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**Concepts on How to Help Prevent or Solve Conflicts in
Africa. The Case of the Cameroon-Nigerian Border Conflict.**

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Cameroon-Nigeria Border Conflict.**

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my father, Menyoli Daniel Ngomba and my mother, Rebecca Liengu Menyoli.

Certification

This is to certify that this thesis "Concepts on how to help Prevent or Solve Conflicts in Africa. The case of the Cameroon-Nigerian Border Conflict" is the original work of Rose Efeti Ngomba.

Matricul number 29947652

Signed
Prof. Ernst Kuper
(Supervisor)

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This work was accomplished thanks to the people who greatly encouraged me. In writing this thesis, I relied very much on many people, some of them deserve to be mentioned.

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to come up with new proposals as to how to solve or prevent conflicts in Africa. The focus is on border conflicts and more specifically on the Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict over the Bakassi Peninsula. Conflict prevention and Management has been of great concern to modern states as well as other organisations. This is because of the increasing number of conflicts in the world and in Africa in particular. There are many ways used to prevent and/or solve conflicts but most of them have not succeeded in their missions especially those in Africa. It is usually presumed that the failures are due to foreign measures which are imposed on the African countries. According to some social scientists, African nations should play a greater role in conflict prevention in their continent. International support which mostly come from Europe and the US (United States) have include aid, peace keeping forces and others. These aid in many cases have not helped to solve or prevent conflict in Africa and elsewhere. Some critics even hold that these aid help to promoted conflict than prevent them. Some of these aid or help from outside are mostly misused and or do not reach those who need them. In order to curb some of the shortcomings faced in conflict prevention and management, some European countries like Sweden have made much research on how to prevent and manage conflict in the world. The idea of cooperation amongst all the actors involve in conflict prevention and management is necessary and important. The training of the local forces by states and the cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organisations in conflict prevention should be strengthened. States should create national co-ordinators who are to promote social rights and anti-corruption in foreign business. There should also be cooperation between states and international organisations covering reconstruction, security, nationality and property issues. A strong appeal is made to multinational companies to involve in conflict prevention processes in their area of operation. The analysis of the roots of conflict and to fight them from the base is an important factor in conflict prevention and management. For the interest of world peace and security, conflict prevention and management should be an important aspect of the foreign policies of modern democratic states.

Like in most African countries, the Cameroon-Nigerian border Conflict over the Bakassi peninsula stemmed from the mistakes the colonial masters (British and the Germans) made when making the boundary. The local boundaries were not considered and the new boundaries were made to serve their interests. The interest and social situation of the local people were neglected and after independence, the mistakes were not corrected but inherited. As was the case with the colonial masters, economic factor of the border crisis is more felt. For the Europeans, it was to secure better trade but the local people wanted to keep their fishing grounds and farmlands, while the local authorities had to collect taxes and royalties. For the Cameroon and Nigerian government, it is the exploitation of more oil and other resources discovered in the region. Attempts to solve this crisis at state level and by regional organisations like the O.A.U have failed. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a UN agent stands a better chance to resolve this conflict. But its resolutions on this conflict must be accepted by both conflicting parties in order to attain a peaceful solution. Also, both parties have to carry out bilateral cooperation with the help of the international community in order to achieve a lasting solution to the conflict.

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Abbreviations

AAC	All Anglophone Conference
AU	African Union
BENELUX	Belgium, Netherland, Luxemburg
CAM	Cameroon Anglophone Union
CDU	Cameroon Democratic Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESPD	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
GOs	Governmental Organisations
ICJ	International Court Of Justice
MNC	Multinational Cooperation (Companies)
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAB	National Archives Buea
NAE	National Archives Enugu
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIIA	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NIS	Nigerian Institute of Surveyors
O.A.U	Organisation of African Unity (now AU)
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PTF	Peace Team Forum
SDF	Social Democratic Front
SIDA	Swedish Development Organisation

SWEDINT	Swedish Armed Force International Command
TNC	Transnational Cooperation
UK	United Kingdom (now Britain)
UNO	United Nations Organisation
WWI	World War One (First World War)
WWII	World War Two (Second World War)

Introduction

In recent years many regions in Africa have been involved in war, internal and external conflicts. This is not only true for Africa but for the world at large. It has been noticed that wars and conflicts are more bloody and brutal nowadays as it was before decolonisation. These conflicts are not only more violent and do not only occur more often, but have one most important factor to be noted; there are more casualties on the civilians than on the military¹. For these reasons, there has been growing concern on how to prevent or solve conflicts of all kinds in Africa and in the world as a whole. It has also been noticed that since the 90s the international society is more prepared to engage in the prevention and solving of regional and international conflicts. Some countries like Sweden and Germany, have taken into their foreign policy goals the issue of conflict prevention and management². These countries although they belong to the European Union, try to put this as a main issue in their foreign policy. Apart from many European countries, regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U now the African Union), the European Union, and the United Nations Organisation (U.N.O) are actively involved in solving problems in Africa and the world at large. The essence of conflict prevention is a stance of responsiveness to unstable, potentially violent conditions that are unfolding on the ground in particular places at particular times³.

Aim and Scope of this Study

The main aim of this topic is to deal with the controversy between theory and practice in conflict prevention and management. Another reason for this work is to see to what extent theories or concepts developed in Europe could help to solve or prevent conflicts in Africa. This will include some approaches like the traditional approach (to solve or prevent conflicts by promoting inter-marriages across borders), the conservative approach of the policy of appeasement which failed in the days of the First and Second World Wars, and the modern approach which includes the arbitration, negotiations and to the worst a military intervention.

This work will also try to find out what is behind the concept of “an African solution to African problems”. This is a concept proposed by African critics who hold that other concepts and models developed in Europe by Europeans to help prevent and solve conflicts in Africa, has witnessed little successes. To such critics, the continent needs its own solutions which will take into consideration the factors that will suit the conditions of the region (for example ethnic groups, ancestral and family heritage, religious ties e.t.c). Also concepts and suggestions as to help solve or prevent conflicts in Africa are to be made by Africans themselves who could be termed as “men on the spot”⁴ - though they could seek foreign help.

In order to treat this work systematically, this work has been divided into two main parts. The first part will concern some conceptual definitions like conflict, its characteristics, types of conflicts and causes of conflicts in Africa. In the first part of this work, another subsection will be looking at concepts of conflict prevention and management. This will include some analysis of actors involved in conflict management, solving or prevention. There are many actors involved in such role but

¹ Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, E+Z, 40.jg, April 1999:4, p. 95.

² Ibid.

³ Luc van de Goor/Martina Huber (eds.): Mainstreaming in Conflict Prevention, Baden-Baden 2002. p. 11.

⁴ Mutiso, Gideon-Cyrus M. and Rohio S.W. (eds): Readings in African Political Thoughts. London 1975. p. 169

this work will be limited to four main important actors which include: state actors (conflict prevention is seen by states as a political means of persuading their foreign policies), multilateral actors (multilaterals could promote conflict prevention among their member states), Non Governmental Organisations-NGOs (this is a risky assignment for the NGOs and conflict prevention is an agenda imposed upon them by their donors). The caution to all NGOs is to consider precisely what or to which conflict prevention they are concerned with, and the last is the corporate sector which engages with conflicts directly or indirectly and legitimately or illegitimately. This includes those who buy local products (like oil, diamonds, woods), women groups, religious groups and other private funded groups⁵. It should be noted that each actor deals with conflict prevention and solution at its own level and according to its interest. A combination of all these actors in their roles could produce an ideal solution to conflict prevention and management.

The Swedish model of conflict prevention and management will come at this level of the work, to show how and why all these actors are necessary in the attempt to prevent and manage conflicts⁶. Why Sweden? This is because this country though in Europe, is one of the first to develop a model for conflict prevention and management; which includes not only all actors mentioned above but also can be used in Africa and any where in the world. Her model does not only deal with conflict prevention and management but also how to consolidate the peace attained after solving a conflict. The Swedish model could be seen as a typology of a European theory for conflict prevention and management. After this, we shall look at the African theory of an "African Solution to African Problem".

After looking at the Swedish model we shall move to the second main part of this work. This will be the case of the Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict. The conflict is mostly on the ownership of the Bakassi peninsula which has a geographical strategic position and it is rich in natural resources like oil. Each country is claiming the territory and has based its arguments on border arrangements negotiated by colonial powers. Border issues are usually a great significance in neighbour relations. The significance is derived from the fact that borders limit political, social, economical and strategic influences. The main defect in any border is its definition and that usually poses problems between farmers, compounds, villages and nations⁷. This conflict is important because it presents a form of conflict which is very typical of African states.

It is one that has put into test regional organisations like the O.A.U, in its role of conflict prevention and peace-keeping in Africa. This crisis has attained the International level as it is now being treated in the International Court of Justice in Hague. To my opinion this is an example of a conflict that does not only need local actors (African solution), but also European as well as other international conciliation.

The example of this conflict will try to see how far the two theories in conflict prevention and management could help to solve the Bakassi problem. Other new suggestions will be made as to how to help solve the crisis.

⁵ Goor and Huber (eds.). p.126

⁶ E+Z. p. 110.

⁷ Njeuma Martin Z. : Cameroon- Nigeria Frontier: Modell for Culture of Peace, 1989-1991 (term paper). Buea 2001. p.2-4.

When a boundary is made, divergent views may emerge from the parties concerned. The party that benefits from the arrangement regards the boundary as proper, while the dissatisfied party agitate for a redefinition. In rare cases can both parties be satisfied. The best boundary therefore, would be that which could serve the purpose for which it was made with limited disagreement. Boundary making is not new in Africa . Before the colonial era, there were boundaries: stones, rivers, mountains, trees, roads villages and hills which served as boundaries between groups. Grazers and farmers of one ethnic group were limited to their own sphere and they knew their limits⁸. But when the colonial powers came to Africa, they made new boundaries thereby imposing their own on the pre-existing ones. Their objective was to secure those territories that would give them maximum economic advantage. Their boundaries therefore ignored the local economic and sociological factors:- Farmlands, ethnic groups and even families were seperated. As a comparison, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1969 also led to separation of families and farmlands.

The Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict is a replica of such European boundary divisions which has now put at stake the peace and security of both states and that of Africa as a whole. A conflict which needs an immidiate solution. In oder to understand this crisis, it will be wise to give a brief historical background of both countries. This will include the conflict before independence (during colonialism) of both countries, after colonialism (independence of both countries) and the conflict at present. Attempts at solving this conflicts at varoius levels will be looked at and the reasons why they failed.

After treating this conflict, we shall now move to the conclusion of this work. Here suggestions shall be made as to solve the Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict. These suggestions could also be used for solving other conflicts in Africa. It is important to note that suggestions to conflict prevention and management are not only limited to Africa, but could also be used in other conflict situations. In the end, a personal critic will be made as to conflict prevention and solution in Africain in general.

⁸ Ibid.

PART I

1.1. Definitions of some important terminologies

Concept

According to “the Dictionary of Political Analysis”⁹, a concept is an abstraction to which a descriptive label is attached; the label may then be applied to individual members of the class to which the concept refers. Concepts are significant in that they are the building blocks of political science and every other discipline. They are the agents by which relevant phenomena are identified and classified, and meaning communicated.

Conflict

Still from the “Dictionary of Political Analysis”¹⁰, conflict is a type of interaction characterised by antagonistic encounters or collisions of interests, ideas, policies, programmes and persons or other entities.

Significance:- Resolving conflict and promoting cooperative solution to social problems are the most basic functions of a political system. In supressing conflicts, governments utilize a variety of approaches, including promises, rewards, threats and ultimately some form of physical coercion. Although political theories have generally recognised the overlapping duality of conflict and cooperation, some such as Karl Marx and Thomas Hobbes, have stressed the basic conflicts inherent in man`s nature or in particular political systems¹¹. Similarly, in the international politics, conflicts can become an overriding factor controlling interactions between states. For example cold war conflict that determined the relationship between capitalist and communist states in world politics after the World War Two (WWII).

According to John Galtung in “Peace War and Defence”¹², conflict can be perceived as a property of an action system, viz; when two or more incompatible or mutually exclusive values are pursued. He goes further by saying conflict is a value disagreement, and it should be distinguished from cognitive disagreement, which has to do with the definition of what is true and what is false. Conflict in this sense has a broad field of application-from the individual person who tries to allocate scarce resources (for example: time and money), to competing ends of two nations pursuing the same values (for instance personal, economic, political, social and religious values).

Michael Nicholson in “Studienbücher zur Sozialwissenschaften 3”¹³ says: conflict is for every human underneath a characteristic feature. For this reason he tries to define conflict by looking at its characteristics.

A conflict comes when two or more persons (parties) share opinions in opposite directions. A conflict comes when two or more persons do not understand one another. A conflict does not only involves individuals but also groups and nations.

⁹ Jack C. Plano (ed.). The Dictionary of Political Analysis, England 1973. p. 25.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 26

¹¹ Ibid

¹² John Galtung: Peace, War and Defence; Essays in Peace Research Vol. 11, Copenhagen 1976.p. 305

¹³ Michael Nicholson. Studien Bücher zur Sozialwissenschaften 3, Konfliktanalyse Einführung in Probleme und Methode, Düsseldorf 1973. p.13-17.

Therefore, a conflict is defined as an 'Event' that occurs between feelings which may not be only between rational beings. For example, when two helicopters clash, one does not talk of a conflict. Therefore a conflict must be defined in consideration of the wishes and needs of the 'Actors'.

In nowadays, conflicts could be seen more as a social behavior. In economics they are strikes, in the international politics they are wars, threats of war, between married persons (social relationships) it comes to friction and it could also be experienced sport. It is right to see into and examine conflicting behaviors as general form of behaviors. By this we imply on conflicts and their causes. A total analysis with the consideration of the forms of conflict has got the advantage that in this way general simple criterials could be found which could lead to the solving of existing problems. The fact is that one ends up in the understanding of international conflict, when one examines other forms of conflict and by so doing use the aquired knowledge for the research of the causes of war. This is what this work is all about.

Conflict Prevention

For an explanation and a better understanding of the concept Conflict Prevention, the book "Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention" edited by Luc van de Goor and Martina Huber was considered. This is because this book specialises on conflict prevention and I think it gives a clear and simple explanation for this process. In p.47, I quote "The prevention of conflict is a moral imperative in today's world. It is a humanitarian necessity in order to save innocent lives. It is an economic necessity both for the countries immediately involved and for the international community because of the exorbitant price of war and post-war reconstruction. It is a political necessity for the credibility of international co-operation, in particular the United Nations (UN). Conflict prevention was born from a tradition of conflict resolution, or peace movements, or simply humanitarian concerns". This was taken from a speech made by Jan Eliasson, the first UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs.

Prevention can come into play both in places where conflicts have not yet occurred recently (that is, prevent vertical escalation). To prevent horizontal escalation will include forestalling the spread of already active hostilities to new sites. And also where recent but terminated violent conflicts could reoccur (that is, prevent relapse in post-conflict situations). In short the essence of conflict prevention is a stance of responsiveness to unstable, potentially violent conditions that are unfolding on the ground in particular places at particular times¹⁴. Accepting the fact that conflict prevention is an inter-related process, it therefore means that in order to prevent conflict, many factors must come into play. Despite the earlier use of the term "preventive diplomacy", conflict prevention cannot be restricted to any particular means of intervention or implimentating actor, such as diplomats.

In principle, it involves the methods and means of any governmental or non-governmental policy sector, whether it is stated as prevention or not¹⁵. For example, not only mediation, good office and the like, but also sanctions, conditional development aid, mediation, structural adjustment, humanitarian assistance, arms

¹⁴ John Galtung. p. 314-315

¹⁵ Goor/Huber. p. 47

control, media education, preventive military deployment, democratic institution-building, private investment, trade to name a few are necessary for conflict prevention.

Of course, whether any of such means are in fact effectively conflict preventive is not automatic from their mere aims and application. This will depend on how they are applied and the results they actually obtain. Indeed, some of these tools applied without conflict sensitivity have contributed to violent conflict (an argument we are going to see in the course of this work and how far this is true). Note: conflict prevention is as such for activities which promote the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. This includes minimising the possibility of outbreak, preventing conflict that has occurred from increasing and rectifying the damage occurred as a result of conflict.

Conflict Solution.

This is almost the same like conflict prevention but for the fact that conflict prevention is to prevent a conflict from occurring in the first place. While conflict solution means solving conflicts that have already taken place or those that are still taking place. Therefore, for a better understanding of conflict solution, we will look at its definition in John Galtung's book on "Peace, War and Defence"¹⁶. Conflict solution can be defined as the absence of conflict, that is the state of the action under consideration where only one of the competing values is pursued or enjoyed. According to Salim Ahmed Salim, in conflict solution to peace; I quote "Peace is not the absence of conflict". "Indeed a condition of peace is one which positive goals and objectives of individuals, communities and the society as a whole are pursued without hindrance or fear of loss of life or integrity"¹⁷.

Types and Levels of conflicts:

Vertical Conflict¹⁸: This is when one group is dominated and this group fights for its liberation. This was the case we saw with most African countries in the 1960s, fighting for liberation from their European colonial masters. This type of conflict includes conflict between the centre and the periphery, which is most common in the present day Africa.

Horizontal conflict: This occurs between two equal parties with no element of dominance. Such conflict could occur between two districts within a state or between two states (for example the Cameroon-Nigerian border crisis). This type of conflict may see the intrusion of third party(ies).

Conflict could be seen as part of international relations. A study of conflict can be viewed at two levels: intra-state and inter-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict may take the form of a struggle between two or more groups of power contenders, within a state each seeking access to political power in order to advance its interest and goals. At worst, intra-state political conflict can cause costly wars especially when the state apparatus fails to mediate successfully between the conflicting parties.

For example the French revolution of 1798, the Russian revolution of 1917 and the Nigerian civil war of 1967¹⁹.

¹⁶ Galtung. p. 305

¹⁷ www.allafrica.com

¹⁸ Galtung. p. 208-304

¹⁹ Curtin, Feierman, Thompson, Vansina. African History. London 1978. p. 576

Inter-state conflict occurs because of competitions between two or more states. Interdependence produces a degree of intergration by which we mean increased interaction or close contacts amongst independent and sovereign states²⁰. However, because of different interest, increased contacts is likely to cause conflicts as it is to promote cooperation.

Intra-state conflict may even occur within a well organised state system with a legally constituted state apparatus for mediation and arbitration of conflicts. This implies there are more factors needed to prevent conflict other than an organised state system which we will see in the coming sections of this work. Within the state system, there is a government endowed with the resources for allocation among conflicting interest groups. Through the manipulation of power and allocation of resources among interest groups, the state system produces consensus which is necessary for the maintenance of the system. Causes of conflicts could be because of political, social, economic, ideological and personality differences e.t.c. This statement is more general but in the coming sections we will limit our self to the specific case of causes of conflicts in Africa which we will try to explain in more detail. Before doing that let us try to look at some general ways through which conflicts could be prevented in the first place and the solutions to the conflicts which took place.

According to John Galtung²¹, there are three principal ways to prevent conflict. Creation of a net work of primary relations between groups, for example inter-marriage. It seems to believe that the more primary a relation is, the more intense the sentiments. This might be base for conflict prevention, if the primary relation formed between groups are really functionally important to both groups (as the case of complex networks of business associates) and not adhoc, their conflict preventing value may perhaps be considerable. But the value is highly dependent on how polarised the status sets and the formal and informal interaction in the two groups are. However, the worst possible combination, from a non-violent piont of view, would be a conflict between formerly quite intimate, but now highly polarised groups. This might be so in cases where the emotions from the broken primary ties could act as an impetus to such conflicts rather than a solution. For example, a civil war; this has been the case of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Africa. Despite this, it is worth to mention that this system of primary relation to prevent conflict is one that was used in Africa before colonialism. This system of conflict prevention did function well at that time because the Africans put more value on extended relationships, they believed more on tradition and most of all were more social as well as economic interdependent on one another. But the modern Africa and the world of today is almost the opposite where each nation is struggling to be self sufficient and more independent from the other as much as possible.

As a result, there is little value in primary relations between groups or states of nowadays. This, then handicaps this form of conflict prevention to function in our modern world.

Nevertheless, this traditional old system of primary ties is regaining its place back in modern politics. For example, one can see in the European Union and the African Union where countries come together and try to identify themself through their common values and ties. Though this is not primarily to prevent conflict in the first

²⁰ J. Bayo Adekanye: Conflicts loss of state capacities and Migration in Contemporary Africa, London 1998. p. 165-206

²¹ Galtung. p. 314-315

place, one might interpret this form of identification as a tool to be used to prevent conflict (the theory of good brotherhood). This point could be disputed upon but I feel, that such regional organisations are good tools for conflict prevention. More about this argument will be seen in the coming section of this work.

The second way of preventing conflict is through the creation of mutual interdependencies²². The creation of mutual interdependency consists essentially of the extension of ties through industrial and economic cooperation with all other ties of secondary relationship positive for both parties. But the creation of mutual interdependency might make conflict more probable, simply because of the extension of the surface of contact. On the other hand, there will probably be constraints on effort at conflict resolution, so that techniques of middle sized violence will probably be avoided. The application of violence directly aimed at hurting the adversary with, will have a boomerang effect because of the interdependency created. But the temptation to control the whole of the beneficial interaction network (be it in the economic, cultural or social field) will probably also increase. This means that application of violence may even be more probable if the perceived chance of gaining complete control is sufficiently high. Despite danger, this form of preventing conflict has a more positive effect if a state or a group in its interdependency does not dominate the other(s) and or vice versa. That is, each state needs the other to prosper and each state has its own strength which the other can not do without. This is an approach the African leaders who met recently on June 5th 1991 in Abuja, Nigeria at the Organisation of African Unity's Summit had in mind²³. These heads of states signed a treaty creating an African Economic Community which has to develop an African Common Market in 30 years. This will create interdependence which could be used as a base to prevent conflicts in Africa (this decision was actually concretised with the creation of the African Union).

The third way of preventing conflict is by the creation of authority in a super system. This is possible where others could be subordinated. According to this system, a combination of references to knowledge, skills and direct, positive actions for the conflicting groups should have a certain effect. This will imply that those who are identified with the activity by both parties will probably acquire authority over both in a conflict situation. This art of preventing conflict is good in that even in a highly polarised situation, an authority of this kind may provide a meeting ground and serve functions as a mediator. The fact that others could be subordinated in such a system in conflict prevention could be seen in the state as the super power with the right to prevent conflict within its system.

But in inter-state conflicts between two or more states, the international system like the UN and regional systems like the O.A.U and the EU will have to play the role of a super system. Whereby in the above mentioned systems, there is no real subordinated partners as such; though some states to an extent might have more influence in decision making over the others²⁴. But in such international systems like the UN there are other means of checks and balances for such "bigger" states over "smaller" states.

²² Galtung. p. 305

²³ www.allafrica.com

²⁴ See Bruno Simma in „The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary“, München 1994.

Solving Conflicts

There are many ways of solving conflicts in general and one of them is by subjugation. This is the situation where one of the parties to a conflict is examined and subjugated to a point where he can no longer voice his view. This party might also be segregated and downgraded so much that he may present his values but will have no impact on the actions of the total system. Such solutions are referred to as non-accepted solutions and are undemocratic²⁵.

Conflicts could be solved by democratic vote over values to be pursued by the system. The value system of the majority is adopted as the value of the total system but this does not necessarily mean that the minority acquiesces (submissively accepts) and internalises these values, and accepts the solution. For this reason in a democratic decision-making system, the role is always to respect the rights of the minority; so that decision-making should not lead to dissatisfaction of the minority and thus lead to conflict rather than solving it.

There is also the "Quaker technique" (John Galtung p.305) of conducting conferences where a formal vote is not taken before there is unanimity present; so that there will be no defeated party. This is not unusual practice of concealing faction formation by voting the majority in plenary session is an application of the important symbol of unanimity and hence a pretence that a solution is accepted. A good example of such decision-making body was the League of Nations which saw it fall with the beginning of the Second World War²⁶. As a correction of such a decision-making body, the UN was formed which has a democratic decision-making body with respect to the rights of the minority in decision-making.

The strongest case of an accepted solution seems to imply a complete internationalisation in both parties to the conflict of a common value system. For example, to create a "Buffer Zone" or to some extent "Peace Keeping Forces" (both ways used by the UN)²⁷. This may be either the system held by one of the parties before the solution or a new system, invented during the conflict. In the first case, conversion (or change of mind or heart) may be said to have taken place. In the second case, a compromise to which both parties agree has been found. It seems reasonable to say that both conversion and compromise are needed to bring an acceptable solution.

