becomes relevant in addressing legal dilemmas in postwar trials. According to Benbaji et al. (2015), some jurists establish a link between morality and the legality of war, considering that the motivation to comply with the laws of war would depend in part on personal moral convictions. Hence, the decisions of the legal experts could be informed by research into the psychological aspects that enable compliance with the ethical framework of war and its rules.

2.2.1. Other Empirical Approaches to War in Psychology

War is not a recent topic of interest in psychology. Over the decades, the complex nature of war has motivated diverse research questions and approaches. Some of them are more akin to the tradition of social psychology and others to cognitive science (Marulanda-Hernández & Yáñez-Canal, 2015; Watkins, 2020). Different studies can be grouped around three leading research approaches: research on attitudes and discourses toward war and peace, research on aggression, violence, and norm deviance, and research in experimental moral psychology. This latter approach includes studies on moral development in violent contexts, studies on the causal factors underlying judgment of moral permissibility, and studies on judgments of moral responsibility and blame of intergroup violence. A brief review

of these three approaches will help us understand the theoretical and methodological distinctiveness of the research on the moral judgment of war.

Research on attitudes toward war and peace has been one of the most prolific approaches over recent decades (Cohrs & O'Dwyer, 2018). Using structured surveys and attitudinal scales, researchers have explored attitudes toward nuclear war (Mayton, 1988), war on terrorism, and other contemporary armed conflicts (Carnagey & Anderson, 2007; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). A series of studies from this approach have oriented to children's and young people's attitudes and judgments about war and violence (Kuterovac Jagodi, 2000; Myers-Bowman et al., 2005; Souza et al., 2006). Other studies have aimed to identify correlations between attitudes of support or rejection of war and individual differences in terms of nationality and culture (Li et al., 2016; van der Linden et al., 2011); gender (Brooks & Valentino, 2011; Covell, 1996); religious belief and political affiliation (Friese et al., 2009; Wille, 2007). Some studies have also pointed to personality traits such as authoritarianism and dominance as predictors of attitudes favoring military intervention (Bothwell & Kennison, 2004; Crowson, 2009).

Research from this first approach offers different methodological advantages for identifying the possible variables or factors accounting for people's evaluations of war. Despite these advantages, most of this research focuses on the statistical description of the responses and their correlation, giving little attention to their moral and political implications. For example, these studies are concerned with people's attitudes approving or disapproving of military intervention, terrorism, or nuclear deterrence, without reference to the moral distinctions or principles guiding people's justifications or condemnations of war.

Few studies in the line of this approach have explicitly dealt with attitudes about judgments and discourses on the justice of war, political reasons for using violence, and conceptions of the transgression of international human rights law. One of the leading studies on conceptions of the norms of war is the People on War report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (1999). Similar research with ex-combatants of armed groups and security forces in Colombia has explored the justifications of war and attitudes about tactics and military conduct in combat (Marulanda-Hernández & Yáez-Canal, 2017, 2018). In other studies, researchers have instead resorted to discourse analysis to identify the attitudes of political and military leaders towards the declaration of war (Halverscheid & Witte, 2008). One

of the main differences between these studies and research on the moral judgment of war lies in the methodology used. While most of these studies rely on surveys and attitude scales, the research on the moral judgment of war uses systematic experiments with moral dilemmas. These experiments allow researchers to control for confounding variables and better establish the role of different factors in people's evaluations.

A different perspective in social psychology dealing with war has been interested in accounting for aggressive behavior, violence, and norm deviance. This approach assumes that actions committed during war involve deviance from the norms governing everyday morality (Cohrs & O'Dwyer, 2018; Watkins, 2020). Different models following this approach have expanded theories of social transgression to account for the behavior of actors involved in armed conflicts. One of these theories is Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1991, 2002; McAlister et al., 2006), which proposes the existence of a self-regulatory system that monitors our behavior and judges it as right or wrong. This system keeps people in line with moral norms and generates self-condemnation when they deviate from them. Both the actions committed in the war and the attitudes of justification or support involve a process of moral disengagement based on adherence to four types of belief (Bandura, 1991, 2002; Cohrs et al.; Cohrs & O'Dwyer, 2018; McAlister et al., 2006). People consider war actions acceptable and support them if: a) there are moral reasons or positive consequences that justify them (e.g., self-defense, stopping terrorists), b) it is possible to reject the responsibility for war (e.g., considering that there is no alternative but to resort to arms), c) negative consequences such as the destruction or killing of innocents are underestimated or ignored, and d) the victims are dehumanized or blamed for the war.

A similar theory from social psychology that has been extended to explain violent actions in war is the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 2009; Martín-Baró, 1983; Martín-Baró et al., 2003). This theory holds that when people face moral dilemmas involving harm to others, there is a conflict between two different beliefs or cognitions about the action to be taken. For example, someone may think that violence is condemnable in all its forms and, at the same time, consider it a duty to defend the community. This dissonance is overcome by eliminating one of the two cognitions or adding more information to the dilemma, for example, by considering that violence is wrong unless used in self-defense.

Within this second approach, there is a research line derived from Milgram's famous study on obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963), which is concerned with the actions of perpetrators and criminals in war. Researchers in this line consider that extreme conditions or political circumstances in times of crisis and factors such as the influence of authority, social pressure from peers, and a sense of responsibility and obedience would account for why some people commit cruel or atrocious acts against others (Blass, 1991; Milgram, 1963; Zimbardo, 2008).

Research in social psychology has contributed significantly to understanding the influence of individual and contextual factors on violent behavior. It has also offered some accounts of how certain beliefs or attitudes lead to the justification of violence and how people resolve cognitive dissonance when faced with moral dilemmas. The main contrast between this second research approach and the research on the moral judgment of war is given mainly by the moral position both assume concerning war. Research on the moral judgment of war does not start by defining war as a sphere for moral transgression, which has been a recurrent point of view in social psychology. Consequently, the empirical findings from the research on moral judgment in war are most relevant when the debate concerns the possibilities of justification and moral regulation of war through an ethical framework. Similarly, since moral judgment research distinguishes between legitimate and non-legitimate actions in war and separates the crime in times of war from crime in ordinary circumstances, their findings may have a greater resonance in the legal debate.

This distinction in the moral position assumed by the two approaches also leads to a difference in the type of experiments and moral dilemmas proposed. Both approaches describe scenarios or situations in which others are harmed, or fundamental principles are transgressed. However, the interest of researchers in moral judgment goes beyond the description and evaluation of reactions to acts of extreme or brutal violence. Instead, they are concerned with exploring the features of scenarios that lead people to distinguish between morally permissible and impermissible acts. In this way, they resort to examples used in philosophical discussions on moral permissibility, both in everyday life (e.g., trolley problems (Watkins & Laham, 2019) and in war situations (e.g., tactical vs. terrorist bombing (di Nucci, 2014)). Scenarios from these examples present different conditions differing in terms of causal structures (means vs side-effect or locus of intervention

(Iliev et al., 2012; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Watkins & Laham, 2019), agent's intention (di Nucci, 2014), victim and agent identity status (civilian vs soldiers, in-group vs out-group agents (Benjabi et al., 2015; Watkins & Laham, 2019), among others.

The third approach to war arises from experimental moral psychology. In contrast to the former approach, which assumes actions committed during war as a deviation from moral norms, research in cognitive science holds that the same factors and mechanisms that underlie everyday moral judgments may account for people's evaluations of actions of war or extreme violence. Studies in this line are mainly interested in discovering generalities of morality across different scenarios and, in many cases, war is not an issue directly addressed (Marulanda-Hernández & Yáñez-Canal, 2015; Watkins, 2020).

A group of studies within this approach comes from research on the development of moral judgment. These studies have focused primarily on how violent contexts influence the moral judgments of children and adolescents about aggression and revenge (Pasupathi et al., 2017; Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2009). The results suggest that children and adolescents develop a broad knowledge of moral principles despite growing up in violent contexts. At the same time, they justify retaliation and other violent actions deeming values such as loyalty and defense of the group as crucial as any other moral values. These studies diverge from the traditional Kohlbergian view, in which violent expressions would be considered a sign of an early level of moral development. However, the study of perceptions of armed and political violence among children and adolescents does not distinguish between these forms of violence and forms of common criminal violence.

Another line of studies in moral psychology has used scenarios depicting war situations to explore judgments about the moral permissibility of harming others. For example, the crying baby dilemma, in which a baby must be smothered to protect a group of civilians fleeing Nazis, has been used to explore the influence of physical contact and proximity as factors influencing evaluations of the moral permissibility of harming others (Greene et al., 2004). Other researchers have instead created war scenarios analogous to non-war scenarios, such as the trolley problem, to investigate the role of causal structures and locus of intervention in people's moral judgments (Iliev et al., 2012; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Watkins & Laham, 2019). However, the interest of these studies

is to account for moral judgment in general rather than to deal with the specific question of the morality of war. They also do not address or discuss questions regarding the ethical framework of war.

In the same line of moral psychology, other studies have studied group bias as a factor influencing judgments of moral responsibility and blame regarding collective violence (Bloom et al., 2020; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Leidner et al., 2010; Moncrieff & Lienard, 2018). Experiments in this line have shown that identification with the group leads to justifying or motivating the use of violence against members of other groups while reducing responsibility for the crimes committed. Like the moral disengagement theory, these experiments show that justifications for violence arise from attitudes of dehumanization of the victims. However, studies in this line mainly account for motivation and attribution of responsibility for intergroup violence in general, including cases of crimes against humanity rather than war as a specific issue. Hence, these studies focus more on the transgression of the norm than on the moral justification and regulation of war.

Research on the moral judgment of war arises mainly from this third research approach, thus also aiming to extend some models or theories accounting for everyday morality to account for the morality of war. For example, some current models in moral psychology suggest that people's moral judgments about the permissibility of harm to others stem from shared moral intuitions (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Haidt, 2001; Mikhail, 2011). In a similar vein, researchers on the moral judgment of war argue that moral judgments about war derive from shared intuitions similar to those that guide our decisions in everyday life. Such a view in psychology is consistent with the idea of contemporary philosophical authors that humans are naturally inclined to judge war and violence according to shared moral intuitions (McMahan, 2004; Walzer, 2015). Given the above, some researchers on the moral judgment of war argue that models such as moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Baron, 1996) or universal grammar theory (Mikhail, 2011) can provide answers to the emergence, evolution, and representation of the norms of war (Traven, 2015; Watkins, 2020).

Unlike other studies in moral psychology, as mentioned above, research on the moral judgment of war focuses on the phenomenon of war as distinct from other scenarios of violence or harm. It also draws on the ethical framework of war or the just war theory to raise some of its research questions. This reference to the ethical

framework of war also implies that the models and theories of previous research in moral psychology are not only integrated, but also adapted according to the structure and language of this ethical framework. The last feature distinguishing research on the moral judgment of war is the exploration of factors or variables unique to the war context. Given the approach that previous research in moral psychology has adopted when addressing war, such factors have either not been of interest or were overlooked.

2.2.2 Topics of Interest in the Research on the Moral Judgment of War

As an ethical framework regulating war, just war theory is divided into two dimensions or sets of moral principles guiding moral judgment: *the jus ad bellum*, which defines the just causes for declaring war or the legitimacy of collective armed violence, and the *jus in bello*, which concerns the morality of the military means of waging war and the conduct of combatants. In the research on the moral psychology of war, the main object of study is related to the *jus in bello*, with the problem of the morality of killing in war attracting the most attention.

The main topics and questions in the research so far on the moral judgment of war could be separated according to some of the principles within *the jus in bello*. The main principle that defines the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate killing in war is the principle of discrimination between civilians and combatants (Orend, 2013; Rengger, 2008; Walzer, 2015). This distinction between victims has been explored in almost all studies (Benbaji, Falk, & Feldman, 2015; Watkins & Goodwin, 2019; Watkins & Laham, 2019). Thereby, studies in research on the moral judgment of war are further distinguished and grouped according to the secondary principles derived from the principle of discrimination.

One of the secondary principles of jus in bello is the principle of civilian immunity, or the obligation to exclude or protect civilians from military operations (Coates, 1997; Fabre, 2009, 2014; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The pioneering proposal linking philosophical discussion and advances in moral psychology is concerned with the emergence and transmission of this principle and the conditions justifying exceptions to it (e.g., the permissibility of harm as a side-effect and legitimate defensive killing) (Traven, 2015, 2021). Other studies in a similar vein have focused specifically on the role of causal factors in moral judgments about the

moral permissibility of killing in war (di Nucci, 2014; Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Watkins & Laham, 2019).

The moral equality of combatants is the other secondary principle within *jus in bello*. This principle holds that combatants of just and unjust warring sides acquire the right to kill their enemy combatants while equally being legitimate military targets (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Therefore, the actions of combatants can only be judged according to the *jus in bello* or the war convention. The group of studies conducting experimental research related to this principle has established their question by taking into account the current discussion in moral philosophy between defenders of the moral equality of combatants and revisionists of the just war theory (Benbaji, Falk, & Feldman, 2015; Watkins & Goodwin, 2019; Watkins & Laham, 2019).

The Moral Grammar of War and the Emergence of the Principles of Protection of Civilians

One of the first authors who have been interested in the psychological foundations of the principle of immunity or protection of civilians is Traven (2015, 2021). His proposal, framed in the study of moral and legal theory, draws on advances in empirical moral psychology to argue that laws regarding killing civilians or non-combatants in armed conflict are rooted in the cognitive-emotional wiring of the brain. In other words, innate intuitions about the morality of harming others lead people to create social norms that establish what is and is not allowed in armed conflict. Such intuitions would be explained by the existence of similar norms regarding killing civilians or innocents in different societies and times. Unlike other studies, Traven (2015, 2021) does not conduct experimental research but relies on a comparative analysis of ethical codes across different cultures and periods. He has compared the ancient military and moral codes of China and early Islamic empires, showing that the rules for protecting civilians are not artefacts of Western culture or the just war tradition. Consequently, he suggests that thinkers in the just war tradition, such as Cicero or Grotius, did not invent the moral criteria underlying civil immunity but instead discovered them.

According to Traven (2015, 2021), reason and emotion interact in the evolution of moral and legal norms to protect civilians. Specifically, cognitive-emotional biases influenced the design of the rules of distinction and proportionality

in war, leading to the institution of principles like those embodied in the current international humanitarian law. One of these biases is the intention/side-effect distinction[13], which holds that intentional killings are morally worse than unintentional side-effect killings. For example, targeting a civilian is a war crime, while bombing a military target that incidentally kills civilians may be permissible if it serves a greater good. This cognitive-emotional bias does not exclusively condition the evaluation of war actions but also influences moral reasoning in many other social activities. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the intention/side-effect distinction is substantially innate.

People evaluate the morality of war actions using a grammar of moral rules based on the intention/side-effect distinction (Traven, 2015, 2021). This grammar group 4 rules: R1.1. It is permissible to harm others in legitimate individual or collective self-.defense. R1.2. It is not permissible to harm people of a specific category, being that category defined by each culture (e.g., innocent, in-group members); R2.1. Intentional violence has a higher cognitive and emotional valence than non-intentional violence. R2.2. Intentional harm is morally worse than unintentional harm. R3. It is wrong to cause intentional harm to innocent people. " Innocent " refers to someone who does not intend to violate moral norms and does not pose a threat. R4. It is permissible to cause unintended side-effect harm to others. This permissibility depends on two conditions: (a) The action must be necessary to achieve the justifiable end, and (b) the potential benefits must outweigh the harm caused to others.

Finally, Traven (2015, 2021) argues that the moral and legal principles that demand the protection of civilians and allow individual or collective self-defense may have emerged and remained based on underlying strong emotional reactions. One of such emotions is empathy. For example, in times of war or humanitarian emergencies, people show empathy for the victims and tend to support the creation of strict laws to protect them. However, empathy may also hinder the extension of protective norms because people tend to give more importance to the lives and

[13] The intention/side-effect distinction proposed by Traven (2015, 2021) could be regard as similar to the distinction between means vs. side-effect mentioned in other sections of this and other chapters.

interests of their relatives, friends, or compatriots. Thus, it is necessary to enlarge the circle of moral concern to create norms that also protect enemy civilians' rights.

An alternative to Traven's proposal for the emergence of war norms is based on the moral foundation's theory (Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Baron, 1996). This theory classifies judgments in the everyday context using taxonomies of values or moral foundations, which capture the content of moral judgments across different cultures (Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Baron, 1996). These five foundations are care-harm, justice-scam, loyalty-betrayal, authority-subversion, and sanctity-degradation. Watkins (2020; Watkins and Goodwin, 2019) suggest that the moral foundation's theory could also explain shared intuitions and distinctions about how people judge war. For example, rules that require the protection of civilians would be based on the care-harm foundation. Likewise, codes guiding combatant action would arise from the loyalty-betrayal and authority-subversion foundations.

The Role of Means and Side-effect Distinction and other Causal Factors in Moral Judgment of War

The just war theory considers exceptions to the prohibition of harming civilians in extreme situations by invoking the doctrine of double effect (DDE), which justifies collateral damage while pursuing a greater good (Coates, 1997; Holmes, 1989; Walzer, 2015). Some theoretical approaches in moral psychology assume that the distinction between means and unintended side-effect proposed by the DDE is rooted in human cognition (Cushman & Young, 2011; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007, 2011). As it will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, this distinction would explain why most people consider it morally permissible, for example, to divert a trolley to save five workers from being run over while killing another worker as a side-effect, but not to push a person off a bridge to stop the trolley for the same purpose.

Philosophical debates about the moral justification for harming people in war by appealing to the distinction between means and unintended side-effect, or DDE, have motivated some researchers to conduct experiments to investigate the role of causal factors in the moral judgment of war. For example, di Nucci (2014) conducted an experiment inspired by the contemporary philosophical debate about the relevance of agent's intention (intended vs foreseen) and causal structure (means vs side-effect) as moral criteria to judge the moral permissibility of causing harm

to others (Kamm, 2011; Scanlon, 2008). He asked university students to evaluate the moral permissibility of two kinds of action: the terrorist bombing, which involves an attack on a school to kill many children and force the capitulation of the enemy, and the strategic bombing, which involves an attack on an enemy munitions factory to force the enemy to a quick capitulation while killing the children as side-effect. Di Nucci (2014) have found that people do not consider the distinction between intentional and mere foreseeing harm as a relevant moral criterion. Instead, they rely on the mere distinction between means and side-effect.

A further experiment used the famous trolley case scenarios to explore differences between peace and war contexts and the influence of in-group and out-group bias on moral judgments (Watkins & Laham, 2019). The researchers designed three experiments using two versions of the trolley problem. One of them, the switch scenario, in which one person is killed as an unintended side-effect of redirecting a trolley that threatened the lives of five other people. The other version, the footbridge scenario, involves the death of one person who is pushed off a bridge as a means of stopping the trolley and saving the other five people. The kind of victims sacrificed determined the difference between the peace and the war scenarios: in the peace scenarios, the trade-offs require sacrificing civilians to save civilians. In war scenarios, the trade-offs require sacrificing soldiers to save soldiers. This study shows that people tended to judge it more acceptable to kill people in war than in peace. Moreover, people establish differences in terms of means and side-effect, judging more favorably the actions that harm a person as a side-effect of trying to save five people. In addition, individuals show a group bias in their judgments, favoring actions in those scenarios where the person killed was from the out-group and the five saved were from the in-group.

It is necessary to contrast these experiments supporting the account based on the DDE with evidence supporting rival accounts that consider other types of causal factors as more relevant than the distinction between means and side effects. One of these accounts points to the distinction between the "personal" or "impersonal" harm and the distance between the agent and the victim as main factors driving judgments about moral permissibility (Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2013). Although not explicitly stated, studies using war dilemmas involving personal injury would indicate that this factor may also be relevant in the context of war (Greene et al., 2004). Another alternative account is

the locus of intervention theory, which claims that differences in the place at which the agent intervenes, a threat or a potential victim, better predict people's responses to the permissibility of harm (Waldmann et al., 2017; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010). Several studies have observed that people generally show more aversion to actions targeting a victim than a threat, both in situations of war and peace (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Iliev et al., 2012).

Research on the role of causal factors in moral judgment has given rise to an interdisciplinary dialogue with significant insights for discussion of the morality of war. However, this emerging enterprise requires further investigation into the psychological factors and mechanisms identified by previous research in moral psychology and their interaction with some context-specific factors of war that have not been explored. In response to this research gap, the studies presented in the following chapter investigate the effect of causal factors in war, particularly the locus of intervention, and their interaction with differences in the moral status of the victims of military actions.

The Moral Judgment about the Moral Equality of Combatants

Most psychological research on the morality of killing in war has explored the effect of the distinction between civilians and combatants established by the principle of discrimination. This principle demands the protection of civilians as long as they do not actively contribute to the battle while allowing military attacks against combatants. So far, evidence shows that people's judgments conform to the principle of discrimination (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Laham, 2020), i.e., people consider it impermissible to treat civilians as military targets, but permissible to wage war against combatants.

However, in these studies, the principle of discrimination is of minor importance compared to a secondary principle derived from it, namely the moral equality of combatants. Research on this secondary principle arises from a recent philosophical debate between two opposing views regarding the *jus in bello*: the traditional perspective defended by Walzer (2015) and the revisionist perspective of the just war theory, advanced by McMahan (2011). A main claim of traditionalists is that the cause of the war is not relevant to judging soldiers' actions, assuming that all have the same right to kill their enemy. In contrast, revisionists argue that the cause of the war is relevant and claim that only righteous soldiers

have the right to kill while maintaining their right to be excluded from military attacks.

A pioneering study within this line is that of Benbaji, Falk, and Feldman (2015). They investigated moral judgments of military conduct in war by asking Israeli participants to put themselves in the position of a military commander who must decide to kill combatants or civilians on the other side to gain a military advantage. The researchers controlled for factors associated with traditionalist and revisionist views (e.g., the cause of the war, the agent's contribution to that cause, and the moral status of the victim targeted by the agent). They concluded that people's moral judgments align with a revisionist view rather than with a traditionalist view of just war. In other words, people consider the action of a military commander fighting a just war as more permissible than that of a military commander fighting an unjust war.

In a further study, Watkins and Goodwin (2020) also manipulated the justice of war and its effect on different types of war-related evaluations. People considered that combatants fighting for just causes had more right to act than those fighting for an unjust cause, even though both sides' actions are identical. These results show that people's judgments contradict the principle of equality of combatants. In another study by Watkins (Watkins & Laham, 2020), following up on the initial study by Benjabi et al. (2015), people also evaluate killing by combatants and civilians more positively when they come from an unjust side than by those from the unjust side. Researchers attribute the unfavorable judgment about unjust combatants to negative perceptions and stereotypes.

The studies mentioned above have investigated the influence of the just cause of war and the distinction between civilians and combatants in conditions concerning regular killing in war (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Goodwin, 2020; Watkins & Laham, 2020). However, no previous studies have been conducted on moral judgments about individual defensive killing. The mediation of the cause of war and the distinctions between civilians and combatants in moral judgments about collective and individual self-defense will be the central question of the study presented in Chapter 4. This chapter also describes in more detail some of the previous empirical studies on the moral equality of combatants.

2.3. Summary and Conclusions

Besides sharing research interests and using a common conceptual language, moral philosophy and psychology engage in distinct but complementary levels of analysis in the study of moral norms and ethical frameworks (Fedyk, 2017). Moral philosophy concerns searching for the best-justified structure and principles for an ethical framework. In contrast, moral psychology aims to describe psychological knowledge that allows the realization of an ethical framework or makes it possible to judge and act following moral norms. Thus, moral psychology is devoted to researching the psychological factors and mechanisms accounting for moral evaluations, decisions, or behavior of people involved in a social activity. The interrelation between both disciplines also implies a mutual contribution to their particular endeavors. For example, moral psychologists assume theoretical and conceptual postulates about morality that are usually derived from philosophical theories. (Fedyk, 2017; Sauer, 2017). Likewise, philosophy draws on scientific contributions and considers descriptions of societies and human behavior to support or formulate moral principles (Held, 1996; Johnson, 1996).

