Outside the Wire

Foucault’s Ethics and

the Canadian Military

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Abstract

Foucault believed an ethical person developed through “self forming activity” and the exercise of free will. Foucault’s theories on ethics and power-knowledge, however, can be viewed as a contradiction. The problem, say his critics, is that self-forming activity should not be possible in an environment dominated by power-knowledge. Foucault did not address this apparent contradiction in the few years he had remaining. He did briefly comment that they were compatible and had always been throughout his work; he had just not been aware of it. The dissertation also discusses the matter of free will necessary for ethical “self forming activity”. Again, Foucault was largely silent on that issue but it is possible to deduce his standpoint. To argue these points, it is necessary to answer the common criticisms that Foucault was caught in a discourse that inhibited objectivity, that his personal ethics coloured his theory, and that he provided nothing new to Western philosophy. In an attempt to resolve these issues, the author combines Foucault’s theories on ethics and power-knowledge by pairing them for practical application. The model is applied to the Canadian Forces, which has a well-developed ethics program and obvious power-knowledge network. The synthesis of Foucault’s theories, however, reveals a contradicting ethic of statism and a parallel power-knowledge system of bureaucracy and dysfunctional, executive officer personality type.
# Table of Contents

List of Figures.............................................................................................................................................. 8

Chapter 1 – Introduction: Foucault’s Contradiction and Military Ethics ................................................. 9

1.1 Terminology ..................................................................................................................................... 12

1.2 Methodology..................................................................................................................................... 17

1.3 The Current State of Research ........................................................................................................ 19

1.3.1 Foucault and Ethics ................................................................................................................. 19

1.3.2 The Military and Ethics ............................................................................................................ 23

Postmodernism and Military Social Science ......................................................................................... 23

The Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society .......................................................... 26

Royal Military College of Science, UK ................................................................................................. 29

Chapter 2 – Moral Development and Military Expeditions: Ethical Substance and *Discourse* ....... 30

2.1 Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus ....................................................................................... 30

2.2 Modern Statism and Bureaucracy ................................................................................................. 33

2.3 Statism and the Canadian Military ................................................................................................. 36

2.4 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 39

2.5 Selected Texts on Statism and Bureaucracy ................................................................................... 39

Chapter 3 – Obligations, Myths, Monuments, and Management: Mode of Subjection as *Moral* Codes and Knowledge ........................................................................................................ 52

3.1 Foucault and Moral Codes.............................................................................................................. 52

3.2 Military Moral Codes....................................................................................................................... 55

3.2.1 Professionalism ........................................................................................................................ 56

3.2.2 Warrior’s Honour ..................................................................................................................... 59

3.2.3 Leadership and Social Contractarianism ................................................................................ 61
3.3 Knowledge........................................................................................................................................ 65
  3.3.1 Teaching Military State Narratives.......................................................................................... 67
  3.3.2 Memorializing Military State Narratives ............................................................................... 72
  3.3.3 Branding Military State Narratives ....................................................................................... 77
3.4 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 82
3.5 Selected Texts on Military Moral Codes and Knowledge ............................................................... 84

Chapter 4 - How It Works and What It Does: Self-Forming Activity and Actual Behaviour through
Power-Knowledge..................................................................................................................................... 104
  4.1 Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus ..................................................................................... 105
  4.2 The Military ................................................................................................................................... 108
    4.2.1 The Executive Category ......................................................................................................... 108
      Civil-Military Executive Bureaucracy ......................................................................................... 109
      Military Executive Officer Personality Type ............................................................................ 112
      Executive Officers and the Selection System ............................................................................. 115
      Attempts at Reform .................................................................................................................. 120
      Executive Culture and Institutional Adaptability ..................................................................... 124
    4.2.2 The Rank and File.................................................................................................................. 126
      The Military Heterotopia .......................................................................................................... 127
      Complaint System .................................................................................................................... 130
      Secondary Conscientious Objection ......................................................................................... 138
      Ethics Training ........................................................................................................................ 139
    4.2.3 Actual Behaviour on Expedition ......................................................................................... 151
      Somalia ....................................................................................................................................... 151
      Former Republic of Yugoslavia .............................................................................................. 152
      Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................ 154
4.3 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 159

4.4 Selected Texts on Military Bureaucracy and Culture ............................................................... 162

Chapter 5 - Does It Exist? Free Will: Between Behaviour and Ethics ........................................... 198

5.1 Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus ..................................................................................... 198

5.2 Modern Science ............................................................................................................................. 203

5.3 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 208

5.4 Selected Texts on Free Will ........................................................................................................... 208

Chapter 6 - What is Their Goal? Telos as Ethics and Ethos ............................................................. 212

6.1 Foucault ......................................................................................................................................... 212

6.2 Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus ....................................................................................................... 216

6.3 The Canadian Military .................................................................................................................. 219

6.4 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 223

6.5 Selected Texts on Telos, Ethics, and Ethos .................................................................................. 223

Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Application ......................................................................................... 230

7.1 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 230

7.2 Application to Foucault’s Ethics ................................................................................................. 233

7.3 Application to Military Case Study .............................................................................................. 236

7.3.1 Engagement in Public Life .................................................................................................... 239

7.3.2 Military Trade Unions and Professional Associations ......................................................... 239

7.3.3 Canadian Militia ..................................................................................................................... 241

7.3.4 Secondary Conscientious Objection ...................................................................................... 244

7.3.5 Military Force Structure and Selection .................................................................................. 246

7.4 Future Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 248

Information on Media Sources ............................................................................................................. 251
List of Figures

Figure 1. Foucault’s Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge .................................................. 14
Figure 2. Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge Schema .................................................... 17
Figure 3. Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge Cycle of Analysis ..................................... 18
Figure 4. Espoused Military Ethos versus Military Culture (Actual Behaviour) ....................... 56
Figure 5. Foucault’s Ethics, Ethos, Telos ................................................................................. 236
Figure 6. Espoused Military Ethos versus Military Culture (Telos) ......................................... 237
Figure 7. Military Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge as Venn Diagram ....................... 237
Chapter 1 – Introduction: Foucault’s Contradiction and Military Ethics

“Canadian soldiers on the international mission to Afghanistan face one problem that bedevils them constantly – but rarely makes it into the public eye.

For Canadians coming from a relatively cold climate, 45 C temperatures in early summer and 50+ by mid summer can be quite an adjustment.

They also wear skin tight flak jackets at all times when “outside the wire,” slang for being outside the high-security bases.

On those missions, even when traveling in a convoy with supplies, they spend much of their time in sealed, metal armoured vehicles. Some of them have air conditioning systems, but still end up feeling like radiators when you peel yourself out of one after a three-hour drive.

One saving grace is the tents the soldiers sleep in: they have large air conditioners attached.

All in all, it makes ice cream a welcome treat – if not a main course – if and when it is available.”

CBC News, David Common, June 13, 2006:

“Afghanistan diary: An invisible enemy plagues Canadian troops”

Foucault introduced his theory on ethics late in life after decades of work on archaeology, genealogy, and power-knowledge. His belated interest has been interpreted as either a repudiation, a corrective, or a complement to the nihilism of power-knowledge. Some refer to it as a change of heart more than a change of mind. Foucault, however, was adamant that the human as subject, and necessarily as an ethical subject, had always been implied in his work although in a muddled form (Foucault, 1984: 352). As his writings progressed from the decades of the 1960’s to the 1980’s, Foucault allowed the
individual some self-expression beyond that of a “passive product of techniques of domination” and more as a holder of a precarious identity (Gros, 2005: 525-526). Eventually, Foucault argued that the individual subject can only emerge at the intersection of a technique of domination and a technique of the self (Gros, 2005: 525). At that point, his interests shifted toward the human as an active subject as opposed to a targeted object. Foucault said that “in the type of analysis I have been trying to advance for some time you can see that power relations, the government of the self and of others, and their relationship of the self to the self constitute as chain, a thread, and I think it is around these notions that we should be able to connect together the question of politics and the question of ethics” (Foucault 2005: 252). He also remarked that “the goal of my work during the last twenty years has not been to analyze the phenomena of power…instead, [it] has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, humans are made subjects” (Foucault, 1982: 208). Davidson (2005: xix), similarly, notes that Foucault’s conception of the care of the self is “the history of ethics as a history of forms of moral subjectivation.”

Foucault died June 25, 1984, with his work on ethics and its possible reconciliation with power-knowledge left incomplete. The primary sources used here contain most of what he said directly on the topic: The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982 (Foucault, 2005), twenty-four lectures he gave from January 6, 1982 to March 24, 1982; and the “Practices and Sciences of the Self” (Foucault, 1984), one of a series of interviews with Paul Rabinow and others at the University of California at Berkeley during the month of April, 1983. Gros (2005: 515) considers Hermeneutics to be the “crowning achievement of Foucault’s life’s work,” because it is the point where he turns from a critique on power to a study of the human subject. In the Hermeneutics lectures, it is not difficult to see how Foucault’s line of argument would lead to the ethics of the self outlined in the Rabinow interview conducted in the spring of 1983. To at least one Foucault supporter, there is no doubt that there is no contradiction between power-knowledge and ethics. Regarding the “Practices and Sciences of the Self,” Gros (2005: 515) believes it is the “organizing principle of [Foucault’s] entire work,” because it is where his ideas on power-knowledge are made complete by the interaction with his nascent theory on ethics. Thus, Hermeneutics can be understood as a genealogy of the process by which individuals interact with
the influences that affect their ethical self, while “Practices and Sciences of the Self,” is a schema of categories, terms, and techniques within which individuals form an ethical self. Hermeneutics looks at the dynamics of a process while “Practices and Sciences of the Self” presents a framework and terminology.

An attempt to resolve the debate and further develop Foucault’s methodology has significant potential to generate new lines of thought. In fact, he expected that his methods would be used like “a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area… I don’t write for an audience, I write for users, not readers” (Foucault 1974: 123-4). In this book, the theories of ethics and power-knowledge are combined to address the question of their compatibility. The new model will then be assessed for its explanatory power regarding other, more familiar debates about Foucault’s genealogical method, i.e., are his genealogies bound by discourse such that they cannot credibly examine another; and what are his preferred ethics, both theoretical and personal, and are they substantially different from his important referents on the matter in Hermeneutics and elsewhere.

In addition, the combined theory is used on a case study of the Canadian Military ethos to assess its value as a general analytical tool. It brings a new form of analysis to military ethics, which are normally limited to moral codes and the moral duties of the individual to the institution and the state. It is also an opportunity to further explore Foucault’s contention that discourse in the modern West is disseminated by a few “great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media)” (Foucault, 1980: 131-132).

Western militaries are in need of alternative means of criticism. Since the end of the Cold War, they have been faced with rapid change in technology and geopolitics, and with more gradual change in the nature of professions and other characteristics of society. The erosion of respect for many professions in the late 20th Century, for example, inevitably undermines the legitimacy of the discourse that supports the military profession (Abbott, 2002; Burk, 2002). Militaries have also come under pressure from transnational and non-government organizations, shifts in civil-military relations, and a growing reluctance to accept military service as an unlimited liability (Abbott, 2002; Burk, 2002: 20). Their post-
Cold War and post-9/11 security jurisdiction has expanded to include a more overt projection of armed force around the globe and across a widening spectrum of military activity. The legitimacy of public authority, spending priorities, and professional military autonomy has faced both increasing scrutiny and doubt, which has been met with a decreasing tolerance for inquiry and dissent. This unsettled context has given rise to more frequent and varied ethical dilemmas regarding the legitimacy of combat and humanitarian expeditions, the legal status and human rights of combatants and non-combatants, the role of new technology in weaponry and communication media, and so forth. Hence, while the military can serve as a proving ground for a discourse on ethics, it can also benefit from new ideas and strategies for reform.

There exists a wealth of research material on ethics and power-knowledge techniques in the Canadian military that includes contemporary manuals, regulations, and practices; military affairs literature; social science; and criticism of its leadership, bureaucracy, and armed expeditions. The institution’s moral codes and ethical goals are well publicized and have been the subject of much controversy since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the expedition in Afghanistan.

In summary, the primary question addressed in this book is whether a combination of Foucault’s theories of power-knowledge and ethics can resolve the debate about their compatibility. Secondarily, the explanatory potential of the new model will be assessed by an application to five related questions: can Foucault’s discourse be used to critique others without creating a paradox; what are Foucault’s preferred ethics; does it add anything substantially new to the Western philosophic tradition; what is the contemporary Canadian military ethos; and what are the policy options.

1.1 Terminology

“Postmodernism” is used as an omnibus reference to poststructuralism, post-colonialism, standpoint feminism, post-positivism, deconstructivism, historical ontology, and similar schools. This definition is derived from a survey of authors, especially the editors of anthologies on the subject. For example, Cooper and Burrell (1988) use the term “postmodern” to describe the works of Nietzsche,
Lyotard, and Derrida, as well as Foucault. They write that “Foucault’s genealogical method is... similar to Lyotard’s antagonistic and Derrida’s deconstruction: all deny the concept of a perfect origin and substitute for it a process of differential contestation” (Cooper, Burrell, 1988: 101). Ingram (2002c: ix) argues that poststructuralists and postmodernists have so much in common that the differences are trivial. Gane (1986: 3) lists many possible alternatives for Foucault: “neo-eclectic, neo-positivist, empiricist, Spinozist, relativist, or phenomenologist.” Hacking (2002: 1-5) argues for “historical ontology.” It does not refer to the late 20th Century, post-Cold War era, as if postmodernism is a period of time rather than a philosophy. Many military affairs authors do so. Modernism is logocentrism, positivism, historicism, scientism, and similar descriptives that are often associated with the 19th and 20th Centuries. Most of all, modernism is a characteristic of mature bureaucracies and the pragmatics of science as described by Foucault, Kuhn, Lyotard, and Latour.

“Hellenism” refers to the writings and other accounts of classical Greco-Roman philosophy. Although Foucault cites many authors of that era when writing about ethics and the subject, such as Plutarch, Seneca, and Aurelius, priority is given to the writings of Epictetus and Epicurus. They are prime representatives for two major philosophic schools, Stoicism and Epicureanism that are of interest to Foucault in Hermeneutics and the “Practices and Sciences of the Self.” Epictetus has been praised “for the consistency and power of his ethical thought” (Graver, 2009) and Epicurus, similarly, for developing a “complete and interdependent system” (Konstan, 2009). The difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ethics of the public life, however, helps clarify the meaning of ethos and telos.

Free will is addressed within the framework of deliberation and volition as summarized in the work of Frankfurt (1971). He provides a comprehensive terminology and analysis derived from an extensive review of the major works of Western philosophy. Frankfurt distinguishes between first order and second order “wants,” “deliberation,” and “volition.” He defines a “want” as a desire or immediate impulse that has not been given much, if any, thought. “Deliberation” is a period of thought during which the individual weighs the pros and cons of satisfying the impulse. Basic “volition” is stimulus-response
behaviour to satisfy a want while “second order volition” is a conscious choice to act after a period of deliberation.

In Foucault’s theory, there is a distinction to be made among ethics, ethics of the self, and ethos. Here, “ethics” refers to individual behaviour that is judged according to the moral code of an individual or group. The “ethics of the self” are the categories within which an individual’s ethical development proceeds. “Ethos” is group behaviour, or culture, within an institution, a state, or other organization. Individual ethics, therefore, is shaped within the framework of the ethics of the self in the context of a larger societal ethos.

Foucault (1984: 352) made it clear that his concept of the ethics of the self and power-knowledge is not a discrete and linear form of cause and effect. Like power-knowledge, it is a web of interconnections, coincidences, and dead ends. Notwithstanding this fluidity, it is necessary to stabilize the discussion so it can be treated in a sequential logic expected in a book.

In “The Self,” Foucault (1984) describes how the ethics of the self fits into his life’s work, as illustrated in Figure 1.