Another way by which conflict could be solved is by the use of force through military intervention. Many criticise this form of solving conflicts. The criticisms are based on the following facts. Military action entails explicit infraction against violence, against the taking of lives of others. More specifically, military armament will be perceived as an increase in manifest intensity and a threat, even though it is not so intended²⁸. The preparation for the ultimate possibility (that of killing) presupposes a certain amount of polarisation in the system which is incompatible with functions like the extension of democratic values of self-realisation, diversity, brotherhood, universal love etc.

Despite this criticism of military action, one could say that such actions are needed to

²⁵ Galtung. p.282-304

²⁶ Perry, Chase, Jacob, Jacob, Vonlaue: Western Civilisation: Ideas, politics and Society. Third edit., Boston 1989. p.671

²⁷ Galtung . same page.

²⁸ Ibid.

oust “the necessary evil”. Military action comes into play when all other means of solving conflicts such as diplomacy, negotiations, compromises including the above mentioned, come short of the task of solving a conflict. Then the military action despite its shortcomings is the last resort to be considered. Military actions do not intend to kill civilians as well as inflict casualties on the field. As we have seen from the First and the Second World Wars, and in cases like Kosovo, Afganistan, Kuwait, Serria Leon, military actions from the international scene were very necessary to bring such brutal conflicts to an end²⁹. These brought about lots of destruction in human lives and infrastructures but the international system had no other choice than to intervern in these areas militarily. In some cases, military actions have to be followed with by peace keeping troops in order to maintain peace in such regions and also to help reconstruct the conflict thorned countries.

1.2. Causes of Conflict in Africa

Introduction³⁰

Slowly but steadily we will be moving to more concrete terms as to what could be some of the causes of conflicts in Africa. It is important to specify after having written a lot on general concepts of conflict solution and prevention. As our topic demands, we shall look at causes of conflicts in Africa as whole though each conflict has its own specific causes. It is nevertheless worthy to note that it is advisable to examine the root causes of each, conflict be it in Africa or elsewhere properly before trying to look for ways to solve it. This is because looking at the causes of a particular conflict will give an understanding of the factors that come into play as regards the conflict. Thus, making it easier to bring into play the necessary factors that could lead to its prevetion or solution.

Paul Collier at the World Bank holds that conflict is more a result of greed than grievance³¹. The EU Council hold that root causes of violent conflict include the imbalance of political, economic, social and cultural oportunities, illegitimate governments, absence of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of differences, and the absence of a vibrant civil society.

As earlier mentioned there are a lot of causes of conflict in Africa depending on the conflict in question. A list of causes of conflict in relations between African states might include the following factors: ideology, personality, internal power struggles (military factors), the treatment of ethnic minorities, decolonisation, territorial disputes, refugee problems and finally external interferance. Ideology, personality, internal power struggles and the treatment of minorities belong to some of the domestic sources of intra-state conflicts in Africa. We shall try to look at each of the above mentioned causes of conflict more deeper .

Ideology

Conflict over ideology and pionts of principle is common in African international relations; even the principle shared by all African governments. For example, all

²⁹ Perry et al. P. 671, 764

³⁰ See map on page 86 for the location of African states in the continent.

³¹ Goor/Huber. p. 149

African governments share the common opinion of opposition to the racist policy against apartheid.

But despite this general view against apartheid among African states, apartheid was at the source of conflict between African states³². Since the conference of independent African states in April 1958 in Accra, Ghana, a general consensus had prevailed among African states that apartheid and racism must be brought to an end within the continent.

The O.A.U (the Organisation of African Unity) had taken position that no African state should have diplomatic and commercial relationship with the Republic of South Africa, but some African states disagreed. Some southern African states like Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana whose national income are dependent on the Republic South Africa's (R.S.A), maintained both diplomatic and commercial relationship with the apartheid regime of R.S.A. States like Kenya allowed commercial airlines flying to and from South Africa to refuel in Nairobi.

Even radical Mozambique allowed the practice of exporting African workers to South Africa which started in the colonial era to continue. It did so because it could not afford to lose the valuable source of foreign exchange. Kenya's deeply rooted western orientation and dependency made it unwilling to refuse refueling facilities to western European airlines flying to and from South Africa.

Non-alignment³³ is another area in which African states have oftenly disagreed both on its application and on what the concept itself means. Anti-communist presidents like late Houphouët Boigny (Ivory Coast, 1905-1993) and the former Senegalese president Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906-2000), both equated Non-alignment with alliance with the communist. In their view Non-alignment is a device used by radical states to undermine African Governments allied to Western Europe and North America. Meanwhile, Julius Nyerere (1922-2001) of Tanzania and Sékou Touré (1922-1984) of Guinea Conakry denied that Non-alignment inevitably leads to a closer identification with socialist countries. Many other African leaders share this view and support Non-alignment in order to achieve equitable relationship with both the East and West Bloc during the Cold war period³⁴. Ideological differences have created an atmosphere of hostility between many African states.

In East Africa where Kenya and Tanzania pursue different modes of production and social organisation, it is not uncommon to find Kenya claiming that the reason of Tanzania's apparently unfriendly attitude lies in the failure of its socialist experiment. The power struggle between Ghana and Nigeria which started in the years of the O.A.U and continued until Nkrumah (1909-1972) was overthrown in 1966³⁵, was partly as a result of ideological differences. The conflict between Angola and Zaire between 1975-1979 can on one hand be explained by ideological differences though it is true that president Mobutu Sésé Sèko (1930-2000) was also interested in the oil resources of the enclave of Cabinda³⁶.

Military Coups and Inter African relations

Since the independence of the former Belgian Congo on June 30th 1960 and the

³² Horst Stoeber: Organisation der Afrikanischen Einheit (O.A.U). Resolutionen und Erklärungen 1963-1981. Berlin 1981. p. 23-50.

³³ Curtin et al. p. 579

³⁴ Perry et al. p. 827

³⁵ Autobiography of Nkrumah. London 1973.

³⁶ Bayo p. 206-215

subsequent military interaction in the political process of the country, African arm forces have increasingly become power contenders in the domestic politics of many countries. The military has done this by overthrowing civilian governments. This intervention has been made possible by the decline in the established machinery for the transfer of power which made political change within the state problematic. Often, the military has been the only force capable of challenging the government³⁷. Furthermore, disrespect for political institutions in many cases, led to rampant corruption at the top of the political and civil administration.

Together with the steady weakening of political leadership and the intense and uncompromising rivalry among the political elites. These factors have combined to give the military a rationale for overthrowing civilian governments. The importance of military intervention in African politics is underlined by the fact that by 1981, more than half of the O.A.U member states were either represented by military governments or had experienced attempted military take overs.

Civil War

Civil war is one of the most explosive of intra-state conflicts and it often transcends national boundaries. The 1967 Nigerian civil war started strictly as an internal conflict³⁸. It seems from a number of factors that we can analyse the situation as follows.

First, power struggle among the military leaders, religious and ethnic differences and regional grievances were all among the main causes. The military coup which preceded the civil war had destroyed the constitutional framework for change of leadership. It had therefore weakened the political system and when the political system failed to mediate between the conflicting interests, the civil war broke out. The civil war broke out when the Igbos (an ethnic group) declared themselves independent and proclaimed the state of Biafra. It is worth noting, that this civil war had a part to play in the border conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria which we will see in the second part of this work. The civil war between the Biafrans and the Federal Government did not remain internal for long. When both parties sought external assistance, it developed into an international issue. The international aspect however, was partially deflected by the O.A.U which evoked the principle of “an African solution for an African problem”³⁹ (this principle will be looked at later in the coming section of this work).

This principle was to an extent officially respected by the super powers. However, the former Soviet Union did support the Federal Government and some groups in France rallied behind the Biafrans. Among African states, the problem was whether or not the O.A.U should uphold Biafran independence and sovereignty. The recognition of Biafra would have been counter to the O.A.U principle of protecting the territorial integrity of member states. The crisis, despite the fact that the majority of African states upheld the O.A.U Charter and supported the Federal government, brought a lot of tension and division in the relationship between African states⁴⁰. Four African states namely Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia recognised Biafra and a few more supported the Biafran claim to independence without according its full political recognition.

³⁷ www.allafrica.com

³⁸ *ibid*

³⁹ Mutiso. p. 169

⁴⁰ Bayo.p. 223

The decision by some states to recognise Biafra made it very difficult for the O.A.U to solve the conflict. More importantly, it strained relations between the Nigerian government and those countries which had expressed recognition to the Biafran. The O.A.U was also divided by the Angolan civil war in 1976, when 22 member states supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Government and 21 states opposed it.

The Endless Chadian civil war (started in 1979 and ended with the coming of Idris Deby in December 1990) even had greater impact. Libya's intervention in Chad in 1981⁴¹ was greeted by one of the strongest and most universal continental protest ever witnessed in Africa. It is this intervention which led to the July 1981 Nairobi O.A.U resolution to send a peace keeping force to Chad. Unfortunately, the subsequent failure of the O.A.U peace keeping operation has damaged the image of the O.A.U as a potential continental peace keeper.

After looking at some of the most important domestic causes of inter-state conflicts in Africa, we shall take a look at the external sources of inter-state conflicts in Africa:

Territorial Disputes

Territorial or boundary disputes are very explosive in Africa (this we shall treat more in detail in our case study: border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula). Since 1961, more than half of the O.A.U member states have been involved in at least one territorial dispute. Territorial dispute in its restricted sense refers to conflict over a whole territorial entity. It means, the denial by one of the disputance that the territory claimed has any right to self determination, independent existence or sovereignty. In the case of boundary disputes, the territory disputed upon is claimed by the disputing parties and each of them claim right over the territory or area.

Morocco's claim over Mauritania at the time of the later's independence constituted a territorial dispute. Since the late 1970s, Morocco has laid claim to the western Sahara and such claims also falls within the category of territorial dispute⁴². Morocco has also evoked pre-colonial historical experiences and religious affinity in order to justify her claims to Mauritania and the western Sahara.

Most territorial disputes in Africa have their origins in colonialism. European colonialists drew up African boundaries without any thoughts to their future impacts. Boundaries were drawn in order to suit European interest and not accurately reflecting ethnic divisions. This was the case with regards to the Ewe of Ghana and Togo⁴³. It was the same situation to the Somali speaking peoples of Djibouti, Etheopia, Kenya and Somalia. Historical relationships were also ignored.

Territorial disputes in Africa arise when the legality of the colonial boundaries are challenged. Countries which reject the legality of colonial boundaries declare them illegitimate because they were drawn and agreed upon by Europeans.

This ideology has, we shall see later, played a role in the idea of "African solutions for African problems". These countries argue that the treaties legalising colonial

⁴¹ Wolfgang, Dönhoff, Fels Kaiser, Nock (eds.) Deutsche Gessellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Die Internationale Politik 1938-1984. Oldenburg, 1987. p.281-293.

⁴² Njeuma. p. 8.

⁴³ Curtin et al. p. 238, 509

boundaries were signed by Europeans alone and that as a result the treaties lack legality in independent Africa. For these reasons, the colonial boundaries should be adjusted in order to take historical and ethnic realities into consideration.

The countries on which territorial claims have been made reject this argument and insist that colonial treaties inherited by independent African states constitute international obligations on the new governments. It is worth noting that the O.A.U has bestowed legality and legitimacy on the existing inter-states boundaries in Africa⁴⁴.

Natural Resources

Territorial disputes can also be explained by the presence of natural resources. Morocco's claim on Algerian territory in 1963 appears to have had an economic motive (the presence of oil deposits in the desert area). If Morocco controlled the Western Sahara, it would be able to monopolise the production and marketing of Phosphate, and to exploit the area's Iron Ore deposits. Libya's claim to the Northern Aouzou Strait stems from the presence of Uranium in the region⁴⁵. The Nile water is a potential source of inter-state conflicts among the Nile valley states. Since the coming of the socialist government in Ethiopia, Egypt has on several occasions declared that it would go to war with Ethiopia if it tampered with the flow of the Blue Nile which has its source in the Ethiopian highlands. The Blue Nile is important for the annual flooding of the river Nile on which both Egypt and Sudan depend heavily for agricultural activities.

Colonialism and Decolonisation

As the scramble for Africa caused a great deal of confusion and toe-trading among European powers, it became necessary that the sphere of influence by different European powers having claims to Africa, be formally defined⁴⁶. With this aim in view, Bismark, for the imperial German government invited interested powers and what is known as the Berlin Conference of 1884 was duly convened. In 1885, this conference came out with what is usually called the Berlin Act of 1885⁴⁷.

This conference which saw the partition of Africa into spheres of interest was to satisfy the European needs of trade. It did not take into consideration the future of the Africans themselves, the ethnic and traditional ties of the Africans, the natural boundaries which the Africans used before the Europeans came, religious ties nor ethnic ties of the Africans. These as we have partly seen has a great aftermaths in the continent today, which contribute to causes of conflicts in Africa. Colonialism left behind the so-called politically independent African states.

The post-colonial period saw the rise of repressive power systems in Africa, the unborn pre-power stage of foreign capital, the direction of economic in agricultural products such as cotton, coco etc, the uneven exchange between towns villages as well as the delicate development and income/salary differences. Areas which do not have nothing to offer for the Europeans were left out and those with resources developed (economically, infrastructures etc). Areas dominated by the Islamic religion for example were ignored, while those that accepted Christianity were developed and the people were also given western education.

⁴⁴ www.allafrica.com

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ Ndabangingi Sithole. African Nationalism. London, 1959. p. 65-74

⁴⁷ Curtin et al. p. 451-458

The colonial masters educated such people who later became elite of their societies and turned to serve the colonial masters than their own people; and the colonial masters also supported such rulers in times of conflicts as it is assumed. For example, France supported Chad during the Chadian conflict of 1979-1990. Still the case of Chad as an example, Chad got independence in 11th of August 1960 and the agricultural region of the south with more Christians had elites who got their education from Paris⁴⁸.

While the Sahara and savanna north with the majority of Muslims studied in Kairouan or in Tripoli or Khartoum (their education of course could not be compared with what their counterparts had in Paris). Post-colonial times witness the elites of non-Christian areas much differences to their counterparts who were Christians. They had a higher and more competent western education, economic and social standards were more better (one out of the several causes of the Chadian conflict). This affected the unevenness in the representation in politics and the development of African states. As a result of this imbalance in the society, some regions are underrepresented in politics and therefore nurse grievance which when not resolved in most cases lead to intra-state conflict.

As territorial disputes lead to military engagement in Africa, so is decolonisation. The support of independent African states for liberation movement exposed these states to colonialist military aggression⁴⁹. During the 1960s, Tanzania had to endure arm attacks from Mozambique because Tanzania supported Frelimo's war against the Portuguese colonialist. In the 1970s, Guinea's (Guinea-Conakry) support for the liberation struggle in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau brought it into conflict with the Portuguese authority. The white minority regime in Rhodesia (now Namibia) made repeated raids into Mozambique and Zambia because both countries allowed Zambian nationalist to operate from their territories⁵⁰. Colonialism also brought about the problem of white settlers in Africa which is also one of the main causes of conflicts in Africa. Some examples include the white minority dominated rule in South Africa leading to apartheid, the settler problem in Algeria which is still one of the main causes of today's conflict in Algeria, the settler problem in Mozambique.

Though some authors like Ndabaningi Sithole argue that colonialism has got also some positive side which include, the suppression of slavery and slave trade in Africa, human dignity and reduced tribal wars. Colonialism led to the rise of African nationalism, civilising the African population meaning bridge the gap between the civilized and uncivilized and by doing so reducing the European monopoly. It brought progress, peace and order, promoted coming together of different tribes, better communication and new economic system and the creation of new classes among the African people.

Despite the above advantages of colonialism, it is but sure that Africa was better off before colonialism, Africa did not need colonialism in order to develop and that the results of colonialism are more negative than positive in all aspects of life in the African continent today.

The effect of colonialism is being felt today in Africa. Most national economies are

⁴⁸ Wolfgang et al. P. 281-293.

⁴⁹ Ndabaningi. p. 80

⁵⁰ ibid

directed towards the market interest of the formal colonial masters. Arbitrary boundaries and the creation of artificial states makes it difficult for a peaceful development and building of collective identities as basis of a nation. Adding to that dictatorial governments and kleptocratic elites hinder the development of Africa.

Decentralised states have in the last years become a regional phenomenon, partly causing many violent conflicts and also less socio-economic development. It is true that there are always two sides of an argument but as of the case of colonialism, it is clear from the facts that it did more harm than good to the African continent and had far reaching consequences which are still felt till date.

The Military factor

In East Africa and the horn of Africa, inter-state armed conflicts appear to correspond to the level of growth in military strength. Immediately after independence, armies were very small and their weapons unsophisticated. Therefore, the military skirmishes in the horn of Africa between 1963 and 1967 had involved small and poorly equipped armies and had never grown out of proportions. The picture changed significantly during the second half of the 1960s. The change followed from a combination of internal and external factors. In Uganda, Milton Obote's (1966-1971 and was voted again in 1980-1983/84) had faced formidable opposition from the Baganda people⁵¹. The government became increasingly dependent on the military to maintain its-self. Internal opposition also created fear of external intervention. These three factors combined to convince the Obote's regime to expand and modernise the Ugandan army. An air force was established under the Obote. The Ugandan army was increased from a number of 5000 men to 7000 men in 1967, to over 10.000 men in 1970. Thus throughout Africa, arms build up have increased inter-states tension and have transformed disagreements into violent conflicts. In leaders like Idi Amin (ruled from 1971-1978 in Uganda) and Ghadafi of Lybia (1969-till date), the acquisition of arms has bred adventuristic sentiments.

Expansionist like Said Barre (ruled from 1969-1991) of Somalia and King Hassan II (1930-1999) of Morocco⁵² have created the temptation to play the power game by deploying military force in order to achieve territorial ambitions.

Not to go more into detail on the problems of the military in conflicts in Africa, we shall conclude this section by looking at some prospects for the future. Conflicts in Africa are in a state of flux. They fall under two main categories:- those conflicts involving violent confrontations and conflicts over matters of principles. The later type is the most common as it represents the expression of attitudes and a national way of life. In the experience of Africa since independence, conflict over principles alone have not been the cause of violent conflict between African states. However, conflict of principles when accompanied by a threat to vital national interest may lead to war. This can be seen in the Tanzanian-Ugandan war of 1978- 1979. It can therefore be observed that differences on matters involving principles will continue to be a characteristic of inter-state relations in Africa.

Another observation is that few if any wars are likely to be fought over issues such as ideology and Non-alignment. So far it seems that inter-state violence is a product of the concern for vital national interest such as territorial integrity, national honour and access to resources and the personality of leaders. As long as territorial claims remain a measure objective of some African states, the possibility of future wars between

⁵¹ Ibid.p. 100-107.

⁵² www.allafrica.com

two or more African states can not be discounted. It has been noticed that economic factor (natural resources) is one of the main causes of conflicts in Africa, be it within a state or between states. This true of most recent conflicts in Africa like that in Zaire, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Cameroon-Nigeria. The point is that Africa experience more economic wars than have ever been the case. It is also worth to note that leaders such as Amin and Ghadafi bring about regional tension in their actions.

Equally important is the growing strength of African armies (strength, that is in relation to each other). Military armament may for a time act to maintain an equilibrium through the operation of a balance of power. But as we have shown in the horn of Africa and in East Africa, the current arm race in the continent has the potential of increasing inter-state tension with a possible increase in inter-state violence. Military build up has posed much threat to the territorial integrity of some African states than had been the case in the early 1960s. Strong armies are also likely to induce unilateral interventions in the internal affairs of other states.

Finally and unfortunately, the O.A.U in its present form can not be expected to deal effectively with any upsurge in inter-state violence; though it was one of the reasons of its birth was to take care of the peace and security of the continent. Some of the reasons why O.A.U has not been able to play this role properly are⁵³: the failure of its members to stand as one in decision making (division in the O.A.U in the Angolan crisis of 1975), lack of an independent peace keeping force, member states do not hold to resolutions taken by the organisation (like the case of South Africa as mentioned above). Member states do not pay their dues to the organisation therefore, hindering its functions. Finally lack of will of member states to pursue the interest of the organisation which they formed.

1.3. Actors involved in Conflict Prevention

Introduction

States have over centuries been the main actors in conflict prevention strategies. This is a role which states play knowingly or unknowingly in the pursuing of their political goals. Through recent developments in foreign policy discourse, conflict prevention has become a category of action, based on the rudimentary notion that significant violence is best avoided⁵⁴. As such one might say that the development of specific resources and procedures in the conflict prevention role of states, has to some extent become formalised through institutional objectives (such as units in the ministry, departments or general foreign policy). Some states may have even developed a culture of prevention⁵⁵.

The major governmental and non-governmental entities seem to have an institutional compulsion and vested political interest deeply built into their routines so that they only can pursue costly and difficult military intervention and distribution of humanitarian aid.

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ Goor/Huber (eds). p .89

⁵⁵ Njuema. p. 3-6

Constrains of State affairs in conflict prevention⁵⁶

The state as an apparatus has not got it easy to prevent conflicts. It witnesses weakness of the necessary political will to make conflict prevention a firmly fixed and deeply rooted agenda of its system. The following are some of the reasons to explain this shortcomings in the state affairs:

First, states have constrains in setting foreign agenda. This defines conflict prevention as a policy that can be useful for states in some cases, but not the majority. In their agenda-setting, states shy away from long-term entanglement which could jeopardise other values at stake in a particular conflict such as good relations with an international partner. The fear of endangering trade relations or the straight forward accomplishment of normal task like spending aid budget in a transparent and special way conflict, is also another factor.

Second, one may find a diffuse intellectual climate about foreign relations that is not conducive to conflict prevention planning. The thinking runs in the following way: conflict prevention belongs to the sphere of foreign security policy. Further, the thinking is that conflict prevention is no more than good diplomacy and it does not concern Non-governmental Organisations that are involved in private good will efforts.

Finally, one finds the inter-play of electoral interest, targeted pressure groups and media discourse (a problem more common with African states). Crisis reaction remains an infinitely more powerful tool to obtain visibility in the public eye than tedious and discreet work of seeking long term prevention or resolutions.

How state Actors have adressed the above three constraints

1) Foreign policy (problems and constrains)

The first constrain as we have already seen above relates to the way foreign policy objectives are set and the way in which administrations dealing with external relations evaluate themselves. In this context, conflict prevention is often seen as a specialised concern that relates to particular moments or regions. Some states even use the principle of “non interference into the internal policy of another state”⁵⁷ to back their look warm attitudes as a concern of conflict prevention. One might be right to say that the behavioural style of any state actor has necessarily pre-existed the development of the nation of conflict prevention.

However, changes in the international system and security field over the last decade have affected the style of such state actor to a considerable extent. The more frequent use of collective initiatives, as opposed to bilateralism, is a clear example of the increased status of conflict prevention by state actors. While the operations in the Balkans have already been variations on the choice of multilateral framework, operations in Africa are now systematically placed under the United Nations umbrella, most noticeable by France (and other formal colonial masters).

⁵⁶ Goor/Huberp. p 89-104

⁵⁷ Simma in UN Charter.

There has been a growth in the mediation activities and some countries like Norway, Germany and Sweden are making conflict prevention a hallmark of their diplomacy. Most foreign interventions are marked by references to the avoidance of greater violence through their actions.

There are however, many competing priorities in the international environment that all but hinders conflict prevention in many states. Some states regard conflict in certain areas as more threatening and thus necessary to prevent or solve than conflicts in other areas. For example, it is striking to note that while the Nordic states have all created departments and special advisers dealing with peace-building and conflict prevention⁵⁸. In such a system, the Far East and Europe is excluded and including Africa. One reason for such exclusion might be that these states think that conflict in the excluded regions might not be that threatening to their region. This might not be the case as we have seen in the case with the Americans. Another reason might be that these states do not find it worthy to carry the burden of the regional organisations like the European Union (EU) which has to take care of Europe or the UN which is to take care of the whole world. These reasons are just suggestions which might not necessarily be the best.

Many governments see their priorities as economic success and the promotion of trade as we earlier mentioned. The cultivation of protective or enabling environment is of a secondary nature. Although this may seem like a cynical assessment, this is what is happening in most regional organisations⁵⁹. The point here is that such priorities neglect conflicts in other regions. An example was seen in Africa with the case of the genocide in Rwanda.

In the time space of three months, the Hutus killed an estimated number of one million Tutsis⁶⁰. The world knew of this and especially the Americans but did little to prevent it. There are many of such examples in the world today.