Inspired by ongoing debates on the ethical framing of war, moral psychologists have recently become interested in providing a descriptive map of the moral judgment of war (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins, 2020). This research integrates models and methods of experimental moral psychology, adapting them to the structure and language of the ethical framework of war (Benbaji et al., 2015; Traven, 2015; Watkins, 2020). The main topics addressed in research on the moral judgment of war derive primarily from discussions about killing in war and the principles of *jus in bello*. A general concern in most studies has been the distinction between civilians and combatants as a criterion to judge the legitimacy of military actions. The principle compelling this distinction encompasses two secondary principles, which have been the research focus. The first is the principle of civilian immunity or the prohibition against killing civilians in war. The first proposal focuses on the emergence and transmission of norms concerning the protection of civilians in war. The discussion on the conditions allowing to harm civilians in war has also led to further research on moral distinctions based on causal features of events. The last group of studies focuses on the principle of the moral equality of combatants.

So far, research using scenarios of war has shown that a causal factor such as the locus of intervention plays a significant role in evaluating the permissibility of military actions. However, it is still necessary to investigate whether information about causal features is processed with information about the potential victims and its influence on judgments about the moral permissibility of harming people in war. Chapter 3 attempts to respond to this question.

On the other hand, the question of killing in self-defense has been the subject of extensive study by philosophers, particularly concerning the ethics of war. Self-defense may be invoked in war both collectively, as a just cause of war, and to justify individual action in military operations (McMahan, 2005; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). While research on the moral equality of combatants and the principle of discrimination partly addressed collective self-defense, the problem of individual self-defense remains barely unexplored. The last chapter presents a set of experiments concerning judgment about legitimate self-defense in war.

Chapter 3

Side-Effect Killing in War: A Set of Experiment on the Influence of Causal Factors and Victims' Status on Moral Judgment

Can we morally justify killing some people in war to safeguard the lives of a majority? Some philosophers think that we could do it in exceptional circumstances and under certain conditions. According to the doctrine of double effect (DDE), for example, it is always morally impermissible to kill others as a means to achieve a greater good. However, killing some people may be morally justified if it is an unintended side-effect of a legitimate action that pursues the same good end (Fitzpatrick, 2012; McIntyre, 2001). But the relevance of this condition may vary according to the moral distinction that the just war theory makes between the killing of civilians and the killing of combatants or soldiers[14]. The just war theory forbids direct and indirect harm to civilians while allowing soldiers to be attacked or endangered to protect civilian lives (Coates, 2016; Fabre, 2009; Walzer, 2015). Hence, some philosophers consider it morally preferable to sacrifice soldiers as a means of saving other civilians than to harm civilians as a side-effect of actions directed at legitimate military objectives (Kamm, 2011, 2012; Walzer, 2015).

Different experiments in moral psychology using hypothetical scenarios from non-war contexts have shown that variations in the causal features of events affect people's evaluations of the moral permissibility of harming others (Chemla, Egré, & Schlenker, 2015; Cushman & Young, 2011; Iliev, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2012; Royzman & Baron, 2002). A popular account of this result is based on DDE and argues that people examine the causal link between the action and its consequences, showing a higher aversion to intentional harm done as a means to achieve a greater good than to unintended side-effect harm (Cushman & Young, 2011; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007, 2013). However, this account is

[14] To avoid confusion, I will henceforth use the term "soldier" to refer to both combatants and soldiers. The term "combatant" defines a more general category and is more frequently used within just war theory (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). However, I prefer to use the word "soldiers" here, since it is the term frequently used in studies conducted by other investigators and the present research.

constrained to situations in which a person is used as a means in the strict sense (e.g., when her body is used to block a threat directed at other people). An alternative model, the locus of intervention theory, predicts aversion to a broader range of situations. This second model states that people focus primarily on the locus at which the agent intervenes, judging more favorably actions that redirect a threat to people who would die as a side-effect than actions targeting a victim (e.g., to stop the threat by redirecting a car transporting the victims) (Waldmann, Wiegmann & Nagel, 2017; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010).

The model based on the DDE and the locus of intervention theory have been tested in experiments using scenarios that describe actions taking place in war (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Watkins & Laham, 2019). However, no previous research had established whether moral distinctions between civilians and soldiers or other differences between victims in war mediate the effect of causal factors in judgments about the moral permissibility of killing. This chapter offers an empirical approach to this question. It presents a series of experiments testing the effect of the locus of intervention on judgments about the moral permissibility of killing in war and the variations of this effect according to different categories of victims, either civilians or soldiers[15].

3.1. The Moral Relevance of Causal Factors and Victim Status in War

Moral philosophers have long debated whether preserving a person's life or the life of a group of people justifies harming innocents. We could find a variety of solutions according to different moral criteria. For example, a consequentialist principle would require weighing the costs and benefits of an action and benefiting the general welfare. Therefore, we may consider it morally appropriate to sacrifice a small group of innocents to save a larger number of people, as long as we regard each person's life as equally valuable (Kahane et al., 2018; Rachels & Rachels, 2012). In contrast, a non-consequentialist approach regards the act's morality as the key criterion for judgment. This view would lead to at least two feasible solutions: one of them is the extreme prohibition of harming innocent people regardless of the good consequences it entails (Kamm, 2007; Rachels & Rachels, 2012). The other

[15]The materials, data, and codes for the statistical analyses of this chapter can be found on https://osf.io/g73aj/

solution, which is more lenient than the first, allows harm to be done for the greater good only under certain strict conditions. An example of this second solution is the one proposed by the doctrine of double effect (DDE).

According to the DDE, harming other people is forbidden when it is intentionally caused as a means to achieve a greater good. However, the same harm may be justified when it is an unintended side-effect of legitimate action, and its good outcomes outweigh the bad ones (FitzPatrick, 2012; Marquis, 1991; McIntyre, 2001). In this way, the DDE examines not only the moral relevance of the act itself, but also the consequences it yields. Philosophers often resort to the hypothetical case of the trolley problem to illustrate the relevance of this distinction between means and unintended side-effect as a criterion of moral permissibility (Kamm, 1989; Kamm & Rakowski, 2015; Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). In the so-called switch scenario, the trolley problem asks to imagine a bystander deciding between letting a trolley run over five men working on one track or pressing a switch to divert the trolley to another track where only one man is working. In the so-called footbridge scenario, a man on a bridge is heavy enough to stop the trolley, and the bystander must decide to push him onto the track to save the five workers. Since the actions in the switch and footbridge scenarios describe the same consequences, e.g., killing one person to save the other five, the moral difference between the two scenarios lies in the intention and causal link between the act and the harm caused.

Several studies in moral psychology have shown that people react to the two scenarios of the trolley problem differently (Crockett, 2013; Cushman & Young, 2011; Feltz & May, 2017; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007). Most people judge it as permissible to divert the trolley to a track where it runs over one person to save the other five. However, they generally consider it morally impermissible to push a heavy man onto the tracks to stop the trolley. A popular account for this difference in responses to both scenarios holds that people's judgments mirror the logic of the DDE (Cushman & Young, 2011; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007, 2013). That is, people examine the causal link between the action and its consequences and distinguish the harm intended as a means to greater good from the harm caused as an intended side effect of a legitimate action pursuing the same end.

Moral psychologists mostly accept the conclusion drawn from the DDE that the causal differences in the two scenarios prompt different moral evaluations. Nevertheless, some aspects of the account based on the DDE have been the subject

to debate. On the one hand, the DDE regards the agent's intention as a relevant moral criterion. Some philosophers have objected to this view (Di Nucci, 2013, 2014; Kamm, 2007; Scanlon, 2008), considering that intention plays a minimal or perhaps null role. Instead, the causal structure of the action, or the distinction between means and side-effect, would be the decisive factor for the moral permissibility of harming others. In line with this discussion, some researchers have focused on investigating the role of causal structure in moral judgments independent of the agent's intention. (di Nucci, 2014; Knobe, 2010; Levine, Leslie, & Mikhail, 2018; Waldmann et al., 2017; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010).

On the other hand, the DDE is constrained to the distinction between means and side-effect. However, it is not easy to find cases where people are used as means in the strict sense in real-world circumstances. For instance, the man's body pushed from the bridge is a means to stop the trolley (Thomson, 1976). In contrast, if we move a car with a passenger on the trolley tracks to stop it, it is the car, not the passenger, that is the means (Waldmann et al., 2017). Further research using dilemmas in which victims are not used as means in the strict sense and with variance in causal structures indicates that other causal features of events may be more relevant to judgment than the distinction drawn by the DDE [16] (Iliev et al., 2012; Sloman et al., 2009; Waldmann et al., 2012; Waldmann et al., 2017; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010).

3.1.1. Locus of Intervention as Moral Criterion

A theory recently proposed as an alternative to the model based on DDE claims that the locus at which an agent intervenes is the primary factor driving judgments of moral permissibility (Waldmann et al., 2017; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010). According to the locus of intervention theory, the primary moral criterion is the difference between actions that target a potential victim and those that target a threat. This idea does not imply that other causal factors are irrelevant to moral evaluation. The theory proposes rather that the locus of intervention leads to a different attentional focus, downplaying or highlighting other causal features or consequences of the action (Waldmann et al.,

[16] For example, a group of experiments suggests that more negative moral evaluations in the original footbridge scenario are derived from an interaction between physical factors, such as personal contact (Cushman et al., 2006) and physical force (Feltz & May, 2017; Greene et al., 2009).

2017; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010). For example, in the switch scenario of the trolley problem, the action targets the object threatening the lives of the five workers. The intervention on the threat leads people to contrast both the consequences of diverting the trolley and not doing so (i.e., allowing the death of five or causing one). Thus, the general causal link between actions and consequences becomes a relevant factor. On the contrary, the action in the footbridge scenario is directed at the victim placed on the bridge. The intervention on the victim draws the focus on the victim's fate, making the harm caused to the victim a more salient factor.

Note that the predictions of the model based on the DDE and the locus of intervention theory for the switch and footbridge scenario are similar. To contrast the hypothesis from these two models, Waldmann et al. (2017; 2007; 2010) have resorted to other variants of the trolley problem[17]. In one experiment, the researchers described a situation in which a train threatened the lives of five workers, and it is necessary to intercept the first train with a second one to save the workers' lives (Kamm & Rakowski, 2015; Waldmann et al., 2017; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010). The experiment used two scenarios differing in terms of the locus of the intervention but similar in how the harm occurs, i.e., due to a collision between trains. In the threat intervention condition, which contrasts with the original switch scenario, the agent targets the empty train about to kill five workers. The agent diverts this train, which is the threat, to a second track where it collides with a second train that carries one worker. In the victim intervention condition, which contrasts with the original footbridge scenario, the agent targets a second train that carries a person who is the victim to be sacrificed. The agent diverts this second train carrying the victim to the track of the first train to stop it and, therefore, save the first workers. As predicted by the locus of intervention theory, people considered the intervention on the victim morally worse than the intervention on the threat (Waldmann et al., 2017).

[17]The influence of other causal factors has also been tested using alternative versions of footbridge scenarios that do not involve personal harm. For example, in some variants of the footbridge scenario, a bystander can pull a lever (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2009) or can activate a switch to open a hatch (Greene et al., 2009) that cause the man to fall in front of the trolley. In another version, the so-called “loop” scenario (Greene et al., 2009, the trolley can be diverted into a second track that makes a loop and returns the trolley to the track where five people are working. However, the trolley would first hit one person working on the loop track, who would be the means to save the others.

Predictions from the model based on the DDE and the locus of intervention theory may also apply to situations other than the typical trolley problem scenarios and their different variants. In a recent study, Watkins and Laham (2019) used scenarios of the trolley problem to explore whether people's judgments are equally consistent with the DDE in both peace and war circumstances. In the context of peace, the dilemma involved harming a civilian to save other civilians. In the context of war, the trade-off was between one soldier and saving other soldiers. Watkins and Laham (2019) also manipulated the identity of the victims to be sacrificed by describing them as coming from the same group (in-group) or from a different group (out-group) than the people to be saved. The researchers observed that although people tend to judge sacrifice in war as more acceptable than sacrifice in peace, they still morally distinguish the actions of switching and footbridge scenarios in both kinds of contexts. People also tend to judge as more favorable the sacrifice in those scenarios where the person killed is from the out-group and the five people saved are from the in-group. The sensitivity to this factor was greater in war circumstances.

While Watkins and Laham (2019) rely on the model based on the DDE to interpret the distinction between the switch and footbridge scenarios of the trolley problem, other studies have presented war scenarios that do not always use victims as means in the strict philosophical sense. Waldmann & Dieterich (2007) investigated the effect of the locus of intervention on moral judgment using a case where a torpedo is about to kill six soldiers on a boat. In the victim's intervention condition (or patient-intervention variant), three soldiers in a boat are ordered to move in front of the torpedo to save the other six. In contrast, in the threat intervention condition (or agent-intervention variant), the torpedo is redirected to a submarine with three soldiers by remote control. In this experiment, people's responses favored the threat intervention condition over the victim intervention condition. In a similar experiment, Iliev et al. (2012) observed that most people deem it right to redirect enemy troops to save five soldiers while sacrificing only one soldier. In contrast, people regard it as impermissible to order a soldier to move toward the enemy troops to save five of his companions, i.e., the action targeting the victim.

So far, the observed effect of the locus of intervention has been established only for some circumstances of war. Since the mentioned studies have only

included war scenarios in which soldiers are sacrificed to save other soldiers, it is unknown whether this effect remains when potential victims have a different moral status in war. Dilemmas in war may also involve, for example, situations in which both civilians and soldiers are at risk for the protection of other civilians. As we shall see in the next section, philosophers morally distinguish the killing of civilians and soldiers in war. Therefore, the permissibility of harm is judged differently. If people's moral intuitions are aligned with this view, we would expect to observe differences in the effect of the locus of intervention across different kinds of victims.

3.1.2. The Moral Status of the Victim in War

Like any human activity, war is regulated by moral considerations and principles meant to prevent the excessive use of violence. These principles have been integrated into ethical and legal frameworks, such as just war theory, international humanitarian law, and genocide (Bellamy, 2006, 2012a; Coates, 2016; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). All these frameworks share as one of their main principles the obligation of the armed forces to discriminate between those who may be legitimate targets of military attack and those who may not (Bellamy, 2006, 2012b; Benvenisti, 2006; Fabre, 2009, 2014; Walzer, 2015). Accordingly, civilians should be excluded from hostilities and protected from harm, as they do not actively contribute to the battle and do not pose a threat. In contrast, soldiers can be considered legitimate military targets or put at risk to protect others. Previous studies have shown that people's judgments conform to the principle of discrimination between civilians and soldiers (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Laham, 2020). That is, people consider it inadmissible to treat civilians as military targets, but it is permissible to wage war against soldiers. This the permissibility to kill soldiers also depends on the cause of the war it serves. For example, people tend to accept killing unjust soldiers by just soldiers as more permissible than in the inverse case.

For some philosophers, the asymmetry that war poses in the moral treatment of combatants arises from a traditional representation of their social role (Bellamy, 2012a; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Once ordinary citizens join an armed force, they acquire the right to use violence, take an active role on the battlefield, and threaten their enemies. In turn, they waive their right to protection or immunity

from military attack. Based on this social representation of combatants, principles such as DDE appear to be traditionally limited to circumstances involving harm to civilians (Kamm, 2011, 2012; Walzer, 2015).

For example, there has been much discussion of the moral wrongness of British bombing raids on German cities during World War II since the killing of civilians was intended to undermine soldiers' morale and gain military advantage rather than as a side effect of attacking legitimate military targets (di Nucci, 2013, 2014; Kamm, 2012; Scanlon, 2008; Walzer, 2015). Less questioned, however, has been the French air force's decision to ask its pilots to bomb German military units in France at low altitude, even though that increased the risk to their lives while reducing the threat to nearby civilians. (Walzer, 2015). This latter case seems to evidence a widespread acceptance of the armed forces to put soldiers' lives at risk to protect civilians without strictly applying distinctions between means and unintended side effects (Coates, 2016; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015).

The previous section has presented some studies that demonstrate that people judge the moral permissibility of harming others in war based on information about causal features of events. We have discussed the study by Watkins and Laham (2019) investigating differences in responses to switch and footbridge scenarios in circumstances of war and peace. A limitation of this study is that it presented trolley problem scenarios without placing them realistically in war or peace circumstances. The instructions mention that the actions occur in peace or war circumstances, but otherwise, vignettes of both conditions are similar.

We have also discussed some research showing that people judge the moral permissibility of specific actions in war based on distinctions in the locus of intervention (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007)). However, similar to Watkins and Laham's study (2019), the war scenarios of those studies only involved trade-offs between soldiers' lives. So far, what is unclear is whether civilian and soldier lives are equally valued when solving these dilemmas. Thus, the open questions are whether people's intuitions are consistent with this normative distinction between civilians and soldiers, and whether this distinction might mediate the effect of causal factors on moral evaluations.

3.2. Overview of Experiment

The present research tested whether the locus of intervention is a relevant moral factor in war through five experiments. It also examined the role of the kind of victims in concert with the role of the locus of intervention. We designed a novel sacrifice dilemma that takes place in war. Unlike studies that used the footbridge scenario, we compared situations that differed only in terms of the locus of intervention (threat vs victim). In that way, in none of our scenarios, the victims were used as an involuntary means. In our experiments, a missile launcher truck is about to attack an enemy village, and a bus parked near the battle site could be used to stop the attack and save the lives of a hundred people. After the intervention, the people at risk in the village and the possible victims belong to the agent's country. The agent is a general looking to protect his fellow citizens from the enemy. In the victim intervention condition, a bus transporting the potential victims is directed to the missile launcher truck. Instead, in the threat intervention condition, the bus is empty and is directed at the missile launcher truck, causing an explosion that kills potential victims in a bus station. We asked the participant whether the agent should perform the suggested action in our experiments. The term "*should"* is a normative notion meant to elicit a moral response about the permissibility of the act in the given circumstances[18] (Kahane & Schackel, 2010).

Experiment 1 tested the role of locus of intervention in a war dilemma in which a threat to civilians could be prevented by sacrificing a smaller group of people. In experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated the status of the victims whose lives could be sacrificed. We compared a trade-off involving civilians only with a trade-off in which civilians can be saved by sacrificing soldiers. Experiment 4 is similar to Experiment 3, differing only in introducing a new category of victims. Here, we used new scenarios where, instead of regular soldiers, farmer-soldiers, who have entered the armed forces to remain on their properties and protect them,

[18] Kahane and Shackel (2010) have discussed the methodology and appropriate normative vocabulary when formulating experimental questions in moral psychology. For example, in contrast to the question "should the agent do the act?", question such as "is it appropriate for the agent to perform the action?" or "is the action right or wrong?" present greater ambiguity and may lead people to rather judge the agent's intention or whether the killing is right or wrong per se. We must also consider that, from a normative perspective, harming others is always morally wrong, but may be morally justified or permitted in extreme circumstances and under some conditions. When formulating our experimental question, we sought to direct people's attention to the latter aspect, namely, the permissibility of the act.

are the potential victims to be sacrificed. The last experiment investigated whether the effect of the locus of intervention on moral judgments about killing in war is affected by group bias.

This research aims to contribute to the recent dialogue between moral psychology and the ethics of war (Traven, 2015, 2021; Watkins, 2020; Watkins and Brandt, 2018). We also see this as a significant advance in extending previous models that account for the role of causal factors in moral judgment to more complex cases or situations.

3.3. Experiment 1

The first experiment tested the locus of intervention as a primary factor influencing people's moral judgment about the permissibility of harming others in circumstances of war. We hypothesized that people would rate the moral permissibility of the threat intervention more favorably than the victim intervention in a situation involving an exchange of civilians to save civilians from the same side. In the victim intervention condition, a bus transporting fifty people is directed to the missile launcher truck to save a thousand people from an attack on a village. In the threat intervention condition, that bus is empty and is redirected to the missile launcher truck. After the bus hits the threat, it causes an explosion that kills fifty people in the vicinity. Note that the two scenarios differ from trolley dilemmas because they represent dilemmas in war. The two contrasted conditions also use the same action, redirecting a bus. Finally, in the victim intervention condition, passengers who would lose their lives are not used as means to stop the missile. Considering the casual description of the action in both scenarios, the DDE cannot explain the expected effect, which would support the locus of intervention theory.

3.3.1. Method

Participants and Design

142 people were randomly recruited and compensated for their participation on the web for data collection Prolific (82 women, 59 men, 1 who did not indicate gender; age M = 31.8, SD = 9.59, range = 18 to 75 years). Participants were native English speakers. We excluded the responses of six of the participants from the final data analysis as they did not pass the attention check filter. In an a priori power analysis for a two-independent sample t-test, we estimated that with a sample size

of at least 122 participants (61 on average per group) and an alpha level of .05, we would have a probability of approximately 95% of detecting a medium effect (d= 0.6). We used a one-factor, between-subjects design (2. locus of intervention: victim intervention vs threat intervention).

Materials and Procedure

The experiment was conducted in English via the web-based software Unipark. Each participant received a link that led to the online survey. The first page of the survey described the general instructions about the experiment and explained how to respond to a Likert scale for each condition. Each participant was randomly assigned to only one of the two possible conditions (victim intervention vs threat intervention). In the beginning, participants in both conditions received the following vignette describing the situations:

> "Imagine that two countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has secretly placed a missile launcher truck on the territory of Blue Nation and is about to launch a missile over a nearby village, which would kill one thousand people who live there. The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the hundred people."

The participants were then presented with one of two possible courses of action and the possible consequences of carrying it out or not. For example, in the victim intervention condition, the participants read the following description:

> "Close to the threat is a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard. A general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, fifty civilians in the vicinity of the truck would die."

In turn, participants in the threat intervention condition read the following description:

> "Close to the threat is a self-driving bus transporting fifty passengers. A general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and

eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the fifty civilians inside the bus would die."

Once participants read the vignettes, they were asked to evaluate the moral permissibility of the action through the following question: Should the general navigate the bus into the missiles-launcher truck? Participants gave their answers by marking one point on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1("certainly not") to 6 ("certainly yes").

3.3.2. Results

As illustrated in Figure 1, participants assigned to the threat intervention condition evaluated the moral permissibility of the action more favorably (M=4.5, SD=1.28) than participants assigned to the victim intervention condition (M=3.6, SD=1.50). Differences in overall ratings of each scenario were significant, $t(129) = 3.76$, $p < 0.001$, $d=0.7$, thus confirming our prediction.

The results of experiment 1 were consistent with previous research on the effect of locus of intervention using scenarios of war (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). As in the previous research, we presented scenarios in which the sacrificed victims had the same characteristics as the saved ones. Our participants also evaluated the moral permissibility of the sacrifice according to the place in which the agent intervenes. The novelty of our experiment was that it describes a situation in which civilians, rather than soldiers, are sacrificed to save other civilians. This difference allowed us to identify a consistency between people's intuitions and the normative criteria regarding protecting civilians in war (Bellamy, 2012b; Coates, 2016c; Walzer, 2015). Participants condoned harm to civilians only in extreme emergency situations and as a by-product of legitimate military action, mirroring the normative approach based on the DDE. However, in contrast to such a normative approach, our experiment would indicate that people's moral evaluations of harm to civilians rely primarily on the locus of the intervention rather than on the distinction between means and unintended side-effect.



Fig. 1. Results of Experiment 1: Mean ratings of moral permissibility in victim and threat intervention conditions. The error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The 6-point Likert scale ranges from 1 ("certainly no") to 6 ("certainly yes").