*Figure 1. Foucault’s Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge*

```
Foucault’s Method

knowledge (archaeology)                         moral domain                         power (genealogy)

moral codes                                        ethics of the self                       actual behaviour

ethical substance                              mode of subjection                      self-forming activity

                   telos
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Note: Adapted from Davidson, (1986: 229). The first level has been added here based on the overview provided by Foucault (1984). “Power” and “knowledge” are separated to facilitate the analysis of an otherwise indivisible term.

Foucault said that the moral domain is the third of three elements of critique, along with those of knowledge, (truth or archaeology), and power, (genealogy). The moral domain is then sub-divided into moral codes, actual behaviour, and the ethics of the self. “Moral codes,” as the phrase is commonly used, identify behaviour that is either forbidden or encouraged. Moral codes include a range of prescriptives found in anything from sacred scripture, to unconscious cultural assumptions, to incentives to conform within group dynamics. Although some codes may not change for centuries, such as the Ten Commandments, their interpretation and observance does. Foucault speaks of “actual behaviour” as acts that individuals can judge to be morally good or bad. The ethics of the self are then divided into a set of four categories describing the factors that form the subject’s self or moral identity, namely: ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming activity, and telos. “Ethical substance” is defined as a primary concern, desire, or emotion related to morality that is dominant at a particular time and place. It is usually shared by the majority of persons in the same community as basic cultural assumptions and can be very slow to change, sometimes taking centuries for a major shift. The “mode of subjection” is a set of directions, explicit and implicit, that guide the formation of the ethical subject. It is somewhat like a do-it-yourself manual on how to live according to the ethical substance. “Self-forming activity” refers to the exercises, training, acculturation, behaviour, and feedback by which people form their ethical selves. The subject actively participates, depending on one’s perception of free will, as an automaton, a free mind and body, or anything in between. The fourth aspect, “telos,” is the behavioural end product resulting from self-forming activity and other variables, including the material environment and random events. Whether telos is the fulfillment of a determinist mode of subjection and self-forming activity, or the result of an individual’s free will, is key to the question posed in this book. In either case, telos is closely tied to ethical substance. It is where the ethical substance is visible in subjects and society.
The power-knowledge side of the analysis will use the terminology from a textbook introducing students to Foucault written by Kendall and Wickham (1999: 34-56). To achieve consistency, they selected and synthesized their terms from among the many variations employed by Foucault’s over the course of his life. Kendall and Wickham (1999: 34-49) see “discourse” as a system of concepts and rules outlining what has been accumulated and what can be added to a corpus of knowledge and practice. A discourse can build around a profession like medicine or historical norms and precedence like international law. Discourses can cluster together to form larger discourses such as modernism and ethics. For example, an addition to the existing discourse of medical practice, such as neurology, is introduced according the rules of medical science and bureaucracy and is perceived as modern progress. A new type of war crime is added to international law according to changes in the discourses of technology, tactics, or politics, and is considered as a significant step forward in the discourse of civilized armed conflict.

“Knowledge” can be thought of as a sub-set of discourse where the connection between concepts and actions are much closer and more detailed. Whereas the discourse of medicine can produce a new field of practice, such as neurology, the knowledge of neurology would consist of research, peer reviewed reports, clinical trials, physician experience and skill, funding, hospital space, patients, and so forth. The term “power,” in Foucault’s theory, is knowledge interacting with visible activities and objects. Deleuze suggested that the term could be replaced with any number of words indicating power, such as “to incite, to induce, to seduce, to make easy of difficult, to enlarge or limit, to make more or less probable, and so on” (Deleuze, 1986: 70; Kendall, Wickham, 1999: 50). Hence, power-knowledge is the daily transactions through which the ethical subject is formed. Power-knowledge is like an infrastructure available for the exercise of and resistance to authority, the organization of people and events, and other types of interaction. Rather than being a force wielded by those in authority, power is available to anyone at any level in, or out of, a hierarchy for any number of ends.
1.2 **Methodology**

As already mentioned, the methodology combines the theories of power-knowledge and ethics. To facilitate a sequential argument, their elements are re-arranged and paired to link the two theories, as illustrated at *Figure 2*. The areas with the best potential for new insights and further development are highlighted in bold print and with background fill.

*Figure 2. Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge Schema.*

![Figure 2](image)

Note: terms for the ethics of the self are italicized.

Each pairing is discussed in its own chapter. For now, it is enough to say that the ethical substance identified for Foucault and for the Canadian military is considered a discourse; the mode of subjection is the moral code and knowledges used to facilitate ethical development; self-forming activity takes place at sites of power-knowledge; and the *telos* is the ethical person or societal ethos, whether or not it fulfills the moral code. “Actual behaviour” and “free will” have been added to emphasize their standing as a crucial part of the argument. Foucault placed actual behaviour at the same level as moral codes and the ethics of the self (see *Figure 1*). Although this might be acceptable as a static hierarchy of concepts, it is not well placed for use as an analytic methodology. Instead, self-forming activity can be treated as behaviour from two points of view. Firstly, it is activity in response to the ethical substance and
mode of subjection. Secondly, it is activity that defines the *telos*. It is the same behaviour, but examined from different perspectives. Whether it is deemed to be mediated by free will is important to the discussion of Foucault’s and the military’s ethics and ethos. Because it is the same activity, nevertheless, behaviour is addressed in the same chapter as self-forming activity. Free will, meanwhile, has its own chapter.

The analysis can also be viewed as a cycle, as drawn in *Figure 3*. The arc highlights the area most vulnerable to empirical research.

*Figure 3. Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge Cycle of Analysis*

The sequence of the argument does not follow what one would expect with Foucault’s method. He would begin with a genealogy researching societal and bureaucratic transactions, then progress to discourse and a study of the subject. The author of this book did begin field research as would Foucault with a genealogy of power-knowledge and an exploration of military executives and rank and file.
members as subjects. While writing, however, it was found that the argument could best be presented in the sequence described above.

The book will on occasion use or refer to modernist social science research methods, such as survey questionnaires despite many potential problems with their technique and institutional context. That will be discussed in more detail below. Certainly, there is much to be gained if they are used as indicators of areas of interest and means of further questioning. They will not be taken as science or as a sole means of making critiquing policy. Most of all, there is little reason to expect that they can address complex and introspective questions that involve ethics and power-knowledge.

Each chapter ends with a selection of texts from the mainstream media in Canada. They are selected and edited quotes pertaining to the military case study that are directly related to the research and ideas contained in the chapter. Some excerpts are presented as ethnographic material of social or cultural phenomena but without further categorization or analysis. Others provide a record of events related to persons, scandals, and political and legal disputes. The texts are not intended to be a representative, weighted sampling of media events.

1.3 The Current State of Research

1.3.1 Foucault and Ethics

The literature review for Foucault will refer to authors whose works have appeared in the major anthologies edited by Gordon (1980); Hoy (1986a); Gane (1986a); and Ingram (2002a). Two journal articles, Cooper and Burrell (1988) and Burrell (1988) were also chosen because they applied Foucault’s theories to large bureaucracies. One other anthology was consulted, but not used as a reference, i.e., Crotchety and Schroeder (1998). It did not contain pertinent material that differed substantially from the other sources. Up to his death, some authors apparently remained unaware of Foucault’s strong interest in ethics, although he believed it had always been evident in his work. As late as 1980, for example, Gordon (1980) edited a collection of Foucault’s output from 1972 to 1977 that does not deal with ethics. Even the final two interviews on sexuality, the topic that is generally credited as inspiring Foucault’s view on
ethics, are limited to a discussion on power-knowledge. Later, when it became clear that ethics was Foucault’s primary interest, authors were mostly concerned with reconciling ethics with power-knowledge, as mentioned earlier.

Foucault scholarship on ethics is long on theory and short on empirical examples. Young (1995), for instance, examines how various physical and social events coalesced to create the discourse and power-knowledge of combat related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Although this is an important topic for contemporary Western militaries, Young does not directly address ethics. Similarly, none of the case studies available in Kendall and Wickham’s primer overtly incorporate ethics as a factor (Kendall, Wickham, 1999). Otherwise, the assumption that Foucault had not completely developed his ideas has perhaps encouraged authors to dispute and extend what exists, rather than apply what is available. In the anthology edited by Hoy, (1986a), chapters by Hoy (1986c), Smart (1986), Davidson (1986), and Hacking (1986) examine the central issues in Hermeneutics. On the topic of the self as ethical subject, Hoy (1986b: 14-20) discusses Foucault’s preoccupations with the malleability of thought and behaviour, Hellenist and Kantian precedents, and the role of moral codes related to ethics. In the introduction, Hoy includes a concise outline of Foucault’s three phases of methodological development that describes the shift from prescriptive content and behaviour to the formation of the person as an ethical subject apart from any moral goal (Hoy, 1986b). In his opinion, the discipline of power-knowledge leaves little room for discretionary ethical behaviour. Smart (1986) explores the implications of the self as an ethical subject when active in, or resisting contact with, forms of governance. He speculates whether Foucault himself sought to behave according to a self-defined ethical code and telos and was his methodology open to critique because it was encased in yet another discourse. Hacking (1986b) adds to the debate of whether Foucault succeeded in remaining detached so he could critique with the objectivity he sought and contributed anything substantially new in the Western philosophic tradition. For Davidson (1986: 232), it is the mode and means of shaping oneself as a moral subject that is the most important factor in Foucault’s theory. Since archaeology and genealogy are used in the analysis of the ethics of the self, Davidson believes the three are fully compatible and do not represent a change in direction. In his
opinion, the purported shift in Foucault’s thoughts from determinism to freedom is not an issue. If the
discussion of ethics is properly subordinated to power-knowledge, Davidson (1986: 232) believes a
wealth of insights await.

In another anthology published in the same year, edited by Gane (1986a), the authors argue that
Foucault’s work does not add anything new to the Western tradition. The authors are skeptical that his
theory of power-knowledge is compatible with the human agency necessary for ethics and political
activism. In his introduction, Gane writes that Foucault left it to others to develop a sustainable strategy
for governance (Gane, 1986b). Donelly (1986) argues that Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy do not
deriff in a fundamental way from conventional historical research. He questions the relevance of
Foucault’s thoughts on societal discipline outside closed institutions and special sub-groups. Dews
(1986), meanwhile, interprets Foucault’s reasoning as if it is a linear and modern approach still based on
cause and effect. His assessment, however, makes no mention that Foucault’s genealogies look for
multiple interactions and random events. Dews (1986: 101) believes that power-knowledge negates any
potential for a politics of resistance and leaves governance in a condition of authoritarianism. Minson
(1986) is even more pessimistic. He argues that Foucault’s theories lack originality and offer little
explanatory potential. Foucault’s methods fail, according to Minson (1986: 122), because they are just
another discourse attempting to critique discourse. He also concludes that Foucault has conceptualized
power as a universal and totalizing force. Wickham (1986: 152-153) refers to power as being visible only
at specific sites through the intersection of specific policies, meetings, regulations, organization charts,
etcetera. Activism and resistance consists of using the same instruments to mediate the outcomes or
achieve alternative results. Contrary to Gane’s comment in his introduction that ethics was one of the
three most important themes in Foucault’s discourse (Gane, 1986b: 6, 7), none of the authors see it as
much of a factor. Since they cannot reconcile Foucault’s ideas of power-knowledge with their versions of
activism and governance, it is not surprising that they viewed Foucault’s ethics as a marginal concern.

Bureaucracy is treated as a major site for the interactions of power-knowledge and one of the
determining factors in the formation of the military ethical subject. Cooper and Burrell (1988: 110) argue
that tension in the “modernist-postmodernist debate” is important for the “reinvigoration of the analysis of
social systems in general and organizations in particular.” Cooper and Burrell see postmodern analysis of
bureaucracy as a study of the instabilities and uncertainties behind what many take to be monolithic
institution. They view modern bureaucracy as a vehicle for an orderly and disciplined discourse able to
downplay exceptions to the rule. For Burrell (1988), Foucault’s life’s work is again divided into three
little Foucault wrote on ethics, the open-ended nature of the debate, and the difference in approach to that
taken in the Anglo-West, he returns to the discussion of archaeology and genealogy.

The authors in the anthology edited by Ingram (2002a) are more confident of Foucault’s
contribution to philosophy. In the introduction, Ingram (2002b: 29) credits power-knowledge as being
able to criticize both social contractarianism and functionalist statism. Ingram characterizes the Anglo-
Western tradition as empirical, rational, utilitarian, and social contractarian. It is heir to Hobbes, Locke,
Mill, Dewey, and Rorty and shares their concerns about freedom of conscience, speech, and association.
The tension in Anglo-West thought between individual ethical behaviour and a more pervasive social
ethos gives rise to issues of civic activism and a trade off between self-interest and submission to the
state. The continental tradition, according to Ingram, is influenced by Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and
Nietzsche. Ingram (2002: 9) notes how the continental method matured as a “deep reflection” that
questions concepts through a top-down search for supporting ideas. Ingram (2002: 30) describes
Foucault’s power-knowledge as being neither bottom-up nor top-down. Instead, it is a series of
impersonal interactions in every dimension. The deep reflection of continental philosophy is but one part
of genealogy. Ingram (2002) states that the continental tradition’s unrelentingly skeptical attitude is not
shared by Anglo-Western thinkers who focus on reproducing practical models for a society supporting
rights or utilitarian pursuit of the greatest good.

Recognizing the influence Kant had on Foucault on the matter of ethics and free will, Ingram
(2002) pays special attention to Kant’s attempt to reconcile rational individualism with the social forces
shaping the moral subject. For Kant, reason served the dual purpose of enabling us to see cause and effect
that can lead to the free will needed to break the chain of action and response. The reactions that we do not see fall outside our understanding and, whether they are important or not, become irrelevant. Kant’s recognition of unknown variables related to an event resembles that of Foucault. Ingram (2002: 30) explains that he chose Foucault’s essay “What is Critique?”, a response to Kant’s essay, “What is Enlightenment?”, because it exemplifies the space allowed for human agency within the confines of determinist interactions. The companion piece by Butler (2002), entitled “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” she links the ethics of the self and the emancipatory potential of political activism. Butler argues that Foucault’s discovery of ethics incorporates enough of Kant’s hope for enlightenment that the word virtue becomes appropriate.

1.3.2 The Military and Ethics

This section surveys the relationship between postmodernism and military social science. The relationship is then examined in the context of two of the more prominent organizations dealing with Anglo-Western military affairs: the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society for the U.S. and Canada, and the Royal Military College of Science in the UK. Both sponsor the publication of scholarly journals, host international conferences, and have an extensive relationship with military institutions. The chapter ends with a review of writing on military ethics that make no mention of postmodernism.

Postmodernism and Military Social Science

After the Cold War, military social scientists in the Anglo-West debated the usefulness of postmodernism as an analytic method. Two schools of thought emerged. The first is interested in sociological and political trends in military institutions and their host societies as if a postmodern age is synonymous with a post-Cold War era. This school includes Battistelli (1997); Moskos and Burk (1998); Dandeker (2000); Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000); Pinch (2000); Williams (2002); Gibson (2004), and Segal and Enders (2008a). They focus on changes in geopolitical strategies, the nature of expeditions,
military professionalism, public attitudes, mainstream media, conscientious objection, sexual orientation, and the roles of women, spouses, and civilian employees. They tend to downplay the potential of postmodernism as an analytic method and sometimes treat it as a curiosity. Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal (2001), for example, are amused by Baudrillard’s approach to simulacra and war in the media. Gibson (2004), meanwhile, briefly acknowledges that postmodernism is a form of post-positivist thinking, but then writes about social trends and intelligence gathering methods in the post-Cold War years. The second and much less prominent school advocates the use of postmodern critique to study cultural assumptions, behaviour patterns, and institutional characteristics. This school includes the work of Foster (2004), Morgan (2003), Coker (1998), Phillips (1999), and Ridderhof (2002). Foster (2004) recommends that the military develop a postmodern ethos in order to question authority and act autonomously, not rely. A postmodern culture would also prepare individuals for the compression of time and space in terms of media, tactics, and governance (Foster, 2004: 93-94). Morgan (2003) describes the psychological effects that postmodern thought can have on individual soldiers and potential recruits. Coker (1998) raises the same issue of cynicism and disillusionment, but is more concerned with the idea of poetic irony post-Cold War. While interesting to read, his work does not add anything new about postmodernism and the military. Phillips (1999) recommends using postmodern analysis of cultural constructs as a new way of reviewing military leadership doctrine. Ridderhof (2002) would like to see Derrida’s textual deconstruction techniques applied to military documents and manuals as a means of uncovering cultural assumptions. Phillips and Ridderhof, however, do not demonstrate how their ideas would work and what they might find.

Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal (2001), meanwhile, argue against both schools. They believe that the first overstates the effect of post-Cold War sociological trends and maintain that Western militaries are still quintessentially modern. If the concept of postmodernism is to be useful, they argue, it should be approached as a methodology. Although the authors advise keeping an open mind, they nevertheless misinterpret postmodern analysis and conclude that it is of little value. Their reasoning is further

Bondy
discussed immediately below. In the end, they opt for modern social science applied to a modern post-Cold War period.

There is a reason why so many researchers in military affairs have such difficulty with postmodernism. They are working with significant misunderstandings and fear. Moskos and Burk (1998: 166), for example, simply state that postmodern nihilism is a place where they simply “prefer not to go.” Williams (2002: 273) warns that military commanders “would make a grave error if they became postmodern in the sense of rejecting empirical experience.” Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal (2001: 466) are worried by the proposition that postmodernism is “relativism that sees all knowledge as conditional and without foundation…” and that it “embraces ‘indeterminacy rather than determinism, diversity rather than unity, difference rather than synthesis, complexity rather than simplification.’” It may be that their study of postmodern philosophy has been cursory and limited to literature aimed at social scientists. Booth et al (2001: 466), for instance, took their quote from Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions (Rosenau, 1992). Rosenau (1992: 110) also writes that postmodernists “doubt that a conception of reality need exist at all.” She blames the postmodern belief that “you can say anything you want” as a cause of peace protests, environmentalism, feminism, anarchy, animal rights, gay and lesbian orientations, and the popularity of psychokinesis (Rosenau, 1992: 137: 144-155). She goes on to disparage postmodernism as nothing more than an act of desperation and resentment by unemployed academics, adolescent rebels, immature students, and anti-establishment individuals deprived of power (Rosenau, 1992: 11). An essay by Murphy (1988), “The Relevance of Postmodernism for Social Science,” offers an explanation for the disquiet shown by Rosenau and the military social scientists. Murphy (1988: 93-94) writes that “postmodernism appears to the uninitiated as an attempt to subvert rational discussion,” which “causes many problems for traditional sociology, due to the challenge that is posed to some of its most hallowed precepts.” Modernist social science, Murphy continues, assumes that a legitimate claim to truth and order will save society from anarchy, something that is obviously of the utmost importance to the military and the state. While this resistance has been lessening in mainstream academia, it remains strong in the military affairs community.
The Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society

The dominance of the modernist discourse in Anglo-Western military affairs is reinforced by two prominent institutions: The Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS AF&S), based in the U.S., and the Royal Military College of Science in the UK. The latter is discussed in the next subsection. The IUS AF&S is described as “the major inter-disciplinary and international learned society in the field, with over six hundred members in more than twenty countries” (AF&S, 2008a: 5). Academics not allied with the military, especially those using postmodern methods, have been reluctant to participate in such organizations because of ethical reservations about war being treated as a scholarly discipline and the perception that military bureaucracy stifles innovative thought (Burk, 2002; Ouellet, 2004; McFate, 2005; AF&S, 2008a: 9). Thus, the IUS AF&S consists in the main of specialized academics and uniformed personnel, many funded or paid by militaries and defence departments. Military members tend to work on leadership and culture, or in related fields like social work and personnel administration. The IUS AF&S is clear about its intent to serve the needs of the state. David R. Segal, the “IUS Immediate Past President” in 2003, for example, received the U.S. Department of the Army Medal for Outstanding Civilian Service in 1989 and 2000; was Special Assistant for Peace Operations to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1994 to 1996; and served two terms on the Board of Visitors of the U.S. Army War College (U. of M., 2005). When the U.S. military occupied Afghanistan, Segal argued that military sociologists should forego further discussion of postmodernism and return to traditional service to the state (Segal, 2002).

There are long-standing and close ties between the IUS AF&S and the military in the U.S. and Canada. A member of the IUS AF&S Canadian Chapter Board of Directors, Franklin C. Pinch, is a frequent contributor to military sociology within the public and private sector (Moskos, Williams, Segal, 2000: xvi). While a colonel in the Canadian Forces, Pinch was the Personnel Selection Officer Branch Advisor and senior ranking executive for uniformed social scientists. Later, he taught at the Royal Military College and worked at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. The mission of the Institute is
“to generate and disseminate leadership and professionalism research, concept development and doctrine to support the Canadian Forces in generating effective military leaders” (CFLI, 2008). His successor and President of IUS AF&S Canada from 2003 to 2010, Allan Okros, followed the same career path. While at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Okros and Pinch were on the writing board for the official Canadian Forces ethos manual entitled *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (CFLI, 2003). That publication will be discussed later as the seminal text on the Canadian military moral code. As of 2010, Okros is an Associate Professor at the Royal Military College, deputy head of the military leadership institute, and executive director of the Centre for Security, Armed Forces, and Society (GoC, 2010a).

Two essays related to the IUS AF&S, U.S., and Canadian chapters further describe the relationship between social scientists and the military. “Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology,” was published by Siebold (2001), a founding member of the IUS AF&S, while working at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Ouellet (2004) authored “A New Paradigm in Military Sociology?” for the IUS AF&S conference, Canada Region that was held in Toronto, October 1-3, 2004. At the time, Ouellet was Conference Director, member of the Conference Program Committee, and a professor and Director of Academics at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. As of 2010, he is a member of the international Board of the IUS AF&S. Siebold argues for a military sociology that is focused on, and wholly subordinate to the interests of the state. He recommends that research concentrate on a limited number of core issues and theories to support the military’s mission of taking “raw ‘materials,’ such as recruits, weapons systems, and doctrine and work with them to produce capable combat units (land, sea, and aerospace) ready to engage the enemy on the battlefield (or carry out alternate military missions)” (Siebold, 2001: 140, 150). This is nearly identical to the mission statement found in the capstone field manual for U.S. Army professionalism (FM 1, 2005). At the same time, Siebold suggests there is a need to incorporate alternative viewpoints into military sociology from other fields, such as political science. The military should also adapt to the culture of its host society, in his view, to increase its power and prestige and showcase its unique culture and ethos. If military sociology
does not choose core issues, it risks becoming disunited, less productive, “fractionalized like wide areas of sociology,” and as a result, it might “like an old soldier, just fade away.” (Siebold, 2001: 155). While Ouellet (2004: 7) also believes that military sociology should incorporate alternative points of view, he questions whether an over-emphasis on service to the state has strayed from the organization’s original aims. He cites Janowitz, one of the organization’s founders, who believed that such service must be balanced by efforts to preserve independence and objectivity. That is difficult, Ouellet writes, because the military chooses the research topics it will fund, controls access to data, and expects results with immediate utility. Consequently, researchers would appear to be co-opted by the military (Ouellet, 2004: 8). As a remedy, Ouellet recommends that epistemological and ontological methodologies be broadened and shifted closer to those of non-military, mainstream sociology. He begins by advocating a shift toward postmodern methods, but loses heart along the way. Ouellet would like researchers to revisit ideas of self-identity and concepts of “patriotism, courage, gallantry, liberation, and oppression,” but without undermining the legitimacy of these moral codes (Ouellet, 2004: 15-17). He asks that one not “construe” his recommendations “as an attempt to do a true Kuhnian… revolution by replacing one paradigm by another” Ouellet (2004: 27).

A volume of *Armed Forces & Society*, the official journal of the IUS AF&S, was devoted to the teaching of sociology in military academies and officer training programs across the West and in some peripheral states such as Japan, Turkey, and South Africa (AF&S, 2008b). The project was supported in part by the U.S. Army Research Institute (AF&S, 2008a: 3). As an a further indicator of their influence on the discipline, David R. Segal, along with Morton G. Ender, is a guest editor and the entry from Canada is co-authored by Pinch and Ouellet. In their introduction, Segal and Ender give credit to a few charismatic figures for the spread of sociology in military academies. It began with Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos and was passed on through a cadre of their students: James Burk, David R. Segal, and Mady Segal. “Most sociologists at the academies,” they write, are their “direct scholarly descendants,” including twenty of the thirty-six sociologists at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (AF&S, 2008: 10). Pinch is the charismatic figure named for Canada (AF&S, 2008: 10).
The Royal Military College of Science of the UK, a part of Cranfield University, hosted a conference entitled “Post-Modern Military: Rethinking the Future,” on April 24-25, 2003 (Cranfield, 2003). It was to pursue the themes of postmodernism raised in the anthology authored by IUS AF&S senior members Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000). Only one panel session, however, used postmodern analysis. Kennedy-Pipe (Cranfield, 2003) warned that an attempt to isolate the military from postmodern skepticism risked attracting and retaining undoubting authoritarians. Kennedy-Pipe cites the example of the U.S. military, which is being increasingly dominated by religious fundamentalists and incremental utilitarianism. Welch (Cranfield, 2003) describes how military culture could be analyzed by postmodern theories on domination, self-constructed identities, and humanitarian aid as a new imperialism. Research on recruiting, Welch believed, would reveal that the process would favour persons who are authoritarian and conformist. The keynote speakers, meanwhile, either ignored postmodernism, despite the stated theme of the conference, or dismissed it as an irrelevant and harmful distraction. The U.S. and UK were in the process of occupying Iraq as the conference began. As did Segal early in 2002 in response to Afghanistan, they too had a change of mind. In their opinion, postmodernism had outlived its purpose and it was now time to act in solidarity with the military. These speakers included Chris Bellamy, Christopher Dandeker, John Allen Williams, Gwyn Prins, and Ian Andrews, who was then Under-secretary for the Ministry of Defence, UK (Cranfield, 2003) while Dandeker and Williams were senior members of the IUS AF&S. Keynote speakers were applauded when they praised and expressed gratitude to troops.
Chapter 2 – Moral Development and Military Expeditions: Ethical Substance and Discourse

2.1 Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus

Foucault’s theories of power-knowledge and the ethics of the self can be discussed as discourse and the expression of an ethical substance in their own right. To begin with, there is much in his theories that is consonant with traditional Western philosophy. Foucault develops his theories on ethics by reference to those of Kant and the Hellenists. It is often acknowledged that Kant established the parameters for the discourse on ethics that has framed the discussion in West. He helped establish what Foucault would call the ethical substance, the knowledge, and a moral code for Enlightenment and modern moral philosophy. For Gordon (1980: 235-236, 248), Foucault’s philosophy is grounded in Kant’s idealism where a skeptical approach to power can help society progress in terms of productivity and governance. Hacking remarks that Foucault was “a remarkably able Kantian,” and finds that the two believe that individuals participate in the formation of their ethical selves, whether the work is done internally or imposed by society (Hacking, 1986: 238-239). Guyer and Wood (Kant, 1998: 22-23), in their introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, repeat the same sentiment by stating that Kant’s discussion of moral law and individual ethics, whatever its merits, has shaped the debate such that modern moral philosophers are all “children of Kant.” Modern philosophers, moreover, must accept or at least debate Kant’s contention that free will is a necessary condition for individual ethics (Kant, 1998: 116; Kant, 1983a). On this matter, Foucault is no exception. Foucault and Kant, however, part company on the matter of ethical legitimization. In the “Third Antinomy,” Kant (1998: 484-489) reasons that freedom of the will requires an originary, or first, cause. Otherwise, all is a perpetual chain reaction of cause and effect. The absence of a metaphysical origin is one of Foucault’s core tenets. They also diverge regarding the relationship of absolute power and the state and its implications for personal ethical behaviour. In “What is Enlightenment?” (1983b: 42-43), Kant endorses state authority when he writes that it is a
soldier’s and a citizen’s absolute duty to obey the state. While Kant allows scholars and theologians unlimited freedom to dissent, he argues that periods of popular “freedom to comment” must be brief (Kant, 1983b: 44). Rulers can accept some dissent but only as long as they have a “well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee peace…” (Kant, 1983b: 45). Foucault, meanwhile, argues that personal engagement is an urgent necessity in contemporary politics (Foucault, 2005: 251-252).

In *Hermeneutics* and “Practices and Sciences of the Self,” Foucault searches for continuities and breaks between the modern era and the Hellenists. Firstly, by an ethics of the self, Foucault did not mean a narcissistic fascination as in the “Californian cult of the self” (Foucault, 1984: 362). Instead, his concept is modeled on the often austere practices of the Hellenists. Foucault repeats their advice: “You must attend to yourself, you must not forget yourself, you must take care of yourself” (Foucault, 2005: 10-11). While physical care is included, it is quite subordinate to caring for the formation of the ethical self. It is an attitude towards oneself and others that regards humans as subjects. It is a series of actions that “changes, purifies, transforms, and transfigures” (Foucault, 2005: 10-11).

Foucault is specific about the sources of his written and spoken discourse and why it is important for a contemporary ethics. He said that the Stoics and Epicureans distinguished between two forms of knowing (Foucault, 2005: 237-238). The first, sophism, is the knowledge of things that do not change the self into an ethical being. The second, philosophic knowledge does help form an ethical being. To explain, Foucault distinguishes between false rhetoric and true rhetoric. Rhetoric is analogous to discourse in Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge. Both false and true rhetoric, as with discourse, employ rules, choose words, guide what can and cannot be said, and take into account how it will affect people (Foucault, 2005: 368). False rhetoric, as practiced by sophists, is discourse that is learned and rephrased but never questioned in depth. Since there is little self-examination and moral development, it does not help form an ethical individual. True rhetoric, as sought by philosophers, is a discourse based on a skeptical attitude toward the source of one’s morals. This self-questioning can lead to ethical behaviour. While teachers can impart either false or true rhetoric, philosophers do not assume to be the arbiter of either. It is expected that individuals will learn how to find true rhetoric and discourse by practicing
philosophy on their own. This free thinking, or individual deliberation, can be both process and content for Foucault’s ethics of the self. It is the ethical substance and discourse behind his vision of ethics. How this freedom might be achieved and whether it is attainable is discussed in the following chapters.

Of course, discussions of truth have not been left in such a simple and clear state. In the concluding remarks to the *Hermeneutics*’ lectures, Foucault refers to the conundrum where a subject attempts to find true discourse while being formed by other discourses. All he can say is that the philosophic, ethical person should avoid being a captive product of a claim to truth (Foucault, 2005: 243). Foucault then goes so far as to call this struggle “the root of the challenge of Western thought to philosophy” (Foucault, 2005: 487). He continues by referring to phenomenology, the issues of perception and knowing that underpin the self’s captivity or freedom, as the “summit” of Western philosophy (Foucault, 2005: 487). Phenomenology, in Foucault’s argument, is an attempt to understand the desire for certainty and maintain a skeptical attitude so the mind remains open to further information. As so expressed, it is the ideal of the scientific method and the spirit of the Enlightenment. Foucault, then, is indeed an heir of Kant. It can be said that Foucault’s discourse of process is inspired by the Hellenists but its philosophic problems are ultimately a legacy from the Enlightenment.

Unlike most people, it could be that Foucault was able to bring the bulk of his fundamental concerns regarding ethics to the surface. In *Hermeneutics*, he constructs a discourse from Hellenism, consistent with the heritage of Kant that is based on the human as subject, the nature of truth, and how it is to be known. As ethical substance, those are the issues he attempts to solve through the three main aspects of his work, i.e., how the human subject can face power-knowledge to live ethically. Of course, there remains a portion of his discourse and ethical substance not well discussed because his theories of power-knowledge and ethics were left in an inconclusive state. For instance, he addresses the problem of finding true rhetoric while thinking within a potentially false rhetoric with an admonishment not to allow that to happen. The latent content of his discourse should emerge as his unresolved “preoccupations” are investigated in the chapters to come.
2.2 Modern Statism and Bureaucracy

The discourse of military culture in the West is derived from modern statism and bureaucracy. “Statism” will be defined as the authority and self-reproduction of government bureaucracy, the legitimization of governance, and space-time relationships between territory and national values. Foucault (2002a: 195-196) defined statism as a combination of positivist science and the state’s domestic and international politics. In this context, consider that Ingram (2002b: 29) believes Foucault’s political philosophy is a critique of statism, broadly interpreted as social contractarianism in cooperation with and in service to the state. Foucault expressed his dislike of a statism that is used to legitimize moral sovereignty and place limits on dissent (Foucault, 1984: 382). Foucault speaks about state and international politics and how it figures into the formation of an ethical subject in “Society Must Be Defended” Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976 (Foucault, 2003). Historical narratives and other means of establishing a state identity emerge to consolidate or contest the outcome. The narratives, he says, are “a sort of discursive weapon that could be used by all the adversaries present within the political field” and as “a discursive tactic” that “eventually becomes the law governing the formation of a knowledge” (Foucault, 2003: 189). Historical narratives identify how a nation and supra-state or sub-state groups are “bound together by customs, interests, and laws” (Foucault, 2003: 167). They are simplifications of complex events where chronologies have often been revised and events selected and discarded to fit the political purpose. Since war is the point of origin and true source of legitimacy for state power and state policy, Foucault contends, whether foreign or domestic (Foucault, 2003: 14-15). He said that the attempt to establish truth and good in matters of war and peace based on the legitimacy of the state gave way in the modern era to emotional appeals for brutality and cynicism based on historical narratives (Foucault, 2003: 55). That gives rise to a one sided and optimistic insistence on victory or fear and despair at the prospect of defeat. There is no moral equivalency and no compromise, moreover, because believers see their narrative as unique and inherently just (Foucault, 2003: 56). Discursive warfare leads to a “with us” or “against us” belligerence, and a belief that the adversary is wrong and deluded (Foucault, 2003: 52-53). Because they are so essential for a group, there is an urgent need to
promote and protect their claims. Consequently, Foucault (2003: 54-55) that historical narratives are fragile and easily questioned. Thus, it is a discourse for the sophist to learn or for the philosopher to critique.

Statism, so conceived, incorporates the familiar discourse of the “Us/Other” binary and the associated contradictions in space and time. The analysis by Walker (1993) is particularly germane to the discourse underlying military culture and expeditions. Walker explores the coincidence of the development of Western states and geopolitical conflict. He also addresses the narratives used to legitimize inter-state war and the exploitation of foreign peoples and regions. In this sense, space refers to being inside or outside state territory and time is viewed as a historical chronology both within and outside the frontier. The Western state is comes to be accepted as a site of universal and timelessly desirable characteristics, such as good governance and technological progress. Foreign peoples and regions are compared to bygone eras in Western history, such as the middle and feudal ages. In their space and time, governance and progress are considered underdeveloped and even backward. Hence, Walker writes of “a spatial dualism of life inside and outside the state” (Walker, 1993: 61). The legitimacy of the Western state is enhanced when its superiority is proven to and defended from the inferior (Walker, 1993: 62, 66-67). This can be accomplished by imposing the Western way of life on the outsiders by military combat and/or humanitarian interventions. Non-state actors are even more threatening to Western states because they operate in an unfamiliar space and time. A strong conviction in the superiority of homeland and the duty to modernize the “Other” harden the resolve necessary to launch expeditions (Walker, 1993: 54-55, 59-60). Indeed, Walker (1993: 182) concludes that military expeditions, more than any other act of state, is the clearest and most emphatic expression of the statist discourse. To facilitate these costly and potentially unpopular undertakings, narratives are further simplified and dramatized. Reductionism and repetition becomes crucial to avoid what those favouring intervention refer to as “analysis paralysis” (Walker 1993: 91). Walker writes that “time can be turned into space, history turned into structure, pluralism turned into the hope for universalism,” so that “[a]mbivalence is cancelled” (Walker, 1993: 120). With non-state and supra-state actors in mind,
Lipschutz makes the same observation. She argues that post-Cold War events and attitudes have made statism a discourse “requiring constant reiteration and reification in mantra-like fashion” in response to the “internal dynamics of state disintegration” (Lipschutz, 1995: 18).

The discourse underlying expeditions with both humanitarian and military-statist aims is durable and constantly renewed. Jahn (1999) describes how the modern discourse was developed during the European invasion of the Americas. Legitimacy for the conquest was sought in theology, natural law, and the economics of property. In decades long and well-publicized debates in Spain between Vitoria, Sepúlveda, and Las Casas, the leading intellectuals of Europe settled on a new discourse of international relations that sought to legitimize dual humanitarian and military expeditions. At that time, the superior values were Christian and the humanitarian goal was to save souls. The military-statist goals are obvious. Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke added to it with their discussions of natural law. Locke thereby considers it just and of benefit to all to use force to promote the dual purpose interventions that spread the progressive governance and productive practices of the West. This discourse is still used today to legitimize expeditions and even transgressive military behaviour. Cresswell (2004), in the IUS AF&S journal *Armed Forces & Society*, argues that Locke’s ideas can legitimize the 2003 U.S. led invasion of Iraq. He maintains that Locke’s principles provide a justification for state’s right to set its own standards of international behaviour, including the right to launch a pre-emptive attack another state and force regime change providing there is a chance it can improve the prospects of the region. Locke’s ideas can even support the state’s right to claim immunity for soldiers who transgress treaties and international law, he continues, as long as they are serving their state (Cresswell, 2004: 635). Cook (2000), similarly, believes that the exceptionalist values and moral superiority of the US justify the violation of international law.

The discourse of modern bureaucracy draws the analysis a step closer to the everyday transactions of power-knowledge. Large bureaucracies incorporate some of the assumptions of statism. Progress is assured, according to the discourse, because bureaucracies are thought of as anthropocentric expressions of reason that are fair and productive (Cooper, Burrell, 1988: 103). Bureaucracies, it is thought, efficiently self-organize to achieve goals and solve problems. They are given the ability to
identify and prioritize problems and even to reform itself through incremental improvements. These assumptions persist despite ample proof to the contrary. Large bureaucracies have persistent flaws. They favour information that can be quantified; over-specialize into functional sub-groups; do not reform as quickly as circumstances warrant; and are driven by centralized authority, often detached and slow to react (Burrell, Cooper, 1998: 102-106). Consequently, bureaucracies are usually bound to rephrase and reshuffle existing procedures, policies, and structures, often in an ad hoc and disorganized manner. They tend to institutionalize non-adaptive, short-term reactions and to focus on well established, traditional threats (Cooper, Burrell, 1988: 104-105). Bureaucracies are also expected to legitimize transactions of great personal interest to individuals, such as personnel selection and complaint systems, to be discussed below. Consequently, the intended and unintended consequences for individuals and society are often significant (Burrell and Cooper, 1998: 109).

Large well-resourced bureaucracies are often efficient disseminators of narratives, despite their faults. They are able to simplify and repeat a cluster of events and exploits with consistent interpretations. Since no one person has significant influence on policy, the message remains relatively constant, sometimes changing in reaction to external pressures. Otherwise, its inability to adapt helps preserve traditional narratives regardless of evidence to the contrary.

2.3 Statism and the Canadian Military

The discourses of statism and the attendant bureaucracy are the primary sources of ethical substance for the Canadian Military. The discourse serves as the behavioural context for politicians, military executives, uniformed rank and file, media, and ordinary citizens. It is used as a source of moral and juridical legitimacy by the factions promoting a preferred set of narratives in the competition for control of military policy. In keeping with the scope of the book, the policy options are between humanitarian and combat expeditions after the end of the Cold War.

Humanitarian expeditionary statism in the 1990s is widely associated with the academic and politician Lloyd Axworthy. He was a Liberal Party Member of Parliament who served as the Minister of
Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000 and is usually associated in Canada with diplomatic “soft power” armed interventions in defence of “human security.” The latter term refers to the security of individuals in who are threatened by violence, ill health, famine, forced migration, and like problems. Two articles by prominent Canadian scholars in the International Journal assess Axworthy’s foreign policy goals and outcomes. Hampson and Oliver (1998), in an article entitled “Pulpit Diplomacy,” describe how Axworthy sought to provide international leadership for humanitarian issues such as banning the use of land mines, curbing the arms trade, and ceasing the exploitation of child soldiers. They suggest that his agenda be called the “Axworthy Doctrine” (Hampson, Oliver, 1998: 380). The doctrine, as characterized at the time, acknowledged the new post-Cold War conditions, the erosion of state security in favour of human security, soft power relying on a state’s international popularity, a decline in the use of military force, and increased roles for non-government organizations. To deserve this reputation, however, Hampson and Oliver (1998: 405) conclude that while the “sermon” might sound appealing, the price of implementation must be paid on the “collection plate.” Without increased spending on foreign affairs initiatives and expeditionary infrastructure, they believe it is simply hubris. Jockel and Sokolsky (2000: 1, 7), in “Lloyd Axworthy’s legacy,” cover similar ground and maintain that humanitarian expeditions have long been part of the Western tradition and even have a strong element of Christian missionary zeal. They acknowledge that Axworthy’s legacy rests on the belief that Canada is a peace-loving nation. Jockel and Sokolsky then add a twist. Humanitarian foreign policy actually serves state interests by strengthening the narrative of Canada being a peaceful state. In addition, it helps define Canadian identity because it compared favourably with U.S. aggression. Coming before the attacks on the U.S., September 11, 2001, human security expeditions also helped justify the existence of armed forces for purposes other than national pride and identity. The authors just cited, however, realized that Axworthy’s ideal did not stray far from combat statism. Hampson and Oliver (1998) worry that civil society working under the banner of human security can be perceived as creating a “beachhead” for Western statist hegemony. Jockel and Sokolsky (2000), meanwhile, noted that the decision to intervene in a human security crisis can be highly
discretionary and that expeditions are more likely to be launched according to political opportunism rather than true moral issues.

Combat expeditionary statism became the official foreign policy after the attacks on the U.S. in 2001. A book authored by a group of well-known academics is illustrative of this shift in emphasis (Stairs, Bercusson, Entwhistle, Granatstein, Nossal, and Smith, 2003). It states that Canada foreign policy should have the single aim of serving national interests in the form of international influence, economic and military strength, and the projection of “values” (Stairs et al, 2003: v). The Executive Summary goes further by stating that “the only real imperative in Canadian foreign policy is Canada’s relationship with the U.S. All other Canadian international interests are far behind in importance…” (underlining as in the original document) (Stairs, et al, 2003: viii). Granatstein also wrote two papers for the pro-U.S. C.D. Howe Institute entitled “A Friendly Agreement in Advance, Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Past, Present, and Future,” and “The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada’s National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S.” (Granatstein, 2002 and 2003). Even in the absence of a threat to national security, King argues that more resources should go to the military to avoid the being viewed as a “free-rider” on NATO and the U.S. alliance (King 2002: 10-11). More spending, whatever the amount, would only be political posturing to obtain favourable trade relations with the United States (King, 2002: 8, 9).

The change in policy from human security to combat is visible from official government websites. As recently as 1999, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade website emphasized the value of “soft power” and “human security” based on moral persuasion, individual human rights, combating disease, and alleviating environmental degradation (GoC, 1999). Until October 2001, armed expeditions were mentioned only as an option of last resort. Within a couple of months, the website announced a new “3D strategy” to be applied by “Team Canada,” to improve security for other peoples and lay the foundation for prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law (GoC, 2006). The acronym 3D refers to Defence, Development, and Diplomacy. Team Canada, according to the site, consists of federal and provincial governments who are to help investors expand their reach and profits in global
markets. The 3D policy does not mention “soft power” (GoC, 2006). The website has since dropped the “Team Canada” label in favour of the phrase, “whole-of-government approach,” and lists security as the first priority and humanitarian assistance as third (GoC, 2010b).

2.4 Summary and Conclusion

The discourse and ethical substance for Foucault and the Canadian military are of a very different nature. Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists emphasize a discourse through which individuals acquire the knowledge necessary to shape themselves into ethical beings. The knowledge is considered philosophic and ethical if the individual can learn to exercise independent deliberation and volition through an analysis of discourse and historical narratives. If discourse is merely learned, rephrased, and altered in degree but not in kind, then the individual is a sophist pursuing a non-philosophic knowledge of little relevance to ethics. The ethical substance is the pursuit of ethical knowledge within philosophic inquiry. The Canadian military follows a discourse through which individuals learn and debate the competing narratives of statism without concern for the role played by the space-time, Us-Other binary. The knowledge of military statism and bureaucracy, in lieu of personal ethical growth, helps establish the sense of certainty required to undertake expeditions. The ethical substance is the pursuit of statism and practice of bureaucracy as a means of acting out the tensions of competing group narratives.

2.5 Selected Texts on Statism and Bureaucracy

On narratives of Us-Other statism and military combat expeditions as represented by Patrick Stogran. His role as a public relations representative is pursued in selected texts following Chapter 3:

Edmonton Journal, Mike Blanchfield, May 5, 2002:

“Hunting down ‘the heathens’: A quest for justice: Edmonton’s Lt.-Col. Pat Stogran, who commands Canada’s troops in Afghanistan, is part strategist, part warrior. And in tracking down the al-Qaeda, he’s all business.”
As commander of Canada’s soldiers in Afghanistan and the man leading [Operation] Harpoon, Stogran was eager to be near the front of his advancing column of soldiers.

“We experienced all the anxieties any one of our forefathers would have experienced going into combat expecting 60 to 100 al-Qaeda. When we encountered three, that was a bit of a downer for them.”

Whenever and wherever their next battle is fought, the allies share an unwavering revulsion of the enemy, one that Stogran and his fellow commanders in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition strive daily to cultivate in their troops.

“At the risk of being controversial,” Stogran says, “I view them as being very much heathenish. “We’re here to bring the al-Qaeda to justice, and we’re an extension of Canada. We conduct ourselves as Canadians.”

Hunting down and killing terrorists would not likely make most people’s lists of what it means to be Canadian.

“But the people are still out there. ... They are continuing in their evil ways. They don’t hope to achieve anything other than killing people. They still have the money. ... They are as committed as they were on Sept. 11,” he says. “If I didn’t think Canadians are vulnerable, I wouldn’t be as committed to this campaign as I am.” Forty-three-year-old Patrick B. Stogran is an educated student of war, a calculating tactician, a trained killer and a devoted husband and father of two. He goes to church regularly and prays a little harder than he did eight months ago.

As commander of Canada’s soldiers in Afghanistan and the man leading Harpoon, Stogran was eager to be near the front of his advancing column of soldiers.

“The soldiers in the battalion are eager to get involved,” Stogran explains. “It’s the ultimate extreme sport I think. They like to parachute. They like to push the limits. The ultimate limit is when there are people out there trying to kill you.”

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*The Ottawa Citizen*, M. Smith, March 26, 2002:

Interview with Stogran in Kandahar, Afghanistan:
Stogran: “I feel on top of the world. I feel like Wayne Gretzky [Canadian hockey legend] commanding a team of all-stars and having just won one gold medal and looking forward to several others.”

Smith: “The troops appreciate Lt.-Col. Stogran’s willingness to fight and are now calling him ‘Devil Six,’ the operational handle he has when dealing with communications and his U.S. counterpart…”.

“…‘devil’ [is] from the Special Service Force in the Second World War” [the Devil’s Brigade was a joint U.S.-Canadian commando unit]. “To pick up their spirits, he tells them to think about the bragging rights they’ll have when they get home. ‘Outside the guys in the Legion, no one will be able to attest to your experience,’ he says.”

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Other expressions of Us-Other statism and the military combat expedition narrative:

The Globe and Mail, Daniel Leblanc, July 15, 2005:

“JTF2 to hunt al-Qaeda”

Canada’s elite JTF2 soldiers are heading to Afghanistan as part of a 2,000-troop deployment that will target the “detestable murderers and scumbags” behind the rise in international terrorism, General Rick Hillier said yesterday.

“These are detestable murderers and scumbags, I’ll tell you that right up front. They detest our freedoms, they detest our society, they detest our liberties.”

“We’re not going to let those radical murderers and killers rob from others and certainly we’re not going to let them rob from Canada.”

The Ottawa Citizen, Mike Blanchfield, March 5, 2006:

On a 2006 visit to the Canadian mission in Kandahar, Prime Minister Harper was quoted: “we’re showing leadership… taking on dangers and advancing the kind of things that go to the heart of what
Canada is all about as a country.” Upon landing, Harper exclaimed, “[i]t’s exciting, what can I say.” General Hillier added, “[e]very soldier, sailor, airman, airwoman you talk to here is excited about the mission. They’re proud to be here. They believe they’re doing something fundamentally good.”

*The Ottawa Citizen*, Matthew Fisher, March 18, 2008:

“Boytes remembered as soldier’s soldier: 81st Canadian to die in Afghanistan ‘committed warrior.’”

Sgt. Jason Boyes, the 81st Canadian soldier to die in Afghanistan, was remembered yesterday as a committed warrior and a respected and admired leader.

“He was someone we can all emulate. He represented the warrior spirit, 100 per cent.”

Regimental Sgt. Maj. Brian Semenko, a friend of Sgt. Boyes’, said the fallen soldier “felt the best way to serve was to do it overseas. His idea was not to give candy to children, but to kill insurgents.”

“He was a soldier’s soldier, but he was also one of the guys.”

Gov. Gen. Michaëlle Jean described Sgt. Boyes’ death as “a very painful reminder of the dangers that our fellow countrymen and women in the Canadian Forces face with exemplary courage -- ready for the ultimate sacrifice -- when they commit to do their very best to help Afghan communities, impoverished and terrorized by years and years of war, and to re-establish the peace and stability to which they aspire so deeply.

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On the humanitarian motives for military expeditions:

*CBC News*, March 5, 2006:

“The axe assault that badly injured a Canadian soldier was part of a deliberate ambush as troops met with village elders in southern Afghanistan, military says.”
In March of 2006, Lieutenant Trevor Greene was liaising with villagers when an Afghan man struck him in the head with a blunt, stone axe, inflicting a serious but non-fatal injury. A friend, Captain Kevin Schamuhn, explained that Greene was “just really set on helping these people and doing it right.”

CBC News, March 9, 2006:
“Father of wounded soldier supports ‘war against terrorism’”

Four days later, Mr. Greene’s father was quoted as saying that “his son believed strongly in what he was doing in Afghanistan” and that “he was doing it very well from our perspective.”

The Ottawa Citizen, Kelly Egan, April 13, 2007
“Canadians choose fight over flight from Forces.”

The gravity of the situation in Afghanistan is not deterring new recruits from joining the military.

There is the odd walk-in kid who wants to be Rambo, like war was a video game. But recruiters are quick to dissuade.

More likely is the recruit motivated by a sense of duty, with a good idea already of military life and fair notion of what public service is all about.

Scott Mansfield is the son of a military man. He is 18 and graduating from St. Matthew’s High School in Orleans this year.

“For me, it really gives me a sense of pride in our nation to see the role we’re playing in the international community.”

Ms. Luloff hopes to use the experience to see the world and as a springboard to eventually join the Ontario Provincial Police. She is also motivated by a desire to serve.

“I feel so blessed to be living in this country, especially when you see what’s going in the rest of the world.”

It is edifying to listen to young people acting on honourable motives, volunteering to stand in harm’s way, for the sake of Canada.
The Toronto Star, T. Brautigan and C. Morris, April 18, 2007:

“Soldiers remembered for trying to make ‘world a better place.’”

On April 11, 2007, Corporal Aaron Williams, 23, was buried at Perth-Andover, New Brunswick, and Sergeant Donald Lucas, 31, was buried at St. John’s, Newfoundland [both casualties from Afghanistan]. Colonel Ryan Jestin, base commander at Gagetown, New Brunswick, speaking at William’s funeral, said it is difficult to come to terms with the youth of the slain soldiers. He added that several leave behind small children who will never know their dads. “I believe that these deaths have not been in vain,” Jestin said. “The families all told me their sons were doing what they wanted to do. We’re trying to make the world a better place and you can’t ask for a better legacy than that.”

The Toronto Star, Sheila Dabu, June 21, 2007:

“Soldier wanted to ‘make a difference’: Uncle, mother recall quiet corporal who looked forward to serving his country.”

Cpl. Stephen Bouzane’s motivation for serving in Afghanistan far outweighed the potential dangers of the mission, his uncle says.

“He was looking forward to going there, to making a difference,” Paul Bouzane said in an interview from his home in Gander, Nfld., after learning of his nephew’s death.

In St. Alban’s, Nfld., Bouzane’s mother Maureen said she always knew her son wanted to join the Forces, following two grandfathers who served World War II.

His uncle served in the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry unit as well.

“He did a journal when he was in Grade 7 and he wanted to join the army like his uncle Paul because he wanted to ride the tankers,” she said.

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On the debate about combat versus humanitarian military expeditions:

“Commander confident his soldiers up to task: Bound for Afghanistan.”

Throughout his lengthy military career, Lt. Col. Pat Stogran trained for the type of mission that will soon take him to Afghanistan.

“Too often we get slotted into a peacekeeper pigeonhole and we’re viewed as a constabulary, but we always train for the highest common denominator,” Stogran said.

“My guys, to a man, are comfortable with going into a high-threat environment.”

The Toronto Star, Letter to the Editor, Corporal Paul Demetrick, Canadian Army (Reserve) [militia], Penticton, B.C., October 8, 2008.

“Opinion | Soldier says it’s time to end Afghanistan war”

I love my country just like anybody else. But when I hear of things our troops have done in Afghanistan, I have to ask, “What kind of legacy do we wish to leave behind?” Some examples: we respond to hostile fire by indiscriminate bombing and shelling of villages, killing innocent men, women and children; we fire white phosphorus shells (a chemical weapon outlawed by the Geneva Conventions due to the horrific way it burns human beings) into vineyards where it was known Afghan insurgents were deployed; we hand over prisoners of war to Afghan authorities, who torture them; and we shoot and kill a 2-year-old Afghan boy and his 4-year-old sister. Do we want to be remembered for hating, killing and destroying, or caring, healing and helping with reconstruction?

A weapon is put in one hand and ammunition in the other, and we are taught the fine art of killing our fellow human beings.

My fellow citizens, help me and soldiers like me end the war. Let’s hear your voices.

CBC News, March 9, 2006:

“Relatives of dead soldier question Canada’s role in Afghanistan.”
Alice Murphy, the mother of Corporal Jamie Murphy, who was killed in Kabul in January 2004, was quoted: “I think about Jamie every second of every day.” His aunt, Eva Skeffington, however, noted that the expedition “did go at first for peace and now it’s war.”

The Globe & Mail, February 16, 17, 18, 2008

“Finding Canada’s place in the world”

Part I – Lloyd Axworthy “We need a new map, Lloyd Axworthy argues”