Trade itself is another issue of concern which has remained quite immune to notions of conflict prevention. In the UK for example⁶¹, the Department for Trade and Industry has not promoted interest in social responsibilities of cooperations, which could be a peace-building tool. While the Foreign Office has promoted issues such as regulation of the trade in small arms and been a leading advocate of the ban on conflict diamonds (supporting NGOs and industry self-regulation in particular), this has not found little echo in the Department of Trade and Industry. For others, the behavior of their key international partners may be even more important than the economic and humanitarian outcomes of peace in some distant crisis. Conflict prevention is particularly affected by the behaviour of partners, as it is mostly (but not exclusively) carried out through joint or multilateral action. A priority to action or inaction by this partner(s) will be the cue followed by the state in question. This is true for many countries in relations with the United State (US). There are very many examples one could find in the Cold War period.

Even on the creation of an international protective environment, the hierarchy of aim is sometimes not very clear. For example, poverty alleviations in which a World Bank

⁵⁸ Goor/Huber. p. 89-104

⁵⁹ Ibid (see pages 89-104 for further explanations and examples)

⁶⁰ Greenpeace Magazin/4 : Politik / Wirtschaft / Umwelt, Juli-August 2002. p. 88-89

⁶¹ Goor/Huber p. 89-104

objective, endorsed as the overall objective by all OECD (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development) donors, is served in part by conflict prevention⁶². However, all aid administrations privately admit that conflict prevention represents such a general objective that the host of their intermediate objectives may crowd out the conflict prevention element⁶³. The problem is the need of specific objective goals as opposed to the very general ones. The maintenance of good relations will prevent a politically contradictory position, for example, large infrastructure projects may have a negative impact on local tensions. Lack of diplomatic representation can also impose capacity limitations on conflict prevention. A good example is on the physical presence of civil servants in a country. This has been one of the most significant aspect for Denmark in determining a relatively marginal role in the Rwanda-Burundi crisis, where the most important intervention has been contributed to the international humanitarian effort⁶⁴.

Some states also do not want to risk the lives of their citizens by sending them to work in such conflict areas. A suggestion to solve such a problem will be to train people from such war zones to carry out such functions themselves. This we shall see later, when treating the Swedish case of conflict prevention and management. There is often a need for much deeper analysis and actions than states can afford. An example will be the case of other African states in the role of conflict prevention in their region. Most of these states are so poor that they cannot even raise resources for such a task. As concerns others who can afford, they are over demanded.

A good example is a country like Nigeria which has its own problems at home, but still had to contribute about 2/3 of the peace-keeping forces in Sierra Leone and Liberia under the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)⁶⁵. It could not do much in other conflicts in Africa at this time. Another difficulty is that a lack of historical presence might block the intervention of a state in conflict. This is one of the factors that dictated that Norway intervened in Guatemala, Mali and Sudan, rather than in the Congo⁶⁶. The French mediation in Yemen-Eritrea conflict stemmed directly from colonial history as one could say. Some countries have advantage over others in executing conflict prevention activities in war areas. This is because they have in the past centuries accumulated experience gained by aid and diplomatic personnel. More crucial is that such countries have the privileged access of a long aid effort which gives their Ministry of foreign Affairs a strong basis for decision making as concerns intervention in conflict prevention. An example was the division of labour between UK and France west of Nigeria, has focused initiatives. France was also seen in Niger in 1966 and the UK in Sierra Leone to this day⁶⁷.

The above analysis was to treat the state actor's role in conflict prevention and to see how states have tried to carry out their role in their foreign policy objectives. Owing to the above arguments, one can say that states have not had it easy to carry out this function smoothly. For that reason, here are some suggestions to better this role in the foreign policy objective on conflict prevention. States should create national co-ordinators whose task is to promote social rights and anti-corruption in

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, „Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 1985: Towards a Dynamic Regional Intergration” (rewarded by former president Ibrahim Babangida). Lagos 1991. p.103-111

⁶⁶ Goor/Huber.p.89-104

⁶⁷ Ibid

foreign business, so as to check the activities of the workers in their companies operating in foreign lands. States see foreign policy in its more conscious and deliberate form, as the result of a three-way calculation of interest, opportunity or feasibility and threats⁶⁸. But they should be aware that, stability and interdependence are increasingly gaining prospects as the frames of a good foreign policy. Another point of caution is that, opportunities for prevention do multiply. Initiatives are becoming increasingly defined in collective terms, leading to the emergence of new structures for the prevention of stability. The EU for example has a Regional Return Initiative for Refugees and Displaced Persons. This includes government and international organisations, covering not only reconstruction but also security, property issues and nationality.

2) Political Culture (problems and constrains)

Conflict prevention was born from a tradition of conflict resolution, or peace movements, or simply humanitarian concerns⁶⁹. The interpretation of political culture differs from state to state. It has been developed in US and UK as an academic discipline. In the Nordic countries, it was seen as an extension of cooperative security or solidarity engagements. To a lesser degree in Holland and Germany, it is linked up with the peace movements⁷⁰. These various interpretations of political culture have limited the universality of its appeal or its apparent relevance to many state actors.

In Africa and most third world countries, the struggle for emancipation was seen in part as best served through violent means. This is reflected in the notion of "sublime violence" propounded by the insurgent unionism of the beginning of the century in Africa, and the philosophy of many liberation movements around the world from 1945⁷¹. Conflict prevention is indeed not automatically a tradition in the political culture of all countries. Violent conflict can be a means in the struggle for emancipation (political, cultural etc). Conflict prevention might hamper such emancipatory struggles. The nationalists struggle for independence in African states could be seen as a good example.

Most European countries like Germany contribute to conflict prevention through the EU and not as state actors on their own⁷². The conflict prevention Network of the EU was originated from the project of a former French Prime minister (Lionel Jospin 1997-2002). But this interest has not been reflected any more than a title for the foreign policy initiatives. Conflict prevention does not evoke clear visions of which actions will be undertaken, either in the form of historical precedents or "praxis". It remains intellectually remote. This has structural dimensions.

It is not possible to find in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a structure dedicated to dealing with conflict prevention, even if it has been presented as a priority particularly for Africa⁷³. The emphasis has shifted to the notion of civil protection in neighbouring regions, or in the case of Germany, to development aid planning tools. In case of others, colonial heritage has often confused the issue of the need for/of conflict prevention practices. Colonialism clearly brought its share of violence and injustice (as we have already seen before), but it resembled many of the present day

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Njuema. p.3-6

⁷⁰ Goor/Huber .p. 89-104

⁷¹ Ndabaningi. p. 120

⁷² E+Z. 40.jg. 1999: 12 December (D 12104 E). p. 332

⁷³ Goor/Huber 89-104

practices of state actors abroad as one could say. A lesson states could learn from the colonial masters of the past as such is to operate in long term in a potentially hostile environment with scarce resources; colonial administrations resorted to public information and education, trade, area development, or medication. States have to increase their habit of political and socio-economic analysis at all levels of administration to deal with conflict prevention.

Still to talk about the state actor and the policy of political culture in conflict prevention, there must be analysis at various levels of conflict prevention on the part of state actors. This is important because it has been noticed that the notion of conflict prevention suffers from a level of analysis problems. For example, to analyse the crisis in question and to see what actions could be taken as measure to solve or prevent crisis.

In each case it is very important to know if aid is needed, by whom, when, why and how the aid should be distributed. The problem is that most of the states will often seek to prevent conflict because of the uncertain outcomes in significant conflicts; but not because they see conflict prevention as a political culture. Another problem state actors face is that a policy of conflict prevention is always premised on a particular political and security analysis. This is not necessarily unanimously shared, not even within a single government.

What one state will define as a conflict prevention, another one may see as conducive to conflict, or extension of sphere of influences. A classic case of this has been the policy of the G8 countries as regards Iraq⁷⁴. The search for a stable succession to the regime in Iraq seems to the Russian diplomats as very dangerous. Different actors may not see the use of sanctions as having the same impact. It is now clear in the voting patterns of the UN Security Council that Russia does not consider the US global hegemony as a source of stability. Another case is that with the African states as concerns the Congo Crisis of 1960⁷⁵. As concerns the states actors in this conflict, some African states mostly those who came from the Kassablanca group in January 1961 (those who stood for the African Union to be total independent and from a third force), preferred to see a Congolese state which would be free from any form of external control. Whereas the other group, the Monrovia group formed in May 1961 (those that stood for an African Union in cooperation with the US and the former colonial masters) took a more moderate stand on the Congo crisis, supported the UN efforts and also refrained from any criticism.

3) The packaging of conflict prevention

The packaging of conflict prevention is another aspect in question as regards to the state actors. States have to have a concerted policy of conflict prevention in circumstances of insufficient information about the benefits of conflict prevention as we have already mentioned. This valuable policy orientation has to compete for ministerial and parliamentary attention. This is because there is most often the risk that conflict prevention will constantly become crowded out by a host of other priorities such as the environment, free and fair elections, humanrights, poverty and health problems. Considerable effort has been given to new initiatives, such as decentralisation of public services, with little regards to the possible impact on

⁷⁴ Resent news reports from CNN.

⁷⁵ Bayo. p. 230

conflict. A case in point is presented today by Indonesia, where it risk increasing ethnic and geographical cleavages in the country fuelling civil war. The case of Nigeria in Africa as concerns the Shari laws in the northern part of the country, could also be seen as another example⁷⁶.

It has been noticed that the media coverage on crisis and initiatives are suggested by journalists that can only be related secondarily to conflict prevention⁷⁷. This creates a public pressure for more tangible activities, such as the delivery of supplies or public denunciations. Conflict prevention has not been well sold to the geographical services in diplomatic and aid communities, or to the politicians. Rather, it has been recognised that conflict prevention has been mostly discussed in aid management circles, or secondarily in relation to emergency deployment of protection and military resources. For this reason, conflict prevention has consequently remained a very technical concept, not widely understood, and hard to use by policy units. This, has made the technical nature of conflict prevention planning easier to engage in humanitarian operations, or peace conferences, with their more immediate implications.

As a very good example for such constrains, we will discussed Sweden's method, SIDA (Sweden International Development Organisation), in the later stage⁷⁸. As the limits of humanitarian assistance have become more evident, conflict prevention world has generated its own budgets in turn leading to more intense advocacy from the NGOs side.

To conclude this section of state actor in conflict prevetion, the following are some ideas on how to handle the constrains mentioned above in general:

There are various points for the promotion of conflict prevetion, or proposed pivots for policy change. To bring all these together, one could say that conflict prevetion could be promoted if insightful linkages were established between foreign policy objectives, specialised units, and external analysis. The level of analysis at which conflict prevention is envisaged (a region, an operation, a market) that would remain modest to allow it to become more transcultural. We have seen many factors that hinder the culture of prevention in states. So the fact is, rather than looking for ways to curb these out, it would be more productive to devise a new approach and strategy for conflict prevention focusing on how it is presented. By doing so, an attempt will be made to elicit the interest of other departments or other states by pointing out the changing the nature of interests (the persuit of stability), opportunities (joint actions, particularly in the EU and the O.A.U), and the threats (the commonalities faced by large corporations in say Nigeria, aid programmes, defence and security training).

There is a need of an internationally oriented civil society and research community, or at least its seperation from the functions of the state and diplomacy⁷⁹. This allows for a new legitimacy in foreign relations, less security oriented, and more linked to humanitarian concerns. This will lead to the existence of risk that are much more significant to the states than violence in a particular region. In a related problem, there have been cases where commencial interests have been actually favoured by

⁷⁶ CNN report on "Inside Africa". 22 July 2002

⁷⁷ Greenpeace. p. 88

⁷⁸ E+Z. April 1999:4. p. 110

⁷⁹ Goor/Huber .p. 89-104

conflict and war, either through the use or sale of weapons, or the access to lucrative markets.

This problem requires a re-framing of the relationships of states and civil society in those areas where there are no close and often contractualised relationships. This could be done through framework contracts, regular discussion groups and even career integration between politicians, ministers of foreign affairs, NGOs and research institutions.

There is also a need to highlight the useful and complementary nature of conflict prevention⁸⁰. This can be done by strengthening the link established between a particular risk⁸¹ and a conflict prevention action. This could mean rather than focusing on the conflict and the strategy deployed would focus on an element related to an aspect that is part of the tradition concerns on the state. The second step would be carried out through a systematic policy of network and a cross-border agreement. For example, steps on conflict prevention in Paris-Brussels-Berlin all in the EU. The third step consist of placing a level of analysis ceiling on conflict prevention.

Conflict prevention would be equated with relatively localised actions, tied to a particular crisis, tied to societal rather than military issues. Here conflict prevention is then only a federation of efforts in a limited domain. Limiting the scope of conflict prevention has one immediate advantage: It becomes more manageable at the traditional level of state representations abroad.

A European Delegation Project Management Unit in Niger Delta, for example, or a Military Technical Assistance in Rwanda⁸². There might be a danger that such policy might address limited issues and symptoms rather than causes. But this is not the case because conflict prevention measures rarely by themselves eliminate causes of conflicts. They contribute particular influences to an overall dynamic that has been identified as promoting peace. The next actor in conflict prevention will be multilateral organisations.

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ A risk could be seen here in relation to a clearly perceived state interest.

⁸² Goor/Huber. p.89-104 (for more details on these examples)

1.3.1 Multilateral Organisations in the role of Conflict Prevention⁸³

In the 1990s, many Multilateral actors have shown a growing concern in the field of peace, security, development, and more recently the prevention of violent conflict. Under Multilateral Organisations we shall look at the conflict prevention policies of the UNO, the EU and the O.A.U. These three have been chosen in order to enable us to stay within the limits of our topic. There are three main questions which would be looked at in the course of treating this section. We shall try to answer questions as: why multilateral organisations promote conflict prevention. Which tools are used in conflict prevention by Multilateral Organisations and which tools are more effective. Finally, which are some relevant methods for conflict prevention as concerns Multilateral Organisations. Before starting, there are some assumptions that are to be made as concerns the conflict prevention role of Multilateral Organisations. In general, conflict prevention aims at establishing the “culture of prevention”, by making it an integral and equal part of all major activities. In doing so, conflict prevention should become such a powerful part of organisational culture that the planning, making and implementation of policy must all be taken into account.

Conflict prevention will have evolved from a cross-cutting issue to a connecting one that is common to all essential areas of engagement. Multilateral actors in this study will be analysed according to these requirements such as clear mandates, clear performance, organisation and procedures and, also policies and programmes.

a) Clear mandates:

The priority of conflict prevention within the mandate of an organisation will clearly influence the motivation and efforts for incorporating conflict prevention objectives into its agency policies, procedures and practice. The UN as the first example, stands out as an international multilateral actor primarily concerned with conflict prevention. A number of provisions in the UN Charter⁸⁴ expresses the intention of the UN to prevent violent conflicts and to take collective measures in order to secure peace. Despite its political weight and its normative expectations, the UN has not always succeeded in generating positive results, in all of its conflict prevention activities.

This failure can be partly attributed to the structural flaws of the UN and the difficulties of changing the perceptions of its member states concerning the intrusiveness of conflict prevention. The UN has also failed in its conflict prevention missions because member states place more priority to their national interest than on a global interest when it comes to conflict prevention. This we have already seen while treating state actors in conflict prevention. The UN however, plays a key role in legitimising conflict prevention activities and has a clear mandate for promoting conflict prevention in the policies of the member states.

The EU, as our next example, can itself be considered as a peace project and its role in conflict prevention is growing steadfastly; through the process of enlargement, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)⁸⁵, its development cooperation and external assistance programmes, and most importantly, the EU attempts to contribute to

⁸³ Ibid. p.105-125

⁸⁴ Simma UN Charter and Comments. p. 107-129

⁸⁵ Goor/Huber. p. 105-125

the international peace and stability. To add to this it is worth mentioning that the EU has a special council on “preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in Africa”. This council deals with information exchange, common analysis, coordination with the union and other members of the international community and in particular with the recipients of assistance. Conflict prevention as an explicit goal has been on the EU’s political agenda since the early 1990s and emerged as a relatively non-controversial issue upon which the new Union’s foreign policy could be based. Hence, the main objectives of the CFSP⁸⁶ (as set out by the Treaty on the European Union), is “to preserve peace and strengthen international security” in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

The EU also have the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) which has this peacekeeping goal. Also, individual member states like Sweden have supported the EU in spreading the concept of conflict prevention within the EU and other member states.

The O.A.U on its part has a one of its main aim to resolve conflicts between its member states. For this purpose, the O.A.U established the Arbitration committee, though to a larger extent fell short of its goals. The Charter of the O.A.U partly explains its shortcoming in the role of conflict prevention and conflict management⁸⁷. This is partly because nothing obliged member states to recognise competence of the organisation in such affairs and the Charter did not provide for any permanent O.A.U armed forces.

Another reason is that its budget was insignificant and member states did not pay their arrears as contributions. The main reason for poor achievement of conflict resolutions in the O.A.U is the lack of political will of the member states who were more worried about preserving their sovereignty than solving conflict in the region.

Despite this, the O.A.U established a new Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and a Peace Fund in 1992, which has to deal with the growing number of conflicts in Africa⁸⁸. The most recent development in Africa is the formation of the African Union which has to curb out all the weaknesses of the O.A.U. This organisation has as one of its new proposals, the creation of a peace and security council, the creation of a permanent “stand-by peacekeeping force” and the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development)⁸⁹. As of now, the works of this new organisation with regards to its task are still to be seen.

b) Performance goals:

This will include improved preparedness, efficiency and co-ordination, to remove bureaucratic barriers to actions, minimised the gap between early warnings and response, the achievement of political will among member states or associates coherent and long-term preventive routines.

The European Commission explicitly identifies the pursuing of conflict prevention as a policy goal. With this, the Commission is aiming for increased efficiency, better co-ordination between the Commission and member states “activities”⁹⁰. It is also creating coherence in the CFSP, using development policy to treat the root

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ www.allafrica.com

⁸⁸ www.allafrica.com

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Goor/Huber. p.105-125

causes of conflict, and reacting more quickly to countries entering a downward spiral towards violence. Although progress has been made in many of these areas, bureaucratic bottlenecks and divergent/lacking understanding of conflict prevention, indicates that neither the EU nor the European Commission are fully involved in conflict prevention activities.

The UN also has performance goals as concerns conflict prevention. They focus on improving internal co-ordination and the creation of an in-house culture of prevention with the aim of achieving a more efficient response to emerging violent conflicts. For this aim, the UN has suggested and implemented a number of organisational and procedural reforms. As regards to the performance goals, it has certainly made important progress. As of the O.A.U, the need for better and more efficient conflict prevention and management measures could be seen in the new organisation as mentioned above.

c) Organisation and Procedures:

This includes integration of conflict prevention perspectives into the structure and activities of a multilateral actor such as new organisational structures, secretariats, or units for conflict prevention, executive committees, working groups and internal training programmes. The key challenge is to link these structures clearly to conflict prevention, while at the same time preventing compartmentalisation and hierarchies that centralise decision making and are resistant to institutional changes.

The following are some suggestions for Multilateral Organisations in order to enable them carry out the function of conflict prevention properly:

- Focal point for conflict prevention: Once multilateral organisations have established focal points within the organisation, they should encourage parallel processes in member states, partner countries and like-minded groups. These focal points should develop an overall conflict prevention strategy, drive and insure the implementation of declarations.
Furthermore, these focal points are to mobilise and ensure the allocation of resources for preventive activities as well as develop coherent policies and programmes on conflict prevention. For example, the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has recently been designated by the UN Secretary General as the focal point for conflict prevention within the UN's system⁹¹. Its Policy Planning Unit, in particular, is spearheading promotion of conflict prevention. The units identified here have varying degrees of operational capability. This is partly due to resources and staff, organisational location and turf battles. The mandate of the organisation and the political support and prominence given to the issue of conflict prevention by the leaders of the organisation are also some reasons. Apart from the recognised efforts of the UN, it is clear that multilateral actors have not yet managed to establish focal points outside their organisations.
- Framework for inter- and intra-organisational co-operation: Conflict prevention is an issue that demands cooperation between various actors at different levels (thus inter-organisational cooperation has to be enhanced). Most multilateral organisations are often struggling against the existing organisational culture to establish structures and mechanisms facilitating internal and external co-ordination

⁹¹ Ibid

and collaboration. For example the “UN Framework for Coordination”⁹² for exchanging informations, assessing risk, and identifying preventive instruments, which plays a co-ordinating role in the UN system. The UN example could be useful for the EU and the O.A.U or the AU (African Union).

- **Executive level meetings:** By using thematically focused meetings both within the multilateral organisation and with outside actors, the issue of conflict prevention would be fused into relations with member states and like-minded organisations. High-level meetings are important in creating a momentum for conflict prevention, co-ordination and to enhance collaboration within and between multilateral actors engaged in preventing violent conflicts.
Many multilateral organisations are built around meetings that co-ordinate policies and creates coherence among their member states’ policies. By putting conflict prevention on top of the agenda on these executive level meetings, political support is given to the conflict prevention issue itself as well as to other aims of the such meetings. Still the UN as our best example, it stages high level meetings with regional organisations, such as the recent “Cooperation for Conflict Prevention”. This is also a good example for the EU and the AU to learn from the UN.
- **Information Management:** Here information gathering from countries in crisis also needs to be improved. Information is a key component of conflict prevention. Multilateral organisations should exchange informations among member states and other organisations, exchange common analysis on conflict prevention and co-ordinate within the organisation and other members of the international community (in particular recipients of assistance). The EU Council for “ Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping in Africa”⁹³ is one that is trying to put this into practice. The AU has much to learn from the example of the UN as well as the EU.
- **Making Funds Available For Conflict Prevention Activities:** It has been realised that budget routines limits the ability for rapid actions.
For this reason, several multilateral organisations have therefore pioneered flexible budget procedures to accommodate the unpredicted ability of the resource need of conflict prevention initiatives. One example is the UN Trust Fund for Conflict Prevention aims at increasing the ability of the Secretary General to undertake unanticipated, flexible short term conflict prevention actions⁹⁴. It is the Secretary-Generals’ own discretionary reserve, and in January 2000, it has received financial support of 7 million US dollars (Canada: 350.000, Holland: 250.000, Lichtenstein: 20.000, Norway: 4.300.000, Switzerland: 1.350.000, South Korea: 450.000 and UK: 350.000). This fund as one could see is very useful to the secretariat. Another interesting solution is the Japanese Post-Conflict Fund (JPCF) provided by the government of Japan and managed by the World Bank, as complementary to the Post-Conflict Fund. It is however, a last resort to be used if no other means are available for early and comprehensive reconstruction.
- **Policies and Programmes:** As the prevention of conflict span various policy sectors ranging from the social, political, economic to the security sector; it is important to establish programme linkages with and incorporate conflict prevention concerns

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ www.allafrica.com

⁹⁴ Goor/Huber. p. 126-145

with perspectives of foreign policy departments. As we said on the role of conflict prevention by multilateral organisations as actors, it is important to note that the said organisations are doing more to adopt conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of their external relations. It has been noticed that they continue to improve their capacity to prevent violent conflicts and contribute to the global culture of prevention.

1.3.2 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the promotion of Conflict Prevention⁹⁵

NGOs are international organisations which are private meaning that they are not sponsored by any state or government. The influence of such organisations will depend on the size of its membership (some are regional while others are global and others really limited within a country). NGOs also differs in the size of their budget (the more resources they have, the more aims and influence they turn to have). The degree to which NGOs are recognised by Governmental Organisations (GOs), especially the UN, EU and the O.A.U/AU also determines its influence. The recognition is in terms of how much Governmental Organisations fall back for advice to such NGOs. For example the Specialised Agencies of the UNO seek advice from the NGOs⁹⁶. The Amnesty International work hand to hand with the Human Right Committee of the UNO or vice versa. There are four major aspects that constitutes the rational of NGOs: economic reasons (the profit motives- Multinational Corporations/Transnational Corporations), political (those dealing with human rights issues across the globe like the Amnesty International) and socio-religious reasons (those primarily concerned with problems of human welfare and charity).

One of the principal Characteristics of humanitarian response to an upsurge in “small wars” has been an enhanced role for NGOs. The scale and parameters of NGOs involvement in humanitarian crisis have changed remarkably during the 1990s. From providers of relief, they have increasingly been encouraged to support development activities and build local capacities. Most recently, they have been challenged to reconceptualise their programmes in terms of an ability to prevent conflict and build peace. Multi-mandated NGOs have made efforts to incorporate conflict prevention objectives into their programmes. Multi-mandated NGOs are well placed to administer conflict prevention because of the flexibility of mixed services they provide to develop synergies between relief, development and conflict prevention work⁹⁷. NGOs may have recognised the importance of developing greater conflict sensitivity but in practice, many have found it difficult to incorporate this into their strategies and programmes.

The question is why are NGOs involved in conflict prevention? NGOs efforts to

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Simma and Comments.