3.4. Experiment 2

Experiment 1 evidenced the effect of the locus of intervention in a war scenario involving a trade-off of civilians to save civilians. Experiment 2 investigated whether the observed pattern of responses could also be observed in circumstances of war in which the protection of the lives of civilians involves taking the lives of soldiers from the same nation. Thus, in addition to testing the effect of the locus of intervention, experiment 2 explored whether people's moral judgment conforms to the principle of discrimination between soldiers and civilians posed by the just war theory. As we have previously mentioned, this principle prohibits harm to civilians in most circumstances, while allowing military attacks on soldiers (Bellamy, 2006; Benvenisti, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Given this criterion, the principle would not preclude the use of armed forces by risk soldiers to protect the lives of their fellow citizens. Therefore, causal distinctions may also be less relevant as a normative criterion in evaluating the moral permissibility of harming soldiers to help civilians. If so, the observed effect of the locus of intervention in trade-offs between civilians may not be the same for scenarios in which soldiers are sacrificed to save civilians.

To test the effect of the locus of intervention in moral judgment, we created scenarios involving three possible kinds of victims whose lives would be sacrificed to save the people from a military attack. The victims were two types of civilians (children and farmers) and soldiers. Additionally, we create two scenarios that differ in terms of the locus of intervention for all types of victims. We used a total of six scenarios for this experiment. Our hypothesis for this experiment was that the effect of the locus of intervention would vary across different scenarios involving a trade-off between civilians and soldiers or a trade-off between civilians only.

3.4.1. Method

Participants and Design

This experiment involved 187 participants (126 women, 59 men, 2 who did not indicate gender; M age = 37.1, SD = 12.65, range = 18-75 years) who passed the attention filter from a group of 246 persons. All participants were native English speakers, randomly recruited and compensated for their participation through Prolific, a web service for data collection. We conducted a power analysis for independent model ANOVA and determined that with a sample size of at least 187 participants (31 average per group) and a alpha level of .05, we would have a 90 % probability of detecting a medium interaction effect (partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = .084$), but 37% probability of detecting a small interaction effect (Partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). We used a 2x2 independent design: 2 (locus of intervention (victim intervention vs. threat intervention), x 2 (victims: children vs. farmers vs. soldiers).

Materials and Procedure

Except for minor changes, the scenarios used were the same as in Experiment 1. One of the changes was that civilian victims were described as children or farmers in the different scenarios. Another difference compared to experiment 2 is the number of victims sacrificed to save a majority: five people at the bus station or inside the bus, depending on each locus of intervention condition, are sacrificed to save 50 people in the village.

Like the previous experiment, experiment 2 was conducted in English through the web-based software Unipark. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the six possible conditions that, compared to the scenarios in the first experiment, included more information about the potential victims in each scenario and images to help understand the vignette (see Appendix A). Once participants

read the vignettes, we asked them to evaluate the moral permissibility of the action through the following question: Should the general perform the suggested action? Participants gave their answers by marking one point on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1("certainly not") to 6 ("certainly yes").

3.4.2. Results

The statistical analysis showed some differences in the mean ratings of moral permissiveness between the victim intervention and threat intervention conditions across the two categories of civilians (see Figure 2). In scenarios describing children as victims, people considered the intervention less permissible to victims (M=3.8, SD=1.61) than the intervention on the threat ((M=3.2, SD=1.01). Similarly, when victims were described as farmers, people considered the intervention on the victim (M=4.4, SD=1.14) less permissible than the intervention on the threat (M=4.0, SD=1.45). For scenarios in which soldiers were sacrificed to save civilians, the difference in the mean admissibility rating between the victim intervention (M=4.6, SD=1.34) and threat intervention (M = 4.4 SD = 1.14) was narrower.

The Anova test revealed a significant main effect of the status of the victims, $F(2, 184)= 8.14$ $p<.001$, $\eta^2 = .084$. Likewise, the test revealed an effect of the locus of intervention $F(1, 185)= 4,46$, $p=,023$, $\eta^2 = .028$. We do not observe a significant interaction between the locus of intervention and the victims. From these results, we could interpret that the difference in the moral status of the victim influences moral judgments about the permissibility of killing in war (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Laham, 2020). However, given the low likelihood in our experiment of detecting a small effect (37%), we considered the observed effect of the locus of intervention to be inconclusive. Thus, one of our main questions remained open, namely, whether the effect of the locus of intervention varies as a function of the moral status of the victims in the war. Taking into account the limitation of this experiment, we designed a new experiment in which we again manipulated the status of the victims and the locus of intervention.



Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2: Mean ratings of moral permissibility in the victim and threat intervention conditions for three kinds of victims in war. The error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The 6-point Likert scale ranges from 1 ("certainly no") to 6 ("certainly ye")

3.5. Experiment 3

Experiment 2 investigated whether the observed pattern of responses holds in wartime circumstances involving a trade-off of soldiers to save civilians. However, the results of that experiment were inconclusive because of their low power to detect a true effect of the locus of intervention. The present experiment aimed to replicate the effect of the locus of intervention observed in experiment 1 while exploring whether people's intuitions are consistent with the normative principle of discrimination between civilians and soldiers. To this end, we designed a new experiment that kept scenarios in which saving a larger group of civilians required sacrificing a smaller group of farmers or soldiers. In contrast with experiment 2, we exclude scenarios describing the victims as children, testing the effect of locus of intervention across the simple contrast between regular civilians and soldiers. We hypothesized a significant interaction between the two factors, the locus of intervention and the status of the victims in the war. This interaction implies that we would again observe a significant difference in the moral permissibility ratings of the threat intervention and the victim intervention conditions in those scenarios involving an exchange of civilians to save civilians.

On the other hand, we would not observe significant differences in moral permissibility ratings as a function of the locus of intervention in those scenarios that involve an exchange of soldiers to save civilians.

3.5.1. Methods

Participants and Design

After performing a power analysis for mixed-model ANOVA, we estimated that with a sample size of at least 140 participants (70 average per group) and an alpha-level of .05, we would have a roughly 90% likelihood of detecting a small interaction effect (Partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$). Based on this analysis, we conducted a recruitment process until we obtained more participants than estimated under the condition that they passed the attention control filter and had not participated in the previous experiments. The final sample for this experiment consisted of 173 participants (67 women, 103 men, 3 who did not indicate gender; age, M = 33.9, SD = 11.9, range = 18–72 years), native English speakers, randomly recruited and compensated for their participation through Prolific, a web service for data collection. The design for this experiment was a mixed 2x2 design: 2 (locus of intervention (victim intervention vs. threat intervention), as a factor between subjects, x 2 (victims: farmers vs. soldiers), as a factor within subjects. This last factor was counterbalanced between participants.

Materials and Procedure

The dilemma used in the present experiment is the same as in the previous experiments. The experiment includes four scenarios involving the sacrifice of soldiers instead of civilians. We describe civilians as farmers. The trade-off requires the sacrifice of five people (farmers or soldiers) to save 50 people in the village. To make the status of the victims more salient, we highlighted information about their profession or role in the scenarios. For example, in the case of the farmers, we mentioned that they were going to the local marketplace to attend a course on cultivation techniques. We described soldiers as going to the central military base to attend a course on military technology. Like the scenarios in previous experiments, the victim intervention condition described a bus transporting five people, which was directed to the missile-launcher truck. In the threat intervention condition, the bus is empty and redirected to the missile launcher truck, causing an explosion that kills five people at a nearby bus station.

The experiment was conducted in English via the web-based software Unipark. Each participant received a link that led to the online survey and the page with general instructions. Since the locus of intervention was a between-subjects factor, the software randomly assigned each participant to a scenario describing either a victim intervention or a threat intervention. The victim was a within-subjects factor. Therefore, it was counterbalanced across participants to avoid order or sequence effects. Thus, this first scenario could also randomly vary in terms of the status of victims sacrificed, farmers or soldiers. Once the participants responded to the first scenario, they were assigned to a second scenario with the same locus of intervention but with different victims. As in the previous experiment, each scenario included images that described the initial situations and the consequences of intervention and non-intervention (see Appendix A). For each of the two scenarios presented, participants had to evaluate the moral permissibility of the action through the following question: Should the general perform the suggested action? To express their judgment, the participant could mark one point on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1("certainly not") to 6("certainly yes").

3.5.2. Results

The analysis of mean ratings from each scenario revealed a higher tendency to regard the sacrifice of five farmers to save 50 people in the village as more morally permissible in the threat intervention condition (M=4.41, SD=1.20) than in the victim intervention condition (M=3.66, SD=1.53). These values in the mean responses were similar to those of the first experiment (Threat intervention: M=4.5, SD=1.28; Victim intervention: M=3.6, SD=1.50), thus replicating the observed effect of the locus of intervention. We observed no significant differences in moral permissibility ratings in the threat intervention condition (M=4.8 SD=1.02) and victim intervention condition (M=4.51 SD=1.34) for scenarios describing the victims sacrificed as soldiers.

The mixed ANOVA test confirmed a significant interaction between the locus of intervention and the status of the victim, $F(1, 171) = 9.5574$, $p=.0023$, $\eta_p^2 =.052$ (see Fig. 3). The results also showed a significant main effect of the locus of intervention, $F(1, 171) = 8.259$, $p = .0045$. $\eta_p^2 =.046$, and the status of the victim in evaluations of moral permissibility, $F(1, 171) = 66.611$, $p>.00001$, $\eta_p^2= .280$. These results would support our prediction of the variation of the effect of the locus

of intervention across the two different kinds of victims in the war (civilians and soldiers).

The observed interaction would evidence that information about the status of the victim determines the relevance of causal factors in evaluations of the moral permissibility of harming others in war. Like in experiment 1, when participants were presented with dilemmas involving harming civilians to save civilians, their judgments varied according to the locus of intervention. However, for the new scenarios, the response pattern regarding harm to soldiers appeared to be consistent with the principle of discrimination and moral treatment of soldiers from a normative point of view (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). In this case, the judgments on the sacrifice of soldiers did not vary according to the locus of intervention. Nevertheless, such an evaluation of harm to soldiers appears to be restricted to dilemmas that require deciding on soldiers' lives to save civilians but could not be generalized to all cases in which soldiers' lives are at stake. Previous research has shown, for instance, that locus of intervention is a decisive factor for solving dilemmas involving killing soldiers to save soldiers (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).



Fig 3. Results of Experiment 3: Mean ratings of moral permissibility in the victim and threat intervention conditions for two kinds of victims in war. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. The 6-point Likert scale ranges from 1 ("certainly no") to 6 ("certainly yes")

3.6. Experiment 4

The question driving experiment 3 stemmed from a traditional distinction raised by the just war theory between soldiers and civilians in war (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). In that experiment, we found that people distinguish morally between harm caused to farmers and soldiers. However, these results left open the question of which characteristics are relevant for posing a moral distinction between the two groups. From a normative view, a traditional view assumes that it is enough for people to enroll in a military organization and become soldiers to waive their right not to be attacked (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). In contrast, a revisionist view considers that the victims' contribution to the battle, not the mere fact of being a civilian or a soldier, determines the permissibility of being attacked (Fabre, 2009, 2014; McMahan, 2009). Following this discussion, the present experiment raised the next question: Do people consider it enough for someone to join the military, carry arms, and wear a uniform to waive the protective rights of being sacrificed to save others? Or, instead, can a victim's moral status depend on other characteristics such as how much they are involved and contribute to the war?

The present experiment sought to replicate the effect of the locus of intervention and the status of the victim observed in experiment 3. However, it introduces a new kind of victim that may be sacrificed to save many civilians. We used the four scenarios from experiment 3 (i.e., threat and victim intervention involving farmers and soldiers) and added two new scenarios describing the new kind of victim. These victims are farmers who want to stay on their farms and protect themselves from the enemy (farmer-soldiers). However, their government only allows them to stay if they accept enlisting in the armed force and sign a declaration that they know the risk of staying in a war zone. Farmer-soldiers have some features of soldiers in that they are armed and formally enlisted. However, they differ from regular soldiers in taking a more restricted role in the war. On the other hand, farmer-soldiers have characteristics of civilians. For example, their main goal is to protect themselves and their families on the farm without being obligated to engage in other war activities.

As in the previous experiments, we hypothesized that differences in evaluations of the permissibility of intervening on the victim vs. on the threat would be more significant in scenarios involving farmers (i.e., regular civilians). We also

expected to observe the smallest effect of the locus of intervention in scenarios involving regular soldiers. For the intermediate category of farmer-soldiers, we predicted a position in the middle between civilians and regular soldiers.

3.6.1. Method

Participants and Design

We conducted a power analysis for a two-way ANOVA**,** estimating that with a sample size of at least 800 participants (133 average per group condition) and an a-level of .05, we would have over 90% likelihood of detecting a small interaction effect (partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$). Thus, we recruited participants until we obtained more than the minimum estimate, under the condition that they passed the attention control filter and had not participated in the previous experiments. The final sample included 841 people (506 women, 330 men, 5 who did not report their gender; age M = 35.01, SD = 12.5, range = 18-74). All participants were native English speakers who were registered and compensated for their participation through the web for data collection Prolific. We used two factorial between-subjects design: 2 (locus of intervention: victim intervention vs. threat intervention) x 3 (victims: farmers vs. farmer-soldiers vs. soldiers).

Materials and procedure

We used again the four scenarios of experiment 3 that involve either a trade-off of soldiers to save civilians or civilians to save civilians. In addition, we introduced two new scenarios, which varied in terms of the locus of intervention (threat and victim intervention), but where the victims to be sacrificed to save the civilians in the village were farmer-soldiers. This new kind of victim is an intermediate category that has characteristics of the two other groups, soldiers and civilians. To make the different characteristics of farmer-soldiers salient, we added new information to the original scenarios, describing the situation of this kind of victim in more detail. That made the description a little longer compared to other scenarios. The additional description was as follows:

> "To prevent the endangerment of civilian lives, the government of the Blue Nation has ordered the immediate evacuation of the population within a 10-km-range around the border. Despite the government's order, a group of farmers from the Blue Nation refuses to leave the area to be able to care for their farms. The government has allowed them to work on their farms as long

as they join the army to fight with the army if necessary. To be a member of the army, they must sign a consent form in which they accept the following points:

a) The farmers declare that they are aware that war activities are taking place in the area in which they live, which may lead to situations in which they might be killed. The farmers accept this risk to their lives.

b) The farmers declare that they have been given M-16 combat rifles and military training for their use. The delivery and training will take place right after signing the consent form.

c) The farmers declare that they formally join the army of the Blue Nation. They are allowed to work on their farms but must fight with the army if necessary.

A week after the outbreak of war, The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a small hut. At this small hut, there are 5 farmers who are now also soldiers from the Blue Nation. Not far from the small hut, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked."

The experiment with the six scenarios was conducted in English through the web-based software Unipark. The procedure was like previous experiments. Each participant received a link that led to the online survey and the first page with general instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to only one of six possible conditions that varied in terms of the locus of intervention and the status of the victim. Finally, we asked participants to evaluate the moral permissibility of the action through the following question: Should the general perform the suggested action? To express their judgment, the participant could mark one point on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1("certainly not") to 6("certainly yes").

3.6.2. Results

The difference between the average ratings for the victim and threat intervention conditions was broader for scenarios involving the sacrifice of farmers than for other victims. We observed a higher tendency to regard the sacrifice of farmers in the threat intervention condition (M=4.55, SD=1.33) than in the victim intervention condition (M=3.61, SD=1.55). The effect of the locus of intervention

decreased in the scenarios involving farmer soldiers, with higher ratings for the threat intervention condition (M=4.75, SD=1.14) than for the victim intervention condition (M=4.09, SD=1.36). Finally, we did not observe a significant effect in scenarios involving regular soldiers. In this case, the evaluations of the victim intervention condition (M=4.30 SD=1.24) and threat intervention condition (M=4.53 SD=1.24) have a narrower margin of difference.

The two-way ANOVA test revealed a main effect of the locus of intervention, $F(1, 835)= 45.580$, $p<.00001$, $\eta_p^2= .052$, and the status of the victims, $F(2, 835)= 6.321$, $p=.0018$, $\eta_p^2= .015$. Furthermore, we observed a significant interaction between these two factors, $F(2, 835) = 4.939$, $p=.0073$, $\eta_p^2= .012$, which confirmed that the effect of the locus of intervention was different at each level variation of the status of the victim (see Fig 4). In contrast to the threat intervention condition ($t=-0.087$, $p= .931$), ratings of moral permissibility for the victim intervention scenarios increased across all three victim categories following a significant linear trend, $t= 4.154$, $p <.0001$. Thus, the decrease in the intervention locus effect was driven primarily by an increase in favorable evaluations of the permissibility of intervening on victims to save civilians.

Results of the present experiment replicated the effect of the locus of intervention observed in experiments 1 and 3 for scenarios where the potential victims were either regular civilians or regular soldiers. Moreover, we also replicated the interaction between the two manipulated factors, confirming that the information about the status of the victim in war determines the relevance given to the causal aspects of an event in the evaluation of moral permissibility. Nevertheless, the variations observed in the effect sizes of locus of intervention across three categories of victims would suggest that people's judgments do not rely on the narrow distinction between civilians and soldiers. Instead, they proceed from a casuistry approach, which considers the specific situation of victims in each scenario to determine whether the harm is permissible.

In our case, the fact that farmer-soldiers voluntarily decided to become soldiers and received military training might make people consider it more permissible to risk their lives to save others than farmers who remained regular civilians. However, people also seemed to pay attention to the fact that these farmer-soldiers joined the army to defend their farms and families, which makes them different from regular soldiers. Given that their role in the war and their degree

of involvement in the battle were different, people might consider that the distinction between victims and threat intervention is still relevant to judge the permissibility of harming farmer-soldiers.



Fig 4. Result of Experiment 4: Mean ratings of moral permissibility in the victim and threat intervention conditions across three kinds of victims in war. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. The 6-point Likert scale ranges from 1 ("certainly no") to 6 ("certainly yes").

3.7. Experiment 5

The principle of discrimination requires the exclusion of civilians from combat, regardless of the side to which they belong. However, some authors do not fully embrace this view. Primoratz (2002), for example, argues that civilians belonging to an unjust side should also bear the costs of the war fought by their nation. His argument is based on the idea that in a democratic society, civilians who vote for war or a leader who promotes war are also responsible. In a similar vein, some philosophers claim that it is legitimate for a state at war to consider the life of a civilian of its nation more important than that of an enemy civilian, appealing to the political duty of the state as the guarantor and protector of the rights of its citizens (Davis, 2021; Kamm, 2012). Revisionists of just war theory have also advocated abandoning the classic distinction between soldiers and civilians, differentiating instead between those who contribute to an unjust war and those who do not (Fabre, 2009, 2014; McMahan, 2009). From this point of view, civilians who

contribute significantly to the unjust war, either by manufacturing weapons or participating in military logistics, are legitimate military targets. In contrast, those civilians who do not participate in the war and those soldiers and civilians who contribute to a just war retain their status of innocents.

Some studies on the phenomenon of collective violence and war have identified group bias as a factor affecting judgments about moral responsibility and justification of collective crimes (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Castano & Kofta, 2009; Leidner et al., 2010; Moncrieff & Lienard, 2018). These studies conclude that high degrees of identification with the group increase the justification of violence against other groups. Similarly, previous experiments in moral psychology suggest that variations in the kind of victim significantly impact moral judgment about sacrificial dilemmas. For example, some early studies using sacrificial dilemmas found that people are more reluctant to accept the sacrifice of a person in the switch scenario of the trolley problem when the victim and the agent are related, either as friends, family, or partners (Bleske-Rechek et al., 2010; Haidt & Baron, 1996; Hao et al., 2015). In the study of Watkins and Laham (2019) comparing responses to the switch and footbridge in peace and war scenarios, people tended to judge the sacrifice as more favorable in scenarios where the person killed is from the out-group and the five people saved are from the in-group. This distinction was exacerbated in scenarios that describe war circumstances.

In line with previous research, the present experiment investigated whether the effect of the locus of intervention on moral judgments about killing in war is affected by group bias. Considering previous studies on group bias, we predicted a variation in the effect of the locus of intervention according to whether the civilians sacrificed to save the people in the village are from the same group or from the enemy group.

3.7.1. Method

Participants and Design

We collected a sample of 263 (150 women, 113men; age, M = 33.9, SD = 12.2, range = 18–71 years) who passed the control check filter and did not participate in previous experiments. Participants were native English speakers, randomly recruited, and compensated for their participation through Prolific, a web service for data collection. The power analysis for mixed-model ANOVA

determines that with a sample size of larger than 200 participants (100 average per group) and an a-level of .05, we would have more than 95% likelihood of detecting a small effect (Partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$). We used a 2x2 mixed design: 2 (locus of intervention (victim intervention vs. threat intervention), as a between-subjects factor, x 2 (victims' group: own civilians vs. enemy civilians), as a within-subjects factor. The within-subject factor was counterbalanced across participants.

Material and procedure

Experiment 5 used the same dilemma that our previous experiments on the influence of the locus of intervention on moral judgment. Scenarios of this experiment described civilians, either as farmers from the same group of people in the village or farmers of the enemy country. To make the difference between groups more salient, we describe farmers from the same country as the people in the village (the country fighting a just war) as pacifist farmers. In contrast, enemy farmers were described as civilians supporting the war of their unjust country.

Experiment 5 was conducted in English via the web-based software Unipark. Each participant received a link leading to the online survey and the page with general instructions as in other experiments. The locus of intervention was a between-subjects factor. Therefore, each participant was randomly assigned to a couple of scenarios describing either a victim intervention or a threat intervention. Since the factor victim was a within-subjects factor, it was counterbalanced across participants to avoid order or sequence effects. Thus, participants were first randomly assigned to a scenario in which the victims to be sacrificed were either own civilians or enemy civilians. Once the participants responded to the first scenario, they were presented with a second scenario describing the opposite kind of victims. Like in other experiments above, each scenario included images describing the initial situations and the consequences of intervention and non-intervention. For each of the two scenarios presented, participants were asked to evaluate the moral permissibility of the action through the following question: Should the general perform the suggested action? To express their judgment, the participant could mark one point on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1("certainly not") to 6("certainly yes").

3.7.2. Results

The analysis of mean ratings from each scenario revealed a higher tendency to regard the sacrifice of five farmers of the own group to save 50 people in the village of the same nation as more morally permissible in the threat intervention condition (M=4.24, SD=1.40) than in the victim intervention condition (M=3.76, SD=1.69). In scenarios where enemy farmers were sacrificed to save the civilians attacked in the village, we did not observe a significant difference in the mean ratings of the threat intervention condition (M=4.7 SD=1.44) and victim intervention condition (M=4.8 SD=1.26).

After performing an ANOVA test for a mixed-design, we found a significant interaction between the locus of intervention and the victims' group, F (1, 261) =3.9535, p=.0478, η_p^2 =.015 (see Fig 5). The results also showed a significant main effect of the victims' group, F (1, 261) =82.858 , p>.001, η_p^2= .241, but no significant main effect of the locus of intervention , F(1, 261) = 3.754, p = .0537 η_p^2 =.014. However, a simple effects analysis showed that the difference between the threat and victim intervention was relevant for evaluating the sacrifice of civilians belonging to the same group of civilians to be saved, p= .0078, but not for evaluating the sacrifice of civilians from an enemy group, p=.4836.

First, the distinction between victims of their same group and the enemy group appeared to be consistent with previous research on the moral judgment of killing in war (Watkins & Laham, 2019). The interaction between locus of intervention and victims' group indicated that people rely mainly on the distinction regarding causal factors to evaluate the moral permissibility of harming civilians within the same group, but not for harming civilians from the enemy country. However, the conclusion about these results should be limited to a situation in which enemy civilians belong to the country fighting an unjust war.



Fig 5. Result of Experiment 5: Mean ratings of moral permissibility in the victim and threat intervention conditions across two kinds of victims in war. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. The 6-point Likert scale ranges from 1 ("certainly no") to 6 ("certainly yes").

