Decision Time in Social Dilemmas – Personality and Situational Factors Moderating Spontaneous Behavior in First and Second Order Public Good Games
von Dorothee Mischkowski
Datum der mündl. Prüfung:2019-12-12
Erschienen:2020-02-26
Betreuer:Prof. Dr. Andreas Glöckner
Gutachter:Prof. Dr. Andreas Glöckner
Gutachter:Prof. Dr. Stefan, Schulz-Hardt
Gutachter:Prof. Dr. Peter Lewisch
Dateien
Name:Dissertation_Mischkowski.pdf
Size:7.77Mb
Format:PDF
Description:Dissertation Dorothee Mischkowski
Zusammenfassung
Englisch
There is an ongoing discussion regarding the circumstances under which individuals seek to maximize the welfare of the common good rather than their own benefit – two motives that are contrasted in social dilemmas. In this context, it could be shown that cooperation behavior in social dilemmas decreases with decision time and, thus, represents a spontaneously expressed phenomenon. This finding has triggered substantial debate about the cognitive underpinnings of prosocial behavior in the fields of psychology and behavioral economics to which this thesis contributes with the scope of two articles: First, dispositional pro-sociality (i.e., social value orientation and Honesty-Humility) was identified as a moderator of spontaneous cooperation. Specifically, spontaneous cooperation was shown to be valid only for prosocial individuals – thus offering an explanation for heterogeneous replication results of the spontaneous cooperation effect. In turn, the second article explores whether spontaneous cooperation can be generalized to costly punishment behavior (also known as instrumental cooperation) in social dilemmas. Specifically, negative affect and social value orientation are investigated as potentially underlying motives of spontaneous punishment. Results show that spontaneous punishment – unlike spontaneous cooperation – is not conducted by prosocials but rather retributively displayed by highly upset, above-average contributors. These results of the similar, spontaneously expressed behavior in social dilemmas and the accompanied motivations are critically discussed concerning their added value to the underlying theory of spontaneous cooperation as well as in light of a theory of spontaneous pro-sociality in general.
Keywords: Social Dilemmas; Cooperation behavior; Decision Time; Social Preferences; Intuition