⁹⁷ Ibid

mainstreaming⁹⁸ conflict prevention are as a result of both external pressures and the direct experience on the NGOs themselves. The 1990s saw NGOs face more external and self criticism than ever before. This led to a re-examination of their mandates and approaches in their conflict prevention activities. The following are some of the external and internal factors that lead to NGOs current interest in concept prevention.

External factors (the “new world disorder” and donor pressures):⁹⁹

During the cold war years, relief, development and peace were conceptually and institutionally divided. Peace and conflict belonged to the political sphere and were preserve of diplomats. Development and relief were also viewed as distinct areas of activity and were the responsibility of separate institutions (in the inter-governmental, governmental and non-governmental actors). However, in the 1980s and 90s, these divisions started to break down. It became increasingly evident that approaches developed to address inter-state wars were no longer appropriate. It became evident that “one-way” diplomacy had limited leverage in conflicts containing multiple and free wheeling non state actors. Relief aid helped in saving lives but was also absorbed into the war economy and may have sustained violent conflicts. A good example could be seen in case of Liberia under president Charles Taylor¹⁰⁰. According to a UN report, the Firm of Gus van Kouwenhoven a man from Holland is responsible for the deforestation of the Liberian forest. This man and his Firm according to this report has a very tight relationship with the president of Liberia and this Firm smuggled arms to Charles who then supported the war in Sierra Leone. Also, it is said that the money Taylor got from timber export to this Firm was used to finance the rebel groups in Liberia who later then fought in Sierra Leone and in Liberia itself. That not withstanding aid given to Sierria Leone was used to feed the rebel groups and not for the civilians.

Another case was in Angola were the late rebel leader Jonas Savimbi used aid sent to that country to help sustain his rebel group. There are so many example of such misled and/or misused aids in many African countries. Development assistance often became part of the problem as it accentuated regional imbalance and strengthened the positions of unaccountable elites. Therefore conventional theorising and policy responses to conflict no longer appeared to be as relevant. This in turn implies that there is a need and search for alternatives. As a result of this, there has been a collapsing of division between relief and development, and conflict and peace, as research has shown the inter-connections and casual relations between them.

There has been a growing interest in multi-track approaches to conflict prevention, management and resolution. There has been a shift from bi-polar to multi-polar approaches, with NGOs constituting an increasingly important part of the response. The growing support for NGOs activities and their funding is based on the belief that they can stretch out to areas that governments cannot reach¹⁰¹. To an extent NGOs have not always lived up to this belief in their comperative advantage. In the 1990s,

⁹⁸ Mainstreaming is about incorporating a particular objective or approach into an agency’s policies, procedures and practices, (Goor/Huber)

⁹⁹ Ibid 105-125

¹⁰⁰ Greenpeace.p. 89-90

¹⁰¹ E+Z p. 12 Dezember 1999. p. 332-335

they came under attack for a variety of perceived failings. For example, they undermined social contracts, became opportunistic and unregulated, feeding war economies, and were staying silent in the face of pervasive human rights abuses. Due to part of this critique and in part to donor pressure for policy coherence, there have been strong external pressures on NGOs to develop more intelligent and expansive approaches. At the very last, donors are asking NGOs to be able to demonstrate they are doing no harm¹⁰².

For example, NGOs are now being encouraged by the World Bank to think in terms of incorporating reconciliation and peace-building objectives into their relief and development programmes. The EU for example, has for some years been looking closely at the issues of conflict prevention, especially challenges relating to the political and economic causes leading to violent conflicts and related security and defence policies. They also lay emphasis on roles which the NGOs and the civil society can play. NGOs are important in conflict prevention because most of them are well placed to work with the victims of conflict and to identify and address root causes at an early stage.

Internal factors¹⁰³ (demands from the field):

Apart from the external pressures on NGOs to change the way they function, there have been strong internal pressures for change. Relief workers came back from Afghanistan, Rwanda and Yugoslavia for example, asking themselves and their organisations whether they were part of the problem. There are two schools of thoughts which have emerged regarding how NGOs should put things in order:

- a) *The Maximalists*¹⁰⁴: The “Maximalist” argue that “new wars” require new responses that respond not only to symptoms, but also addresses the underlying causes of conflict. This has led to a broadening or widening of humanitarian mandates to include developmental and peace-building objectives (not leaving out the traditional focus on humanitarian needs). The “do no harm” approach was part of this debate, which was driven by the question of whether NGOs could become more mindful of conflict and peace dynamics, and also be more accountable for their actions and impacts. Many African leaders also support this argument.
- b) *The Minimalists*¹⁰⁵: The “Minimalist” argue on the other hand that, NGOs should go “back to the basic”, in the sense of reaffirming the core belief and principles of humanitarianism. This position is based on a number of assumptions and assertions. First, in humanitarian crisis, the humanitarian imperative or the primacy of human life should drive NGOs in their activities (in other words, saving life comes first). Second, the key frameworks and tools for achieving this, are the principles of neutrality, impartiality and the International Humanitarian Law. These present the tools through which agencies negotiate a framework of respect of humanitarian space for the delivery of aid. Third, although it is recognised that there is a need to ensure aid “does not harm”, it is not part of its mandate to try and “do some good” in the sense of conflict prevention. In fact trying to “do good” corrupts humanitarian principles and

¹⁰² Goor/Huber. p. 105-125

¹⁰³ Goor/Huber. p. 126-145

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 138-139

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

detracts them from the core task of saving lives. Therefore, in essence, this approach represents a return to fundamentals, and the deepening rather than broadening of mandates. Such debates on both schools take place within and between NGOs.

The next issue will be problems faced by NGOs in their conflict prevention role. NGOs face a problem of “top-down”¹⁰⁶ pressure from within the organisation. It may be identified as an issue by the head or regional office and then disseminated downwards. But activities will be effective if it is the result of both top-down (aspects of control and donation strategies) and bottom-up (this will include initiatives and suggestions coming from those with experiences in the field) pressures. There is a problem of internal versus external change agents. Here, the question is, should NGOs rely on their own resources to facilitate a process of change or should they use external consultations or change agents? Mostly they use a combination of the two which is better. This is because, relying on ones own expertise is likely to produce greater ownership. The problem is there might not be the technical expertise or political will to push through the required changes. External agents can provide the expertise but might not sufficiently appreciate the local conditions and institutional constraints. For these reasons, it is advisable to use both internal and external change agents.

Another problem is that of training versus structures. Training might lead to personal changes but not necessarily structural. Training is clearly most effective when combined with an integrated package of measures that include structural changes and incentive systems. For example, it makes no sense for a staff to attend training in conflict analysis if he/she is not provided with the space to do this in his/her normal work. The last but not the least is that of separate versus integrate approaches. It is important to separate conflict from other objectives, so that it is seen as distinct and important though conflict prevention may be a cross-cutting issue¹⁰⁷. Training may be one way of creating a critical mass of awareness within the organisation. Other ways of doing this, are to create separate policy unit or conflict advisors or to develop specific conflict related tools and frameworks. This is a difficult task to undertake for the NGOs, hence they should work with donors and in a broader policy environment. NGOs should also work with local partners which pursue conflict sensitive approaches. This implies there should be cooperation between local and foreign/international NGOs in conflict prevention. This will lead to a broader spectrum of initiatives in solving conflicts and thus, enhancing the task of conflict prevention.

To conclude this section, it is worth to comment that international NGOs will function more better when they work in cooperation with the local ones. The functions of NGOs might range from making policies and building structures as concerns conflict prevention, organising workshops, seminars, conferences, carrying out researches, training workers and organising out programmes and projects like advocacy and lobbying on conflict issues. In the range of these many functions, NGOs should be careful not to be influenced by the political policies of their donor countries. This they can do by having their own well structured and aimed strategies to conflict prevention. They should develop a strong and independent political analysis system.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.138-139

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

This will mean questioning international policy in relation to conflict prevention. Western governments (and others) who may not be prepared to back up their policy rhetoric with actions would also be questioned. Also they have to be careful with those donors whose conflict approaches often make structural tension worse.

It is also worth mentioning that donors should on their part help NGOs in their role of conflict prevention. Apart from financing and funding them, donors should provide longer term funding. Since NGOs are non-profit making institutions, donors should encourage them to improve on their process rather than on their impacts. Donors should develop more flexible modalities (measures to comply with in order to receive money), encourage greater experimentation (because experience is the best teacher) and innovations.

They should also increase resources available for capacity building, recognise that intelligent approaches require time and money. They need to accept that there will always be the need for conflict prevention; and therefore re-adjust their strategies and funding policies by taking this into consideration. Generally from the NGO perspective, the overall pot of money is downing, while the conditions being placed on the money are increasing. All the above are very general since what is good for an NGO may not be the same for another.

1.3.3 The Corporate Sector as an Actor in Conflict Prevention¹⁰⁸

Introduction

The corporate sector is a section which entails the activities of many business that are locally based, Transnational or Multinational Companies. The Transnational Companies (TNC) can be termed as the strongest of NGOs as far as international relation is concern. This is because they are concern with economic meaning, the production and distribution of goods and services. Almost $\frac{3}{4}$ of the worlds trade and industrial production is carried out by TNC. As concerns the third world countries and Africa in particular, these TNCs controll almost all of their productions¹⁰⁹. As a reminder, it was because the colonial masters wanted to protect these companies that made the Europeans to partition and later on colonise Africa. The fact is that the corporate sector is not only limited to MNCs and or TNCs, but other small businesses are concerned and they all have a common factor which is in the economic sector.

The regulation of business through an increasing number of guidelines and principles are tempering tendencies to totally disengage social and political control from economic activity today. However, in the 21st century, we are again experiencing a huge increase in the rate of economic growth which is generating frightening population increase¹¹⁰. The increase in Urban populations, combined with fragile political systems in many countries (especcally third world countries and Africa in particular) will further stress labour. The probability is that if solutions are not found, then there will be a ready pool of people who have nothing to lose by joining political or pseudo political movements. The question one might ask is what are the alternatives if globalisation does not bring with it the social, economic and political needs of most people living in this planet?

The liberalisation of trade, increased influence of the private sector and the newly emerging markets following the collapse of the former Soviet Union have provided opportunities for business. But these trends are also generating exclusion and hardship for many others. Economic marginilisation, together with the proliferation of light weapons and the large revenues generated by the exploitation of natural resources in many countries, is creating an alternative political and economic system in itself. For example, the mining of diamonds in Sierra Leone has prvided small producers with an income greater than that which could have been derived from legitimate endeavours. In the case of Sierra Leone, such moneys were used to build up rebels who fought in the civil war.

Mark Duffield refers to this response as “reflex modernity” that manifest itself in “network wars”¹¹¹. These chains require armies of drivers, porters and guards and illegal markets appear, providing demand for local produce and servives. As modernity meets the needs of some, reflexive modernity meets those of others.

The losers are those caught up in the violent conflict that is part and parcel of this pattern of development. There are over 21 million refugees in 2001 compared to 2 million in 1970. The US Committee for Refugees says that approximately 9 million

¹⁰⁸ Jahrbuch für Frieden und Konflikt Forschung, Ban IV, Düsseldorf 1974. (Artikel von Kurt P. Tudyka: „Multinational Konzerne in Afrika , Asien und Lateinamerika“, p. 39-50)

¹⁰⁹ www.allafrica.com

¹¹⁰ Goor/Huber. p.145-162

¹¹¹ Ibid. p.146

people were already refugees or internally displaced in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa before 2001¹¹². The causes of violent conflict though too complex, could partly be explained by economic marginalisation and inequalities in access to resources. As mentioned above, they are also about governance. Furthermore, they are more often than not about identity and less often today, motivated by ideology. Nevertheless, the growing influence and strength of the private sector, the continuation of the modern project to sustain the economic growing power of consumer means that changes are affected by business. While the influence of the public realm decrease in this sense. Real progress will be possible only when companies, governments and other parties agree to work together through a state of mutually supportive steps.

Conflict Prevention in the Corporate Sector

In conflict prevention, the emphasis is on organisations adopting a “Culture of Prevention” that reflects an integrated and holistic approach, in a way that contributes to peace and justice. From a corporate perspective, this will mean making conflict prevention part and parcel of core business activity, social investment programmes, and policy dialogue. It also means making conflict prevention an integral part of the business planning cycle. This will entail the assessment of business opportunities, setting up of operations, and the process of existences and closing down¹¹³. A business is managed in order to maximise profit and minimise cost. The business benefits of peace and its cost of conflict are two poles which businesses consider in conflict prevention. The cost could be framed in terms of indirect social loss of conflict which have an indirect impact on business. The direct cost could be that which will hit the individual company’s bottom line and / or reputation. In order to involve companies in conflict prevention, it is important to analyse the benefits of peace. Better investment opportunities reduce operational cost and the reallocation of national state expenditure and international funding. Looking at four Ds (Deprivation, Disease, Death and Disruption)¹¹⁴ of economic growth, government and civil society are more concerned with the first three. On the other hand, disruption is of direct concern to business. Companies can not provide services and generate profit, if there is constant disruption to transport networks, markets, supplies of labour and equipments.

Disruption such as war creates opportunities for illicit business. In such a situation, there are benefits of war to others such as the armed forces and those who depend on them.

However, for legitimate business, disruption created by violent conflict undermines their ability to operate. This also poses serious challenges to both local and multinational ventures. The difference in companies as concerns conflict prevention is that Multinational Companies operating in conflict zones can choose to withdraw, while local companies have no such choice. To deal with this challenge of conflict prevention, companies need a framework for analysis.

They need to adopt the culture of prevention in their system. A company needs to be able to analyse the causes of the conflict and its dynamics. As part of the analysis of causes of conflict, companies should be able to identify the key actors involved in a conflict, whether it is civil society groups, governments, rebel groups or the international community. There must be also the awareness of the role of the

¹¹² www.allafrica.com

¹¹³ Ibid. p. 145-162

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 148-149

company itself in the conflict and the impact the conflict may have on the company. The impact maybe more reputational than operational for multinational oil companies; in Angola for example¹¹⁵. Whereas for a locally owned banana plantation in the heart of Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines, the threat of violent conflict to the day to day operation of the business will have overriding impact. Similarly, the impact of each of these companies on the conflict is very different. The banana plantation can have a positive or a negative influence dependent largely upon its employment policies and its relationship to the muslim and christian groups. It may also have local contacts with parties to the conflict that could be utilised and could play a role in lobbying other actors for change.

For the oil companies in Angola and elsewhere, the revenues for oil extract tend to feed the coffers of authorotarian, centralised governments, and the bulging purses of the Transnational companies (TNC). Whilst at the same time marginalising other sectors of the economy and leaving public services such as health and education out in the cold¹¹⁶. The fact here is that when states do not have to depend on domestic taxation to finance development, governments are not forced to formulate their goals and objectives under the security of citizens who pay the bills. In this situation, the company may be able to play a role in improving the local business environment. This they can do by strengthening local business and/or improving people's participation in the public sector. Multinational companies argue that they do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries in which they operate. They do not want to interfere at worst in the internal politics of their operating countries. They also fear the risk in conflict prevention which might divert their aim of business. This is true to an extend, but as we have just seen, conflict prevention has benefits and if business is disrupted by a conflict, then it might cost the companies heavily. There is awareness that conflict also affects the direct operating costs of companies. In Algeria for example, it is estimated that, oil firms typically spend 9% of their budget on security. In Colombia, it is approximately 4-6.5%¹¹⁷. The point is that, these companies have much influence in the countries in which they operate. They can therefore, put pressure on the governments of their operating countries to bring positive changes in their systems. Multinational companies (MNC) and others should show more concern in areas where they operate and help to develop them. For example they could build schools, hospitals, roads and other facilities which would be used by their workers as well as the local population.

This idea of more involvement by MNCs and TNCs in their operating regions was also proposed by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a means by which such companies could help prevent conflict in Africa¹¹⁸.

As concerns steps towards conflict prevention, some organisations are working on this in some capacities. For example, the Congo Consulting is a profit consultancy that is working with others to agree social benchmarks for the resources sector. This is a new project and therefore needs a long way to go before any social consensus could be made. Another case is that of these oil companies, some like Shell, BP and Chevron have signed human rights and security voluntary principles. Others, like Premier oil and Norsk Hydro support the Universal Declaration of Human rights and

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 150-151

¹¹⁶ Kurt P. Tudyka. p. 35-37

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p. 40-45

¹¹⁸ E+Z. April, 1999:4. p. 101

the Anglo-American participation in the Global Mining Initiatives¹¹⁹.

To round up this section, here are some remarks on what companies could do to promote conflict prevention: Company engagement in issues that relate to conflict prevention is growing. This is reflected in the increasing number of guidelines and policies on social and environmental issues. But more is expected to be done and especially from those companies operating in African countries as concerns conflict prevention. TNCs also recognise that business has to operate in a way that it will be able to face the challenges of the 21st century. Companies should also learn from other international and locally based business/groups as to conflict prevention experiences. They should work in collaboration with other actors in conflict prevention actors, develop appropriate frameworks and processes required, skills and tools needed and make relevant guidelines and regulations as concerns conflict prevention.

International agencies, governments and civil society groups on the other hand need to put their heads together with those companies championing conflict prevention processes, to explore how best to develop more practical experience. Also, they have to develop how to distil learning from this practical experience into global policies that will create a supportive environment for corporate engagement in conflict prevention. At the same time, companies have to tighten the already existing policies and guidelines, to help provide space for these to work. The tightening up has to provide some protection from those less scrupulous competitors and to help the process of policy dialogue between the private sector, the government and the civil society. The policy dialogue could help in the future in what could continue to be sensitive and highly complex to challenges in countries vulnerable to violent conflict. Through creative alliances, the international community, corporate sector, host governments and local organisations can together find solutions to the serious problems that face people living in conflict regions. How such a proposal could work in Conflict prevention could be seen in the case study of Sweden.

1.4 Swedens example in the Prevention of Violence and the Management of Conflict¹²⁰

Looking at this example the immediate question one might ask is, why Sweden?. As Bo Wirmark¹²¹ put it, Sweden is seen as a model when it concerns the politic of securing peace and conflict management in Europe. Sweden is one of the first European countries which has started cooperating with the civil soceity as concerns conflict prevention and management in its assignment in the Foreign Office Ministry

¹¹⁹ Goor/Huber. p. 154-157

¹²⁰ E+Z April 1999:4 p. 110-113

¹²¹ Ibid. p. 110

long ago. The Swedish Peace Team Forum had started witnessing successes since from its start as Bo puts it. Also Sweden is looked upon in Germany and in Europe as a whole, as a good example in regards to peace, security, and conflict management. The Swedish foreign ministry works hand in hand with NGOs, governments and the civil society to bring peace. That said, the next question is how does Sweden go about this task? The Swedish government has come up with what is known as a "Peace Team Forum" which is responsible to undertake this assignment.

The Swedish Peace Team Forum (PTF) and how it works¹²²

The PTF made up of about 30 free will organisations which come from Emergency Aid, Development Aid and Peacekeeping workers. The PTF was started since 1995 with impressions gained from experiences which brought about democracy in South Africa.

In 1994, before the elections in South Africa, there existed cooperation work between 3 South African organisations, 17 Swedish Trade Unions, Church groups, solidarity and peace organisations, altogether, 66 Swedish free will election observers were present in different regions of the land. The aim of the project was to enable the damping of violence, so that election campaigns would be carried out peacefully and the results proclaimed without the risk of violence escalation. Another project at this time was the "Escort Guatemala", which tood to mobilise and follow up international help of refugees from foreign regions. The experience of these two projects gave birth to the PTF.

The PTF concentrates on three main factors¹²³:

- Conducting conferences. For example they organised a conference in 1997 which was attended by 100 representatives. Apart from the Swedish, representatives (from the government and non-government officials) came from all over the world which includes, officials from international NGOs, from the EU, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the UN Secretary General. Their discussions were centred on the relationship between governmental and non-governmental organisations as concerns the prevention of violence, conflict transformation and peace consolidation. The representatives also discussed the demands for the future measures to conflict prevention, as well as to arrange such conferences in the near future.
- To carry out education for peace services: This entails the education of people as future peace workers and for peace services in conflict areas. This education system has to develop a model curriculum in the form of a 4-12 weeks basic courses which had to be made public and a hand book added to it. Under the motto " Prevention of Conflict, Conflict Management and Conflict Consoliadtion", courses, seminars and workshops were to be organised.
- Investigate / examine the role of NGOs. The investigation of Peaceworks of NGOs are prepared and examined at this moment only after the finance has been secured.
- Added to the three above mentioned roles, the PTF tries to keep in contact with international developments in this section (mainly with the help of the European Platform on Conflict Prevention and Resolution). Inorder to carry out its functions properly the PTF works in colaboration with the state. The state finances the works of the PTF as it works in coopration with the state. The

¹²² Ibid. p. 111

¹²³ Ibid. p. 111-113

state does not control its activities, but support them. In the organisation of international conferences, the project control group bears the responsibility of the program, invitations and so forth.

This group is advised by the reference group which is set by the foreign ministry. The members are selected from all institutions which are to participate in the conference. The ministry also puts in diplomatic help to assure the other governments and organisations. Moreover, the Swedish Christian Council has prepared a catalog regarding the participation of NGOs in the act of conflict prevention and management. It contains the following major points:

*Prevention of conflict escalation*¹²⁴: This includes the development of Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS). Under this, new methods of observing and keeping the human and minority rights are developed. These methods also include the dynamics between groups, the press, medium freedom and also the identification and support for endangered communities. Added to this is the creation and the promotion of communication of trustworthy dialog between conflicting parties. Facts inquiries in relation to social and economic trends are made not leaving out political developments, which could lead to the building up of tension.

*Peacekeeping and Peacemaintenance*¹²⁵: Here, actions such as official and unofficial negotiations are made. Such negotiations lead to the clearing of land mines, the development of consciousness of the presence of mine to the population, negotiations on how to detect mines and where. The accompanying of endangered persons and groups without violence is also taken into consideration. However, to maintain the consolidation of peace, NGOs are needed to support free and fair elections and to deliver psychological care. They also re-educate and re-integrate refugees and those in exile. The re-education and re-training of ex-combatants in the society is another aspect. The support of peace education in different areas and the promotion of respect of human rights are considered. To attain those aims in education and training, schools (including adult schools), apprenticeship and educative programmes are organised in the local media.

*Coherence in the political field is another field of concern*¹²⁶: The Swedish Development Policy is almost the same with that of its parliamentary policies. This includes, development in all aspects, environmental care, gender equality, the strengthening of democracy and human rights.

In order to carry out these goals, a dialog was organised between the SIDA (the Swedish Development Organisation) and the foreign ministry which ended up with a plan known as "Action Plan for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights". This plan amongst others developed a special strategy which dealt with conflict prevention and management under the canopy of humanitarian aid. The humanitarian aid has been put into action in 10 countries which have faced civil wars especially in Africa, for example in Sierra Leone. To make sure that these aid are not misunderstood, they have to be independent from other aid as pure humanitarian motives.

There is an increase in concern on the relationship between conflict management at the political level and the solving of humanitarian crisis. SIDA is more interested in

¹²⁴ Ibid. p.113

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid

knowing the causes of conflicts as could be seen in the assignments it gives to other operative partners, and to NGOs who place more emphasis on humanright issues. The foreign ministry entails an 18 man "Advisory Council on Support for Peace and Security"¹²⁷. The leader of this council is the representative head of the foreign ministry.

The members of this council include representatives of the PTF, SIDA, the defence ministry and some most important research institutes in this field. The advisory council meets 7-8 times a year in order to spot out actual problems faced by the ministry. In 1997, the foreign ministry opened a study on conflict prevention which gave an open look on the problematic. This study is to follow up the different government active programmes in short terms. As part of the conflict prevention programme, the defence ministry in 1997, assigned the ambassador Stig Elvemar¹²⁸ to present a report on educative measures for peace services. He was asked to develop a model for the training of military and civilian persons who could be used in situations of international crisis. He looked at all opportunities which could lead to cooperation between civilians and military actors in this sphere. Although the functions of these actors (the military, diplomates and workers of NGOs) differ, there are enough common factors for a useful training to be made together. Such trainings will foster the cooperation between these actors. One of the proposals made by Elvemar in his report as concerns organising a training together was to open an "International Competence and training Centre". This is also called the "Folk-Bernardotte-Institute for International Conflict Management and Peace Missions"¹²⁹.

According to his proposals, a Swedish system to train military personells for peacekeeping services was developed in cooperation with other Nordic countries. This model enjoys international praises, respect and wins world interest. The Swedish Armed Force International Command (SWEDINT) is in Södertälje¹³⁰.