Our present international policy is guided by an outdated set of co-ordinates arising from a slavish adherence to the Bush administration’s misguided efforts at empire building, military adventurism, continental border security and bilateral trade deals, while avoiding international collaboration on environmental and disarmament initiatives.

Let’s begin by rejoining international efforts to rehabilitate UN peacekeeping efforts using the Responsibility to Protect principle endorsed by the world summit in 2005.

Part II – J.L. Granatstein, “It’s a matter of realizing our national interests”

What are Canada’s national interests? The first, the basic one common to every state, is obvious: We must protect our people, territory, and sovereignty. We must see that we remain united and independent. Then we must advance the economic well-being of Canadians. We must help protect North America and, as we are not now and never will be a great power, we must work with like-minded states to advance freedom and democracy around the world.

Our values, our humanitarianism, our multiculturalism, and our belief in justice at home and abroad, spring directly from our national interests and our long history as a democracy. Above all, given our geographic location, we must have close relations with the United States.

Part III – David Eaves, “Unleash the power of our citizens”

Canada’s foreign policy has sought to model and advance the ideals of our national experiment: peace, order and good government.
For almost two centuries, we’ve pursued this objective. And yet, we’ve repeatedly redefined our role. In our efforts to improve and defend this system Canadians have, among other things: served as allies and fierce warriors, fighting in two world wars and one Cold one; operated as diplomatic honest brokers, inventing peacekeeping and preventing war between superpowers; and organized as human rights and human security activists, extending the benefits of stability and justice to those who’ve known little of either.

As employees, consumers, business owners, investors, aid workers and, above all, citizens, the decisions we each make increasingly shape Canada’s reputation and impact.

The Toronto Star, Kerry Gillespie, May 25, 2007:

“Military faces ‘revolution’: Hillier cites new recruiting, new training”

The Canadian military is undergoing a revolution in what it does and how it does it – designed to let the country take its deserved place on the world stage, Canada's top soldier says.

“We’re trying to give Canada a seat at the table, an opportunity to influence a region, a country, an event in accordance with our interests and with our values because of our (military) contribution,” Hillier told reporters after his speech at the annual Canadian Press dinner.

This is something Canada has not done since Vimy Ridge in World War I, he said.

The Toronto Star, Letter to the Editor, May 28, 2007:

“Wars not needed for influence: Military faces ‘revolution’”

Gen. Rick Hillier, “Canada’s top soldier,” seems far too quick and ready to conflate international influence with military activity. But what Hillier appears unprepared to consider is the fact that Canada has indeed been influencing the international community for decades, and that we have been doing so quite independently of any war games waged abroad.

It’s true that historians often cite Vimy Ridge as a “coming of age” for the Dominion of Canada. Yet one could argue that some of Canada’s activities since that time, including its decision not to
participate in the Vietnam conflict or our refusal to lend military support to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, serve as strong evidence of a very different sort of maturation.

Jason Green, Montreal

The Globe and Mail, Michael Valpy, February 28, 2007

“The myth of Canada as peacekeeper: Despite high-minded policy statements and public perception, Canada’s global role, Michael Valpy reports.”

It’s so hard to square mythology with reality. While 70 per cent of Canadians consider military peacekeeping a defining characteristic of their country, Canada has turned down so many United Nations’ requests to join peacekeeping missions during the past decade that the UN has stopped asking. In 1991, Canada contributed more than 10 per cent of all peacekeeping troops to the UN. Sixteen years later, its contribution is less than 0.1 per cent.

On this month’s fifth anniversary of Canadian troops being sent to Afghanistan and one year after assuming responsibility for the counterinsurgency campaign -- a war by any other name -- in Kandahar province, one of the country’s biggest unanswered questions is: What is Canadian military policy? It’s certainly not to be the global leader in peacekeeping the country once was.

Yet several academics who study Canadian military and foreign policy see patterns of anti-UN bias among senior army officers and a preference for operating beside the United States. The anti-UN bias comes from their experience in UN peacekeeping missions of the past, and their U.S. preference is based on top-grade logistics and tactical support that the U.S. military can offer their own troops.

The Globe and Mail, Gloria Galloway, February 17, 2010:

“Harper lauds troops in Haiti, takes swipe at Liberals.”

“This fleet of new aircraft, the C-17 fleet, [Harper flew to Haiti onboard a C-17] is a big part of making this response possible. I single out the C-17 for a reason. There was a time when that kind of
heavy lift aircraft didn't fit Canada's soft-power policies,” Mr. Harper told soldiers yesterday at a steamy military camp on the city’s outskirts with a crumbled house as a backdrop.

“But our government bought them for the hard-power requirements of today’s word. Now we’re using them for relief work. What is the moral of the story?” he asked. “To do soft power, you need hard power. You need a full range of capabilities.”

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Disputing the practice of referring to Afghanistan war dead as heroes as a means of suppressing dissent:

_The Globe and Mail_, Canadian Press, March 26, 2010:

“Criticism of scholarships for children of fallen soldiers draws sharp rebuke”

Veterans and political leaders say they’re dismayed with criticism being levelled at a scholarship for the children of soldiers killed in the line of duty.

Sixteen professors at the University of Regina have sent a letter to the school’s president saying the school should withdraw from the program known as Project Hero. The program, created by retired general Rick Hillier, offers free tuition to the children of dead Canadian soldiers.

But the professors say the program is “a glorification of Canadian imperialism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.” “We think that the death of individuals is always a tragic matter, but we think that heroism is something different.” – Professor Joyce Green, who signed the letter.

“In our view, support for Project Hero represents a dangerous cultural turn. It associates heroism with the act of military intervention. It erases the space for critical discussion of military policy and practices,” the letter reads.
On competing narratives about Canada’s state identity related to the domestic Anglo-Franco political-cultural divide:

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*Le Devoir*, A. Castonguay and R. Dutrisac, December 12, 2006:

“The Bloc Quebecois [a political party based in the Province of Québec and in favour of secession] threatens to topple the government of Stephen Harper regarding the Canadian mission to Afghanistan.”

Gilles Duceppe [party leader] demanded that the Harper government re-balance the mission “to put more resources into reconstruction.” “There is no balance between the humanitarian and the military.”

[translated by author]

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*National Post*, Don Martin, Monday, July 23, 2007:

“Two solitudes on the battlefield: Anglo-franco barriers impose unique challenges for local interpreters.”

A mirror reflection of Canadian society has beamed all the way to Kandahar, but it’s probably not a slice of life we should import into an Afghan society already divided tribally, politically and militarily.

The two Canadian solitudes are alive and isolated here in Kandahar, even though anglophone and francophone soldiers are fighting for the same cause, running the same convoys and guarding each other’s backs outside the fence.

But inside the camps and forward bases, they live, eat and socialize separately, while occasionally taking derisive swipes at each other.

That will generate a unique logistical problem because translators able to switch easily between French and Pashtu are said to be impossible to find.

This is not to suggest the mission is in any way compromised or that there’s overt antagonism between the two cultures. Still, an undercurrent of disdain and derision between the soldiers of Canada’s founding nations is a reality here.
In the mess tents of Camp Nathan Smith, for example, there’s a clear linguistic wall. French-language television beams into one wing, English into the other.
Chapter 3 – Obligations, Myths, Monuments, and Management: Mode of Subjection as Moral Codes and Knowledge

Ethical substance and discourse affect individuals through interpersonal behaviour, bureaucratic transactions, coincidence, social crises, media, public events, and other interactions too numerous to list. Before discourse can reach people and act as a mode of subjection, it must be packaged as the “knowledge” side of Foucault’s power-knowledge. In this chapter, knowledge is combined with non-discursive factors to provide the content, medium, and claims to legitimacy for the statist narratives influencing military ethics. This includes moral codes and historical narratives relating to the combat and humanitarian aspects of military expeditions.

Moral codes can be divided into two categories in a way similar to the discourses of philosophy and sophistry. In the first category, moral codes are a knowledge that helps individuals learn how to critique discourse and historical narratives. These correspond with the moral codes espoused by Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenist philosophers. They are a mode of subjection that provides a guide on how to critique other codes. The chapter begins with an overview of the moral codes implicit in Foucault’s reading of the Kant and the Hellenists. The second type of moral code is a mode of subjection that enables individuals to fulfill the requirements of a particular discourse and narrative. These codes are learned, sometimes rephrased, but rarely challenged in depth. For the military, they consist of the espoused moral codes derived from statism. Those who propagate and seek to adhere to these codes are sufficiently certain of their truth value that details are listed in ethics and ethos manuals, memorialized in monuments and ceremonies, and used as content for communication campaigns.

3.1 Foucault and Moral Codes

As companions to the cultivation of the inquiry mind, Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists do exhort their readers to follow certain traditional moral virtues. In Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?”
he states that courage is necessary if an individual is to think freely and independently (Kant, 1983). Kant believed that those who do not attain such maturity, are timid, lazy, and dependant on others for knowledge. Thinking freely leads to acting freely and makes humans deserving of just political governance (Kant, 1983: 45-46). In “What is Critique?” a lecture delivered in 1978, Foucault shares Kant’s sentiment that self-enlightenment is a moralist’s “call for courage” (Foucault, 2002: 194). Thus, Kant and Foucault both associate familiar kinds of traditional virtue, courage, and maturity, to preparation and the act of perception. Butler (2002) elaborates on Foucault’s moral code in a commentary on his “What is Critique?” She attempts to identify what Foucault would see as virtue by linking Kant’s belief in emancipation with Foucault’s call for a default attitude of skepticism and resistance. But Foucault only mentions the word “virtue” twice, in back to back sentences, in the introduction to his essay: “There is something in critique which is akin to virtue. And in a certain way, what I wanted to speak to you about is this critical attitude as virtue in general” (Foucault, 2002: 192). Butler extends that thought by speculating that Foucault’s virtue is based on his unconscious belief in “originary freedom” (Butler, 2002: 224). Such a claim, however, strays much too far from Foucault’s postmodernism. There is nothing to support that conjecture in his theory on ethics and the schema for the ethics of the self.

The moral code espoused by Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists, nevertheless, remains the application of critique itself and not any motivations, traits, or values associated with it. In this sense, they differ from the mainstream Anglo-Western ethical tradition. Gane, (1986) and Davidson (1986: 231) argue that Kant parts company with the dominant Western moral tradition that is preoccupied with moral codes that enumerate duties to society and the state. Rather, Kant believed that individuals have a greater moral duty to themselves (Davidson, 1986: 232). In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Kant encourages individuals to undertake an intellectual preparation to become free in their thought (Kant, 1983). In Hermeneutics, Foucault finds the same lesson in Hellenist thought. Foucault says that “caring about the self means equipping ourselves for a series of unforeseen events by practicing a number of exercises” (Foucault, 2005: 485). Epictetus Discourses III.x.1., maintained that the practice of philosophy is to “make preparation” (Foucault, 2005: 484-485). Foucault said that “to put ourselves in a frame of mind,”
to use the “set of exercises available to us,” will ensure that we are “permanently prepared for this life which will only ever be, until its end, a life test in the sense that it will be a life that is a test” (Foucault, 2005: 485). Preparation is not a straight path, he cautions, and could even require a period of “losing of one’s way” (Foucault, 2005: xxviii). Disorientation is a means by which a person can be detached from the espoused moral codes learned by rote and be free to deliberate toward a way of life tailored to the needs of a particular place and time. Foucault distinguishes between preparation for a specific activity and a more general preparation for a moral life (Foucault, 2005: 94). He refers to the specialized training Plato gave to Alcibiades so he could participate in the governance of the polis. At the same time, Alcibiades needed to learn how to lead a moral life whether for his own benefit and for the greater good in the public sphere. The moral code, in this case, is to carefully prepare.

Perception is a process dependent on freedom of thought and individual deliberation. For Foucault, critique of discourse was at the core of Hellenist ethics (Foucault, 2005: 264). Foucault refers to the precept in Seneca Letters CIV, which requires moral individuals to see through the narratives of glory (Foucault, 2005: 264-265). For Plutarch, ethics is skepticism toward discourse when discourse shapes the moral quality of human life (Foucault, 2005: 237-238). He characterized the Hellenists’ pursuit of the moral life as a “spiritual” transformation and introspection into one’s soul (Foucault, 2005: 457). Ethical preparation requires that one relate to “a world that is perceived, recognized, and practiced as a test” (Foucault, 2005: 485-486).

As was argued above, in the chapter on ethical substance and discourse, Foucault, Kant, and the Stoics believe that ethical subjects ought to participate in public life by engaging in governance. In the chapter on telos below, this moral imperative will be distinguished from that of the Epicureans. It is important to note that participation also carries moral weight when viewed as a series of tests in life in general as mentioned above in the discussion on preparation. Public life, it becomes clear, does not mean political office or any other socially notable accomplishment, but can refer to struggle of any kind that involves ethics and power-knowledge.
The moral code, therefore, as the continuation of the ethical substance and discourse can be summarized as preparation, perception, and participation in public life. It differs from the nihilistic position often attributed to Foucault as the philosopher of power-knowledge.

### 3.2 Military Moral Codes

Military moral codes can also be conceptualized as a duty of self-abnegation and a contradictory requirement to prepare, perceive, and participate as an ethically independent person in public life. Perception, however, is suspended in regard to the understanding and critique of statist discourse and historical narratives. Thus, the Hellenists would not consider the military code to be ethical knowledge because it does not contribute to what they thought was personal moral development. These codes are part of the mode of subjection that transmit the discourse of statism and bureaucracy. This chapter considers three of the most prominent military moral codes: professionalism, warrior’s honour, and the combination of leadership and social contractarianism. They roughly parallel the moral code that Foucault found in his reading of Hellenism: professionalism and warrior’s honour equate with preparation and perception; and leadership and social contractarianism compare with participation in the public life. Unlike the philosophic moral code of Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists, which depends on the attitude and private conduct of the individual, many of the effects of the military’s moral code can be observed as public statements and individual and group behaviour. *Canada’s Soldiers*, an official report of the results of an army questionnaire survey, uses a Venn diagram to illustrate how moral codes relate to actual military behaviour (DGLCD, 2005: 2). The goal is to increase the area where ethos and culture overlap, or in other words, where behaviour conforms to the moral code. *Figure 4* is a reproduction of the diagram.
Figure 4. Espoused Military Ethos versus Military Culture (Actual Behaviour):  

Reproduced from DGLCD (2005: 2)

*Duty With Honour* (CFLI, 2003) is the official, keystone manual on the Canadian Force’s ethos, and consequently, of the military moral code. *Duty with Honour* uses the Western statist discourse and the Canadian Constitution of 1982 to make a claim to originary and juridical legitimacy, respectively. The discourse and document are also deemed to be the source of the nation and the military institution’s defining narratives and values. The manual will serve as the primary reference for this section. This is also an Army Ethics Program that will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 4 in a section dealing with ethics training, bureaucracy, and power-knowledge. The Army’s moral code is consistent with that found in *Duty with Honour*.

3.2.1 Professionalism

The most salient military moral code is self-abnegation in relation to the state and its government. *Duty with Honour* considers this to be the central aspect of military professionalism:

“The profession of arms in Canada is composed of military members dedicated to the defence of Canada and its interests, as directed by the Government of Canada. The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self, the lawful,
ordered application of military force, and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability.”

(CFLI, 2003: 10).

The reference to the lawful application of force is dealt with below as part of the warrior’s honour. Other professional “values,” such as duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage, and professional “expectations,” such as “fighting spirit, discipline, and teamwork” (CFLI, 2003: 26, 30-31, 54), can be considered enablers helpful in reaching the primary objective. Although the military ethos is supposed to provide opportunities for persons to “express their unique military identity” (CFLI, 2003: 21), there are few references to individual autonomy. At one point, the manual obliges the professional to maintain “the integrity and reputation of the military profession” (CFLI 2003: 14), but it does not address how personal integrity and service before self can coexist. Whereas Foucault and the Hellenists saw moral courage as necessary for independent thinking, military professionals are to be courageous, instead, in order to accept selflessness and unlimited liability. The authors try to avoid limiting the code to strict obedience and mention that professionals are also expected to exercise courage to follow their individual conscience (CFLI, 2003 31). However, there is no mention of what would happen if that should push the individual to act contrary to state interests apart from statements that hold state interests to be paramount. It is not surprising then that aside from self-abnegation, the authors’ attempt to define professionalism dissolves into circular arguments. They assert that “members of the profession” “demonstrate their professionalism by: embracing the military ethos” and that the “military ethos embodies the spirit that binds the profession together” (CFLI 2003: 11, 21). It is also declared that all military personnel have met the standard of professionalism because all military personnel are by definition professionals (CFLI, 2003: 10-11). In effect, the writing committee rephrases the traditional, statist, military moral code without understanding the ethical substance or accounting for inconsistencies in the discourse.

The manual also obliges military professionals to exemplify statist narratives by being “dedicated to the national values of the country they are sworn to defend” (CFLI, 2003: 21). “[T]he legitimacy of the
profession of arms,” moreover, requires that the profession “embody the same values and beliefs as the society it defends” (CFLI, 2003: 28). Despite being given such prominence, some military values then in vogue have since fallen out of favour or are not observed by the government to an appreciable extent. For example, the manual refers to the special value Canadians place on peacekeeping, human security, and “viable international relations” (CFLI, 2003: 29), notwithstanding the fact that military expeditions since 2001 have been oriented toward combat and accompanied by a deterioration in human security. The manual also mentions the importance of official bilingualism as a contribution to the state’s cultural unity. The policy was introduced as part of the struggle of group narratives to appease Québec nationalists.

Professionalism also requires that individuals learn a specialized body of technical knowledge, gain practical experience, and develop creative problem solving skills (CFLI, 2003: 17-19). At the same time, professionalism depends on “consistency in maintaining the core of professional effectiveness” (CFLI, 2003: 66). A “common body of knowledge” is to be developed at National Defence Headquarters and the rest of the military is responsible for “decentralized execution” (CFLI, 2003: 57). Consistency is to be “imparted” through the “early socialization process and becomes increasingly more substantive as the member progresses” (CFLI 2003: 52). Thus, the manual is clear about the importance of the developing the ability to perceive. Professionals are to manage the institution “to meet future requirements,” adapt to “changing roles and new tasks,” and have the foresight to “anticipate” and “respond” to “changing social and cultural conditions” (CFLI 2003: 49). Professional development programs are expected to move the individual from a dependency on rules to an understanding of principles as a guide to behaviour (CFLI, 2003: 57). Additionally, they must “proactively seek an understanding” of change itself (CFLI, 2003: 69). These principles are necessary to build a “learning organization” open to novel ideas and concepts to move to “higher planes of effectiveness” (CFLI, 2003: 66). This includes the introduction of robotics into the “battlespace” that will give rise to “unusual ethical dilemmas” about human control and responsibility (CFLI, 2003: 72). Again, the authors’ recognize the importance of independent thought and judgment but have not addressed the fundamental conflict at the centre of ethical self-forming activity.
3.2.2 Warrior’s Honour

The most important requirement of the warrior’s honour, discernible from Duty with Honour, comes “with adhering fully to the law of armed conflict, especially in the humane treatment of prisoners of war” (CFLI, 2003: 32). That assumes that observance of international law can be reconciled with the absolute priority given to the interests of the state (CFLI, 2003: 10, 32). On that point, the authors assume readers share the Western historical narrative that Canadian expeditionary combatants always fight just and legal wars. Also consistent with the discourse, warrior’s honour is assumed to have progressed further inside Western states than it has outside and is therefore more reliable and worthy of trust (CFLI, 2003: 10, 32). Honour, moreover, increases over time with professional development, so that individuals become able to “think critically” about moral dilemmas that are “the norm in the complex operational and socio-cultural environments” (CFLI, 2003: 57). With warrior’s honour, the potential conflict lies between international law and state moral sovereignty.

Once again, attempts at defining an element of the moral code become circular. According to the manual, the warrior’s honour requires that the “values” and “beliefs” of the military ethos constitute “a style and manner of conducting military operations that earn for soldiers, sailors and air force members that highly regarded military quality – honour.” At the same time, “honour is earned by the men and women of the Canadian Forces when they uphold the values and beliefs of the Canadian military ethos” (CFLI, 2003: 32). The section on the warrior’s honour in Duty with Honour is very short and the authors include a quote from Michael Ignatieff to convey their meaning through an emotional appeal:

A warrior’s honour is a slender hope, but it may be all there is to separate war from savagery. And a corollary hope is that men can be trained to fight with honour. Armies train people to kill, but they also teach restraint and discipline.

Ignatieff can be considered a representative, well-known, and influential spokesperson for the use of aggressive military interventions by the West in the post-Cold War period (Ignatieff, 2003). Warrior’s Honour was published while Ignatieff was a Professor of Human Rights at Harvard University and Director of the Carr Center of Human Rights Policy. He has been a frequent guest commentator for the BBC and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (CBC); won Canada’s Governor General’s Award for non-fiction in 1987; and delivered 2000 Massey Lectures, the prestigious annual event sponsored by the CBC and the University of Toronto. In 2006 and again in 2008, Ignatieff was elected to a safe Liberal Party seat in the federal Parliament. After an unsuccessful attempt to win the party leadership in 2006, he succeeded on May 2, 2009 and headed the official opposition. In the federal election on May 2, 2011, the Liberal Party failed to form a government.

In Warrior’s Honour, Ignatieff frequently uses a rhetorical technique in which he first offers a highly pessimistic and skeptical account of a policy that might regulate ethical behaviour in Western expeditions only to arrive at an optimistic and strong acceptance of the very same option. Ignatieff often presents himself as a critic of statism but only when it applies to others. For instance, he writes that “narcissism” can transform social-cultural events into a “narrative” complete with a “glorious past” that shape how a people over value themselves and devalue their foreign counterparts (Ignatieff, 1998: 34-51). Ignatieff is very pessimistic that people can see through their imposed national and sub-national identities, but his argument for conflict resolution largely depends on that degree of self-understanding (Ignatieff, 1998: 164-178). Nevertheless, he firmly believes the West has a moral responsibility to intervene militarily in the “developing world” (Ignatieff, 1998: 51-54). Although he confesses that he found it difficult to “defend… the non-murderous fictions upon which my political convictions depend” and to defend his conviction that killing is necessary, he believes that the West is alone in its ability to abide by international legal and moral codes of military conduct (Ignatieff, 1998: 34-51. Italics in the original). He worries, though, that warrior’s honour is becoming rarer because expeditions are being regulated more and more by the laws of individual states in lieu of international law (Ignatieff, 1998: 109-129). Again, the conflict between ethics and sovereign morality addressed by Duty with Honour and Ignatieff conforms
to the Lockean discourse that formed the basis of modern, Western international relations and that Cresswell identified as possibly justifying the violation of international law...

3.2.3 Leadership and Social Contractarianism

It is important to distinguish between military leadership and contractarianism as it exists in small and large groups. Individuals can influence self-forming activity for one another in small military units in ways that can either support or undermine the espoused moral code. Although this social milieu still mediates individual deliberation and limits options for acceptable behaviour (Winslow, 2004), it nevertheless introduces an element of unpredictability in the broader institutional power-knowledge network. This factor will be discussed below in the section on military culture in Chapter 4. Here, leadership and contractarianism are viewed as a moral code intended to guide the interactions between executives and the rank and file in larger groups within the bureaucracy.

It is also necessary to understand that the individual’s behaviour, even in a position of highest authority, has little effect on the institutional as a whole. In their studies of organizational behaviour, however, Coens and Jenkins (2000) argue that group effort is the most important factor in institutional performance whereas the contribution of any one individual is not even measurable. Instead of leadership, for example, executives in large bureaucracies are more concerned with peer driven self-interest. Their selves “must be understood in a context of habits, institutions, and operative rules of thumb” (Schroeder 1998: 622). Foucault (1995: 195-230), in agreement with new theories of organizational behaviour, believes that government and military leaders, rather than lead, only preside over a self-sustaining bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the selection of goals and attempts to solve problems are credited to executives in positions of authority. As power-knowledge webs, bureaucracies reduce the likelihood for personal initiative. Bureaucracy might mitigate the risk of individual incompetence, but does little to involve executives or the rank and file to work toward the relevance and legitimacy of the institution. Recent research in military affairs suggests that the role of leadership is indeed oversold and romanticized (CSIS Report, 1999: 7). Specialized military functions and the waning of symmetrical
warfare, among other factors, have limited the options available for would-be leaders (Booth, 2001: 468, 473; English, 2001: 2, 99). Cotton (1997) says that people “cannot lead complex institutions armed only with charisma, political skills, and a few simple precepts: truth, duty and valour, integrity, etcetera.” Thus, the relationship between executives and the rank-and-file is more accurately one of social contractarianism rather than leadership.

Leadership and social contractarianism are combined in the concept of transformational leadership. When the term gained prominence during the 1970s, it was presented as a style where leaders and followers are considered “inextricably bound together” and a process that would meet the moral and material needs of both (Northouse, 2007: 176). The transformational, or charismatic, leader appeals to the followers’ emotions and imagination to help the latter identify and nurture their moral values and individual goals. Transformational institutions are expected to generate enthusiasm and align the interests of the rank and file with those of the executives. The Canadian Forces Leadership Institute’s Leadership Manual endorses the theory as a means “to alter the characteristics of individuals, organizations, or societies in a fairly dramatic or substantial way” (CFLI, 2005: 23). The authors remarks that that transformational techniques are “anchored in the values of the military ethos” and among the time-honoured methods of “superior leadership” (CFLI, 2005: 23). They note that these have always included “inspirational appeals which arouse emotions or make professional values salient,” and help in the establishment of “behavioural norms” (CFLI, 2005: 22, 23).

Critics, however, question the right of leaders to set moral priorities and the role of the inevitable element of self-interest (Northouse, 2007: 348). For example, Snyder (1987) says transformational leadership lends itself to a frequent and amoral use of impression management. McKendall (1992) believes that a dominating normative role played by those at the top of the hierarchy can render an organization non-adaptive by stifling creativity. Howell and Avolio (1992) warn that a transformational executive cadre will often pose as saviours to disguise domination, blame laying, and egoism. Transformational institutions, they continue, also keep followers in a state of dependency and in competition with one another. Bernard M. Bass, a prominent theorist in the field, has two books listed in
the *Leadership Manual’s* bibliography, i.e., Bass and Stodgill (1990) and Bass and Avolio (1994) (CFLI, 2005: 43). In a later article, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) respond to criticisms about the ethics of transformational leadership. The authors acknowledge that since the transformational model touches upon key Western, ethical issues such as “liberty, utility, and distributive justice...” as well as “trust,” it becomes necessary to distinguish between moral “authentic transformational leadership,” and immoral “pseudo-transformational leadership” (Bass, Steidlmeier, 1999: 181). Unethical transformational appeals, they note, can include “impression management” that lead to “‘spin,’ deceit, and self-glorification” (Bass, Steidlmeier, 1999: 196-197). Attempts to rally support via projections of “identity images” “of strength and decisiveness,” could go too far and become unethical overstatements of strength and appeals to fantasy and flattery. Such problems notwithstanding, the authors insist that executives can be trusted to determine a just “timing of the release of information” and choose among “absolute truth telling, the shading of the facts, and the big lies; between emotional and intellectual appeals; and between objectivity and advocacy.” Despite the potential for manipulation, Bass and Steidlmeier nevertheless conclude that the difference between authentic and pseudo-transformational leadership really depends on whether rank and file willingly grant charisma and admiration to executives, or whether they suspect their superiors are acting for “self-aggrandizement” as coordinated by their “handlers.” In the end, they admit that throughout history the difference between ethical and unethical leaders has been “riddled with falsity and pretence,” and is a challenge not unlike that of distinguishing between true and false prophets (Bass, Steidlmeier, 1999: 196-197). Their solution, however, is a repeat of the basic moral code found in *Duty with Honour*. The authors exhort readers to have faith in the “virtue of trustworthiness,” whereby ordinary people will have their interests protected if they are prepared to trust the executives (Bass, Steidlmeier, 1999: 204-205). On that point, *Duty with Honour* asserts that leaders at all levels “are at the heart of military professionalism,” exhibit “unassailable integrity,” make decisions that “reflect an honest and truthful assessment of the situation,” and “act courageously, both physically but more especially, morally” especially “when the tension between achieving the mission and ensuring the well-being of subordinates is high” (CFLI, 2003: 55, 56). Under the code of professionalism, recall, individuals are obliged to protect
the integrity of the institution, not their own, and otherwise are to maintain the priority of state interests. In effect, the rank and file are to suspend the independent sense of judgment they are expected to hone through professional development and by their warrior’s honour.

The social contract is weighed heavily in favour of the state. Upon joining, the individual is expected to forfeit irrevocably most of their options for free volition. For example, it is assumed that military personnel “serve voluntarily and, as such, willingly accept the statutory authority of the chain of command to compel members to perform any lawful duty at any time” (CFLI, 2003: 20). The Canadian Forces can discriminate in matters of employment according to a blanket exception included in the Canadian Human Rights Act requiring that military persons “must at all times and under any circumstances perform any functions that they may be required to perform” (CHRA, 1982: art 15(9)). In exchange, the state is not legally bound by any agreement. Duty with Honour states that “conditions of military service give rise to a set of reciprocal expectations between the profession and society” and the government is supposed to acknowledge “certain formal obligations to service members” via an “unwritten social contract” (CFLI, 2003: 44). In 2003, the manual notes that a parliamentary committee intending to underline the importance of such reciprocity characterized the obligations vaguely, but emphatically, as a “national commitment – in essence a moral commitment” (CFLI, 2003: 44. Italics in original). The obligations they mentioned, however, are modest in comparison to what is expected in return. The individual is to be entitled to physical care and a promise of adequate pay, housing, community services, career progression, and veterans care. The government “took note” of the committee’s recommendation but went no further regarding enforcement and oversight (CFLI, 2003: 45). Significantly, the contract was left unwritten. In practice, even these commitments are routinely abrogated in response to fiscal concerns, such as government spending deficit in the mid-1990s (English, 2001). Another wage freeze is scheduled for the fiscal years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 according to the Federal government’s 2010 Budget announced on March 4, 2010 (GoC, 2010f). The rank and file have no means of bargaining over compensation and benefits and have no access to the rationale, supporting statistics, and other calculations related to the expenditures affecting their welfare.
The *Leadership Manual* and Bass and Steidlmeier contrast “transformational” leadership with “transactional” leadership. Transactional contractarianism, a more accurate term, relies on widely understood rewards and punishments and appeals to reason in place of emotion and enthusiasm (Bass, Steidlmeier, 1999: 184). In theory, it is an alternative to irrational incitement that can induce the rank and file to act against their interests (Stevens, D’Intino, Victor, 1995). Transactional contractarianism is also associated with checks and balances that lessen the likelihood of exploitation of subordinates by executives (Keeley, 1995). The book will return to the distinction between transformational leadership and transactional contractarianism later during the discussion of *telos* and when making recommendations for reform of the military institution.

### 3.3 Knowledge

Moral codes are one of many forms of knowledge that turn the themes of statism and bureaucracy into guides for ethical behaviour, or to use Foucault’s term, modes of subjection. Knowledge, as it applies to Foucault and the military’s ethics, also includes the official and unofficial, as well as the tacit and explicit use of law, medicine, communications, politics, finance, and many other elements in modern Western society. The discourse of statism interacts with non-discursive factors such as technology, human behavioural patterns, and the natural world, with human and non-human elements often of equal importance (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 42-48, 95). The remainder of this chapter describes how statism becomes content for bureaucracies concerned with the teaching of military history, memorialization, and publicity. For these knowledges, statism is expressed as a collection of preferred historical narratives that are frequently repeated, slightly rephrased, and reduced to iconic simplicity. In *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault (2003) describes how groups construct historical narratives for use as a weapon in state and inter-state politics. Narratives, he says, are “a sort of discursive weapon that could be used by all the adversaries present within the political field” and as “a discursive tactic” that “eventually becomes the law governing the formation of a knowledge” (Foucault, 2003: 189). They coalesce around a cluster of personalities, events, and other symbolic elements and are promoted as a
claim to superior moral legitimacy. It is normally a contested site where several groups compete to establish a dominant historical narrative. Whereas ethical substance and fundamental discourses can be stable for decades and even centuries, Foucault believed historical narratives are sometimes fragile and easily questioned (Foucault, 2003: 54-55). As the competition for historical narrative supremacy intensifies, however, the parties often become more entrenched and strident in favour of their versions, thus increasing the likelihood of being disproved. The struggle between the proponents of combat and peacekeeping expeditions in Canada has already been mentioned. The narratives examined in this section relate to the WWI attack on Vimy Ridge, the lionizing of WWI fighter ace Billy Bishop, and the WWII raid on Dieppe. They are among the most prominent military events that have been the subject of much dispute in Canada while retaining their power to act as rallying points and political instruments for identifiable groups. Despite indisputable and widely available information to the contrary, their meaning and significance are almost always interpreted as when first contrived. The three narratives are also good illustrations of the tension in the moral code surrounding the techniques of transformational leadership and between selflessness and the perception of truth. Each gained its iconic status through the deliberate manipulation of facts and public perception by government and military executives and continue to be used to this day to elicit self-abnegation from the rank and file.

Once again, there are points worth repeating about Foucault’s theory. At first, knowledge may appear to follow a cause and effect sequence. When examined in detail, however, knowledge often arises from coincidence, opportunism, and random events. Each narrative presented here illustrates how these factors come into play. In addition, it must be remembered that knowledge cannot be separated from power in Foucault’s thought. Consequently, the narratives discussed next also refer to the interface with groups and individuals, such as school curriculums, veterans associations, broadcasting networks, and monument building and maintenance projects.

Billy Bishop and Dieppe are discussed in the sub-chapter immediately below on teaching state narratives. Vimy Ridge will be the main example used in the following sub-section on memorialization.
3.3.1 Teaching Military State Narratives

To understand better how the narratives can become an issue in education, consider the views of a prominent advocate for the faction in favour of a combat oriented foreign policy. In the discussion of competing versions of statism above, Granatstein was identified as an advocate for greater use of military force. He is also an influential academic, the author of popular books on Canadian history, and a frequent guest commentator on the mainstream media. He was inducted into the Order of Canada in 1997 and acted as the CEO for the new Canadian War Museum from 1998 to 2000. In 1998, he wrote *Who Killed Canadian History?*, a national best seller advocating the teaching of what he takes to be the traditional story of Canada (Granatstein, 1998). As a teacher, Granatstein writes that he “preached the gospel of Canadian history and national history to thousands of students;” “[i]f our history is to achieve this great national purpose, then major changes are needed in our schools and universities;” and “[w]e cannot achieve this unanimity unless we teach our national history, celebrate our founders, establish new symbols, and strengthen the terms of our citizenship” (Granatstein, 1998: 11, 17, 148, 149). While he believes it is acceptable to include negative stories, such as the internment of immigrants from enemy states who had arrived just prior to WWII, the emphasis should nevertheless be placed on the large number of people that have been successfully assimilated under normal circumstances (Granatstein, 1998: 149).

Non-government organizations have been formed to achieve these ends. The Dominion Institute is a charitable organization formed in 1997 by “a group of young professionals, concerned about the erosion of a common memory and civic identity in Canada” (Historica-Dominion, 2010a). The Institute’s programs include “The Memory Project” initiated the fall of 2001 just after the attacks on the U.S. on September 11 of that year. Its main purpose is to expose students to the personal artifacts and oral histories of over 1,000 veterans via online digital archives and onsite classroom events. The Institute states that about 1,500 veterans are available on a speakers list and that over 300,000 people have visited their site. The Institute also offers Battlefield Study Tours and sponsors Veterans Appreciation Days award ceremonies. Granatstein is a member of the Advisory Board. The Historica Foundation of Canada
began operations in 1999 with the aim of helping “all Canadians come to know the fascinating stories that make our country unique” (Historica-Dominion, 2010a). It manages the educational programs Historica Minutes, Encounters with Canada, and Historica Fairs, and maintains *The Canadian Encyclopedia* and *The Encyclopedia of Music in Canada*. The Foundation’s site refers to *The Canadian Encyclopedia* as “Canada’s most authoritative and comprehensive reference, available in both official languages” (Historica-Dominion, 2010a). It will be used in this section as a representative source for the combat expedition narrative. The Foundation depends on individual charitable donations, corporate sponsorship, and government subsidization through the Department of Heritage Canada. The Dominion Institute and the Historica Foundation merged on September 1, 2009, to become what its website refers to as “the largest, independent organization dedicated to Canadian history, identity and citizenship” (Historica-Dominion, 2010a).

The federal government also sponsors a broad range of educational activities that promote the combat narrative. The Museum of War, for example, provides “learning opportunities” for students “from kindergarten through senior high school” in support of the curricula of Ontario and Québec (GoC, 2010c). It offers a “Remembrance Day Toolkit” for use in primary and secondary school classrooms consisting of activities and “scans of original postcards, letters, journals, telegrams, photographs, war art, and archival documents of ceremonies” (GoC, 2010d). The Department of Veterans Affairs even manages an annual “Valentines for Vets” program in which children across Canada make “tens of thousands” of Valentine’s Day cards that are sent “to Veterans in long-term care facilities across the country” (GoC, 2010e).

Education in Canada is within the jurisdiction of the provinces. The three narratives discussed in this chapter are on the Province of Ontario’s general curriculum guidelines for grades 9 and 10, (i.e., 14-15 year olds), (GoO, 2010: 47). It is expected that students will be able to describe Canada’s contribution to the First and Second World Wars in the person of Billy Bishop and via the combat operations, including Vimy Ridge and Dieppe. In a section entitled “Forging a Canadian Identity,” however, the curriculum lists only one military item: “peacekeeping operations” (GoO, 2010: 46). Ontario is by far the most populace province with the highest proportion of recent immigrants. The curriculum guide issued by
the Ministry of Education for British Columbia requires that 16 year old students in grade 11 assess how Canada’s participation in the World Wars affected its “autonomy” and “international involvement” by describing various battles, again including those at Vimy Ridge and Dieppe (GoBC, 2010: 33). The Ministry of Education in Québec, however, does not mention specific figures or combat events in its broad curriculum directive (GoQ, 2010).

The first narrative is the making of Billy Bishop into an aerial combat hero. In WWI, government employed war publicists developed and broadcasted the narrative of Billy Bishop to generate and sustain enthusiasm for a large expedition. This was especially urgent in Canada, a country that was not under any military threat itself and which contained a well-organized French-speaking minority that opposed the war. Aerial combat drama had become an important propaganda tool. In particular, Canadian and British executives were desperate to counter the publicity of Germany’s Red Baron (Greenhous, 2002: 27). Pilots were often eager participants in the creation of positive, but often fictitious news. Some were motivated by self-interest and vanity to exaggerate and fabricate victories (Greenhous, 2002: 22). Bishop, being portrayed as the greatest ace of them all, was perhaps more guilty than others if judged by the sheer number of claimed victories. Post-war investigations, however, revealed that only about four of Bishop’s claimed seventy-two victories were actually witnessed and verified beyond a doubt, with maybe another twenty that could be considered credible (Greenhous, 2002: 25). His most famous air raid on an aerodrome, for which he won a Victoria Cross for bravery, was proven not to have taken place (Greenhous, 2002: 25). In September and October 1917, the “born mythomaniac” returned to Canada for a cross-country publicity tour sponsored by the pro-war, anglophile press magnate Lord Beaverbrook (Greenhous, 2002: 170, 199, 201). His effect on the general public was considerable. Among the better informed, however, including fellow pilots, Bishop has always been the subject of controversy. In 1982, National Film Board producer Paul Cowan’s television documentary-drama, The Kid Who Couldn’t Miss, provided a revisionist account that revived the struggle over the narrative. The program gave rise to a vociferous and vindictive reaction, especially by veterans groups. A Senate sub-committee, convened to restore what was taken to be the official truth, was unable to refute the negative evidence (Bishop, 2008a).
For historians, the legend continues to be a subject of dispute, but only about the degree to which the myth is false. Authors also include the Cowan documentary as an integral part of the narrative (Greenhous, 2002). Greenhous wrote the entry for “Billy Avery Bishop” in *Canadian Encyclopedia* (2010b). Unlike his book, in the classroom-oriented encyclopedia, he is careful only to say that there are doubts about the legacy related to Bishop’s own claims and does not mention the role played by military and government propagandists. Generally, when Bishop is the subject of a reference in contemporary Canada, it is still as a war hero and a name too well known not to mention. The controversy is portrayed as a minor problem or not mentioned at all. The Canadian War Museum site phrases things this way: “While some of Bishop’s “kills” were questioned by contemporaries and by later historians, he remains one of the war’s leading aces and most decorated Canadians” (GoC, 2010g). The *Canadian Encyclopedia* entry is accompanied by links to other websites that accept the original version without any doubt, e.g., a private collection of stories and portraits entitled “Canadian Air Aces and Heroes,” and the Department of Defence’s Directorate of History and Heritage list of Victoria Cross winners (*Canadian Encyclopedia*, 2010b). At its “Treasures Gallery: Portraits of Billy Bishop” website, The Canadian Museum of Civilization only displays a portrait with the caption “‘Billy’ Bishop is Canada’s most famous military figure,” along with images of his medal set and a commemorative postage stamp (GoC 2010h). The Billy Bishop Museum in Orillia, Ontario, his boyhood home, serves as a type of shrine and offers a school program with Province of Ontario “curriculum-based materials” (Bishop, 2008b). The program is designed to assist schools “in a concrete, practical context through a museum experience, and learning activities, to develop students’ skills, strategies, and habits of mind required for effective inquiry and communication” (Bishop, 2008b). The nearby city of Owen Sound is also home to the Billy Bishop Regional Airport (OSA, 2010). On November 10, 2009, the eve of Remembrance Day, The Toronto Port Authority changed the name of its small city center airport to the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport (CBC, 2009). On February 22, 2010, an exhibit featuring Billy Bishop artifacts were put on temporary display (TPA, 2010b).
The Canadian Encyclopedia lists the Dieppe Raid as one of its “100 Greatest Events in Canadian History” (2010a). References to the raid on the French port city of Dieppe are usually preceded by the word “disastrous.” Of the 5,000 mostly Canadian troops who crossed the English Channel on August 19, 1942, there was a 67 percent casualty rate, with 900 deaths and 1,874 taken prisoner (Greenhous, 2008: 423). While the official narrative has long recognized the raid as a tactical blunder, the emphasis has been placed on the display of determined heroism, lessons learned about amphibious assaults that eventually helped win the war, and the issue of bungling by the British high command and their callous waste of well trained and well led colonial troops (Balzer, 2006). Balzer (2006) examines the pre- and post-raid public relations policy related to the operation. He cites source documents indicating that the planners had prepared a public relations response in the event of failure. To mask a defeat, communications were immediately to emphasize individual heroism and human interest stories. This effort was a success in no small part due to the appetite for such stories in the media (Balzer, 2006: 419). Balzer also demonstrates that the tactical lessons learned were actually of little value. As for placing the blame on British executives, Henshaw (2001), counters with evidence that Canadian politicians and army generals bear most of the blame. He cites weak political control, the need for pro-war propaganda, and the personal ambition of Canadian generals. Although senior British Army officers were strongly opposed to raid, including joint operations commander Mountbatten, Britain no longer had the authority to cancel the attack (Henshaw, 2001: 252).

The traditional narrative is repeated by the Historica-Dominion Institute in a lesson plan available for the raid on Dieppe for use in classrooms as part of the “Stories of the Second World War” portion of its Memory Project (Historica-Dominion, 2010b). The Canadian Encyclopedia (2010c) entry mentions two Dieppe Victoria Cross winners, and repeats the claim that “the raid did provide valuable experience for subsequent amphibious assaults in North Africa, Italy and, most notably, Normandy on 6 June 1944.” A link connects with the Department of Veteran Affairs site for the Dieppe Raid that features eyewitness accounts of heroism and human interest stories from reporters and soldiers (GoC, 2010i). Ron Beal, a veteran, tells of his experience in a story entitled “Canadians at Dieppe - Sacrifice before Victory.” There
is also a vignette about Sister Agnès-Marie Valois, a French nurse, who, “[f]or Canadians taken prisoner… was seen as a true angel of mercy.” The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s website does likewise in their guide for teachers through educational materials, suggested lesson plans, and topics for discussion groups that use news clips from their archives (CBC, 2008b). The background material for grades 9 and 10 includes film showing Dieppe veterans being honoured at the National War Memorial in Ottawa on the 50th anniversary of the raid and an interview recounting the traditional position, initially broadcast nation-wide in 2002, featuring historians Villa, Whittaker, and Granatstein (CBC, 2008b). There are numerous Dieppe Raid memorials in cities that were home to the units involved, such as Hamilton and Windsor, Ontario; and Regina, Saskatchewan; and where Canadian soldiers were encamped in the southern area of the UK, of course, at Dieppe, France (Gough, 2002: 221).

3.3.2 Memorializing Military State Narratives

Military monuments and other forms of memorialization can also be studied as a knowledge that helps create and sustain historical narratives. They provide content and venues for ceremonies, speeches, and iconic visualizations. Foucault (2003: 67) speaks of memorialization as an attempt to give historico-political narratives the appearance of enduring authority, legitimacy, and emotional significance. Events and virtues are to be “immobilized” in “monuments that will turn them to stone and render them, so to speak, present forever” (Foucault, 2003: 67). Memorials are examples of behaviour by which narratives of “glory” can legitimize the discourse of state authority (Foucault, 2003: 67). In Canada, memorials to peace keeping compete with those to war making in parallel with the broader competition between two forms of statist, expeditionary interventionism. Peace memorials, however, are not established or maintained with the same level of state resources as those dedicated to war because war does more to strengthen state identity. Indeed, peace memorials portray states as part of the problem (Gough, 2002: 215). Many pacifists even see government sponsorship of monuments to peace as a contradiction because it attempts to associate the state with the timeless ideal of universal peace (Gough, 2002, 215). In addition, Gough maintains, contested statist values require iconization, while the international ideal of
humanitarian progress does not. This also duplicates tension between exceptionalist national traits and the progress of modernism, whereby combat expeditions demonstrate Canadian virtues while peacekeeping is international and associated with human progress in general.

There are currently 4,971 war memorials in Canada according to the Department of National Defence and the Organization of Military Museums Canada (GoC, 2008). The distribution can vary from 80 in Toronto, population 2.5 million, to 3 in Mildmay, Ontario, population 3,500. Many monuments are modest plaques, books of remembrance, cairns, and museums. As of 1994, about 400 monuments were devoted to peace, most of them parks (Gough, 2002: 221). The Federal Department of Canadian Heritage provides support because “Canadians value heritage as central to their sense of identity, their attachment to Canada and their quality of life” (GoC, 2007a).

The military, especially, relies on memorialization to reinforce its identity. *Duty with Honour* refers to the narratives of “military history, heritage, and traditions” and “celebrating battles won and conflicts prevented,” as necessary “intangibles” for the military ethos (CFLI, 2003: 58). The manual states that they generate pride and spur motivation, cohesion, and “esprit de corps” (CFLI, 2003: 58). Photographs of war monuments, without captions, are used as icons in military publications. *Duty with Honour*, for example, features photographs of details of the War Memorial in Ottawa as part of a montage on the front cover and as a full-page frontispiece on page 3. A smaller photo of The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier appears on page 44. A half page photo of the Peacekeeping Monument can be found on page 77 and a full-page reproduction introduces the Selected Bibliography section on page 79 (CFLI, 2003). The Canadian Forces *Leadership Manual* ends with a full-page photo of the Vimy Ridge Memorial. In the time separating the publication of the two manuals, the military’s identity as represented by monuments had shifted from war and peace to war (CFLI, 2005: 23). This section considers how three large-scale monuments are used in the establishment of Canada as a state and the subsequent struggle for narrative supremacy between the peacekeeping and combat versions of statism. The monuments are the Canadian National Vimy Memorial in France; the National War Memorial and the adjacent Tomb of the
Unknown Soldier in Ottawa; and the Canadian Peacekeeping Monument in Ottawa. Vimy as a narrative and a monument will serve as the primary example.

The Canadian Encyclopedia (2010a) also lists the attack at Vimy Ridge as one of the one hundred greatest events in Canadian history and adds that “it was a brilliant victory for the Canadians, who sensed a new national awareness.” During WWI, British and French troops had unsuccessfully attacked German held Vimy Ridge, near Arras, France. A force mainly consisting of Canadian forces finally took the ridge in the five days from April 9 to 14, 1917. There were about 10,600 Canadian casualties, of which 3,600 were fatal (Canadian Encyclopedia, 2010d). The War Museum’s Online Exhibition article states that “[m]any historians and writers consider the Canadian victory at Vimy a defining moment for Canada, when the country emerged from under the shadow of Britain and felt capable of greatness” (GoC, 2010i). According to the War Museum’s entry and another at the Veteran Affairs’ website, the battle is significant because Canadians developed novel tactics and operated as a single, national group rather than be integrated into a number of British units (GoC, 2010j). Both sources quote Canadian Brigadier-General A.E. Ross, who said “[i]n those few minutes I witnessed the birth of a nation” (GoC, 2010i; GoC, 2010j). Shortly after the war, official military historians were aware of the potential for controversy surrounding the choice of Vimy Ridge as a preeminent symbol of success and Canadian identity. Mewburn (1929), chair of the Battlefields Memorial Commission, worried that claims of Canadian prowess were exaggerated. For example, the tactics had been copied painstakingly from the French Army and most of the troops had been born in Britain. In comparison, Mewburn knew that the relatively unpublicized Battle of Amiens in August 8, 1918, which had many more Canadian born soldiers and commanders, was truly innovative in tactics and technology. It was also strategically much more important. The same could be said for the operations at Drocourt-Quéant Seitch on the Hindenburg line and the Canal du Nord in September 1918, which actually affected the outcome of the war (Mewburn, 1929: 7). Among others factors, regimental pride led to the choice of Vimy Ridge. Colonel Duguid, who was the Director of the Historical Section of the General Army Staff in 1929, pressured the Memorials Commission to select Vimy as the prime site because he and his unit had fought there (Mewburn, 1929). Ultimately, Mewburn
acknowledged that enough momentum already surrounded Vimy that the attack would be the easiest to promote as Canada’s version of Agincourt (Mewburn, 1929). Agincourt, fought in France in 1415, had become an inspirational battle for English nationalists. A large memorial was soon planned for Vimy. The Vimy Monument was completed on the ridge and originally dedicated on July 26, 1936, just a few months before German troops regained sovereignty over the Rhineland. What was to be a timeless icon quickly became a contemporary embarrassment (Gough, 2002: 221). On April 17, 2007, the Monument had been extensively refurbished to mark the 90th anniversary of the operation. Maintenance work, neglected for decades, had been hurried to meet the target date (GoC, 2003). An elaborate re-dedication ceremony in Ottawa and Vimy was attended by politicians, current and former military personnel, and other dignitaries. The Governor General of Canada, Michaëlle Jean, delivered a speech in Ottawa that demonstrates how historic accuracy is sacrificed and narratives are subject to reductionist, emotional appeals aimed at convincing the rank and file that selflessness is worthwhile whether past, present, or future. Here are some excerpts:

“It was precisely 5:30. A cold, grey morning in northern France exploded with the impossible sound of a thousand guns firing as one.

It was the day a young Canada marked out a place of its own.

In many ways, the confidence we have in ourselves as Canadians, the independence with which we express ourselves in the world, and the esteem with which we are held by the global community began with the courage and sacrifice of that day so long ago.

Today, as we gather at our National War Memorial to mark the 90th anniversary of this pivotal event in our collective history, a great many of our fellow Canadians are gathered at the Vimy Memorial in France.

Our young people continue to answer the call today; they don uniforms and selflessly venture forth, on behalf of Canada and alongside their comrades
from the international community, into troubled parts of the world where it is crucial to build and maintain peace.

Just yesterday, six of our soldiers paid with their lives and two others were wounded by a deadly mine in southern Afghanistan.

Exactly one month ago, I visited with them in Kandahar. I was touched by their unyielding determination, their courage in the face of innumerable dangers and their sense of duty to help provide the people of Afghanistan with what they hope for and deserve: security, stability, justice and conditions in which they can thrive.

I am delighted to see so many young faces here among us today, and to know that some 5,000 other young Canadians are at Vimy Ridge as we speak.

You, the youth of our country, have a duty to remember those who sacrificed their own youth, if not their lives, in the name of justice and freedom.

The legacy they have handed down must stand the test of time.

Memory lasts longer than stone monuments.

Today our memory has rekindled the torch of remembrance to light our way as we confront the horrors facing humanity.

We must never forget.”

Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada (GoC 2007g)

The timing for the original dedication of The National War Memorial and the Peacekeeping Monument in Ottawa also illustrate the fragility of mythic narratives. Although the design to memorialize the dead from WWI was chosen in 1926, the work on the War Memorial was only completed in May 1939, just months before the start of WWII (Gough, 2002: 211). The Canadian Peacekeeping Monument, meanwhile, was dedicated on October 8, 1992, just months after the March 19, 1992 torture killing of a detainee by the members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment on a peacekeeping expedition to Somalia.
(Gough, 2002: 208-209). The scandal that followed greatly reduced Canada’s reputation as a peacekeeper. Shortly after the monument’s unveiling, it was vandalized by graffiti bearing the name of the murdered Somali youth.

Within a few years, when government and military executives sought to shift the public’s attention from peacekeeping to combat expeditions, memorialization efforts were re-directed to combat narratives. Accordingly, a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was installed at the foot of the National War Memorial in Ottawa on May 28, 2000, to hold the remains of a soldier found at Vimy Ridge (Gough, 2002: 221-222). After lying in state in the Parliament Buildings, the body was moved to the memorial and re-interred in a granite and bronze sarcophagus. The ceremony lasted several days and was well televised. The Veterans Affairs Website stated that it “is a fitting way to honour the sacrifices on which our freedoms were built” (GoC, 2007a).

The War Memorial and Tomb are the site of the annual Remembrance Day ceremonies, which are broadcasted across the nation every November 11, the date of the signing of the Armistice to end WWI. Ceremonies centered on the Peacekeeping Monument are much more modest. For years, it was neglected as a venue for official remembrance until a National Peacekeepers Day was declared in 2008 by the federal Parliament as a private member’s bill. It was celebrated for the first time on August 9, 2008 at the Peacekeeping Monument, sixteen years after the original dedication ceremony (GoC, 2008c).

3.3.3 Branding Military State Narratives