3.8. Summary and conclusions

The research presented in this chapter comprises five experiments investigating whether the previously observed influence of locus of intervention on judgments of the moral permissibility of killing (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann et al., 2017; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010) varies across different potential types of victims in war. In the first experiment, we observed that participants who evaluated the threat intervention condition rated the permissibility of the action significantly higher than those who rated the victim intervention condition. These results appeared to be consistent with previous research on the effect of locus of intervention using scenarios of war (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).

Experiments 2 and 3 explored whether the effect of the locus of intervention varies according to the difference between civilians and soldiers. In experiment 2, we manipulated the victim's status, presenting participants with a scenario in which the potential victims sacrificed to save the people in the village were children, farmers, or soldiers. Although the statistical analyzes show a slight difference in ratings of moral permissibility among the three groups of victims, we consider the results inconclusive given the low likelihood of detecting a small effect of locus. In

experiment 3, we manipulated the victim's status using only two categories of victims: farmers and soldiers. As in experiment 1, we observed an effect of the locus of intervention on the moral evaluations of scenarios involving a trade-off between civilians to save civilians. However, people seemed to rely less on the differences in this causal factor when evaluating scenarios involving a trade-off of soldiers to save civilians. These results evidenced that the relevance of causal features of the event as a criterion of moral permissibility is conditioned on the victim's status. At the same time, the results showed that people's evaluations are in line with the principle of discrimination raised by the just war theory (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015).

Experiment 4 explored variations of the effect of the locus of intervention for scenarios in which the potential victims are farmers, soldiers, and an intermediate category, i.e., farmer-soldiers. We observed a variation in the effect of the locus of intervention across the three types of victims. That variation may indicate that people's judgments are not based on the simple categorical distinction between civilians and soldiers. Instead, people would consider other available information about the potential victim's background to determine whether it is permissible to harm them, e.g., their motivations and degree of contribution to the battle.

Finally, experiment 5 of this research investigated whether the effect of locus of intervention would be conditioned by differences related to the group from which the victims come. We use four different scenarios that vary according to the locus of intervention and the in-group and out-group victims. The results of this experiment evidenced that group bias affects moral judgment about killing in war, which is consistent with previous research on the role of this factor in moral judgment (Leidner et al., 2010; Moncrieff & Lienard, 2018; Watkins & Laham, 2019). Moreover, the interaction between the locus of intervention and the victims' group would suggest that the causal distinction is primarily relevant to determining the moral permissibility of sacrifice of victims within the same group but not from an enemy group.

Chapter 4

A Set of Experiments on Collective and Individual Defensive Killing in War

War condones acts of violence and destruction that would otherwise hardly be justified. For example, when a war is waged, the moral code prohibiting killing seems to be inverted, becoming a common practice to achieve collective purposes. Throughout the history of normative discussion on the morality of war, few restrictions or exceptions to killing were established (Bellamy, 2012a; Centeno & Enriquez, 2016). Instead, most philosophers focused on the justice or legality of decisions to wage war (Bellamy, 2006; Nicholas Rengger, 2008). However, the growing scope and devastation caused by the world wars and subsequent conflicts during the 20th century prompted philosophers to seek ways to humanize war and establish moral limitations on the use of military violence. Thus, contemporary versions of just war theory not only establish moral criteria to regulate the collective right to declare war, but also provide principles regarding military conduct and the permissibility of killing (Walzer 2015; Orend 2013; Fotion 2007; McMahan 2011).

One of the subjects widely debated by philosophers on the permissibility of killing in war concerns self-defense. The right to self-defense may apply to both states and individuals. In the first case, it refers to the right of a collectivity to use war in response to aggression against its rights. In the second case, it refers to the individual's right to kill an aggressor in war to defend one's life (Dinstein, 2012; Orend, 2013b; Walzer, 2015). One question arising from the normative debate on defensive killing in war is whether the legitimacy of the cause of the war –e.g., whether it is a just war of collective defense or an unjust war of aggression– conditions the permissibility of regular and individual defensive killing. In other words, we ask whether combatants and civilians on the just and unjust sides the same right have to kill combatants and civilians on the opposing side, whether in self-defense or not.

The present chapter presents a series of experiments exploring people's intuitions about the permissibility of killing in self-defense in war. These experiments drew on current moral psychology perspectives and methods. A recent

trend in this field suggests that moral judgments about war stem from shared intuitions that, although similar to those that guide our decisions in everyday life, are mainly determined by the specific conditions of intergroup conflict (Benbaji et al., 2015; Traven, 2015, 2021; Watkins, 2020). For example, previous research has shown that factors unique to the context of war, such as the morality of the cause of war and the distinction between civilians and combatants, influence people's evaluations of moral permissibility (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Goodwin, 2020; Watkins & Laham, 2020). However, no previous study has directly addressed moral judgments about individual self-defense in war.

The first section of this chapter outlines some normative aspects of self-defense in war. It also addresses some empirical studies on the moral judgment of war, which have served as background for our hypotheses and experimental design. The second section of this chapter presents a set of experiments on defensive killing in war and their relevant results[19].

4.1. Collective and Individual Self-Defense in War

In normative ethics, legitimate self-defense has been a key moral criterion for judging the permissibility of harming or killing others. It refers to the victim's right to violent action against an aggressor to protect their own life or integrity (Frowe, 2014; Kahan, D. M., & Braman, D., 2008; McMahan, 1994b; Ohlin, 2017; Thomson, 1991). The violence exercised by the victims is justified by assuming that there is a reciprocal moral obligation among people not to harm or kill each other (Rodin, 2004; Thomson, 1991). Once the aggressor attacks the victim, he breaks this reciprocal obligation, thus waiving his right not to be harmed.

The same definition of self-defense can be extended to the problem of killing of war. In this case, the right to self-defense can refer to both a collective and an individual right (Frowe, 2014; McMahan, 1994a; Orend, 2013; Rodin, 2004; Walzer, 2015). In the ethical framework of war or just war theory, the application of both types of rights varies according to two sets of moral principles: the *jus ad bellum*, which relates to the just cause for waging war, and the *jus in bello*, which

[19] The materials, data, and codes for the statistical analyses of this chapter can be found on https://osf.io/g73aj/

is concerned with the morality of military conduct (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013a; Walzer, 2015).

Under the *jus ad bellum*, legitimate self-defense is considered as a right of states or communities to use armed force against an aggressor to safeguard the life and well-being of their members. The just war theory conceives the international community as a domestic society. Within such a society, each state is defined as an individual entity endowed with rights, while having the duty to respect the rights of other states (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Some of these rights are an extension of the individual rights of the citizens comprising such states. Thus, a state would have the right to territory, freedom, and political self-determination, among other rights. Any military threat posed by another state or group against these rights constitutes a crime. Since the right to individual self-defense governing the domestic sphere also becomes a collective right in the international context, any state can declare war arguing legitimate self-defense (Dinstein, 2012; McMahan, 2005; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2007, 2015).

Within *Jus in bello*, legitimate self-defense is defined as the right of combatants and civilians of different sides to use violence or kill during a conflict in defense of their own lives (Frowe, 2014; Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2011; Walzer, 2015). The right to self-defense complements two traditional principles within the just war theory regulating killing in war and distinguishes it from criminal homicide in everyday circumstances (Bellamy, 2006; Walzer, 2015). One of these principles is the principle of discrimination between civilians and soldiers. This principle prohibits military action on civilians insofar as they do not belong to the armed forces and, therefore, do not actively participate in the battle (Bellamy, 2012a, 2012b; Coates, 2016; Fabre, 2014; Walzer, 2015). This prohibition also includes wounded and captured combatants as they no longer pose a threat. The second principle, linked to the principle of discrimination, is the principle of moral equality of combatants (McMahan, 2006, 2011; Rodin, 2008; Walzer, 2015). This principle holds that, unlike civilians, all combatants consent to enter the war, acquiring the right to kill other combatants and waiving their right not to be killed.

While most philosophers seem to agree on the criteria regulating the declaration of war and the legitimacy of collective self-defense, there are conflicting positions on the definition and implementation of the principles of *jus in bello*, including the right to individual self-defense. The discussion focuses

primarily on establishing whether the morality of military actions, the *jus in bellum*, should be independent of the morality of the cause of war, the *jus ad bellum*. On the one hand, Walzer (2015) and other proponents of the contemporary version of the just war theory (Bellamy, 2006; Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013a), hereafter referred to as traditionalists[20], advocate such independence between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. In other words, they consider that the principles governing military action should apply equally to all combatants regardless of the side to which they belong. On the other hand, revisionists of the just war theory argue that the legitimacy of military actions must be conditioned by the morality of the cause of war (Kamm, 2012; Lazar, 2013; McMahan, 2004, 2006, 2011; Rodin, 2008). In this way, an action on the battlefield cannot be morally permissible if the war being fought is not just. Traditional and revisionist positions present arguments leading to different conclusions about the permissibility to kill in war.

Traditionalists consider war as a collective political activity, where the group and its institutions, not individuals, assume moral responsibility for the legitimacy of the declaration of war (Bellamy, 2006; Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). This view implies that combatants are responsible only for their conduct in battle, governed by principles derived from traditional military codes and established conventions, which are different from those regulating relationships among states. A reason to judge combatants only by their conduct in battle is that the declaration of war is a collective decision that combatants are often not involved in or fully aware of. Moreover, sometimes combatants are recruited into the armed forces by coercion or manipulated to fight in a war of aggression. Therefore, the only guarantee to mitigate the violence and destruction caused by war would be that combatants obey the rules of battle regardless of the morality of the cause. For example, combatants fighting a war of aggression would do less harm or respect civilians in carrying out their military actions. Similarly, those fighting a collective self-defense war would adhere to the conventions of war to not lose the legitimacy of their cause.

[20] Revisionists use the term "traditionalist" arguing that Walzer and other proponents of the contemporary version of just war theory build the idea of the moral equality of combatants on a traditional representation of soldiers as instruments of the state (Fabre, 2014; Lazar, 2013; McMahan, 2011; Rodin, 2008). This traditional view also entails an image of the battlefield as a space for fighting between heroic warriors or gladiators.

One implication of the traditionalist argument above is that, as with other principles of *jus in bello*, the cause of war cannot condition the legitimacy of individual self-defense. Civilians from just and unjust sides retain their right to kill in self-defense without renouncing their immunity. Similarly, assuming their moral equality, combatants on the just and unjust sides have the same right to use violence to defend their lives from attacks by their enemies (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Although combatants are not allowed to target civilians, they are justified in violating this prohibition when civilians directly threaten their lives, even if they fight an unjust war (Coates, 2016; Walzer, 2015).

In opposition to the traditionalist, revisionists of the just war theory refuse to keep the morality of the means to wage war separate from the morality of the cause. One implication of refusing this independence is that combatants and civilians who contribute to the battle become morally responsible for collective wrongdoing (Fabre, 2014, Frowe, 2014, Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2004, 2011). Revisionists also refuse to define war as a moral sphere with rules distinct from those governing ordinary life (McMahan, 2006, 2011; Rodin, 2008). Therefore, an ethical framework regulating violence in war would not be very different from ethical frameworks regulating violence in the domestic sphere. For example, for revisionists, killing is immoral both in war and peace. However, in both cases, killing may be morally permissible or justifiable under certain circumstances, such as the legitimate defense of the rights and people's lives. Without such justifications, any killing in war must always be morally proscribed.

Revisionists share the traditional position of the just war theory that innocents should not be involved in the fighting and should not be the military target. Nevertheless, consistent with their position on the dependence between the means and ends of war, revisionists renounce the simple distinction between civilians and combatants as a moral criterion (Fabre, 2009, 2014; Frowe, 2014; Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2011). As we have seen, traditionalists argue in favor of the moral equality of combatants by considering that all combatants pose a threat to their enemies. The revisionists argue instead that the status of innocence prevails to the extent that the person has done nothing wrong to waive the right not to be harmed, even if he or she is armed and belongs to a military force. Since killing in war is justified by the legitimate collective right to self-defense, combatants fighting for a just cause do the right to engage in war while preserving their status

as innocents. On the contrary, combatants and civilians contributing to unjust aggression become accomplices in a criminal war.

Under the same arguments above, revisionists claim that the cause of the war primarily defines the permissibility of acting in individual self-defense (Frowe, 2014; McMahan, 2011). Otherwise, the notion of individual self-defense would not follow the same logic in war as in the context of peace. As an illustration, consider the similarity between the following two cases: In the course of a battle, an unjust combatant reacts to the attack of an adversary from the just side and kills him to protect his life. In another case, during a bank robbery, the robber reacts to the attack of a security guard by killing him first[21]. Consistent with the claim of independence between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, traditionalists argue that only the unjust combatant, not the robber, can appeal to self-defense (Walzer, 2015). Revisionists regard such a claim as absurd. They argue that there is no reason to justify neither the combatant nor the robber's killing as both are responsible for posing an unjust threat, thereby waiving their right to respond to a defensive attack (McMahan, 2011).

Finally, it can be argued against revisionists that combatants act under orders and are sometimes coerced or not fully aware of the war they are waging. However, revisionists consider that these circumstances do not presuppose those combatants cannot make moral choices, nor do they absolve them of moral responsibility (Frowe, 2014; McMahan, 2011). Combatants acting under orders, duress, or ignorance can be legally excused for their crimes since they are members of the armed forces. However, since only moral reasons justify killing in war, unjust combatants are still morally guilty of the wrongs committed. Revisionists claim that advocates of traditional just war theory have overlooked this distinction between the legal and moral judgment on the conduct of combatants.

The first question of interest to moral psychology arising from this debate is whether people regard the cause of the war or the collective purpose it serves to judge the moral permissibility of killing. If people's intuitions align with the traditionalist position, they would judge the morality of killing without considering

[21] The example has been proposed by Walzer (2015) to support his argument that the rules governing killing in war are of a different nature than those governing crime in the domestic sphere. Mcmahan (2011) has taken up this example to point out that Walzer grounds his view in a heroic and traditional representation of combatants and the battlefield.

the justice of the cause of war. In that case, we should not expect differences in moral judgments about the killing by combatants fighting in collective defense and those fighting a war of aggression. Instead, if we suppose that people's moral judgments mirror the revisionist position, we should expect a less favorable judgment about killing by unjust combatants than just combatants.

A second question to be investigated empirically concerns how people evaluate the moral permissibility of killing in cases of individual self-defense in war. A first possible scenario is that people's moral judgments about individual self-defense do not rely on the morality of the cause of war. Then we would observe a tendency to consider that any person under threat of death, regardless of the side they belong to, has the same right to kill his aggressor in self-defense. Otherwise, if people consider the cause of war relevant, we should observe less favorable evaluations of individual defensive killing by unjust combatants than by innocent civilians and just combatants. Despite the extensive attention that philosophy has devoted to the question of self-defense, especially in the context of war, there is still little research in moral psychology on this matter.

4.2. The Influence of the Cause of War on Evaluations of Moral Permissibility

The ongoing debate on the morality of war has led to a growing research program in moral psychology that aims to study the cognitive factors and mechanisms that underlie moral judgment about war (Benbaji et al., 2015; Traven, 2015, 2021; Watkins, 2020). Taking the normative framework of war as a reference point, some authors consider that people share moral intuitions consistent with certain normative principles. For example, some studies have shown that people's judgments are consistent with the requirement of civilian protection (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Laham, 2020) and the principle of moral equality of combatants (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Goodwin, 2020).

One of the pioneering studies is that of Benbaji et al. (2015). The researchers presented hypothetical scenarios to Israeli participants and asked them to imagine that they were commanders in charge of a just or unjust war who must make the moral decision of ordering an attack on an enemy-inhabited hill. Slightly more than half of the participants on the just side responded that it was right to attack, in contrast to approximately 40% of the participants on the unjust side. In this study,

participants on the just side showed a greater predisposition to accept the attack when civilians were the target than participants on the unjust side. The authors conclude that this influence of the cause of the war on people's moral judgments shows that their intuitions are more aligned with a revisionist position than with a traditionalist position of the just war theory.

Benjabi et al. (2015) interpret the difference in the pattern of judgments about killing in war by just and unjust sides based on self-regulation theory. This theory holds that moral behavior is determined by an internal balance between self-esteem and the cost of moral behavior. That is, people act morally to maintain a good self-image, even if the behavior leads them to sacrifice their own interests. Thus, for example, those who have acted immorally will try to act morally in a future event to rehabilitate their self-image, which would be a " moral cleansing " effect. On the other hand, those who have acted right may consider they could act immorally in subsequent events, or a "moral licensing" effect. From this point of view, people who adopt the perspective of an unjust commander judge attacks against their enemy more harshly to rehabilitate their self-image. Conversely, when people adopt the perspective of a commander acting against unjust aggression, they feel justified in killing civilians and soldiers from the enemy's side.

In a more recent study, Watkins and Goodwin (2020) have also manipulated the justice of war and its effect on different types of evaluations concerning war. The researchers asked participants about the types of conflict in which soldiers are allowed to be involved, e.g., humanitarian interventions, wars of aggression, and defensive wars. In another series of experiments within the same study, the researchers asked participants to evaluate the permissibility of soldiers on the just and unjust sides to commit some different military actions (e.g., torture, killing civilians, or siege). People considered that soldiers fighting for just causes had more right to act than those fighting for an unjust cause, even though their actions were the same. Such results seem to show that people's judgments conflict with the principle of moral equality of combatants. Another interesting finding is that judgments about the behavior of unjust soldiers were more stringent when they identified with the cause of the war than when they were forced to participate in it. The researchers also observed a stronger relationship between moral judgments of soldiers' behavior and evaluations of their character traits and moral goodness, with the latter being a more relevant factor.

A further study by Watkins and Laham (2020) follows up on the initial study by Benjabi et al. (2015). In this study, the researchers were also concerned with people's intuitions about the principle of the moral equality of combatants. However, unlike Benbaji et al. (2015), they did not analyze a commander's strategic decision but rather the actions of ordinary soldiers. In addition, Watkins and Laham asked participants to put themselves in the role of third-party war observers. As in the study by Watkins and Goodwin (2020), Watkins and Laham (2020) establish a relationship between moral judgments and perceptions and stereotypes of soldiers from just and unjust sides.

In a first experiment, Watkins and Laham (2020) explored people's intuitions about the principle of discrimination regardless of the cause of war. The participants were asked to evaluate the morality of killing soldiers and civilians by other soldiers or civilians. The participants judged it to be more permissible to kill soldiers than civilians. Moreover, they considered that soldiers were more allowed to kill than civilians. In a second experiment, the researchers manipulated the cause of war. In this case, participants evaluated soldiers and civilians on the just side more positively than their counterparts on the unjust side. However, the expected discrimination between soldiers and civilians remained. Watkins and Laham (2020) attribute the unfavorable judgment of unjust soldiers to negative perceptions and stereotypes. They also consider that the sociability and morality traits of the victims would lead to differences in judgments. To a lesser extent, the dehumanization of soldiers may explain why they are more likely to be targeted than civilians. These results differ from the study by Benbaji et al. (2015), who report that participants on the just side of the war appeared to agree with ordering a military attack even when it harmed soldiers and civilians alike, in contrast to participants assuming the position of the unjust side.

4.3. Overview of Experiments

In line with previous research, we conducted a series of experiments to explore the influence of the cause of war, or the collective purpose of war, on people's evaluations of the permissibility of killing combatants and civilians (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins & Laham, 2020). The first two experiments (6 and 7) investigated whether the cause of the war, just or unjust, influences people's evaluations of the permissibility of killing in war. We manipulated two factors: the

cause of the war (just war, or collective self-defense war, vs. unjust war, or war of aggression) and the kind of victim (soldiers vs. civilians). In these experiments, people were asked to evaluate the permissibility of a regular killing (i.e., one that is not committed as an act of individual self-defense).

Experiments 6 and 7 partly reproduced the design and results of the previous studies by Benbaji et al. (2015) and Watkins and Laham (2020). In contrast to these studies, our purpose is also to place the findings in the context of the discussion on defensive killing in war. Thus, experiments 6 and 7 were meant to provide a basis for Experiment 8, which was concerned with moral evaluations of individual self-defense. Given that no previous study has studied moral judgment on this type of killing in war, Experiment 8 introduces the novel component of our study. In this last experiment, we manipulated the cause of the war (just vs. unjust), the identity of the attacker (soldier vs. civilian), and the type of killing (self-defense vs. non-legitimate self-defense).

Like previous studies (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins and Laham, 2020), our experiment presented participants with hypothetical war scenarios and asked them to evaluate the permissibility of individual actions involving harm to others. Like Watkins and Laham's (2020), we also placed participants in the role of a third-party evaluator. However, given our interest in the discussion on defensive killing in war, our scenarios presented some distinctive features. For example, we describe two opposing sides, one of which wages a war of aggression according to a plan to exterminate enemy inhabitants, while the other wages a just war to defend its community. In the studies of Benbaji et al. (2015) and Watkins and Laham (2020), the cause of war is instead the invasion of one country to seize the natural resources of the other, so the claim of legitimate collective defense is less clear or salient.

Unlike previous studies, our scenario scenarios are more elaborate, providing more details about the circumstances under which the agent kills soldiers or civilians. We asked the participant to evaluate the action of a soldier engaged in either an aggressive war campaign or a collective defense mobilization. In Experiment 6, we used real names for the countries: Nazi Germany, waging a war of aggression, and Poland, acting in self-defense. Experiments 7 and 8 used fictitious names: the totalitarian Yellow Nation, waging an aggressive war, and the democratic Blue Nation, waging a defensive war. The research question asked

participants to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: It is morally right for the soldier [peasant] to shoot the enemy soldier [peasant][22].

4.4. Experiment 6

Experiment 6 aimed to explore people's intuitions regarding two of the normative principles of war previously discussed. One is the principle of discrimination between civilians and combatants, which requires that war be restricted to combatants while leaving out civilians. The other principle concerns the moral equality of combatants, which assumes that combatants have the same right to kill enemy combatants regardless of whether they belong to the just or unjust side. We sought to determine whether people's intuitions are consistent with the requirement to exclude innocents from battle, which would result in higher rates of moral permissibility toward military actions against combatants than against civilians on either side. Furthermore, we investigated whether people's intuitions are consistent with the traditional or the revisionist normative positions. Consistent with previous research (Benbaji et al., 2015; Watkins and Laham, 2020), we hypothesized that people would show more aversion to killing civilians than soldiers. Furthermore, people would evaluate the killing of combatants on the unjust side more favorably than those on the just side, thus matching a revisionist position.

4.4.1. Method

Participants and Design

This experiment involved 484 participants who passed the attention check filter (284 women, 191 men, 7 other genders, and 2 who did not indicate gender; age M = 34.42, SD = 12.40, range = 16-81years). All participants were native English and compensated for their participation through Prolific. As for collective action, the appeal to self-defense serves to justify the cause or declaration of war. Power analysis for a two-way ANOVA indicated that a sample size of at least 460 participants (115 per group) and an a-level of .05 would allow us to detect a small

[22] Our question referred to the moral permissibility of the agent to act in the given circumstances. As in the previous study, the question was formulated following Kahane and Shackel's (2010) discussion on the appropriate normative vocabulary when formulating experimental questions in moral psychology.

interaction effect with 85% likelihood (Partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$). We used a 2x2 between-subjects design: 2 (cause of war: unjust vs. just) x 2 (victim: civilian vs. soldier).

Material and procedure

Experiment 6 was designed and conducted in English on the web-based software Unipark. Each participant received a link through Prolific leading to the online survey. The participants found general instructions on the first page of the survey about the experiment and how to respond to the moral evaluation task. Each participant was randomly assigned to only one of four possible conditions. We asked participants to evaluate the action of a combatant, described as a soldier, either from Poland or Nazi Germany. Poland wages a just war to defend itself against unjust Nazi Germany, which carries out a campaign of invasion and mass extermination. The soldier arrives at the village of his enemy and kills either an enemy soldier or a civilian.

Participants evaluating the action of a soldier fighting for a just cause read the following vignette:

"In September 1939, the Polish government attempted to defend its territory against Nazi Germany. The purpose of the Polish government was to stop Nazi Germany before it reached its border.