It specialises in courses in which officers in the lower and upper ranks are trained for leading roles with assignments in international peace missions. Civil policemen are also trained there for international missions under the same roof. This type of training course is taught in cooperation with the national police authority and it is opened to foreigners. Similar courses are also organised by the SIDA and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency where civilian observers and rescue service personells are trained. The school programmes are of high quality. What is lacking is a multidisciplinary network that cuts across borders. There must be a training and further training platforms in which all actors in international conflict management could meet with oneanother; to exchange ideas. Such actors might include military officials, policemen, representatives of humanitarian organisations, diplomates and persons who take part in preventive peace activities. It is for this reason that Stig proposed the opening of an international institute of conflict management in Sweden.

This institute will take care of dialog between the different sectors involved in conflict prevention and management. It will support the development of new methods for the building of corresponding capacities in this area. It will also be opened to NGOs in Sweden as well as those from foreign countries. Most importantly, there will be a tight cooperation between international and regional organisations and other school

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 112

¹²⁸ Ibid. p. 111

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ Ibid

centers. The institute should also make sure that these actors learn from each other. This will enable them develop common strategies for deployments on the spot. Through this institution, all those involved in conflict prevention and management projects should be informed about the findings (knowledge) of the academical peace and conflict solving research.

Other necessary informations discovered and practical experiences made in deployments should be made known to others. In short information exchange is very important. An example of such a proposal is the manoeuvre of the “Nordic Peace”. This is a good example which illustrates the cooperation between the civilians and the military personnels in the Island of Gotland (this took place in Autumn 1998)¹³¹. Swedish peace organisations, a number of military officials and civilians from the Nordic and the Baltic states took part in this manoeuvre. The main problem in the Island was the post military conflict situation which included the taking of hostages and such similar actions. The aim of the manoeuvre was to practice the cooperation and coordination between military and civil personels. It was a breakthrough in this area and also for the cooperation between state officials and civil organisation. The success in this work brought increased interest in the continuation of such cooperative projects.

To conclude, Sweden has undertaken alot in the last years in the subject of conflict prevention and management. The proposals of Stig are still on the making. The work has began and will meet obstacles; but to overcome these obstacles means to undertake more bigger projects/assignments. The Swedish case could be seen as a European concept of Conflict prevention and management.

1.5 The Theory of an African Solution for an African Problem¹³²

The main idea behind this principle is that Africans themselves should be given a chance to play a greater role in solving and preventing crisis in Africa. Postulants of such theory include amongs others the leaders of Nigeria, Liberia, Lybia, Ghana, South Africa and others who do not want to take sides openly (for a better view of African States, see map 1 on page 86 showing all African countries including Cameroon and Nigeria). As we can see, these are the leaders who form the brain box behind the new “African Union” (took over the O.A.U in 2002)¹³³.

The history of this theory could be traced as far back to the days of slavery and slave trade. The philosophy behind this theory is founded in the history of Africa and it is based on the origin of pan-Africanism¹³⁴. The idea of racial discrimination bounded the pan-Africanist philosophy which was also one of the main idea behind the formation of the O.A.U The pan- Africanist idea came out with the revolt in Haiti in 1832. Freed slaves revolted against racial inequality and for the black cultural revival. They wanted their identity and to return to their roots.

One of the leading figures was William Blyden in the West Indies (1832-1912- formerly a diplomate and professor in the Liberian collage). He later fought for the creation of liberia for freed slaves. Another activists was W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 113

¹³² Curtin Feiermann et al. p. 444-471

¹³³ www.allafrica.com

¹³⁴ Encylopaedia of the Social sciences volumesXI-XII (MOR-PUN), London 1993. p. 549-550

1963) who did not believe in the return of freed slaves to Africa¹³⁵. To him, their sweat was used to enrich America and therefore they should remain there and fight for their rights. He believed that, this struggle nevertheless should be supported by all Africans. Unlike Du Bois, Marcus Mosiah X (1887-1940) held that freed slaves should return back home in Africa.

To him and his supporters, slaves have lost their cultural roots and thus will not be able to put up a strong fight in these foreign lands. All these activists organised conferences abroad and in Africa. Some of the conferences include, that of 1920 in Accra, 1923 in London and Lisbury, 1927 in New York, 1945 the Manchester conference in London and 1958 in Accra. Some prominent African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972), Mobutu Sésè Sèko (1930-2000) and Njomo Kenyatta (1894-1978) and Patrice Lumumba (1925-1961) attended some of these conferences. The end result was the formation of the O.A.U in 1963.

The formation of the O.A.U saw a new face of the ideology of “an African solution for an African problem”. On discussions leading to the formation of the O.A.U, the question was on what type of union African leaders wanted and how fast this should take place. Some African countries wanted a unity which was going to be gradual and based on cooperation on aspects of economic and communication amongst African states. This group wanted such a union where the independence and sovereignty of each state would be respected. They also felt that Africa’s survival after independence will depend much in cooperation with the USA and the former colonial masters.

This group was called the Monrovia group and consisted mainly of the following countries:- Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia¹³⁶.

The other group was called the Cassablanca group in which the prominent members were countries like Mali, Egypt, Morocco, Ghana and Guinea¹³⁷. They opted for a total union, for the total independence of African states and for their freedom from a third force. To Nkrumah of Ghana, the independence of Africa will not be complete if it still tied itself to western powers. Unity should be total and as soon as possible he insisted. At the Addis Ababa conference of May 22-23, this conflict in ideology founded a compromise with the formation of the O.A.U (25th May 1963). With the formation of the O.A.U, the philosophy did not die out, but was transformed to another stage.

As conflicts continue to occur more oftenly after the independence of African states, this theory took another phase. Cases of conflict in Africa became multiplied in their nature and turned to be more violent. This called for an immediate attention from the Africans themselves as well as the international community. Before, African leaders believed more in their European counterparts, as well as in the UN for help in solving conflicts in Africa. But when the help of UN and the European friends did not succeed, as expected by the African leaders, then the philosophy of an “African Solution to an African Problem” was revived. For example when the UN mission in solving the Congo crisis in 1960 failed, many African states were disappointed. Most of the states which made up the Cassablanca group preferred to see a Congolese

¹³⁵ Mutiso et al. p. 225

¹³⁶ www.allafrica.com

¹³⁷ Ibid.

state which would be free from external control. When it came to the Nigerian civil war of 1967¹³⁸, African leaders in the O.A.U partially contained the international aspect by evoking the principle of an “African Solution for and African Problem”.

Why this philosophy? It is because of the disappointment African leaders have had with slavery, colonialism and external help in solving conflicts in Africa. Apart from the failure of the UN missions, Aid programmes have also failed to do their best.

Some European countries under the canopy of aid interfere into the internal politics of African states in which they operate. They also sell arms and carry out illegal trade in these countries. Most of these countries are more interested in their businesses than conflict prevention. Many examples like in the case of Sierra Leone, Congo, Liberia, Angola, Uganda. It has also been noticed that most aid sent to Africa land in the wrong hands and therefore, rebel leaders used these aid to sponsor their groups. The case Johnas Savimbi (1934-2002) in Angola can prove this¹³⁹. The arguments of the postulants of this theory are as follows:

- Most European countries lack historical knowledge about African states. This is a very important aspect in solving conflict in Africa and as such the conflict prevention strategies of these countries witness little successes in Africa. Another point is that because the Europeans lack historical background, they form their peace models using certain ideal assumptions, some of which can only work in Europe. They construct a so-called European model and try to apply them in Africa. Most often, the social behaviour of the conflict parties are not included.

The long term local historical movement of the people in conflicts are also considered. The fact is that even if the European models are correct, the local Africans in most cases do not take them serious because they still look at the Europeans as foreigners. It is difficult to impliment ideas or models of somebody else without knowing/understanding all the parameters used in constructing the model. This usaully leads to abandonment of models, since the people in Africa can not modify the models in case of any errors.

Most international actors lack favourable intellectual tradition to understand the conflicts in Africa. This leads to the lack of analysis on which actor is the best for conflict prevention and the optimal form of change in African States. There is a perception that conflict prevention is not measurable and hence less worthy of interest for those who are not involved directly. This is akin of the school of thought who critrise development aid for not achieving growth in the third world countries.

- Every crisis has its own causes and thus demands its own theory and analysis on how to solve it. This implies no two conflicts are the same be it in Africa or elsewhere. There is another explanation for any local conflict which needs its own theory. As Völker Mathais puts it “Für jeden der lokalen Konflikte gibt es eine andere Erklärung, für Jeden wird eine andere Theorie gebraucht...und nur das Verständnis der Ursachen kann zur Entwicklung von Instrumentarien verhelfen, die zur Schlichtung der jeweiligen Konflikte tauglich wären. Oder, wenn sie denn rechtzeitig verstanden würden, zur ihrer Prävention“¹⁴⁰.

The fact here is that most attempts by European countries to solve conflicts in Africa

¹³⁸ Curtin et al. p. 570-582

¹³⁹ Greenpeace. p. 88

¹⁴⁰ E+Z April 1999:4. p. 95

have failed. Even the former colonial masters do not have much to offer in many cases because they were there for their own economic interests and therefore, know little about the African system and its people. Another reason for the failure is that conferences are held out of the continent and theories are brought up which at times do not take into consideration the factors on the ground. Most of the time, representatives of such conferences either governmental or non-governmental, usually come from other foreign nations. So they just have imaginary situations in their minds and as such can not come out with good ideas on conflict prevention strategies. Apart from the fact that some theories of such meetings are more euphoric than real, the organisations lack staffs to carry out their projects.

As a solution to these problems, the proposals of the theory “an African Solution for African Problems” are¹⁴¹:

- Ideas on how to prevent or solve conflicts in Africa should come from the Africans themselves. This is because they can best interpret and/or understand the ethnical, religious, traditional, tribal and cultural elements which are linked to some causes of conflicts in the continent. As such, they stand a better chance to come up with proposals for solutions.
- The Africans also have the experiences of the “men on the spot”. Where they live in and rule the conflict regions. For these reasons, they can best understand the economic, social and political contours of their lands which could cause conflict. People in the conflict region will have much trust in their fellow countrymen as aid/peace workers compared to the foreigners. This statement could be argued; but the case of Kosovo and Sierra Leone has shown that local volunteers are more accepted by a majority of the population¹⁴².
- The problem is also linked to the lack of staffs in conflict prevention missions, therefore, the local civilians should be trained to carry out such activities (the so called “men on the spot” should be trained to carry such missions). This idea is not new, as it was used by the British (the system of indirect rule) in the colonial days to rule their colonies.

Looking at these two cases, one could say that both methods of conflict prevention present good arguments. For the Africans, they lack the finance and the resources to effectively carry out conflict prevention and management. The dilemma of including local Africans in conflict solving could be that they could be biased in their decision making. To avoid such bias, conflict prevention workers should be neutral (people not affected/involved in the conflict) and should be trained to take objective decisions. For foreigners/Europeans, the financial possibilities are there but lack applicable principles. So it would be wise to take the proposal of Stig, in which foreign countries would work in cooperation with African states to solve and prevent conflicts in Africa. However, it is advisable that Africans could come up with good conflict prevention proposals which when combined with external aid, will help in conflict prevention and management in the continent.

The training of civilians and other peace workers could be sponsored by the international community and development aid programmes which should be well

¹⁴¹ Mutiso et al. and Ndabaningi

¹⁴² E+Z Jg.39. 1998:3. p. 68-68

administered and controlled. This would avoid misuse of such help and also foster accountability. When people are trained in Europe and sent to Africa, the possibility is that the conditions might be different. So it would be better if the peace and aid workers absorb training in areas similar to where they are needed.

Moreover, we believe that the African theory is not totally against the European system of solving conflicts in Africa. What they are trying to point out are some of the reasons why this has not meet up with the expected demands. They are saying that time has come where the Europeans have to work in collaboration with the Africans. The Africans should be given more priority in issues concerning conflict prevention in the continent as was the case before. This is a good idea because so far, the arguments have shown that, only cooperation amongst the different actors in conflict prevention activities could produce better results.

This work will continue to the second part which is that of the Cameroon-Nigerian border conflict over Bakassi. The aim of this is to see how far these two theories combined together would help to solve this crisis and other problems in Africa. To treat this section, we shall first of all give a brief historical background of the two countries as concerns boundary making. We shall then look at the conflict in particular which will focus on the Bakassi region.

By doing this, the border conflict will be treated during colonial times, after colonialism and in the present. Some attempts at solving this conflict at different levels and by different actors would be looked upon. This will include some state actors within Africa (also the O.A.U), some European countries and the UN.

PART II

2.1 The Cameroon-Nigerian Border Conflict

2.1.1 Historical Background of Boundary between the two Countries:

When Colonial powers came to Africa they made new boundaries over the pre-existing ones. Their objective was to secure those territories that would give them maximum economic advantage. At that time geographical strategic interest was not in the foreground. The new boundaries therefore ignored the local economic and sociological factors of the Africans. Moreover, agricultural land, ethnic groups and even families were separated.

Cameroon lies between Latitude 2° and 13° North of the Equator and between Longitude 16.15° East of the Meridian. It is bounded on the west by the Federal Republic of Nigeria, on the north and north east by the Chad Republic, on the east by the Central African Republic and on the south by Congo, Gabon and the Atlantic Ocean. It has an area of about 475.000 square kilometres¹⁴³.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is situated between Latitude 4° and 14° north of the Equator and between Longitude 3.75° and 15° east of the Meridian. It is bounded on the north by the Republic of Niger and Chad, on the east by Cameroon, on the south by the Atlantic Ocean and on the west by the Republic of Benin. It has an area of about 923.768 square kilometres¹⁴⁴.

The Cameroon-Nigerian border especially around the Bakassi area is one of those conflicting areas in Africa since the beginning of the colonial era. The border between Cameroon and Nigeria stretches from the Lake Chad in the North to the Biafra in the Atlantic Ocean, covering a distance of about 1.000 kilometres¹⁴⁵. It was laid out by the Germans and the British between 1885 and 1914.

After the First World War, the German Cameroon was partitioned between Britain and France as Mandated territories. 1/3 of the Cameroons was given to the British as a Mandated territory which was administered as part of Nigeria (see map 2 on page 87 showing the Anglo-German boundary and the Anglo-French boundary of Cameroon). The other 2/3 of the Cameroons was a French Mandated Territory. The consequence was that a new boundary emerged between Nigeria and Cameroon. It should be noted here that the old boundary between Nigeria under British rule and Cameroon under the German rule was not cancelled. In 1961 when Cameroon was about to gain its independence, a plebiscite was held in the British Cameroons. The Northern section of Cameroons decided to remain in Nigeria and become Nigerians. The people of the southern part of the Cameroons choosed to rejoin the French Cameroons and became Cameroonians.

So the old British-German boundary on the south of Cameroon was revived as the official boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria at independence of both countries. This boundary division like other colonial imposed ones in Africa, was drawn without due respect to political, cultural, ethnic and economic considerations of the local

¹⁴³ Abbia, Cameroon Cultural Review 27-28, Yaounde, Cameroon, 1974, p. 157

¹⁴⁴ Anene, J.C: International Boundaries of Nigeria, London 1970. pp 47-50

¹⁴⁵ Ngho, Victor Julius: Cameroon 1884-1985. A Hundred Years of History. Yaounde, Cameroon 1987. p. 79-87

people¹⁴⁶.

Thus the Cameroon-Nigerian border which runs from the Lake Chad in the north to the Atlantic Ocean in the south, divides most ethnic groups putting some in Nigeria and others in Cameroon. Such divisions had negative effects on the political, economic and cultural life of the people on both sides of the border. As a result, border clashes between the neighbouring states became more occurrant. The most conflicting zone has been the Bakassi Peninsula. Inorder to better understand the developments of this conflict, we shall look at the conflict during colonial rule, after independence and at present. At each stage we shall look at various attempts at solving the conflict by different actors (such as the states and international organisations).

2.1.2 The Border Conflict during Colonial Rule

Looking at the border conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon in colonial time will not make much sence if a brief history of the boundary making between the two countries is not mentioned. Therefore, this section will include the Anglo-German border, the Anglo-French boundary after the WWI. This is because at first the British had to divide the territories of now Cameroon and Nigeria with Germany. After the WWI, the Germans were defeated in the war and Britain and France now had to rule the Cameroonian territory as a colony and finally as a mandated territory under the UN till independence. It will also be wise to mention the implication of these different boundary agreements to the local people. The exact terms of the agreements and notes exchanged between the different European colonial powers may not be reproduced. But important sections and references maybe made mentioned of to illustrate facts.

The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the General Act that emerged from it, in effect empowered European powers to expropriate territories in Africa. At the time of the Conference in Berlin, British merchants dominated the Nigerian coast from Lagos to Calabar and were great rivals to the Germans along the Cameroon Coast from Ambass Bay to Douala.

Because of concurrence between European states over territories in Africa, the so called "Spheres of Influence", the Berlin Conference was called to prevent conflict among European states over territories in Africa. With the Germans in Cameroon and the British in Nigeria, boundary issue bewteen their two spheres was that of great concern. Controversy on these territories came in due to the conflicting ambitions of the two colonial powers. First, the British were unhappy to surrender all of Cameroon to the Germans because of the long standing British influence in the territory¹⁴⁷. Second, British traders in Calabar were aware of the economic potentials of the Balondo people of Bakassi and beyond. The people of the region had long commercial contacts with the Efik traders who were middlemen between the Balondo and the Europeans on the Calabar coast.

¹⁴⁶ Van Sina et al. p. 444-471

¹⁴⁷ Ngoh, p. 85

The Germans on their part, maintained that since Britain was in control of the Niger Delta and Calabar, they too would control the source of any other major river south of Calabar. With the fore-said conflicting ambitions, British and German officials set out from April 1885 to define the Cameroon-Nigerian boundary. This was done in two stages: first by exchange of notes at diplomatic level defining their respective spheres of influence. Second, by demarcating the boundary on land by the Boundary Commissions.

In the defining and the demarcating processes, the entire border from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean, a distance of about 1.100 kilometres was divided into three major sections as follows: From the Sea to the Cross River, from Cross River to Yola and from Yola to Lake Chad. The agreements started with the definition from the Sea to the Cross River. This section is our point of concentration as it concerns the Bakassi problem.

The first Anglo-German border arrangement was between April 29 and June 16, 1885. That Agreement stipulated that Rio del Rey should be the Cameroon-Nigerian border on the Atlantic Coast¹⁴⁸. With the position of the coast defined by the June 16 1885 Agreement, the border was then to be taken inland. By the exchange of notes between July 27 and August 2, 1885, the border was extended from the Cross River to Yola. When it was discovered that Rio del Rey was not a river, another Agreement was made in July 1 1890. The Agreement stipulated that the line of demarcation should provisionally run directly from the head of Rio del rey to the point about 9°8 E long, marked "Rapide" on the Admiralty Chart¹⁴⁹.

Another Agreement was signed on April 14, 1893 defining precisely what was meant by the head of the Rio del Rey in the treaty of 1890. It then provided that the right of the creek should form the boundary between the Oil Rivers Protectorate and the colony of Cameroons¹⁵⁰. On November 15, 1893, another accord was signed describing the border from the Cross River through Yola to Lake Chad. On December 12, 1900 an Anglo-German border Agreement was signed at Buea. This agreement revised clearly that of April 29, 1885, putting the Bakassi Peninsular technically under German control. On April 16, 1901, the Agreement of December 12, 1900 was revised and the Anglo-German border was put clearly at the centre of the River Akwayafe, thereby putting the Bakassi Peninsula under the German Cameroons¹⁵¹. As earlier said further boundary agreements were made from Yola to Lake Chad but our main concern will be on the crisis region of today-the Bakassi region.

The agreement of April 20, 1906, signed at Archibong re-affirmed Akwayafe as boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria along the creeks under colonial rule. Several agreements as to boundary divisions were signed between the Germans and the British but the final Agreement on the Cameroon-Nigerian boundary was concluded and signed in London on March 11, 1913¹⁵². In addition to defining the border, questions regarding the navigation of the Cross River and transit trade were

¹⁴⁸ Herstlet E.: The Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol III, London 1967, p. 868

¹⁴⁹ Cited by Weladji in Abbia, op. cit, No. 29-30, 1975, p. 177

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. p.186-187

¹⁵² Brownlie Ian: African Boundaries; A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia. London 1979. pp. 553-587

also discussed and agreed upon. This agreement in effect re-affirmed most of the important clauses in the London Agreement of October 6 1909¹⁵³ (Agreement which defined the boundary from Yola to the Sea). This agreement was signed in London by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary on behalf of Britain and Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador, signed for Germany¹⁵⁴.

That said about the Anglo-German border, we shall now look at the Anglo-French border from 1916-1961. The end of the WWI saw the defeat of the Germans by a joint Anglo-French troop in the Cameroon region. Following the defeat of the Germans in Cameroon, France and Britain agreed in the interest of continued cooperation and amity, to partition the territory provisionally. After several consultations, the agreement was finally signed on March 16, 1916 between General Charles Dobell representing Britain and General Aymerich, representing France. The French took 2/3 of the Cameroonian Territory and the British 1/3. Since this agreement was provisional, negotiations reopened in 1918 and a new agreement was concluded. A new Anglo-French boundary Agreement was signed on July 10, 1919 by Viscount Milner for Britain and Henry Simon for France¹⁵⁵. According to this arrangement, the boundary took off in the north from the junction of the three old British, French and German boundaries at a point at Lake Chad. It started from Latitude 13° 05' north and approximately 14° 05' Longitude east of Greenwich and stretched southwards in a zig-zag form and entered the Atlantic Ocean in the south at a point 35° west of true south¹⁵⁶.

The Milner-Simon Agreement established an international boundary between British and French occupied Cameroons. Like the Anglo-German boundary of 1913, the new international boundary ignored anthropological and economic factors¹⁵⁷. In some areas, the boundary was confused and even unknown to the local people and governments.

For example in June 1938, two Preventive Police Officers chasing smugglers, crossed the border without knowing from the British sector to the French territory near Bongola. The French arrested the constables, disarmed them and later sent them back to the British sphere. For administrative convenience, the British divided its own part of the Cameroons into two:- northern and southern Cameroons. The Southern Cameroons was administered as a province within the Southern Province of Nigeria. The Northern Cameroons was further sub divided into administrative Divisions and incorporated into the Northern Provinces of Nigeria.

It should be noted that despite the Anglo-French boundary, the Anglo-German boundary was not dissolved¹⁵⁸. This summary of the boundary division between Cameroon and Nigeria is important in that with such a background one could follow up and analyse the border conflict of today between the two states. It is also important to see that this border issue is not only for the independent states of today but that it was a problem also for the colonial masters who drew the boundaries.

¹⁵³ Waladji in Abbia, op. cit. No 31-33, Feb.1978 pp 177-180

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, op. cit. No.35-37 June 1979, pp. 382-383

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Many ethnic groups were separated for example the Balong were divided into east (in French Cameroon) and west (in British Cameroon).

¹⁵⁸ This was a disappointment to many local people who wanted either to leave within the French or the British side of the boundary without moving.

Though the border conflict has taken a different dimension today as it was in the colonial times, it is sure that the remote causes of the conflict lies in the history of the two countries. The analysis of the implications of the Cameroon-Nigerian border during the colonial rule will be discussed below.

When Britain and Germany set out in April 1885 to define the Cameroon-Nigerian border on the Atlantic coast, they never bothered about the Bakassi Peninsula. The control of the waterways was important to them because this enabled them to have access to the hinterland trade. Since Britain was already in control of the Niger Delta and the outlet of the Cross River, Germany wanted to control the next river which was the Rio del Rey. The Anglo-German border Agreement of June 16, 1885 fixed their common boundary at Rio del Rey¹⁵⁹. Due to this, the Bakassi Peninsula fell within the British sphere. The boundary in Rio del Rey did not last because this was not a river as first thought by the Germans. Between May and June 1885, two Swedish explorers, G. Valdau and K. Knutson, undertook an exploratory journey along the river Ndian region. There, they discovered that the Rio del Rey was not a river but an estuary¹⁶⁰. This information brought to light the fault in the Agreement of June 16, 1885.

The Germans found that if the estuary of Rio del Rey became the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, their ambition of controlling the waterway east of the Cross River

would not be achieved. They then suggested that the River Akwayafe should replace the Rio del Rey. The British rejected the proposal and instead suggested the River Ndian. This they believed would keep the exaggerated "Efik Commercial Empire" intact¹⁶¹. After protracted arguments, the British gave in to the Germans. Within the British circle, it was thought that the disputed creeks would be an "Eldorado on a worthless swamp"¹⁶². It was said to be a strip of dismal swamps inhabited by a few miserable fisher folk. With these views in mind, the British saw no reason for continuous insistence on controlling the creeks. See map 3 on page 88 showing Rio del Rey, the Akwayafe River, the Bakassi Peninsula and other fishing towns in the Kumba Division.