Another knowledge, as the term is used in Foucault’s schema, comes into play when a bureaucracy with substantial resources adopts a policy of promoting an historical narrative as a brand. Branding is a mass consumer marketing technique that Ind (2003) links to the modernist discourse of material progress by the enjoyment of private property and greater consumer choice of goods and services. While he mentions the Age of Enlightenment and John Locke as antecedents, brand marketing began with the routine discipline and technologies that became available in the late 19th and 20th Centuries (Ind, 2003). The application of branding to state identities is now widespread and well developed. A
leading voice in this field is Simon Anholt, a UK based author, government consultant, and editor of the quarterly journal *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*. The Director of Strategic Communications Services for the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade sits on the journal’s editorial Board. A sample online issue is available free to the public (*PBPD*, 2008). An advertisement for Anholt-GfK Roper Nations Brand Index™ consultancy service is also available online (Roper, 2008). The approach follows the discourse of the space and time tensions of Us-Other statism. The company promises to “succinctly” measure a nation’s brand along five axes: exports, governance, culture and heritage, people, and tourism. Their assessment includes the degree to which the population inside a state believes that outsiders share their espoused values of democracy, fairness, and their way of life in general. The brand also includes the perception of outsiders of the subject state’s culture, heritage, competence, and degree of hostility or friendliness toward others. Promotional material promises that branding can enhance the self-identity of individuals by fulfilling “higher needs for self-esteem, socialization and self-actualization” (Ind, 2003: 4). The attractiveness of a state brand also aligns with the need of creating the degree of certainty required to launch armed expeditions. Ind notes that a well-managed brand can assuage “anxiety and doubt” and make decisions “easier and safer” (Ind, 2003: 4). Ind’s understanding of branding also resembles Foucault’s concept of self-forming activity in the sense that successful branding depends on customer cooperation to absorb the image and attributes of the product because a brand is but a “transforming idea, that only exists in the buyer’s mind and it is the buyer that has the power to begin, sustain or terminate a relationship with it” (Ind, 2003: 3). Ind is not unaware of the negative aspects of branding and modern productivity in general. States often exhibit traits not in the interests of the majority, such as inequitable distribution of wealth and policies that fail to reduce environmental degradation. The benefits usually accrue to a small elite, thus raising the issues of transformational contractarianism discussed above. Ind (2003) is also concerned that branding is often tainted by expediency, exaggeration, and unethical execution. Thus, branding raises the issue of trust and vulnerability on the part of customers, because they never have complete information.
The proponents of a policy favouring combat expeditions now use branding to advance their preferred narrative. Military executives also hope to convince the public that armed forces are still relevant in the post-Cold War era and essential post-9/11. Here is a quote from Lieutenant Colonel Goodspeed (2002) promoting the use of branding for the Canadian Forces in an article entitled “Identifying Ourselves in the Information Age”:

“Brand is a hard-edged, real world concept that we have ignored for a long time. In its simplest form, brand is what people think of when they think about us and, if we don’t ruthlessly manage our brand, others, by design or default, will manage it for us.

Brands have to be clearly understood; they require painstaking, long term management and meticulous day-to-day execution.

A solid brand that builds long-term support and public confidence demands informed public understanding and trust.

One characteristic of a good organizational brand is that it must reinforce and help define our ethos. The subject of ethos has for very sound reasons taken on tremendous prominence in the last half decade. Brand, in a military context, is a telegraphic means of expressing the organization’s ethos. We owe it to those who went before us to ensure that the characteristics and ideals that forged our heritage are not lost because we refused or were incapable of promoting them using the tools of the Information Age.

It is not too much to suggest that a CF brand should evoke images of an elite team: committed, professional and steadfast men and women who are mentally and physically prepared to overcome hardship and danger.

An effective brand should not be dependant on size, equipment, or current tasking; however, it must be something that inspires, motivates, and guides each
of us. It has to be one that has an enduring significance and evokes to our members, as well as all Canadians, both our character and our expectations.”

Goodspeed (2002: 48)

Note how Goodspeed envisions branding as making use of reductionist imagery, disciplined bureaucracy, and the new technologies of modernism. It is also essential to competition in a struggle of narratives and is a means of responding to recent pressure on the military ethos. At the time his article was published, Goodspeed was a public affairs officer working in National Defence Headquarters and on the staff of the Canadian Defence Academy.

Branding takes advantage of the resources and public acceptance of military recruiting advertising. Goodspeed argues that it is the best way to establish and sustain a brand because it is the most visible aspect of the military for the majority of Canadians. He believes that recruiting is a long term process whereby potential targets and their local community should receive a consistent and frequently repeated message. Recruiting advertisement is also important to “internal marketing” for existing personnel because it improves “retention, satisfaction and morale” (Goodspeed, 2002: 47). In March, 2001, the Department of National Defence assembled 65 defence analysts to discuss the image of the Canadian Forces (Staples, 2006: 8-9). They debated the pros and cons between a peacekeeping and a war-fighting brand. Peacekeeping fit the public’s perception of the military and was expected to garner wide support for expeditions and adequate defence spending. They thought that war fighting, on the other hand, represented the real identity of the military. It was decided that the peacekeeping narrative would be replaced by one favouring war. The Department of National Defence Human Resource Strategy, issued at the same time as Goodspeed’s article, began to emphasize pride and dynamic operations as a brand in its recruiting advertising (GoC, 2002). By December, 2006, television recruiting commercials featured heavily armed military personnel stalking through west-central Asian neighbourhoods. With no voice over, the ads feature banner script advertising the opportunity to “fight fear,” “fight
distress,” and “fight chaos.” (GoC, 2008). By the end of December, 2006, brochures in recruiting centers were using the language of the new brand. Fighting for freedom and fighting against fear, distress, and chaos fits easily into the values and progress statist discourse.

Military spending has shifted to from peacekeeping to combat expeditions during the two decades following the end of the Cold War. In fiscal year 1992-1993, as much as 90 percent of military spending for expeditions was for UN missions. By 2004-2005, only 30 percent was spent on UN missions (Staples, 2006: 8-9). In a 1999 Pollara poll, commissioned by the Department of National Defence, however, Canadians reported a marked preference for development and humanitarian aid as opposed to combat operations, even if Canadian territory were threatened. Almost 80 percent reported that they preferred a military that deployed abroad in support of peace, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief (Munton, 2003: 29). Only 30 percent saw the military’s role as being the defence of Canada. An Ipsos Reid poll conducted in March of 2009 found that the Canadian population still strongly identified their national and military identity with peacekeeping (Ipsos Reid, 2009). Focus group participants associated the military with “Canadian flags, peace symbols, Canadian soldiers as peacekeepers and deliverers of humanitarian assistance” (Ipsos Reid, 2009: 1). They referred to Canada as a “peacekeeping country.” About 90 percent of the survey respondents said they considered a military response to international situations requiring humanitarian assistance as being a moral issue. While many respondents still viewed peacekeeping with pride, they were nevertheless aware that role was undergoing change. Most people in the focus groups did not want combat expeditions except as a “very last resort” and only for “the right reason; for example, protecting civilians or self-defence” (Ipsos Reid, 2009: 2-3). The branding campaign appears to be reaching its audience but still has not changed their opinions.

Henry (2009) refers to the later poll in a comment on the government’s failed efforts. Henry is a retired colonel, a former spokesperson and Senior Defence Analyst for the pro-military advocacy group Conference of Defence Associations, and a subject matter expert invited to testify before Parliamentary Committees on numerous occasions (e.g. GoC, 1999c). Despite the efforts of Conservative politicians and military leadership, the lack of results, he reasons, is due to “disinformation” (Henry, 2009: 42). He
contends that modern electronic media, such as the internet, Google, Wikipedia, Facebook, YouTube, and blogs, has carried content designed to deliberately mislead the population into accepting the myth of peacekeeping. “Irresponsible interest groups,” he continues, have “forced governments to respond to their agendas by duping large populations of voters” (Henry, 2009: 42). The government itself is guilty, knowingly or not, for failing to send a consistent message when it promotes causes “such as gender equality, visible minorities, multiculturalism, social justice and peacekeeping” (Henry, 2009: 43). He concludes by urging the government to work in these new media to “fight and defeat disinformation on its own ground” (Henry, 2009: 43). He need not worry about military personnel according to the results of an Army sponsored opinion poll on military policy. Just fewer than 30 percent of respondents said it was worth risking Canadian lives on peacekeeping expeditions and about 15 percent thought the same for humanitarian expeditions (DGLCD, 2005: 28). In contrast, over 80 percent said that accomplishing the mission was more important than their safety when defending Canadian territory. The sample was “neutral” when asked whether the army ought to promote espoused Canadian values such as minority, gender, language, and human rights (DGLCD, 2005: 25).

Brand Canada as a statist discourse is popular with the population. Canadians report that they are pleased with their nation and their image as a people. According to a Pew survey of global attitudes released in 2005, 94 percent of Canadians say they think they are well liked by other peoples (Pew, 2005). This rate of self-approval was the highest among the 16 countries surveyed. The Ipsos Reid poll of 2009, meanwhile, reports that 82 percent of Canadians consider the military to be “a source of pride,” and that 90 percent say that it the military is an “essential” element of their country (Ipsos Reid, 2009: 1).

3.4 Summary and Conclusion

Moral codes and other forms of knowledge transform ethical substance and associated discourses into narratives and potential activities ready for use within a power-knowledge network. In this chapter, moral codes were derived from Foucault’s Hermeneutics and the Canadian military’s ethos and leadership manuals. Related knowledges examined were the teaching of state narratives, the memorialization of
combat and peacekeeping expeditions through monuments and ceremonies, and the promotion of military statism as a branded product.

The moral code that Foucault found in his reading of Kant and the Hellenists is a process of preparation, perception, and activism in governance and public life. There is a duty to oneself to critique discourse and shape a personal, moral way of life, rather than obey externally imposed norms. To follow Foucault’s moral code, individuals must develop a capacity for free deliberation and volition. The individual’s ability to maintain free thought and action, however, must overcome the challenge of critiquing discourse while in a discourse and while bound by the strictures of power-knowledge. It becomes necessary to exercise sufficient free will to escape these bounds. This conundrum is a core issue for Western philosophy and struggle, as understood by Foucault and demonstrated by the Canadian military.

Moral codes in the Western tradition, especially the Anglo-West, emphasize the duties of the individual to the state. In the military, the code is dominated by the duty of self-abnegation derived from a discourse whose assumptions and principles are not subject to question. The military moral code, paradoxically, also states that the individual is responsible to prepare, perceive, and act independently in matters of ethical behaviour in the manner described by Foucault. Three military codes have been identified in the ethos manual *Duty with Honour*: professionalism, warrior’s honour, and the combination of leadership and social contractarianism. Professionalism is a long-term effort to prepare oneself for duty by learning a core body of technical knowledge, and in a circular argument, by adhering to the military’s moral code. The warrior’s honour is the perception and resolution of ethical dilemmas in accordance with military professionalism, societal values, and laws. Leadership and social contractarianism can be viewed as an espoused form of governance whereby executives are granted moral infallibility and followers irrevocably forfeit their interests. The military *Leadership Manual* (CFLI, 2005) endorses transformational leadership, which uses emotional appeals, personal charisma, control of communications, and other means to persuade followers to obey executives and cooperate with the bureaucracy. Such methods may be necessary to persuade the rank and file to follow a contradictory code.
that demands both unlimited obedience and liability on one hand, and individual ethics and accountability on the other. In the manuals, while it might be expected that statism would not be critiqued, there is no attempt to reconcile the demands of statism with those of individual conscience.

In the discussion of the statist discourse and narratives in Chapter 2, it was found that the competition for political supremacy requires reductionism, repetition, and emotional appeals. In this chapter the formation of military, statist moral codes into Foucault’s knowledges were studied as the teaching, memorializing, and branding of military state narratives. Each becomes a knowledge when combined with other discourses and non-discursive things, such as school curriculums, museums, and television documentaries; concrete and bronze on battlefields and in capital cities; and bureaucratically managed advertising campaigns. This combination, of course, forms power-knowledge. As historical narratives move from statist discourse to the inter-personal and situational practices of power-knowledge, they become increasingly vulnerable to factual inaccuracies, exposure as acts of propaganda, embarrassing timing, and the exaggerated claims of competing politicized groups. Some examples of revisionist research were provided regarding Billy Bishop, Vimy Ridge, Dieppe and the major monuments dedicated to WWI, WWII, and peacekeeping. Notwithstanding the problems, they are still used without apology or restraint as modes of subjection.

In the next chapter, the power-knowledge evident at sites of interaction illustrates how Hellenistic stoic ethical training and the rules and procedures of the modern military bureaucracy challenge the moral codes just discussed. The effects of dominant narratives and knowledges are also examined in the context of military culture and actual behaviour in garrison and on expedition.

3.5 Selected Texts on Military Moral Codes and Knowledge

A reference to the warrior’s honour in the context of possible war crimes and partisan politics:

The Ottawa Citizen, Juliet O’Neill, February 3, 2010:
“Liberals blame government, not soldiers, in detainee dispute”

Liberals made clear Wednesday they are accusing civilian members of government, and not soldiers on the ground, of possible war crimes in Afghanistan.

Liberal defence critic Ujjal Dosanjh drew the distinction after the Conservatives mailed a “householder” pamphlet to thousands of constituents accusing the Liberals of questioning the honour of Canada’s military during the months-long Afghan detainees affair.

The pamphlet contains a partial quote by Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff about the conduct of troops and a partial quote by Toronto MP John McCallum that “they may have been committing war crimes.”

Dosanjh and Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae condemned the pamphlet, sent to ridings with high military populations, as “lies and nonsense.”

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Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran as a spokesperson for the government’s policy of combat statism using historical narratives and memorialization:


“Final respects for fallen heroes: Skyreach packed as garrison, country honour sacrifice.”

“Computer controlled cameras, ample stage lighting and simulcast video on a giant screen on stage for those sitting too far from the stage, lent a surreal Hollywood quality to the memorial.” A video taped message from Stogran in Kandahar was aired on the Jumbotron screen. General(ret) de Chastelain spoke of the soldiers from Stogran’s regiment who had died in World Wars I and II, Korea, and peacekeeping expeditions. Gregoire quoted the spouse of a soldier from the nearby base as saying, “It made me more proud to be a Canadian. Our guys don’t want to sit on the sidelines. This is what they trained for.”
Governor General of Canada News Release, “Distinguished Canadians to join Governor General at a luncheon celebrating the Golden Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen,” October 3, 2002

Her Excellency the Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, Governor General of Canada, and His Excellency John Ralston Saul have invited a group of distinguished Canadians – one representing each year of Her Majesty’s reign – to a luncheon at Rideau Hall in honour of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and His Royal Highness The Prince Philip Duke of Edinburgh.

From celebrated artists and scientists, to renowned athletes and dedicated nation-builders, the Canadians invited to celebrate Thanksgiving with The Queen represent achievements that make us proud to be Canadian. Each year of Her Majesty’s reign will be represented by a Canadian whose achievements marked that year.

From internationally acclaimed director Norman Jewison, the representative for the first year of Her Majesty’s reign, to LCol Pat Stogran, representing the Golden Jubilee year, these Canadians represent a living history of our nation. LCol Stogran was the Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, stationed in Afghanistan over the past year.

The Ottawa Citizen, D. Rider, November 30, 2002, A6:

“Stogran heckled for Afghan action. York students brand army officer ‘killer,’ U.S. tool”

“We were the kings of Kandahar.” “We’re professional but fierce ‘like a pack of rabid pitbulls’”

[Stogran] “was branded a ‘killer’ and a ‘tool of Canadian big business’ by some students during a heated question-and-answer period.” “Mustapha Henaway…” told Stogran “he should be full of shame not ‘glee and conviction.’” “We can use the guise of terrorism to murder people around the world,’ Mr. Henaway added, to applause from a handful of the students.”

“Lt.-Col. Stogran snapped ‘next question’ but then added ‘go talk to some Afghans… in Kandahar, the people we built wells for, that we built schools for.’ ‘Josh Decker, a student and member of
the socialist groups International Bolshevik Tendency…’ said: ‘You don’t know how many people you killed’, ‘to which Stogran replied: ‘Will you cut me some slack. That was an uncalled-for statement.’”

“After the session, Lt.Col. Stogran said in an interview that, had he known the questions ahead, he wouldn’t have given a ‘feel-good happy speech.’”

Governor General of Canada News Release, March 12, 2003:

“Governor General announces Meritorious Service Decorations, Mentions in dispatches and the Commander-in-Chief Unit Commendation,”

Her Excellency the Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, Governor General of Canada, today announced the recipients’ names for Meritorious Service Decorations (military division), Mentions in dispatches and the Commander-in-Chief Unit Commendation that will be awarded to military recipients. Insignia will be presented later this year.

Meritorious Service Cross [awarded to] Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Benton Stogran, M.S.C, C.D.

The Toronto Board of Trade website, November 12, 2003:

“Recent Events – 2003”

Colonel Stogran captivated the Board of Trade Young Professionals with tales of leadership and combat in Afghanistan at this 2nd Tuesday Remembrance (sic) Day Dinner. Of the men and women under his command, he said: “There was a sense of ownership, a sense of pride. They were representing Canada. When you send your young sons and daughters over there, you are exporting Canadian ethos, Canadian values.”

The Ottawa Citizen, photo and caption, September 26, 2004:

“We have a bunch of Mandarins that shove this peacekeeping down the throats of Canadians and say we are not a militaristic society… ‘We like a good punch-up,’”

Canada is “too ‘wrapped up in medicare.’”

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Note: If Colonel Stogran was speaking without authorization, he was committing service offences under Queen’s Regulation and Order 19.14 - Improper Comments, which states that an “officer or non-commissioned member” shall not “do or say anything that: if seen or heard by any member of the public, might reflect discredit on the Canadian Forces…”; and under Queen’s Regulation and Order 19.36 Disclosure of Information or Opinion, which states an “officer or non-commissioned member,” “without permission” shall not deliver “a broadcast in any dealing with a subject of a controversial nature affecting other departments of the public service or pertaining to public policy.” Even if he was authorized to speak on military matters, Defence Administrative Order and Directives (DAOD) 2008-2 Media Relations and Public Announcements, states that “CF members and DND employees speaking in their official capacity, including designated subject matters experts and PAOs [Public Affairs Officers], shall not: respond to media queries that fall outside of their personal areas of experience or expertise, unless authorized to do so; or offer personal opinion on government, DND or CF policy.”

Veterans Affairs Canada News Release, March 13, 2008:

“First Veterans Ombudsman—Colonel (retired) Patrick B. Stogran”

In his first month on the job, the Ombudsman crossed the country, reaching out to Veterans. “We have to cultivate a deep empathy for our Veterans,” he says. Colonel Stogran’s experience is extensive and varied. He has served in a number of military roles, but first rose to prominence during his time as Commanding Officer of troops in Afghanistan.

“The world views Canadians as a caring people,” he says. “Throughout our military history ... Canadians always answered the call. The reason why the Dutch people cheer our Veterans in the streets of Holland is because of that sacrifice.”
Other military and government executives speaking on behalf of the government’s policy of combat statism using historical narratives and memorialization:

*The Ottawa Citizen*, Tim Shufelt, March 27, 2008

“Defence chief praises new breed of ‘war heroes,’ Governor General presents soldiers with decorations for actions in combat.”

A new generation of Canadian war heroes is emerging from the battlefields of Afghanistan, Canada’s chief of defence staff said yesterday.

“You marked a new chapter in our military history,” Gen. Hillier said.

For just the second time since Canada’s military valour decorations were created in 1993, the Medal of Military Valour was awarded to four soldiers, and the Star of Military Valour -- an honour second only to the Victoria Cross -- to Maj. David Quick.

“I’m pretty assertive, but how aggressive I can be, and how vicious I had become at times, those are things I was shocked about and still deal with today as the kind of things I’m not necessarily proud of. There are things about myself I wish I didn’t know.”

Gen. Hillier said that range of emotions was part of the soldier’s experience.

“We go about our daily duties, and we get to experience enormous satisfaction, and many burdens all at the same time. Two sides of the same coin. Depending on what the day delivers, we celebrate the first and we bear the second with honour.”

*The Toronto Star*, Kerry Gillespie, May 25, 2007:

“Military faces ‘revolution.’ Hillier cites new recruiting, training”

The Canadian military is undergoing a revolution in what it does and how it does it – designed to let the country take its deserved place on the world stage, Canada’s top soldier says.
“We’re trying to give Canada a seat at the table, an opportunity to influence a region, a country, an event in accordance with our interests and with our values because of our (military) contribution,” Hillier told reporters after his speech at the annual Canadian Press dinner.

This is something Canada has not done since Vimy Ridge in World War I, he said. The Canadian contribution in the decisive battle at Vimy Ridge is often cited as a reason the country, until then viewed as little more than a British colony, won the right to separately sign the Versailles peace treaty.

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Memorialization of past battles tied to current combat expeditions:

CBC News, August 19, 2007:

“Dieppe anniversary marked amid sadness for Afghanistan loss”

“The emotional trip back in time Sunday for elderly veterans of the disastrous Dieppe raid was heightened with the news that another Canadian soldier had been killed in Afghanistan.

A tribute to the 913 Canadians who died in the Aug. 19, 1942 battle in this northern French port was just underway when the army’s chaplain, Maj. Michel Dion, announced in his prayer of remembrance that a 23-year-old Quebec-based soldier had been killed near Kandahar.

But a veteran of Afghanistan who accompanied the old soldiers on this emotional pilgrimage said the recent casualties have reawakened Canadians to their history and introduced a whole new generation to the pain of war.

Drawing the link between the military sacrifices of past wars is something the Conservative government has done increasingly as the public has grown more uneasy about rising casualties in Afghanistan.

“It is a different world, but there is no question there is a link between what our soldiers fought for here and what they are fighting for in Afghanistan,” Veterans Affairs Minister Greg Thompson said.
following the day’s second multi-nation tribute at the Canadian memorial overlooking the beachfront Esplanade.

“The values we cherish as Canadians, those values have not changed in 65 years,” he said. “The mission is a different mission. It is defined differently. It’s a different world that what we were living in 65 years ago. Still, at the end of the day, we are accepting our international responsibilities.”

The raid on German fortifications, preceding the victorious D-Day assault by two years, was described as a test run for larger invasions, which were to follow throughout the war.

The Ottawa Citizen, Jack Granatstein, April 9, 2002, (A15):

“The battle that made a nation: The Canadian Corps won Vimy Ridge 85 years ago in a bloody fight that shaped who we are today”

The victory of April 9, 1917 has been hailed as the birth of Canadian nationalism, the day Canada ceased being a colony and became a nation. Vimy is the Canadian victory, the pinnacle of Canadian military achievement.

Worth remembering, however, is that Byng [the commanding officer] was British, as were his superiors – the Canadian Corps did not fight under Canadian command until Currie took over. Moreover, it was not until late 1918 that the Canadian-born made up more than half of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

Did this make the force less Canadian? On the contrary, virtually every commentator then and since concluded that the soldiers became Canadian in battle, convinced that their corps, their nation-information, was something special. So it was – and is.

The Globe and Mail, Gloria Galloway, April 6, 2007:

“Language faux pas mars Vimy preparations. Ottawa also scrambles over lunch money for students.”
As Canadians prepare to mark the heroic victory at Vimy Ridge, the government is correcting French grammar and spelling errors on plaques at the memorial and explaining why students who attend the battle’s 90th anniversary ceremonies must buy their own lunch.

[Veterans Affairs Minister Greg Thompson] said he could not provide the names of those responsible, or the name of their group, other than to say they are Canadian.

Trip organizers told teachers in an e-mail that the government said it would provide lunch for the students on April 9, the day of the ceremony at the Canadian memorial.

But Mr. Thompson said Thursday that no such offer had been made and the students would have to pick up their own lunch tab.

“I think it was a misunderstanding, to be perfectly frank,” the minister told reporters. “It was very clear from the get-go that the students and the schools raised their own funding independent of Veterans Affairs to do this.”

“I am anything but impressed with the French grammar and the French syntax and the like on the [visitor’s centre at the] monument,” said Col. Drapeau.

“We come across as amateurs. And veterans, including myself, will see that as a bit of a slap in the face, an absence of care, an absence of attention. And, in a country like Canada with two languages that are official, there is absolutely no reason for it. The excuse that we have left this to volunteers simply doesn’t wash. It just doesn’t cut it with me.”

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The Ottawa Citizen, Jennifer Campbell, March 12, 2010:

“Bring a bit of Vimy to Ottawa, ex-general says”

Seven years from now, Senator Romeo Dallaire would like to see a piece of Vimy Ridge here in the national capital region. The year 2017 is rather significant for Canada, he points out, given that it’s the 150th anniversary of Confederation, as well as the 100th anniversary of the battle of Vimy Ridge, where many argue Canada became a nation.
The senator’s idea is to replicate the statue of Mother Canada, who solemnly stands, head bowed, over the Ridge, mourning the loss of life there, and indeed all over France during the First World War. He’d like to see the Ottawa version of the white stone statue made two to three times the size of the one at Vimy, and he’d like her to be positioned in Jacques Cartier Park, just across the bridge in Gatineau, a kilometer (as the crow flies) from Parliament Hill, and visible from some of its offices, and from its grounds. The idea is to let even more Canadians to take in at least part of the remarkable tribute to Canada’s war dead by bringing a part of the Arras-based monument to Canadian soil.

Dallaire, who had a distinguished military career before becoming a senator, was a member of the Vimy Monument Conservation Advisory Committee, which oversaw the monument’s extensive restoration in 2007.

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*The Ottawa Citizen*, Don Butler, March 14, 2011:

“Vimy Foundation hopes fundraiser will raise the battle’s profile”

The swift capture of Vimy Ridge was one of the decisive events of the First World War. In two days of ferocious fighting — April 9 and 10, 1917 — Canadian soldiers captured more ground, German prisoners and guns than in any previous British offensive since the start of the Great War.

Now the Vimy Foundation, a five-year-old organization dedicated to raising awareness of the battle’s significance, especially among young and new Canadians, is about to throw what amounts to its Ottawa coming-out party. Tickets, which cost $175 and include a $125 tax receipt, went on sale in early March.

“In some ways,” observes Burrows [event chairman], “this really was Canada becoming a full nation on its own, directly as a result of Vimy.” But that’s poorly understood by most contemporary Canadians. Polls have found that awareness of the Vimy battle ranges from six to 30 per cent among Canadian adults.

The foundation is doing all it can. It runs an annual scholarship program, called the Beaverbrook Vimy Prize, that sends a group of 15- to-17-year-olds to England, France and Belgium for two weeks of
study and battlefield visits. The prize is awarded based on essay submissions and interviews. The foundation also runs a Vimy Week program with Encounters with Canada. It brings between 120 and 130 students to Ottawa for a week of study and touring.

Houghton [the Foundation’s President and portfolio manager for high net worth individuals at RBC Dominion Securities] credits France’s former ambassador to Canada, François Delattre, now in Washington, for wholeheartedly supporting next month’s fundraiser, which will feature champagne, hors d’oeuvres and remarks by Rick Hillier [the Foundation’s Honourary Chairman], the Canadian Forces former chief of staff.

CBC News, February 10, 2009:
“Toronto airport renamed after Billy Bishop”

“Billy Bishop was one of our first war heroes, and he set the stage for today, where thousands of other men and women in uniform put their lives on the line for Canadian values and the defence of others,” said Mark McQueen, chairman of the Toronto Port Authority in a written statement.

“The Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport is dedicated as much to Canada's veterans and active service military personnel as it is to its namesake, who inspired a young nation with his courage and dedication,” said McQueen.

The Bradford West Gwilimbury Times, Miriam King, August 14, 2008
“Celebrating National Peacekeepers’ Day”

While it was the 5th year that members of CAVUNP (Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping), CFB [Canadian Forces Base] Borden, police services and local dignitaries have come together to honour “Peacekeepers Day”, it was the first time that the entire Nation has also joined in recognizing the contributions of Canadians through U.N. Peacekeeping missions. In June 2008, the federal government passed private member’s Bill 287, declaring August 9th as National Peacekeepers Day in Canada.
Why August 9th? It was on that date in 1974 that Canada suffered its greatest 1-day loss of life in a peacekeeping mission, when a missile brought down a Buffalo airplane on a routine supply flight to Damascus, Syria. All 9 Canadians on board were killed.

Note: The ceremony was held in Angus, Ontario, population 2,596.

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*The Globe and Mail, Canadian Press, August 9, 2008*

“Peacekeepers honoured in long-awaited day of recognition”

Canada’s international peacekeepers enjoyed a long-awaited day in the sun Saturday, with the celebration of the first-ever National Peacekeepers Day.

Veterans Affairs Minister Greg Thompson paid tribute to their efforts at a ceremony in Ottawa, telling about 100 Canadian Forces and RCMP veterans of peacekeeping missions that they represent the very essence of Canada.

“It’s who we are, it’s what we stand for,” said Mr. Thompson. “And it’s what other nations think of when they see the Canadian Maple Leaf.”

Prime Minister Stephen Harper offered similar sentiments in a written statement, describing peacekeeping efforts as “a symbol of our country’s commitment to building a more safe and secure world.”

Ironically, the official declaration of a national day of honour comes at a time when the Canadian military, stretched thin by its combat role in Afghanistan, is devoting fewer resources and personnel to United Nations and other international peacekeeping missions.

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On memorialization and vulnerability to embarrassment:

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*CBC News, July 3, 2006:*

“Police seeking revelers who urinated on Ottawa memorial.”
Ottawa police are looking for three Canada Day revelers photographed urinating on the National War Memorial.

[The] picture, taken around 11 p.m. on July 1 after a fireworks display ended, has prompted outrage.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper called an Ottawa radio station and said the action was “thoughtless,” but “it doesn’t represent the views of any segment of Canadian society, we all strongly honour our vets.”

The incidents came hours after Harper and Gov. Gen. Michaëlle Jean hosted a huge ceremony at the site.

CTV News, June 27, 2007

“Ottawa boosts security at National War Memorial.”

The federal government is instituting a series of year-round security measures at the National War Memorial and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier after Canada Day revelers urinated on the site last year.

Beginning Saturday, two sentries will stand guard at the site throughout the summer tourist season, while year-round electronic surveillance of the memorial in central Ottawa has been boosted.

The steps come after an outcry from citizens and veterans’ organizations over the desecration of what Veterans Affairs Minister Greg Thompson calls a “sacred site.”

It’s not the first time the memorial has been subjected to indignities. In 2005, someone spray-painted a swastika on the stone in the early-morning hours of Remembrance Day.

They say a lack of education on what Canadian veterans have contributed to the country is largely to blame for the disrespectful incidents.

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Recruiting, advertising, and military and statist branding:
“Canadians choose fight over flight from Forces.”

The gravity of the situation in Afghanistan is not deterring new recruits from joining the military. I mean, in a week when eight soldiers come home in flag-draped caskets, including two from our own back yard, who puts their hand up to join the armed forces? The truth surprises. The psychology is only to be guessed at, but the result is inescapable: somewhere, for some stranger, a soldier’s death opens a door.

A woman called the centre this week offering to join the infantry. She is 50 years old. A man was signed up only 48 hours ago, to be a grunt on the ground. He is 49.

“The impact, sad to say, is positive,” said Maj. Daniel Veillette, the centre’s commanding officer, in an indirect reference to the cluster of fatalities in Afghanistan.

The Forces, clearly, are getting good at this [recruiting]. They have a new set of provocative television commercials, which emphasize the Forces’ ability to “fight” over its softer reputation to soothe. It is no longer just about handing out candy to excitable children.

The Forces have 10 major centres from coast-to-coast, 39 offices, and 170 personnel who do nothing but recruit full-time. They are commonly in high schools across Canada and at job fairs.

The report cautions that such recruits could put the Canadian Forces’ positive public image at serious risk. It goes on to suggest the military’s reputation could be “easily shattered by the actions of a few or even just one Canadian Abu Ghraib” – a reference to the abuse of Iraqi detainees by U.S. military.

The new report says the standing of the Canadian Forces has clearly risen since the Somalia scandal, thanks to a general alignment between military values and Canadian values.
“Combined with the communication strategy geared toward fighting the threats of today’s world, all ingredients seem to be there to boost Canadians’ benevolence toward the Forces.”

The Toronto Star, Allen Woods, February 17, 2007,

“To sell Canada on war, try ‘hope’ but not ‘liberty’: focus groups tell Harper not to echo Bush.”

The Conservative government has been “too American” in its attempts to justify the Afghan war to a skeptical Canadian public, according to an internal report commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The extensive critique of the Tory communications strategy on the war comes from a series of cross-country focus groups conducted in November 2006 at a cost of almost $76,000. The study, obtained by the Toronto Star, found that Prime Minister Stephen Harper was “echoing” U.S. President George W. Bush in his attempt to explain why Canadian soldiers are fighting and dying in the country’s southern province.

Harper has drawn a link between the NATO-led mission and the 24 Canadians who were killed in the collapse of New York’s World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001. Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor recently described the fight as “retribution” for the terrorist attacks.

“Participants associated this message with public relations positioning – it was seen as echoing the kind of messaging American officials have made regarding Iraq,” wrote the report’s authors, the Strategic Counsel public opinion firm.

The report lists “vocabulary/terms/phrases/concepts to reinforce” the message that the government is right about its commitment to the war in Afghanistan. They include “rebuilding,” “restoring,” “reconstruction,” “hope,” “opportunity” and “enhancing the lives of women and children.” Words and phrases to avoid include: “freedom, democracy, liberty – in combination this phrase comes across as sounding too American.”

Strategic Counsel also advised that the government “avoid developing a line of argumentation too strongly based on values. While the value of human rights is strongly supported, there is a risk of
appearing to be imposing Canadian values. Again, this is not seen to be the “Canadian way.” It appears the taxpayer-funded study sought feedback from the focus groups on the sway of arguments made over the past few months by the NDP and the Liberals. The NDP, for example, frequently points out the mission is unbalanced because the government spends $9 on combat efforts for every $1 on development.

“The fact that they would spend $76,000 to try and get arguments to sell the war in Afghanistan to the Canadian public ... really indicates that the war is not saleable,” said NDP defence critic Dawn Black (New Westminster-Coquitlam). Liberal MP Keith Martin (Esquimalt-Juan de Fuca) said the existence of the report was “quite shocking,” though he didn’t take issue with its findings.

CBC News, May 2, 2007:

“Hillier takes Stanley Cup, former NHLers to Afghanistan”

Gen. Rick Hiller arrived at the main Kandahar base with the former pros, which included Bob Probert, Dave (Tiger) Williams, Ron Tugnutt, Rejean Houle, and Yvon Lambert.

Along with showing off the Stanley Cup, the group plans to play a couple of ball hockey games with some of the more than 2,000 Canadian soldiers stationed at the base and get a tour of the region.

Soldiers, hockey players, and journalists clustered around as the cup was removed, under the watchful eye of one of its white-gloved handlers. At one point, Hillier kissed his fingertips and touched the gleaming cup.

The visit is believed to be the first time the 115-year-old trophy has been in a combat zone.

The visit takes Hillier away from the controversy swirling around Parliament Hill.

The Conservatives have been put on the defensive in the House of Commons over allegations that prisoners captured by Canadian soldiers were later tortured in Afghan custody.

The Toronto Star, Bruce Campion-Smith, Feb 04, 2008:

“Afghan mission tough PR sell: Insider, critics, Manley all say tight-lipped style is failing Canadians”
Several times a week, senior federal officials gather by phone to plot strategy for pitching the controversial Afghan mission to Canadians. Sandra Buckler, the prime minister’s director of communications, is an occasional participant.

But as communications campaigns go, this group hasn’t been doing a very good job, according to the independent panel that assessed Canada’s future in Afghanistan.

A government insider goes further, calling the communications strategy an “abject failure.”

While the high-level teleconferences are ostensibly held to improve communications, it often becomes an exercise in keeping a lid on information, said the official, who is familiar with the phone calls.

All issues related to the Afghan mission are vetted through the Privy Council Office, the bureaucratic wing of the Prime Minister’s Office.

Peter Donolo who served as communications director for former prime minister Jean Chrétien [said the media procedures for the return of soldier’s remains] “left a lingering aftertaste that they are very much into media manipulation,” Donolo said.

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*The Ottawa Citizen*, Don Butler, February 16, 2008

“Canadians appreciate veterans’ sacrifices, poll finds.”

In overwhelming numbers, Canadians recognize the contribution of veterans and say they are proud of the role the country’s military has played in world conflicts, including the war in Afghanistan.

Perhaps surprisingly, solid majorities feel the same way in Quebec, despite the province’s long history of anti-militarism, according to an Ipsos Reid survey conducted for Veterans Affairs Canada.

And eight in 10 Canadians -- including 70 per cent in Quebec -- say they are proud of the role Canada’s military has played in conflicts such as the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War and the war in Afghanistan.

More than eight in 10 Canadians say they wore poppies in the past year, including 91 per cent of Ontarians. Numbers are lower in Quebec, but more than half in the province say they wore poppies.

“NHL players return to Kandahar.”

Star-struck Canadian soldiers were girding for a battle of a different sort Wednesday as a team of National Hockey League veterans, the Stanley Cup in tow, touched down on a mission to boost military morale.

Gen. Rick Hillier, Canada’s chief of defence staff, and Defence Minister Peter MacKay were also on hand as the towering silver trophy went on display on the tarmac at Kandahar Airfield for the second time in less than a year.

MacKay, who was on his way home after a top-secret three-day visit, likened the mood among the troops to that of a kid on Christmas Eve.

“The soldiers on the base – there’s probably a few of them who didn’t sleep last night in anticipation of getting to play against some of their heroes, getting to see the Stanley Cup,” he said.

“It’s just a huge morale boost.”

“We’ve got plenty of beef,” Napier grinned. “They pushed us around a little last year, so we brought a little more muscle.” That includes enforcers like former Canadiens winger Chris Nilan and Bob Probert, who racked up more than 3,000 penalty minutes over a 15-year career with the Detroit Red Wings and Chicago Blackhawks.

“When we were thinking about people to come, y’know, the troops love the tough guys, so this year we loaded up with tough guys,” he said.

The Globe and Mail, Simon Houpt, July 1, 2010

“What is Canada’s brand? The question of identity is worth considering, as countries with strong brands can capture a competitive edge.”

As Canada turns 143 years old today, it is grappling with one of the most modern questions: Namely, What is our brand?
This is not just an academic issue. Over the past few years, the practice of place branding has proven to be catnip to countries around the world seeking a competitive edge. That’s because brands enable entities – whether people, companies, or places – to create and then capture premiums. Brands allow the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts. Countries with strong brands capture political, cultural, and economic premiums. When observers talk about Canada punching above its weight on the world stage, they’re really talking about the country leveraging its political capital based on a brand.

One year ago today, Erin O’Keefe, Interbrand Canada’s director of strategy and brand engagement, was working in the company’s New York office when she took a few moments to ponder the difference between the Canadian and U.S. national holidays unfolding this weekend.

“The Fourth of July is about a revolution, the triumph of the individual,” she noted earlier this week. July 1st, on the other hand, commemorates the decision to form a country out of four founding provinces. “Canadians celebrate a meeting. A union. It’s an agreement about mutual goals over the individual.”

And it’s awfully hard to escape your DNA. The motto of “Peace, order, and good government,” included in the Constitution Act of 1867, still retains a hold over every decision we make.

On using contemporary means of communication to counter sentiments against military spender and in favour of peacekeeping:

*The Ottawa Citizen*, David Pugliese, July 29, 2010:

“Wikipedia edits traced to Defence computers.”

Defence Department computers in Ottawa have been used to vandalize information on a Wikipedia site critical of the Conservative government's decision to spend billions on a new stealth fighter. Nine attempts have been made to alter the online encyclopedia's entry on the Joint Strike Fighter,
including the removal of any information critical of the Harper government's plan to spend at least $16 billion on the new fighter aircraft.

Defence Department computers were also used to insert insults, aimed at Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff, into the Wikipedia Joint Strike Fighter page. Ignatieff has questioned the proposed purchase. Quotes from news articles outlining opposition to the arms sale by University of British Columbia professor Michael Byers, a former NDP candidate, were also removed.

A spokesman for Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) [the owner of the computers] said the attempts to alter the Wikipedia page were not part of a concerted effort to stifle debate on the proposed JSF purchase but inappropriate use of government computers by, as yet, an unidentified individual or individuals.

Byers, who recently wrote a Toronto Star commentary criticizing the JSF purchase, said the Harper government is particularly sensitive about any opposition towards the JSF purchase, a situation reflected by the attempts to alter the Wikipedia page. Earlier this week, Conservative senator Pamela Wallin sent letters to the National Post and the Toronto Star, complaining that in his commentary, Byers was not identified as a member of the board of the Ottawa-based Rideau Institute.

Wallin, chairwoman of the senate’s defence committee, described the institute as a left-wing peace and social policy think-tank that criticizes military spending and seems to favour peacekeeping. But Byers called Wallin’s stance hypocritical, noting that in her letters to newspapers she did not reveal that she is an honorary Canadian air force colonel, as well as being on the board of directors of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, a pro-military organization closely aligned with DND.
Chapter 4 - How It Works and What It Does: Self-Forming Activity and Actual Behaviour through *Power-Knowledge*

In the context of Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge, power is an impersonal and often mundane network of transactions that produces subjects by influencing and limiting their range of thought and behaviour (Kendall, Wickham, 1999: 141, 142). He regarded power as discontinuous and separate phenomena without much logic or coherence beyond the immediate interaction (Foucault, 2005: 307-308). Power only exists in specific cases when it becomes identifiable through an activity in an institution or society at large (Foucault, 2005: 13). Discourse and power are inseparable, so that discourse “is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it” (Foucault, 1980: 133). Knowledge and power are also interdependent such that the un-scientific knowledge embedded within modern organizations is not merely a tool to apply power - it is power (Hoy, 1986a: 128-135, 142). Discipline within institutions and society, likewise, overlays Foucault’s concept of power. Hoy (1986a: 136) characterizes discipline in the modern era as a “more finely tuned mechanism of control over the social body, a more effective spinning of the web of power.” It is the lighter hand and less costly form of highly bureaucratized power that makes it possible to manage large states and militaries.

Within Foucault’s ethics of the self, power is the interaction of the discursive, the non-discursive, and knowledge. The knowledges discussed in Chapter 3 provide part of the self-forming activity milieu for Kant, the Hellenist philosophy student, and the state’s ethical subject. In general terms, a power-knowledge combination will be treated as the relationship between the individual and public life, and the means of teaching the moral codes described above. The institutional and state apparatus for self-forming activity for Kant was expanding under Western monarchies while for the Stoics and Epicureans, it was rudimentary. For contemporary Canada, the knowledges studied in Chapter 3 were concerned with narratives. The power-knowledge combinations examined in this chapter are instead concerned with
bureaucracy and institutions. The knowledges are obscured by executive exclusivity and procedural mechanics. Although the featured power-knowledge sites cross with the discursive and non-discursive aspects of domestic and international politics, military regulations and law, and organizational behaviour, they affect the individual in personal terms related to expeditionary deployment, criminal and service offences, complaints, promotion, pay and benefits, and so forth.

4.1 Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus

In his early work on power-knowledge, Foucault researched the history and practices of insane asylums, schools, hospitals, prisons, and armies to determine how they act upon groups and individuals. In his later work on ethics, Foucault drew upon the ethics and ethos of Kant and Hellenism for an example of how individuals interact with discourse and knowledge to help form themselves as ethical subjects. The effects of power-knowledge on ethics, however, were not directly addressed. This section considers how a moral code as knowledge associated with preparation, perception, and participation in public life becomes power-knowledge and a self-forming activity.

Foucault’s concept of self-forming activity is similar to Kant’s idea of human consciousness and agency. Kant certainly shared the idea that individuals participate in the transformation of their perceptions into individual ethical deliberation (Guyer, Wood, 1998: 21). Indeed, Guyer and Wood (1998: 22) believe that Kant’s most enduring contribution to the issue of ethics was to make the role of active self-subjection a part of the modern debate. In the “Third Antimony” in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant searches for obstacles to conscious reason with the logic of a thesis and anti-thesis, but not in the context of power-knowledge (Kant, 1998: 484-489). In his “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Kant (1983b) argues his case in the context of political freedom, which is more germane. Governing authorities, in his view, can permit or deny the expression of dissent to suit to variations in state political stability and according to the professional affiliations of the dissenter. In ordinary times, he believes that citizens must pay taxes, military officers must obey orders, and officiating clergy must adhere to dogma. He is not overly concerned with the scope and potential for coercive
environmental forces to limit thought and volition. Only the scholar is allowed free expression of independent thought at all times. Otherwise, Kant agrees that rulers have a right and obligation to maintain a “well-disciplined, numerous army,” as the guarantor of subjection (Kant, 1983b: 41). Although Kant conceived of reason as a fundamental human characteristic and law of nature, it is to be exercised in public life by a privileged few or only in extraordinary times.

In Foucault’s reading of the Hellenists, they are portrayed as emphasizing the importance of their mastery of discourse and knowledge in lieu of resistance to power-knowledge. The Hellenists believed they chose their disciplinary regimen and were not concerned about the influence exerted by authorities, whether political or cultural (Foucault, 1984: 361). As discussed above, the Hellenists held personal preparation and perception in high regard and the social context was inter-personal involving only teachers, friends, and other members of exclusive schools. It is a moral activity requiring a range of techniques and practices that would enable an individual to become more independent in terms of governance (Foucault, 2005: 372). In *Hermeneutics* and “The Self,” Foucault writes at length about amounts to Hellenist power-knowledge techniques providing self-forming activity for individuals, friends, and in philosophic schools under the strict tutelage of a philosopher. The moral code of preparation, perception, and participation becomes knowledge when combined with ordinary activity, such as memorization and walking tours. Epicurean students, for instance, were to reconstruct important parts of their philosophy to ensure full assimilation and the ability to faithfully repeat its core precepts (Foucault, 2005: 356). Epictetus recommends the walk-about-town where students take to the street to learn to identify the source of their reactions and control their response to whatever and whoever crossed their path (Foucault, 1984: 361). What better resembles Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge, however, is the introduction of new technologies, however simple they appear now, such as personal journal keeping, correspondence by letter, and attendance at elite schools of philosophy.

Affordable, readily available paper was a new technology, a non-discursive object for use in any number of knowledges. It assisted students in the move from discourse to knowledge to self-training activity (Foucault, 1984: 363-364). Journals were expected to prepare the student to overcome personal
faults and deal with past, present, and future crises. In the same manner as Foucault distinguished care of
the self from a hedonistic “lifestyle,” the journals were not a self-indulgent diary of events and emotions.
Lessons learned from the master, sayings of note, and experiences from previous exercises were recorded
in books intended only for personal development and were used as part of a demanding regimen. For
example, Stoics could record the results of the *praemeditatio malorum* as the ultimate technique to
prepare for life’s trials (Foucault, 2005: 478-479). The goal was to imagine the worst possible pain and
disaster and then meditate on its effects. By looking forward to such an ordeal, instead of looking back on
it, Epictetus sought to turn hindsight into foresight. The notebook keeper could also attempt to answer
questions such as Epictetus’ “[w]hat would you wish to be doing, then, when death finds you?” *The Discourses (IV.10.12, 13)*. The content and expected outcomes of the teaching would sometimes differ.
Epicureans, for example, were adamantly opposed to self-forming exercises intended to simulate anguish
in the vain attempt at imagining a limitless number of disasters as a means of fortifying the self. Their
telos, as will be seen in Chapter 6, differs from the Stoics accordingly. Personal letters, similarly, could
meet several teachings ends at once. A letter written to a friend grieving over the death of a family
member would help alleviate and shorten emotional pain, provide writers with a reason to carefully
review and refine thoughts from their notebook, and be sent to third parties as a moral lesson and to be re-
read on the occasion of loss of their own (Foucault, 2005: 360-161). In fact, letters sometimes serve as a
primary record of the work of philosophers, such as Epicurus. In his *Letter to Menoeceus, 123*, he advises
“[p]ractice and study without ceasing that which I was always teaching you, being assured that these are
the first principles of the good life.”

In addition to rudimentary technology and mental exercises, Hellenists formed their ethical self as
a member of close, cultural communities that can be considered a site of intense power-knowledge.
Epictetus founded a famous school at Nicropolis in Greece on the main route between Rome and Athens
(Gill, 1995: x). There, Epictetus used “half-formal talks, sermons or counselling sessions” to “sum up the
practical implications of living a life shaped by Stoic ethical principles” (Gill, 1995: xviii). His students
were required to observe complete silence for long periods of time to facilitate a “seduction” whereby the
master’s words became their own (Foucault, 2005: 366, 368). Epicurus founded a similar, full-immersion school in Athens called “The Garden,” which is described as a “kind of religious fellowship or society of friends” (Morgan, 2001: 357).

In his work on power-knowledge, Foucault made it clear that the bureaucracy and technologies of modernism were not just a change in degree from earlier means of self-forming activity, but also a change in kind. In his references to Kant and the Hellenists, the full effect of power-knowledge was yet to come. When searching for a contemporary ethic and ethos that could survive the increasingly effective impediments of modern power-knowledge, Foucault did state that it was not possible to transpose an ethos from one time and place to another (Foucault 1984: 343). Unfortunately, he does not provide a direct discussion of how the moral code and power-knowledge of Kant and Hellenism would interact with the power-knowledge he describes in his earlier writings. It is necessary to apply Foucault’s ethics to one of the quintessential institutions of the modern era.

4.2 The Military

This section will demonstrate how power-knowledge manifests in the form of bureaucratic transactions and interpersonal dynamics in the Canadian military. It will help define the degree of ethical freedom that is possible within a tightly structured institution. In the language of Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus, to what extant does the Canadian military encourage preparation to perceive with an independent mind and participation according to individual ethical standards? According to its own moral code, to what extant does military employment allow for the reconciliation of selflessness with personal conscience. Is there sufficient latitude to allow for the behaviour and feedback necessary to form an ethical self with the capacity for free deliberation and volition?

4.2.1 The Executive Category

This sub-section examines the power-knowledge sites of the civilian and military executive category within the framework of institutional bureaucracy in relation to those of the rank and file and the
general population. It also describes the approach taken to reform programs for the bureaucracy, and military tactics, strategy, and culture.

**Civil-Military Executive Bureaucracy**

Canada has a highly centralized form of government with a narrow and tightly guarded hierarchy (Savoie, 1999). Its executives have become excessively reliant on rules and regulations, preoccupied with avoiding blame, and overly competitive regarding career advancement (Savoie, 1999: 275). Executives work within a “club” in which peer pressure provides a guide and feedback to shape behaviour (Savoie, 1999: 277). In particular, good standing in the “club” depends on a willingness to avoid internal dissent and the ability to protect a minister from media embarrassment (Savoie, 1999: 277, 278). Art Eggleton, the Minister of National Defence from 1997 to 2002, for example, rated his performance according the number of questions he had to field in the House of Commons (Savoie, 1999: 347). The effects are very much in evidence in the Canadian government-military relationship. The appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff largely depends on that person’s ability to work within the government’s bureaucratic and political culture (Savoie, 1999: 280-281). Bland (1999) cites the results of a survey of government and military executives, however, that reveals significant tension between civil and military executives. For example, over half of civilian executives had no opinion on the level of defence spending that could be considered adequate. Almost two thirds of military executives, meanwhile, believed that the Deputy Minister of Defence has too much say in military affairs and does not have the qualifications to make decisions. Both civil and military executives are not satisfied with the governance of military policy. Half of all respondents want Parliament to approve overseas deployments, but agree that Parliamentarians are not well enough informed on military matters to make the decisions (Bland, 1999). Regarding the Defence Committee of the House of Commons, 68 percent of all respondents believed the committee does not provide effective oversight, 72 percent say it needs a permanent research staff, 76 percent want them to review major crown projects before contracts are signed, and about 50 percent would like it to
interview nominees for Chief of Defence Staff. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that military policy is relatively free from effective political oversight.

Transcripts from the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence reveal that it too lacks strength. In Canada, Senators are appointed by the political party in office as a patronage reward. Questions posed at committee meetings are often nothing more than casual comments and the members are quite diffident in their regard for military officers (GoC, 2001a). At a committee meeting held December 3, 2001, for instance, both the senators and the chiefs of staff agree that the military has insufficient resources for the declared tasks. The senators, however, do not appropriate any funds and can only request more from the Prime Minister. Senator Banks asked the Chief of Maritime Staff whether he wants committee members to “go and pump on any urgent basis for more money for the Navy?” Instead of offering to lobby for the Army, all Senator Forestall says to the Chief of the Land Staff is “[w]e are proud of what you are doing and with what you have to do it with.” Senator Meighen noted that the military is “out of sight, out of mind” and will stay that way “without a huge expenditure of money.” Senator Lapierre said he is “rather terrified and quite depressed” by the defence policy in place and simply declined to question the Chief of the Land Staff. The senators nevertheless praised the general for defining the problem and urge him to take his message directly to ordinary Canadians.

Bland recognizes that government executives are more concerned with political and economic interests than the defence of the homeland (Bland, 1999). He worries that they do not debate substantial foreign affairs issues nor worry about coherence between resources and strategy. International crises are addressed in isolation and quickly disappear from the table. Discussions on major spending projects focus on the benefits for party supporters and local ridings while strategic issues, if discussed at all, are focused on negotiating advantageous trade arrangements and other non-military considerations (Bland, 1999). His observation remained true even while Canada maintained a combat expedition in Afghanistan through the first decade of the 2000s, as will be evident in the section on actual behaviour later in this chapter. Cabinet might meet with the defence chiefs but generally accept advice only if it is politically expedient (Bland, 1999). Otherwise, decisions are made by a few military and government executives according to
their mutual interests and the limits of the defence budget (Bland, 1999). If an eager minister attempts to investigate further, military and government executives obfuscate, predict catastrophe, wait for a new minister, or avoid making any real decisions. Often, a vague phrase will suffice, such as advocating purchases for a “general” or “multi-purpose” military force (Bland, 1999: 14-15). While Bland urges military executives to establish a set of ideas in “line with the way most Canadians think about national defence,” he believes they have been raised to do “just the opposite” (Bland, 1999). This appears to be true, however, regarding many other public services apart from military affairs according to Savoie (1999: 276). Even the rank and file who say they work for the well-being of ordinary Canadians feel estranged from the executives in terms of service delivery priorities and values (Savoie, 1999: 276).