In the course of the defensive war in Poland, a platoon of Polish soldiers arrives in a German village. One of the Polish soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of [an armed Nazi soldier who is part of the plan to invade his country and is ready to shoot/ an unarmed German peasant who takes refuge during the war]. The Polish soldier then decides to shoot this [Nazi soldier/German peasant] who dies instantly."

In turn, participants who evaluated the action of a soldier fighting for an unjust cause were presented with the following vignette:

"In September 1939, Nazi Germany launched a military invasion campaign against Polish territories. The purpose of the Nazi government was to seize the territory and carry out a mass extermination of its inhabitants.

In the course of Nazi Germany's war of extermination, a platoon of Nazi soldiers arrives in a Polish village. One of the Nazi soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of an [armed Polish soldier defending his country from invasion and ready to shoot/unarmed Polish peasant sheltering during the invasion].

The Nazi soldier then decides to shoot this [soldier/Polish peasant] who dies instantly.

Once participants read the vignette, we asked them to evaluate the degree of the moral permissibility of the action. To this end, the participants were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: It is morally right for the [Nazi soldier/Polish soldier] to shoot the [Nazi soldier/German peasant/Polish soldier/Polish peasant]. To answer the question, participants had to mark one point on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

4.4.2. Results

We did not observe a significant difference between average ratings of the killing of a civilian from the just side by an unjust soldier (M= 5.39, SD=1.12) and the killing of a civilian from the unjust side by a just soldier (M= 5.69, SD= 0.95). On the other hand, average rates of moral permissibility show that people tend to evaluate the killing of an unjust soldier by a just soldier (M= 2.70, SD=1.30) more positively than the killing of a just soldier by an unjust soldier (M= 4.55, SD=1.48).

The two-way ANOVA test revealed a significant interaction between both predictors, kind of victim and cause of war, $F(1, 480)= 48.86$, $p<.00001$, $\eta_p^2 =. 092$ (Fig. 6). We also observed a significant main effect of kind of victim, $F (1, 480) = 296.483$, $p>.00001$, $\eta_p^2 =.382$, and cause of war, $F (1, 480) = 95.722$, $p>.00001$, $\eta_p^2 =.166$. The observed interaction between the cause of war and the identity or role of the victim in war would indicate that collective purposes are relevant when evaluating the permissibility of killing among soldiers. In other words, fighting a collective defense war would justify killing soldiers who wage a war of aggression, while soldiers defending their communities retain their right not to be attacked. Thus, people's judgment seems to be aligned more with a revisionist position, which rejects the moral equality of combatants (McMahan, 2006, 2011; Rodin, 2008), than with the traditional position (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). On the other hand, the observed interaction confirms the validity of the principle of discrimination as a moral judgment concerning harm to civilians (Coates, 2016; Fabre, 2014; Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013a; Walzer, 2015). With these results, experiment 6 replicated the effect of the cause of war observed in previous research (Benjabi et al., 2015; Watkins and Laham, 2020).



Fig 6. Results of Experiment 6: Mean ratings of moral permissibility in just and unjust war conditions for two kinds of victims in war. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. The 6-point Likert scale ranges from 1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

4.5. Experiment 7

The results of experiment 6 suggested that people evaluate the moral permissibility of killing in war by considering the morality of the war the combatants are fighting. This link between individual action and collective purpose applied to the case of killing between combatants, while evaluations about killing innocent civilians relied on the distinction between civilians and combatants. The present experiment aimed to replicate these results. However, we also wanted to discard the possibility that the historical representation of Nazi Germany influences people's evaluations. For this purpose, we only modified the names used in scenarios of the previous experiment. In experiment 7, we described a war between two fictitious countries: the Blue Nation, ruled by a military leader who enacts political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing, and the Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country. As in the previous experiment, we created four scenarios that vary regarding the justice of the war the agent is fighting for and the kind of victim killed. Since we expected to replicate the result of the first experiment, we hypothesized that participants would judge the actions of combatants on just and unjust sides differently, evaluating more negatively

combatants fighting for an unjust cause than those fighting to defend themselves against aggression. We also expected to observe a general disproval of killing civilians regardless of the side to which they belong.

4.5.1. Method

Participants and Design

Considering the effect of the interaction of experiment 7 (Partial eta-squared, η_p^2 =. 092), we conducted a power analysis for mixed-model ANOVA to estimate the sample size. Thus, we established that with a sample of at least 342 participants (85 average per group) and an alpha level of .05, we would have a roughly 90% likelihood of detecting a medium interaction effect (Partial eta-squared, η_p^2 = . 03). lower than observed in the first experiment.

We randomly recruited 363 participants who passed an attention check and did not participate in our previous experiments (222 women, 127 men, 4 other genders; M age = 33.41, SD = 11.20, range = 18-75 years). We recruit and compensate participants for their participation through Prolific. The design of this experiment was the same as experiment 6, namely, a 2x2 between-subjects design: 2 (cause of war: unjust vs. just) x 2 (victim: civilian vs. soldier).

Materials and procedure

The second experiment was conducted in English, using the web-based software Unipark. Like in experiment 6, each participant received a link leading to the online survey. Participants initially received general instructions about the experiment and how to respond to a rating scale of preference. Next, each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four possible conditions. Unlike experiment 6, in this experiment, the scenarios described a hypothetical situation with fictitious names: The Blue Nation, ruled by a military leader who intends to invade and kill the population of its neighboring country, the Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country. The vignettes described a situation in which either a civilian or a soldier was killed by an enemy soldier fighting for a just or unjust cause (see Appendix B).

Once participants had read the vignette, they were asked to evaluate the moral permissibility of the action by indicating the degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: It is morally right for the [blue/yellow] soldier to shoot the [yellow/blue] farmer. Participants gave their responses by

marking one point on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

4.5.2. Results

As in experiment one, we did not observe differences in evaluations of the killing of a civilian from the just side (M= 5.42, SD= 1.21) and unjust side (M= 5.63, SD= 0.98) by enemy soldiers. The killing of both kinds of civilians was considered equally wrong. In contrast, as expected, participants who evaluated the killing of a just soldier by an unjust soldier deemed the soldier's action more negatively (M= 4.75, SD=1.42) than those who evaluated the killing of an unjust soldier by a just soldier (M= 3.49, SD=1.58).

A two-way ANOVA test revealed a significant interaction between cause of war and kind of victim, $F(1, 349)= 14.01$, $p= .00021$, $\eta_p^2 =. 040$ (see Fig. 7). We also found a significant main effect of kind of victim, $F (1, 349) = 101.191$, $p>.00001$, $\eta_p^2 =. 225$, and cause of war, $F (1, 349) = 27.274$, $p>.00001$, $\eta_p^2 =. 072$.

The result of the present experiment replicated the effects of the cause of war and the kind of victim observed in experiment 7. Once again, the interactions observed would indicate that the cause of war is relevant for evaluating the permissibility of killing enemy soldiers but not civilians. By using fictitious names of countries involved in a hypothetical war, in contrast to the more realistic scenario of experiment 6, we ruled out that the historical representation of Nazi Germany had a relevant effect on the results of the first experiment.



Fig 7. Results of Experiment 7: Mean ratings of moral permissibility in just and unjust war conditions for two kinds of victims in war. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. The Likert scale ranges from 1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

4.6. Experiment 8

The right to legitimate self-defense against actual or foreseeable aggression threatening the life of a community is one of the arguments most often invoked to initiate a war (Fotion, 2007; Orend, 2013a; Walzer, 2007, 2015). In previous experiments, we examined whether soldiers fighting on the defensive or aggressive side are equally authorized to kill their enemy's soldiers and civilians to pursue their collective ends. However, the right to self-defense is also invoked to justify individual defensive killing on the battlefield. In other words, any civilian or combatant whose life is threatened by an aggressor is allowed to use violence and eventually kill him to stop the threat he poses. As already discussed, from a traditional position of the just war theory, every person retains their right to individual self-defense regardless of the side of the war they belong to (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). On the contrary, revisionists claim that those who fight an unjust war pose an unjust threat to others and, therefore, waive their right to defend themselves against attacks by enemy combatants or civilians (Fabre, 2014; Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2006, 2011; Rodin, 2008).

In contrast to experiments 6 and 7, experiment 8 focused on the moral permissibility of killing an aggressor in individual self-defense. We manipulated the cause of the war and the identity of the person who acts in self-defense, describing him either as a peasant or as a soldier. Cases of non-legitimate defensive killing are considered equivalent to those described in experiments 6 and 7. Thus, in these cases, we expected to observe differences in patterns of moral evaluation according to the justice of the war to which the attacker's actions contribute. Since no previous experiment has explored evaluations of the permissibility of legitimate individual defensive killing, we could not establish only one hypothesis. Instead, we expected to see two possible outcomes or patterns of judgments. One is that the war and the attacker's identity play a relevant role in people's evaluations. Therefore, we would observe significant interactions between these two factors leading to variations in people's moral evaluations across different scenarios. Alternatively, such factors may be irrelevant when evaluating the moral permissibility of individual defensive killing. Therefore, people would judge equally permissible the action of any person, combatant or civilian from just and unjust sides, to defend his or her own life in war.

4.6.1. Method

Participants and Design

For this experiment, we conducted a power analysis for a three-way ANOVA, estimating that with a sample size of at least 760 participants (95 average per group condition) and an a-level of .05, we would have over 90% power for detecting a small interaction effect, (Partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$). We recruited 803 participants who passed an attention check filter and did not participate in our previous experiments (496 women, 298 men, 6 other genders, and 3 did not report gender; age M = 35.21, SD = 11.54, range = 18-75 years). Participants were recruited and compensated through Prolific. We used a 2x2x2 factorial design 2 (Cause of war: just vs. unjust) x 2(Attacker: soldier vs. civilian) x 2 (Defense: self-defense vs. non-legitimate self-defense).

Materials and procedure

The experiment was conducted in English using the web-based software Unipark. Each participant received a link leading to the online survey. The first page of the survey described general instructions about the experiment and

explained how to respond to the Likert scale in each condition. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three possible conditions determined by the three predictor variables (cause of war vs. attacker vs. self-defense). The scenarios of this experiment were similar to the scenarios of experiment 7, describing the unjust war of a Blue Nation, which intends to invade and kill the population of its neighboring country, the Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country defending itself from the enemy. In the case of the self-defense condition, in the end, the scenarios described the action of a victim (soldier/ or peasant) killing an armed soldier who was about to shoot him. The following is an example of one of the scenarios presented (see also Appendix B):

"In the course of the war of invasion and extermination of the Blue Nation, a platoon of blue arrives at a village of the Yellow Nation. In a small hut, there is a yellow soldier defending his country from invasion. The yellow soldier notices the arrival of a blue armed soldier at the hut, who is about to shoot him. Before being attacked, the yellow soldier decides to shoot this blue soldier in the chest, who dies instantly."

The scenarios of no legitimate self-defense killing presented a similar ending to the scenario described above. The difference was that the soldier who arrived at the hut was unarmed and looking for supplies for his troop.

Once participants had read the vignette, they were asked to evaluate the degree of the moral permissibility of the action. As in experiment 7, they must indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: It is morally right for the [blue/yellow soldier/peasant] to shoot the [yellow/blue] soldier. In addition, participants were asked whether the action was or not in self-defense, indicating to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: The killing of the [yellow/blue] soldier by the [soldier/peasant] [blue/yellow] is an act of self-defense. Participants gave their responses to both questions by marking one point a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

4.6.2. Results

The mean ratings of agreement and disagreement on the moral permissibility of killing varied across the different groups (Figure 8). People generally disagreed

more about the permissibility of killing in no self-defense by attackers from an unjust side than from a just side. There were no significant differences in the evaluations of killing by the unjust soldier (M=5.0, SD=1.23) and the unjust civilian M=4.9, SD=1.12). Furthermore, there were no significant differences in the evaluations of killing by the just soldier (M=3.0, SD=1.39) and the just civilian, M=3.3, SD=1.5).

Participants disagreed significantly more about the permissibility of self-defense killing by the unjust soldier (M=3.8, SD=1.48) than other kinds of attackers. However, killing in self-defense by an unjust soldier was evaluated more positively than killing in non-self-defense. There were no significant differences in evaluations of self-defense killing by the just soldier (M=2.55, SD=1.51), the just civilian (M=2.16, SD=1.40), and the unjust civilian (M=2.8, SD=1.50). Ratings of agreement on the permissibility of killing in self-defense and no self-defense were significantly related to ratings of whether or not the acts constituted an act of self-defense, r(801)=. 67, p= < .0001.



Fig 8. Results of Experiment 8: Mean ratings of the moral permissibility of self-defense and no self-defense killing in just and unjust war conditions for four kinds of attackers. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. The Likert scale ranges from 1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

A three-way ANOVA independent test showed a significant two-way interaction between three possible combinations of the three factors (Fig 10): the attacker and the cause of the war, $F(1,795)= 6.179$, $p =.0131$, $\eta_p^2=. 008$; the type of killing and the attacker, $F(1,795)= 16.575$, $p>.0001$, $\eta_p^2= .020$; the type of killing and the cause of war $F(1,795)= 14.576$, $p=.00014$, $\eta_p^2= . 018$. We also observed a significant mean effect of the cause of War ($F(1,795)= 212.151$, $p |< .00001$, $\eta_p^2= .211$), the kind of attacker (($F(1,795)=7.231$, $p= .0073$, $\eta_p^2= . 009$), and type of killing ($F(1,795)= 142.910$, $p |< .00001$,, $\eta_p^2= . 152$). A Tukey's HSD post hoc tests indicate that the difference in the type of attacker (soldier vs civilian) was significant when they belonged to the unjust side (p=0004) but not when they belonged to the just side (p= 0.965). There was a difference between soldiers and civilians in the self-defense condition (p<00001) but not in the non-self-defense condition (P =0.7143170). In general, the ratings of moral permissibility were more positive about self-defense killing than no self-defense killing (p <.00001).

People's evaluations of individual defense killing favored the actions of civilians on different sides and of combatants fighting a collective defensive war, as opposed to combatants contributing to a war of aggression. This finding would show consistency between people's judgments and McMahan's revisionist view (2011), which holds that a combatant fighting an unjust war waives his right to a defensive response. However, people's evaluations appeared less stringent than the revisionist position. Although killing by unjust soldiers is generally evaluated unfavorably, participants still considered that action in self-defense is more permissible than in no self-defense.



Fig 9. Results of Experiment 8: Mean ratings of moral permissibility and interactions for three possible combinations of factors (form left to right): attacker x cause of war; type of killing x attacker; type of killing x cause of war. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. The Likert scale ranges from 1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

4.7. Summary and Conclusions

We presented three experiments evidencing that people's moral judgments about killing soldiers and civilians are influenced by the morality of the cause of the war the killer is fighting, i.e., either a just war in defense of their group or an unjust war. Experiments 7 and 8 investigated the effect of information about the cause of war and the kind of victim on moral judgments about regular killing in war (i.e., other than individual self-defense killing). We asked the participant to evaluate the action of a soldier engaged in an aggressive and genocidal war or one of collective defense. Both experiments used the same design, so the second experiment was intended to replicate the result of the first experiment. The results

support our hypothesis that the justice of war is relevant for evaluating the moral permissibility of killing soldiers, but not civilians. Similarly, we observe higher average disagreement rates about killing civilians than soldiers. These two experiments confirmed the results of previous studies showing an asymmetry in the evaluations of the actions of just and unjust soldiers (Benjabi et al., 2015; Watkisn & Goodwin, 2020; Watkins and Laham, 2020). In contrast to these studies, our result extends to circumstances in which a group's life is at stake, thus relating more clearly to the discussion on the legitimacy of killing as a collective self-defense action.

Experiment 9 investigates the moral evaluation of individual defensive killing, a condition that had not been investigated in previous experiments on moral judgment in warfare. We manipulated the cause of the war, the identity of the attacker (soldiers vs. civilians), and the type of killing (self-defense vs. non-legitimate self-defense). This experiment supported our prediction and previous results that the distinction between just and unjust causes would be relevant for evaluating the permissibility of regular defensive killing. The novelty of the results refers mainly to evaluations of legitimate and no legitimate individual defensive killing. People generally evaluate more positive defensive killing by civilians on different sides and soldiers fighting a collective defensive war than killing by soldiers contributing to a war of aggression. In that way, the cause of the war that a soldier supports also appears to be a relevant criterion for determining the permissibility of individual defensive killing. These results would evidence that people's intuition seemed to align with the revisionist position of the just war theory not only in the case of collective self-defense but also in the case of individual self-defense. Notwithstanding, people generally tended to deem individual actions in legitimate self-defense more permissible than in non-legitimate self-defense.

General Discussion

For centuries, philosophers have drawn moral distinctions between wars waged in defense of common rights or to preserve peace and those waged to favor ambitious or perverse interests. They have also discussed the proper ways of waging war and the conditions that make killing permissible. Such moral criteria and distinctions have given rise to an ethical framework known as just war theory. In recent years, this ethical framework has guided moral psychologists to outline a research map and frame questions concerning the moral judgment of war. Just way theory has also provided a conceptual language for describing people's moral judgment of war while allowing dialogue between different scholars concerned with war's moral and legal dimensions.

A key assumption shared by some philosophers and moral psychologists concerned with the morality of war is that the principles encompassed within the just war theory have emerged and developed from moral intuitions shared by people in different times and cultures (Bellamy, 2006; McMahan, 2011; Traven, 2021; Walzer, 2015). Therefore, even when war has been a scenario of destruction and killing, women and men have not witnessed it passively. On the contrary, they have judged it based on moral considerations of necessity, righteousness, justice, or proportionality. Even those who take extreme pacifist or bellicist positions tend to consider there are circumstances in which it is either possible to justify the use of armed violence or to set moral limits to its use. Regarding killing, for example, previous research suggests that most people's moral judgments are consistent with the principle that demands the protection of civilians. Likewise, people tend to admit exceptions to that principle by considering conditions like those proposed by the doctrine of double effect (DDE) (Benbaji et al., 2015; Traven, 2015, 2021; Watkins, 2020, Watkins & Laham, 2019).

Yet moral intuitions about war do not differ widely from those people rely on to judge actions in other spheres of human life. As has been emphasized throughout this dissertation, people also admit exceptions to the prohibition against killing or harming others for the greater good in non-war contexts. Such exceptions involve considering moral distinctions regarding the agent's intentions, causal features of the action, and consequences, among others (Cushman & Young, 2011;

Greene et al., 2009; Mikhail, 2007, 2013). What makes war different from other situations is that it shows unique conditions that require additional criteria of moral judgment. For example, within the philosophical debates on the legitimacy of killing in war, a main criterion of judgment is the distinction between civilians, who must be protected, and combatants, who are legitimate targets. Such distinction, unique to war, makes the moral distinction between means and foreseeable side-effect posed by the DDE relevant in defining the permissibility of harming civilians, but not of harming combatants. Another example is the case of legitimate self-defense in war. Although moral criteria in this context are similar to moral criteria in the domestic sphere, some philosophers argue that the right to collective and individual self-defense in war should be separated so that a combatant who participates in collective aggression retains his right to individual self-defense (Walzer, 2015).

In view of the above considerations, this dissertation has raised two main questions: Which factors or psychological mechanisms account for people's moral judgments about the permissibility of killing in war? Are people's moral judgments aligned with some of the principles within the ethical framework of war or the just war theory? The answer to these two questions was given through different experiments on two different conditions that make it permissible to transgress the limits imposed on killing in war: the cases of killing as a side-effect and as self-defense.

5.1. Causal Factors as Criteria of the Moral Permissibility of Killing in War

Chapter 3 presented experimental research on the permissibility of killing as a side-effect in war. We conducted five experiments seeking to replicate the effect of the locus of intervention previously observed in both scenarios of war and non-war (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann et al., 2017; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010). The locus of intervention theory assumes that people focus on the initial target of the intervention in the causal chain, either a victim or a threat, and consider the moral consequences of the presence or absence of intervention on this target. Since the intervention on the victim focuses primarily on the harm caused to the victim, this type of intervention is more aversive than the intervention on the threat. Consistent with this assumption, previous research has shown that people tended to judge it less permissible to save the lives of a majority

by harming a smaller number of people in cases where the agent acted upon the smaller number of people by redirecting it to the threat. On the contrary, people deemed it more permissible to redirect the threat to a place with few people to save a majority.

In our experiments, the agent intervenes on a bus moving it in the line of a missile launcher that is about to harm 50 civilians. In the threat intervention condition, the bus is empty and headed for the missile, so the collision killed 5 people nearby as a side-effect. In the victim intervention condition, the victims are inside the bus and are redirected to the missile launcher. In general, we observed across experiments that participants who evaluated the threat intervention condition rated the permissibility of the action significantly higher than those who rated the victim intervention condition.

The results of our experiment added to previous evidence on the influence of the locus of intervention on moral judgments of actions taking place in war (Iliev et al., 2012; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). In the threat intervention condition, the intervention initially targets an empty bus, which is not a morally relevant target. The event that becomes morally relevant is the collision of the bus with the missile launcher, which is about to kill 50 people. In this case, the contrast analysis shows that with the intervention, 5 people will die, but in the absence of the intervention, 50 people will die. This favorable contrast led the threat intervention condition to be perceived as more permissible than the victim intervention. On the other hand, in the victim intervention, the bus's initial target is its passengers, the morally relevant target. Without the intervention, the 5 passengers would still be alive, whereas the intervention leads to their death, making the intervention aversive.

Note how our results differ from previous experiments using war scenarios and supporting predictions based on the DDE (di Nucci, 2014; Watkins & Laham, 2019). A key claim of the model based on the DDE is that what makes an act impermissible is using people as a means (Feltz & May, 2017; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007). Thus, researchers have presented participants with scenarios that differ between means and side-effect to test this claim[23]. However, in our victim and threat intervention condition, the death of the five victims is always a side-effect of the collision between the bus and the missile launcher. The distinction is

[23] For example, Footbridge and switch scenarios of trolley case (Watkin & Laham, 2019) or terrorist bomber and tactical bomber scenarios (di Nucci, 2014).

mainly given by how their deaths are related to the intervention. In the victim intervention condition, the intervention target, the bus, and the death of the five passengers inside are closely connected. This connection makes the fate of the victims more salient when making a moral evaluation of the action. In the threat intervention scenario, the deaths of the five bystanders are indirectly caused by the collision between the empty bus and the missile launcher. Thus, the fate of the victims is the last event in the causal chain, which leads to perceiving the act as less aversive[24]. Given the contrast between our scenarios, the DDE would not account for the differences we observed in people's moral judgments, thus showing that its predictions would be restricted to a limited number of cases where people are used as means. By contrast, the aversion to intervention over the victim proposed by the locus of intervention theory would extend to a wider range of cases beyond the scope of the DDE.

This advantage of the locus of intervention theory over the DDE is of particular interest in analyzing different cases of war where military actions are carried out at a greater distance and with weapons with a broader destructive range. For example, in scenarios of bombing over civilian population areas, civilians may not be used as a strictly means to gain victory or may even not be the direct target of military attack. However, people tend to find such acts morally unacceptable. Other controversial cases of war are the military siege, in which civilian are killed by cutting off food or water supplies, and those cases where civilians are killed by poisoning the water or using poisonous gases. Although such cases are now regarded as morally reprehensible, historically, they were justified by arguing that the death of innocents was only an intended side-effect of attacks targeting combatants (Walzer, 2015).

5.2. The Mediation of Differences between Victims in the Effect of the Locus of Intervention

Previous research has evidenced the effect of the moral status of victims in warfare, or the distinction between civilians and combatants, on judgments about the moral permissibility of killing (Benbaji, Falk, & Feldman, 2015; Watkins &

[24] This contrast between our scenarios is similar to Waldmann and Dieterich's (2007) experiment, showing that throwing a bomb toward a person is less aversive than throwing a person toward a bomb.