So an agreement was reached at in April 14, 1893 which saw the River Akwayafe accepted as the boundary between the German Cameroon and the British Nigeria. Following this Agreement, the Bakassi Peninsula was brought into the German sphere of influence. From then the Bakassi Peninsula became part of Cameroon. Further Agreement which followed after this such as that of April 20, 1906 and that of March 11 1913¹⁶³ reinforced the Cameroonian control over this Peninsula. It should be noted that the Germans were more interested in the control over the Akwayafe waterway than the Peninsula. But it is worth taking note on which side the Bakassi Peninsula belongs; as this would be the point of conflict with the recent Cameroon and Nigerian Governments as we shall see later as the conflict develops. The main reason why the Germans were more interested in the waterway than the Peninsula, was because this waterway would enable them have access to the

¹⁵⁹ Herstlet E.: *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, vol 111, London 1967, p. 868.

¹⁶⁰ Abbia., No. 27-28, 19974. p. 159

¹⁶¹ Anene .p. 74

¹⁶² Reported by Anderson, British Foreign Secretary, cited in Anene, p. 81

¹⁶³ Abbia., No. 31-33, p. 180-185

hinterland for their trade interest. The British and the Germans were aware that this new changes in the region would affect the local people in that some may prefer one foreign government to the other. For this reason, Article 27 of the March 11, 1913 Agreement stated that within six months from the date of marking out the boundary, natives living near the boundary-line may, if they so desire, cross over to live on the other side. The Efik population that was dominant at the Bakassi never crossed the border to the Nigerian side. They remain in Bakassi and consequently became Cameroonian citizens. The problem here was that though within the Cameroonian territory, the Efiks at Bakassi did not readily submit to the Cameroonian authorities. Those of them in Isangele, Archibong, Akwa and Abana who depended on markets at Ilang and Calabar on the Nigerian side resented being in Cameroon.

They furthermore regarded themselves as people from Calabar who had no natural or other affinities with the people of Cameroon. They often conflicted much with the German border control officers who were out to check illegal trans-frontier activities. When the First World War (WWI) broke out in August 4, 1914, the Germans as well as the British fought in their colonies. The British attacked the Germans from Nigeria, the French from Chad in the north and a combined troop of French and Belgian troops from the Congo in the south-east. The presence of the German troops in the Rio del Rey was a great worry to the British authorities at Calabar. They were afraid that Germans could attack Nigeria from Rio del Rey and for this reason, much attention was paid to the movement of troops in that area¹⁶⁴. Drinks, tobacco, salt and foodstuffs were banned from being taken from Calabar to the region. Some Efiks, especially those at Akpa Abana, saw the war as an opportunity through which the Anglo-German border could be altered and consequently put them in Calabar. To that effect, they contributed money and food to keep the British forces in their region¹⁶⁵. As the Germans had chased out the Efik traders from the Bakassi area in Calabar, some Efiks traders saw the war as opportunity to re-establish their commencial activities in the region.

With the end of the war and the defeat of the Germans in Cameroon the Bakassi problem took another face. The Cameroonian territory was divided between the British and the French as we have already mentioned above at the end of the WWI. Between 1916 and 1922 when the British Cameroons had not been officially intergrated into the federation of Nigeria, the Efik at Bakassi, especially those at Abana put more pressure on the British authorities to dissolve the Anglo-German border and include them under the Calabar administration. The British resisted this pressure and did not dissolve the border.

These people including the Esuk-Efiat still put forward a petition on August 20, 1920 to the Governor of the Southern Province of Nigeria. They demanded that they be transferred to the Calabar Province¹⁶⁶. The Governor's reply was that the Anglo-German border could not be altered until the position of the Cameroons as a Mandated Territory was clearly defined. From 1922 when British Cameroons began to be administered as an integral part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, there was still strong desire by the Efik people to be transferred to the Calabar administration. Having failed to be transferred to Calabar, the Efik people at Bakassi remained very uncooperative with the British Cameroons administration. Between 20th and 31st January 1924, Tweed, Assistant District Officer for Kumba and F.B. Carr, Acting

¹⁶⁴ Calprof, 4/3/26, C. Conf. F/59/14, Commanding Officer to Commissioner, Dec. 8, 1914, N.A.E.

¹⁶⁵ Calprof, C/616/ 1920, Abana chiefs to Governor General, August 20, 1920; N.A.E.

¹⁶⁶ Calprof, C/616/1920, Abana Chiefs to Governor, August 20, 1920, N.A.E.

Divisional Officer for Kumba, visited the creeks of Rio del Rey to collect taxes. They found that many people had moved to Calabar while others evaded tax payment by using canoes to run to the high sea¹⁶⁷.

As time went on, it became more difficult for the District Officer of Kumba to administer the Bakassi area effectively. So in order to solve this problem, it was decided that the Rio del Rey be put under the Victoria Division in 1929. Another objective of this transfer was to assist the prevention of the sea-borne contraband trade by placing the whole coastline of the province under the administrative control of the Divisional Officer, Victoria, instead of having one part of the coast to Kumba and the other to Victoria Division. The League of Nations was informed of this accordingly¹⁶⁸. In real terms, this transfer did not solve the problems faced in this region as concerned tax collection. The people were still unwilling to cooperate. So it was arranged that the Fishtowns be administered by the District Officer of Eket (on the Nigerian side) mainly to collect taxes on behalf of the District Officer of the Victoria Division; though the boundary of the Cameroons could not be legally altered¹⁶⁹. From the Mandate to independence (1922-1961), not much was registered in terms of hostilities in the Bakassi region, despite the fact that the fishermen were not all that cooperative with the Cameroonian authorities. But the problem took a more serious phase with the independence of both countries.

At this point, it is worth noting that the colonial masters took into consideration only their interest while making the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. The historical, traditional, socio-economic and political background of the local people in the boundary region were not considered. This a fault which the postulants of the theory of "an African solution to African Problems" till date see in the European models for solving conflicts in Africa. Thus making the boundary did not solve the problem of the Efik people at the Bakassi region. The Germans, the British, likewise the French were more interested in their activities in the mainland Nigeria/Cameroon and not in the problems of the local people. For these reasons, the problem was inherited by the new independent governments of Cameroon and Nigeria. These new governments had not just the Efik problem to solve but also the problem of resources in the Bakassi region as we shall see later.

¹⁶⁷ Calprof No. C. p 596, vol II, 3/1/551, Report on Tax Collection in the Fish Towns of Rio del Rey creek area of Kumba Division in the Financial Year 1923-1924, N.A.E.

¹⁶⁸ British Annual Report on Cameroons under British Mandate, 1930, p. 7

¹⁶⁹ Calprof, C/616/1920, 5/10/454, D.O Victoria, to Resident Buea, 7/4/1943, N.A.B

2.1.3 The Bakassi Problem from 1961 to 1981

With Nigeria and Cameroon advancing towards independence, different political options emerged in the British Cameroons with regards to future political affiliations. There were those who wanted the reunification of the British and the French Cameroons. Others wanted permanent integration with Nigeria since for Forty years the British Cameroons had been administered as an integral part of Nigeria. In the Southern Cameroons, those in favour for the reunification of the two sections of the Cameroons were led by John Ngu Foncha (leader of the party “Kamerun National Democratic Party) and Ndeh Ntumazah (leader of the political party known as “One Kamerun”)¹⁷⁰.

Opposing them and advocating for permanent integration with Nigeria was Dr. E.M.L. Endeley with his party the “Kamerun National Congress”¹⁷¹. In the Northern Cameroons, the Nigerian political parties operated freely and they stood for integration. Some of them were the The Action Group, the Northern Peoples Congress, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens and the Northern Elements Progressive Union. Opposing integration in the Northern Cameroons with Nigeria were the Northern Democratic Party and the Kamerun Freedom Party¹⁷².

The policy of integration and reunification had an implication on the Cameroon–Nigerian border. Should the integrationists win, it would mean the dissolution of the Anglo-German boundary of 1913; which might become a provincial or divisional boundary within the Federation of Nigeria. Such an agreement would make the Milner-Simon Anglo-French border of 1919 an international boundary between the federation of Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon. Should the unificationists win, the international status of the Anglo-German boundary of 1913 would remain and the Anglo-French boundary of 1919 would be state boundary within the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

On February 11 1961, a plebiscite was organised in the British Cameroons. In the Southern Cameroons, the vote was 233,571 for reunification of the and 97,741 votes for integration with Nigeria. In the Northern Cameroons, it was 146,296 votes for Nigeria and 97,659 for unification¹⁷³. From the plebiscite results, the Northern Cameroons got integrated into the Federation of Nigeria. The Anglo-French border of 1919 became the international boundary between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Anglo-German border of 1913 became the inter-divisional borders within Northern Nigeria to which Northern Cameroon was attached.

In the Southern Cameroons the majority voted infavour of the reunification of the Cameroons and thus reunified with the Republic of Cameroon. The reunification meant that the international status of the Anglo-German boundary in the Soutehr Cameroons had to be retained. Once more as in the days of the Germans, the Bakassi with the Efik dominated population ceased to have legal contacts with the other Efiks in the Cross River State of Nigeria. Customs restrictions re-emerged and movements across the boundary had to be

¹⁷⁰ The spelling of Cameroon with a “K” is form a German spelling since Cameroon was a former German colony.

¹⁷¹ Ngoh, p. 208-210

¹⁷² Ngoh; p. 208-210

¹⁷³ *ibid*

done in accordance with international norms; a situation which the Efiks in Bakassi found difficult to comply with. So opposition to the border at Bakassi re-emerged.

In the 1960s the Government of Cameroon discovered petroleum oil in the Bakassi region. In addition to its fertile fishing grounds, the area became a zone of vital resources. The Cameroonian Government with such discovery in resources in this region took to itself to exploit these resources and its territorial waters for its sole benefit. Since the venture involved heavy investments, the Cameroon Government started taking necessary legal precautions to remain within its international boundaries.

It was also aimed at reassuring potential foreign investors that it was possible for Nigeria and Cameroon to get on peacefully. With this in mind, a law was passed in the Cameroon National Assembly fixing Cameroon's territorial waters at 18 miles, 6 miles more than the Nigerians had fixed their own limit¹⁷⁴. To effectively follow their plan, the Cameroonian Government faced two important problems on their way. First, immigrant Nigerians who claimed the territory for Nigeria, inhabited the creeks. Second, Cameroon's internal political situation was marred with violence and makissa (local fighters) to the extent that the Cameroon Government could not easily assert its territorial rights. As a result on the initiative of the Cameroonian government, short of a general bilateral treaty, Cameroon and Nigeria signed an Agreement to provide the legal framework to control the movements of persons and goods between their countries on February 6th 1963¹⁷⁵. Though this could hardly be efficiently applied throughout the length and breadth of the frontier, the Cameroon government felt more comfortable to proceed with its exploration plans. It should be noted that the Nigerian Government had a long monopoly in exploiting resources in this area long before Cameroon could start. Thus, the plans of Cameroon was evitably going to interfere with the Nigerian monopoly in the region.

Two incidents in 1965 along the frontier turned the attention of both the Cameroon and Nigerian governments to the necessity of fixing definite frontier in the oil rich maritime territories especially around the Bakassi area¹⁷⁶. There was the incident that involved a team of experts of Mobil Oil and Elf Sereptca Companies prospecting for petrol on behalf of the Cameroon Government on the Cross River Delta; on approximately longitude 8°33E and latitude 4°30N¹⁷⁷. The prospectors fell in the hands of a Nigerian intelligence patrol unit, which siezed the passport of the leader, Guy Cogswell of American nationality. They were prevented from further exploration because it was claimed that they were operating in Nigerian territory. This event shock waves on both countries and made the ignorance of the Cameroon Government on the Cameroon-Nigerian frontier obvious. It hurt the sensitivity of the Cameroon Government which was very anxious to get into oil production, since the fear was not to damage the existing good relation with the Nigerian Government.

The case was later resolved by the intervention of the Cameroonian government through "diplomatic channels"¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁴ Njuema; p. 13-14

¹⁷⁵ Njuema; p. 13

¹⁷⁶ Ibid; p. 13-15

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 13

¹⁷⁸ Ibid; p. 14

The second incident concerned violent confrontation between two leading communities--Bodam and Danare--astride the frontier. At the heart of the conflict was the fact that some years ago, the people of Danare on the Nigerian side changed the traditional manner of sharing royalties accruing from Companies engaged in forest exploitation. It became a serious matter when the arbitration of the Doki elders was in favour of the Bodam and the Danare people refused to yield. The rumours that Cameroonian gendarms were on their way to support Bodam led to burning of houses. In their effort to settle the problem by the District Officers of Mamfe (in Cameroon) and Ikom (also known as Ikang in Nigeria), the true problem was revealed.

It was realised that the fundamental issue which was not limited to the Bodam and Danare villages, was the deficiencies in the frontier which was supposed to separate Cameroon from Nigeria. The reality was that in this southern segment of the frontier, after more than two generations, many people had become unaware of the frontier as a diving line.

The return to the old Anglo-German frontier, abandoned since 1914, saw the re-emergence of the old custom's posts and closure of "unauthorised" tracts across the frontier. As we have mentioned earlier, during the Mandate period, many Nigerians had moved into the Cameroonian territory unimpeded. Each village decided to fix or imagine a frontier in the place it would want it to be¹⁷⁹. Confusion was inevitable because the frontier pillars and stone Cairns were now rarely visible and some, in fact had been removed. Besides, some parts of the frontier passed through difficult terrain that could not be effectively demarcated with the limited resources, experience and rudimentary equipments at the time the boundary was made. These problems called for action at the state level where resources could be generated. To solve this issue, the two Heads of States set up a joint and balanced technical Commission to survey and demarcate the frontier through research and field studies in 1965¹⁸⁰. Financial provisions were made and the work started, unfortunately the team could not finish its assignment because of the Nigerian Civil War in 1966/67.

During the Nigerian Biafra war (1966-1967), Isaac Adaka Boro, commanding the forces of the Federal Government of Nigeria¹⁸¹, had to obtain permission from the Cameroonian authorities to use the Bakassi Peninsula to transfer troops to invade the Biafrans. The use of Bakassi as a base to transfer troops indicates its strategic importance to both Nigeria and Cameroon. Seeing the rich resources in the area and taking cognizance of its strategic importance, the Nigerian Government began to lay claims on Bakassi.

As soon as the Biafran war came to an end, President Amadou Ahidjo (1924-1989) and General Yakubu Gowon (ruled from 1966-1975), head of the Nigerian Military Government at the time met in Lagos in 1970. They decided that their border problems should be handled by a Joint Boundary Commission¹⁸². The Cameroonian Government then requested the Secretary General of the UN to express a view on

¹⁷⁹ Njeume; p. 14

¹⁸⁰ Ibid; p. 15

¹⁸¹ Desertation written by Major Abubakar .A. Atofarati " The Nigerian Civil war: Causes Strategies and Leasons Learnt". USA 1991/1992

¹⁸² Njeuma Martin Zachery " Cameroon-Nigeria Frontier: Modell for Culture of Peace, 1890-1991". p, 15

the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula. By a Verbale Note of January 18, 1971, the UN Secretary General replied that following the 1913 Anglo-German Agreement, Bakassi which was being disputed upon belonged to Cameroon¹⁸³. The Nigerian Government rejected this clarification and as Oscar Ede explains, the Nigerian rejection was based on the wrong notion that the 1913 Agreement assumed on Rio del Rey was a river 80 miles long.

In compliance with the Ahidjo-Gowon Agreement of 1970, a Cameroon-Nigerian Joint Commission was established in 1971¹⁸⁴ to take care of the border crisis. In April 1971, Gowon and Ahidjo signed an accord in Yaounde which empowered the Boundary Joint Commission to demarkate the three-mile of territorial jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 21 and 22 of the Anglo-German Agreement, N° 13 of March 11, 1913¹⁸⁵. The accord also empowered the two governments to instruct their technical experts to delimit the seaward boundary beyond the three miles limit, applying the Geneva Convention Law of the sea. They further agreed to establish a permanent consulting committee to monitor and review international issues of mutual interest. This consultative committee was also to ensure, that the existing agreement between the two countries were updated and implemented.

After the Ahidjo-Gowon accord, J.C Ngoh, Federal inspector for West Cameroon, and Oluwole Coker, the Nigerian Director of Surveys, met in June 1971 and signed what was referred to as the "Ngoh –Coker Line". This line indicated the compromises reached at by the two head of states in the April meeting in Yaounde, Cameroon. The line was reached by mutual consent between the Ahidjo and Gowon on the advice of the experts of the two countries. It created a humped boundary line slightly to the east of the Channel of the Cross River- 1500 metres east of the original line proposed by Cameroon and 3.500 metres west of what Nigeria proposed. The compromised boundary was the charted on the Admiral chart N° 3433 by the technical experts¹⁸⁶.

Following this arrangement and further applying the Geneva Convention on maritime border, the whole of the Cross River Channel could be under Cameroon. The "Ngoh/Coker Line" was later rejected by the Nigerian authority on the grounds that Nigeria had for long established her influence in the channel of the Cross River and that her fishermen had been fishing for too long in the disputed area. For these reasons the Nigerian authority opted that a new arrangement should be made.

Probably because of the Nigerian argument and because Cameroon wished to solve the conflict peacefully, the Cameroonian authority did not take over the channel but maintained the Akwayafe as the border with Nigeria.

The next step taken by Gowon and Ahidjo on solving the Bakassi dispute was a meeting of the two in Kano (northern Nigeria) in September 1974¹⁸⁷. The two leaders

¹⁸³ Cited in Oscar O.B. Ede, „ The Nigerian-Cameroon Boundaries“ in Sunday New Nigeria, Nov. 15, 1981. Oscar Ede was a researcher at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs(NIIA) Lagos in the 1980s and is one of the Nigerian experts as concerns the Cameroon-Nigerian border conflict.

¹⁸⁴ Njeuma; p. 17

¹⁸⁵ See Ian Brownvile for details.p.560-564

¹⁸⁶ Nwaka, Nigerian-Cameroon Border Relations, p. 24. (Department of History, University of Calabar, 1981).

¹⁸⁷ Njeuma, p. 11-16

concluded another Agreement which established the demarcation of a four kilometer buffer zone, a two kilometre free corridor on either side of their disputed territorial waters, and the zone was free from oil prospecting and exploitation. It should be noted that this agreement was only on the territorial waters and not the Bakassi Peninsula which was then regarded as part of Cameroon. In June 1975, Gowon and Ahidjo met again at Maroua (north Cameroon), and agreed to extend the delineation of the maritime boundary line between their two countries from Point 12 to Point "G" on the Admiralty Chart N°3433 (British) which was attached to the declaration¹⁸⁸. Cameroon agreed that Calabar Channel should remain with Nigeria since she had been using the channel for many years. Since the Maroua Agreement was in effect the culmination of a series of important negotiations since 1970, it was agreed that the Accord be ratified by the legislative authorities of the two countries. In Cameroon, the National Assembly ratified the accord.

In Nigeria, the case was different, due to military rule in Nigeria at that time, there was no Legislative Assembly, thus the accord was then presented to the Supreme Military Council. The Council outrightly rejected the Accord, arguing that Cameroon had cheated Nigeria in the negotiations. General Gowon was accused for generously giving Nigerian territory to Cameroon under compromise. It was suspected that Gowon made the concessions because of what was considered as Ahidjo's role during the Nigerian Civil War¹⁸⁹. During the civil war in Nigeria, the Cameroon Government supported the Federal Government of Nigeria and even allowed Major Isaac Adaka Boro to use Bakassi as earlier mentioned, to transfer Federal troops to invade Biafra from Calabar. During the war, Cameroon refused to allow the Biafrans to use its territory as a base for the importation of arms. Cameroon's support for the Federal Government in the war of secession was mainly because Ahidjo was also heading a Federal Government in Cameroon. Should he support the Biafran secession, Nigeria could some day support the secession of the anglophones (people formerly under British rule) from the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Furthermore, as one of the founding fathers of the O.A.U, President Ahidjo had to respect the support O.A.U gave to the Federal Government of Nigeria during the civil war.

After the Maroua accord, Gowon's Government was overthrown and General Murtala Mohammed came to power. He rejected the Maroua accord arguing that it was never ratified by the Supreme Military Council. He threatened that rather than accept the outrageous agreement, Nigeria would go to war if Cameroonians refused further negotiations¹⁹⁰. However, General Murtala did not live long enough to see his dreams come true. He was assassinated in a bloody coup d'état and General Olusegun Obasanjo (presently president of Nigeria following the elections of 1999) came to power. Obasanjo made several attempts to reopen border negotiations with the Cameroonian authorities but concrete solutions were not achieved. In August 1977, he and Ahidjo met at Garoua in North Cameroon and at the end of the meeting, the communique issued only expressed the good relations that existed between the two countries. Nothing was mentioned as of the border crisis.

Till 1980, things appeared to be under control as concerns the border crisis. But the

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Oscar Ede, "Nigerian-Cameroon Border Problems: Causes and some Suggestions". A paper presented at the NIA Departmental seminar, Lagos, June 16, 1981, p. 14-16

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. p.14-16

Cameroon-Nigeria border issue re-emerged more seriously in 1981. The events which came up could be seen as the immediate causes of the crisis which presently has now raced international concern. It all began when on January 21, 1981 men of the Nigerian Navy arrested the district Head of Idabato of Isangele Sub-division of Bakassi Peninsula in Cameroon¹⁹¹. The arrest was made when the District head, with seven persons in his entourage were visiting some of the creek towns under his administration. The arrested men were detained for seven days and released only after a strong protest from the Cameroonian Government to the Nigerian authorities. In Cameroon where administrators as command officers are highly respected, the arrest and detention of the District Officer and his men was regarded as a great insult to Cameroonian Government (especially as Cameroon claim that the arrest was within their territory).

The next incident followed on May 16 1981, when President Ahidjo was commissioning an Oil Refinery in Victoria, south western part of Cameroon. Men of the Nigerian Navy went to the sea, around the Bakassi area where Cameroon exploited oil. There, they clashed with their Cameroonian counterparts; the clash resulted to the death of five Nigerians. The death of those men provoked high anti-Cameroonian feelings in Nigeria. Each country claimed that the incident took place on her own side of the border, thereby accusing the other for trespassing¹⁹². As accusations and counter-accusations went on, the Nigerian Government sent a strongly worded note to the Cameroonian Government demanding the Cameroonian Government to apologise unconditionally to them. They also demanded that the Cameroonian Government punish the navy responsible for the incident and also pay compensation for the Nigerian victims. These demands were to be complied within seven days from the date of issuing¹⁹³.

In response, the Cameroonian Government sent a high-powered delegation to Lagos (then capital of Nigeria but now Abuja) on the evening before the deadline. The delegation led by the Cameroonian Minister of State in charge of Foreign Affairs, Paul Dontsop expressed regrets to the Nigerian Government and also condolences to the families of the victims of the unfortunate incident. The Cameroonian authorities further suggested that the whole issue of border clashes be handled by a Joint Commission of both countries. The Nigerian Security Council considered the Cameroonian message as inadequate.

The Council maintained that the message did not cover all the grounds contained in the earlier note from the Nigerian Government to that of Cameroon¹⁹⁴. The Nigerian Government then reported the issue to the O.A.U and requested that it should be discussed at the O.A.U Conference of Heads of States that was to meet in June.

In order to see how intense the issue was affecting the people of both countries, it is worth to look at some public reactions on both countries at this stage of the conflict. While contacts were going on for a peaceful solution, the Nigerian press went on to fan the conflict and arouse anti-Cameroonian sentiments in Nigeria. The "Nigerian Chronicle" of June 3, 1981 published an article titled "New Cameroonian Nationalism" written by Evaristus Iniodu. Part of the article read: "President Ahmadu Ahidjo and his

¹⁹¹ Njeuma; p. 11-16

¹⁹² Cited in The Nigerian Observer, 17/6/81 and Daily Times, 13/6/81.

¹⁹³ Cited Nigerian Observer, 17/6/81

¹⁹⁴ Statement from Executive Office of the President, Lagos, cited in Times International, vol.2. No. 37, June 7, 1981.

fellow countrymen wanted to declare May 16, 1981 as a National Day of celebration to commemorate the glorious victory of Cameroonian Lilliputian David over giant Goliath Nigeria.” The Sunday Times also wrote on this problem and on the article of May 24, 1981 Cameroon was accused of hostility, and resentful of Nigeria’s dominant rule in Africa. Just to summarise it, the Cameroonian action was described as pre-meditated, an unprovoked case of aggression and intended to test the will of the Nigerian Federal Government.