There are four recent, significant examples of foreign and military policy being formulated with a lack of political oversight and public awareness. The first concerns the arrangement of closer ties between the Canadian and U.S. militaries and the shift from peacekeeping to combat expeditions. Staples (2007) recounts how a Canadian Department of National Defence strategic report (GOC, 2001b) was altered as it was going to press shortly after the attacks on the U.S. in 2001. He quotes from the report as follows: “the balance between the notion of ‘human security’ and traditional concepts of security will likely shift in the direction of defending national territory and populations and away from poverty eradication and human rights” (Staples, 2007: 155; GoC, 2001). Anticipating a shift in military policy affecting ethics, the report also argues that international law need not apply in the war on terror (Staples, 2007: 155). The second example is a case in which a bureaucratic transaction usurped the sovereignty of Parliament in the negotiation of international treaties. Staples (2007: 166-167) describes how the North American Aerospace Defence Command, (best known by the acronym NORAD), was quietly renewed, expanded, and left open to further growth without Parliament or ordinary Canadians made aware. NORAD was initially designed to defend against Soviet aircraft in the 1950’s but its mandate has changed to further Canadian-U.S. integration and include an unpopular joint missile defence project (Staples, 2007). Concurrently, Canada Command was organized to act as a subordinate headquarters to the U.S.’s Northern Command to facilitate joint humanitarian and armed military operations in the homeland
Bondy

(Staples, 2007: 168). Staples argues that this bureaucratic incrementalism diminishes Canadian sovereignty (Staples, 2007: 175). English (2001: iii) sees the U.S. and Canadian militaries as sharing a culture “characterized by cautious leaders who try to protect their interests by behaving insularly, politically and bureaucratically.” As the U.S. and Canadian militaries continue toward integration, there will be a growing convergence in military culture (English, 2001: iii). Yet another example of foreign policy making by the military appears in the section below on actual behaviour regarding the signing of an international treaty on detainee transfers in Afghanistan.

Military Executive Officer Personality Type

Literature about the personality typology of military executive officers is comparatively rare. When it does exist, regarding leadership for example, it is preoccupied with lists of traits, circular logic, and tautological references similar to those used for moral codes. Paparone (2003) finds that most of the current research confuses cause and effect by assuming that executive officers are promoted because of their personality traits. The implication, of course, is that the personality traits make the person suitable for membership in the executive category. Paparone is arguing that perhaps a different set of traits would make a person more effective as a fair and honest leader as described in manuals like Duty with Honour. Instead, it is argued here that the observed personality type is required for the negotiation of a selection system that sustains the supremacy of statism at the expense of independent ethical development for both executives and the rank and file. Thus, personality type becomes a vital non-discursive factor in the power-knowledge web of the institution (Bondy, 2005a).

One of the most often cited attempts at measuring the personality traits of executive officers was completed for the U.S. military by Campbell (1996). He used a battery of standard tests that included the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, California Psychological Inventory, FIRO-B test, and the Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory (Campbell, 1996: 167). The respondents scored high for characteristics of dominance, self-acceptance, inflexibility, aggression, and achievement via conformity that were so far above the norm that they pointed to a pathological obsession.
(Campbell, 1996: 167). He added that executive officers are also “self-centered,” prone to exclude others, and repulsed by traits they do not value, such as artistic talent (Campbell, 1996: 167). The overlap between success and conformity, he writes, fulfills “a desire for structure and clearly prescribed criteria for performance assessment” (Campbell, 1996: 155). His subjects recorded low scores for flexibility that points to unwillingness “to consider new, innovative solutions to problems” (Campbell, 1996: 155). He also worries “about the prospects of them instinctively understanding the concept of achieving world peace without bloodshed” (Campbell, 1996: 174). This is excusable, he maintains, because the U.S. needs “aggressive adventurer” officers to counter-balance their counterparts in enemy militaries who lack the “ameliorating influences of higher education” and “the benefits of 200 years of democracy” (Campbell, 1996: 173). Campbell, writing that he wanted “to close on a positive note,” remarked that his subjects were “personally delightful as well as extremely competent” (Campbell, 1996: 175). Dixon’s *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* is a popular reference for critics of the military (Dixon, 1976). He built a psychological profile based on material from historical records. Without a trace of the deference shown by Campbell, Dixon found that military officers are commonly anxiety prone and failure fearing; seek highly visible status and certain promotion through dishonesty and expediency; and tend toward meticulous, obsessive-compulsive routines on both small and important matters. He saw a mental orthodoxy contributing to faulty, non-adaptive decision-making, and careerist behaviour. This prevalent type does not really have “any sincere devotion to work” and are not true achievers, because their promotions depend more on conformity and obedience rather than taking risks that can add real value (Dixon, 1976: 244). Military institutions, though, are ideal for the “authoritarian” personality type and as a means of channelling a disposition toward violence to socially acceptable outlets (Dixon, 1976: 285). Indeed, the most effective leaders often have anti-social traits and proclivities to transgressive behaviour that are only acceptable in the military. Bureaucracy, moreover, provides a suitable venue for the dynamics of “dominance-submission” and offers a highly developed set of rules
that reduce guilt related to aggression and dishonesty (Dixon, 1976: 285). Regarding contractarianism, (Dixon, 1976: 215) concludes that since officers are appointed by superior officers rather than acclaimed by followers, they are not required to satisfy the needs of the rank and file. He connects the fear of failure and exclusion common among senior officers to a tendency to isolate their group from the outside (Dixon, 1999: 399-400). Corroborating assessments are available regarding the Canadian military. In the opinion of a prominent psychologist in the Canadian Forces, “warrior officers are uncomfortable with reflection and abstractions…” (Cotton, 1997: 3). Cotton (1997) also refers to the tendency for officers to exclude others and over-emphasize the importance of their careers. English writes that Canadian officers, in the eyes of the rank and file, “are perceived to be more interested in their careers than in service to the nation” (English, 2001: iii). Subordinates lack trust in executive officers because of their careerism, “an unwarranted ‘can do’ attitude,” and a failure to abide by the espoused moral code (English, 2001: 77). The chair of a military board of inquiry into the failure to care for ill and wounded personnel reported that while this care should be the second most important obligation for military executives, after mission accomplishment, the priority is instead given to public relations and legal liabilities (Sharpe, 2002: 29). Writing on his experience as the chair of the inquiry while still a military executive officer, Sharpe wrote about the cultural distance between officers and non-commissioned personnel:

“The reality is, whether we intend it or not, [rank insignia on] a uniform can be a barrier that inhibits rather than encourages the flow of information between people. Unfortunately, for some it can also become a barrier to hide behind that allows them to avoid developing strong interpersonal skills. It tended to be officers from this group who challenged our decision to work with the soldiers in the informal manner we did [i.e., wearing civilian clothing].”

Sharpe (2002: 56)
Executive Officers and the Selection System

Jackall (1988) uses a metaphor that aptly describes the kind of culture centered this personality type and institutional structure. He compares the sub-divisions of a bureaucracy to a collection of competing fiefdoms. An executive acts like a liege demanding fealty from middle managers who act like courtiers, or in more contemporary language, team players. Team players have no strong convictions and optimistically accept all tasks assigned. They work with a loyalty aimed at meeting near-term milestones and a few other easily verifiable measures of performance. More importantly, the team player must never compromise the impression that the fiefdom is well managed by expressing dissent or exhibiting unscripted behaviour. Because of constant pressure to reduce costs and the availability of few discretionary benefits, the liege has few options in the way a vassal can be rewarded other than career advancement. Under these circumstances, promotion related interactions between the executive and the team player become the primary concern within the fiefdom (Jackall 1988).

The practices related to performance evaluation and personnel selection provide a good example of power-knowledge transactions that act as self-forming activity. For Bell (2001), the issues that most directly affecting a person’s life, such as courses, postings, and promotion, become the primary guide and behaviour modification mechanism in modern militaries. Personnel policies shape Army culture more effectively than lists of espoused virtues (Bell, 2001). Performance evaluation emerged as an industrial age technique that was transposed onto the U.S. Army as a reform project during the Progressive Era (Vandergriff 2002). Mechanistic selection practices, however, do not survive contemporary review. Murphy and Cleveland (1995) describe how both raters and ratees actively distort appraisals. Over half of any performance score varies according to a long list of submerged factors, such as personal likeability, shared personality traits, idiosyncratic ideas about performance, stereotypes, prejudice, self-interest, factionalism, and variations in work context. Similarly, selection for special mentoring and promotion streaming includes a strong element of intuitive personal attraction (Martin et al. 2002). Coens and Jenkins (2000) warn that appraisal techniques often backfire by causing psychological damage to the majority of people and worsening hierarchical relationships. Even innovations like 360-degree reviews...
that have input from superiors, peers, and subordinates contain fatal flaws that conflict with the institution’s declared mission (Coens and Jenkins 2000). Tillson (2001) notes that organizations in the private sector have wisely begun to abandon the attempt. Comparable analyses of the pitfalls of performance appraisal are available from Bernardin, Cooke, and Villanova (2000); Lefkowitz (2000); and Tziner and Murphy (1999). A Department of Defense sponsored review of military culture in the U.S. concluded that that “modernizing” executives simply made a mistake when they introduced what they thought was a “scientific” appraisal and selection system (Dorn, Graves, 2000). It does little to impede like-promoting-like or to objectively reward merit.

To gain an advantage in the competition for promotion, a sub-group must hoard the tacit information required to advance (Goh, 2002). If the official rules are known to every competitor and everyone follows the rules, after all, no sub-group can gain a competitive advantage. Thus, when insiders achieve their aims, it inevitably undermines the declared objectives of the selection system. Having an insider’s edge, moreover, further satisfies the need of the characteristic executive officer personality type for clarity and certainty in the advancement process, as mentioned above (Campbell, 1996: 1550), and for getting ahead by whatever means necessary (Dixon, 1976: 244). Fair and open competition is not acceptable. Over the years, often in an ad hoc manner, procedures have evolved that are biased in favour of a sub-group of insiders in the Canadian Forces. They have advanced in large part by controlling access to key credentials and the mechanics of the performance appraisal process. The credentials include postings to certain units and headquarters, positions in close contact with senior executives such acting as an aide de camp, attendance at staff colleges, exchange postings with allied militaries, and brief exposure to a variety of positions deemed necessary to acquire generalist, management experience (Bondy, 2005a). The credentials are chosen and allocated to designated persons by “succession planning” councils chaired by the highest-ranking executive officer for each functional trade grouping. For an example of the Army’s succession planning process see the Land Force Command Order (LFCO) 11-79, 2003, and for a functional trade group, the Logistics Branch Bulletin, 2000. At the same time, at informal meetings, executive officers direct subordinates to reserve a limited number of high scores for job performance for
the persons designated for advancement. When the scores for accumulated credentials and predetermined performance ratings are tallied, the favoured ratees are ranked at the top of the selection list. Promotion becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Here is a quote describing this sequence of events from Romeo Dallaire, retired Lieutenant General and Senator:

“In every regiment of the Canadian Forces, there is an informal council of elders - senior or retired officers who remain intimately connected to the life of the regiment. These elders determine a regiment’s individual culture and character. One of their key responsibilities is to select the so-called streamers; the young men or women who the elders believe have the right stuff to become future generals. There is never any official announcement or acknowledgement of this process, but once you are chosen, it’s as if an invisible hand is reaching out to guide you, nurturing your career through a carefully selected series of command and staff positions…”

Dallaire (2003: 28)

The Somalia Inquiry Report noted the same situation (GoC, 1997a). In a section entitled “Personnel Selection and Screening,” it notes that performance appraisals tended to understate weaknesses and rely on additional information from the ratee’s superiors in lieu of those from peers and subordinates. When selecting for postings and commands, the report also referred to the influence of “regimental ‘Godfathers’.” In all, the report states that the merit principle and operational requirements were set aside in deference to “bureaucratic and administrative imperatives” (GoC, 1997a).

The performance appraisal form and interview in the Canadian military is a self-forming activity that is open to direct observation. Each spring, before the summer promotion season, there are private, one-on-one meetings between each level of the hierarchy where a subordinate is presented with a completed performance appraisal form by a superior. The current version of the “Personnel Evaluation Report” can be viewed on the internet (CFPAS, 2009). Majors read and sign reports presented by
lieutenant colonels, for example, and the latter read and sign a report from colonels. The subordinate is obligated to read the report and sign to verify that they have read it, whether or not they agree with its contents. It is a fait accompli and the only aspect that can be disputed is whether the form was completed according to regulations (Ombudsman, 2007a). Performance and potential are rated by precise scores and a qualitative narrative in two steps by the immediate and next highest-ranking superior (CFPAS, 2009).

First, the immediate “supervisor” considers 16 performance skills, such as team building, leading change, problem solving, initiative, resource management, and ethics and values. Each is scored according to 6 degrees of accomplishment, from “unacceptable” to “mastered.” Conduct on and off duty is marked as only acceptable or unacceptable. Next, the supervisor’s superior, the “reviewing officer,” assesses the ratee for 6 indicators of potential, including leadership, professional development, communication skills, planning and organizational skills, administration, and dedication. Each scored according to 4 levels: low, normal, above average, and outstanding. It is not apparent why some skills are considered performance and others potential. For example, why are “team building” and “leading change” considered a matter of current performance and not potential? Conversely, why are “planning and organizational skills” and “administration” a measure of potential and ordinary job skills? The supervisor and the reviewing officer also write narrative paragraphs that contain some general comments and attempt to substantial extreme ratings. The reviewing officer also ranks ratees with their peers at that unit and makes a recommendation about the promotability by ticking one of four boxes: no, developing, ready, or immediate. There is space for another level of review that is used for ratees above the rank of captain and for extreme scores.

While the personnel evaluation report will perpetuate personal bias at the personal and unit level, the centralized selection boards held at National Defence Headquarters do so for the institution as a whole. Whatever the supervisors and reviewing officers might think about potential and promotability, the decision is made by the central board. The board assigns a score out of 300 possible points based on the performance and potential scores on the evaluation reports received from the units for the previous three years. Then, they assign a second score out of 200 possible points for accumulated credentials according to the direction received by the branch succession planning councils. The overall score is
calculated to the first decimal. It is possible, for example, for a person to score 431.5 points out of 500 (GoC, 2006c). The appearance of precision, of course, gives the impression that appraisal and selection is the result of objective and scientific measures. Ratees are then ranked on a national list to be promoted as vacancies arise according to an annual, trade-wide “posting plot.”

For a person to become an executive officer, they would have passed through this two-sided winnowing each year of their employment. Only the most actively self-formed ethical subjects, adept at the tacit methods and accepted as insiders, would become a colonel or general. The promotion process also effectively conditions the behaviour of the rank and file even though they are not advancing. Largely unaware of the deception, ordinary personnel strive in vain to become promotable by accepting undesirable and often taxing positions that nevertheless are not counted as promotion credentials. Within a few years, outsiders are so far behind in terms of qualifications that they cannot compete for the executive ranks. If they are eventually promoted, it is to a modest rank, below colonel, and usually late in their career. The Canadian military is not alone in having such a structure. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) have studied the stratification technique of hoarding credentials as it applies to society as a whole. A similar power-knowledge net is at work in other Anglo-Western militaries. In the Australian Defence Force, for example, Jans and Schmidtchen (2002: 100) describe an annual career “tournament” that creates “winners” who get continued access to career enhancing but relatively easy generalist positions. More challenging tasks are assigned to “losers” upon whom the future performance of the “winners” depends. The New Zealand Defence Force has an “A team” and a “B team” where inclusion and exclusion is also tacit and uncontested (Carruthers 2002). Likewise, Tillson (2001: 85) has criticized the U.S. Army for having many “wickets” that force ambitious officers “to focus on their careers rather than on their units.” Officers vie for a few career-enhancing opportunities that enable superiors to punish dissent and reward sycophancy so that most officers eventually become “organization men” (Vandergriff 2002: 96).

In Western militaries, the repercussions of poor personnel succession planning span several generations because young officers are selected for rapid promotion by older executives. Long-term
succession planning leads to a continuity of norms, personality types, and the accumulation of credentials that discourage departures from the routine. Although performance evaluation formats and other details might change, the group dynamics, sought after psychological traits, and other tacit factors do not. Vandergriff (2002), for example, describes a set of negative cultural problems that have persisted since 1947 despite nine major attempts at reforming the U.S. Army performance appraisal and selection system. It would appear that the resulting culture cannot reform a vital feature of itself.

Attempts at Reform

In the 1990’s, a series of scandals and evidence of everyday transgressions and mismanagement created pressure for institutional reform. In 1999, the Auditor General reported that the Canadian military had “experienced a moral crisis in the last few years” (OAG, 1999: article 26:14). In 2001, the Auditor General again reported there was a moral crisis in the military due to a lack of planning, the absence of a strategy toward reform, and interest on the part of executives (OAG, 2001, articles 24.13, 24.17, 24.22). There was no shortage of criticism of Canadian military behaviour at the time. It ranges from the exposé of individual venality found in Tarnished Brass: Crime and Corruption in the Canadian Military (Taylor, Nolan, 1996) to analyses by military affairs analysts such as Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia (Bercusson, 1996) and Lament for an Army (English, 1998). Three of the more serious incidents will be discussed in detail below in the section on “Actual Behaviour on Expeditions,” i.e., incidents in Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan.

Even the living conditions for the rank and file were being criticized via a contentious series of hearings at military bases submitted to Parliament on October 28th, 1998 by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA). The Defence Department sought to address the resulting 89 recommendations under the Quality of Life project. It organized 113 initiatives under six “Pillars”: Pay and Allowances; The Housing Portfolio; The Injured, Retirees, and Veterans; The Military Family; and Transitions (2000b). Each of the 113 initiatives was then colour coded green, yellow, orange,
and red on monthly progress reports. Green indicated that the initiative was complete, yellow meant nearly complete, orange was a caution, and red coded projects had begun, had been abandoned, or otherwise had failed. Charts identified which directorate was responsible for the initiative and the investigation or scandal that prompted the reforms (GoC, 2002a).

On October 14, 1997, the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change was formed to monitor the progress of broad reform effort that included the Quality of Life project (Committee, 2000). It was headed by John A. Fraser, a former Member of Parliament, cabinet minister, Speaker of the House, Canada’s Ambassador for the Environment, and a militia infantry officer and Honorary Colonel. The committee’s mandate was “to monitor… change initiatives, the process for implementation of these changes, and to evaluate their effectiveness…” (Committee, 2000). The final report, released in February 2000, found that although reform required “self-examination,” “self-improvement,” and “professionalism,” the department had resorted to a bureaucratic “tick the box” procedure for a series of disconnected initiatives emphasizing “tactical solutions” for what was really a “strategic challenge” (Committee, 2000). This quote is a concise summary of the issues:

“As the Minister and others have noted, this program involves profound cultural change. And that means finding ways of embedding within the institution and constantly reinforcing such new or re-discovered values as accountability, self-examination and self-improvement, fairness and openness, alongside the existing values of professionalism, loyalty, courage, and service to country. To do this, changes in structure, procedures, regulations, and education arrangements (like those already made or under way) are necessary. But these measures by themselves will not be sufficient to ensure that the new values will become internalized to the point of being as instinctive as, say, loyalty or service to country. And until this degree of cultural shift is attained, there remains a risk that the achievements of the change program will be diminished, or that the substance of the changes will lack staying power.”
“In spite of these positive changes, the Committee has observed some deficiencies in how the Department and the CF have tackled reform. We attribute this to what we perceive as the absence of an overall strategic agenda to ensure the cohesive implementation of a very broad-ranging set of changes. In our view, the reform program, to achieve its goals, requires an overarching philosophical shift in the way business is done.

“The Committee has identified this pattern as a case of putting the activity ‘cart’ before the conceptual ‘horse’, which has led to implementation of a good many recommendations, but has not produced a clear vision of what the reform program is to achieve.

“Why has this happened? The Department’s approach to reform seems to have resulted from the way in which change was directed by the Government. The Department and the CF were given the task of implementing hundreds of recommendations deriving from various sources, which appeared over a span of two years. The implementation of individual recommendations was accepted as a series of tactical jobs. NDHQ dealt with each as a specific objective, developing an action plan, schedule and an achievable goal: to implement the recommendation and ‘tick the box’. Public communication of the reform program in various DND/CF publications reflects that approach: charts, percentages and bar graphs represent the completion status of recommendations; the percentage recorded as complete therefore has become the gauge of reform. Taken as a whole, however, the many ministerial decisions represented an opportunity and a challenge to identify and describe the strategic vision behind them and to formulate a coherent implementation plan to realize that intention. Put simply, the defence team has applied **tactical** solutions to what it considers to
be **tactical** problems. What the Committee has stressed over its tenure is that the reform program is a **strategic** challenge that requires **strategic** solutions.”

GoC (2000a) “Part One – General Observations” (Bold face emphasis in the original text)

Defence Department attrition surveys conducted from 2002 to 2004 did not point to any improvements. They indicated that rank and file members were still quitting because of unfair treatment, itself, poor leadership-governance, frustrating rules and regulations, and concerns about the management of their career (OAG, 2006). The last Annual Report for the Quality of Life Project, for 2003-2004, listed 23 of the Committee’s recommendations as not yet satisfied (GoC, 2005a). There were 16 other recommendations that were considered satisfied but whose status was supposed to be reported annually to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA). In 2006, the newly elected Conservative government dissolved the Committee and, of course, the annual monitoring (GoC 2009d). The items that were deemed to have required repeated verification included pay, adequate leave for vacations and family emergencies, the well-being of military families, assistance for personnel wanting a second career, harassment in the work environment, and military clothing and equipment.

Fraser’s Minister’s Monitoring Committee is one of a long series of high profile, internal DND studies of personnel strategy all reported problems with personnel management and strategic policy making. These reports include the Mainguy Report, 1949; the Belzille Report, 1972; the Vance Report, 1980; the Officer Corps Study, 1989; and the Croatia Board of Inquiry of 1999 (English, 2001). English (2001: iii) criticises Canada’s National Defence Headquarters as being too bureaucratized, civilianized, and reliant on measuring its effectiveness by incremental increases in efficiency. English concludes that until the Canadian military’s top-down command structure is changed, “little of enduring worth will be accomplished” (English, 2001: 108).
Executive Culture and Institutional Adaptability

With a bureaucracy and dominant personality type that are inflexible and distracted by dynamics of career advancement, it should be no surprise that the institution is slow to adapt. In the introduction, the literature referred to the discussion of the post-modern military and the post-Cold War era. It was suggested that postmodern militaries have emerged in some states such as Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark (Moskos, Williams, Segal, 2000). There is also a broader discussion of a changed military and geopolitical environment that analysts attempt to label as third, fourth, and fifth generation warfare or as a Revolution in Military Affairs. They recommend significantly greater doctrinal and technological flexibility as well as cultural renewal (e.g., Spinney, Sayen, Vandergriff, 2001; Evans, 2003). Culture has become a catch word under which are grouped key change factors, such as professionalism, values, leadership, and ethics. Operations and culture are intertwined and it has been argued that culture affects an army’s choice of doctrine and technology more than elaborate assessments of needs and efficacy (English, 2001; Johnston, 2000: 30; Dorn, Graves, 2000). In fact, as a pre-condition for a Revolution in Military Affairs some believe there should first be a Revolution in Military Culture (e.g., Johnston, 2000). Jans and Schmidtchen (2002: 10), for example, recommend shifting the emphasis from tactics and technology to culture by restating the common military “C-cubed” (C³) acronym, which has stood for command, control and communications. Instead, Jans and Schmidtchen argue that “C-cubed” should mean culture, careers, and climate.

Contemporary military analysts maintain that excessive bureaucracy inhibits the innovation necessary to develop and adapt to new tactics and strategies (Martin, Mc Clausand, 2002; Watkins, Snider, 2002). There is an institutional bias that expects technology to sustain adaptability (Adams, 2000; Gentry, 2002). Organizational structure adds to the problem. Abbott (2002: 532-534) considers how military adaptation depends on a very deliberate and usually tardy evolution. Western states are caught in a recursive cycle where opponents can change tactics and technology faster and at less cost. When change does occur, it is not coordinated across the broad spectrum of military capabilities that are rife with conceptual disagreements and competition for resources. Agreement and prioritization involve many rival
parties divided according to branch of service, units with tactical specializations, combat support systems, defence industry interests, political considerations, pressure from allies, and etcetera. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect effective adaptability because military organizations are mired within a “mass of countervailing complexities” (Abbott, 2002: 534). Robotics, nanotechnology, and similar scientific innovations are expected to provide a decisive advantage for expeditionary forces in the decades to come (DLSC, 2003; DLSC, 2005). The Army’s Future Force manual, for example, emphasizes the use of concentrated firepower and near total information dominance over a battle-space that is coordinated by sensors, mechanical and human, and operated by multi-tasked soldiers and commanders. The battle space is illustrated with an artist’s conception of a three-dimensional theatre of operations as a cube resembling a terrarium with bodies of water, landscape, air space, and items in global orbit, all exchanging digital information simultaneously (DLSC, 2003). The Army’s Future Force manual also states that “[f]ully autonomous weapons systems with independent tactical decision-making capabilities (i.e. without a human-in-the-loop) are expected to become technically possible by 2015 – though there will likely be continued legal and ethical challenges to their employment” (DLSC, 2003: 37). The Army’s Director Land Strategic Concepts even produced a science fiction novella called Crisis in Zefra that describes how these weapons could be used (DLSC, 2005). It features illustrations rendered in the style of action comic books and follows a plot resembling that of a suspense adventure. The illustrations and the text, it should be noted, reflect the standard inside-outside cultural attitudes toward ethnic differences. For example, a potential opponent with an angry and resentful facial expression is drawn in the dress and architecture of Arabic-Muslim region (DLSC, 2005: 8). Crisis in Zefra was ridiculed in the July 2007 issue of Harper’s Magazine and removed from the Army’s website shortly thereafter. It remains available online at the ghostwriter’s consulting firm’s website (Schroeder, 2005).

The editors of a U.S. Army sponsored anthology called The Future of the Army Profession conclude that the U.S. “Army’s bureaucratic nature outweighs and compromises its professional nature” (Watkins and Snider, 2002: 537). Abbott, who wrote the final chapter, believes that any claim to an organized expertise is highly selective and dependent on bureaucratic power (Abbott, 2002: 528-531). He
argues that there is a fundamental contradiction between the behaviour of officers and their espoused moral codes. For Abbott, the conflict lies in the assumption that modern personnel selection mechanisms are compatible with the espoused code of duty before self. Instead, self-interest drives military ethics in a direction fraught with negative consequences (Abbott, 2002: 528-531). Abbott (2002) is doubtful that military professionalism is a viable and sustainable notion. It is more vulnerable than most self-designated professions to the effects of large bureaucracies and advanced capitalism characterized by outsourcing, a reliance on technology, and similar inhibitions to adaptability (Abbot, 2002: 523-525). The ethical questions arising from experimental tactics and technology make successful adaptation even less likely.

Foster (2004) is critical of the effect of the extreme obedience demanded in the military on the prospect of adaptability. Although he agrees it is necessary to fulfill the individual’s duties owed the institution and the state, misplaced obedience can have negative effects on criticism, initiative, intellect, and candour. It elevates followership over leadership since the obedient are prone to obey any order and any authority, notwithstanding its perceived effectiveness, ambiguity, arbitrariness, motivations, and ethical outcomes. Today, in the midst of declining effectiveness and relevance, Foster believes that the effects are “insidiously corrosive” and have led to “institutional stagnation and strategic debilitation” (Foster, 2004: 90-92). He is critical of the traditional military ethos and its code of selfless obedience because it inhibits dissent, initiative, the intellect, and moral courage (Foster, 2003: 90). There is a non-adaptive institutional culture, he continues, shaped by “an authoritarian institution built on rank, the sanctity of command, uniformity, and rigid rule-following” (Foster, 2003: 91). He worries that “we do indeed have a serious problem – a problem due in no small measure to the military’s institutional embrace of obedience as a governing ethos. To anyone concerned with the collateral effects of America’s imperialistic appetites, it is something we ignore at our own peril” (Foster, 2004: 93).

4.2.2 The Rank and File

The examination of power-knowledge as self-forming activity for the rank and file will emphasize the disciplining effects of the military heterotopia as an extension of the statist and
bureaucratic discourses. First, the concept of the heterotopia is discussed, then three bureaucratic power-knowledges are covered: the complaint system, ethics training, and secondary conscientious objection.

The Military Heterotopia

The military, whether in garrison or on expedition, exhibits the same inside-outside, us-other tensions as do states. It is a figurative line of razor wire where personnel are on familiar ground inside and vulnerable to unfamiliar forces outside. In broader terms, exceptionalist and timeless values are thought to exist inside the military while naïveté and ignorance prevails among politicians and the general public. Military personnel, moreover, believe their selfless sacrifices are enjoyed by citizens who too often take them for granted. When added to advantages between Canada and other regions, personnel on expedition have a more extreme sense of exceptionalism compared to the local, foreign population. Thus, most military personnel presume to occupy a moral and a physical space that stands apart from its domestic and foreign environments. Foucault (1986) uses the term heterotopia to describe such a place. Heterotopias can exist for things either held in high esteem, loathed, or forbidden. They help define something present in both the subject and the host society by creating the illusion that it is absent or set aside. Foucault refers to heterotopias that sequester adolescents, the physically and mentally ill, the old, and the criminal. In the West, the military has been a place of honour for the well disciplined, young, healthy, and heroic, and as a refuge for the unemployed, the aimless, and the aggressive.

Heterotopias are often total institutions where all, or much, of the individual’s time and activities are controlled and power-knowledge is concentrated and magnified. The categories of power-knowledge most evident in heterotopias are Foucault’s conceptualizations of panopticism, bio-power, and pastoralism (Foucault, 1980). Indeed, the military is one of the primary examples used by Foucault to illustrate his ideas of societal discipline, along with mental asylums, efforts taken by municipalities to combat the plague, and the Christian inquisition. Panopticism refers to a web of practices and technologies that make surveillance sufficiently widespread and intrusive that the person internalizes the disciplining effect and no longer needs continuous supervision. It can work through education, policing,
security cameras, architecture, tax returns, and so forth. In the military, it quite evident in drill, inspections, barrack design, mess behaviour, military law, and so forth. Bio-power is another set of practices that organizes and classifies individuals and the population according to age, gender, health, rates of hospitalization, the classification of diseases, public hygiene, and so forth. State authorities use the data to enhance labour productivity and mobilize military force. Military bio-power is applied through close monitoring of physical fitness and physical or psychological injuries, the wearing of uniforms, haircut and make-up style restrictions, the use of serial numbers, and daily reports on personnel ready for duty. Pastoralism is similar to the relationships between clergy and congregations where individuals examine their souls and confess in order to be blessed or avoid damnation. Pastoralism in the military manifests in exhibitions of such things as patriotism and a readiness to use weapons on others; judgment via performance appraisal and summary trials; reviews of family and marital relationships; and the selection of who is to be counted in or out of the promotion stream. All of these self-forming activities have a powerful cumulative effect.

The military heterotopia’s power to homogenize and control behaviour has marked repercussions on discipline and civil-military relations. If military personnel gravitate toward a shared identity, they will be confident that their narratives, moral codes, and processes are best and that they are fully capable of working without interference. Heterotopian exceptionalism also exists in smaller groupings. There is also room for the development of wide variety of local moral codes, modes of subjection, and self-forming activities that might not contribute to the discipline and cohesion of the larger unit or formation. They can adopt unique forms of greeting, initiation rites, binge drinking schedules, and a strong loyalty limited to one another. For example, the military commissioned a report from an anthropologist to analyze the culture of the unit involved in the Somalia scandal and for the personnel involved in the incident at Bakovici in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. It was found that “exaggerated” sub-unit cohesion interfered with the functioning of larger formations, the expedition, and the military institution as a whole (Winslow, 2004: 8). Winslow found that recruits are most concerned about avoiding ostracism within their primary sub-group to the detriment of the military or state interests. She cites research on strong
primary group bonding that indicated a propensity to hide any wrongdoing from outsiders, including their own superior officers. It is a tight “we-they” standpoint that can lead to resentment when outsiders interfere (Winslow, 2004: 8). This also leads to an environment where superiors narrow their focus on the behaviour of their subordinates and ignore the acts of personnel in other units. These tendencies, Winslow observed, become more pronounced on expeditions. She suggests that the torture killing of the Somali man might have occurred partly because the perpetrators felt so secure in their small group that they did not expect to be held accountable. In such a context, Winslow advises that discipline, professionalism, and the role of junior leaders close to the primary groups are of the primary importance (Winslow, 2004).

Separate aspects of the military heterotopia itself conform to the us-other discourse. In garrison, the normal and the transgressive are juxtaposed at the same location. On one hand, there are well kept residential areas, more orderly than the most civilian communities, complete with chapels for mainstream denominations, married quarters for those the military defines as married, schools, community centres, shopping, and other elements of a small town. Nearby, often within hearing distance, are military training areas with firing ranges, parking lots of armoured fighting vehicles, and soldiers on field exercises. Barracks separate families from junior personnel and the unmarried. There are rites of passage for visitors who are subject to inspection and required to present identification cards at guarded entry gates.

Temporary or mobile heterotopias have the same effect. The military stages displays of personnel, equipment, and stunts for recruiting and brand advertising in venues such as shopping malls, schools, fairgrounds, and sport stadiums. Like foreign expeditions, temporary displays generate many of the same psychological reactions such as pride and protest.

There are references in official reports and manuals that support the idea of the military as heterotopia. The Office of the Auditor General Report of 1999 (OAG, 1999: article 26:14), noted that Canadian Forces personnel “perceive themselves as distinct from the rest of society.” The authors of Duty with Honour believe that military members accept “a unique and distinct identity within Canadian society,” so that “[t]hey are members of Canadian society, yet in subtle ways they are apart from it” (CFLI, 2003: 77). The ethos manual also declares that military professionals monopolize a special body
of knowledge and have the right to be a self-regulated institution (CFLI, 2003: 50-52, 59). On the topic of exceptionalism, Duty with Honour states that Canada’s military ethos “distinguishes a member of the Canadian profession of arms from ill-disciplined irregulars, mercenaries or members of another armed force that lack defining values” (CFLI, 2003: 22). Cotton refers to executive officers as “beleaguered warriors” and “defenders of the faith,” who believe there was once a golden age for the military ethos and what remains of it today is still is enough to set them apart from and above civilian society (Cotton, 1997: 3).

Complaint System

The Canadian Forces complaint system is a power-knowledge that supports the advantage of the executive category over the rank and file. Complaints processing relies heavily on rules and regulations, delays, and a complex division of authority that make the system quite difficult to understand and navigate. At no point is the complainant provided with adequately independent, staffed, and expert advocacy services. Similarly, there is no review or oversight office with the authority to reverse a decision by or impose a remedy on the Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces. Thus, the complaint system is able to protect the executives’ careers by reducing the risk that malfeasance and errors will be exposed, enforce obedience when decisions may be self-serving, and make it easier to deny fair treatment within social contractarianism. If ordinary personnel attempt to behave ethically when it is against the desires or orders of the executives, the complaint system strictly limits their opportunity to explain and justify decisions and actions.

The primary means of official complaint in the Canadian Forces is the internal grievance system. Complainants first submit a grievance to their commanding officers who attempt to deal with it themselves or forward the matter to the senior officer responsible for the issue. If the grievor is not satisfied with the results, the grievance is forwarded to the Final Authority, who is nominally the Chief of the Defence Staff (CFGB 2010b). The Final Authority’s power to adjudicate, however, has been delegated to the Director General Canadian Forces Grievance Authority, an executive officer in the
Regular Forces (CFGB 2010a). Grievors are provided with no legal advice or representation from the Defence Department and are left to hire a civilian lawyer at their own expense (CFGA 2010b: article 2.10). Outside of the internal grievance system, a complainant can turn to civil courts or the Federal Human Rights Tribunal, if the issue falls within their limited jurisdictions. Once they have submitted a grievance, it is mandatory that grievors have a uniformed “Assisting Member” of their choice, or one appointed by the chain of command, but this person is not an expert in law or the grievance system and is limited to explaining procedures and helping with research and the writing of the submission (CFGA 2010b: article 5.3). The Assisting Member “is not permitted to speak formally on behalf of, or in any way officially represent, the grievor within the grievance process” (CFGA 2010b: article 5.3). The executives, consequently, have an enormous advantage in terms of resources and expertise.

Military executives also have the advantage of captive oversight committees. What were supposed to be independent, external offices staffed with independent minded civilians were eventually established with no more than advisory powers. Firstly, the Somalia Commission Report of 1997, articles 40.34 and 40.36, recommended that the Chief of Defence Staff have no adjudicative powers in the grievance process and there be created an Office of the Inspector General with wide ranging authority to investigate misbehaviour and provide redress to complaints (Somalia Report 1997). An Inspector General’s office was never set up, and as we saw above, the Chief of Defence remained the Final Authority in the existing grievance system. Instead, other oversight committee’s were established, including the Canadian Forces Grievance Board, the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, and the Military Police Complaints Commission. Their shortcomings will be discussed in this section. These organizations were initially staffed with some independent minded civilians but during the following the decade that followed they were replaced with former military personnel who can be considered members of the military community. Michel Drapeau, a well known critic of the Canadian Forces and a retired colonel who says he holds military officers in high regard, nevertheless is concerned that the practice placing such people in positions of oversight is contrary to
Canadian values and warns that the hierarchy will continue to be “inward looking and insular,” and “either frustrate or evade civilian oversight” (Drapeau, 2009).

The first review body involved in the complaints system that claims it is external is the Canadian Forces Grievance Board. It was authorized by Parliament in 1998 because the grievance system’s many levels of review were considered “slow and unresponsive” and the process was perceived “as being too closely linked to the chain of command and lacking any external input” (CFGB 2001: 4). Its 2002 Annual Report requests more resources to address a growing backlog (CFGB 2003: 3). The additional resources were not forthcoming. Instead, the new chair announced the following year that greater efficiencies would be sought via a new management structure (CFGB 2004: 3). In the 2005 Annual Report, the Chair, Ms. Laurin, declared that most of the case backlog in their office had finally been cleared, but in the 2007 Report, she referred to a continuing point of delay elsewhere (CFGB 2006: 3; CFGB 2007: 2). The outgoing chair expressed a desire for “more timely decisions at the Final Authority level” [i.e., the Chief of the Defence Staff’s delegated authority] (CFGB 2007: 2). Ms. Laurin also called for an expanded mandate so the Board could review all grievances and had begun discussions with the Canadian Forces toward that end (2007: 2). All told, the Board sees only about 40 percent of all grievances (CFGB 2007: 6). According to the 2009 Annual Report, however, the mandate remained the same whereby the Final Authority was only obligated to forward grievances dealing with administrative matters such as disciplinary fines, demotion, and release; pay and benefits including medical and dental services; and allegations of conflict of interest, harassment, and racism (CFGB 2009). The Final Authority may forward other files at its discretion. In its 2010-2011 Report on Plans and Priorities, the Board was still hoping to negotiate with the Final Authority to obtain the right to review all grievances (CFGB 2010c). As already mentioned, its reports to the Final Authority are not binding. When the Board does recommend that the grievance be satisfied and it is denied, limited reasons are given and the core issues are often not addressed (Ombudsman, 2003).

The first Chair of the Grievance Board was Mr. Paul André Massé 1999-2003, who had been a member of the military from 1967 to 1973 and a member of Parliament in the Liberal Party from 1979 to
While in Parliament, he was on several committees related to the military and foreign affairs. Other members of the Board had no comparable military backgrounds and could be viewed as external to the military community and its cultural acclimation. The first Vice-chair was Ms. Diane Laurin who also served as Chair from 2003 until 2008. Ms. Laurin’s background was in law and the Montréal municipal government and police force. She had worked on projects that included public morals, labour negotiations, work relations, and professional ethics (CFGB 2001: 37-38). The first two Part-time Members were Ms. Naomi Z. Levine, a lawyer, chartered mediator, investigator, and harassment consultant; and Ms. Wendy E. Wadden, a lawyer active in the governance of universities and the law profession and a specialist in working with perpetrators of family violence (CFGB 2001: 39). The membership soon began to change. The Vice-Chairperson from 2004 to 2010 (the present) has been James Price, a former Judge Advocate General lawyer and military officer beginning in 1981. He was appointed to a military judgeship from 2000 to his retirement in 2004 (CFGB, 2010a). The shift to a completely ex-military executive was completed with the appointment of retired Lieutenant Colonel Bruno Hamel in 2008. The Part-time Vice Chairperson is now Denis Brazeau, a retired colonel. The three Part-time Board Members, meanwhile, are Mike Auger, a retired lieutenant colonel; C. Fred Blair, who worked in the Judge Advocate General group of the Canadian Forces from 1972 until 1999; and Carina Anne De Pellegrin, a graduate from the Royal Military College and a member of the Canadian Forces for nine years (CFGB 2010b).

The oversight body at the second level of review that claims to be at arms length is the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, established in 1998 (Ombudsman, 2010a). The Ombudsman’s office has a very narrow mandate regarding the assistance it can provide and the remedies it can recommend. Rather than act as an advocate for the individual, it is obligated to remain neutral and safeguard the rights and prerogatives of the military as much as those of a military member. A complainant wanting someone to argue their case must hire a lawyer with their personal resources. Not only can the Ombudsman not impose a settlement, it does not have the mandate to criticize the content of a policy (DAOD 5047-1: Sections 3, 34, 36). It can only comment on whether the processes were
correctly observed. The Ombudsman also cannot review or comment on the findings of complaints that have been closed by the military’s internal grievance system or intervene if the complainant finds that the grievance process appears to be unnecessarily delayed. Mostly, the Ombudsman is a source of information for members who are required to research and state their own case. That process, however, is complex and time consuming. Individuals must choose among twenty-three general areas that can be considered as grounds for a complaint. They are then expected to consult with or submit complaints to 50 different persons, offices, hotlines, websites, regulations (often several times each), and acts of Parliament before, instead of, or in addition to, contacting the Ombudsman. What follows is the complete list provided in the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) section of the Ombudsman’s website:

“Unit orderly rooms; chain of command; commanding officers; any available military officer; military chaplains; military social workers; Chief of Defence Staff; Director General Military Careers; Director Accounts Processing, Pay and Pensions; Reserve Pay Hot Line; the Canadian Forces Member Assistance Program; Defence Counsel Services hotline; Summary Trial Review Authorities; Court Martial Appeals Court; Canadian Forces Provost Marshal; Military Police Complaints Commission; the streamlined Redress of Grievance process; the Canadian Forces Grievance Manual; Director Canadian Forces Grievance Administration; Canadian Forces Grievance Board; local, district and national offices and inspectors for the Canadian Forces Housing Authority; the Harassment/Sexual Assault hotline; Centre for the Support of Injured and Retired Members and their Families hotline; local, district and national officers of Veterans Affairs Canada; Veterans Review and Appeal Board; Bureau of Pension Advocates; local Post-Deployment Clinics (for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder); Directorate Quality of Life; Maritime Life Assurance Company; the President of the Service Income Security Insurance Plan; the Public Service Health Care Plan Trust; the Ombudsman’s Mandate; the booklet “The Code of Service Discipline
Potential complainants are warned on ten occasions that military personnel can only contact the Ombudsman if the “circumstances are compelling.” The Ombudsman’s website hotlink defining the word “compelling” leads to another site that lists 18 Ministerial Directives and two appendices. A brief definition of the word finally appears under a section entitled “Existing Mechanisms” consisting of three sub-sub-paragraphs to an article. The Ombudsman’s site also warns or infers that there are at least eleven types of situations for which the potential complainant cannot contact the Ombudsman at all. The Ombudsman’s FAQs page, however, still does not list all of the channels of complaint open to military personnel. There are also Alternate Dispute Resolution services with local and national offices, the Defence Ethics Program, DND Living Accommodations Dispute Resolution Procedure (LAI, 2007: section 16), and Military Family Resource Centres.

A new “Streamlined System” for the processing of grievances in the military’s internal complaint was implemented on June 15, 2000 (Ombudsman 2007a). The first Ombudsman, André Marin, reported that there were many problems and unreasonable delays with the new process. In four successive Annual Reports, from 2001-2002 to 2004-2005, Marin observed that there were systemic delays in the Canadian Forces Grievance process often lasting several years, with the longest reported delay still in progress after eight years (Ombudsman, 2007a). When Marin’s term expired in 2006, he was replaced by Yves Côté, who has had a long association with the government, Department of National Defence, and the Canadian Forces. In his first Annual Report as Ombudsman, for 2005-2006, Côté did not mention the problem with backlogs and delays in the resolution of grievances (Ombudsman 2010a). Instead, he organized part of the report under a section entitled “Focused on Positive Results.” For 2006-2007, Côté reported that the
backlog had been reduced. In January 2008, after fulfilling his promise not to draw attention to his office as did his predecessor, he left for an executive position in the Justice Department (Esprit, 2008).

Côté’s appointment began the transfer of Ombudsman’s Office from a civilian to a military community organization. He first worked as a uniformed legal officer in the Canadian Forces from 1977 to 1981 then continued as a civilian lawyer in the public service until the present. Côté acted as the government’s coordinator for the Somalia Inquiry and Legal Advisor for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s and as counsel for the federal government’s Privy Council from 2003 to 2005. After his brief tenure as Ombudsman from 2006 to 2008, he became an associate deputy minister at the Justice Department (Davis, 2005; Ombudsman 2010b). The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) opposed Côté’s appointment because they believed that he would be biased (Taylor, 2005). As was mentioned above, the Standing Committee was dissolved in 2006 (GoC 2009d). The Minister of National Defence ignored the committee’s recommendation. A prominent military critic reported that the rank and file would not trust the former Judge Advocate General lawyer and many would not submit complaints, bureaucratic frustrations notwithstanding (Taylor, 2005). He warned that “cutting the whistle off a boiling kettle is not a long-term solution that will serve to anyone’s benefit” (Taylor, 2005). His interim replacement was Ms. Mary McFadyen, formerly General Counsel to Marin. McFadyen had worked in the private sector prior to joining government in 1993 but has had no other employment connection to the military (Ombudsman, 2010b). In the 2007-2008 Report, she reaffirmed the need for ombudsman independence and also claimed credit for a substantial reduction in unresolved files. In the Annual Report for 2008-2009, she briefly noted that the “system, which is supposed to provide soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen with an informal mechanism to challenge Canadian Forces actions and resolve matters without the need of the courts or other processes, seems flawed and unfair” (Ombudsman, 2010a). In February 2009, retired Major-General Pierre Daigle was appointed Ombudsman (Ombudsman, 2010c). Since his appointment by the Minister of National Defence, defence analyst and lawyer Michel Drapeau has noted, the Office has kept “a very low profile and major investigations have been few and far between” (Drapeau, 2009). He
notes that several senior investigators have submitted grievances that will be settled by Daigle (Drapeau, 2009).

The Military Police Complaints Commission was also established in 1998 to hear complaints about military police behaviour and the conduct of investigations (MPCC 2008). A similar shift from non-military observers to former military occurred in the Military Police Complaints Commission, but its success was short-lived. The first commissioner was Louise Cobetto 1999 to 2004, succeeded by retired Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Tinsley in 2005, a former member of the military police and a legal officer (GoC, 2010k). All was quiet until Tinsley forced into action by persistent external complaints about military police conduct relating to detainee transfers in Afghanistan and he found that the military would not cooperate with his investigation. When his term was not renewed for December 11, 2009, he became quite vocal in his criticism. In a statement made before a Parliamentary committee investigating the issue, while still the chair of the board, he commented that “[i]t would seem that some of the key lessons of the Somalia experience, from which I have already said this commission arose, wherein accusations—whether well-founded or not—were fueled by a lack of transparency, have not been learned (Wherry, 2009). He added that the government has become the obstacle to the investigation rather than the police. At an opposition party organized conference on government accountability held on January 26, 2010, Tinsley became a critic of the complaints commission format. He was quoted as saying that the “perception has become widespread that something is not quite right in the system” (Freeze, 2010). He referred to “political ‘horsetrading’” and the role played by unelected “staffers” in the selection of commission executives. “The potential for abuse itself does not bode well for good governance,” Tinsley concludes (Freeze, 2010). Glenn Stannard, a former City of Windsor Chief of Police, was appointed as acting Chair on December 14, 2009 (MPCC, 2010). By the end of May 2010, the government still had delivered so few documents that it was likely proceedings would have to be suspended. When Stannard asked the government’s legal representative, Alain Préfontaine for an explanation, he was told that “the documents will be given to your counsel when they are good and ready” (Chase, 2010).
Secondary Conscientious Objection

The military’s moral code, as discussed in Chapter Three, holds that once a person has enrolled, they are expected to accept unlimited liability and the duty to obey. In an apparent contradiction, the manuals on the moral codes and the ethics training guidelines to be covered in the next section expect individuals to disobey or alter orders that contravene the code or that they believe are not legal (CFLI, 2003: 26, 30). Duty With Honour makes the warrior’s honour dependent on such things as the “humane treatment of prisoners of war” (CFLI, 2003: 32). On expedition, though, the freedom to act on one’s freely deliberated volition is strictly proscribed. The limits depend on rank, public relations, local customs, rules of engagement, and state interests. This section will address the discrepancy between the rules and practices supporting obedience and those supporting selective conscientious objection.

The rank and file have little chance of acting according to their conscience once enrolled when their interpretation of the moral code varies with orders from their superiors. The only means of exercising conscientious objection to deployment on an expedition they find morally objectionable, according to the Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD 5049-2) is to request release from the military after they have completed their tour. Even then, release is conditional on a number of factors and many reasons of conscience are not admissible. The commanding officer can grant or reject the request for release based the characteristics of each expedition, the precedent a release might set, the importance of the expedition to the state’s domestic and international politics, and the objectors’ political and religious beliefs. DAOD 5049-2 refers to an “applicable release authority,” superior to the commanding officer, but does not identify who that is. The “authority” may deny or grant the release according to an investigation of the objectors’ family background and upbringing, religious affiliations, the teachings of their religion, how their beliefs have been confirmed, the credibility of the objector and the commanding officer recommending the release, and other factors (DAOD: 5049-2). Redress for anyone not satisfied with the release decision can only be pursued via the flawed internal military grievance system discussed above.
The refusal to act on a morally objectionable order in situ is called selective conscientious objection. If individuals fail to obey an immediate command, they would be charged and arrested for “Disobedience of a Lawful Command” under Queen’s Regulations & Orders (QR&O) article 103.16. A conviction can result in “life imprisonment or a lesser punishment” (QR&O: 103.16). It defines a lawful command as anything related to military duty the disobedience of which might impede a military proceeding. In the regulation, there is no mention of conscientious objection, international law, the military’s moral code, or Canadian values. QR&O 103.33 on “Setting Free without Authority, or Allowing or Assisting in Escape,” for instance, is a strong deterrent to selective conscientious objection for individuals concerned with their role in the current controversy in Afghanistan over transferring detainees to a third party that practices torture, an act that contravenes international law. If someone believes this is the case, there are no procedural mechanisms and no flexibility within which they can object. The moral precept to act with the warrior’s honour is not possible within the regulations and practice.

Ethics Training

As part of the reform agenda initiated in response to the scandals of the 1990’s, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces were obliged to institute an ethics-training program. The effort began in 1994 with a letter from the Chief of the Defence Staff authorizing the establishment of an ethics office and a project that would produce an ethics program where results could be measured and progress monitored. After three years, however, nothing significant was accomplished. On December 21, 1997, another order was issued to launch an ethics program after the Boards of Inquiry on the incidents in Somalia and Bosnia had issued their reports (GoC, 1997c). Little was done for a further two years. The Office of the Auditor General reported that key components of the program had still not been put in place five years after the Chief of Defence Staff’s letter ordering its establishment (OAG, 1999: 26:33). The department had not yet instituted “clear reporting mechanisms” as they had for other programs as it had to report instances of harassment and racism (OAG, 1999: 26:35). The senior military officials in each
branch of service, moreover, said they were not even aware that they were responsible to set up their own
programs (OAG 1999: 26:36). In a follow-up report in 2001, the Auditor General again observed that
“little progressed had been made” and that the Chief Review Services, responsible for overall
management of the program, had not developed a system for performance reporting (OAG, 2001: 12:335,
12:38). By then, the Department of National Defence had only managed to produce a Defence Ethics
Baseline Survey in 2000 and a Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 7023-0 on June 26,
2001, providing a standing authority for the program and a basic list of moral values. This section
discusses the implications of the survey and the characteristics of the ethics program itself.

Like most institutional reform efforts, there was an attempt to use social science as a means of
establishing credibility and to reduce the risk and responsibility for the project managers and sponsors.
The literature on measures of culture versus climate makes the distinction that actual cultural behaviour,
including ethics, must be observed and not surveyed. Climate is what respondents report, however
accurate or inaccurate their impressions might be, and whether they actually believe it to be true. Culture
is actual behaviour, including ethics, and must be observed and not surveyed by questionnaire. The
difference between culture and climate organizational research has been discussed at length in academic
and business literature (Denison, 1996). There are differing conceptual approaches. Culture can be
conceived of as a set unconscious assumptions that change slowly, while climate can be a collection of
conscious perceptions more easily swayed by recent events (Denison, 1996). In the 1980’s, postmodern
criticism of positivist organizational behaviour research and a general belief that research no longer