Laham, 2020). There is also research supporting the role of causal factors in moral judgment about the permissibility of harming soldiers during military actions (Iliev et al., 2012; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Watkins & Laham, 2019). However, no previous study had addressed the interaction between locus of intervention and differences in the kind of victims in war. We explored this interaction in a set of experiments presented in Chapter 3. A first question, not explored in previous research, was whether the observed effect of the locus of intervention remained for those situations of war in which civilians are at risk of protecting other civilians. The second question was whether the locus of intervention was equally relevant for the moral evaluation of scenarios involving the exchange of soldiers to save civilians. This second question also asked whether people based their evaluations on a simple distinction between soldiers and civilians or whether their judgments also varied when victims had characteristics related to both categories.

The result of experiment 1 shows an effect of the locus of intervention on scenarios describing a trade-off of civilians to save civilians. This effect showed that people find impermissible an intervention that directly harms people who did not consent to be sacrificed to save others. These judgments were consistent with normative concern about civilian protection in war (Bellamy, 2012a; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). However, from a normative point of view, the permissibility of killing depends on the role of the victim on the battlefield. Therefore, the immunity of civilians is mainly given by contrasting their role with that of combatants (Fotion, 2007, Orend, 2013, Walzer, 2015). Given this view, Experiment 1 should be considered a starting point for exploring the role of victim status in judgments of moral permissibility in war. Its results should be contrasted with the following experiments in which combatants are described as potential victims.

Having determined the role of the locus of intervention as a moral factor influencing moral judgments in war, we designed three other experiments in which the moral asymmetry between civilians and soldiers becomes the interest factor. In experiment 2, we manipulated the victim's status by presenting participants with a scenario in which the potential victims sacrificed to save the people in the village were children, farmers or soldiers. The results of this experiment are inconclusive given the low likelihood of detecting a small effect of the locus of intervention. However, we observed a slight difference in ratings of moral permissibility across

the three groups of victims, which led us to test the interaction between two factors in a new experiment.

For experiment 3, we made some corrections to the experimental design, using a mixed-model design, and excluded a category of civilian victims (children) to focus on the simple contrast between regular civilians and soldiers (farmers vs. soldiers). In that way, we increased to 90% the probability of detecting a small interaction effect (partial eta-squared, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$). As in experiment 1, we observed an effect of the locus of intervention on the moral evaluations of scenarios involving a trade-off between civilians to save civilians. However, people seemed to rely less on differences in this causal factor when evaluating scenarios involving a trade-off of soldiers to save civilians. These results would suggest that the status of the victim in war defines whether the place in which the agent intervenes is relevant to judge the moral permissibility of the action. While victim interventions were considered less permissible than threat interventions when civilians are sacrificed to save civilians, the effect largely disappears when soldiers are sacrificed. According to the just war theory (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015), civilians can expect to be protected from harm unless there are exceptional circumstances. On the contrary, it is enough to be a soldier to be susceptible to military attack, and it is okay to put soldiers at risk to save others. The results of our experiment appeared to be consistent with this distinction. Likewise, the widespread perception that being a soldier is a sufficient condition to be a legitimate military target or to be put at risk to save the lives of others seemed to persist.

Experiment 4 responds to the current debate between a traditional view of the just war theory (Bellamy, 2006; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015) and revisionist approaches about the criteria justifying killing civilians and soldiers in war (Fabre, 2009, 2014; McMahan, 2009). In this regard, we investigated whether people's judgments were consistent either with the simple distinction between civilians and combatants drawn by traditionalists or with the casuistic approach by revisionists, which considers that the permissibility of a military attack depends on whether the victims participate in the battle and contribute to an unjust cause.

To investigate whether people's evaluations vary beyond the simple distinction between civilians and soldiers, we introduced a new category of victims, a group of farmers-soldiers. These victims have a limited role in the battle, distinguishing them from civilians and regular soldiers. They join the army, receive

military training and are armed, but their role is limited to protecting their farms and families. Despite this group of victims having the status of a soldier, we observed a significant difference in moral permissibility to victim intervention and threat intervention conditions. This difference was not as large as that observed in the scenarios with civilians (in our case, farmers).

However, it is enough to consider that people evaluate the permissibility of harming victims in war beyond the narrow distinction between civilians and soldiers, as proposed by a traditionalist view of the just war theory (Walzer, 2015). Instead, consistent with a more casuistic approach (Fabre, 2009, 2014; McMahan, 2011), people would consider other available information about the potential victim's background, such as the reason for enlisting in the military and the degree of commitment to the battle. For example, farmer-soldiers voluntarily decided to become soldiers and received military training might make people consider it more permissible to risk their lives to save others than farmers who remained regular civilians. However, people also seemed to pay attention to the fact that these farmer-soldiers joined the army to defend their farms and families, so they seem to have some right to not be harmed. This combination of characteristics between civilians and regular soldiers may lead people to think that the distinction between victims and threat intervention is still relevant in judging the permissibility of harming farmer-soldiers.

Finally, we asked whether group bias can trigger differences in moral evaluations of killing in war. Previous studies in moral psychology have shown that group bias is related to the dehumanization and emotional subhumanization of victims (Bloom, Kimhi, Fachter, Shamai & Canetti, 2020; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Moncrieff & Lienard, 2018). In a recent study, Watkins and Laham (2020) have also shown that stereotypes and a sense of dehumanization can mediate moral evaluations of the harm to soldiers. In experiment 5, we used four different scenarios that varied according to the locus of intervention and the group of victims (in-group and out-group). In some scenarios, the victims to be sacrificed to save the people in the village were enemy civilians; in other scenarios, the victims were civilians from the same country. The results of this experiment showed that group bias affects moral judgment about killing in war, a result that is consistent with previous research on the role of this factor (Leidner et al., 2010; Moncrieff & Lienard, 2018; Watkins &

Laham, 2019). Furthermore, the interaction between locus of intervention and victims' group indicated that the difference in causal features of the action seems to be only relevant to evaluating the moral permissibility of harming civilians within the same group.

5.3. The Influence of the Cause of War in Moral Evaluation of Collective and Individual Defensive Killing

The research presented in Chapter 4 comprises three experiments investigating people's moral judgment about regular killing in war as part of collective action and individual defensive killing. One of the main questions guiding this experiment derives from the philosophical discussion between traditionalists and revisionists of the just war theory on the importance of the cause of war to define the permissibility of a combatant to kill other combatants or civilians. Despite a slight difference, both positions agree that it is wrong to kill civilians in war since they do not participate in the battle or pose a threat (Fabre, 2009, 2014; Mcmahna, 2011; Walzer, 2015). The point in controversy is about the traditional view of the moral equality of combatants, i.e., combatants on the just and unjust side have the same right to kill and be killed by their enemies (Fotion, 20107; Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). The traditionalist argues that the morality of the combatant's behavior is determined solely by the principles of jus in bello, namely, the principle of discrimination between civilians and combatants, but not by the morality of the cause of war. In contrast, revisionists hold the morality of the cause of war, the collective reasons, as the main criteria to define whether a combatant has a right to live with their enemies (Lazar, 2013, McMahan, 2011). Previous experiments in moral psychology have shown an asymmetry in people's evaluations of killing by combatants on just and unjust sides, deeming it less permissible killing by combatants fighting in an unjust war (Benjabi et al., 2015; Watkisn & Goodwin, 2020; Watkins and Laham, 2020). These results suggest that people's intuitions align better with a revisionist position of the morality of war than with a traditionalist position.

Experiments 6 and 7 investigated the effect of the cause of war and the victim's identity on moral judgments about regular killing in war. We asked the participant to evaluate the action of a soldier, described as a soldier, engaged in either an aggressive war campaign or a collective defense mobilization. In some

conditions, the soldiers find an enemy soldier and kill him. The victim was described as an innocent peasant from the enemy country under other conditions. Both experiments used the same design, so the second experiment was intended to replicate the result of the first experiment. The difference between the two experiments is that only the first experiment used real names to describe the countries. The countries in the first experiment were Nazi Germany, which was waging a war of extermination, and Poland, which was acting in self-defense against the Germans. Instead, the second experiment used fictitious names: the totalitarian Yellow Nation waging an aggressive war and the democratic Blue Nation waging a defensive war. In both experiments, people evaluated more positively the killing of unjust combatants (from Nazi Germany or the totalitarian Yellow Nation) by just combatants (from Poland or the Blue Nation), than the killing of just combatants by unjust combatants.

The results of experiments 6 and 7 replicated previous research (showing that people consider information about the cause of war to judge whether a combatant is morally allowed to kill enemy combatants. These results also evidence that people's intuitions are more aligned with a revisionist of the just war theory (Lazar, 2013; McMahan, 2011) than with a traditionalist view (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015). Note that our scenarios presented a war in which one side was defending itself against a campaign of extermination by the other side. Instead, in other studies (Benjabi et al., 2015; Watkins and Laham, 2020), the war described had to do with competition for territory and natural resources. Thus, in contrast to previous studies, our result refers more clearly to the discussion of the legitimacy of war in defense of a group's life.

Yet, the relevance of the justice of the war, or the collective ends, as a moral criterion for the judgment of killing in war was limited to moral evaluation about killing among combatants. In other words, Experiments 7 and 8 showed that the effect of the cause of war on moral judgments disappeared in conditions where the victims were civilians, regardless of whether they belonged to the side fighting a defensive war or a war of aggression. This effect of differences between civilians and combatants was observed in the Watkins and Laham study (2020), but not in the research by Benjabi et al. (2015). In the latter investigation, people who assumed the perspective of a just side commander tended to agree to attack the enemy, even if the attack caused harm to civilians and combatants alike.

Experiment 8 investigated the moral evaluation of individual defensive killing. Previous research has explored moral judgment about killing with scenarios in which combatants or civilians must kill to protect the lives of their community members (Benjabi et al., 2015; Watkisn & Goodwin, 2020; Watkins and Laham, 2020). Instead, this experiment described scenarios where combatants and civilians kill to protect their own lives. We manipulated the cause of the war, the identity of the attacker (soldiers vs. civilians), and the type of killing (legitimate self-defense vs. non-legitimate self-defense). The scenarios in this experiment described a similar situation in the war between two sides to the one presented in experiment 7. Participants were asked to evaluate the action of a soldier or a peasant who kills an enemy soldier. In self-defense conditions, the agent acts before the enemy soldier shoots him; in the condition of no self-defense, the agent kills an unarmed and unsuspecting soldier. In general, people evaluated more favorably the legitimate self-defense actions of civilians on different sides and of combatants fighting a collective defensive war, as opposed to combatants contributing to a war of aggression. These evaluations would suggest that people consider the morality of the cause of war or the collective reason to make war a significant criterion for evaluating the permissibility of individual defensive killing. Thus, in the case of individual self-defense, people's judgments also appeared to be consistent with the revisionist perspective of the just war theory (Lazar, 2013, McMahan, 2011).

However, although most people evaluate the action of unjust combatants unfavorably in legitimate and non-legitimate self-defense conditions, they still consider that killing by unjust combatants in self-defense is more permissible than in no self-defense. Such a difference in judgments suggests that for people, the immediate defense of one's own life against an objective threat may justify killing even if it contributes to a less proximate collective end. Thus, people's evaluations of individual self-defense appear not to be as strict as the revisionist view that a combatant completely waives his right to a defensive response by fighting in an unjust war.

Finally, the normative debate about the independence between the cause of war and the morality of military conduct can be interpreted as a problem about the independence between collective and individual intentions. For revisionists of the just war theory, for instance, the individual actions of conduct contributing to collective ends or intentions cannot be judged independently of the morality of such

ends (Frowe, 2014; Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2011). Thus, even if a combatant waging a war of aggression respects the rules of combat, he is still committing a war crime. In experiments 6, 7 and 8, people's judgment appeared to be more aligned with this revisionist view, i.e., they also considered the agent's intention relevant to judging war's morality. At the same time, it appeared that people do not separate intentions driving individual actions from the collective ends to which such actions contribute.

Previous evidence in moral psychology shows that people regard agents' intentions as relevant when judging the morality of an action (Alicke and Zell, 2009; Cushman, 2008; Cushman and Young, 2011; Guglielmo, 2015; Knobe, 2004). In some studies, for example, people tend to make spontaneous evaluations according to agents' characteristics and mental states. They respond positively to socially attractive agents or who show behavior consistent with accepted values and negatively to agents who belong to a disliked ethnic group or whose behavior has led to a disastrous outcome (Alicke & Zell, 2009; Knobe, 2004). By showing that people judge more negatively agents involved in immoral or unjust wars, our research would add to this previous research as a first approach suggesting that collective and individual intentions are also relevant when judging the morality of actions in a war context.

5.4. Limitations and Perspectives for Future Research

In general terms, the different experiments presented throughout this dissertation have some characteristics that may limit the scope of our conclusions. First, in the different experiments, the scenarios described a war situation between two nations, where the agent always belonged to one of the two warring sides. Such scenarios conform to a traditional or paradigmatic idea of modern warfare between states, where the actors, their roles, and territorial boundaries are well defined. Similarly, the scenarios clearly describe whether an agent is fighting a just or unjust war, with the moral contrast between the two warring sides being equally clear. However, the nature of war is much more complex than in our hypothetical cases. For example, most of the wars of the 20th century have been conflicts between regular and irregular sides, either from the same country or from different countries (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016; Hobsbawm, 1994; Luard, 1986). Within some irregular forces, such as guerrilla or terrorist groups, it is difficult to clearly

distinguish the role of combatants and civilians. In addition, many armed conflicts involve a struggle for territory and resources, with unclear territorial boundaries and, in many cases, even the existence of a legitimate state is not evident.

Similarly, establishing whether a war is just in real war conditions is highly complex. For example, in the cases of revolutionary civil wars or wars of independence, both sides have seemingly legitimate reasons for using armed force. In extended wars, such as the Colombian case, both the state and the guerrillas have been perpetrators and victims claiming legitimate defense (Marulanda-Hernández & Yáñez-Canal, 2015). The Colombian case is also an example of how a just cause can be legitimate, but the means used to defend such a cause make the war unjust. On the other hand, in our experiments, we focused only on the war in which the just side fights to defend its members against the aggression of a totalitarian or hostile state. However, this is only one of several possible just causes of war. For example, the defense of territory or political autonomy is also legitimate. Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, humanitarian intervention in another state or preventive war constitutes just causes of war.

Second, given the need for experimental control, the agents' actions described in our studies take place in limited and detailed battlefield circumstances. The reality of the battlefield is complex, and the decisions and actions of agents respond to multiple variables that cannot be easily described or cannot be decoupled in experimental designs. Combatants, for example, act under circumstances of duress or under conditions of physical and psychological exhaustion that may be relevant when judging the morality of their acts (Centeno & Enriquez, 2016; Grossman, 2009). People may also consider important information about the combatant's character or personality traits (Watkins & Laham, 2020). It must also be taken into account that the combatants act under a militant structure, hierarchically organized, following a collective plan and under orders from their superiors. Our experiments do not provide extensive information about the conditions under which combatants act, nor do they describe whether combatants behave according to their own will or whether their intentions differ from those of the organization or group to which they belong. Therefore, there was an open space for people to make free inferences about these aspects.

This dissertation also opens additional questions regarding the distinction between victims in war. First, in contrast to Watkins and Laham's study (2019),

most of our experiments on side-effect killing in chapter 3 were restricted to the problem of exchange between victims of the same side waging a just war and acting to defend its population. In that way, our conclusion cannot be generalized to explain moral evaluations of the harm caused to victims, whether civilians or combatants, of different sides. The grade in which a person may be sacrificed to save others according to the side of the war she belongs to has prompted a recent debate in moral philosophy. For example, Kamm (2012) proposed a violability ranking considering that it is more permissible to kill combatants than civilians and more morally permissible to kill enemy combatants than their own combatants. Likewise, it would be more permissible to put in risk enemy civilians that own civilians. Thus, her ranking of vulnerability is as follows: own non-combatant < enemy non-combatant < own combatant <<< enemy combatant. No previous research has tested whether people's judgments would or would not be consistent with this or similar rankings.

There are some differences in how the previous and the present research have described the civilians involved in the scenarios. For example, Benjabi et al. (2015) asked people to evaluate the killing of civilians supporting soldiers with food and civilians not participating in the war. The researchers found no difference in moral judgments between these two cases. On the other hand, Watkins and Laham (2020) did not provide details on the role or participation of civilians in the war. In contrast to these studies, our experiment described civilians from the just and unjust sides as innocent people sheltering from war. Given these differences, it is difficult to conclude from the various experiments whether moral judgments about the killing of civilians derive from the traditional distinction between combatants and civilians (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015) or the distinction made by revisionists between innocents and those who pose an unjust threat to others (Fabre, 2009, 2014; Frowe, 2014; Kamm, 2012; McMahan, 2011).

In different experiments, we manipulated different categories of victims with a defined role in the war. However, war offers many examples in which civilians and combatants play different roles with varying degrees of contribution to the war. For example, Fabre (2009) argues that it is morally permissible to harm civilians working in a weapons factory or engaged in battle. However, it is not permissible to target soldiers who play a role as medical or logistic personnel. Similarly, McMahan (2009) argues that soldiers should be immune from attack

when they fight for a just cause or maintain their status as soldiers but do not pose a significant threat to the enemy. The philosophical discussion of self-defense also considers more complex cases related to the differences between the aggressor and the victim. For example, Frowe (2014) considers that it might also be permissible to harm people who pose an indirect threat or people who unintentionally pose a threat to the lives of others. Thus, a question of interest for empirical research is how this variability in the role of victims, well discussed in the normative field, might interact with the factors already identified to influence moral judgment.

On the other hand, our research focused on war scenarios without comparing similar actions in peace scenarios. Although the distinction between combatants and soldiers is specific to the war, in non-war contexts, there also are distinctions between those ordinary individuals and those who assume a role of protection from others that may be relevant when considering the permissibility of harm. For example, police officers, firefighters or nurses risk their lives daily to save others. The question remains whether, in emergencies, people would consider it more permissible to cause harm to such people, in contrast to ordinary people, to achieve a greater good. Likewise, it is open to whether differences in locus of intervention would be equally relevant to defining the permissibility of harming a police officer or firefighter to save other people.

Another open question has to do with a contemporary discussion about the moral implications of the traditional representation of combatants as an instrument for the benefit of others. Some authors argue that this representation leads to the dehumanization of the combatant (Benvenisti, 2006; Fabre, 2014; McMahan, 2009). Previous studies in moral psychology have shown that group bias is linked to dehumanization and emotional infrahumanization of victims (Bloom, Kimhi, Fachter, Shamai, & Canetti, 2020; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Moncrieff & Lienard, 2018). In a recent study, Watkins & Laham (2020) have also shown that stereotypes and a sense of dehumanization may mediate moral evaluations about harm to soldiers. Future research could explore whether a shared conception of instrumentalization or dehumanization of soldiers may explain variations in people's evaluation of the moral permissibility of killing.

Finally, several current studies in moral psychology have oriented to conduct experiments following a cross-cultural perspective characterized by a

wider heterogeneity of the participants. For example, different studies have observed that the variation in responses to dilemmas such as the trolley problem is similar across different nationalities and cultures, with different characteristics and languages (Awad et al., 2020; Bago et al., 2022; Hauser et al., 2007). As for the moral judgment of war, there have so far been no comparative studies that allow us to determine whether linguistic or cultural differences might condition the observed results. As in most previous research, given time and resource constraints, the studies in this dissertation were conducted with native English speakers. However, the findings of this research on the morality of killing in war should be considered as a reference to promote new large-scale cross-cultural research on the moral psychology of war.

We have described previous work that compares manuscripts and codes from different cultures and suggests relevant cultural variations in the emergence, transmission, and application of moral and legal principles for war (Morkevičius, 2018; Traven, 2015, 2021). Similarly, previous research on attitudes toward war and terrorism has identified correlations between nationality (Li et al., 2016; van der Linden et al., 2011), religious beliefs and political affiliation (Friese et al., 2009; Wille, 2007) with responses of rejection or support toward military actions. On a similar line, other research has identified cultural differences in the discourses of political and military leaders toward the declaration of war (Halverscheid & Witte, 2008). In general, this previous research would suggest that not only ethical, political, and religious differences, but also certain historical conditions, such as living through or having experienced war (e.g., Ukraine, Rwanda, Syria, Colombia) or political violence (e.g., having suffered from fascist totalitarianism or communist regimes), may have a significant impact on the representation of what is morally right or wrong in war.

Based on previous studies on war, we might anticipate that future research with scenarios similar to those employed in this dissertation would show variations across different contexts or cultures in people's evaluations of the morality of killing in war. Such research would be challenging, requiring translation and adaptation of the material into different languages, as well as extensive logistical effort. However, studies in this direction are necessary if we are to deepen our understanding of the emergence and evolution of war norms and the interaction

between the cognitive, historical, and social factors underlying the moral judgment of war.

References

Allen, N. A. (2006). Just war in the Mahābhārata. In R. Sorabji & D. Rodin (Eds.), *The ethics of war: Shared problems in different traditions.* Ashgate.

Alicke, M. D., and Zell, E. (2009). Social attractiveness and blame. *J. Appl. Soc. Psychol*. 39, 2089–2105. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2009.00517.x

Awad, E., Dsouza, S., Shariff, A., Rahwan, I., & Bonnefon, J.-F. (2020). Universals and variations in moral decisions made in 42 countries by 70,000 participants. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 117(5), 2332–2337. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1911517117

Bago, B., Kovacs, M., Protzko, J., Nagy, T., et a l., (2022). Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample. *Nature Human Behaviour*. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1038/s41562-022-01319-5

Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of moral thought and action. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), *Handbook of moral behavior and development.* L. Erlbaum.

Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. *Journal of Moral Education*, *31*(2), 101–119. doi: 10.1080/0305724022014322

Barry, C., & Christie, L. (2017). The moral equality of combatants. In Lazar, S., & Frowe, H. (Eds.) *The Oxford handbook of ethics of war*. New York NY: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199943418.001.0001

Bellamy, A. J. (2006). *Just wars: From Cicero to Iraq*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bellamy, A. J. (2012a). *Massacres and morality*: Mass atrocities in an age of civilian immunity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bellamy, A. J. (2012b). *Massacres and morality*: Mass killing in an age of civilian immunity. Human Rights Quarterly, 34(4), 927–958. doi:10.1353/hrq.2012.0066

Benbaji, Y., Falk, A., & Feldman, Y. (2015). Commonsense morality and the ethics of killing in war: An experimental survey of the Israeli population.

The Law & Ethics of Human Rights, *9*(2), 195-227. doi: 10.1515/lehr-2015-0009

Benvenisti, E. (2006). Human dignity in combat: The duty to spare enemy civilians. *Israel Law Review*, 39(2), 81–109. doi:10.1017/S0021223700013029

Berns, L. (1987). Thomas Hobbes. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Blass, T. (1991). Understanding behavior in the Milgram obedience experiment: The role of personality, situations, and their interactions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*(3), 398–413. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.60.3.398

Bleske-Rechek, A., Nelson, L. A., Baker, J. P., Remiker, M. W., & Brandt, S. J. (2010). Evolution and the trolley problem: People save five over one unless the one is young, genetically related, or a romantic partner. *Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology*, *4*(3), 115–127. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0099295

Bloom, P. B.-N., Kimhi, S., Fachter, S., Shamai, M., & Canetti, D. (2020). Coping with moral threat: moral judgment amid war on terror. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *64*(2-3), 231–260. doi: 10.1177/0022002719854209

Bothwell, R. K., & Kennison, E. (2004). The authoritarian personality and attitudes toward war. *Peace Review*, *16*(4), 467–470. doi: .1080/1040265042000318707

Brooks, D. J., & Valentino, B. A (211). A war of one´s own: undertanding the gender gap in support of war. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *75*(2), 270–286. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41288384

Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2006). Not quite human: Infrahumanization in response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *90*(5), 804–818. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.804

Castano, E., & Kofta, M. (2009). Dehumanization: Humanity and its denial. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *12*(6), 695–697. doi: 10.1177/1368430209350265

Carnagey, N. L., & Anderson, C. A. (2007). Changes in attitudes towards war and violence after September 11, 2001. *Aggressive Behavior*, *33*(2), 118–129. doi:10.1002/ab.20173

Centeno, M. A., & Enriquez, E. (2016). *War & society*. Political sociology series. Cambridge UK, Malden MA: Polity.