Some important personalities in Nigeria also made comments on the conflict. Joseph Wayas, President of the Nigerian senate appealed to the Nigerian mass media to play down reports and comments on the issue so that the relationship between the two countries might not be impaired¹⁹⁵. Edwin Ezeoke, the speaker of the Federal House of Representatives advocated immediate military action against Cameroon. To him diplomatic measures were slow and less effective¹⁹⁶. Mallam Lamido, leader of the Peoples Redemption Party (P.R.P in Nigeria), argued that Nigeria should not go to war with Cameroon. He maintained that Cameroon, with only 3.000 soldiers, was able to challenge Nigeria with an infantry of 150.000 men because some Western European countries including France were supporting Cameroon. He accused western European countries for being against Nigeria because its stand on the high oil prices at the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C). He was therefore, of the opinion that Nigeria adopt a diplomatic approach to solve the border conflict¹⁹⁷.

Another public reaction on the part of the Nigerian students took place on the 20th of May 1981. The 20th of May is a national day celebrated in Cameroon in remembrance of the 20th of May when Cameroon (East and West Cameroon) became one Cameroon (from a federal to a unitary state). The students at the Lagos university went on the streets and attacked the Cameroon embassy in Lagos, destroying its properties. The Nigerian Government apologised for this and promised to repair the damaged properties. The Cameroonian Government accepted the apology but opted to do the repairs alone and the Nigerians were assured that their lives and investments in Cameroon will be protected.

In June 16, 1981, Oscar O.B. Ede presented a paper “Nigerian-Cameroon Border Problems: Causes and some Suggestions”, as already mentioned before at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos. In that paper, Oscar amongst many issues warned his Government not to accept River Akwayafe as boundary with Cameroon. For strategic reasons he warned that if Nigeria accepted Akwayafe, then the border would extend downwards to where it discharges into the Atlantic. That would merge into the area known as Rio del Rey which ultimately, spread to areas around where the Cross River discharges into the Atlantic as well. And if base lines were used to demarcate the areas, then a substantial portion of the sea entrance would be under Cameroonian jurisdiction. Ede further argued that, commercial vessels using the port, will suffer economically. There would also be a strategic disadvantage for the Nigerian Navy which had the Eastern Command in Calabar¹⁹⁸. Ede’s paper influenced the Nigerian refusal of the River Akwayafe as boundary with Cameroon as he is one of the key Nigerian advisers on this issue.

¹⁹⁵ The Nigerian Chronicle, 8/6/81

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. 1/6/81

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. 25/6/81

¹⁹⁸ Oscar Ede Seminar Paper „ Nigerian-Cameroon Border Problems: Causes and some Suggestions“ Lagos 1981

On the part of reactions in the Cameroonian side, not much was registered at this time, since the people could not express their opinion like was the case in Nigeria where freedom of speech on public issues was great. The Cameroon Government alone spoke for the nation. A major speech was made at a press conference given by the Minister of Territorial Administration, Ayissi Mvondo. He spoke on the encounter between the Nigerian and the Cameroonian Navy in the creeks of Rio del Rey which led to the killing of five Nigerians on May 16th 1981. He warned that there should be no panic, neither should Nigerians be molested in Cameroon. He concluded by assuring the Cameroonian population that the two governments were handling the issue.

In Nigeria and Cameroon, there were high expectations on what the O.A.U Head of States Conference would do as they were to meet on June 24, 1981 at Nairobi Kenya. Surprisingly, when the agenda for the conference was released, the Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict was omitted. President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria condemned the O.A.U action and boycotted the summit. Official reasons were not given for this but one could guess the following: The O.A.U might have felt that the two countries could handle the problem. The O.A.U might have thought that the UN would better treat the issue since it had to deal with interpreting the Anglo-German border agreement of 1913. One could also feel that Ahidjo as an elderly member of the O.A.U might have put pressure on the other heads of states to omit the issue so as to avoid the internationalisation of the conflict which he claimed had long been settled by him and Gowon¹⁹⁹.

However, through the intervention of friendly countries like Senegal, Guinea and Sierra Leone, tension between Nigeria and Cameroon died down gradually. The Cameroon Government later paid compensation to the families of the victims who were killed by their navy. The border problem was left to be settled by a joint commission of the two countries. How far this was done will lead us to the next phase of the problem.

2.1.4 The Bakassi Problem since 1981

In order to deal with this section, we will be taking a look at the changing leadership in both Cameroon and Nigeria since 1981, and how the new leaders went about handling the Bakassi crisis. Some attempts to solve the Bakassi crisis both on the part of the two countries, from other African countries within and out of the O.A.U, as well as the international scene including the UN will be looked at in this section of the work. Also, the invasion of the Bakassi territory by the Nigerian forces in 1994 shall be the focal point of this section as it finally took this border conflict to the UN.

The Cameroon-Nigerian relationship was normal after the payment of compensation to the victim's family and the two presidents with the help of their African friends tried to keep the crisis under control. In November 1982, President Ahidjo resigned from the Presidency of the United Republic of Cameroon. His constitutional successor, Paul Biya became president and is still the current president of Cameroon.

¹⁹⁹ Njeuma

In Nigeria, President Shehu Shagari's civilian government was overthrown on December 31, 1983. The military government that replaced him was headed by General Mohammed Buhari. General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew Buhari's regime on August 27, 1985. General Sani Abacha replaced Babangida after the failure of the military to respect the result of the 1993 presidential election that was to see Nigeria return to civilian rule. So after 1981 incident on the border crisis, there have been changes in leadership in both countries though that in Cameroon was more stable than in Nigeria.

The border conflict re-surfaced again on November 21, 1983. Chief Effiong Solomon Atte²⁰⁰ informed the Cross River House of Assembly that Cameroonians had again invaded and occupied the Nigerian Villages of Atabong, Abana Ntuen and Ataha Ntuen in the Effiat Mbo Local Government area in the Cross River State²⁰¹. The Honorable Member of the State House read a petition from the inhabitants of the area in which the people urged the state Government to ask the Federal Government to come to their aid.

In the debate on the petition, the Assembly men attributed the Cameroon action to be motivated by the desire to control larger oil deposits in the area. They felt that Cameroon would continue to remain insolent to Nigeria unless the armed forces occupy the area and forced Cameroon to retreat from the Bakassi area²⁰². The Cross River State Government did not report this issue to the Federal Government. This is because private investigations revealed that the villages that complained were within the Cameroonian territory and their inhabitants often evaded the payment of taxes in Cameroon. Very often, they ran to Nigeria during the tax season and made inflammatory statements. The incident was therefore, attributed to tax evaders²⁰³.

Between 1990 and 1993, there were a number of aggressive actions which once more brought tension between Cameroon and Nigeria as concerns the Bakassi Peninsular. In January 1990, the Nigerian Government reported that four of their fishermen were murdered by Cameroonian gendarms at the Bakassi Peninsular²⁰⁴. In April 1990 Nigerian soldiers arrested the Cameroonian Sub-Divisional Officer of Kombo-Qbedimo who was on tour with some of his assistants. They were kept and tortured for several days before being released. This was seen as a very provocative act by the government of Cameroon.

Between April 1990 and April 1991, Nigerian forces landed on many occasions at the Bakassi towns of Jabane, removing the Cameroonian flag and replacing it with that of Nigeria. These actions were accompanied by Nigerian military manoeuvres in the region. In 1992, men of the Nigerian army prevented the execution of Cameroonian projects in Jabane. The equipment for the projects were carried away to Nigeria. They went further to put up sign boards at Jabane, one of which read: "Welcome to Abana Clan, Akpa Buyo Local Government Area, Cross River State, Federal

²⁰⁰ Nigerian Chief at the border Village of Abana- see map of fishing towns and villages on Cameroon-Nigerian border in map 3, p. 88.

²⁰¹ Chief Effiong S.A., cited in *The Nigerian Chronicle*, 23/11/83.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Interview with George Ngoo (30/12/83), the Cameroonian Consul at Calabar done by Dr. Atem George Dept. of History, University of Buea.

²⁰⁴ Cited in „Truobled Frontiers“ by Nouk Protus in *Cameroon life*, *The Nations Premier Magazine*, April-May, 1994, p. 17

Republic of Nigeria”²⁰⁵.

While tension mounted on the border at Bakassi between 1990 and 1993, efforts were made to find solutions. On August 10th 1991, the president of Cameroon Paul Biya was in Abuja, Nigeria. The border crisis was discussed and the Nigerian occupation of the Cameroonian side of the Lake Chad was given a central stage at the discussions. On August 27th 1991, the Cameroon-Nigerian Joint Commission met in Yaounde, Cameroon. For the first time the Nigerian delegation officially denounced the Maroua Accord of June 1975. They argued that the Nigerian Government did not ratify the agreement because they felt cheated²⁰⁶.

Another meeting of the Joint Commission was held at Abuja the capital of Nigeria on December 19th 1991. There again Nigeria denounced the Maroua Accord. On the other part, Cameroon maintained that the Maroua declaration was valid to the Cameroonian Government since it was ratified by its parliament. The two delegations however, agreed that they did not question the demarcation of the border at Bakassi region. It is therefore, implied that the demarcation was valid and acceptable to both sides. From August 11 to 15th 1993 the Commission met again in Yaounde²⁰⁷. The Nigerian delegation argued that the Nigeria’s denunciation of the Maroua Accord was based on political reasons in Nigeria and not on technical grounds regarding the maritime border demarcation. At this point of the issue the Nigerian Institute of Surveyors (N.I.S) blamed its government for politicising the border problems rather than seeking for technical advice. The surveyors pointed out that before the Bakassi problem even assumed an international dimension, the government of Nigeria has consistently refused to seek technical advice²⁰⁸.

It is worth to note that the blame for refusing to seek technical advice on border problems may not be attributed only to the Nigerian Government alone. It is something that most African governments make as a mistake and instead of seeking advice from experts, they try to politicise most border crisis. Other people, who should be consulted to give expert advice on border problems first of all ought to be the surveyors, then the historians, geographers and lawyers. Politicians should be called in only on policy considerations. If political considerations are allowed to dominate the discussions on border issues, then there would hardly be a solution to any border disputes because political factors are always present.

Having argued in Yaounde in August 1993 that their rejection of the Maroua Accord was on political grounds, the Nigerians appeared to be prepared for a war in that area. On December 21st 1993, Nigerian forces entered the Bakassi region claiming they were there to protect their citizens from “being harassed by the Cameroonian gendarmes. On the morning of January 4th 1994, Nigerian forces landed at Jabane, inside Cameroonian territory and at the same day occupied Diamond town. So between January 4th and February 19th, 1994, Nigerian forces were occupying the Cameroonian territories of Jabane, Diamond and Archbong. To consolidate their grip on the area, some building projects were begun. The Cross River State Government was said to have donated three million Naira to put up three Government primary

²⁰⁵ Njeuma; p. 17-18

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 20-21

²⁰⁸ N.I.S Secretary General, cited in National Concord April 7, 1994, Lagos. p 1

Schools²⁰⁹. With regards to this occupation, the Cameroonian Minister of Justice, Douala Moutome formerly presented the Bakassi case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on March 24th 1994.

When the Nigerian military activities intensified in the region, especially after January 4th 1994 when Jabane was occupied, the Cameroonian Government re-inforced its military strength in the region by putting more troops and equipment at Idabato II, Kombo à Janea and Isangele. In addition to military reinforcement, the Cameroon Government raised objections to the Nigerian aggression. A number of reasons were given for the Nigerian action. Emmanuel Mordi of the Nigerian Embassy in Yaounde explained that Nigeria sent troops to Abana and Atabong because there was a problem of law and order, not as an act of aggression against Cameroon²¹⁰. Micheal Njawe thought that the occupation of the Cameroonian territory by Nigeria was in relation to the sinking of a Nigerian fishing vessel by Cameroonian coastal guards in December 1993²¹¹. The vessel was involved in smuggling activities between Cameroon and Nigeria.

On January 6th 1994, Nigerian Foreign Minister Baba Gama Kingibe headed a Nigerian delegation to Yaounde to discuss with the Cameroonian authorities and they decided that mixed border patrols should be formed for the disputed area. While that was going on, bilateral talks should continue on maritime border so that a just and lasting solution could be found between the two countries²¹². Unfortunately, the decisions of this meeting were never implimented.

On February 9th 1994, another meeting was held in Buea at the level of Foreign Ministers. The two sides had a heated arguments and each was claiming the Bakassi area. The meeting ended up without any agreement reached and few days after that, the armies of the two countries ran into a skirmish. On February 18th 1994, the Cameroonian Government, for the first time informed the population about what was happening. The information came through Joseph Owona, then the Secretary General at the Presidency of the Republic. The population was informed that Nigerian troops had illegally occupied the Bakassi Peninsula, a territory belonging to Cameroon. The secretary further explained that the Nigerians have been asked to pull out of Bakassi. On March 23rd, 1994 President Paul Biya addressed the nation, though not on the issue. But referring indirectly to the Bakassi problem, he assured Cameroonians that Cameroon would not concede an inch of its sovereignty. He reaffirmed Cameroon's option for moderation and conciliation. In Nigeria, the Foreign Ministry on March 2nd 1994 issued a statement that Cameroonian authorities on the eastern side of the Bakassi Peninsula apparently misunderstood the presence of Nigerian troops in that area as being attempt to seize control of the peninsula by force²¹³.

On March 10th 1994, the Foreign Ministers of both countries met in Yaounde to explore possibilities of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis; especially the possibility of a summit between General Abacha and President Paul Biya. The

²⁰⁹ Cited in Cameroon life, op. cit. p. 21.

²¹⁰ Emmanuel Mordi, cited Le Messenger, vol.IV, No. 1, Jan. 10, 1994. p. 6

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Nigerian Foriegn Ministry, cited in Cameroon Life, op. cit. p. 18

Cameroonian delegation insisted that Nigerian troops should leave Bakassi before President Biya could meet General Abacha in the Nigerian town of Maiduguri which was proposed by the Nigerian delegation to be the venue of the summit. However, they maintained that President Biya could meet General Abacha out of Nigeria. The two sides were unable to come to terms, so the Yaounde meeting failed to achieve any positive results²¹⁴.

On March 29th 1994, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Yaounde issued a Circular No. 65/327/S.I./ Vol. 1/94 being a document prepared by the Government of Nigeria showing reasons why Bakassi was part of the Federation of Nigeria. The document was distributed to all Diplomatic Missions and International Organisations in Yaounde (see document Appendix A)

Some External reactions Concerning the Conflict

In order to avoid military confrontation as was the wish of many Nigerians, Cameroonians and the international community, it was necessary that there should be mediation by a third party. President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo accepted to be a mediator. He paid a visit to Yaounde and Abuja on March 3rd 1994 and consulted with the authorities of both countries. On March 11th 1994, he sent a delegation to Yaounde to discuss with President Biya and that delegation also went to Abuja.

By the time the O.A.U held a summit in Tunis from June 13th 1994, enough ground work had been made by President Eyadema for President Biya to meet President Abacha. Though not formally included in the O.A.U agenda, the summit provided an opportunity where Biya met Abacha in the presence of President Eyadema at the Abou Nawas hotel on June 13th 1994²¹⁵ in Tunis. The Two leaders agreed to solve the border problem peacefully and that they would set up a joint commission and later met in a tête à tête in Lome, Togo. The judicial process that was going on at the I.C.J was not to be interrupted. (see communiqué in Appendix C) At the height of the problem, some foreign countries which had military pacts with Cameroon visited the country. For example the French paratroopers arrived Yaounde at the end of February. Accompanying them were some French leaders who held talks with the Cameroonian authorities and later moved to Abuja. They tried to convince the authorities of the two countries to find a peaceful solution to the problem.

The Nigerian Government was not happy with the presence of French paratroopers and a warship in Cameroon. The Foreign Minister, Jerry Gana warned that Nigeria would not tolerate unprovoked aggression and intimidation by any foreign power. He called on Nigerians to brace up to defend every inch of their territory²¹⁶. The French Ambassador in Lagos then explained that the French warship that was on routine visit to Cameroon had left Douala port on March 6, 1994.

The French military presence in Cameroon at the time of crisis was in line with Franco-Cameroon military cooperation agreement. In addition, France had investments in Cameroon that needed protection in case of war. Furthermore, the French-dominated oil company ELF Cameroon, exploited about 32 oil wells in Bakassi which produces about 120.000 barrels of petroleum oil daily and that fetched

²¹⁴ Njeuma; p. 19-20

²¹⁵ Njeuma; p. 19-21

²¹⁶ Jerry Gana, cited in Cameroon Life, p. 15

about two million dollars per day²¹⁷. On March 18, 1994, the General Manager of ELF company Jaffre Phillippe from France was in Cameroon and was received in audience by President Biya. Though the French had to honour the military pact it has with Cameroon and protect their investments in the territory, it was a great risk for France. This is because the French investments in Nigeria were greater than those in Cameroon. It was even estimated that the overall French investments in Nigeria could be greater than those in all francophone African countries combined. The risk here is that Nigeria could nationalise those investments if the French joined Cameroon in a war against her in Bakassi.

Another foreign country that showed concern on the side of Cameroon was Israel. The Israeli Deputy Army Chief of Staff, General Dagom Meier was in Cameroon with his delegation on March 24th 1994. It was an indication that perhaps Cameroon had an understanding with Israel on military matters. This is just an assumption for there are no concrete information as this is concerned.

Reaction of the O.A.U and the UN to the Conflict

While some foreign countries showed concern, Cameroon reported the matter to major international organisations. At the end of February, the matter was reported to the Organisation of African Unity (from 2002 onwards, the O.A.U was called the African Union)²¹⁸ for the second time since Nigeria had earlier done so in May 1981.

The O.A.U sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention and Resolution met on March 24th 1994 and asked the General Secretariat to submit a report on the matter within one month (see Appendix B). To that effect, an O.A.U team led by a Deputy Secretary General in charge of Political Affairs, Mapuranga, was in Yaounde on April 25th 1994. They held talks with the Cameroonian authorities and were even to go to Bakassi but failed, maybe for security reasons. The O.A.U stand was clear on the matter. The Committee on Conflict Management and Resolution resolved in a meeting on March 24th 1994 that, the two countries should respect colonial boundaries as enshrined in the Charter of the O.A.U²¹⁹. The resolution further demanded the withdrawal of troops from the disputed area. Since each country claimed ownership of the territory, the troops from both countries were not withdrawn.

On March 1994, the Government of the Republic of Cameroon filed in the Registry of the International Court of Justice at the Hague an Application instituting proceedings against the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in respect of a dispute described as relating essentially on the question on the ownership of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsular. From then henceforth the issue of the crisis has been put into the hands of the international Court. The UN Security Council met on April 29th 1994 and requested the UN Secretary General to contact both Cameroon and Nigeria and advise them to seek a solution to the problem. This was to be done within the framework of existing practice and regulations on international frontiers. Since the matter was already with the International Court of Justice at Hague which is the legal agency of the UN, it appeared that the Court would be the proper organ to settle this matter. The Court would base its judgement on existing practices and regulations on international frontiers. The matter has been looked at by the Court to which both countries have presented their arguments and facts to prove that their

²¹⁷ Cited Cameroon Life, pp. 18 and 21.

²¹⁸ www.allafrica.com

²¹⁹ Njeuma. p. 12

claim over the territory is just. The final judgement of the Court on the conflict has now come out in favour of Cameroon (further comments on the Court's judgement will be discussed later in the conclusion)²²⁰.

In order to explain its position very clearly to the international community, the Cameroonian Government sent envoys abroad at the end of March 1994. The Vice Prime Minister, Ahmadou Moustapha led a delegation to North Africa and the Middle East. Minister Kontchou Koumengni went to France and the BENELUX countries, and the Assistant Secretary General at the Presidency, Ephraim Inoni went to the United States and Canada. Minister Francis Nwian went to East Africa, while Tsanga Abanda went to China, Far East and South east Asia. The delegations leaving Cameroon at the end of March possibly intended to mobilise world leaders to support Cameroon at the UN Security Council session that was to meet in April 1994²²¹.

Local Reactions to the conflict

In Cameroon and Nigeria, political leaders and pressure groups reacted to the Bakassi conflict as well. Professor Wole Soyinka, a Nigerian intellectual denounced the use of force in the conflict. Expressing concern over human values and the fate of the local population in the disputed area, he proposed the holding of a referendum to resolve the crisis. Cameroon rejected the idea of a referendum because the people voted on February 11, 1961 in the plebiscite that brought the unification of the two sections of the Cameroons.

In Cameroon, the leader of the Social Democratic Front (S.D.F) John Fru Ndi, supported the bilateral talks rather than get foreign powers involved. He condemned the French involvement in the crisis²²². He even talked of his intended trip to Nigeria to discuss the matter with Nigerian authorities. Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya of the Cameroon Democratic Union (C.D.U) issued an important statement on the conflict. Among many things, the C.D.U leader called on Cameroon and Nigeria as founding members of the O.A.U to uphold the principle of respecting colonial borders and to be aware that solutions obtained through wars are never definitive. The two countries were advised to respect accords signed by colonial powers²²³.

Some Anglophone Cameroonians saw the Bakassi crisis as an opportunity to blame the Francophone dominated Government in Yaounde for the marginalisation of Anglophones and the neglect of their territory in terms of development. The Free West Cameroon Movement argued that La Republique du Cameroon (Francophone Cameroon) and Nigeria had no business on the Southern Cameroons territory²²⁴. Retired Ambassador Epie, Chairman of the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (C.A.M) stated that La Republique du Cameroon would have been an interested party had she not seceded from the 1961 federal union with Southern Cameroons²²⁵.

The Standing Committee of All Anglophone Conference (A.A.C) issued a statement in March 1994 arguing that it was only the Federal Government of the Republic of

²²⁰ For hearings in the Court, go to www.allafrica.com

²²¹ Njeuma, p. 13

²²² John Fruh Ndi, cited in The Herald, No. 91, March 10th 1994

²²³ Adamou Ndam Njoya, cited in Weekly Post, vol.2, No. 50, March 30th – April 4th 1994, p. 15

²²⁴ Dissertation by Nfor N. Nfor “ The Southern Cameroons: The Truth Of The Matter”, Bamenda May 2002, p. 18-27

²²⁵ Cited in Cameroon Life, p. 17

Cameroon that exercised jurisdiction over the Federated States of West and East Cameroon. That implied that Federal Government jurisdiction extended over West Cameroon to the border with Nigeria. With the destruction of the Federal Government in 1972 and the revival of the La Republic du Cameroon in 1984, which was logically matched by the revival of Southern Cameroons, the western border of La Republique du Cameroon cannot stretch beyond the River Mongo²²⁶. The A.A.C however denounced the occupation of the Cameroonian territory by Nigerian forces.

As hostilities increased, Nigerian residents in Cameroon became worried. There were about two and half million Nigerians resident in Cameroon. Some of them sold their property and left the country, fearing an outbreak of war because they had seen the devastating effects of war during the Nigerian Civil War. Resident Nigerians and Cameroonians abroad also pleaded for a peaceful solution to the conflict. A group describing itself as concerned citizens of Cameroon and Nigeria resident in the United States of America, Canada, France, Britain, Denmark, Italy Australia and Finland appealed to Biya and Abacha to avoid military confrontation²²⁷.

3.1 Summary and Conclusion

The Cameroon-Nigerian border conflict as we have seen could be interpreted from different dimensions. It could be seen as a result of the European imperialism in Africa in the 1880s. As we have already mentioned, when the Europeans sort to divide Africa into their various spheres of influence, they never thought of the African people. It was all about getting the best area to carry out trade for their companies (to get access into the hinterland and to secure trade routes offshore). In the Cameroon-Nigerian border from the sea to Yola, the British and the Germans, like their European counterparts in other parts of Africa, did not respect the boundaries of the local people. When the 1913 Anglo-German Border Agreement was signed, the people were given the chance to cross either to the Nigerian side or to the German side. But this did not help to solve the problem as we have already seen. People were separated from their farms, families, ethnic ties and so forth. So it was not easy for the local people to leave their lands or such to cross over to one side or the other. Hence only few people crossed the border during this time while others remained in their lands. The case of the Efiks as we have seen before in the Bakassi area is a good example. These people though in the Cameroonian side resented the German authority over them, later the French and finally the Cameroonian authority. As such, it is but clear that socio-political problems will arise in such situations as is the case we have mentioned earlier.

On the other hand, the economic factor is more pressing. As was the case with the colonial masters, economic factor of the border crisis is more felt. For the Europeans, it was to secure better trade but the local people wanted to keep their fishing grounds and farmlands, while the local authorities had to collect taxes and royalties. For the Cameroon and the Nigerian government, it is the exploitation of more oil and other resources discovered in the region.