accurately reflected social conditions inside contributed to a new on the study of culture through closer
observation (Denison, 1996). The study of the behaviour of Canadian military personnel in Somalia and
the former Yugoslavia by anthropologist Winslow (2004), mentioned above, is an example. In some
environments, surveys can provide practical background information and point to problem areas. In his
review of culture and climate, Denison (1996) finally concludes that observation and surveys should be
combined, along with their conceptual underpinnings, but that sociology should use the case study to gain
insight into individual relationships. In a highly bureaucratized hierarchy, however, the surveys and the
subsequent reports can be used to avoid accountability because policy can be set on data that appears scientific. They can also be distorted by ulterior motives, such as the avoidance of embarrassment to executives, competition for resources, careerism, and the tendency for researchers to use terminology like culture and climate that can easily confuse executives. There are many often dubious assumptions made in such projects about the feasibility of the survey topic, the psychological maturity of the respondents, heuristics thought to control cheating, ambiguous reporting of the survey results, and the goals of the surveyors and their sponsors. For instance, individuals usually self-report that they have achieved a state of moral development they consider more attractive than their actual behaviour (Darley, Batson 1973). Whatever is self-reported, actual behaviour tends to conform to group norms (Bandura 1991). Tett, Jackson, and Rothstien (1991) demonstrate that questionnaire answers can be easily faked to match the desired result. In their experiment, groups of respondents were asked to complete the same questionnaire several times for a variety of potential employers. The results were uniformly and convincingly altered to suit the occasion. Heuristics designed to detect faking do not work. The best the authors can recommend is to compare rates of dissemblance among groups thought to have varying degrees of motivation to fake good or bad (Tett et al., 1991).

The Department of National Defence bias in favour of quantitative questionnaire surveys is evident in the format of the Social Science Research Review Board’s application form for external project proposals (GoC 2009b). Although the form lists focus groups and interviews as possible formats for a survey, along with questionnaires, they are to be analyzed by quantitative, not qualitative methods. The definition and means of measurement for experimental constructs require the description of scales for validation, rating, and interpretation. Researchers must identify the independent and dependent variables, and the statistical algorithms to be used to test the hypotheses.

A close look at the research used to develop a performance measurement system and produce something that would look substantial in the department’s ethics training project, the Baseline Assessment of Ethical Values (Catano, Kelloway, Adams-Roy, 2000) can serve as a case study. In the introduction to the survey report, Catano et al., write that research on ethical climate was requested by Department of
National Defence leaders because of an increase in the number of peace missions, downsizing, and decentralization. They do not embarrass their clients by referring to the scandals and investigations that actually gave rise to the project (Catano et al, 2000: 4, 13, 17). The Baseline Assessment also failed to address several issues that the military respondents in had thought were important. Eighty percent of the comments written in the final section of the questionnaire complained vehemently about poor leadership. The report authors also do not make it clear that the Baseline Assessment is measuring ethical climate and not actual ethical values. The authors claim that their survey answers the need for an “baseline assessment of the ethical values DND members currently adhere to;” reveal “the values used by members to make ethical decisions;” and indicate what “Military and Civilian personnel believe…” (Catano et al, 2000: 4, 16).

How accurate is the DND report, moreover, given the probability that ethics might not be the best field of study as opposed to alternatives such as group dynamics and personal rewards or that the theory used to choose questions and the method of interpretation is valid? The report is also not straightforward regarding the viability of the survey’s theoretical model for moral development. In the “Executive Summary” and the early pages of the full report, there is mention that the research is intended to validate their conceptual model (Catano et al, 2000: 7, 15). Much later, they admit that the model of moral development they employed was not confirmed and that “this portion of the research was not successful” (Catano et al, 2000: 56). As normally happens with ethics surveys, as mentioned above, the respondents reported that they had achieved the highest stage of moral development, contrary to the theory developed by Kolhberg (1976) they had chosen. Rather than warn the survey’s results are suspect, however, the authors claim that “the findings are useful in corroborating the findings in other sections of the instrument” (Catano et al, 2000: 56). The report authors were certainly overstating the accuracy of their efforts by scoring the results to one decimal point (Catano et al, 2000: 13). Even people literate in survey techniques, moreover, would have to take great care when interpreting the Baseline Assessment. A user would have to read carefully the methodology section and the footnotes to understand the effect of complex manipulations. For example, there are instances where results are displayed on a Likert scale in
diagram form asking for one of five degrees of agreement: disagree strongly, disagree, are neutral, agree, or agree strongly. When reporting the results in plain language, however, the scales are collapsed into a yes-no binary percentage (Catano et al, 2000: 13-14). This simplification transforms five degrees of intensity for agreement-disagreement into a claim that a problem does or does not exist. Likert scale results are also reversed so that a reader of the complete report must be aware that “strongly disagree” answers on the original questionnaire can become a “strongly agree” in the final report. Thus, to judge for oneself whether the original question presented to the respondent was fair or biases requires some effort. There are more difficulties confronting a non-expert. Some survey items provide ambiguous multiple choice questions asking respondents to distinguish between what they think has been achieved, what can be achieved, and what ought to be achieved in the matter of institutional fairness (Catano et al, 2000: 35). Elsewhere, respondents answered that they believe supervisors and co-workers behave ethically 63.2 percent of the time but ought to behave ethically 81.5 percent of the time. The authors of the report, by contrast, considered 63.2 percent to be “very high.” The authors’ ethical standard was set 18.3 percent lower than that of the survey respondents (Catano et al, 2000: 39, 113). No justification is presented. Similarly, respondents reported that self-interest is the operative value in their unit 57.2 percent of the time, which survey analysts considered a “sound positive” result (Catano et al, 2000: 29, 31, 39, 68).

The report authors had warned, at many points in the report, that the assessment was only a “baseline” and that “research was not aimed at gathering outcome results” (Catano et al, 2000: 7, 8, 15, 56, 68, 70, 71). Nevertheless, they eventually claim “that Department of National Defence personnel have sound positive values and characteristics,” without providing a standard or a benchmark. A positive assessment was premature by the survey report authors’ own standards. In the absence of any longitudinal data, the report authors go further to assert that their client’s nascent Defence Ethics Program “is working in establishing both behaviours and expectations about behaviour with respect to courage, integrity, loyalty, honesty, fairness, and accountability” (Catano et al, 2000: 39).

The authors of the next survey, undertaken in 2003, confirmed that the model used by their predecessors to investigate the concept of ethical decision making could not be compared to the results of
their current survey (Durson, Morrow, Beauchamp, 2005: 33). Too many changes had been necessary to make the model viable. They add that it is important to understand and address the modes of ethical decision making in policy making and training. Nevertheless, they report that respondents perceived an improvement in the ethical climate and had higher “expectations” for ethical behaviour in comparison to the results from 2000 (Durson et al., 2005: 2, 11). The authors conclude that the results are “encouraging” because leaders can affect many of the factors contributing to the ethical climate (Durson et al., 2005: 12). Actually, the attention paid to ethics had just made the respondents more aware of the shortcomings of their superiors and the organization. This is no encouraging news in the survey results. The largest gap between what respondents report as being actual behaviour versus what ought to be, for example, is in the area of organizational fairness (Durson et al., 2005: 22). The authors note that without such fairness, personnel are more likely to seek “retribution” against the organization and not give commitment. Not surprisingly, persons of higher rank who benefit from the status quo and who should be held accountable are less likely to report that fairness is a problem (Durson et al., 2005: 18, 23). There are also large gaps for civilians and military personnel between the amount persons care for or “look out for one another” and “stick together” in the workplace (Durson et al., 2005: 23, 24). The authors remark that this is of particular importance for military personnel because it affects cohesion and operational effectiveness. The discrepancy between actual and expected standards of integrity, loyalty, courage, honesty, and accountability is also large (Durson et al., 2005: 24, 25). Such a perception discourages people from acting ethically themselves. There are also negative outcomes for the report’s measures self-interests, observation of organizational rules, and the behaviour of supervisors (Durson et al., 2005: 25-29) Again, the written comments added at the end of survey questionnaire provide blunt opinions of the state of the leadership and the social contract. When asked “[w]hat is the most important ethical issue in the DND/CF today” respondents cite organizational fairness, which includes questions about the “existence of double standards” and “care of personnel” (Durson et al., 2005: 12). They complain of preferential treatment based on rank and inequities in the performance evaluation and selection system. Many said the latter was “inherently flawed” and that supervisors favoured their “friends,” “‘yes people,’” those “‘who played the
game,”” and members of “‘the old boys club’” (Durson et al., 2005: 12, 93, 94). Important gaps between “as is” and “should be” were also found in the areas of community and workplace cohesion and co-worker behaviour (Durson et al., 2005: 2, 23-25).

The 2007 Defence Ethics Survey report states that the ethical climate has improved since the 2003 survey and that there is “a fairly positive trend” in the view of military respondents (Fraser, 2008: 7). Again, there are marked differences according to rank with junior personnel having a more negative opinion of their peers and their supervisors in terms of caring and self-interest. To say there has been an improvement from a dismal climate is not difficult. About 40 percent of respondents are either neutral or disagree with five positive statements about organizational fairness. They were asked to respond to: “This organization looks after its members. Organizational policies are fair to everyone. This organization cares for its members. This organization respects the dignity of all members. This organization is fair” (Fraser, 2008: 7). The questionnaire’s statements are equally positive for care of personnel, co-worker behaviour, supervisor behaviour, and following organizational rules (Fraser, 2008: 5-7). On the last topic, 65 percent of respondents were either neutral or disagreed with the statements indicating that everyone followed the rules (Fraser, 2008: 11). What would be the results if the statements were all negative, or if even half were positive and half negative? Regarding models of ethical decision making, the author of the 2007 report was satisfied that there was enough continuity from 2003 to conclude that respondents favoured a mixed approach (Fraser, 2008: 16). That is defined as a combination of approaches that vary by culture and which could be based on rules, caring, consequences, self-integrity, and self-interest.

Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 7023-0 was amended September 1, 2003, to include references to the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service manual written at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (DAOD 7023-0, 2003). Following the Anglo-Western tradition, Annex A to DAOD 7023-0 presents a “Statement of Defence Ethics” listing the duties and obligations of the individual to the others and to the state. The principles are to: respect the dignity of all persons; serve Canada before self; and obey and support lawful authority. Individuals are obligated to demonstrate: integrity, loyalty, courage, honesty, fairness, and responsibility. This is to be accomplished by the
“internationalization of ethical principles” DAOD 7023-0. The order states that the values represented in the “Statement of Defence Ethics” are consistent with the *Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service* and the military ethos manual *Duty with Honour*. The order also outlines a management structure consisting of an ethics program authority and an advisory board with representatives from the branches of service and major functional groupings in National Defence Headquarters.

In 2006, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute finally published a training manual and workbook as part of the Defence Ethics Program (CFLI, 2006), 12 years after the Chief of the Defence Staff’s letter authorizing the establishment of an ethics project. The training manual and workbook repeats the knowledge in *Duty with Honour* and applies it within a knot of self-forming power-knowledge transactions. The training manual states that “ethics is at the core of everything” a military member does, and that “their conduct must reflect Canadian and military values, the principles of which are grounded in ethics” (CFLI, 2006: 2). It quotes *Duty With Honour* in that military values “come from what history and experience teach about the importance of moral factors in operations… These values are understood and expressed within the Canadian military ethos as follows: Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage” (CFLI, 2003: 30-31). The “framework includes principles (e.g., respect the dignity of all persons) and obligations (i.e., integrity)” and “beliefs and expectations (e.g., unlimited liability)” (CFLI, 2006: 10). The training manual contains several passages that describe the nature of Foucault’s self-forming activity through institutional power-knowledge. For example, the training methodology is described as a “values-based approach,” where a value is defined as an important belief that can guide behaviour (CFLI, 2006: 10). Acknowledging that people do hold different sets of values, the manual expects that military personnel will abandon their important beliefs and replace them with the military’s.

The method relies on offering a narrow range of acceptable options as solutions to scenarios with ethical dilemmas. In each scenario, in which the trainee is already in a severely compromised position. The most ethical course of action could have been chosen before the circumstances of the scenario arose or are not available for discussion because they would involve such behaviours as disobedience or desertion. The trainee is to follow five steps in their analysis of moral dilemmas by considering: the facts,
the elements of the moral code at play, personal values and ethical responsibilities, and environmental factors such as rank, tasks, and rules of engagement. The individual then must weigh risks related to moral conscience, self-interest, the Canadian Forces’ image, and obedience to superiors. Finally, trainees choose an option and declare how they would act (CFLI, 2006: 16-17). Thus, individuals are expected to apply the military’s moral code to ethical dilemmas created by military activity and defend their decision in the midst of a group indoctrinated within the same moral code.

Forty ethical dilemma scenarios are offered for discussion in the manual (CFLI, 2006). They can be linked to many of the discourses raised above. Twenty deal with problems arising on operations and an equal number within garrison; the inside and outside aspect of the heterotopia. Five cases involve groups of civilians from organizations such as from the UN, CARE, conflict resolution NGOs, and religious missionaries; the inside-outside aspect of domestic and international culture (CFLI, 2006: 87-89). The twenty case studies set in garrison deal with petty theft, violations of rules and regulations, harassment, and discrimination. Cases 22 and 32 present dilemmas concerning communication with the media that could embarrass the Canadian Forces and government; statism as careerism and branding (CFLI, 2006: 117-119). Case 35 describes how a performance evaluation has been manipulated to mislead a selection merit board; executives controlling subordinates (CFLI, 2006: 126-128). Three case studies based on actual events that occurred on expedition are summarized immediately below. In operational case study number 3, a Canadian military woman is sexually harassed by men from a coalition force who are known not to treat women according to Canadian values. The woman complains to her male superior who then reports the incident to his male superior. The latter does nothing. For this case, the options listed in the Instructors Manual include: reporting to the next higher officer in the chain of command, telling the harassed female soldier that she has to accept different mores and should stay away from the offending men, arrange to have a Canadian male soldier act as a type of bodyguard, or repatriate the female soldier to Canada (CFLI, 2006: 30-32). In case number 5, a Canadian soldier sees a counterpart from the host state army taken out of sight by other local military personnel. The Canadian can hear sounds indicating that someone is being beaten. When he objects to the local commander on site, he is told to mind his own
business. The options that the instructor should consider are: walk away and let the man be beaten, explain to the local force’s commander that the beating should stop because it is contrary to international law and could harm the expedition’s image, insist that the local commander accompany the Canadian to investigate the apparent beating thereby putting the latter at risk of punishment by his compatriots, or risk harming relations with the local military by investigating the incident alone unescorted (CFLI, 2006: 36-38). In case study number 18, a military liaison officer and a small patrol meet with local civilian leaders. To show trust and cordiality, the Canadians set aside their arms and armour. The local people, however, begin acting suspiciously in a way that signals a possible attack. The options include: ask the elders to explain, insult the elders by taking up weapons and armour, insult the elders by ordering other patrol members to be extra vigilant (CFLI, 2006: 75-77).

The scenarios do not even conform to the military’s basic theory on tactical and strategic flexibility as expressed in the Observe – Orient – Decide – Act loop, known by the acronym OODA loop (U.S. Army Field M 3-22.40, 2007). It is easy to see the parallel between OODA and the requirement to deliberate and act with second order volition necessary for ethical behaviour. Because the overwhelming precept in the military is obedience and secondary conscientious objection is subject to severe sanctions, the OODA loop of ethical behaviour is blocked before the subject can act.

The administrative policy and network of the ethics training program in the army, issued after the production of the scenarios, provides the bureaucracy sought by the Chief of the Defence Staff’s in his order first issued in 1994 and by Office of the Auditor General in its Annual Reports of 1999 and 2001. In such a power-knowledge system, recall, regulations and transactions help form the ethical self. The Army issued a Land Force Command Order (LFCO) 21-18 in August 2005 that established a mandate, communication plan, monitoring agencies, quantitative performance measurement, program oversight, tasks and responsibilities, a subject matter expert office, an ethics coordinators’ network, funding rules, and so forth.

The army’s Director Land Personnel Management as part of the Army’s Ethics Programme, (AEP), completed a PowerPoint slideshow introductory briefing for Unit Ethics Coordinators (AEP,
2009), and published a manual for executive officers called *Duty with Discernment* (DwD, 2009). The slideshow begins with a nod to the well-known member of the Hellenist Cynics School, Diogenes of Sinope. One drawing, by William Gropper shows Diogenes holding a lamp looking for an honest man and another features the painting by John Williams Waterhouse where the philosopher is living in a barrel. The lamp reference is later translated into the Lamplighter facet of the Army Ethics Programme, which attempts to provide a structure for whistle blowers. The barrel could be an ironic warning that persons availing themselves of that avenue of dissent should take refuge. Whistle blowers are to report violations of the moral code to Unit or Regional Ethics Officers who are military officers subject to the chain of command. Their reports, in turn, are made to executive officers with the personality traits and bureaucratic levers described earlier. At no time would a complaint about unethical behaviour be heard by an external and sympathetic ear. The slide show also makes frequent mention of the army’s goal to give the soldier a sense of ethical certainty. That is to be based on knowledge of expectations associated with military employment, army values, and national values and beliefs. Military values include unlimited liability and discipline; army values, covered at length in Chapter 3, include duty and loyalty; and national values and beliefs include order and good government, and the obedience and support to lawful authority. These feeder values are supposed to shape professionalism, cohesion, operational effectiveness, and ethical certainty. In the end, individuals will perform their duty with discernment, which implies a degree of second order deliberation and volition. There is, however, a contradiction between imperatives like discipline, duty, obedience, ethical certainty and the discretion required to meet the ethics program’s ultimate goal and that of the Western tradition of philosophy, Diogenes of Sinope included. To return to the list of national values, they are naturally statist and have not been observed in the case of military personnel. The list presented on the slide also includes democracy, rights and freedoms, and respect and dignity for all persons. To the extent that they have existed in the past for the general population, moreover, these values have been steadily eroded by a succession of neo-liberal Conservative and Liberal Party governments from 1980 onward. Electoral politics have become a duopoly, freedoms have been curbed by fear of armed attacks, and funding for education, health care, and other social services is being

While it appears that *Duty with Discernment* (2009) was written by Richard J. Walker, the attribution is not clear. It is subtitled *CLS guidance on ethics in operations*, CLS being the Chief of the Land Staff, the head of the army in garrison. In any case, the language is often archaic and representative of the us-other standpoint. For example, it opens with “[r]ecent global events caution us that the veneer of civilization can be very thin and the humanitarian need to protect the weak and the innocent from a ruthless and implacable foe confirms to us that being a force for good in the world is a uniquely human entreprise” (bold typeface in the original) (DwD, 2009: 5). The manual argues that success in asymmetric warfare depends on popular domestic support and ethical certainty among those in the expedition. Ethical certainty builds on the effects of state branding that strengthen convictions of superiority that make it easier to launch armed expeditions and “assuage anxiety and doubt” that could accompany such decisions (Ind, 2003: 4). Ethical certainty, according to the program, is to be achieved by adherence to the army’s ethos. The elements of the code are then repeated in different ways. In many instances, reference is made to the warrior’s honour: [i]t is ethical restraint that makes the distinction between a warrior and a barbarian” (DwD, 2009: 13). The “terrorist strategy,” meanwhile, engages in “perfidy, subterfuge, and a disregard for human life – yours, theirs, and everyone else’s” (DwD, 2009: 13). The manual forbids hatred of the enemy “in revulsion to a heinous act” because “it may prove to be irrational and self-destructive” (DwD, 2009: 20). Hatred, the author notes, carries the risk of losing one’s own humanity. The catch phrase “We don’t do that” in reference to anything that contravenes the ethos is repeated at several points especially when the manual is addressed to Non-commissioned Officers (bold typeface in the original) (DwD, 2009: 20, 23, 24, 26, 27).

Such ethics training programs in large organizations are open to the criticism leveled by Jackall (1988: 6), who writes that they “are often strained, artificial, and often confusing even to managers since they frequently become occasions for the solemn public invocation, particularly by high-ranking managers, of conventional moralities and traditional shibboleths.” While Kilner (2002: 24) believes that
military leaders have a duty to both “train soldiers to kill” and “explain the moral justification for such killing,” he adds that neither is accomplished by debate but by thorough indoctrination. The indoctrination comes from the complete power-knowledge package, both outside and inside the military.

4.2.3 Actual Behaviour on Expedition

The effects of power-knowledge in the military bureaucracy and culture influence recent and current expeditions. This sub-section examines some of the ways that the historical narrative, bureaucracy, moral code, public relations, and personality type interact with actual behaviour when confronted with operational challenges and ethical dilemmas. It will analyze three expeditions: Somalia, the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan.

Somalia

The two most important scandals of the 1990’s related to expeditions were the torture killing of a Somali youth and personal misconduct and black-marketeering in Bakovici, Bosnia. The Somalia Commission of Inquiry was the most sensational and attracted a great deal of attention in the media. The investigation was closed by the government, however, when it began to look into possible wrongdoing by senior military and government executives, and politicians. Nevertheless, there is much in the abbreviated findings that is consistent with the analysis in this book. In the Somalia Inquiry Report, for instance, it was noted that the executive military officers involved were so convinced that their promotions were due to high merit that they blamed the scandal on the system and their subordinates (GoC, 1997a). Orders were accepted without questioning and with a false sense of capability that is “ingrained in military discipline and culture.” Executives lacked leadership and a sense of accountability and were motivated by personal ambition and “blind loyalty” to the chain of command. The report refers to the “shame,” lack of “honour,” and “failure” related to the expedition. The authors had “little sympathy” for executives who were distressed about their reputations and careers. The investigators described how military headquarters continually hampered their efforts. Under a section entitled “The Military in Canadian Society,” the
authors assumed that it was necessary for the institution to abide by a “military ethos, with its emphasis on the core values of integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness, and self-discipline. Every military operation from Vimy to Dieppe, Ortona to Caen, Kapyong to the former Yugoslavia has reaffirmed the need for such an ethos.” The Somalia incident, the authors found, indicated that a rhetoric on ethics is insufficient and that executive officers must provide a role model. The commission exhorts the leadership to describe and enforce a code of conduct consonant with “Canadian standards, values, laws, and ethics.” The report also expresses inside-outside heterotopianism and statism as follows: “Soldiers wear the official uniform of Canada. They display the Canadian flag on those uniforms when on missions out of the country. Society’s expectations of the nation’s flag-bearers are indeed higher than for the average citizen. Those expectations include the notion that soldiers serve as a symbol of the national character” (GoC, 1997a).

Former Republic of Yugoslavia

At the same time as the Somalia scandal, information became public about alcohol abuse, fraternization, sexual misconduct, insubordination, black marketeering, and inappropriate violence by Canadian troops at Bakovici, Bosnia. Allegations first surfaced in the spring of 1994. By 1996, it had become apparent that the military was not able to investigate this incident itself because of “bias,” “mistrust,” and “interference by the chain of command” (GoC, 1997b). There was a reluctance on the part of the military to acknowledge that an investigation was required and their attempts were desultory and inconclusive (GoC, 1997b). Because of public skepticism and political pressure, on July 22, 1994, executive officers were obliged to engage a retired Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner, Lowell Thomas, to undertake an independent investigation. The Thomas Report, made public in January 1997, found the military’s attempt to investigate to have been “flawed and unduly delayed” (GoC, 1997b). Thomas recommended changes to investigative policies, processes, bureaucratic structure, and channels of communication. The Thomas Report was also concerned about military culture. They cited “a lack of trust and confidence - in individuals, the investigative process, or the organization.” The Report further noted that “common sense, initiative, cooperation and leadership cannot be legislated. Restoring
trust requires action and a vision that is shared by all. The aim is to reinforce values and ethics in the military community in a publicly visible and effective way” (GoC, 1997b). The Dickson Special Advisory Group (GoC, 1998) was then formed under the direction of Brian Dickson, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. It was to assess the adequacy of the Code of Service Discipline and the functioning of tribunals and other practices. The Dickson Report was issued on March 14, 1997 (GoC, 1998). The Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton, also announced on September 1, 1999, that “modernization” of the practice of military investigations would be instituted in phases over the following months (GoC, 1999b). The recommended reforms were mainly bureaucratic and procedural. A large part consisted of shifting tasks and mandates to new entities within the same organization. Other changes were criticized for keeping control through staff appointments. A Military Police Complaints Commission, for example, was operated by a retired military legal officer and was given a mandate restricted in ways similar to that of the Ombudsman. In the section on reform of the bureaucracy, above, the chair of the Minister’s committee monitoring the pace of reforms criticized the absence of consensus or a strategy for change. His criticism applied to the ad hoc and piece-meal replies to the Thomas and Dickson recommendations.

The separate Croatia Board of Inquiry, 1999, examined the complex interrelationship between illness, stress, and toxic substances in the environment, which had sickened soldiers in Croatia from 1991 to 1995. The chair of the inquiry wrote a booklet later outlining what he thought was necessary for successful investigations of military wrongdoing (Sharpe, 2002). Inquiries, he wrote, risked losing their credibility unless they had a simple mandate and issued a succinct final report (Sharpe, 2002). He noted that the “importance of having a simple, straightforward theme cannot be overstated.” “Bureaucracy thrives behind complexity, and a retreat behind convoluted terminology is just as damaging to credibility as hiding behind a uniform” (Sharpe, 2002: 64).
Afghanistan

Several inquiries have been initiated regarding actual behaviour on the expedition to Afghanistan. The topics include transfer of detainees, negligence in the death of non-combatants, failure to intervene in cases of assault on civilians by Afghan forces, the murder of a detainee by a Canadian soldier, and the use and trafficking of narcotics among Canadian military personnel (GoC 2007f; Byers, 2006; Byers, 2003; and the selected texts at the end of this chapter). So far, the inquiries have remained internal to the military and subject to criticism for not making information public and unexplained delays. Behaviour has fallen short on a number of fronts pertaining to professional competence related to tactics and strategy, an overemphasis on public relations, violations of international law, and a failure to share popular Canadian values as measured by public opinion polls and media opinion. The Senlis Council, Security and Development Policy Research Group, has issued several reports dealing with these problems. The Senlis Council has ties to philanthropic, humanitarian, and governmental organizations with offices in Ottawa, Brussels, London, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, and “research platforms” in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq (Senlis, 2008a). Lloyd Axworthy, mentioned above as a proponent of peacekeeping and human security, sits on its advisory board. In 2008, the name of the organization was changed to “The International Council on Security and Development” (ICOS, 2009). A 2006 Senlis report noted that “[t]he Canadian mission in Afghanistan is still too focused on a military strategy, which for five years now, has failed to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. Further, this military strategy has not tackled the root causes of the current security crisis: extreme poverty, the lack of development and an almost complete dependence on opium poppy cultivation” (Senlis, 2006: 4). Likewise, “Canada has so far been unable to fully project its values and properly implement its new [3D] foreign policy” (Senlis, 2006: 8). In 2008, the situation in Afghanistan had worsened (Senlis, 2008b). Support for the Taliban had risen and the territory under its control had increased. The Taliban were running parallel governments providing essential services while NATO and other Western agencies were failing to deliver promised aid and
security. Trust in the Taliban was growing while the population was losing faith with the Karzai government and his Western supporters (Senlis, 2008b: 14-22).

The Canadian Senate Committee on National Security and Defence issued its own situation report in 2007. After a visit to Afghanistan and numerous consultations with experts and observers, they found a huge and complex set of problems faced by Western states in their effort to bring peace and prosperity to the country (GoC, 2007f: 13). Canada and other NATO members had insufficient resources and were causing too much destruction and civilian casualties. In a section entitled: “Too Many Innocent People are Killed,” the Senate Committee observes that “collateral damage does not win the hearts and minds of Afghans” (GoC 2007f: 7). Nevertheless, the senators were struck by the degree of optimism shared by military executives and the rank and file, but noted that it was “hard to square that with reality” (GoC, 2007f: 13). If the expedition continued as is, the committee was “doubtful the mission could be accomplished” (GoC, 2007f: 13). The Senators noted that if the cultural, security, and development objectives were to be credible, either major changes in tactics and strategy would be necessary or Canada should withdraw its forces as soon as the current commitment ended (GoC, 2007f: 13-14). As with the Somalia report, there is evidence of inside-outside statism in the sections entitled: “Change Comes Slowly in Medieval Societies,” and “Afghanistan Does Not Want to be Rebuilt in the Image of Canada” (GoC, 2007f: 6, 10). The Senate Committee’s recommendations, however, were sidestepped by the government.

Instead, another panel was formed by the government in 2008 that submitted a report in line with the authorized policy. The Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan consisted of prominent politicians and private and public sector executives who had connections to oil interests, international finance, and the furthering of trade and security integration with the U.S. (GoCd, 2008). The membership indicates how much government policy had shift from the peacekeeping and humanitarian narrative to that favouring combat and ulterior motives related to trade. To emphasize the degree of change, it is worth listing who was on the panel. The Chair, John Manley, had been Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2000 to 2002, when the Canadian expedition to Afghanistan began. At the time of his appointment to the panel, he was acting as Counsel for McCarthy Trétault, a consulting firm specializing
in trade, telecommunications, security, and finance. Panel members included: Derek Burney, a negotiator for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1991-1992 and its expansion into the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994; Jake Epp, a former Cabinet Minister for Energy, Mines and Resources, a Vice President of TransCanada Pipelines, and President of TransCanada International; Paul Tellier, a former Clerk to the Privy Council, (the highest public service executive in Canada), former CEO for Bombardier, CEO of the Year in 1998, and a Strategic Advisor for the international bank Société Général; and Pamela Wallin, who was Canada’s Special Advisor to the Council of the Americas in New York, a Strategic Advisor to the BMO Harris Bank; and a member of the board of Oilsands Quest. Advisors to the panel included many officials from the Afghan government, U.S. government sponsored foreign policy bodies, and U.S. military personnel. Some U.S. officials were close advisors to the Republican administration of George W. Bush, such as Eliot Cohen, a Counselor to the U.S. State Department and a member of the Project for the New American Century. Jack Granatstein, mentioned above as an educator in favour of reinforcing the pro-combat narrative, was included as a Canadian subject matter expert (GoC, 2008d: 56-71). The panel praised Canadian soldiers for their sacrifice, maintained that state interests were at stake, and that the expedition should only end when politicians deem that objectives have been met. The report described many significant problems but expressed confidence that they could be overcome with better management and leadership (GoC, 2008d).

In contrast, The International Crisis Group released a scathing report on the progress of the occupation in 2010 (ICG, 2010), despite being under the authority of members of the political and diplomatic elite. The groups website notes that it “is co-chaired by Lord (Christopher) Patten, formerly EU Commissioner for External Relations, Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; and by Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and former Senior Vice President for International Relations at Boeing. Crisis Group’s President and CEO has been, since July 2009, Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. She succeeded Gareth
Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia (1988-96) and a member of many international panels and commissions, who served as President between January 2000 and July 2009” (Crisis Group, 2010). Their November 28, 2010 report notes that the current U.S. and NATO strategy and tactics are not working. The Afghan security forces are less effective than the Taliban and Western and civilian casualties are at their height. Insurgents continue to benefit from vital support coming from the Pashtun areas of Pakistan and the Pakistani military and secret service. A large part of the country remains under the control of the Taliban, criminal gangs, and corrupt officials. The report remarks, “[p]olicymaking has been haphazard, based on the premise that if a bad idea is revived often enough, it might eventually work” (ICG, 2010: 1). Other problems include manipulation of the courts, misuse of the army and police by “regional powerbrokers,” anti-corruption campaigns that are stifled when they get too close to President Karzai and his entourage, and U.S. support of warlords to obtain intelligence and short-term operational assistance (ICG, 2010: 4-5). The authors conclude that unless these mistakes are addressed, an unlikely prospect, NATO forces will not be able to withdraw in a stable environment (ICG, 2010; 11).

On the question of ethics, Afghanistan presented several significant dilemmas. Recall that *Duty with Honour* referred to the humane treatment of prisoners as an important part of the warrior’s honour. The transfer of prisoners by the Canadian military to Afghan and U.S. authorities has been controversial throughout the expedition. Byers published a legal opinion on a treaty dealing with prisoner transfers signed in December, 2005, by expedition head General Hillier and the Minister of Defence for Afghanistan (Byers, 2006). Byers is a lawyer and academic expert on international law. In the paper, he writes that detainee transfers to a second party and onward to a third party state that might mistreat prisoners would fail “to safeguard Canada’s obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1984 UN Torture Convention, and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (Byers, 2006: 5). Article 25 of the Rome Statute provides for criminal charges and penalties for anyone, including Canadian military personnel and their commanders, who have aided and abetted the transfer of detainees to state authorities who are likely to mistreat them (Byers, 2006: 5). Like the authors of the Somalia Report and the Senate Committee on Afghanistan, Byers also uses language consistent with the discourse
of statism. He does so, however, from the perspective of international law in favour of timeless and global values: “the absolute, territorially-unlimited and time-unlimited character of Article 3 imposes limitations on Canada…” (Byers, 2006: 3). He recommended that Canada build detention facilities on its own or in conjunction with another force that does abide by international law, such as the Netherlands. The Canadian Defence Department rejected that option and also denied that the detainee arrangement signed by General Hillier is a bona fide treaty. Byers demonstrates how the agreement does indeed qualify as a treaty under international law (Byers, 2006: 2). He concludes that it “is an inadequate basis for the transfer of detainees into the custody of Afghanistan” (Byers, 2006: 5). Byers addresses another dilemma regarding negligence in the use of munitions where civilians might be present. As noted in the Senlis and Senate committee reports, Canadian troops are routinely implicated in attacks that result in civilian casualties. These attacks are made according to a type of cost-benefit analysis that depends on the risks of killing civilians with guided missiles compared to than killing them with imprecise weapon (Byers, 2003: 4). Byers argues that such calculations are “inappropriate” and “immoral” (Byers, 2003: 4). Canada has also failed to honour the spirit of a treaty banning the use of land mines. In Afghanistan, when Canadian troops would not lay land mines, U.S. forces did it for them (Byers, 2003: 4). The treaty is often known as the Ottawa Treaty because it was actively promoted by Canadian government officials and private citizens in the 1990s, and signed in the nation’s capital, when human security had been the primary theme of Canada’s foreign policy (Dewing, Koerner, 2003). Lloyd Axworthy, the advocate for human security, was instrumental in the organization of the conference leading to the treaty (Dewing, Koerner, 2003).

Byers’ work and public life is a reflection of the divide in Canada’s statist discourse. He would like to see interventionist expeditions continue, but according to human security discourse (Byers, 2007). He criticizes Canada’s Afghanistan expedition from the perspective of a Canadian nationalist hoping to avert deeper integration with the U.S. and to increase Canada’s humanitarian influence in the world. Byers states his case in his 2007 book, Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for? A relentlessly optimistic manifesto for Canada’s role in the world (Byers, 2007). Lloyd Axworthy endorsed the work in a short paragraph on the book jacket. In the federal election held October 14, 2008, Byers was a candidate for the
New Democratic Party in a downtown Vancouver riding. The party has always been against the Afghan expedition and is generally considered to be more progressive than its Liberal and Conservative counterparts. The New Democratic Party garnered only 37 seats in a Parliament of 308 seats in the 2008 election. Byers placed third in his constituency in a six party race, with 21 percent of the vote, behind the Liberal candidate who won 34 percent, and the Conservative candidate at 25 percent.

When recent expeditions are examined in detail, it is evident that they do not conform to the preferred historical narrative and moral codes for either the combat or the peacekeeping statist. The chapter on knowledge, above, examined how the details concerning Billy Bishop, Vimy Ridge, and Dieppe, also did not conform to their aims. The historical narratives may well continue to be used as rallying points for recent expeditions, but as an ironic example of consistent failure.

4.3 Summary and Conclusion

Foucault examines several power-knowledge sites such as mental health institutions, prisons, municipal responses to plague, and to some extent, the military. He combines discourse, institutions, practices, architecture, and other factors to explain how they affect the individual as a subject. Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus, of course, do not conceive of power-knowledge in the same manner as Foucault. Their contemporaries would not be subject to the same power techniques as the modern West. Nevertheless, Foucault selects several points from Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus that deal with self-forming activity as preparation and perception. In “What is Critique?” Foucault considers Kant’s idea of critique as a preparation necessary to perceive the workings of other discourses, such as science, law, and literature (Foucault, 2002: 191-192). In Foucault’s conceptualization, these insights are then used to analyze the power-knowledge in organizations such as factories, courts of law, universities, and militaries. In Hermeneutics, Foucault describes the techniques and exercises used to prepare the students of Stoicism and Epicureanism for an ethical life. These practices include mute listening, keeping journals, and living in a total institution. The ethical life itself requires the ability to think and act while gaining an understanding of discourse and power-knowledge. With Kant and the Hellenists, the mode of subjection
emphasizes the means by which one participated in the formation of an ethical self. A mature ethical self, for Foucault, Kant, the Stoics, Epicureans, could then engage power-knowledge, but on the subjects own terms.

In the military, power-knowledge techniques in the bureaucracy, culture, and heterotopia are often in sharp relief. Discourse and knowledge combine with bureaucracy and cultural practice to form a rigorous and pervasive power-knowledge. It affects the individual in a personal manner via the routine events of headquarters staff work and garrison life, and the extraordinary events encountered on expeditions. At headquarters and in garrison, mode of subjection and self-forming activity take the form of meetings, documents, manuals, training, organization design, and budget revisions. The bureaucracy, however, does not achieve the optimal use of resources in a supra human or scientific way, thereby allowing opportunities for sub-group competition and individual self-interest. The executive category is insular, defensive, and pre-occupied with the desire to suppress internal controversy and avoid negative publicity. Military executives and representatives of corporate interests dominate governance although they have values that differ from the majority of society. There is no substantial and effective means of participation in governance by non-executive members of the military, ordinary citizens, or members of Parliament outside the inner cabinet. To the extant that the personality type profiles are accurate, one can see why executives would manipulate the selection system to their advantage, be attracted to the profession in the first place, feel little responsibility for the rank and file, inhibit organizational adaptability and attempts at reform, and generally act like pseudo-transformation “leaders.”

Rank and file complainants, for example, face a nearly impenetrable array of rules, procedures, delays, and organizations with incoherent mandates.

Adaptability in terms of military tactics and technology is disjointed and poorly timed because of competing agendas among many sub-groups, each with different tactical capabilities and equipment. Less encumbered opponents adapt with greater speed and with less expense. When under external pressure to reform, the bureaucracy responds with incremental change and often with a poor awareness of the broader environment. Efforts to promote ethical behaviour are slowed and limited by elaborate administrative
systems, attempts to measure the immeasurable, and a culture dedicated to obedience and self-abnegation. If individuals attempt to follow their conscience, they encounter moral codes, rules, norms, and military law that do not offer a consistent discourse or practicable options. The dilemma scenarios presented in training programs start and end within boundaries that limit freedom of conscience. Without a viable opportunity to choose otherwise, military personnel on expeditions can become party to violations of international law and subject to arrest for the remainder of their lives.

Selection for promotion and personality type are two of the most important factors shaping military culture. Selection is driven by personal bias that favours those sharing the same personality traits as executive officers. The procedures for performance evaluation and ranking are manipulated by executives to make promotion a self-fulfilling prophecy. Dominant personality traits include pronounced tendencies toward conformity, obedience, aggression, disdain for other types, under-valuing introspective thought, resorting to authoritarian methods, and trust in the system that has rewarded them so visibly. Their homogeneity adds to an unjustified confidence in their abilities and faith in the efficiency and morality of their behaviour. The prevalent personality type for executive officers helps maintain a power-knowledge bureaucracy that fulfills the institution’s goal of enforcing unlimited liability from the rank and file for statist aims.

The military power-knowledge heterotopia concentrates and magnifies the culture to create a formidable mode of subjection and self-forming activity. The institution as a whole, and primary sub-groups in particular, develop an exaggerated sense of uniqueness and exceptionalism. The military institution, moreover, duplicates the inside-outside, time-space tension of statism, whether in garrison, at public relations events, or on expedition. The military has also been the subject of criticism, investigation, and scandal. The expeditions to Somalia, Bakovici, and Afghanistan led to recommendations to reform that were stymied by bureaucratic and cultural resistance. The warrior’s honour has been breached by instances of prisoner abuse, illegal transfers of detainees, avoidable civilian casualties, the treaty on land mines, and other acts.
It is evident that the military’s moral codes of professionalism, warrior’s honour, leadership, and social contractarianism are not fulfilled. According to the moral code Foucault derived from the Enlightenment and Hellenism, the military does not adequately prepare, perceive, and act to meet the military’s declared moral standards. The bureaucracy and culture exhibit the many deceptions described by Foucault as “tricks,” “traps” and “instruments of power” that give the appearance of fair governance while failing to constrain executive self-interest (Foucault, 2003: 107). Indeed, Foucault wrote that power-knowledge can create soldiers with “docility-utility” (Foucault, 1984: 181).

4.4 Selected Texts on Military Bureaucracy and Culture

The following texts have been selected and edited to illustrate how the application of power-knowledge in the military in garrison and on expedition is illustrated in the news media.

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On the economic and military relationship with the U.S.:

The Toronto Star, Tim Harper, March 1, 2008

“Canada’s Afghan mission tied to NAFTA, McCain warns”

Republican presidential hopeful John McCain says threats by Democrats to walk away from NAFTA could endanger the Canadian commitment to the war in Afghanistan.

“If we announce that we’re going to unilaterally change a treaty or suspend it ... obviously I think it can affect Canadian public opinion adversely. In fact, I’ve been told that by my Canadian friends and colleagues,” the Arizona senator told reporters after a town-hall meeting in Round Rock, Tex.

McCain reminded his Texas supporters that “brave young Canadians” are fighting alongside American troops in Afghanistan and said the U.S.-Canada-Mexico pact is tied to security concerns, particularly since the Afghan mission is “a matter of controversy” in Canada.

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On military bureaucracy, including neglect of veterans and the social contract, a dispute over recycled terminology, the installation of a Canadian military bureaucratic cell in the Afghan President’s executive office, and in-fighting among branches of service. Note that Col(ret) Pat Stogran, who had been named by the government as the most outstanding Canadian of the 50th year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth II was finally considered as too vocal in his criticism of veterans related bureaucracy:

The Toronto Star, Murray Brewster July 25, 2007:

“Bureaucracy gap leaves some soldiers without benefits: Programs, services under Veterans Affairs often unavailable for months after leaving the military.”

“Therefore most can expect to be unemployed for a period of time after release,” said an Oct. 11, 2006, briefing note prepared for Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor.

“Both circumstances are significant sources of stress for medically releasing members.”

A senior program director at Veterans Affairs said the department is aware of the gap and doing what it can to speed up the benefits approval process, especially for badly wounded soldiers.

The Edmonton Journal, Tim Naumetz, August 01 2007:

“Military deny ‘personnel crisis’ cited in gov’t video: Wrong term used in recruitment drive”

A government call for new recruitment videos for the Canadian Forces says some positions in the military are in a “personnel crisis.”

But military media relations officers threw cold water on the description Tuesday, saying it was used in error. Those officials also denied the video production call or the demand for army recruits is related to Canada’s substantial military deployment in Afghanistan.

A public works request for proposals to produce the 20 new videos was published this month.

The media officers said whoever produced the request for the Public Works Department mistakenly used a term that was created more than three years ago when the military was beginning a recruitment drive after years of downsizing.
“With e-mail and working with computers and that, it’s just, rather than reinvent the wheel every time, sometimes it’s easier to take another document you’ve been working with before and you just change the part that needs changing,” said Capt. Holly Brown.

When asked whether any Canadian Forces occupations were understaffed to the point of crisis, Brown replied: “There may be, although we don’t use that term personnel crisis; someone used it but that’s not the official term.”

The Toronto Star, Canadian Press, September 25, 2007:
“Canada wrote Afghan leader’s speech, NDP says”

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speech to Parliament last year was written by the Canadian military as part of an “elaborately staged political stunt,” the NDP [New Democratic Party] is charging.

The claim, based on heavily censored access-to-information documents, ruffled diplomatic feathers today and prompted a strong denial from the Afghan ambassador in Ottawa.

Dawn Black, the NDP defence critic, said the documents indicate military advisers were asked to prepare an initial draft of Karzai’s speech, delivered on Sept. 22, 2006.

“What Canadians heard was not the voice of the Afghan people, but the talking points of the Department of National Defence,” Black said.

Black quoted a situation report from Task Force Afghanistan as saying: “Team prepared initial draft of President (Karzai’s) address to Parliament 22 Sep.”

He [Karzai] also took direct aim at NDP Leader Jack Layton’s opposition to the war, saying that those who believe the mission was weighted too heavily toward combat and not enough toward reconstruction were wrong.

The documents released by the NDP suggest the Canadian military’s strategic advisory team - a 15-member group that has been helping create and train a new Afghan civil service in Kabul - was the organization that provided the draft of the speech.
The unit also apparently provided a communications officer who accompanied Karzai’s
delegation on his trip to Ottawa and New York.

She [Black] also said she will seek an investigation by the Commons defence committee into the
military’s communications campaign.

“There has been speculation about the resources that the Department of National Defence is
pouring into trying to sell this mission to the Canadian people,” Black said.

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*The Ottawa Citizen*, David Akin, May 14, 2010:

“Military rescinds cuts to Canada’s navy fleet”

Canada’s chief of defence staff took the rare step Friday of overturning a directive made by his
top admiral — an order that some analysts said was essentially gutting Canada's navy and, as a result,
quickly became a political liability for the Conservative government.

That sets up the possibility of a fierce turf war within the Canadian Forces as each service — the
navy, the army and the air force — and each command — the reservists and special forces, for example
— tries to defend existing budget allocations.

“I heard Minister MacKay with regard to his guidance, but at the end of the day, in the military
chain of command, it’s my direction to rescind the order,” Natynczyk told reporters at a Parliament Hill
news conference. “It’s my job to make sure that my minister's not surprised.”

“So, ultimately, he [the top admiral] wins because he got the cuts reversed. What will become of
him, I’m not so sure because there will be a huge price to pay for having had the minister look like he
doesn’t know what he’s talking about” [said military analyst Mercedes Stephenson].

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*CBC News*, Murray Brewster, August 14, 2010:

“Veterans ombudsman loses battle with Ottawa; Pat Stogran to be let go by Tories”
Canada’s outspoken veterans ombudsman won’t be re-appointed by the Conservative government. He apparently ran afoul of the federal government in his criticism of the bureaucracy, which he accused of being more interested in saving money that helping veterans.

News of his impending dismissal went off like a bombshell in the veteran’s community on Friday because in Stogran many former soldiers found a kindred spirit, someone who understood their concerns. His term comes to an end in November.

He was appointed with much fanfare in 2007 to be first ombudsman under the New Veterans Charter, a marquee position the Conservatives leaned heavily upon as proof they were behind the troops.

In an interview with The Canadian Press earlier this year, Stogran said the system was weighted towards treating wounded soldiers like industrial accident victims. More recently, he accused the department's bureaucracy of blocking initiatives that would help veterans because it would cost the federal treasury more money.

His frustration was also evident in recent Twitter postings. “The penny pinching ‘insurance company’ mentality should not be embraced since it does not reflect the spirit of the legislation,” was the message posted from his account on July 23. And from later the same day: “What seems to be missing is the principle of honouring Veterans by generously providing benefits.”

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On operational adaptability and professionalism:

The Toronto Star, Allan Woods, January 10, 2009:

“Bomb-fighting strategy under scrutiny: string of soldier’s deaths prompts new look at Canadian tactics”

Canadian deaths last month accounted for one-third of all coalition fatalities in a month traditionally marked by decreased activity and low death tolls. Military commanders describe it as a run of bad luck while the Taliban maintain it’s the result of a determined guerrilla tactic designed to drive out coalition forces.
But some suggest it is the result of poor strategy – chasing bombs and bomb-makers out of rural villages only to see insurgents, their weapons and influence over local Afghans flood back in once western soldiers have passed on.

But all predictions are that the Taliban also plan to step up their fight with more – and more sophisticated – bombs and new tactics.

But he went on to describe a game of Afghan whack-a-mole where insurgents enter a village to plant IEDs that are eventually found and defused by cutting-edge technology and skilled military bomb disposal teams. Inevitably, another cell pops up in another village and another fire has to be extinguished.

The Ottawa Citizen, Brian Hutchinson, September 11, 2010:

“‘Massive activities’ from Canadian troops coming in Afghanistan: Lieutenant-General”

Describing the efforts of his soldiers in Kandahar this summer as “good, but not good enough,” the commander of Canadian troops overseas said “massive activities” are coming to win over key districts in the troubled Afghan province.

If Canadian troops do not improve conditions in the districts before leaving next year, their sacrifices since 2006 will have been wasted, he suggested.

MGen Lessard acknowledged that his troops have encountered significant setbacks since 2008, when hard-won territory in Panjwaii district was ceded to insurgents. As late as this June, the Canadian mission was in his view “regressing ... There was a lot more enemy presence and a lot more activity ... The enemy in eastern Panjwaii was definitely taking the initiative. I believe in the last two months, we’re holding. We, I believe, have stopped the enemy initiative. That’s good, but that’s not good enough.”

The Toronto Star, Bruce Campion-Smith, June 26, 2007:

On civil-military relations and executive officer personality type:
“Can political battles be far behind? Gen. Rick Hillier is supposedly eyeing premier’s job in Newfoundland when he retires from the military.”

Rick Hillier, premier of Newfoundland and Labrador?

Perhaps it’s not so far-fetched. A persistent rumour in Ottawa this spring has the popular general taking up politics after he hangs up his uniform.

“I think people in the ranks understand that Hillier is awfully political. I hear people tell me he talks about running for premier of Newfoundland,” said Senator Colin Kenny, who chairs the Senate committee on national security and defence.

It might not be such a big leap, say military observers, who argue that Hillier has dabbled in politics from the very moment he set his sights on the military’s top job as chief of defence staff.

But the problems run deeper for Hillier. More and more, the Prime Minister’s Office is interfering with the department’s communications strategy around the Afghanistan mission. Hillier’s ambitious shake-up of the military organization has ruffled feathers and fuelled internal dissension.

“It’s Mr. Hillier’s war,” Granatstein said. “He was the one who persuaded the Liberals to go into it. He’s been the major spokesperson for it. Whether he’s having any impact on the public, no matter how well he speaks, I think is highly doubtful. The poll numbers are dropping dramatically for his war.”

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On military culture:

The Toronto Star, Allan Woods, May 19, 2007:

“Caution urged on recruits: Increasing number of those interested in joining Canadian Forces show ‘socio-dysfunctional’ profile, report warns.” (Other passages from this article were quoted above in the selected texts on discourse and power-knowledge).

Male candidates are “macho,” while women have “a strong masculine side.”
The potential recruits tend to show an affinity for social Darwinism, characterized by the view that only the strongest members of society will survive. Violence and sex are also prominent interests associated with potential soldiers, according to the study, by Montreal-based polling firm CROP Inc.

This contrasts, the study says, with those already enrolled in the army, who have upstanding qualities, including a commitment to duty and ethical concerns. They also seek enriching experiences and have a capacity to deal with uncertainty.

But negative traits, like ethnic intolerance and fatalism, are also present in some current military personnel and the report warns specifically about the need to maintain exacting recruiting requirements to weed out those who could cause trouble on the battlefield.

The Toronto Star, Steve Rennie, July 24, 2007:

“Military coming up short in attempts to diversify: Canadian Forces want more women, visible minorities, natives to sign up, report says”

Despite efforts by the Canadian Forces to boost the number of women, visible minorities and aboriginals within its ranks, the military has been losing ground in recruiting from designated groups.

The military’s employment equity plan, obtained by Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act, reveals few jobs within the military near “acceptable” levels of representation of women, visible minorities, aboriginal peoples, and people with disabilities.

More than half the women and visible minorities surveyed said they were either not very familiar or completely unfamiliar with the military.

Military historian Jack Granatstein said he would have expected more Canadians to have a better understanding of the military given the amount of coverage it gets because of Afghanistan. “I am surprised because I just think there’s been far more coverage in the last five years than I’ve ever seen of the regular forces, outside of full-scale war,” he said.

Herrington said one possible explanation for the military’s failure to meet its employment equity goals is that visible minorities tend to live in large, urban centres, away from the military’s traditional
rural recruiting base. Another theory, she said, is that some also come from war-torn countries where the military is seen as corrupt.

Christian Leuprecht, a political science professor who specializes in diversity within the Canadian Forces at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ont., said those are symptoms, not the root of the problem. Despite a 1989 human rights tribunal that gave the military 10 years to open all its ranks and trades to women, he said it still isn’t doing enough to attract new recruits from minority groups.

Leuprecht said the military has been slow to move from “a very traditional, monolithic” culture to one “more reflective of Canadian society that would be more welcoming to people from diverse backgrounds.”

“If you look at the senior leadership, it tends to be white males ... the people within the organization still think that they alone know what’s best in terms of who needs to get promoted,” he said.

The Globe and Mail, Dean Beeby, July 11, 2010:

“Sexist cartoons pulled from military teaching materials: Three-week courses have been offered since 2007 and are mandatory for those deploying to Afghanistan.”