Chemla, E., Egré, P., & Schlenker, P. (2015). Predicting moral judgments from causal judgments. *Philosophical Psychology*, *28*(1), 21--48. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.863145

Christensen, J. F., Flexas, A., Calabrese, M., Gut, N. K., & Gomila, A. (2014). Moral judgment reloaded: A moral dilemma validation study. *Frontiers in Psychology, 5.* doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00607

Clausewitz, C. von (2006). Ethics and military strategy. In G. M. Reichberg, H. Syse, & E. Begby (Eds.), *The ethics of war: Classic and contemporary readings*. Malden MA, Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Coates, A. J. (1997). *The ethics of war*. New York: Manchester University Press

Cohrs, J. C., & O'Dwyer, E. (2018). “In the minds of men. .”: Social representations of war and military intervention. In P. L. Hammack (Ed.), *Oxford library of psychology. The Oxford handbook of social psychology and social justice* (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199938735.013.29

Cohrs, J. C., & Moschner, B [Barbara] (2002). Antiwar knowledge and generalized political attitudes as determinants of attitude toward the Kosovo war. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *8*(2), 139–155. doi: 10.1207/S15327949PAC0802_0

Covell, K. (1996). National and gender differences in adolescents' War Attitudes. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, *19*(4), 871–883. doi: 10.1177/016502549601900411

Crockett, M. J. (2013). Models of morality. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, *17*(8), 363-366. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.005

Cropsey, J. (1987). Karl Marx. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crowson, H. M. (2009). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. *Social Psychology*, *40*(2), 93–103. doi:10.1027/1864-9335.40.2.93

Cushman, F. (2008) Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. *Cognition* 108 (2), pág. 353–380. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006.

Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011). Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations. *Cognitive Science, 35*(6), 1052--1075. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x

Davis, J. (2021). Scope restrictions, national partiality, and war. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 20*(2). doi: 10.26556/jesp.v20i2.1170

Di Nucci, E. (2013). Double effect and terror bombing. In T. Spitzley, M. Hoeltje, & W. Spohn (Eds.), *Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V.* GAP.

Di Nucci, E. (2014). *Ethics without intention*. Bloomsbury ethics. Bloomsbury.

Dinstein, Y. (2012). *War, aggression, and self-defense* (5th ed.). Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511920622.013

Dower, N. (2009). *The ethics of war and peace: Cosmopolitan and other perspectives*. Cambridge UK, Malden MA: Polity.

Elster, J. (1989). *Nuts and bolts for the social sciences*. Cambridge University Press.

Fabre, C. (2009). Guns, food, and liability to attack in war. *Ethics*, *120*(1), 36–63. doi:10.1086/649218

Fabre, C. (2014). *Cosmopolitan war*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567164.001.0001

Fedyk, M. (2017). *The social turn in moral psychology*. MIT Press.

Feltz, A., & May, J. (2017). The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-analysis. *Cognition, 166*, 314--327. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.027

Festinger, L. (2009). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*). Stanford University Press.

FitzPatrick, W. J. (2012). The Doctrine of double effect : Intention and permissibility. *Philosophy Compass*, *7*(3), 183–196. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00474.x

Foot, P. (1967). The Problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect . *Oxford Review*, *5*, 5–15.

Fotion, N. (2007). *War and ethics: A new just war theory*. London, New York: Continuum.

Fortin, E. L. (1987). St. Thomas Aquinas. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friese, M., Fishman, S., Beatson, R., Sauerwein, K., & Rip, B. (2009). Whose fault is it anyway? Political orientation, attributions of responsibility, and support for the war in Iraq. *Social Justice Research*, *22*(2-3), 280–297. doi: 10.1007/s11211-009-0095-2

Frowe, H. (2014). *Defensive killing*. Oxford University Press.

Greene, J. D, Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E, Darley, J. M, & Cohen, J. D (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science (New York, N.Y.), 293(5537), 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872

Greene, J. D, Nystrom, L. E, Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M, & Cohen, J. D (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. *Neuron*, *44*(2), 389–400. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027

Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. *Cognition*, *111*(3), 364–371. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.001

Greene, J. D (2013). *Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them*.New York: The Penguin Press.

Grossman, D. (2009). *On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society*. Back Bay Books.

Guglielmo, S (2015): Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review. Frontiers in psychology 6, 1637. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01637.

Haidt, J (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834.

Haidt, J., & Baron, J. (1996). Social roles and the moral judgement of acts and omissions. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *26*(2), 201–218. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199603)26:2<201::AID-EJSP745>3.0.CO;2-J

Hao, J., Liu, Y., & Li, J. (2015). Latent fairness in adults' relationship-based moral judgments. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *6*, 1871. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01871

Halverscheid, S., & Witte, E. H. (2008). Justification of war and terrorism. *Social Psychology*, *39*(1), 26–36. doi:1027/1864-9335.39.1.26

Hassner, P. (1987a). Georg W.F. Hegel. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hassner, P. (1987b). Immanuel Kant. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Kang-Xing, R., Jin, & Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. *Mind and Language*, 1-21.

Hegel, G. (2006). War and the spirit of the nation-state. In G. M. Reichberg, H. Syse, & E. Begby (Eds.), *The ethics of war: Classic and contemporary readings*. Malden MA, Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Held, V. (1996). Whose agenda? Ethics versus cognitive science. In L. May, M. Friedman, & A. Clark (Eds.), *Mind and morals: Essays on cognitive science and ethics.* MIT Press.

Held, V. (2002). Moral subjects: The natural and the normative. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, *76*(2), 7. doi:10.2307/3218626

Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world?. *The Behavioral and brain sciences*, 33(2-3), 61–135. doi:0.1017/S0140525X0999152X

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1994). *Age of extremes: The short twentieth century, 1914-1991*. London: M. Joseph.

Holmes, R. L. (1989). *On war and morality. Studies in moral, political, and legal philosophy.* Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Iliev, R. I., Sachdeva, S., & Medin, D. L. (2012). Moral kinematics: The role of physical factors in moral judgments. *Memory & Cognition*, *40*(8), 1387–1401. doi:10.3758/s13421-012-0217-1

International Committee of the Red Cross. (1999). The people on war report: ICRC worldwide consultation on the rules of war.

https://shop.icrc.org/the-people-on-war-report-icrc-worldwide-consultation-on-the-rules-of-war.html

Jacobs, J. (2008). *Dimensions of moral theory: An introduction to metaethics and moral psychology*. John Wiley & Sons.

Johnson, M. L. (1996). How moral psychology changes moral theory. In L. May, M. Friedman, & A. Clark (Eds.), *Mind and morals: Essays on cognitive science and ethics.* MIT Press.

Kahan, D. M., & Braman, D. (2008). The self-defensive cognition of self-defense. *American Criminal Law Review*, *45*(1), 1-66.

Kahane, G., & Shackel, N. (2010). Methodological Issues in the Neuroscience of Moral Judgement. *Mind & Language*, *25*(5), 561–582. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01401.x

Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018). Beyond sacrificial harm: A two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology. Psychological Review, 125(2), 131-164. doi:10.1037/rev0000093

Kamm, F. M. (1989). Harming some to save others. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, *57*(3), 227–260. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320077

Kamm, F. M. (2007). *Intricate ethics: Rights, responsibilities, and permissible harm*. *Oxford ethics series*. Oxford University Press.

Kamm, F. M. (2011). *Ethics for enemies: Terror, torture, and war*. *Uehiro series in practical ethics*. Oxford University Press.

Kamm, F. M. (2012). *The moral target: Aiming at right conduct in war and other conflicts*. *Oxford ethics series*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kamm, F. M., & Rakowski, E. (2015). *The trolley problem mysteries*. *The berkeley tanner lectures*. Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190247157.001.0001

Kant, I. (2006). Cosmopolitan Rights, Human Progress, and Perpetual Peace. In G. M. Reichberg, H. Syse, & E. Begby (Eds.), *The ethics of war: Classic and contemporary readings*. Malden MA, Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Kelsay, J. (2006). Arguments concerning resistance in contemporary islam. In R. Sorabji & D. Rodin (Eds.), *The ethics of war: Shared problems in different traditions*. Ashgate.

Kelsay, J. (2018). Alberico Gentili. In D. R. Brunstetter & C. O'Driscoll (Eds.), *War, conflict and ethics. Just war thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st century*. London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Knobe, J (2004): Intention, intentional action and moral considerations: *Analysis* 64 (2), 181-187.

Knobe, J. (2010). Action trees and moral judgment. *Topics in Cognitive Science*, 2(3), 555–578. doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01093.x

Kuterovac Jagodi, G. (2000). Is war a good or a bad thing? The attitudes of Croatian, Israeli, and Palestinian children toward war. *International Journal of Psychology*, *35*(6), 241–257. doi: 10.1080/002075900750047969

Lazar, S. (2013). Associative duties and the ethics of killing in war. *Journal of Practical Ethics*, *1*(1).

Leidner, B., Castano, E., Zaiser, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2010). Ingroup glorification, moral disengagement, and justice in the context of collective violence. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, *36*(8), 1115–1129. doi: 10.1177/0146167210376391

Lang, A. F. (2018). Hugo Grotius. In D. R. Brunstetter & C. O'Driscoll (Eds.), *War, conflict and ethics. Just war thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st century*. London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Levine, S., Leslie, A. M., & Mikhail, J. (2018). The mental representation of human action. *Cognitive Science*, 42(4), 1229–1264. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12608

Li, C., Li, D., Huang, Z., & Chiu, C. (2016). Peace and war: Rewarding intergroup contacts make past intergroup aggression unforgivable. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *22*(2), 166–167. doi: 10.1037/pac0000140

Lord, C. (1987). Aristotle. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Luard, E. (1986). *War in international society: A study in international sociology*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Marquis, D. B. (1991). Four versions of double effect. *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, *16*(5), 515–544. doi:10.1093/jmp/16.5.515

McAlister, A. L., Bandura, A., & Owen, S. V. (2006). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in support of military force: The Impact of Sept. 11. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *25*(2), 141–165. doi: 10.1521/jscp.2006.25.2.141

MacIntyre, A. C. (1985). *After virtue: A study in moral theory* (2. ed.). London: Duckworth.

McIntyre, A. (2001). Doing away with double effect. *Ethics*, *111*(2), 219--255. doi:10.1086/233472

Marulanda-Hernández, J.C. (2012). El emotivismo moral y su influencia en las teorías contemporáneas del desarrollo moral. *Polisemia,* 13:76-85

Marulanda-Hernández, J. C., & Yáñez-Canal, J. (2015). Moralidad y justicia en la guerra: reflexiones para un abordaje desde la psicología moral. In J. Yáñez-Canal, J. C. Marulanda-Hernández, & L. M. Segovia Nieto (Eds.), *Cognición, moral y desarrollo psicológico. Justicia, guerra y mundo social.* Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios, UNIMINUTO.

Marulanda-Hernández, J. C., & Yáñez-Canal, J. (2017). Principios morales de la guerra: Actitudes frente a la transgresión. *Revista Iberoamericana De Psicología*, *10*(1), 1–8.

Marulanda-Hernández, J. C., & Yáñez Canal, J. (2018). Concepción en torno a las causas justas de la declaración de guerra. *Tesis Psicológica*, *13*(1), 1–23. doi:10.37511/tesis.v13n1a2

Martín-Baró, I. (1983). *Acción e ideología: Psicología social desde Centroamérica* (1a ed.). *Colección Textos universitarios. Serie Psicología: Vol. 1*. UCA Editores.

Martín-Baró, I., Blanco Abarca, A., & La Corte Ibáñez, L. d. (2003). *Poder, ideología y violencia*. Trotta.

Mayton, D. (1988). Measurement of nuclear war attitudes: Methods and concerns. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, *9*(4), 241–263. doi:10.1207/s15324834basp0904_1

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2006). War as an instrument of emancipation. In G. M. Reichberg, H. Syse, & E. Begby (Eds.), The ethics of war: Classic and contemporary readings. Malden MA, Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

May, L. (2008). The principle of just cause. In L. May & E. Crookston (Eds.), *War: Essays in political philosophy*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

McMahan, J. (1994a). Innocence, self-defense and killing in war. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *2*(3), 193–221. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.1994.tb00021.x

McMahan, J. (1994b). Self-defense and the problem of the innocent attacker. *Ethics*, *104*(2), 252–290. doi: 10.1086/293600

McMahan, J. (2004). The ethics of killing in war. *Ethics*, *114*(4), 693–733.

McMahan, J. (2005). Just Cause for War. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *19*(3), 1–21. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00551.x

McMahan, J. (2006). On the moral equality of combatants. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *14*(4), 377–393.

McMahan, J. (2011). *Killing in War*. New York: Oxford University Press, U.S.A.

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, *67*, 371–378. doi: 10.1037/h0040525

Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *11*(4), 143--152. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.12.007

Mikhail, J. M. (2013). *Elements of moral cognition: Rawl's linguistic analogy and the cognitive science of moral and legal judgment*. Cambridge University Press.

Moncrieff, M. A., & Lienard, P. (2018). Moral judgments of in-group and out-group harm in post-conflict urban and rural croatian communities. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*, 212. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00212

Morkevičius, V. (2018). *Realist ethics: Just war traditions as power politics*. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108235396

Myers-Bowman, K. S., Walker, K., & Myers-Walls, J. A. (2005). “Differences between war and peace are big": Children from Yugoslavia and the United States describe peace and war. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *11*(2), 177–198. doi: 10.1207/s15327949pac1102_4

Nussbaum, M. C. (2007). *Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership . The Tanner lectures on human values*. Harvard University Press.

Ohlin, J. D. (2017). The doctrine of legitimate defense. Advance online publication. doi:10.31228/osf.io/jg5yr

Orend, B. (2013). *The morality of war*. Broadview Press.

Pasupathi, M., Wainryb, C., Bourne, S., & Posada, R. (2017). Narrative construction of morality in adolescence among typically developing and violence-exposed youth. *Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 37*(2), 178–198. https://doi.org/10.1177/0276236617733826

Primoratz, I. (2002). Michael Walzer's just war theory: Some issues of responsibility. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5*(2), 221–243. doi: 10.1023/A:1016032623634

Quintelier, K., van Speybroeck, L., & Braeckman, J. (2011). Normative ethics does not need a foundation: It needs more science. *Acta Biotheoretica, 59*(1), 29–51. doi:10.1007/s10441-010-9096-7

Rawls, J. (1999). *The law of peoples*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Rengger, N. (2008). The jus in bello in historical and philosophical perspective. In L. May & E. Crookston (Eds.), *War: Essays in political philosophy*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rachels, J., & Stuart, R. (2012). *The elements of moral philosophy* (7th ed.). McGraw-Hill.

Rochat, P. (2021). Moral acrobatics: How we avoid ethical ambiguity by thinking in Black and white. Oxford University Press.

Rodin, D. (2004). War and self-defense. *Ethics & International Affairs, 18*(1), 63–68. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2004.tb00451.x

Rodin, D. (2008). The moral inequality of soldiers: Why jus in bello asymmetry. In D. Rodin & H. Shue (Eds.), *Just and unjust warriors: The moral and legal status of soldiers /* . Oxford University Press.

Royzman, E. B., & Baron, J. (2002). The preference for indirect harm. *Social Justice Research, 15*(2), 165–184. doi:10.1023/A:1019923923537

Sauer, H. (2017). Between facts and norms: Ethics and empirical moral psychology. In B. G. Voyer & T. Tarantola (Eds.), *Moral Psychology* (pp. 5–27). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-61849-4_2

Scanlon, T. (2008). *Moral dimensions: Permissibility, meaning, blame*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Sloman, S. A., Fernbach, P. M., & Ewing, S. (2009). Chapter 1: Causal models. In D. M. Bartels (Ed.), *The psychology of learning and motivation: v. 50. Moral judgment and decision making* (Vol. 50, pp. 1–26). Amsterdam, London: Academic. doi: 10.1016/S0079-7421(08)00401-5

Souza, L. K. de, Sperb, T. M., McCarthy, S., & Biaggio, A. M. B. (2006). Brazilian children's conceptions of peace, war, and violence. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *12*(1), 49–63. doi: 10.1207/s15327949pac1201_4

Stewart, G. (2018). Cicero. In D. R. Brunstetter & C. O'Driscoll (Eds.), *War, conflict and ethics. Just war thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st century*. London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Strauss, L. (1987a). Niccolo Machiavelli. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L. (1987b). Plato. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), *History of political philosophy* (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Swift, L. J. (1973). Augustine on War and Killing: Another View. *The Harvard Theological Review*, *66*(3), 369–383.

Thomson, J. J. (1976). Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. *Monist*, *59*(2), 204–217. doi: 10.5840/monist197659224

Thomson, J. J. (1991). Self-defense. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, *20*(4), 283–310.

Traven, D. (2015). Moral cognition and the law and ethics of armed conflict. *International Studies Review*. doi: 10.1111/misr.12230

Traven, D. (2021). *Law and sentiment in international politics: Ethics, emotions, and the evolution of the laws of war*. *Cambridge studies in international relations*. Cambridge United Kingdom, New York NY: Cambridge University Press.

van der Linden, N., Bizumic, B., Stubager, R., & Mellon, S. (2011). Social representational correlates of attitudes toward peace and war: A cross-cultural analysis in the United States and Denmark. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *17*(3), 217–242. doi: 10.1080/10781919.2011.587176

Voyer, B. G., & Tarantola, T. (2017). Toward a multidisciplinary moral psychology. In B. G. Voyer & T. Tarantola (Eds.), *Moral Psychology* (pp. 1–3). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-61849-4_2

Waldmann, M. R., & Dieterich, J. H. (2007). Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb: Intervention myopia in moral intuitions. *Psychological Science*, *18*(3), 247--253. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01884.x

Waldmann, M. R., Nagel, J., & Wiegmann, A. (2012). Moral judgment. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning* (pp. 364–389). Oxford University Press.

Waldmann, M. R., & Wiegmann, A. (2010). A double causal contrast theory of moral intuitions in trolley dilemmas. In & R. Catrambone In S. Ohlsson (Chair), *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society*.

Waldmann, M. R., Wiegmann, A., & Nagel, J. (2017). Causal models mediate moral inferences. In J.-F. Bonnefon & B. Trémolière (Eds.), *Current issues in thinking and reasoning. Moral inferences* (pp. 37–55). New York: Psychology Press.

Walzer, M. (2004). *Arguing about war*. New Haven Ct.: Yale University Press.

Walzer, M. (2007). The Crime of aggressive war. Symposium - judgment at Nuremberg. *Washington University Global Studies Law Review*, *6*, 635–644. Retrieved from https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/wasglo6&i=643

Walzer, M. (2015). *Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations* (5th ed.). New York: Basic Books a member of the Perseus Books Group.

Wainryb, C., & Pasupathi, M. (2009). Developing moral agency in the midst of violence: Children, political conflict, and values. In I. Karawān, W. McCormack, & S. E. Reynolds (Eds.), *Studies in global justice: Vol. 4. Values and violence: Intangible aspects of terrorism* (Vol. 4, pp. 169–187). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8660-1_11

Watkins, H. M. (2020). The morality of war: A review and research agenda. *Perspectives on Psychological Science: A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science*, *15*(2), 231–249. doi: 10.1177/1745691619885872

Watkins, H. M., & Brandt, M. J. (2018). The moral landscape of war. *OSF Preprints.* Advance online publication. doi: 10.31219/osf.io/tshpx

Watkins, H. M., & Goodwin, G. P. (2019). A fundamental asymmetry in judgments of soldiers at war. *Journal of Experimental Psychology. General.* Advance online publication. doi:10.1037/xge0000666

Watkins, H. M., & Laham, S. (2019). The influence of war on moral judgments about harm. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *49*(3), 447–460. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2393

Watkins, H. M., & Laham, S. M. (2020). The principle of discrimination: Investigating perceptions of soldiers. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *23*(1), 3–23. doi:10.1177/1368430218796277

Wille, W. (2007). Ambivalence in the Christian attitude to war and peace. *International Review of Psychiatry (Abingdon, England)*, *19*(3), 235–242. doi: 10.1080/09540260701362954

Zimbardo, P. G. (2008). *The Lucifer effect: Understanding how good people turn evil*. Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Appendix A

Materials Chapter 4

Experiment 1

Bus Dilemma

Design: "2(Victims Intervention vs Threat Intervention) x 1(civilians)"

1. Victim intervention scenario

Imagine that two countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has secretly placed a missiles-launcher truck on the territory of Blue Nation and is about to launch a missile over a nearby village, which would kill one thousand people who live there. The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack.
There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the hundred people:
Close to the threat is a self-driving bus transporting fifty passengers. A general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat.
However, due to the explosion, the fifty civilians in the bus would die.
Please answer the following question:

2. Threat intervention scenario

Imagine that two countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has secretly placed a missiles-launcher truck on the territory of Blue Nation and is about to launch a missile over a nearby village, which would kill one thousand people who live there. The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack.

There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the hundred people:
Close to the threat is a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard. A general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat.
However, due to the explosion, fifty civilians in the vicinity of the truck would die.
Please answer the following question:

Question:

Should the general navigate the bus into the missiles-launcher truck?
1(certainly No) 2 3 4 5 6 (certainly Yes)

Experiment 2

Bus Dilemma

Design: 2(Victims Intervention vs Threat Intervention) x 3(Children vs. Farmers Vs Soldiers)

1. Threat intervention scenario: own children as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 children from the Blue Nation are waiting for a bus transporting them to the primary school. The 5 children from the Blue Nation plan to attend a mathematics course at the primary school. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 children from the Blue Nation who are close to the explosion site would die (see Figure 2B).







2. Victim intervention scenario: own Children used as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 children from the Blue Nation are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to primary school. The 5 children from the Blue Nation plan to attend a mathematics course at the primary school (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 children and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 children from the Blue Nation inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







3. Threat intervention scenario: own farmers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 farmers from the Blue Nation are waiting for a bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The 5 farmers from the Blue Nation plan to attend a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 farmers from the Blue Nation who are close to the explosion site would die (see Figure 2B).







4. Victim intervention scenario: own farmers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 farmers from the Blue Nation are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The 5 farmers from the Blue Nation plan to attend a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 farmers and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 farmers from the Blue Nation inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







5. Threat intervention scenario: own soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation are waiting for a bus transporting them to the military central base. The 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation plan to attend a course on military technology. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation who are close to the explosion site would die (see Figure 2B).


Figure 1A
Missiles - launcher truck
5 soldiers from the Blue Nation
Blue Nation
Empty bus
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation


Figure 2A
Missiles - launcher truck
5 soldiers from the Blue Nation
Blue Nation
Empty bus
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation die
Yellow Nation


Figure 2B
Missiles - launcher truck
5 soldiers from the Blue Nation die
Blue Nation
Empty bus
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation

6. Victim intervention scenario: own soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the military central base. The 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation plan to attend a course on military technology (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 soldiers and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







Question:

Please answer the following question:
Should the general perform the suggested action?
1 (certainly No) 2 3 4 5 6 (certainly Yes)

Experiment 3

Bus Dilemma

Design: 2(Victims Intervention vs Threat Intervention) x 2 (civilians vs Soldiers)

1. Threat intervention scenario: own farmers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, are waiting for a bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The 5 civilians plan to attend a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue

Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 civilians who are farmers from the Blue Nation, who are close to the explosion site, would die (see Figure 2B).