²²⁶ Nfor N. Nfor , p. 40-55

²²⁷ www.allafrica.com

Many attempts have been made to solve this conflict at various levels but these attempts have not succeeded. At the level of the O.A.U, the two countries have been asked to respect their colonial boundaries. But the problem is that such resolutions will depend much on the good will of both states. The O.A.U has not got any machinery to force or sanction member states who do not respect their resolutions like the UN. Other African states who have tried to mediate in the conflict as third partners like Guinea and Sierra Leone, have got domestic crisis which hinder them to concentrate on the problems of other countries. Moreover, these are countries who are not stronger than Cameroon or Nigeria; which one could say because of their size or power (political or economic), they could put pressure on the conflicting states to resolve the crisis. Thus, at the end, all will still depend on the good will of the conflicting states as regards to this form of solving the crisis.

With regards to attempts made by both countries to solve the crisis, it has been noticed that political instability in Nigeria has hindered possible solutions. A good example is after the Nigerian civil war. Military struggles in the country that turn to topple one Military leader after the other was common in Nigeria after the civil war. General Gowon's Agreement with Ahidjo (the Maroua Declaration of 1st June 1975) was a good sign of settling the conflict in peace. But this Accord though ratified by the Cameroonian General Assembly, was not ratified by the Nigerian Supreme Military Council. Thus, the Accord could not solve the crisis as it was to be the case.

After that, another military government came in Nigeria and refused to ratify the Maroua Accord. General Murtala Mohammed came in 1975 and shortly he was removed by Obasanjo who was also removed by Shehu Shagari in 1983. General Mohammed Buhari came in who later was ousted by Sani Abacha in 1985 who in the year 2000 gave power to Obasanjo (still on seat now) following a democratic election. In 1982 Paul Biya came to power in Cameroon and has been the president till date. Since independence, the Cameroonian Government has changed hands just once. While the Nigeria Government has changed so many times and the different regimes were shortlived and mostly military. All these hinder negotiation between the two governments and as such a lasting solution over the conflict from the two states has been unsuccessful.

Another attempt to solve the crisis was the idea of a joint border commission to survey the border and come up with solutions which would be put into action (demarcation of the border by experts on land). Such a commission was formed in 1965 but its work could not be completed because of the Nigerian civil war in 1966-1967. After the war, the work of the commission was not continued which was a failure on both governments. If this boundary demarcation was continued, maybe this would have helped to solve this conflict. The Ngoh-Coker tracing of August 1871 was never accepted by the Nigerians; likewise the Kanu Declaration of 1974 which proposed that a corridor of 4 kilometre wide of oil exploitation free zone be created. These declarations and such bilateral talks were all in vain. The idea of a Buffer Zone which was proposed in the Kanu Declaration could be a considerable solution to the crisis. But since the economic worth of this area is so important to both countries, this idea was not implemented. If this area was made a Buffer Zone, the resources could be kept as reserves under the UN as an international body. Another alternative might be that the resources of this zone might be exploited and the rewards be divided to both countries or be used for charity purposes in Africa or elsewhere under the UN

control. But the constrain in this suggestion is that, both countries need this area to exploit the resources. This will help them to employ local population, as well as attract foreign investors thereby improving the economy of both states. So the idea of a Buffer Zone in this area could hardly be accepted by both states because of strong economic reasons. Such a zone would also imply peacekeeping forces to be stationed on the region and as we are all aware of, such forces are for temporal basis or short term. The Bakassi crisis needs a permanent and long lasting solution.

In 1985, President Biya of Cameroon set up a National Frontier Commission by a Presidential Degree. It had the merit of introducing collective thinking and serving as a forum to coordinate the actions of all ministries concerned with frontier matters²²⁸. The drawback was that it was conceived as an adhoc inter-ministerial committee to be summoned only when the President of the Republic deem it necessary. Worse still, the committee was highly political and had no secretariat or research departments to study, review and propose solutions to problems of bringing peace to Cameroon's international frontiers.

The Nigerian government on its part, set up the Nigerian Boundary Commission in 1987 as a Department at the Presidency, and went further to appoint technocrats and scholars to man it²²⁹. Since their creation, both Commissions worked in complete isolation of each other. This could perhaps be due to incongruity of structural organisation, non-concordance of competence and divergence in the profiles of the principle animators of the Commissions. The formation of such committees are good but it would not help as the case has proven to be, when both committees work in isolation.

In August 27th 1991, the Cameroon-Nigerian Border Joint Commission was revived and it met in Yaounde. Though it did not do much to settle the crisis, it was a sign that the countries are prepared to solve the conflict through bilateral consultations. This Commission met again in Abuja on th 19th of December 1991 and in Yaounde on the 11th –15th of August 1993. The demarcation work was accepted by both states and their Heads of States were to take the border issue into their hands. The problem here is that instead of the demarcation work to continue, the Commission put the matter on the hands of the Heads of States. That means back to political solutions. As the Nigerain Institute of Surveyors blamed their government for politicising the matter rather than seeking technical advice, so was the case on the side of the Cameroonian Government.

The Nigerian forces entered the Bakassi region on December 21st 1993 and by Febuary 1994, they had stated putting up infractructures as we have seen earlier. With this new development at hand, the Nigerian foreign minister Baba Gama headed a delegation to Yaounde. With the Cameroonian authorities, they decided that mixed border patrols should be formed for the disputed area. While that was going on, bilateral talks should continue on maritime border, so that a just and lasting solution could be found between the two countries. Still here with such good concessions, the decissions of the meeting were never implimented. The two countries have not keep their promises and/or decisions taken in bilateral meetings.

Looking at the various attempts to solve the conflict as seen above, it is clear that these measure could not yield the expected results. But this does not mean that the

²²⁸ Njeuma; p. 19

²²⁹ Ibid; p. 20

conflict could not be solved or managed. Each conflict has its own causes and it is important to look at the root causes of a conflict in order to solve or prevent it. There are different types of conflicts caused by different reasons; thus each conflict should be treated separately. It would be unfair to think that there can be some general rules which could be applied to the prevention and/or management of all conflicts. The advantage is that by solving and or preventing one conflict, experiences gained could help in solving the other conflict. This point could be helpful in similar conflicts in some regions. For example by solving the border conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria, experiences gained in this process might help in solving other border conflicts in Africa. This is true because most African countries have similar historical background of colonialism, ethnic groups or ties. This makes it easier to understand some factors that come into play as concerns conflicts in Africa. Below are some suggestions to the management of the Bakassi crisis.

3.2 Suggestions

Some Nigerians as well as Cameroonian scholars have proposed measures to solve the Bakassi conflict. For example: Asiwaju in his article²³⁰ proposes three methods of solving the Bakassi problem: war, problem solving and litigation which he thought had more chances of succeeding. African scholars like A.O Cukwurah strongly recommend the European Outline Convention for Trans-Frontier Cooperation between Territorial Authorities or Communities as well as the U.S-Mexico frontier conventions as models for Africa. According to his opinion, an African model should not only lay emphasis on economic gains, but give priority to ethnical and human considerations²³¹.

Prof. Njeuma (a member of the Cameroon-Nigerian Joint Border Commission), said that, the three ways of solving the crisis as proposed by Asiwaju are not exclusive solution to the problem. According to him, no one approach excludes the other, and in any case, no one approach is likely to succeed if the basic assumption of legality is ignored. According to him, a plausible way for the future is to progressively institute a special regime for selective areas along the frontier regions and provinces. The strength of the regime he says should be first and foremost, to respect all the Treaties that establish the existing frontiers while negotiating appropriate structures for common management of shared resources in the short, medium and long term. This he continues would be put on reconciliation, bridging gaps and development across the frontier using African solidarity and unity as the focal point. Further, he suggests that local joint commissions should not only be set up to update or further demarcate frontiers, but also to constitute the nucleus of a new type of government, a contingent for peace that includes all the actors involved in the conflict.

In 1990, the Cameroonian Government formed a National Frontier Commission²³². With the formation of this, hopes were raised that the National Frontier Commission and the Cameroon-Nigerian mixed Commission would work together and examine

²³⁰ A.I Asiwaju, "The Bakassi Peninsula Crisis: An Alternative to War and Litigation", C. H. Schoffield, (eds) Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects, Kluwer Law International, Great Britain, 1998.

²³¹ For more information, see "Joint Communiqué", Nigeria-Cameroon Transborder Cooperation Workshop"; 25th-30th May 1992. Also Njeuma; p. 21

²³² Prof. Njeuma writer of the paper „Cameroon-Nigerian Frontier: Model for Culture of Peace, 1890-1991" is a member of this Commission.

new strategies for frontier demarcation, management and the culture of peace. Both commissions met at Yaounde in August 12th 1991 and the meeting was co-chaired by the foreign ministers of both countries. It was agreed that new structures for the handling of this conflict were to be set up. For example, the Gulf of Guinea Commission that would be compatible to the Lake Chad Basin Commission²³³. But there was one innovation that is, the degree of the personal involvement of the Heads of States, which was quite normal for post-independent African diplomacy. The problem here was that since Cameroon and Nigeria belonged to different sub-regional organisations except for the Lake Chad Basin Commission, existing regional frameworks could not constitute the legal platform for joint or corporate management of frontiers.

Taking into consideration the fact that the countries of the Gulf of Guinea share a common continental shelf and pay similar attention to economic and maritime issues in the region as a whole, the proposal to set a Gulf of Guinea Commission should be seen as an attempt to reinforce the notion of collective responsibility and arrive at an orderly sharing of resources in the area in accordance with the force of laws and conventions. The example of forming a sub-regional organisation to solve such crisis has proven to work in the example of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (formed to share the resources of the Lake Chad between five countries:-Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and the Central African Republic). Thus, such a Commission like the Gulf of Guinea will not only serve as a junction box of the Central and West African sub-region, but also would oversee and defend common interests against foreigners who take advantage of division among African countries to despoil them.

Another suggestion to solve the Cameroon-Nigeria border crisis and other crisis of such nature would be the involvement of Multinational corporations. As already mentioned above, when the Nigerian troops occupied the Bakassi region, the French Government immediately showed its concern on the recent development of the conflict. First of all I would like to make mention that the 1965 incident with the experts of the ELF Serepta and Mobile Oil Companies on the Cross River Delta could be seen as a role which oil companies play to heighten the crisis. In the colonial days, this region was seen as a swampy area full of creeks and of no economic importance. Then the local fishing on the region was not of any dramatic economic importance to both independent governments. But as soon as other resources, especially oil, was discovered in the region, the economic crisis phase of the conflict became more to be felt. Cameroon wanted to exploit these resources and Nigeria also wanted to increase her exploitation activities in the region. Therefore, because of this, I think the oil companies should be involved in conflict solving.

Another situation to take note is that as the Nigerian forces occupied the Bakassi region in 1994, France showed its concern in the crisis. There are two possible reasons for the French concern in the recent stage of the crisis. First, France has a military cooperation agreement with Cameroon which has to be respected in case of war. The second and most often more eminent is the protection of the French investments in Cameroon as well as in Nigeria. The French-dominated oil company ELF Cameroon exploits about 32 oil wells in the Bakassi region. This produces about

²³³ For more about the Lake Chad Basin Commission, see Ngho; pp. 299-331

120.000 barrels of petroleum oil daily and that fetch about two million dollars per day²³⁴. This is not enough as on the other hand, French investments in Nigeria were greater than those in Cameroon. It was estimated that overall French investments in Nigeria could be greater than those in all francophone African countries combined. The risk on the French side was that Nigeria could naturalise those investments if the French joined Cameroon in a war against her over Bakassi. So the General Manager of ELF company Joffre Philippe from France came to Cameroon to talk on the crisis with President Biya. It is but clear that though France had to honour the military pact with Cameroon, it also had to protect its investments both in Nigeria and Cameroon.

So one could see how important is the economic factor in this crisis between the two countries concerned and also for the multinational oil companies like ELF. The point is that if these companies have their business in danger then they can call their home governments to put pressure on Cameroon and Nigeria to find a lasting solution to this conflict. On one hand, it would be easy to protect their interests and on the other hand, the conflicting governments. Since their economies depend to a great extent on such foreign investments, the conflicting governments would want to do something serious in order not to lose their foreign investors. Also such companies like ELF which has business in both countries can help to put pressure on both governments to solve the crisis if not; it would withdraw its investments in the region. It can also activate other foreign investors in the region to also pose similar threats to the conflicting governments. This is an important factor because if the conflict escalates to a war, the business of the Multinational companies would be affected. So it would be of their interest to involve in conflict prevention and management in their areas of operation.

The Multilateral Companies can also help as mediators in such conflicting regions where they operate. As mentioned above in the first part of this work (conflict prevention in the corporate sector), the mechanisms of conflict prevention and management in the corporate sector should be improved in order to help solve or prevent conflict at least in their operating regions. The argument here is that since Multinational companies control almost 2/3 of the production in African countries, they should be more engaged in conflict prevention in Africa and elsewhere where they operate. The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan in the opening of the UN Conference of Human Rights Commission in 1998²³⁵ also made mention of the idea that Multinational businesses should engage more in conflict prevention as a whole. In the case of ELF Cameroon though not clear, it is presumed that ELF has got a lot of influence in Cameroon both economically as well as politically.

Cameroon is a former French colony and now having good economic and military ties with France. This implies that the ELF company could work in collaboration with the French government to help Cameroon find a solution to the conflict. France could also use the Francophonie²³⁶ as a forum to mediate in the conflict. On the Nigerian side, the British as former colonial master could also use its relationship to Nigeria to mediate in the conflict. Britain could use its Commonwealth ties with Nigeria to influence her to seek a solution to this crisis. France and Britain belong to the EU

²³⁴ Cited Cameroon Life, 1994, pp. 18-21

²³⁵ E+Z 40.Jg. April 1994, p. 106

²³⁶ The francophonie is union of former french colonised states in Africa where these states pledged to remain in good relation with France after they gained independence.

through which they can indirectly due to their interest on their former colonies exercise some influence.

One might criticise this proposal as allowing the former colonial masters to still have influence on their former colonies. Or the fear of the interference of Multilateral Companies and/or former colonial masters in the internal affairs of these countries. But the truth is that these ties and respect for the former colonial masters do exist among African countries, through other agreements. The point here is that this could be used for a good purpose so as to help solve conflicts in Africa through mediation. It is not only enough to send aid and/or peacekeeping forces as they do now. But I think it would be better to use such ties to help solve and prevent conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. The working of all actors together in conflict prevention and management as we have seen in the first section of this work is the most probable way to help, solve and prevent conflict. Cooperation between foreign and local forces are necessary for a good system of conflict prevention and management as we have seen in the Swedish proposal.

Since the Europeans left these regions, many things have changed in the frontier. The maritime regions have in recent years become centres of vast economic resources and traffic across the frontier. Multinational corporations have settled and developed vested interests in the area. Activities in the region provide lucrative jobs to many privileged persons. Furthermore, the configuration of the frontier is such that effective policing, in the traditional colonial way, is no longer possible because the real treasures are hidden under water and third parties are strong and are in control. As a matter of fact, the pressures from these changes are daily suggesting plenty of opaque imperialistic styles and attitudes of management. It is no secret that some of the most serious incidents that brought Cameroon and Nigeria to the brink of war have occurred in areas where the frontier lines are in no doubt, but this did not deter interest groups from dauntless acts. The most important issue is the intention of both states to seek for a solution to the conflict. But since it has proven that this intention on both sides is not that strong enough to solve the crisis with or without foreign help; it is at best for the International Court of Justice to pass its judgment.

The long awaited judgement of the ICJ over the Bakassi Peninsular conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria was passed at the Hague on the 10th of October 2002²³⁷. Cameroon has been given sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsular and Nigeria has to pull out its troops from this region. The Court had based its judgement according to the Anglo-German Agreement of 11th March 1913 which put the sovereignty over Bakassi with Cameroon. Similarly, the Court fixed the boundary in the lake Chad area in accordance with the Henderson-Fleury Exchange of Notes of 9th January 1931 between France and Great Britain. The ruling of the Court based on colonial boundary agreements is very important in that it avoids the making of new boundaries in Africa.

This goes to support the O.A.U resolution in its constitution which holds that colonial boundaries should not be altered but be accepted by new independent African governments. Also the ruling of the Court would have raised much confusion and similar border crisis in Africa if it had called for new boundary settlements. This is because other African countries would have taken this as example to foster changes

²³⁷ www.nytimes.com For more information on the Court's ruling and reactions from both countries and the international scene, see www.allafrica.com

in their boundaries. But it is now clear that colonial boundaries should be respected irrespective of the mistakes made by the Europeans in making boundaries in Africa. The example of the Court's decision is similar to that on the conflict over Eritea and Etheopia. These two countries which fought a vicious two-year border war from 1998-2000, agreed to accept a compromise decision by an arbitration panel at the Hague earlier this year.

These two rulings are to set good examples on how to solve conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Once more the importance of such an international organisation has proven its worth in conflict prevention and management; thereby maintaining World Peace and Security.

Since the rulling of the Court over the Bakassi conflict, many have commented on the judgment. It might be early to talk on comments since each side as well as others need enough time to assess the Court's decision. On the side of the Court, it was happy to learn that the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria met on September 5th 2002 in the presence of the United Nations Secretary Koffi Anan in Paris. Both presidents pledged to accept the decision of the ICJ on the dispute. The Court welcomed the result of that meeting and hopes that the judgment which it has delivered will continue to friendly relations to the two brother countries. Koffi Anan has called on the Nigerian leaders to accept the Court ruling and to continue cooperation with Cameroon for further negociations. The AU Secretary General Amara M. Essay in Addis Ababa in October 11th 2002 said the organisation has fully accepted the ruling of the ICJ over the Cameroon-Nigerian border conflict²³⁸. He further called on all member states to encourage the two states to cooperate and respect the decision of the Hague.

On the part of Cameroonian Government, much has not been said officially till now but for the fact that the government is happy to have been favoured by the ruling of the Court. The President had also accepted in the meeting in Paris to accept and respect the Court's judgement no matter the outcome. Following the old tradition of "faithful to its traditional policy of hospitality and tolerace", the Cameroon has committed itself to "continue to afford protection to Nigerians living in the Bakassi Peninsular and in the Lake Chad area"²³⁹. Also in an official communique issued by Paul Biya the president of Cameroon on the 11th of October 2002, the president was calling on all Cameroonians to continue in their good brotherlihoodness and friendliness and cooperation with the Nigerians after the Court's ruling²⁴⁰. He also said that Cameroon has accepted the ruling unanimously and thanked Koffi Anan (the UN Secretary General) for his personal engagement to help Cameroon and Nigeria keep their good neighbourly cooperation during the period of crisis. One of the Lawers representing Cameroon on the case at the Hague Charles Tchoungang called for the Cameroonian authority to be vigilant on its frontiers despite the fact that Nigeria has accepted the Court's ruling. Both governments are calling on their population to keep calm and respect the decision of the Court.

As concerns reactions from the Nigerian side, the president Obassanjo in the meeting at Paris mentioned he will accept the ruling of the Court no matter its outcome. The Nigerian Minister of State for Justice Musa Elayo said it was

²³⁸ www.cameroon-info.net

²³⁹ www.allafrica.com (Newspaper-This Day, Lagos 11-10-2002)

²⁴⁰ www.cameroon-info.net

“inappropriate to talk of winners and losers”, since both countries would benefit having the matter settled. He continues that “the judgment will resolve many outstanding matters between the two states and provide a way forward for both in areas which have caused difficulties in the past”²⁴¹.

He assured the Nigerian population living in Bakassi that the judgement does not damage the rights of the citizens living in the area, or Nigeria’s control of existing reserves and production. He called on Nigerians to calm down and assured them that there is no need for Nigerians to move and that necessary consultations would be undertaken.

A Nigerian naval official in the Bakassi region said “if we lose Bakassi we lose our eastern access to the Atlantic. Our Naval ships cannot move freely to southern Africa for instance, without Cameroon’s approval”²⁴². The Bakassi peninsula is not only strategically (military) important but has potential oil reserves and has rich fish stocks. As Mike Rodgers, senior director at the Petroleum Finance Company, a Washington consulting firm puts it the oil rich Peninsula being given to Cameroon could have a big impact on the local economy of Cameroon. Oil experts say no body knows how much oil is in the area but there is a promise of deposits of hundred of millions of barrels; which is a timely boost for Cameroon, whose production has been steadily declining. ExxonMobil and TotalFinalElf are the major oil companies operating in the area are still withholding their comments on the judgement, saying they need enough time to study the Court’s decision.

Because of the importance of bilateral cooperation between the two countries and the follow up of the ruling of the Court, a mixed commission has set up. The idea to form such a commission came up because Nigeria complained that the ICJ ruling took cognition of the resources but not of the people living in the area. For this reason, Kofi ²⁴³Annan met with Obasanjo and Biya in Geneva in November 15th 2002 for negotiation towards a peaceful resolution on the Bakassi crisis²⁴⁴. Both countries agreed to the formation of the mixed commission which came as a result of the Geneva meeting. The two countries have equal representation in the commission headed by Mr. Amedou Ould-Abdullah, a representative of the UN Secretary General. The aim of this commission is to promote dialogue between the two countries, reconcile their differences and to look at the implication of the ruling on the people at the Bakassi region on both sides. The commission will also make recommendations to promote cross-border cooperation, joint economic ventures, the reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. This commission will also promote the holding of meetings between local authorities and government officials, the withdrawal of troops from the region, the demilitarisation of the Bakassi peninsula under international observation. The first meeting of this commission was in Yaounde on the 1st of December 2002 and another will be held on the 4th –5th of February 2003, in Abuja (the commission is to hold twice monthly).

Such bilateral cooperation including support from the international scene is very important to achieve a lasting peace on the Bakassi crisis. For a lasting peace to reign, both countries have to accept and implement the ruling of the ICJ, consider

²⁴¹ www.nytimes.com

²⁴² www.nytimes.com

²⁴³ www.allafrica.com

²⁴⁴ www.allafrica.com

the activities of the local people living in the area and put transborder activities under control. For if this is not the case, the region will be plunged into war. This will affect the socio-economic and political aspects of both countries and also that of the west African region at large. Therefore, it is very important for bilateral cooperation to continue with international help, to find a lasting solution to the Bakassi crisis.

APPENDIX A

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
Yaounde, Cameroun

NOTE NO. 65/327/S.I./Vol. 1/94

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Missions of International Organisations accredited to Yaounde and has the honour to forward herewith the attached Press Release issued by the Office of the Chief Press Secretary to the President and Commander-in-Chief on the 25th March, 1994 which carries the Nigerian Government position on the Bakasi Peninsula, for your information.

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria wishes to seize this opportunity to renew to Diplomatic Missions and International Organisations accredited to Yaounde, the assurances of its highest consideration.

YAOUNDE, 29th MARCH, 1994

DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Y A O U N D E

APPENDIX B

DECISIONS OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE OAU CENTRAL ORGAN FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION ON THE
NIGERIA/CAMEROUN DISPUTE OVER THE BAKASI PENINSULA
MARCH, 24, 1994, ADDIS ABABA

The Central Organ has now been formally seized with the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakasi Peninsula. It has listened carefully to the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon. It has listened to a statement by the representative of Nigeria. It has listened to the representative of the Current Chairman of the OAU and has taken note of the report prepared by the Secretariat on the question.

The Central Organ, while expressing grave concern at the escalating situation and the implications for the two countries and the region as a whole, took note with satisfaction of the position of the two parties that they are for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. In this connection, the Central Organ underscores the importance of achieving a peaceful settlement based on the Charters of the U.N. and the OAU. They reaffirm their attachment to the respect of the principle and the inviolability of frontiers inherited from the colonial period. They also affirmed their attachment to the respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all states.

The Central Organ called upon the Parties to exercise restraint and to take appropriate measures to restore confidence including the consideration of the withdrawal of troops and continuation of dialogue.

The Central Organ took note, with appreciation, of the efforts undertaken by President Mubarak (The President of the Arab republic of Egypt, Current Chairman of the OAU) and President Eyadema of Togo aimed at defusing the situation and reaching a peaceful settlement,

The Central Organ requested the Secretary General to follow the situation and to report within a month, of the outcome of these efforts.

APPENDIX C

CAMEROON-NIGERIA COMMUNIQUE IN TUNIS - 13/6/94


At the initiative of H.E. Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of the Republic of Togo, President Paul Biya, President of the Republic of Cameroon, and General Sani Abacha, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, have met in Tunis.

The two Heads of State examined the situations stemming from the territorial problems between their two states. They agreed to establish a Joint Commission, under the auspices of the President of the Republic of Togo, to seek peaceful and fair ways and means to solve the problem without prejudice to the on-going proceeding in the International Court of Justice.

With that spirit, the two Heads of State will meet in Lome in the near future; after a meeting of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs.



Map 1. Map of Africa showing independent states (including Cameroon and Nigeria)



Source: Brownlie Ian: African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia, London, 1979. p. 554

Map 2. Anglo-German and Anglo-French Boundary

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