The military has launched a purge of its classroom materials after several offensive cartoons, including some featuring women in degrading sexual situations, were used in courses for soldiers headed to Afghanistan.

One cartoon, intended as an example of reading body language, shows a woman at a bar piled with empty glasses engaged in a sexual act with a man on a barstool. The caption reads: “How to tell when you don’t have to buy her any more drinks...”

Another cartoon shows a senior male officer suggesting to a female sergeant that she become a “bargaining chip” in arms talks – a reference to her submission to a sexual act.

Some of the materials also contain cartoons that make light of the detainee controversy. One depicts a detainee lounging in a beach chair, being fed grapes and fanned by soldiers – apparently a satire on rules that require humane treatment of captured combatants.
The Canadian Press [under access to information laws] asked for “teaching materials provided to individuals enrolled in the ‘Conduct After Capture’ instructor course.” Col. Gillam [officer responsible for the training program] suggested an overzealous information officer provided the news agency with early versions, not those in current use. He said there have been no complaints from anyone about the cartoons.

A Canadian author who has written extensively about male culture in sport, comparing it with the military, said images depicting women as sex objects are not surprising in an organization that nurtures masculine power, aggression and violence.

“What is surprising is that usually, by now, it’s a bit underground and it’s not officially sanctioned,” Laura Robinson said in an interview from Vancouver. “They always give as an excuse that it’s a couple of bad apples when something happens, when women are sexually objectified... I don’t agree with that at all... A lot of rogues make a pattern.”

Ms. Robinson noted that one of the justifications for Canada’s military role in Afghanistan is to bring equality to women. Many military recruits believe in such goals, she said, but soon become corrupted by a narrow male subculture that views women as sexual commodities.

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*The Ottawa Citizen, Andrew Mayeda, January 5, 2011:

Canadian snipers less stressed than average soldier: Study

Canadian snipers who have served in Afghanistan report being less traumatized by the war than the average soldier, according to a study that offers a rare glimpse into the minds of Canada’s battle-hardened troops. Rather than expressing regret over their deadly line of work, snipers say they feel justified in killing enemies who pose a threat to Canadian troops and Afghan civilians. Yet snipers report being more troubled than other soldiers when asked about specific combat experiences, such as knowing that someone has been seriously injured or killed in action, or seeing members of their unit become a casualty.
The findings are part of an ongoing three-year study commissioned by Defence R&D Canada, the research arm of the Department of National Defence. They paint a complex, at times contradictory, portrait of the carefully screened, elite soldiers who are paid to take out the enemy from afar. [The author] J. Peter Bradley, a retired lieutenant-colonel in the Canadian Forces who now works as a professor at Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, notes the Canadian Forces have been developing a system of tests to filter out candidates who don’t fit the right psychological profile. According to this research, snipers tend to score low on “neuroticism,” high on conscientiousness and low on “tender mindedness.”

However, he also suggests the snipers could have been concealing their feelings to reconcile conflicting emotions about killing, or to “protect their place within the sniper community.” “Snipers are top soldiers and weakness is not consistent with the sniper image,” Bradley writes.

On the senior officer selection system:

*The Ottawa Citizen*, David Pugliese, February 9, 2010:

“Colonel Williams a rising air-force star: Williams had recently completed French language training in Gatineau”

Russell Williams was an up-and-coming air force officer who seemed to be on the right track for promotion to the senior ranks of the Canadian Forces.

But on Sunday, the 46-year-old Williams was arrested in Ottawa and charged with two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of forcible confinement and two counts of break and enter and sexual assault.

Those in Ottawa’s defence community who dealt with Williams reacted with shock about the charges. The retired officers, who asked not to be named, say Williams was being groomed by the military leadership for a move into the senior ranks.
The French training, the selection for the Canadian Forces command and staff course in 2003 and 2004, and key appointments at National Defence headquarters meant that Williams was potentially going places, with brigadier-general the next rank he might obtain.

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*The Ottawa Citizen*, Laura Stone and David Wylie, February 11, 2010

“Charges move military to review selection process.”

Canada’s chief of defence staff said there will be an administrative review to determine if the military had missed any signs that Col. Russell Williams — the base commander charged with murdering two women — may have been unfit for leadership.

“We’ve put additional rigour over the past five year into the selection of our leadership,” he said.

“We’ll do an administrative review to see, what did we miss? Did we miss anything here? And it's a difficult situation, one that certainly I’ve not faced, nor talking to the leadership of the Canadian Forces, that we have faced, and so again, what can we learn from this to ensure it doesn’t occur,” said Natynczyk.

One official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Williams was known as “Mr. By the Book” during his years as one of Canada’s top VIP pilots.

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*The Ottawa Citizen*, Giuseppe Valiante, July 11, 2010:

“Multiple military scandals: More misbehaviour or more accountability?”

Experts are wondering if the string of scandals involving high-profile Canadian Forces brass - including this week's dismissal of the top Canadian military commander in Haiti - are a result of an unprecedented number of misconducts, or a sign of a more accountable military willing to publicly prosecute its leaders. “I hope it’s the latter” said Jack Granatstein, a military historian who served in the Canadian Forces until 1966.

On Friday, it was announced that Canada’s most senior-ranking military officer in Haiti has been forced from his command over a number of allegations, including engaging in an inappropriate
relationship. Col. Bernard Ouellette, chief of staff to the United Nations Haiti mission, was relieved on June 26 after a yearlong deployment to quake-ravaged Haiti. Ouellette joins a who’s who of high-ranking military officers dismissed over scandal.

The former commander of CFB Trenton, Col. Russell Williams, was arrested and charged in February with two counts of first-degree murder. He has since been charged with 82 more offences relating to break-and-enters and theft. At the end of May, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Menard, Canada’s top soldier in Afghanistan, was dismissed from his job after he was accused of sexual misconduct with a female subordinate. He has since been reassigned to a desk job in Ottawa. And last month, 12 current and former soldiers were charged with more than 70 drug-related offences, including some related to producing hallucinogenic drugs in a lab close to their barracks at Alberta’s CFB Wainwright.

Michael Byers, an author who holds a Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at University of British Columbia, said he believes the military is taking the no-sex rule more seriously than they have in the past. However, he said the two recent sex scandals might also reflect the increasing number of women in the ranks of the Canadian Forces. He added that there is no definitive evidence that the events of the past few months reveal a more open military. For example, Byers said “there certainly hasn’t been a whole lot of transparency” with regards to the accusations that Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan knowingly transferred their prisoners to local authorities to be tortured. Moreover, the military only announced Ouellette’s dismissal after a journalist in Haiti noticed he was missing, Byers said.

Lt.-Col. Chris Lemay, spokesman for the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, said there have been no rule-enforcement policy changes in the Canadian Forces. “I wouldn’t say that the Canadian Forces have been more proactive in their application of the rules,” he said. “I would say that whenever the case, whatever the rank, the rule has been applied.”
“New deal reached on detainees: But minister’s surprise announcement contradicted by top military official”

Faced with more bruising criticisms over its handling of the prisoner abuse scandal, the Conservative government made a surprising – and confused – announcement that it has struck a new deal allowing Canadians to visit Afghan jails. Human rights groups have been critical of the existing prisoner transfer agreement – signed in 2005 – because it doesn’t give Canadians any right to follow up on the condition of prisoners they’ve transferred into Afghan custody.

But the policy seemed cobbled together on the fly as Gen. Rick Hillier, the chief of defence staff, contradicted O’Connor and denied that military staff will play a key role.

But the government was hit with another charge yesterday – that it was deliberately trying to hide the disturbing state of Afghan prisons from Canadians.

The charge came after the foreign affairs department released a 2006 assessment of the country that had been sanitized of details about Afghanistan’s poor human rights record and allegations of torture.

“The Prime Minister and his government knew about the reality of Afghan prisons and they chose to hide the truth from Canadians,” said Liberal MP Lucienne Robillard (Westmount-Ville-Marie). “It is impossible that he did not know of the foreign affairs report from his own government which states that ‘extrajudicial executions and torture’ are common in Afghanistan,” she said.

“All they should do is say ‘we’re not going to transfer anymore right now. We’re going to hold any detainees temporarily and figure out what the solution is,’” [said Michael Byers, a University of British Columbia expert in international law]. “It would protect our soldiers. It would send the right kind of signal to Afghans,” he said. “To continue to transfer in the face of these allegations is straightforward illegal and shamefully irresponsible,” Byers said in a telephone interview. “This is a very un-Canadian situation.”
Meanwhile, an independent watchdog probing suggestions that Afghan prisoners were abused while in the custody of Canadian soldiers says the government’s reluctance to turn over documents has slowed its investigation. Only in the last week has the Military Police Complaints Commission started to receive material.

The Toronto Star, Thomas Walkom, April 28, 2007:

“Afghan story hardly a surprise. Prisoner abuse just part of the brutal landscape there”

The only surprise about the Afghan prisoner controversy gripping Ottawa is that any of this comes as a surprise. Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government is reeling under allegations that prisoners captured by Canadian troops are being handed over to Afghan authorities who then torture and abuse them.

In this context, Canadian soldiers – equipped with wallet-sized cards that list key elements of the Geneva Conventions on correct prisoner-of-war treatment – seem absurdly benign.

Throughout all of this, the Canadian government has adopted the ostrich strategy of keeping its head firmly buried. Technically, it made sure its soldiers would be beyond reproach. In practice, it left glaring loopholes.

In its efforts to wash its hands of the problem, Ottawa has proved particularly inept. First, Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor said he would send officials into Afghan prisons to make sure that those captured by our troops were well treated. Then, Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day insisted – incorrectly, according to those on the ground in Kandahar – that Canadian officials have already made such visits. Meanwhile, Harper insists the abuse allegations are “baseless accusations,” while Day labels them part of a Taliban disinformation campaign.

Sadly, all of this is part of a familiar pattern. Hypocrisy has long been Canada’s national vice. In the post-9/11 period, it has run rampant. We say we are firm believers in fair play and the rule of law. But it seems we are only willing to apply those standards when there is little cost.
Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, we close our eyes and pledge allegiance to the grand principles of human rights.

As the Star’s Rosie DiManno reported from Kandahar this week, we may detain Afghans on the flimsiest of evidence. (In the case she witnessed, Canadian troops arrested a man they thought might be a bomber simply because he was bearded, dark and one-armed

The Toronto Star, Allan Woods, January 24, 2008:

“Canada halts transfer of Afghan detainees.”

Canada quietly stopped transferring battlefield detainees to Afghan prisons months ago after a credible allegation of abuse surfaced, government lawyers have revealed.

The government has not disclosed how many people Canadian soldiers have detained while fighting Taliban insurgents, citing national security concerns. However, in November, an Amnesty International report put the number of transfers as high as 200.

The groups [Amnesty International and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association] say the government’s surprising decision to stop transfers is an implicit admission that the new agreement, which provided Canadian officials with increased oversight of detainees and prison conditions, has failed. “The torture of detainees that occurred since May 3, 2007, was both predictable and avoidable.”

The Ottawa Citizen, Richard J. Brennan, Allan Woods, November 19, 2009:

“Canada shamed on Afghan prisoner torture”

A senior diplomat delivered a series of explosive allegations to a rapt House of Commons committee Wednesday, telling MPs that Afghan prisoners transferred by Canadians to local authorities in Kandahar were likely all tortured – while high-level officials in Ottawa looked the other way.

“Canada ... cloaked our detainee practices in extreme secrecy,” Richard Colvin, a Washington-based intelligence officer, said in long-awaited testimony to a special parliamentary committee.
“Our detainee practices (were) unCanadian, counterproductive and probably illegal.” Colvin, the second-ranked Canadian diplomat in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007, said he tried repeatedly to raise concerns with senior military and government officials, to no avail.

He said Canadians took far more prisoners than their NATO allies in Afghanistan, many of them innocent people swept up in the chaos of war, and he charged that the policy had taught Kandaharis to fear the foreign troops and had set back the Canadian effort in the region. He also said that when the Red Cross wanted to look into the treatment of detainees turned over by the Canadian troops, the Canadian Forces wouldn’t take their calls.

Colvin had to fight for his afternoon in the spotlight, an appearance the Harper government tried to block. And Conservative MPs attacked his credibility in the committee room. Colvin named those who were warned about the prisoner treatment and did not act, including now retired chief of defence staff Gen. Rick Hillier; David Mulroney, former deputy minister of the Afghanistan Task Force in the Privy Council Office; and Margaret Bloodworth, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s national security adviser.

The Toronto Star, Richard J. Brennan, December 23, 2009:

“Top brass, ministers accused of ducking responsibilities: Ex-diplomat talks tough as Tory MPs again skip hearing on detainees”

When the going gets tough, expect Canadian generals and cabinet ministers to disappear from accountability, a retired senior diplomat told a parliamentary committee.

The committee, probing the treatment of detainees turned over to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops, held an informal meeting Tuesday after Conservative members again refused to show up for hearings.

Gar Pardy, retired director general of the consular affairs bureau of the foreign affairs department, was asked whether he thought the growing allegations about prisoners being tortured after they were turned over could result in Canadians facing war-crime charges.
“Every time these kinds of cases come up, the generals and the ministers disappear over the horizon and it’s the poor buggers in the trenches that are going to get it,” he told Liberal, Bloc Québécois and NDP members of the committee.

The Globe and Mail, editorial, December 30, 2009:

“Democracy diminished, accountability avoided: By suspending Parliament, Stephen Harper allows the governing party to elude the detainee issue, a move that undermines the democratic rights of the people”

Proroguing stops committee work and makes all legislation pending before Parliament vanish. Historically, it has been used when a government has implemented most of its agenda. Until Mr. Harper's innovation, it was not an annual occurrence; the last minority government to use it more than once was Lester B. Pearson's Liberal administration in the 1960s.

There is a tactical political advantage to prorogation. The government temporarily eludes an issue of national importance that is particularly inconvenient: its knowledge of torture of Afghan detainees. Government members have already acted as truants when Afghanistan committee hearings are called. The government failed to provide documents to committee members, and implied it will disregard a parliamentary order to produce those documents. Prorogation is the logical extension of such thinking: shut down parliamentary debate entirely.

The Globe and Mail, Graeme Smith, April 10, 2010:

“Brigade 888, House of pain: Canada’s connection with Kandahar’s ruthless palace guard”

Now, a Globe and Mail investigation of Brigade 888 has found evidence that Canadians lived beside, and helped to train, Afghans who routinely committed torture. Stationed in the governor's front garden, a few minutes’ walk from the guards, some soldiers knew that the governor’s men were holding detainees – they were asked to supply plastic ties for the captives’ wrists.
During Mr. Khalid’s controversial tenure [as governor] in Kandahar from 2005 to 2008, the palace became a microcosm of Canada’s moral dilemmas in southern Afghanistan. Canadian soldiers posted there urgently needed help from local forces, but struggled with how the Afghans behaved.

“Did I think that was a little strange?” one Canadian officer said, describing the governor's private jail. “Yeah, I did. But there was a lot of strange stuff in Kandahar.”

Some Canadians who served in Kandahar say they’re reluctant to discuss Brigade 888 for fear that Canadians will misunderstand the context of their actions, failing to see that such harsh methods were necessary in the bitter war.

One source who served at the palace in 2007 said he still struggles with the morality of what happened in those windowless rooms. “The interrogation methods were purely evil, there is no question about that, but in some cases produced valuable information to save some lives,” he said. “The question here is about moral values. I mean, our values can only be our values if we don’t break or bend them at a time when they are tested.

The Globe and Mail, Steven Chase, May 11, 2010:

“Testimony reveals wrangling between Foreign Affairs, military over detainees. Tension resulted in troubling gaps in monitoring”

With all the blame-laying surrounding the detainee controversy, another less-scrutinized conflict may be at its core: the fractious relationship between the two Canadian bureaucracies entrusted with prosecuting the Afghan war.

On Tuesday, a former military commander’s testimony at a probe into detainee handovers laid bare the peevish wrangling between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian military over who is to blame for lapses in prisoner monitoring.

Each side apparently harbours beefs about the job the other is doing. When the general put pressure on Foreign Affairs to step up its efforts, the response was to blame the military, the hearings
heard. Foreign Affairs replied that it wasn’t conducting more inspections because the military wasn’t providing the resources to mount security convoys that could escort diplomats to prisons.

The grumbling goes both ways. In March a senior Foreign Affairs official blamed the military for shortcomings in inspecting for torture, saying Forces brass have hindered this “monumental task” by refusing to help diplomats do it. Instead of using ties with the NDS to pry more information out of the intelligence agency, the Forces do little more than ferry diplomats to their inspections, Mr. Anderson told a Commons committee. Mr. Anderson said this places “the monumental task of monitoring within an inherently secretive institution such as the NDS on a handful of Canadian civilians” who are “viewed with suspicion.”

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The Globe and Mail, Steven Chase, June 9, 2010:

“Ottawa asks judge to block release of detainee records to military watchdog. Government in court again to restrict what civilian commission can investigate”

The Harper government is heading to court to fight a military watchdog’s demand for secret Afghan detainee records that were buried in a sea shipping container at Kandahar Airfield. The government is arguing in a May 28 application for judicial review that the commission has overstepped its mandate with these demands.

Paul Champ, a lawyer for the human-rights groups that triggered the inquiry, called the legal action “an abuse of process” by the government and said this shows Ottawa has something to hide. “It tells me that we are getting closer to seeing the documents that matter most and the government is willing to go to any lengths to prevent that,” Mr. Champ said.

The conflict arises as separate negotiations between Conservatives and opposition parties on access to these documents head into their ninth day of overtime. The two sides have failed so far to reach a final deal on granting select MPs access to detainee records – with one parliamentarian warning the chances of success are declining for a deal that was supposed to avert a political showdown. They’re
trying to put flesh on the bones of a May 14 deal on the matter after the opposition majority threatened to vote the government in contempt of Parliament.

The Toronto Star, James Travers, July 27, 2010:

“Travers: New leaks flood Canada with old Afghanistan fears.”

Sometimes the darkest secrets are hidden in plain sight. A leaked tsunami of U.S. military documents confirms many of the worst Canadian fears about an Afghanistan war being fought against a determined enemy with duplicitous friends. There are profound implications, if precious few startling surprises, buried in nearly 92,000 intelligence reports strategically released [leaked to the public by internet-based activist group Wikileaks July 26, 2010] to leading U.S., British and German newspapers.

More subtle is the potential impact on the prisoner abuse controversy Stephen Harper has fought long and hard to contain. Exposed to closer scrutiny are the targeted assassinations that military and other informed observers believe are among the ugly truths this government is determined to hide. Flowing from the leaks are reports that U.S. elite army and navy units use capture-or-kill lists neutralizing or eliminating enemy leaders. Canada’s elite JTF2 special forces work seamlessly with U.S. counterparts in Afghanistan, reporting through a unique chain of command directly to the Chief of Defence Staff, the country’s top soldier. Special forces operations are so secret that even defence ministers are excluded from the information loop. But earlier this year a source familiar with JTF2 told the Star the unit works side-by-side with American counterparts to “pick up or pick off” high-value Taliban and Al Qaeda targets.

Concerns about prisoners taken in those clandestine operations were raised in 2007 by the respected International Committee of the Red Cross. In an unusual confidential briefing, it reported to Canada that three insurgents captured by JTF2 disappeared behind Afghan prison walls, where they were either killed or delivered to the U.S. for interrogation at “black sites.”

Last December Harper suspended Parliament partly to end awkward opposition probing into what ministers and generals knew about Afghan abuse of Canadian prisoners. Since then, the Prime Minister
succeeded in temporarily pushing the war crimes debate off the table by negotiating an agreement that allows rival parties to review the documents while limiting what they can reveal. That truce is threatened by what may be the largest ever leak of U.S. military secrets. Those reports draw unwanted attention back to Canada’s connection to politically poisonous and potentially illegal operations that have expanded since the U.S. renewed its Afghanistan efforts.

Some Canadians turn a willful blind eye to this country’s complicity in what Afghans do to each other. More are understandably focused on the still rising costs in lives and money of a war that generals admit can’t be won by arms alone and increasingly appears to be lost. Even if these documents don’t change those perceptions, they may help this country see Afghanistan for what it is and what it’s doing to us.

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Actual behaviour related in expedition as a heterotopia related to illicit drugs in Afghanistan:

The Toronto Star, Bruce Campion-Smith, January 2, 2009

“Troops lured by drug trade, report warns: Military cites ‘high probability’ some Canadians will become drug traffickers while in Afghanistan”

There’s a “high probability” some Canadian troops serving in Afghanistan – one of the world’s biggest sources of illegal drugs – will get involved in the drug trade, a military police report warns.

“Access to illicit drugs in Afghanistan is routine,” reads the report obtained by the Star. “Easy access to heroin, hashish, cannabis presents a temptation for (Canadian) troops in the form of personal use and in the form of importation for the purpose of trafficking,” it reads.

It notes that using and trafficking drugs are illegal and “contrary to the ethos” of the Canadian Forces, but concedes some of the 2,500 troops serving in the war-torn nation might not be able to resist.
The findings are outlined in a series of military police documents obtained by the Star under Access to Information legislation. The documents, requested in November 2007, were released last month.

“Illicit drug use and trafficking is present at most, if not all, (Canadian Forces) establishments across Canada and abroad,” the 2006 national criminal intelligence assessment reads.

“While most (Canadian Forces) members involved in illicit drug activity are trafficking drugs to support their habits, there is a small percentage that are associating themselves closer with organized criminal groups involved in the distribution of drugs,” it says.

A military spokesperson said since the Canadian Forces is a “microcosm” of the larger population, “it is reasonable to expect that a small percentage of CF members will, at one time or another, use illegal drugs.”

A separate military police report also gives a window into crime trends among Canadian troops in Afghanistan. The report, covering February to August 2007, notes the most prevalent complaints are property losses (34), motor vehicle accidents or damage (24) and rules-of-engagement probes (11); 13 investigations including heroin importation; and there were two cases of “negligent” weapons discharges.

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Actual behaviour related in expedition as a heterotopia related to sexual assault of boys by Afghan soldiers:

The Toronto Star, Rick Westhead, June 16, 2008:

“Don’t look, don’t tell, troops told: Civilian sex assaults by Afghan soldiers ignored”

Canadian soldiers serving in Afghanistan have been ordered by commanding officers “to ignore” incidents of sexual assault among the civilian population, says a military chaplain who counsels troops returning home with post-traumatic stress disorder.
The chaplain, Jean Johns, says she recently counseled a Canadian soldier who said he witnessed a boy being raped by an Afghan soldier, then wrote a report on the allegation for her brigade chaplain.

In her March report, which she says should have been advanced “up the chain of command,” Johns says the corporal told her that Canadian troops have been ordered by commanding officers “to ignore” incidents of sexual assault. Johns hasn’t received a reply to the report.

While several Canadian Forces chaplains say other soldiers have made similar claims, Department of National Defence lawyers have argued Canada isn’t obliged to investigate because none of the soldiers has made a formal complaint, says a senior Canadian officer familiar with the matter.

“It’s ridiculous,” the officer says. “We have an ethical and moral responsibility to pursue this, not to shut our eyes to it because it would make it more difficult to work with the Afghan government.

“We’re supposed to be in Afghanistan to help people who are being victimized.”

Byron Wilfert, the Liberal critic for national defence [says] “Anybody who says this is about cultural differences should have their head examined.”

The Toronto Star, Joanna Smith, Rick Westhead, Jun 18, 2008:

“Soldiers’ duty to step in: Hillier.” “Canadian troops ‘are not going to stand by’ if they see Afghans abused, defence chief says.”

Canadian soldiers who witness civilians being raped have a duty to intervene, even if the assailants are Afghan soldiers or police, Canada’s top soldier says.

Omar Samad, Afghan ambassador to Canada, said yesterday he’s “troubled and concerned” by allegations raised by Canadian military chaplains and a senior Canadian officer that soldiers have witnessed Afghan troops abusing young boys, but have been powerless to stop it because of orders.

Several Canadian soldiers said translators have told them that some men assault boys Thursday nights before their call to prayer a day later.

In the Commons, Bloc Québécois MP Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean) said Canada has been complicit if soldiers have been ordered to ignore rape cases.
MacKay [Minister of National Defence] also asked opposition MPs to “show a modicum of respect for the timeframe that it takes to investigate and look into serious allegations such as this. Let us not cast aspersions without doing a little bit of research into the facts first.”

Opposition MPs said later that the rape allegations were first raised more than a year ago.

The Ottawa Citizen, David Pugliese, October 4, 2008:

“Rape of boys in Afghanistan sparks inquiry: Canadian soldiers say Forces ignored complaints about Afghan police, troops”

The Canadian Forces will launch a board of inquiry to look into allegations that soldiers’ complaints about Afghan troops and police raping boys were ignored by the military leadership.

In June, the Toronto Star reported that in late 2006 a Canadian soldier had heard an Afghan soldier raping a young boy at one of the outposts near Kandahar. The soldier later saw the injuries the boy sustained, including seeing his lower intestines falling out of his body, a sign of trauma from anal rape.

The soldier, who now suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome, originally described the assault to a closed-door meeting of a parliamentary committee on national defence in May.

In addition, military chaplain Jean Johns came forward to complain that Canadian soldiers were ordered by their commanding officers in Afghanistan to ignore such incidents of sexual assault. That information was based on claims made to the chaplain by soldiers. Other military chaplains have said they too heard similar complaints from Canadian troops.

That investigation was prompted by a complaint in the spring from NDP defence critic Dawn Black, who had been approached by a soldier upset by the sexual abuse of boys at the hands of Afghan officers. The soldier told Ms. Black he and his fellow troops were under strict orders not to intervene.

“What I was told was this was a Thursday-night ritual and they weren’t to do anything about it,” Ms. Black said yesterday. “I outlined what I was told and asked (the Defence Department) for an investigation.”
Ms. Black said she was disappointed it had taken months before the Defence Department acted on
her complaint.

The Toronto Star, Rick Westhead, October 19, 2008:

“Critics slam Afghan rape probe: Investigation drags even as more soldiers accuse Afghan allies of
abusing young boys.”

The Canadian military’s National Investigation Service [NIS] is telling some witnesses it could
take up to two years to investigate claims by Canadian soldiers that they’ve seen Afghan soldiers and
interpreters raping young boys near Canadian bases outside Kandahar.

That would leave the problem unresolved until about 2011 – the year Prime Minister Stephen
Harper has pledged to pull Canada’s soldiers from the country – when the issue could well become moot.

Soldiers who allege they have witnessed assaults are continuing to return home from Afghanistan
seeking trauma counseling. The first soldiers to complain said their allegations were ignored.

The NIS could file criminal charges against Canadian military police or officers if it finds they
ignored complaints. Besides the NIS, a military board of inquiry is also examining the rape claims.

The Toronto Star, Rick Westhead, December 15, 2008

“World court inquiry sought in Afghan rapes”

The International Criminal Court should probe allegations some Canadian officers serving in
Afghanistan told subordinates to look the other way when Afghan soldiers and local interpreters
sodomized young boys, says one of Canada’s leading human-rights lawyers.

University of British Columbia international law and politics expert Michael Byers, who was
among a group of academics who sought to have former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet detained as a
war criminal, said he plans to ask the ICC to begin its own inquiry into the charges.

Other Canadian soldiers have complained to chaplains and military medical personnel that
officers told them not to get involved because the sodomy was tantamount to “cultural differences.”
If the allegations are true, Byers said, they will reflect more poorly on the Canadian military than
the scandal in the 1993 in Somalia when Canadian soldiers tortured and murdered a Somali teenager who
snuck into a Canadian base.

Still, Byers said he wants the ICC to investigate because he has “concerns about self-investigation
and the demonstrated delays in the Canadian military’s investigation of alleged detainee abuse.”

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Civilian oversight issues:

The Ottawa Citizen, Juliet O’Neill, February 18, 2010:

“NDP wants new civilian oversight for military”

New Democratic Party MPs called Thursday for stronger civilian oversight of the Canadian
military, saying the Afghan-detainees affair has shown the need for greater transparency and
accountability by the Canadian Forces.

They proposed the creation of a civilian office of inspector general, similar to positions in the
United States and Australia. They said civilian oversight could break a federal government-supported
“culture of secrecy” in the military that they said has foiled efforts by a House of Commons committee
and by the civilian Military Police Complaints Commission to get to the bottom of the Afghan-detainees
affair.

The Toronto Star, Murray Brewster, October 3, 2008:

“Military police cleared of abuse allegations.”

Injuries suffered by two captured Taliban fighters two years ago were not intentionally inflicted
by Canadian military police officers, the investigative branch of the Canadian Forces said today at the
conclusion of a lengthy probe of abuse allegations.
The explosive abuse allegations were uncovered by University of Ottawa professor and human-rights lawyer Amir Attaran in January 2007 after reviewing prisoner transfer records.

The documents, obtained under access to information laws, showed three Taliban militants were brought to military police by a single interrogator and all had injuries to their faces, heads and upper bodies.

Attaran filed a complaint with the Military Police Complaints Commission and shortly afterward the national investigation service, which oversees the operation of military police units, began its own review.

He dismissed the findings as an expected whitewash.

“This is something initiated on their own and from the outset I said I don’t trust them at all to do an investigation because you simply cannot have military police investigating whether anything was done wrong by the military police,” Attaran said Friday in an interview.

There were also published reports earlier this year that medical records detailing the treatment of the prisoners at Kandahar Airfield’s multi-national hospital had gone missing.

The notion that Canadian troops were being accused of abusing prisoners has been deeply resented by individual soldiers and a military establishment that has struggled for years to remove the stain of the Somalia scandal.

A few months after Attaran brought his allegations of abuse in Afghanistan forward, there were further claims that three dozen Taliban prisoners – captured by Canadians – were tortured once they were handed over to local Afghan authorities.

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The law of war regarding the care of enemy wounded is applied to Captain Robert Semrau, a junior officer, despite usual delays by bureaucratic techniques. There are references to the contradictions between individual morality, the warrior’s honour, and statist imperatives; and the problems of reporting potential war crimes through the chain command.
The Toronto Star, Canadian Press, January 2, 2009

“Canadian soldier charged with murder of alleged Taliban”

A Canadian soldier has been charged with second-degree murder in the death of a presumed Taliban fighter in Helmand province.

Capt. Robert Semrau is accused of shooting an unarmed man during a battle in October, in which Afghan soldiers defended the Helmand capital of Lashkar Gah from a prolonged attack by insurgents.

“Working with the ANA presents some challenges; you have to be very patient, but when you get down to the bottom of it, they are just like us and like to kid around and joke,” Semrau… is quoted as saying.

The Toronto Star, Emily Mathieu, January 3, 2009

“Murder charge places military under scrutiny: Delay in charge against Canadian soldier in death of unarmed Afghan raises parallels to dark past”

The Canadian military is under scrutiny today after taking more than two months to charge one of its own with the murder of an unarmed Afghan male, stirring memories of the darkest days in the force’s history.

“The incident is very serious, the charges are very serious and of course Canadians can’t help but be reminded of Somalia and the incident that took place during that ill-fated mission,” said Steven Staples, a defence and foreign policy expert.

“The biggest concern is the delay,” lawyer Paul Champ, a human rights specialist, told The Canadian Press. “The allegations are that a Canadian officer – a mentor, at that – shot an unarmed man over two months ago. And we don’t have any information about why it took so long for that allegation to come forward or be investigated.”

In 1993, information was held back by military officials following the torture and death of a Somali teen at the hands of a group of Canadian soldiers on a peacekeeping mission.
The death and ensuing cover-up shook the nation’s faith in the military and changes were enacted to ensure it didn’t happen again, including the creation of the military’s national investigation service. The subsequent inquiry eventually led to the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

The Ottawa Citizen, Andrew Duffy, April 29, 2010

“Captain called shooting a ‘mercy kill,’ soldier testifies at court martial”

Moments after firing two rounds through the chest of a grievously wounded Taliban insurgent, Capt. Robert Semrau told another Canadian soldier that the shooting was a “mercy kill,” a court martial has heard.

Cpl. Steven Fournier testified Wednesday that he was in shock as he walked from the scene with Semrau and their Afghan interpreter. He didn't understand why Semrau had fired his weapon at the disarmed and critically injured man. “Just after we started walking, Capt. Semrau said he felt it was necessary,” Fournier told the court martial. “He felt it was the humane thing to do. He couldn't live with himself if he left an injured insurgent or an injured human being in this condition.”

Semrau calmly told him that he was “willing to accept whatever followed on it and that it was a mercy kill.” Minutes later, Semrau huddled with other members of his mentoring team, Warrant Officer Merlin Longaphie and Cpl. Tony Haraszta. He repeated that he had fired the shots in a mercy killing, Fournier said, and everyone nodded in acknowledgment.

According to Fournier, Semrau also told them “he hoped anyone would do the same thing to anyone else, even himself.” Longaphie, however, has already testified that no battlefield meeting took place that day in Helmand Province and that Semrau made no such admission.

Fournier, 26, told the court martial that he kept quiet about the incident until he was approached by Master Warrant Officer David Fisher in late December, 2008. Fisher had been ordered to get to the bottom of rumours about the Helmand operation. Fournier said he was relieved to be asked about the incident since it had continued to bother him. He was also pleased that Fisher seemed to already know
details, Fournier testified, which meant he wouldn't have to be the “snitch.” He didn't want to be perceived by fellow soldiers, Fournier said, as “the guy who came forward to rat out the captain.”

The Toronto Star, Mike Blanchfield, July 9, 2010:

“Mercy killing ‘not a defence,’ court martial told.”

Mercy killing is no defence for a Canadian Forces captain who decided to kill a wounded Taliban insurgent, a military prosecutor has told a groundbreaking court martial. “Mercy killing is simply not a defence,” Leveillee told the four-member military jury. “It is simply irrelevant.”

Leveillee said Semrau, as a trainer of Afghan military forces, did not live up to his legal obligations on the battlefield — to care for an injured enemy fighter. Had the tables been turned, an injured Canadian soldier would have been entitled to the same level of help, he said. “An enemy who is injured is no longer an enemy.”

Leveillee listed several statements attributed to Semrau over the course of his trial:

“I had to help him.”

“It was a mercy killing.”

“I had to put him out of his misery.”

“I will take the fall.”

“I will wear it.”

“I have killed a man and who knows what will come of that.”

Semrau is believed to be the first Canadian soldier charged with murder as a result of a battlefield encounter.

The Toronto Star, Richard J. Brennan, Bruce Campion-Smith, July 19, 2010:

“Capt. Robert Semrau found not guilty of murder: But military panel finds him guilty of disgraceful conduct in shooting of wounded, unarmed Taliban fighter.”
Capt. Robert Semrau is the first soldier in Canadian history to be found guilty of shooting a wounded, unarmed combatant on a battlefield. While a four-person military judicial panel found the 36-year army captain guilty Monday under the National Defence Act of disgraceful conduct resulting from the Afghan shooting, he was found not guilty of second-degree murder, attempted murder and negligent performance of duty. He faces up to five years in prison for the lesser charge, and most likely a discharge from the armed forces.

Even so, Semrau’s brother Bill Semrau said the family was “disappointed” at the one finding of guilty. He thanked the public for its overwhelming support during the lengthy trial and lead-up. “As a family… we always believed that my brother did nothing wrong and we put our faith in the military justice system and hoped they would find the same thing,” he told reporters following the verdict. Semrau said “thousands” of people from Canada and around the world have added their voices of support for Robert by phone or on a special Facebook site calling for his freedom. “The support we have received from the public is fantastic,” he said.

While Semrau was cleared of murder, his conviction on charge of disgraceful conduct will send a powerful signal to soldiers about their actions on the battlefield, said Michel Drapeau, an Ottawa lawyer and a retired colonel. He said the notion of a “mercy killing” cheapens the role and training of a professional soldier and flies in the face of human rights conventions governing treatment of injured soldiers. Drapeau echoed other experts who viewed Semrau’s conviction on a murder charge as a long shot, given that the body of the insurgent was never recovered.

International law expert Michael Byers called the jury’s finding “appropriate.” “There is no reason to believe that Capt. Semrau was acting maliciously, or that the insurgent would have survived if medical assistance had been called,” said Byers, who holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia. “What matters here is that Captain Semrau disregarded the rules of international humanitarian law, in which all our soldiers are schooled, and chose instead to follow his own moral code,” he said in an email. “Professional militaries
cannot tolerate this kind of freelancing, since it undermines discipline, consistency, and the effectiveness of the team.”

The Ottawa Citizen, Andrew Duffy, October 6, 2010:

“Semrau booted from military for Afghan battlefield shooting.”

Demoted and dismissed from the Canadian military for shooting a wounded Afghan insurgent, Robert Semrau now faces an uncertain future as a civilian.

His lawyer, Capt. David Hodson, said Semrau was “very disappointed” with the sentence, which reduced his rank from captain to second-lieutenant and removed him from military service. The reduction in rank carries a financial penalty. “He’s a warrior,” Hodson told reporters. “He loved to serve in the Canadian Forces and loved serving his country.”

Semrau’s valorous career as an infantry officer came to an ignoble end when Lt.-Col. Jean-Guy Perron said he no longer deserved to wear a Canadian uniform. “You made a decision that will cast a shadow on you for the rest of your life,” Perron, the military judge, told Semrau. In deciding to shoot an unarmed insurgent, the judge said, Semrau ignored the laws that govern warfare and applied his own morality.

His actions placed his subordinates in an “unimaginable situation,” the judge noted. “They had to either support him with their silence or do their duty and report his misconduct,” Perron said. He asked Semrau how those soldiers — or the Afghans with whom they worked — could be expected to follow the rules of armed conflict after his undisciplined decision to shoot a wounded, unarmed man. “Capt. Semrau, I do not know if you have taken any time to reflect on this question in the last year. If not, do so,” the judge ordered.

Lt.-Col. Bruce MacGregor, director of military justice policy, told reporters the sentence sends a message to soldiers that “discipline is at the heart of leadership within the Canadian Forces. If we act outside of the rule of law, Canadian Forces members, we will have to take responsibility for that,” he said.
Perron said there were few precedents to draw upon in sentencing Semrau. The vast majority of disgraceful conduct cases in Canada have involved allegations of sexual misconduct, while two U.S. cases with similar facts involved more serious offences. “This case is unique and for many reasons,” Perron said. Ultimately, the judge said, he had to dismiss Semrau because there was no evidence that the officer has taken responsibility for his actions, or considers them unacceptable. Semrau did not testify during his trial or at his sentencing hearing.

During the sentencing hearing, character witnesses described Semrau as a courageous and dedicated officer who risked his life to treat wounded Afghan soldiers during a November 2008 mortar attack in the Panjwaii district. The youngest son of devout Christian parents from Moose Jaw, Sask., Semrau holds a degree in psychology from the University of Saskatchewan. He joined the Canadian Forces in August 2005 after serving three years in an elite parachute unit of the British army, with whom he deployed to Macedonia and Afghanistan. The former high-school football star and personal trainer lives in Petawawa, Ont., with his wife, Amelie Lapierre-Semrau, a kindergarten teacher, and their two young daughters.

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On the future of the military profession and ethics:

The Ottawa Citizen, Andrew Mayeda and Mike Blanchfield, December 03, 2007:

“Forces hire controversial security firm for Afghan duty: Former Hart Security worker ran apartheid-era ‘special ops unit’; firm now protecting advisers.”

The Canadian Forces have hired a private security firm in Afghanistan that once employed a former member of a South African military unit that assassinated opponents of the apartheid regime.

However, [Hart] also reserves the right to work for companies “whose activities, although legal, may be deemed controversial or appear to fall outside the normal service areas,” according to the company’s website.
Hart is one of three firms employed in Afghanistan by the Canadian Forces. Another British firm, Blue Hackle Security, provides security for the Joint Co-ordination Centre in the heart of Kandahar City, next to the governor’s palace. That is where Canadian Forces personnel and Afghan National Police coordinate emergency responses to crises in the area.

CBC News, Adrienne Arsenault, June 11, 2007:
“The Iraq War and the electronic trenches. Bloggers, bullets and Baghdad”

Military bloggers and the Iraq resistance were managing to post news uncensored and as soon as they chose on the internet. Although Arsenault’s posting focused on British, U.S., and Iraqi messages, she wrote: “There has been no war as wired as this one and no soldiers as free as today’s to talk about how they feel and what they see and do almost as soon as it’s happened. The internet was originally conceived by military planners but even military use of it has slipped from their control.”

The Ottawa Citizen, David Pugliese, June 20, 2008,
“The Conservative government and Defence Department released its new defence policy online”

The Conservative government and Defence Department released its new defence policy online during the night on the eve of the summer recess of Parliament. Liberal Senator Colin Kenny, the chair of the Defence and National Security Committee, said “What happened to respect for Parliament and tabling it in the Commons?” “New Democratic Party defence critic Dawn Black says she thought it was more than a coincidence that the strategy was released the night before the Commons breaks for the summer.”

The Ottawa Citizen, Matthew Fisher, June 17, 2010:
“Forces swamped with deployment requests as Afghan mission winds down”

The Canadian Forces have been swamped with volunteers eager to be among the last troops headed to Kandahar before Parliament closes out the combat mission next year, according to the outgoing commander of the army, Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie.
“Soldiers like to do that which soldiers are trained to do,” was Leslie’s explanation of the willingness of so many to serve one last time in a theatre where 147 Canadian soldiers have died since 2002. The army was at 99 per cent of its established manning levels, he said, adding that the infantry — the most dangerous trade in the army — was oversubscribed.

“I suspect the direct cause of the increased numbers, the lower attrition rates, the higher retention rates, and the significant capital investments in army equipment, is because Canadians are paying a great deal of attention to their army and like what they see,” Leslie said.

“They may not necessarily agree with where we are doing it, but that is up to them to decide. They are supporting their soldiers not only during tragedies, but what we are doing and how we do it. The government, as well, has been very generous in building up its army.”

Told that a U.S. army colonel in Afghanistan had recently declared that Canada already had the best small army in the world, Leslie laughed. “I think that we have the best medium-sized army in the world,” was his boastful reply.
Chapter 5 - Does It Exist? Free Will: Between Behaviour and Ethics

To this point, the discussion has centered on the manner in which discourse, knowledge, and power-knowledge condition the first three categories of Foucault’s ethics-of-the-self, i.e., ethical substance, mode of subjection, and self-forming activity. This chapter will look at the degree to which individuals can think and act within these constraints and alter the formation of their ethical selves. It was argued above that Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, Epicurus, and the espoused military code require some degree of individual deliberation and free volition to live an ethical life. The practice of ethics, in other words, requires conscious, individual choice and decisions when encountering moral dilemmas. This gives rise to questions about the existence of free will, whether the extent free will can be exercised matters, and how many people in an institution or in society as a whole need to possess free will to say it constitutes an ethos. It also returns to the discussion about whether Foucault offers anything new on the subject of free will considering his change of focus from power-knowledge to individual ethics. To this end, the next sub-section will review the theories on free will and cause and effect found in Foucault’s reading of Kant and the Hellenists. That will be followed by three examples from modern neuroscience that pursue similar lines of inquiry.

5.1 Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus

Foucault had little to say about how free will could exist in the context of power-knowledge. Nor did he specify what degree of free will would be necessary to provide content for a contemporary ethics of the self, especially as it applies to governance. In Hermeneutics, as mentioned above, Foucault contrasts those who conform to rhetoric, like the sophists, with those who seek an independent truth. In “The Self,” he describes the Hellenist idea of shaping one’s life as a work of art. Consciously altering how one perceives truth and shapes the self implies the existence of free will. It is only in his analysis of
the philosophy of antiquity in his later works on ethics that Foucault addressed the issue of free deliberation and volition in (see list of references).

Kendall and Wickham (1999: 34-41; 73-78) offer a summary of Foucault’s approach to cause and effect but did not make the connection to his theory of the ethics of the self. His thoughts on cause and effect, however, can help delineate his approach to free will. Foucault conceives of events not in terms of cause and effect, but as coincidental interactions of the discursive and non-discursive. Even human thought is an ephemeral arrangement of cultural artefacts as opposed to an inevitable sequence of logic. There are physical and palpable events taking place, but any semblance of cause and effect is imposed by a discourse or knowledge. A genealogy of all of the knowledges necessary to “explain” a complex event would result in an endless investigation. Attempts to explain smaller parts usually contain what Bruno Latour describes as “black boxes” (Kendall, Wickham, 1999; Latour, 1987: 258-259). Topics that should be analyzed and proven are left as hidden and unexamined assumptions; the very method of reasoning used by sophists. If not analysed, the assumptions limit the individual’s ability to perceive the context, thereby leaving their deliberation and volition cycle incomplete. In fact, Foucault’s failure to discuss free will in his ethics phase is itself a black box.

More information on Foucault’s concept of free will is available through Foucault’s relationship to Kant. Hacking (1986: 239) found that Kant and Foucault had common ground in the belief that the individual formed their own ethical self. They also asked the same question regarding the possibility for individual freedom during this process, and the potential for free deliberation and volition. Hacking also refers to domain beyond the reach of the individual. Freedom, he says, is the space within which we shape our ethical self; otherwise, it is “unknowable” (Hacking, 1986: 239).

It is necessary at this point to briefly review a few ideas of Kant and the Hellenists on the issue. The intent here is not to settle the major issues of perception and free will discussed in the 18th Century, but only to follow a few aspects raised by Foucault and his critics relating to his ethics of the self. In “What is Enlightenment,” Kant (1983b) encourages his readers to develop the freedom of thought necessary to lift themselves from a condition of immaturity. This implies a conscious effort, but there is
no defence of free will in his short article. Instead, we can refer to the succinct but thorough “Third Antimony” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, (Kant, 1998: 484-489). Kant argued that cause and effect must exist because human thought worked through cause effect. In other words, since thought was an example of cause and effect, the latter must exist elsewhere in nature. Since a perception could lead to any number of thoughts, human consciousness would intervene to settle on, or deliberately choose, a specific thought. The role of human awareness that Kant read into the chain of perception, consciousness, and thought have a parallel in Foucault’s mode of subjection and self-forming activity. Both Kant and Foucault infer that subjection and the formation of the ethical subject can only occur with the active participation of the individual. This raises the question of whether human consciousness and reason can serve as an argument in favour of individual, sentient participation in the moral domain. Unlike Foucault, however, Kant accepted cause and effect as a natural law. Kant argues that an endless sequence of cause and effect is not possible because the world could not have always existed and had to have a beginning, or original cause. If there can be such a spontaneous event, like creation, then there can be others. Without some cause and effect, however, Kant argues that appearances would be “confused and disconnected” and that any observer can see this is not the case. Kant, moreover, refers to the philosophers of antiquity as an authoritative source for his point of view. Plato and Aristotle accepted the existence of free will by sharing Kant’s assumptions about an originary beginning (Kant 1998: 484-489; 702-703). The Epicureans, in contrast, do not (Kant 1998: 488; 498, note c; 702-703; 729, note 65). Epicureans believe that there is no beginning and no limit to the unpredictable because there is a constant and often random motion of atoms. Regarding how individual free will fits in the space of the knowable and society, Kant hopes that individuals will only think and act freely in within the bounds set by the state (Kant, 1983b).

Like other Stoics, Epictetus believed that free choice was an essential characteristic of human nature. It was thought that “volition [is] the real person, the true self of the individual” (Graver, 2009). Epictetus equivocates on the issue of free will, however, making arguments for and against without reconciling the two possibilities or describing a middle ground. When arguing for free will, he distinguishes between reactive and free deliberation (*Discourses: I.1.12*). He also extols the potential of
free thought and perception to critique discourse as it is received by the individual. The faculty of reason is described as a control over the “impulse to act and not to act,” (i.e., volition). Both good and evil “are within my power: nobody can deprive of the one, or involve me, against my will, in the other” (Discourses: IV.10.28). Controlling the impulse to act is one of the three virtues he identifies as necessary for a person to form an ethical self in that “appropriate behaviour” follows careful consideration (Discourses: III.2.2). An impulse should be acted upon only when the time, place, and other considerations have been taken into account (Discourses: III.12.13; Discourses: IV.1.44-45). Volition, moreover, should be restricted to things humans can influence and not to phenomenon beyond our reach, such as weather (Discourses: I.1.16). While deliberation on science and mythology relate to discourse, it is the immediate act of willful behaviour that leads to appropriate, ethical outcomes. Deliberation without volition, on the other hand, even when the logic is sound and influence is possible, is nothing more than “talk that ‘befits only pedants and fools’” (Discourses: IV.1.138). Through much of his work, Epictetus describes free will as an unfettered thing available to all. For example, he writes that “in the area of assent… you are unrestrained and unhindered,” and “can anyone compel you to desire what you do not wish? – No one” (Discourses: IV.1.68-69, 74). Also, people “will never be hindered,” if reasoning can free them to exercise their free will (Discourses: I.1.12-13).

When arguing against free will, Epictetus recognizes that society and emotions can over-power a person and limit one’s freedom to live a life of virtue. He states that human behaviour is relatively insignificant when compared to imperial power and divine providence and that no individual is entirely free from sorrow, fear, and desire. That is true even for wise philosophers, Roman senators, and the friends of Caesar. The freedom to act for good or evil is well constrained because everyone is “a slave in a great household” (Discourses: IV.1.1-13). Epictetus also refers to bounds set by gods and providence. He sees an “artificer” behind creation (Discourses: I.6.7), credits Zeus with bestowing reason upon humankind (Discourses: I.1.10), and thanks the gods for guiding and determining the fate of mortals (Discourses IV.1.89,98-102). Beyond human reason, there is the realm of god, where all of existence is ordered and with purpose (Discourses: I.1.12; IV.1.89, 98-102). Hence, Epictetus ultimately believes in
providence in place of chance, and in a purpose chosen by originary divine authority (*Discourses: I.16.7-8; IV.1.99*). God determines who we are, why we live, what we have, and from where we come (*Discourses: IV.1.104*). Free will, as understood by Epictetus, is necessary for individual ethics, but severely bound by the determinism of his religious faith. Rather than reconciliation, Epictetus presents a juxtaposition that promises much logical tension and contradiction.

Much like Kant and Foucault, Epicurus accepted that random events mean that existence are not purely cause and effect and are thereby open to human agency. An often cited passage from his *Letter to Menoeceus, 134*, makes it clear that Epicurus does not want to accept determinism: “It would be better to accept the myth about the gods than be a slave to the determinism of the physicists; for the myth hints at a hope for grace through honours paid to the gods, but the necessity of determinism is inescapable.”

Epicurus’ discourse on atomic physics has much in common with the circumstantial events of Foucault’s power-knowledge and Kant’s rejection of unending cause and effect. Atoms, in Epicurus’ theory, can move in a straight line, swerve, or collide at random, even though there is an appearance of cause and effect for human observers (*Letter to Herodotus*: article 43). His argument for free will, then, is that in the range of possible outcomes in the world, some are determined, some random, and some the result of human will (*Letter to Menoeceus*: article 133). Epicurus was also well aware of the effects of external factors and emotions and how much they can limit free thought and behaviour (e.g., *Letter to Herodotus*, v. 67; *Principle Doctrines*, XXXIV; *Vatican Sayings*, XVII). For example, Epicurus writes that thought and behaviour can be inappropriate when opinion, based on an unexamined discourse, is allowed to intrude (*Herodotus*: v.50b-51; *Vatican Sayings*, XLI). To achieve the “pleasant life,” we should critique our “opinions,” “motives” and “choices” to lessen their unpleasant effects (*Menoeceus*: v.132a). As a consequence, living in a prudent manner is the best advice he has to give (*Menoeceus*: v.133-135a). This is possible, he assures Menoeceus (v. 135b), if the latter would “meditate” and shape his ethical self “by day and by night, alone or with a like-minded friend.”

Kant and Epicurus, therefore, situate their versions of free will in a context of unpredictability not unlike Foucault’s idea of incidental interactions and ephemeral arrangements. Kant, and more so
Epictetus, however, add their faith in an originary cause and religious discourse. It appears that Foucault has more in common with Epicurus on the matter of free will than with the other two philosophers.

5.2 Modern Science

In this section, the neuro-scientific experiments on free will are compared to the philosophy of Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists. First, the logic behind individual deliberation and volition will be developed further. Then, the results of three experiments will be reviewed to determine if science can improve the understanding of human consciousness in relation to free will.

Dirk Hartmann’s article (2004) provides a review of the standard logic concerning free will in the Western tradition, two neuro-physiological experiments, and commentary on the likelihood of proving the existence of free will. Hartmann’s concern is whether individuals can act according to freely deliberated decisions and conscious volition, or do they simply react to external stimuli in a cause and effect relationship (Hartmann, 2004, 277). He refers to closely related issues such as the difference between cause-and-effect and event-and-reason. If that debate is resolved in favour of cause and effect, then the question is whether all events have a cause. Hartmann distinguishes between two ways of approaching the problem. First are the incompatibilists, who maintain that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive. The second approach holds that free will and determinism can co-exist. While not denying that determinism is present, they believe that free will must also exist because individuals can always act otherwise in an ethical dilemma by exercising a veto that terminates the impulse to act (Hartmann, 2004, 277-278). Foucault would be a compatibilist, therefore, since his theory should allow freedom of thought and volition in the face of deterministic power-knowledge. Foucault’s interpretation of Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus, as was just argued above, is in accordance with the compatibilist school. They see determinism as something that can be overcome by assiduous preparation and mindful perception.

To address this issue, Frankfurt’s model of free will is further developed. He writes that wants, deliberation, and volition are categorized as first order and second order to indicate the degree to which they are subject to cause and effect and free will. Hartmann (2004: 278) illustrates with the example of a
cigarette smoker who might want to quit. At its most basic, such a person could have a “first order” want to smoke and a “first order” volition, or reaction, to buy tobacco and smoke it. But that person could also have a “second order” want to either continue or quit smoking. The person is facing a dilemma. If the person seriously thinks about the health implications, the pleasure, and the withdrawal discomfort of smoking that would be “second order” deliberation. (For the purposes of this book, it will be assumed that deliberation is always second order, because it is not possible to have deliberated thought between an impulse and a reaction). For either of the two “second order” wants to become a reality, the smoker also must be free and able to choose to continue or to quit. Whichever course the person decides upon, that is “second order” volition. If the person’s “second order” want to continue smoking is so much stronger than the “second order” want to quit so that there is no real possibility the person will quit, that individual would be considered weak willed and “the slave of his wants and desires” (Hartman, 2004: 278). This is a familiar, negative judgment in Western ethics (e.g., Plato, Republic, Bk IV and IX). Regarding ancient Greek sexual ethics, Foucault said that the issue was whether one was the slave or master of one’s desires (Foucault 1984: 349). For the smoker who indulges a want to smoke with no second order awareness or thought of doing otherwise, the question of free will is irrelevant (Frankfurt, 1971: 18). In that case, there has been no true deliberation or free choice. If there is no free will, either because the person cannot overcome an impulse or does not pause to think, then the potential for individual ethics is absent; the person is not making a conscious choice in the moral domain. Expressed in the terminology of Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenist, such people would be automatons of power-knowledge, intellectually immature, or sophists. In the criteria established in this book, the weak willed would not have prepared themselves to control their impulse or to perceive and critique the underlying discourse and the exigencies of power-knowledge. By definition, they have engaged in self-forming activity according to a mode of subjection, but without developing the potential for the exercise of free will. This would limit the proportion of people who are capable of ethical behaviour and certainly would limit the range of their behaviour that could be considered ethical.