2. Victim intervention scenario: own farmers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The 5 civilians plan to attend a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the 5 civilians inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).


Figure 1A
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmers from the Blue Nation
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation


Figure 2A
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmers from the Blue Nation
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation die
Yellow Nation


Figure 2B
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmers from the Blue Nation die
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation

3. Threat intervention scenario: own soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation are waiting for a bus transporting them to the military central base. The 5 soldiers plan to attend a course on military technology. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation, who are close to the explosion site, would die (see Figure 2B).







4. Victim intervention scenario: own soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the military central base. The 5 soldiers plan to attend a course on military technology (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for

a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation, and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the 5 soldiers inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







Question:

Should the general navigate the bus into the missiles-launcher truck?

1(certainly No) 2 3 4 5 6 (certainly Yes)

Experiment 4

Bus Dilemma

Design: 2(Victims Intervention vs Threat Intervention) x 3(civilians vs Farmer-soldiers vs Soldiers)

1. Threat intervention scenario: own farmers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, are waiting for a bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The 5 civilians plan to attend a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces

of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 civilians who are farmers from the Blue Nation, who are close to the explosion site, would die (see Figure 2B).







2. Victim intervention scenario: own farmers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The 5 civilians plan to attend a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the 5 civilians inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







3. Threat intervention scenario: own farmer-soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has moved a military convoy near the border and plans to carry out a series of attacks on its enemy's territory. To prevent the endangerment of civilian lives, the government of the Blue Nation has ordered the immediate evacuation of the population within a 10-km-range around the border. Despite the government's order, a group of farmers from the Blue Nation refuses to leave the area to be able to care for their farms. The government has allowed them to work on their farms as long as they join the army to fight with the army if necessary. To be a member of the army, they must sign a consent form in which they accept the following points:

a) The farmers declare that they are aware that war activities are taking place in the area in which they live, which may lead to situations in which they might be killed. The farmers accept this risk to their lives.

b) The farmers declare that they have been given M-16 combat rifles and military training for their use. The delivery and training will take place right after signing the consent form.

c) The farmers declare that they formally join the army of the Blue Nation. They are allowed to work on their farms but must fight with the army if necessary.

A week after the outbreak of war, The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a small hut. At this small hut there are 5 farmers who are now also soldiers from the Blue Nation. Not far from the small hut, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue

Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 farmers/soldiers from the Blue Nation, who are close to the explosion site, would die (see Figure 2B).







4. Victim intervention scenario: own farmer-soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has moved a military convoy near the border and plans to carry out a series of attacks on its enemy's territory. To prevent the endangerment of civilian lives, the government of the Blue Nation has ordered the immediate evacuation of the population within a 10-km-range around the border. Despite the government's order, a group of farmers from the Blue Nation refuses to leave the area to be able to care for their farms. The government has allowed them to work on their farms as long as they join the army to fight with the army if necessary. To be a member of the army, they must sign a consent form in which they accept the following points:

a) The farmers declare that they are aware that war activities are taking place in the area in which they live, which may lead to situations in which they might be killed. The farmers accept this risk to their lives.

b) The farmers declare that they have been given M-16 combat rifles and military training for their use. The delivery and training will take place right after signing the consent form.

c) The farmers declare that they formally join the army of the Blue Nation. They are allowed to work on their farms but must fight with the army if necessary.

A week after the outbreak of war, The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a self-driving bus. Inside the self-driving bus there are five farmers who are now also soldiers of the Blue Nation moving in the border area.

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 farmers/soldiers from the Blue Nation, and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the 5 farmers/soldiers inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).


Figure 1A
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmer soldiers from the Blue Nation
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation


Figure 2A
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmer soldiers from the Blue Nation
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation die
Yellow Nation


Figure 2B
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmer soldiers from the Blue Nation die
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation

5. Threat intervention scenario: own soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation are waiting for a bus transporting them to the military central base. The 5 soldiers plan to attend a course on military technology. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation, who are close to the explosion site, would die (see Figure 2B).







6. Victim intervention scenario: own soldiers as victims

Imagine that two neighboring countries, called the Blue Nation and the Yellow Nation, have started a war with each other. The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the military central base. The 5 soldiers plan to attend a course on military technology (see Figure 1A).

The Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 soldiers from the Blue Nation, and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the 5 soldiers inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







Question:

Should the general navigate the bus into the missiles-launcher truck?

1(certainly No) 2 3 4 5 6 (certainly Yes)

Experiment 5

Bus Dilemma

Design: 2(Victims Intervention vs Threat Intervention) x 3(own civilians vs enemy civilians)

1. Threat intervention scenario: Own farmers (from the blue nation) as victims. Yellow nation as the bad country:

Imagine that on a far planet, a warlike country called the Yellow Nation, which is governed by an authoritarian leader, has started a war against its neighbor and peaceful country called The Blue Nation. The objective of the Yellow Nation is invading the territory of the Blue nation to take control of its natural resources.

The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, are waiting for a bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The five farmers are members of a group strongly supporting the peace oriented self-defense goals of the general. As a reward for their loyalty, the 5 farmers have been invited by the general to take part in a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

To attack the Blue Nation, the Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack and defend themselves. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.


Figure 1A
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmers from the Blue Nation
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation


Figure 2A
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmers from the Blue Nation
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation die
Yellow Nation


Figure 2B
Missiles - launcher truck
Blue Nation
5 farmers from the Blue Nation die
Village
50 people from the Blue Nation
Yellow Nation

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 farmers from the general´s country, the Blue Nation, who are close to the explosion site, would die (see Figure 2B).

2. Victim intervention scenario: Own farmers (from the blue nation) as victims. Yellow nation as the bad country.

Imagine that on a far planet, a warlike country called the Yellow Nation, which is governed by an authoritarian leader, has started a war against its neighbor and peaceful country called The Blue Nation. The objective of the Yellow Nation is invading the territory of the Blue nation to take control of its natural resources.

The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, on the other side of the border in the territory of the Blue Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Blue Nation, are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The five farmers are members of a group strongly supporting the peace oriented self-defense goals of the general. As a reward for their loyalty, the 5 farmers have been invited by the general to take part in a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace (see Figure 1A).

To attack the Blue Nation, the Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack and defend themselves. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 farmers from the general´s country, the Blue Nation, and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the 5 farmers inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







3. Threat intervention scenario: Enemy´s farmers (from the yellow nation)as victims. Yellow nation as the bad country:

Imagine that on a far planet, a warlike country called the Yellow Nation, which is governed by an authoritarian leader, has started a war against its neighbor and peaceful country called The Blue Nation. The objective of the Yellow Nation is invading the territory of the Blue nation to take control of its natural resources.

The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, in the territory of the Yellow Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Yellow Nation, are waiting for a bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The five farmers are members of a group strongly supporting the aggressive invasion planned by their authoritarian leader. As a reward for their loyalty, the 5 farmers have been invited by the authoritarian leader to take part in a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace. Not far from the bus station, a self-driving bus with no passengers aboard is parked (see Figure 1A).

To attack the Blue Nation, the Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack and defend themselves. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the empty bus and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion the 5 farmers from the authoritarian leader´s country, the Yellow Nation, who are close to the explosion site, would die (see Figure 2B).







4. Victim intervention scenario: Enemy´s farmers (from the yellow nation) as victims. Yellow nation as the bad country

Imagine that on a far planet, a warlike country called the Yellow Nation, which is governed by an authoritarian leader, has started a war against its neighbor and peaceful country called The Blue Nation. The objective of the Yellow Nation is invading the territory of the Blue nation to take control of its natural resources.

The Yellow Nation has placed a missiles-launcher truck on its territory. The missile-launcher truck is close to the border of the Blue Nation. Nearby, in the territory of the Yellow Nation is a bus station. At this bus station, 5 civilians, who are farmers from the Yellow Nation, are sitting in a self-driving bus transporting them to the local marketplace. The five farmers are members of a group strongly supporting the aggressive invasion planned by their authoritarian leader. As a reward for their loyalty, the 5 farmers have been invited by the authoritarian leader to take part in a course on cultivation techniques at the local marketplace (see Figure 1A).

To attack the Blue Nation, the Yellow Nation is about to launch a missile over one of the nearby villages of the Blue Nation. If the Blue Nation does not act, 50 people who live in the Blue Nation would be hit by the missile and be killed (see Figure 2A). The armed forces of The Blue Nation discovered the threat only five minutes ago and are looking for a way to stop the imminent attack and defend themselves. There is only one possibility to stop the launching and save the lives of the 50 people from the Blue Nation.

By means of a satellite hacking technology, a general of The Blue Nation could remotely control the self-driving bus transporting the 5 farmers from the authoritarian leader´s country, the Yellow Nation, and navigate it into the missiles-launcher truck, thereby causing an explosion and eliminating the threat. However, due to the explosion, the 5 farmers inside the bus would die (see Figure 2B).







Question:

Should the general perform the suggested action?

1 (certainly No) 2 3 4 5 6 (certainly Yes)

Appendix B

Materials Chapter 4

Experiment 6

Invasion case

Design: 2(Attacking country: good vs bad) x 2(Victim: soldier vs civilian)

1. A bad country attacks a good country/ bad soldier kills soldier

In September 1939, Nazi Germany began a campaign of military invasion against the Polish territories. The purpose of the Nazi government was to seize the territory and carry out a massive extermination of its inhabitants.

In the course of the extermination war of Nazi Germany, a platoon of Nazi soldiers arrives at a Polish village. One of the Nazi soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of a Polish armed soldier who defends his country of invasion and is willing to fire. The Nazi soldier then decides to shoot this Polish soldier who dies instantly.

2. A good country attacks a bad country/ good soldier kills soldier

In September 1939, the Polish government tried to defend its territory against Nazi Germany. The purpose of the Polish government was to stop Nazi Germany before they reach their border.

In the course of Poland's defensive war, a platoon of Polish soldiers arrives at a German village. One of the Polish soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of an armed Nazi soldier who is part of the plan to invade his country and is willing to shoot. The Polish soldier then decides to shoot this Nazi soldier who dies instantly.

3. A bad country attacks a good country/ bad soldier kills civilian

In September 1939, Nazi Germany began a campaign of military invasion against the Polish territories. The purpose of the Nazi government was to seize the territory and carry out a massive extermination of its inhabitants.

In the course of the extermination war of Nazi Germany, a platoon of Nazi soldiers arrives at a Polish village. One of the Nazi soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of a Polish unarmed peasant who takes refuge during the invasion. The Nazi soldier then decides to shoot this Polish peasant who dies instantly.

4. A good country attacks a bad country/ good soldier kills civilian

In September 1939, the Polish government tried to defend its territory against Nazi Germany. The purpose of the Polish government was to stop Nazi Germany before they reach their border.

In the course of Poland's defensive war, a platoon of Polish soldiers arrives at a German village. One of the Polish soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of an unarmed German peasant who takes refuge during the war. The Polish soldier then decides to shoot this German peasant who dies instantly.

Question.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:
It is morally right for the [Nazi soldier/Polish soldier[to shoot the [Nazi soldier/German peasant/Polish soldier/Polish peasant].
1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

Experiment 7

Invasion case

Design: 2(Attacking country: good vs bad) x 2(Victim: soldier vs civilian)

1. Unjust country attacks just country/ *unjust soldier kills just soldier*

Imagine there is a country called the Blue Nation in which a military leader has seized the power. The new leader has installed a totalitarian government, which promulgates political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing. To turn the Blue Nation into a dominant empire, he has initiated an invasion campaign on his neighbor the Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country.

Despite warnings from the international community, several troops from the Blue nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Blue soldiers are ordered to attack the citizens of the Yellow nation to force them to leave their homes and thus guarantee the appropriation of the new territories. Several troops from the Yellow nation have also moved to the border to defend their country from invasion and to stop massive extermination of its citizens.

In the course of the war of invasion and extermination of the Blue Nation, a platoon of Blue soldiers arrives at a village of the Yellow Nation. One of the Blue soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of a Yellow armed soldier. The Blue soldier then decides to shoot this Yellow soldier who dies instantly.

2. Just country attacks unjust country/ just soldier kills unjust soldier

Imagine that there is a country called Yellow Nation, currently governed by a democratic party. The president of this nation is an advocate for religious liberty and good relations with other states. However, he has received news that his neighbor the Blue Nation, a totalitarian country governed by a military leader promulgating political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing has initiated an invasion campaign on the territory of the Yellow Nation and ordered to exterminate its citizens.

After receiving the approval of the international community, several troops of the Yellow Nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Yellow soldiers are ordered to stop the Blue soldiers before they arrive at the territories of the Yellow Nation and attack its inhabitants. Several troops of the Blue Nation continue their march towards the Yellow Nation, to complete their mission of invasion and extermination ordered by their military leader.

In the course of the Yellow Nation's defensive war, a platoon of Yellow soldiers arrives at a Blue Nation village. One of the Yellow soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of a Blue armed soldier who participates in the invasion campaign. The Yellow soldier then decides to shoot this Blue soldier who dies instantly.

3.* Unjust country attacks just country/ *unjust soldier kills peasant

Imagine there is a country called the Blue Nation in which a military leader has seized the power. The new leader has installed a totalitarian government, which promulgates political persecution of religious minorities and racial cleansing. To turn the Blue Nation into a dominant empire, he has initiated an invasion campaign on his neighbor the Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country.

Despite warnings from the international community, several troops from the Blue nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Blue soldiers are ordered to attack the citizens of the Yellow nation to force them to leave their homes and thus guarantee the appropriation of the new territories. Several troops from the Yellow nation have also moved to the border to defend their country from invasion and to stop a massive extermination of its citizens.

In the course of the war of invasion and extermination of the Blue Nation, a platoon of Blue soldiers arrives at a village of the Yellow Nation. One of the Blue soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of a Yellow unarmed peasant who takes refuge during the invasion. The Blue soldier then decides to shoot this Yellow peasant who dies instantly.

4. Just country attacks unjust country/ just soldier kills peasant

Imagine that there is a country called Yellow Nation, currently governed by a democratic party. The president of this nation is an advocate for religious liberty and good relations with other states. However, he has received news that his neighbor the Blue Nation, a totalitarian country governed by a military leader promulgating political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing has initiated a campaign of invasion of the territory of the Yellow Nation and ordered to exterminate its citizens.

After receiving the approval of the international community, several troops of the Yellow Nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Yellow soldiers are ordered to stop the Blue soldiers before they arrive at the territories of the Yellow Nation and attack its inhabitants. Several troops of the Blue Nation continue their march towards the Yellow Nation, to complete their mission of invasion and extermination ordered by their military leader.

In the course of the Yellow Nation's defensive war, a platoon of Yellow soldiers arrives at a Blue Nation village. One of the Yellow soldiers enters a small hut where he notices the presence of a Blue peasant who takes refuge during the war. The Yellow soldier then decides to shoot this Blue peasant who dies instantly.

Question.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: It is morally right for the [blue/yellow] soldier to shoot the [yellow/blue] farmer.

1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

Experiment 8

Invasion case

Design: 2 (Cause of war: just vs. unjust) x 2(Attacker: soldier vs. civilian) x 2 (Defense: self-defense vs. non-legitimate self-defense)

1. Unjust country attacks just country/ just soldier kills unjust soldier in self-defense.

Imagine that there is a country called Yellow Nation, currently governed by a democratic party. The president of this nation is an advocate for religious liberty and good relations with other states. However, he has received news that his neighbor the Blue Nation, a totalitarian country governed by a military leader promulgating political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing has initiated an invasion campaign on the territory of the Yellow Nation and ordered to exterminate its citizens.

Despite warnings from the international community, several troops from the Blue nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Blue soldiers are ordered to attack the citizens of the Yellow nation to force them to leave their homes and thus guarantee the appropriation of the new territories. Several troops from the Yellow nation have also moved to the border to defend their country from invasion and to stop massive extermination of its citizens.

In the course of the war of invasion and extermination of the Blue Nation, a platoon of Blue soldiers arrives at a village of the Yellow Nation. In a small hut, there is a Yellow Soldier who defends his country of invasion. The Yellow soldier notices the arrival of a Blue armed soldier at the hut, who is about to shoot him. Before being attacked, the Yellow soldier decides to shoot this Blue soldier in the chest, who dies instantly.

2. Just country attacks unjust country/ unjust soldier kills just soldier in self-defense

Imagine there is a country called the Blue Nation in which a military leader has seized the power. The new leader has installed a totalitarian government, which promulgates political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing. To turn the Blue Nation into a dominant empire, he has initiated an invasion campaign on his neighbor the, Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country.

After receiving the approval of the international community, several troops of the Yellow Nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Yellow soldiers are ordered to stop the Blue soldiers before they arrive at the territories of the Yellow Nation and attack its inhabitants. Several troops of the Blue Nation continue their march towards the Yellow Nation, to complete their mission of invasion and extermination ordered by their military leader.

In the course of the Yellow Nation's defensive war, a platoon of Yellow soldiers arrives at a Blue Nation village. In a small hut, there is a Blue Soldier who participates in the invasion campaign. The Blue soldier notices the arrival of a Yellow armed soldier at the hut, who is about to shoot him. Before being attacked, the Blue soldier decides to shoot this Yellow soldier in the chest, who dies instantly.

3. Unjust country attacks just country/ peasant form just country kills un just soldier in self-defense

Imagine that there is a country called Yellow Nation, currently governed by a democratic party. The president of this nation is an advocate for religious liberty and good relations with other states. However, he has received news that his neighbor the Blue Nation, a totalitarian country governed by a military leader promulgating political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing has initiated an invasion campaign on the territory of the Yellow Nation and ordered to exterminate its citizens.

Despite warnings from the international community, several troops from the Blue nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Blue soldiers are ordered to attack the citizens of the Yellow nation to force them to leave their homes and thus guarantee the appropriation of the new territories. Several troops from the Yellow nation have also moved to the border to defend their country from invasion and to stop massive extermination of its citizens.

In the course of the war of invasion and extermination of the Blue Nation, a platoon of Blue soldiers arrives at a village of the Yellow Nation. In a small hut, there is a Yellow peasant who takes refuge during the invasion. The Yellow peasant notices the arrival of a Blue armed soldier at the hut, who is about to shoot him. Before

being attacked, the Yellow peasant decides to shoot this Blue soldier in the chest, who dies instantly.

4. Just country attacks unjust country/ peasant form unjust country kills just soldier in self-defense

Imagine there is a country called the Blue Nation in which a military leader has seized the power. The new leader has installed a totalitarian government, which promulgates political persecution of religious minorities and racial cleansing. To turn the Blue Nation into a dominant empire, he has initiated an invasion campaign on his neighbor, the Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country.

After receiving the approval of the international community, several troops of the Yellow Nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Yellow soldiers are ordered to stop the Blue soldiers before they arrive at the territories of the Yellow Nation and attack its inhabitants. Several troops of the Blue Nation continue their march towards the Yellow Nation, to complete their mission of invasion and extermination ordered by their military leader.

In the course of the Yellow Nation's defensive war, a platoon of Yellow soldiers arrives at a Blue Nation village. In a small hut, there is a Blue peasant who takes refuge during the war. The Blue peasant notices the arrival of a Yellow armed soldier at the hut, who is about to shoot him. Before being attacked, the Blue peasant decides to shoot this Yellow soldier in the chest, who dies instantly.

5. Unjust country attacks just country/ just soldier kills unjust soldier, non-legitimate self-defense

Imagine that there is a country called Yellow Nation, currently governed by a democratic party. The president of this nation is an advocate for religious liberty and good relations with other states. However, he has received news that his neighbor the Blue Nation, a totalitarian country governed by a military leader promulgating political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing has initiated an invasion campaign on the territory of the Yellow Nation and ordered to exterminate its citizens.

Despite warnings from the international community, several troops from the Blue nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Blue soldiers are ordered to attack the citizens of the Yellow nation to force them to leave their homes and thus guarantee the appropriation of the new territories. Several troops from the Yellow nation have also moved to the border to defend their country from invasion and to stop a massive extermination of its citizens.

In the course of the war of invasion and extermination of the Blue Nation, a platoon of Blue soldiers arrives at a village of the Yellow Nation. In a small hut there is a Yellow Soldier who defends his country of invasion. The Yellow soldier notices the arrival of a Blue unarmed soldier at the hut, who is looking for food supplies for his troop. Before being noticed, the Yellow soldier decides to shoot this Blue soldier in the back, who dies instantly.

6. Just country attacks unjust country/ unjust soldier kills just soldier, non-legitimate self-defense

Imagine there is a country called the Blue Nation in which a military leader has seized the power. The new leader has installed a totalitarian government, which promulgates political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing. To turn the Blue Nation into a dominant empire, he has initiated an invasion campaign on his neighbor the, Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country.

After receiving the approval of the international community, several troops of the Yellow Nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Yellow soldiers are ordered to stop the Blue soldiers before they arrive at the territories of the Yellow Nation and attack its inhabitants. Several troops of the Blue Nation continue their march towards the Yellow Nation, to complete their mission of invasion and extermination ordered by their military leader.

In the course of the Yellow Nation's defensive war, a platoon of Yellow soldiers arrives at a Blue Nation village. In a small hut, there is a Blue Soldier who participates in the invasion campaign. The Blue soldier notices the arrival of a Yellow unarmed soldier at the hut, who is looking for food supplies for his troop.

Before being noticed, the Blue soldier decides to shoot this Yellow soldier in the back, who dies instantly.

7. Unjust country attacks just country/ peasant form just country kills un just soldier, non-legitimate self-defense

Imagine that there is a country called Yellow Nation, currently governed by a democratic party. The president of this nation is an advocate for religious liberty and good relations with other states. However, he has received news that his neighbor the Blue Nation, a totalitarian country governed by a military leader promulgating political persecution of religious minorities and ethnic cleansing has initiated an invasion campaign on the territory of the Yellow Nation and ordered to exterminate its citizens.

Despite warnings from the international community, several troops from the Blue nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Blue soldiers are ordered to attack the citizens of the Yellow nation to force them to leave their homes and thus guarantee the appropriation of the new territories. Several troops from the Yellow nation have also moved to the border to defend their country from invasion and to stop massive extermination of its citizens.

In the course of the war of invasion and extermination of the Blue Nation, a platoon of Blue soldiers arrives at a village of the Yellow Nation. In a small hut, there is a Yellow peasant who takes refuge during the invasion. The Yellow peasant notices the arrival of a Blue unarmed soldier at the hut, who is looking for food supplies for his troop. Before being noticed, the Yellow peasant decides to shoot this Blue soldier in the back, who dies instantly.

8. Just country attacks unjust country/ peasant form unjust country kills just soldier, non-legitimate self-defense

Imagine there is a country called the Blue Nation in which a military leader has seized the power. The new leader has installed a totalitarian government, which promulgates political persecution of religious minorities and racial cleansing. To turn the Blue Nation into a dominant empire, he has initiated an invasion campaign on his neighbor, the Yellow Nation, a democratic and peaceful country.

After receiving the approval of the international community, several troops of the Yellow Nation have crossed the border between the two countries. Yellow soldiers are ordered to stop the Blue soldiers before they arrive at the territories of the Yellow Nation and attack its inhabitants. Several troops of the Blue Nation continue their march towards the Yellow Nation, to complete their mission of invasion and extermination ordered by their military leader.

In the course of the Yellow Nation's defensive war, a platoon of Yellow soldiers arrives at a Blue Nation village. In a small hut, there is a Blue peasant who takes refuge during the war. The Blue peasant notices the arrival of a Yellow unarmed soldier at the hut, who is looking for food supplies for his troop. Before being noticed, the Blue peasant decides to shoot this Yellow soldier in the back, who dies instantly.

Q**uestion.**

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: It is morally right for the [blue/yellow soldier/peasant] to shoot the [yellow/blue] soldier.

1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").

The killing of the [yellow/blue] soldier by the [soldier/peasant] [blue/yellow] is an act of self-defense.

1 ("Strongly Agree") to 6 ("Strongly Disagree").