Hartmann (2004: 279-281) then reviews two neurophysiologic experiments that incompatibilists have interpreted as proving both determinism and free will. The results of the first experiment were published by Benjamin Libet in 1985. He instructed his subjects to spontaneously move a finger, or not move a finger, while he monitored the electrical activity of the cerebrum to the millisecond (Libet, 1985). Libet reported that physiological arousal, also called readiness potential, determined the outcome before the person had time to think and make a conscious decision. Libet deduced that there could only be a cause and effect relationship between the nervous arousal and the movement of the finger. Hartmann counters that Libet’s experiment did not really deal with free will because it did not account for individual deliberation over second order wants and volitions. Indeed, Libet had told his subjects to avoid thinking and deciding until the last possible moment. If a subject confessed to deliberating in the slightest way, Libet did not record the result. In a later experiment, not reviewed by Hartmann, Libet (1999) surveys a larger collection of data and refines his observations regarding deliberation and second order volition. For this experiment, Libet (1999: 54) envisions wants as “unconscious initiatives for voluntary action [that are] ‘bubbling up’ in the brain.” The subject, he thought, could still exercise a veto option in a 100 to 200 millisecond interval before what would otherwise look like a spontaneous urge to act (Libet, 1999: 51).

Although Libet’s concept of “unconsciously emerging initiatives” are the equivalent of Frankfurt’s first order wants and desires, Libet’s 100 to 200 millisecond veto period is far from being enough time to allow for a careful deliberation. Nevertheless, Libet considers the split second veto to be as morally significant as the choice to obey or disobey the “thou-shalt-not” moral code of the Ten Commandments (Libet, 1999: 51). Even if we assume that this reflex veto has been guided by a moral preparation in the Christian discourse, it would not be equivalent to critiquing its moral code. Reacting to a received code is immaturity for Kant and sophistry for the Hellenists. Neither of Libet’s sample groups would be considered to have behaved ethically according to Frankfurt’s standards. Critique, even as preparation for a quick reaction is a necessary condition for ethical behaviour for the Hellenists, Kant, and Foucault.

In the conclusion to his 1999 paper, despite the results of the experiment, Libet effectively abandons his moral veto theory and deviates from the discourse of modern science. He writes that an
extrapolation from experiments in the physical world to “subjective conscious functions and events is a speculative belief, not a scientifically proven proposition” (italics in the original) (Libet 1999: 55). He also points to “an unexplained gap between the category of physical phenomena and the category of subjective phenomena” (Libet, 1999: 55). What we take as our identity, Libet continues, depends on the existence of a second order volition that cannot be tested by an experiment, at least not without great difficulty, and perhaps not at all. Libet (1999: 56) ventures so far as to say that since we have a “deep feeling” from everyday life that we do exercise second order volition, why not assume that it is the case.

The second experiment reviewed by Hartmann (2004: 281-282) was thought to have been conducted in the early 1960s by Grey Walter. The results are only known through a report written by Dennett much later in 1991. The experiment purported to measure the electronic arousal and readiness potential to act and identify a precise decision point. In an experiment that Hartmann believes would be considered unethical today, phone jacks were plugged into the skulls of epileptics who were led to believe it could lead to a cure. Electrical activity in the subject’s brain associated with motor signals was used to generate a signal to change slides on a projector. The unconscious command to the projector was recorded prior to the person moving a finger to push the advance button. The subjects reported that the slide changed just at they had decided to move their finger. Again, because a physical impulse preceded any conscious decision, Dennett’s report was widely taken as proof that decisions are a cause and effect reflex. But Hartmann (2004: 282-284) proves that Grey Walter never conducted the experiment and that Dennett, of course, had no data when he wrote his paper in 1991. It was a fraud that can serve as an example of how modern science can be corrupted by power-knowledge. Nevertheless, it indicates that even an imaginary experimental design generating what was thought to be conclusive proof did not address the logic of second order dilemmas, deliberation, and second order volition. The experiment also did not consider the role of random events. If an act does not issue from cause and effect, it is not necessarily the result of free will.

Hartmann concludes that Libet’s experiments and the one designed by Walter and reported by Dennett (2004: 279) were too simple to prove or disprove the existence for free will. On this, Hartmann is
in agreement with Libet’s conclusion to his article of 1999. The chances of designing and executing a successful experiment are “quite poor”; instead, the issue of free will should be addressed by an “articulate” inquiry into “the language-games pertaining to human agency” (Hartmann, 2004: 284). Such limits on science, whether it concerns attempts at measurement, deceptions, self-aggrandizement, and many other problems have been well described the works of prominent authors such as Lyotard (1984), Latour (1978), and Kuhn (1996).

The field of neuro-physiology has produced other theories relevant to this book. One of the more interesting is the work of Patricia Churchland (2007). She refers to a series of experiments, including that of Libet (1985), and concludes that human behaviour is the result of an unconscious cause and effect relationship initiated by motor neurons and signalled by a readiness potential (Churchland, 2007). Individuals, after the fact, believe they acted according to a conscious intent. This appears like common sense to the experimental subjects, much as Libet (1999: 56) eventually came to believe. The unconscious impulses, however, stem from basic cultural assumptions, training, and other stimuli absorbed throughout one’s lifetime (Churchland, 2007). Motor neurons are merely reacting to the elements that have shapes the ethical self: Foucault’s ethical substance, mode of subject, and self-forming activity. Churchland cites several experiments indicating that unconscious, intuitive reactions, especially to complex problems, actually produced better results. Indeed, spending too much time deliberating on complicated details more often led to poor decisions. It also seemed to be true that “sleeping on a problem” led to better outcomes because the unconscious brain had time to dwell on the particulars. Churchland mentioned Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that advised individuals to prepare the self to make good, unconscious decisions later in life (Churchland, 2007). While this explanation for ethical behaviour does not follow Frankfurt’s formula of conscious deliberation and volition after a problem arises, it does argue for preparing the mind for unconscious decision-making. The form and content of the preparation, however, can only be partly associated with free will. It is mostly a nurturing of the sub-conscious and far from training for group ethical certainty required for an army as sought by the authors of the Army Ethics Programme.
Thus, despite neuro-scientific attempts, the discussion of free will is left more or less as it was after the section on Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists.

5.3 Summary and Conclusion

Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus believe that free will and ethical behaviour are possible because there is an element of randomness in the world that breaks the chain of cause and effect. The absence of determinism, however, does not necessarily mean there is free will. Randomness proves events are not all explained by cause and effect, but the alternative can be a random event. Nevertheless, they agree that people think and act freely if they have critiqued discourse and chosen what they believe to be ethical behaviour, whatever that might be. Kant and Epictetus, while seeming to overstate the potential for freedom of thought, do accept some limits on volition imposed by the state, providence, or a deity. Foucault and Epicurus, on the other hand, believe the potential for free will is limited by power-knowledge in its various manifestations.

It is very unlikely that scientific experimentation can solve the issue of free will. Experiments cannot establish that the transition from first order wants and volition to second order wants, deliberation, and volition is the result of cause and effect, randomness, or a sign of free will. It may well be undecidable. Thus, there is no clear reason to abandon the compatibilist approach of Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists. Their discussion of free will, nevertheless, indicates that there are significant barriers to its existence. Individuals would have to understand that events are the coincidence of multiple and often ephemeral factors, are constrained by power-knowledge, and require disciplined contemplation.

5.4 Selected Texts on Free Will


“Soldier left military over Afghanistan.”
During a training session earlier this year at Gagetown, N.B., [Francisco Juarez] refused to walk onto an obstacle course and told his commanding officer: “I no longer wish to participate.” He was dragged before several army captains, told he would feel like a failure for the rest of his life, and threatened with a court martial and possible jail time.

The military relented somewhat. They fined the B.C. native $500 and discharged him without honour.

But Juarez doesn’t regret his disobedience for a second. He says he was being groomed to become a second lieutenant and would have been in Kandahar by early next year.

“Morally I could have sat back and said, ‘You’re paid to do a job. Just do it and shut up.’ But I decided I couldn’t,” he said in an interview Saturday. “I began to ask myself: Could I give orders to subordinates that would result in them dying for a mission I did not believe in?”

“They all want to go to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the big game,” he said.

“If you’re a concert pianist, you want to go to Carnegie Hall. They were all pretty gung-ho.”

“But you can’t say to the military, ‘I don’t believe in the mission in Afghanistan and I don’t believe in war-making,’” he said. “You can’t do that. The military doesn’t speak that language.” “Buck up,” is how Juarez describes their message.

He also describes in vivid detail the issues that soldiers grapple with before heading on a hazardous mission, and the thought that crossed his own mind that morning beside the obstacle course: “I’m in control of my legs. Nobody can make me do this.”

Note: Panetta’s article quickly appeared on the website for Operation Objection and those of several other anti-war advocacy groups. On October 19, 2006, Juarez spoke about his protest at a Unitarian Church in his hometown of Vancouver. A video of the speech was posted on YouTube. On Remembrance Day, November 11, 2006, Juarez spoke at a peace conference in Ottawa, also on YouTube. (See Background Information on Media Sources at the end of this book for counts on the number of views on YouTube).
United Food and Commercial Workers trade union website, posted as a reader’s commentary by Sue Robertson, November 21, 2006:

Right on, Francisco Juarez! If you have seen through the smoke and mirrors set up to condition the Canadian military mentality to accept things the way the Conservative agenda demands they do, you are a true Canadian. I commend you for your courage in choosing not to collude with this deep integration with the US, which Harper and his CEO cronies are insidiously engineering for our future.

The Ottawa Citizen, Charles Mandel, August 1, 2007:

“Soldier sentenced, lambasted for stay in bed during Afghan attack.”

A Canadian soldier who refused to leave his bed during an insurgent attack on a Canadian base in Afghanistan has received a 21-day sentence and harsh criticism from a military judge.

“You displayed a total lack of discipline and a lack of respect for orders by remaining in bed, by refusing to don your helmet and by refusing to report to your assigned place of duty during the stand-to,” Perron wrote in his July 6 verdict, handed down in Gatineau, Que., on the disciplinary-court martial hearing.

“Such conduct attacks the very core of our institution,” Perron wrote.

The incident involving Billard took place at a Canadian base in Afghanistan on May 22, 2006, at around 2 a.m. Insurgents tried to launch a rocket toward one of the camp’s guard towers, but the attack failed when the missile misfired and the attackers fled.

A siren sounded and small arms fire could be heard throughout the camp. Canadian soldiers returned fire and dispatched a patrol to rout the attackers. The attack lasted under one minute, but the “stand-to” went on for 90 minutes.

During that period, Billard monitored the radio, refusing to put on his helmet and flak jacket and leaving his bed only once to venture to the washroom with a pistol. At the beginning of the attack, other soldiers urged him to get out of bed. At one point, Billard tried to discourage another corporal, telling him: “Where are you going and what for? You are a f–ing flincher.”
Mike Jeffery [Lieutenant General retired], former chief of the army land staff and a fellow at the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute in Calgary, called the case very unusual. He noted that military law and discipline revolves around maintaining a commitment to duty no matter what the risk since soldiers’ conduct in war zones have life-threatening consequences.

The Toronto Star, Chris Lambie, August 1, 2007:

“Soldier lay in bed during fight: Serviceman in Afghanistan gets 21 days in jail for failing ‘miserably’ to do his duty in attack.”

According to a statement of facts, a corporal was donning his fighting gear when Billard tried to discourage him by saying: “Where are you going and what for?” When two comrades tried to roust Billard by banging a locker, he replied: “I’m immune to that. I’m going to sleep.”

“It is not up to you to decide which orders are applicable to you and when they are applicable,” Perron’s ruling said.

“You, like any other soldier at that camp, had one important responsibility: Obey the orders and react in a manner that will ensure the safety of your comrades and the success of the mission.”

There have only been a few Canadian courts martial stemming from incidents in Afghanistan, where Canada has about 2,500 troops.
Chapter 6 - What is Their Goal? Telos as Ethics and Ethos

In Foucault’\textquoteright s concept of the ethics of the self, \textit{telos} is the goal and outcome of behaviour, ethical or not. \textit{Telos} can also be viewed as the individual ethics and group ethos at the site under examination. As described in the introduction above, all four elements of Foucault’\textquoteright s ethics of the self should be thought of as a simultaneous and often unpredictable interaction. In the linear argument used in this book, it has been presented more as a sequence of mutual interactions. In that conceptualization, \textit{telos} should be viewed as an iterative process that comes full circle to reflect ethical substance. \textit{Telos} and ethical substance are the more stable and lasting parts of the moral domain, (see Figure 3 above). \textit{Telos} is not the fulfillment of the moral code. Moral codes are a knowledge to be used in power-knowledge interactions.

This chapter will use the argument developed thus far to describe the ethos and \textit{telos} to be found in the discourse of Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, Epicurus, and the culture of the Canadian military.

6.1 Foucault

Critics have debated whether Foucault had a preferred \textit{telos}. In \textit{Hermeneutics}, Foucault is concerned about the possibility of developing an ethos with content suitable for his time and place without attempting to copy those from the past (e.g., Foucault, 2005: 309, 326-327, 437, 447-448). As was discussed above, some make the case that the concept of a \textit{telos} does not apply to Foucault because he essentially remained a power-knowledge determinist despite his late writings on ethics. Wicks, for example, is not convinced that Foucault succeeded in defending his assumptions of free will and a \textit{telos} of self-governance. He concludes that societal “discipline prevailed and that liberation remained only a more distant prescription” (Wicks, 2003: 262). A close review of Foucault’s work indicates that he did accept the Western tradition of political engagement in public life, although with much pessimism. While Foucault made a determined effort to speak and write with apparent neutrality, there are rare occasions when he plainly states his personal view on \textit{telos}. In “Practices and Sciences of the Self,” Foucault asserts...
that individuals have an a priori right to ask questions and challenge contradictions and a duty to engage in respectful debate with the other: “a morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the search for the truth and the relation to the other” (Foucault, 1984: 381). Foucault adds, “the person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point our faulty reasoning, etc.” (Foucault 1984: 381). Regarding participation in public life, he advocated “not apathy or nihilism, but pessimistic activism” (Foucault, 1984: 343), and condemned the negative egoism of “withdrawing into oneself” or “looking after” oneself (Foucault, 1984: 347; Foucault, 2005: 12, 112). Activism can be justified as resistance to oppression in the case when a social contract is not observed (Foucault, 2003: 17). He also makes value laden observations of Hellenism, such as characterizing their efforts to prepare to perceive as a “true discourse” necessary to achieve “the matrix of rational behaviour” and ultimately an ethos (Foucault 2005: 326-327). The passage where he most clearly identifies political activism as his preferred telos comes from Hermeneutics. The following quote, by its lack of succinctness as much as its content, is nearly a lament in favour of political activism:

“I do not think we have anything to be proud of in our current efforts to reconstitute an ethic of the self. And in this series of undertakings to reconstitute an ethic of the self, in this series of more or less blocked and ossified efforts, and in the movement we now make to refer ourselves constantly to this ethic of the self without ever giving it any content, I think we may have to suspect that we find it impossible today to constitute an ethic of the self, even though it may be an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task, if it is true after all that there is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself.”

Foucault (2005: 251-252)
In “Practices and Sciences of the Self,” Foucault takes the Nietzschean moral standpoint when he admits that it might be better for individuals if they were deceived so they could avoid suffering from the nihilism that can flow from “the bleaker view of politics as essentially domination and repression” (Foucault, 1984: 379). Foucault cautioned, moreover, that “the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth” is “not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time” (Foucault, 1980: 133). Foucault also saw a double task for critique: understanding and finding weak points in governance (Foucault, 2002: 222, 224). On the same topic, he distinguished between the act of critiquing and the prospect that reason and knowledge will improve governance (Foucault, 2002: 204). His ideal ethical subject, therefore, is the active citizen in the Greco-Roman tradition.

Others believe that Foucault’s notion activism in governance can be construed as his telos. While Hoy agrees with Foucault that it is not possible to emancipate the truth from a power-knowledge system, activism is necessary for pragmatic issues that “are real or live for us” (Hoy, 1986b: 19). Hoy adds that gaps in knowledge are more serious than they first appear, because many related and intersecting factors are not apparent and are not even available for analysis. At best, critique might serve as a weak defence against power-knowledge (Hoy, 1986b: 20). Although Foucault writes more often about critique as a means of forming an ethical subject, it is to be used to participate in public life at the sites that affect us as individuals.

In “What is Critique?”, Foucault (2002) addresses the ethical implications arising from the genealogy of the ethical subject and the schema of the ethics of the self. That essay repeats the theme of critique as telos. Butler (2002) contends that Foucault places so much importance on the moral good of critique that it should be considered as his idea of virtue. Foucault’s notion of critique is indeed consistent with the discourse and ethical substance he ascribes to the Hellenists and Kant, i.e., the pursuit of truth related to personal ethical growth. Butler, however, does not stop there. She argues that Foucault’s telos includes political activism when a person’s “liberty is at stake” (Butler, 2002: 218). It is important to
develop a “critical attitude” that can lead to an activism about “not being governed like that and at that cost” (Butler, 2002: 218, 221, quoting Foucault, 2002: 195, 193). Rather than critique as an end, she settles on the telos of the public life. She goes further still by suggesting that he harboured an ethical goal related to modern psychology whereby being active in self-governance would create an identity that is a “more psychologically resonant notion of ‘self”’ (Butler, 2002: 226). But this telos falls too close to the “Californian” cult of the self, which Foucault rejected.

Foucault’s resembles Kant in regard to telos. Foucault believes there is a “certain decision-making will not to be governed, the decision-making will, both an individual and collective attitude which meant, as Kant said, to get out of one’s minority” (Foucault, 2002: 204). On the issue of public activism, Foucault characterized Kant’s goals in positive terms as “desubjugation” and the advancement of a “politics of truth” (Foucault, 2002: 194). Foucault assumes a more modest version of Kant’s idealism, however, by restricting the efforts toward emancipation to what affects people at their site. He left open the possibility that rules can be agreed upon for a particular time and place (Wicks, 2003: 262-263). Indeed, he did not consider the Enlightenment as a step in history toward a modernist era. In “What is Critique?”, Foucault wrote that the process of enlightenment existed in many eras, ranging from the Hellenists to Habermas (Foucault, 2002:199-200).

Foucault’s reading of Hellenism in Hermeneutics provides further evidence that he saw participation in public life as his telos. His approach has much in common with the Stoics. Indeed, the view that an active public life is a matter of morality is a very prominent part of the Western philosophic tradition from the polis to electoral politics. Foucault refers to the efforts of Socrates, for instance, to encourage the shy politician Charmides and the politician-to-be Alcibiades to undertake an active public life (Foucault, 2005: 33-34). They are to apply their training to better govern others and not deliberate as uninvolved philosophers.

There remains a major problem with Foucault’s telos. How many individuals able and motivated to undergo the preparation, develop the required perception, reach a consensus on rules of participation to become active at a site of governance? Foucault (1984: 374) defines ethos as a “philosophy of life” and “a
manner of being.” Nevertheless, he himself questions whether it was only attainable in antiquity for introspective elites with “free time” and a membership in exclusive institutions, secret societies, schools, and like groups (Foucault, 2005: 112-113). Of course, it is not entirely a matter of having aristocratic or wealthy origins. There is the Hellenist belief that “the slave can be more free than the free man” (Foucault, 2005: 18, 85). Still, Foucault refers to Epictetus who believed that while moral self-formation might have universal appeal, it “can only be reserved for some” (Foucault, 2005: 121). In Foucault’s estimation, nevertheless, the majority of people lack the “courage, strength, or endurance, an inability to grasp the importance of the task or to see it through” (Foucault, 2005: 118, 119).

6.2 Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus

By describing his era as an “age of enlightenment” and not an “enlightened age” Kant also made the distinction between critique and the public life as two possibilities for a telos (Kant 1983: 44). On the matter of perception, Kant valued striving for enlightenment because those who do not are accepting a self-imposed and undesirable state of immaturity. He considered self-enlightenment to be nothing less than the foundation of civil and spiritual freedom. Thinking freely leads to acting freely, thus making humans mature and deserving of fair political governance and a just social contract (Kant, 1983: 45-46). Thus, Kant acknowledges the importance of critique but as a means to an end, that is, the telos of fair governance. What separates Kant from Foucault, are the conditions of the governing contract. Kant values widespread enlightenment but only if it is followed by long periods of quiet consolidation (Kant, 1983: 46). Kant’s starting point was to be obedient, while Foucault’s was an attitude of disobedience; to be always vigilant about being governed the way one would want (Foucault, 2002: 195, 193). Kant was also aware that few are capable of self-enlightenment and deserving of just political governance (Kant, 1983: 41, 45-46). Though rare, he maintained, it is a fundamental necessity.

Like Foucault and Kant, Epictetus treated preparation and perception as means to an end. Epictetus taught that one must first be free from deception and have control of their impulses and wants (Discourses: III.2.1-2). He believed that if there is no freedom from compulsion, then there can be no
good and evil, and no ethics (Discourses: IV.1:132; Discourses: IV.10:8). Freedom of thought and activity, however, must translate into ethical behaviour. Epictetus refers to Socrates as a paragon of virtue because he sacrificed his corporeality in favour of maintaining free volition (Discourses: IV.1:161). Ethical behaviour and telos, for Epictetus, required performing one’s public duties and participating in governance even though it is fraught with illusions and vanities. It still must follow free deliberation and volition because Epictetus stipulated that a person is moral only when they have a choice to avoid or be active in public life (Discourses IV.4:23). He acknowledges the benefits of the simple life in ideal circumstances, but he believes it is not practicable because peace can be disturbed by events beyond anyone’s control and can often lead to subservience (Discourses: IV.1.54-61; Discourses: IV.4.1-23). In many cases, it is easier to preserve independence of thought while submitting to authority (Discourses: IV.172-75). Epictetus’ advice is to view life as a play “where it is your job to act well the part that is assigned you: but to choose it is another’s” (Handbook of Epictetus.17).

The telos of activism was not shared by Epicurus. Epicurus believed that the goal of life was to achieve happiness and avoid pain. Public life makes individuals vulnerable to unquenchable desire, unending activity, and uncontrollable events. For instance, Epicurus cautions that people who fail to find security by pursuing fame will not lead a pleasant life (Principal Doctrines, VII). He thought that no amount of preparation and perception could enable individuals to participate in public life on acceptable terms. There are too many distortions in opinions and emotions to overcome. The would-be ethical being would be obliged to pursue too many lines of inquiry, many of which would stall because of lapses in cause and effect or remain unexplained because of coincidence and spontaneity. Epicurus sought to simplify life precisely because so much was at stake in governance and public duty. He makes several unequivocal references to his telos. Epicurus believed that those who control their fears of the external and treat them as if they were similar and not alien would live well; otherwise, it is best to keep to oneself and avoid the worst (Principal Doctrines, XXXIX). Similarly, the purest sense of well-being is found in “withdrawal from the crowd” and that we “[w]e must free ourselves form the prison of private and public business” (Principal Doctrines, XIV; Vatican Sayings, LVIII). His telos was to simplify or avoid the
modes of subjection and self-forming activity that power-knowledge could bring to bear. Public life would be an impediment.

Epicureans, it should be emphasized, do not surrender to determinist power-knowledge. Epicurus realized that some political struggle was necessary if it was unavoidable and essential to avoid pain. The Epicurean compromise between power-knowledge and activism, between determinism and free will, depends on the degree of harm that can touch people at a specific place and time. He believed that people enjoy “immortal blessings” by practicing deliberation and volition, whether or not the outcome is successful (*Letter to Menoeceus, 134-135a*). Better to fail with reason, in other words, than succeed by chance. On the other hand, Epicurus did not think it necessary to test one’s mettle in public life because it could cause unnecessary suffering. Epicureans were strongly opposed to the *praemeditatio malorum*, because it introduced worries that likely would never occur and more likely would be beyond the ability of the person to alter (Foucault, 2005: 468).

Although he refers to the Epicureans frequently in *Hermeneutics*, Foucault does not discuss why they thought that one should minimize participation in public life and governance. In the end, it appears that Foucault’s *telos* is the same as Kant and Epictetus. The Epicureans differ. Epicurus, however, does share many of the assumptions underlying Foucault’s power-knowledge. Epicurus is postmodern in the sense that he sees the world as without a prime mover and without an innate virtue assigned to public life. Unlike Foucault, Epicurus does not attempt to escape from the overwhelming force of power-knowledge by turning to an ethics of activism. The similarities are evident in Epicurus’ “Panegyric on the Prudent Man” (*Letter to Menoeceus IV, A*). Epicurus writes that no one is superior to the prudent man who “thinks that the chief power of decision lies within us, although some things come about by necessity, some by chance, and some by our own wills; for he sees that necessity is irresponsible and chance uncertain, but that our actions are subject to no power. It is for this reason that our actions merit praise or blame” (*Letter to Menoeceus IV, A*). The difference is clear from Epicurus’ *telos* of withdrawing from public life, whereas Foucault hopes that political activism can change the power-knowledge of governance.
6.3 The Canadian Military

Both the literature review presented above and the military’s conception of ethics focus on moral codes, indoctrination, and the development of skills associated with professionalism, honour, and leadership-governance. In the revised Venn diagram presented at the opening of this chapter, these elements are portrayed as contributing only a small part of the actual telos. The factors that contribute the most to military ethics are the discourse of statism, historical narratives, public relations, bureaucracy, and a heterotopian culture. It does not form a unified and coherent power-knowledge and cultural interface, however. The bureaucracy has many transactions that have been added ad hoc or remain as vestiges of previous programs. Others are perfunctory responses to outside stimuli. There are many competing sub-groups, some being part of latter-day fiefdoms, that work counter to the stated aims of the institution. These inefficient, complex, and countervailing techniques and practices can hinder attempts at reform, however well meaning and well resourced they might be. True to Foucault’s theories of societal discipline, however, it is the aggregate effect that shapes the subject. Panopticism, bio-power, and pastoralism can impose a discipline without there being an overarching plan or strategy. In the case of military personnel, the ideal ethical being, the telos, serves the interests of the state whatever their personal interests might be. This chapter will examine the actual telos and then compare it to the ethical ends that have been ascribed in the previous chapter to Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus.

To determine whether this telos is ethical, it must allow for individual free will. Without an adequate degree of free will, the subject’s deliberation and volition are merely the product of a determinist power-knowledge. Such an adequacy test is necessary to meet the military’s code of professionalism and the warrior’s honour, as well as the standards set by the Western philosophic tradition according to Frankfurt. Given the constraints of power-knowledge in the military, individuals have scant opportunities to meet these expectations. Satisfying the state’s interests and sustaining a domestic and expeditionary heterotopia is paramount. While the details of power-knowledge and the state’s interests change, sometimes quickly, it is the nation’s exceptional values and competence that must be continually confirmed. This urgent need is the ethical substance that drives the military institution.
Thus, there is a link between ethical substance and *telos* that has remained stable during the era of Western hegemony. The *telos*, and by extension, the ethos, is an ethics-less person that will meet the needs of statism. In other words, the *telos* as a product is an individual who does not behave according to the moral codes as defined by the military, Foucault, or the philosophers he referred to in his argument.

If there is an opening, even an interstice in the military’s power-knowledge that can accommodate ethical behaviour, it would most likely be found in the domain of leadership-governance. The ethos would remain entwined with statism, but individuals could pursue a personal ethics as their *telos*. Consider the opportunities for participation in governance and modulation of the social contract in the theory developed by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999). Their effort to define ethical governance relied on standards of communication and transparency that were unrealistic even within their discussion. They described the importance of open and honest communication regarding the nature of the social contract and the mission of the organization. This does not happen in Western militaries. The executive officer manipulation of the selection system, for just one example, would have to be made public along with the ulterior motives for expeditions, such as the enhancement of international trade. Information related to the social contract would also have to help members, especially recruits, to understand better the full implications of the terms of service and the code of service discipline. On expedition, personnel would have to know when they are in contravention of international law and subject to prosecution and be able to exercise selective conscientious objection in a practical and fair manner. Despite these substantial impediments, it is still possible for an individual who is well prepared and perceptive to follow a personal ethic.

The question remains as to how many executive officers and members of the rank and file can and will prepare, perceive, and act to dissent and craft a personal ethic. Research on the moral development of military cadets and members of the regular forces in the U.S., can serve as a very rough indicator. As with the ethics baseline survey reviewed in the power-knowledge chapter, the challenges of designing and executing a survey on such a topic are considerable. Forsythe, Snook, Lewis, and Bartone (2002), mentioned in the literature review, nevertheless have attempted a survey of this nature. They
adapted Kegan’s theory of the psychological maturation to measure levels of military professionalism in the U.S. Army. Forsythe et al., identified four levels of psychology maturity. Four were used instead of Kegan’s five because stage one dealt with young children and did not apply to military personnel. Hence, Stage Four is equivalent to Kegan’s Stage Five. For close parallels in moral developmental theory, see Whicker (1976) and Kohlberg (1976).

In the least mature stage, individuals follow rules, conform to standard military roles, and adhere to the basic social norms, such as the ability to delay gratification. Stage One personnel, however, are primarily motivated by self-interest and only accept one point of view at a time. Their self-identity depends on the opportunity to play a traditional military role. This may be limited to the authoritarian-submissive persona and to specific military skills, such as reconnaissance or operating a particular weapon system. Officers and soldiers in the first stage, according to Forsythe et al, are not military professionals. Stage Two individuals are more versatile regarding tactical roles and the capacity to accept other points of view, but only within traditional narratives. Where Stage One personnel might only want to engage in combat, those in Stage Two would also accept peacekeeping. They can be motivated by traditional cultural assumptions beyond self-interest and rudimentary social virtues. For example, they accept self-sacrifice and trust most of the decisions of government and military executives. Personnel in this stage, however, still believe that traditional values are immutable and universal. Their professional adaptability and growth are limited by static cultural norms and narratives, often not open to discussion (Forsythe et al, 2002: 366-369). Forsythe et al., consider people in Stage Two to be limited military professionals. Personnel in Stage Three achieve greater psychological autonomy and flexibility toward the cultural norms and narratives. They adhere to most traditional military and societal norms, but can accept other options. When faced with new tactics, technology, military strategy, and professional jurisdiction, they are able to adjust. Stage Three members are sufficiently mature, psychologically and emotionally, to participate in limited change in military culture. Instead of being recalcitrant members of the military profession, Forsythe et al., consider them to be true professionals. Only in Stage Four do individuals recognize that cultural norms and narratives are constructs and understand that self-identity...
can be manipulated. Thus, they are able to critique military and national culture and shape the ethos to some extent. They have not necessarily prepared to deliberate on ethical dilemmas, however, and worked to break free from institution constraints, but they have the freedom of thought to do so. In any case, this is the kind of person Foster had in mind when he urged the military to adopt a “postmodern” ethos in order to question authority, act autonomously, and not rely on “heroic intellectual countermeasures” (Foster, 2004: 94)

At this point, the limitations of questionnaire surveys become apparent. Forsythe et al., take their results at face value and believe that the majority of respondents are in Stages Two and Three, with a few in Stage One and Stage Four. The authors also assume that the age of the respondents explain why more cadets are in Stage One in comparison to the older, working personnel. Instead, it could be that the respondents in Stage Two, Three, and Four have been well enough indoctrinated to believe that they do possess exceptional moral characteristics. Research on self-reporting indicate that respondents rate themselves as belonging to a socially desirable category of moral development higher than what their behaviour would indicate (Darley, Batson 1973). Efforts to correct for results in which respondents “fake good” are usually unsuccessful (Goffin, Christiansen, 2003). In reality, most people behave in a manner similar to their peers and the prevailing culture at their site (Darley, Batson 1973). Given the constraints imposed by power-knowledge and given the record of behaviour in garrison and on expedition, a large proportion of Canadian military personnel are likely in Stage One; especially executives. The rank and file, meanwhile, could have a relatively larger number in Stage Two, even if it is based on a wide range of illusory narratives and deceptive practices.

Thus, according to the telos of Foucault, Kant, and Epictetus, the military has failed to develop the ethos required to prepare, perceive, and participate in ethical governance, whether as an individual or as a member of body politic. There is not the skeptical attitude valued by Foucault, the openings for enlightenment prescribed by Kant, nor the rigorous development of a strong self as recommended by Epictetus. If there is any room for Epicurus’ withdrawal from turmoil, it is restricted to extreme measures such as desertion or more patient means such as waiting for retirement.
6.4 Summary and Conclusion

For Foucault, Kant, and Epictetus, telos is the ability and opportunity to dissent and engage in governance and public life. Foucault and Epicurus are more pessimistic about the capacity for ordinary people to adequately critique, fulfill the potential for free will, and participate in governance according to their own ethic. Neither Foucault nor Epicurus believes that events and behaviour give meaning to anything beyond the present and corporeal. Foucault, nevertheless, believes it is essential that individuals and communities try to develop an ethic and ethos. Epicurus, to the contrary, believes that participation in public life leaves the individual open to futile pursuits and frustration. His telos is to be prudent and reduce contact with power-knowledge as much as possible to improve the chances of living a pleasant, satisfying life. Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus all agree that very few can prepare and perceive at the level required to achieve their version of telos. There is also the matter of achieving a consensus for rules for governance and participation toward a common goal. Small numbers of ethical persons do not form an ethos. The latter applies to groups and communities.

The military is an extremely poor site to fulfill a telos of participation or withdrawal. Certainly, there is nothing to indicate that the military attracts or trains a philosophic elite capable of achieving the necessary free will or ethical standards. Adequate information is withheld, preparation is for obedience and not perception, and activism is well suppressed. Hence, the military follows a third and different telos. Its telos is statism, with the addition of some subsidiary goals such as the sustainment of executive officer ascendancy and the opportunity for the rank and file to handle weapons and travel.

6.5 Selected Texts on Telos, Ethics, and Ethos

The Ottawa Citizen, Tim Shufelt, March 26, 2008:

“Hero led face-to-face combat without losing one soldier: ‘You’re just a weapon like everybody else,’ says officer to be honoured today.”
In the dust, heat and danger of Afghanistan’s Zhari District, Maj. David Quick of the Royal Canadian Regiment earned the medal for bravery he will receive from the Governor General in a ceremony today at Rideau Hall.

In situations like that, rank makes little difference, Maj. Quick said. “You’re just a weapon like everybody else. You have to fight your way out.”

“Throughout, he showed exceptional courage, leading from the front. And it was because of his strength of character, his willpower, his physical fitness and his tactical acumen,” Lieut.-Col. Walker said.

Tours in Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti then helped accustom him to the constant threat of violence he would face in Afghanistan.

“But up to that point, I wasn’t killing anybody,” Maj. Quick said. And there is no substitute for the intense experience of combat in close quarters, he added.

For all of NATO’s military technology, fighting in Afghanistan is not much different from the wars of previous generations. “You’d mark yourself off, à la Vietnam, with red smoke, and the A-10 would kill everything around you.”

_The Toronto Star_, Rosie DiManno, May 1, 2007:

“It’s all about the bang and thunder.”

Heavy metal Guns N’ Roses music is blasting from the big gunners’ hooch. Naturally. It’s all about the bang and the thunder for D Battery, B Troop, 2nd Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, which is a quaint regimental anachronism.

“Napoleon said artillery wins wars, infantry holds ground,” quotes Bombardier Michael Hobb, a ridiculously cherubic-looking 20-year-old from Yarmouth, N.S. “Napoleon was in the artillery, you know.”

He continues to wax rapturously about his particular component of Task Force Afghanistan, the sheer orgiastic thrust of firing cannons that, while technologically advanced to the point of pin-sharp
precision, still pretty much resemble – to an untutored eye – the lumbering contraptions dragged into the field by Napoleon’s forces a couple of centuries ago.

“Big guns, big boom.” “A ruuuuush,” offers Gunner Adam Hannaford, 23, of Hamilton, drawing out the word so that it sounds like a rocket hiss. Or, as described by Gunner Robert Kelly, 25: “Hours of boredom and then an intense moment of adrenaline.” Adding: “All elbows and a--holes.” As in elbows cocked to pull the lanyards and sphincters clenched in the heat of battle.

One fellow compares the subliminally percussive sensation to sex; another says it’s as sweetly satisfying as chocolate.

The cannonade will save the lives of the only people they care to care about – their allies. Fretting about the “bad guys” is not part of a soldier’s psychological makeup.

The 155mm M-777 howitzers and a variety of other humongous artillery pieces – some containing up to 120 shells that burst into lethal bomblets – are shredding-machines, if less blindly ruinous than air power bombardments. The gunners just call them “bullets.” But they make the ground tremble and they rain death. Pity the victims on the receiving end of the barrage as rockets arch over the heads of the coalition infantry in between.

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The Toronto Star, Paul Watson, Jun 26, 2010:

“Frustrated Canadian soldiers are killing time, more than Taliban

Strict rules of engagement restrict troop tactics: ‘Our mission is not to provide fire support. It is to be prepared to provide fire support’”

An army officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence on insurgents and local tribal politics, defended the strategy of restraint as a crucial weapon against insurgent “information operations,” sometimes called propaganda.

“Say there’s four insurgents, and the good gun commander here gets orders to fire and those four insurgents get killed, and a piece of shrapnel the size of a hubcap decapitates a 12-year-old kid standing
by,” the officer said. “At that point, the four insurgents who were killed are forgotten. What’s highlighted is that 12-year-old kid.”

Bad kills mean bad news, which can turn victory into defeat. And as much as an artillery gunner may want to turn an insurgent into pink mist, commanders have to calculate the risks of losing hearts and minds.

“Make no mistake about it,” he added, “we’ve had incidents a kilometre and a half from here where there’s been pink mist. And we’ll have plenty more incidents in the next six months.”

The Toronto Star, Paul Watson, July 16, 2010:

“On the battlefield, Canadian soldiers get permission to shoot Since Brigadier-General Jon Vance took command in June, Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan are finding it easier to fight insurgents.”

A pair of Canadian helicopters circled low over a vineyard, watching two insurgents try to slip away, waiting for permission to shoot. The chopper crew and soldiers on the ground were confident they had a good kill in their sights, with little risk of harming innocent bystanders if the Griffon’s door gunner pulled the trigger.

But the crew needed permission from high up the chain of command, an often frustrating hierarchy that soldiers call “the kill chain.” For months now, Canadian and other NATO troops fighting in southern Afghanistan have complained that restrictive rules of engagement, written to win Afghans away from insurgents by limiting civilian casualties, have handed the momentum to the enemy.

Not this time. The grinding noise of a chopper’s motorized machine gun, capable of mincing a target with at least 2,000 bullets a minute, echoed across the desert plain. It sounded like a wood chipper dicing up tree limbs. “Oh ya, baby!” one soldier shouted up at the sky as the airborne gatling gun spewed repeated bursts. Whoops and cheers rippled across the dust-blown camp. Oscar Company was savouring some payback, a sweet taste they’ve been enjoying more often in recent days.

Since Brigadier-General Jon Vance returned to take command in early June, the kill chain has been cut shorter, and Canadian troops on the battlefields of eastern Panjwaii district say it’s getting easier
to take the fight to the insurgents. Major Steve Brown, commander of Oscar Company, in the 1st Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment battle group, called Vance “a no-nonsense kind of guy” whose personality has helped reshape battlefield operations.

The Toronto Star, Allan Woods, May 19, 2007:

“Caution urged on recruits: Increasing number of those interested in joining Canadian Forces show ‘socio-dysfunctional’ profile, report warns.”

An increasing number of would-be recruits to the Canadian military are prone to displaying traits of social disobedience, intolerance toward ethnic groups and being fatalistic, a new report says.

The analysis, delivered to the Department of National Defence in March, warns of the “increasingly socio-dysfunctional profile of military aspirants.”

The report raises the spectre of the Canadian military scandal in Somalia, in which the Canadian Forces covered up the 1993 murder of a young Somali prisoner for several weeks. The incident led to criminal charges, a public inquiry and a decade of soul-searching for the military.

A profile drawn up in the study shows that today’s average potential military recruit is “proud and intense,” a “crude hedonist” and drawn to transgressive behaviour – or breaking the rules. Potential recruits are also driven by the need for social status and “to belong,” and feel a lack of confidence in the future.

The new report says the standing of the Canadian Forces has clearly risen since the Somalia scandal, thanks to a general alignment between military values and Canadian values. It found that Canadians are becoming more deferential to authority and more receptive to the need for strong homeland security, law and order and national pride.

The Toronto Star, Murray Brewster, Apr 12, 2008:

“Canadian soldiers to go even higher-tech: System connects GPS, goggles to commanders”
Canadian troops fighting in Afghanistan’s hinterland could soon resemble the cyber-soldiers of the wildly successful Halo video game and novel series. National Defence has set aside as much as $310 million for an integrated soldier system. Companies hoping to cash in had their wares on display this week at a defence industry trade show.

The high-tech systems give soldiers an otherworldly look including bulging goggles, body armour and tiny computer displays. The GPS link helps separate friend from foe on the battlefield and reduces the chance of friendly casualties, a recurring problem in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sensors can simultaneously monitor soldiers’ health and the status of their weapons and pass the information back to headquarters.

Today’s troops are already, however, complaining of data overload.

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*The Ottawa Citizen*, Marlowe Hood, February 28, 2008:

“Armed robots called ‘a threat to humanity’: Made for military, machines could be used by terrorists.”

Intelligent machines deployed on battlefields around the world -- from mobile grenade launchers to rocket-firing drones -- can already identify and lock onto targets without human help.

But until now, a human hand has always been required to push the button or pull the trigger.

“They pose a threat to humanity,” said University of Sheffield professor Noel Sharkey before yesterday’s keynote address at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute.

It we are not careful, he said, that could change. Military leaders “are quite clear that they want autonomous robots as soon as possible, because they are more cost-effective and give a risk-free war.”

But even more worrisome is the subtle progression from the semi-autonomous military robots deployed today to fully independent killing machines. “I have worked in artificial intelligence for decades, and the idea of a robot making decisions about human termination terrifies me.”

[Ronald Arkin of Georgia Institute of Technology argues that] the sensors of intelligent machines, he argued, may ultimately be better equipped to understand an environment and process information.

“And there are no emotions that can cloud judgment, such as anger,” he added.
Mr. Arkin points out that the U.S. Department of Defence’s $230-billion Future Combat Systems program -- the largest military contract in U.S. history -- covers three classes of aerial and three land-based robotics systems.

“But nowhere is there any consideration of the ethical implications of the weaponization of these systems.”
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Application

This application of Foucault’s theories of power-knowledge and ethics to the contemporary Canadian military has had three goals. Does Foucault succeed in reconciling power-knowledge with ethics, does he add something new to the Western philosophic tradition; does it add something new to our understanding of Canada’s military ethos; and can it lead to recommendations affecting military ethics and ethos. The current state of research on Foucault is ambivalent as to whether he had adequately reconciled the differences between the constraints on thought and behaviour associated with power-knowledge and the freedom required for individual ethics and a new ethos for his era. The literature on ethics in the military, meanwhile, was preoccupied with the study of moral codes directed at the individual’s duty to the state. The military social studies community was also devoted to producing research of direct use to the state. One of their major concerns, however, was how to help the military better adapt to a changing post-Cold War and domestic environment. This chapter will attempt to answer these questions by summarizing the positions of Foucault and the military, then by applying these approaches to Foucault’s theories and the military’s ethics policy and practice.

7.1 Conclusions

Foucault developed his theory on ethics and derived the schema for an ethics of the self by examining the work of Kant and the Hellenists. While Foucault mentions several Hellenists, especially Stoics, it is the philosophy of Epictetus and Epicurus that are most pertinent to his argument. From Kant, Foucault saw critique as a necessary element to achieve enlightenment. From Epictetus and Epicurus, he found that the quest for true and ethical knowledge separates philosophy from sophism. Educating the mind for critique and philosophic inquiry require a rigorous and life-long preparation. Armed with a skeptical attitude, the ethical subject can then perceive where discourse, moral codes, and power-knowledge are false and vulnerable to exposure. Individuals thereby become aware of manipulations and
constraints and are in a position to participate in the formation of their ethical self and modulate how they are governed. Foucault and his sources maintain that if individuals can freely deliberate and act to shape their identity, and if their community can establish rules and practices to affect how they are governed, that would qualify as individual ethics and a group ethos. In the terminology of the ethics of the self, seeking enlightenment and truth equates with the critique of ethical substance and mode of subjection. Preparation, perception, and participation correlate with self-forming activity, free will, ethics, ethos, and telos.

There are complications and problems with this theory. Preparation and perception are themselves enmeshed within ethical substance and discourse. This, of course, is a common criticism of Foucault and postmodernism. If critique exposes the prevailing cultural assumptions as illusions and human constructs, then acting on these insights is also illusory and contingent on time and place. In the case of Foucault, his endorsement of preparation, perception, and participation is part of the Western discourse of human agency and emancipation. He expresses his hope for the constitution of a contemporary ethic with content and an ethos of activism. But the discourse requires meaningful preparation and perception. In the context of Foucault’s power-knowledge, preparation can be of limited use and perception can be ineffective because the individual is inundated with complex, unpredictable, and irrelevant information. There are other problems associated with preparation and perception. To be ethical in the Western philosophic tradition it is necessary to follow a logical sequence: a dilemma arises, deliberation follows, and the result is second order volition as an act of free will. According to recent neuro-physiological theory, however, there is little or no deliberation. Instead, volition is an automatic response to unconscious assumptions developed over time. Even if the question of free will is set aside, in the theories of Western philosophy and neuro-physiology, the key element is individual preparation of long duration. This again raises the problem that preparation and perception are molded by ethical substance and discourse. In the absence of free will, therefore, behaviour would be a cause and effect relationship that cannot considered ethical. In the end, the potential for the existence of individual ethics and group ethos is denied by the discipline of power-knowledge. If an allowance is made for increasing
the range of individual choice through preparation and perception, thus giving rise to something like a circumscribed free will, then it can be said that Foucault’s ethics is reconciled with power-knowledge.

The philosophers discussed in this book also set their own limits on participation. According to the telos of Kant and the Epictetus, ethical individuals can participate in governance only as the dictates of society permit. Foucault expects ethical subjects to be active in governance as the bounds of power-knowledge permit, and perhaps only when affected in a personal way. The telos of Epicurus, by contrast, would have the well prepared and perceptive see that power-knowledge is too strong to make participation worth the effort and the risk. He would advise the ethical subject to withdraw as much as possible, keep life simple, and only participate as a last resort.

With so many challenges, it should not be surprising that none of the philosophers discussed here believe that many can prepare, perceive, participate at the level required to choose and achieve an ethical telos. Even the educated and active could do little more than rephrase discourse and repeat behaviour that is largely determined by power-knowledge. Hellenists would consider the majority to be sophists who pursue non-philosophic knowledge of little relevance to ethics. They would be left as minors in Kant’s view and could not engage in the pursuit of enlightenment. Few would manage to critique with sufficient depth to contribute to the ethic Foucault wished to see for his era. In the telos of Epicurus, the unaware are bound to live frustrated lives in the face of power-knowledge. Even a community of Epicureans, would have to agree to rules of behaviour to keep power-knowledge at arm’s length. With odds like these, it is more appropriate to speak of a culture that is without an ethos.

The military culture can be analyzed using the same three elements of individual ethics: preparation, perception, and participation. Preparation consists of a life-long exposure to the ethical substance, discourse, and historical narratives of statism. This is intensified by the discipline of the heterotopia. It is effective in that it gives a sense of confidence and moral certainty that facilitates action at the level of first order wants and volition. Preparation and perception, in this case, generate the culture necessary to advance state political and material interests. The culture deters the development of a skeptical attitude toward discourse that could raise ethical qualms and toward cultural dynamics, such as
the careerism of executive officers that could undermine trust. Instead, preparation readies the individual for automatic reactions where free will can be set aside. Reacting to leadership and social contractarianism is as close as military personnel can get to participation in governance. The term “leadership” loses its traditional meaning when referring to figurehead executives presiding over bureaucracy and a rank hierarchy. The concept of a social contract becomes non-applicable because it depends on uninformed consent and is subordinate to executive and state interests. Instead, transformational governance appeals to emotions, uses personal charisma, controls access to the mechanisms of power-knowledge, and otherwise persuades followers ignore their own interests.

Governance for the rank and file is well constrained by the lack of opportunities to understand the promotion system, modulate terms of service, have access to a fair complaint system, and to exercise selective conscientious objection. As it stands, the executives are so compromised and the rank and file so well controlled that the military can be considered an institution that stifles individual ethics and a group ethos. This leads to the conclusion that a contemporary military ethic for the individual would be extremely rare and costly. An ethos for the institutional or even small groups is even more unlikely.

7.2 Application to Foucault's Ethics

Foucault often referred to the military as a site similar to those he analyzed in his genealogies on power-knowledge, such as mental health institutions, prisons, and municipalities responding to the plague. In *Society Must be Defended*, Foucault also addressed the issues of statism, historical narratives, and the military itself. In *Hermeneutics*, the “Practices and Sciences of the Self,” and “What is Critique?”, he introduced concepts about ethics in the philosophy of the Hellenists and Kant. What is absent from his work, as discussed in the introduction, is an explanation of how power-knowledge and ethics can co-exist. His argument for free will is pivotal if these two phases of his thought are to be reconciled. To the extant that it is possible to uncover his position on free will, it seems to be the compatabilist view. But compatabilism rests on the belief that if determinism does not explain all behaviour, there must exist some degree of free thought and volition. To substantiate the compatabilist position, however, it is
necessary to explain why the alternative to determinism is necessarily free will and not simply randomness. Foucault’s idea of the coincidental and contingent nature of power-knowledge interactions favours the argument for determinism while maintaining an opening for free will as alternative to some non-determinist events. It is also evident that he believed free will, and by extension ethical behaviour, is reserved for rare individuals and should be husbanded for use at a few sites of urgent, personal significance. Likewise, the potential for someone to perceive and act as an independent ethical subject would be well mediated by power-knowledge. It would seem that Foucault’s hope for an individualized ethic would be rarely fulfilled and narrow in scope. Any expectation that there could be a broader institutional or societal ethos would be even less likely. Thus, while the content of Foucault’s ethics follows the Hellenist and modern Western traditions of human agency and engagement in politics he is pessimistic about the likelihood of it coming to fruition. The quote from *Hermeneutics*, therefore, appears justified: “I think we may have to suspect that we find it impossible today to constitute an ethic of the self…” (Foucault, 2005: 251-252).

This conclusion, however restricted it may be, is in agreement with the views of the Smart (1986), Hacking (1986), and Davidson (1986). These authors believed that Foucault had succeeded in reconciling the determinism of power-knowledge with free will. Davidson (1986: 232), in particular, concludes that if ethics were suitably placed within the context of power-knowledge, it has great promise as an analytic tool. The conclusion is at odds with Hoy (1986c), Gane (1986b), Donelly (1986), and Wickham (1986), although it acknowledges the validity of many of their arguments. They held that Foucault’s conception of power-knowledge left no room for a meaningful expression of free will and ethics.

The utility of his schema and terminology for the ethics of the self is another matter. Although not reconciled, the parallels produce tensions that enable a closer analysis and suggest some questions. It is possible to combine and overlap the terminology and concepts from power-knowledge with those on ethics to examine how an ethical subject is formed without an ethics based on free will. The combined theories both describe how the ethical subject is formed and the content of ethics applicable to the site.
This is apparent in the case study of the Canadian military by following a cycle of analysis consisting of ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming activity, and telos. It was flexible enough to accommodate other factors such as actual behaviour, free will, individual ethics, and group ethos. Foucault’s theory that discourse and ethical substance are measured in centuries while moral codes remain constant over the millennia applies. The ethical substance and discourse of inside-outside statism have dominated international politics in the centuries that began with colonialism and continue in the contemporary practice of mounting peacekeeping and combat expeditions. The moral codes of duty, honour, and leadership/governance, meanwhile, have existed over two millennia from the Hellenist age to the manual Duty with Honour. It was found that mode of subjection and self-forming activity applied to moral codes, historical narratives, memorialization, branding, and power-knowledge, most clearly within the heterotopia. In contrast to ethical substance and discourse, the practices and techniques of power-knowledge can change appearance and be replaced in an opportunistic and haphazard way. Power-knowledge allows for errant, coincidental events, and connections to other power-knowledges. Transactions with individuals and actual behaviour were evident in desultory bureaucratic reform, careerism, personality type, non-adaptive responses to changes in tactics and the host society, and ad hoc responses to scandals. Free will fits in the cycle between actual behaviour and telos. With free will, there can be a telos with individual ethics and a group ethos. Without free will, there is a culture that is ethics-free.

Thus, while the content of Foucault’s ethics might look familiar, the methodology of his ethics of the self does depart from the Western tradition, whether in its simplest form focused on moral codes, or in the more developed philosophic issues. His terminology and schema for the moral domain has demonstrated its potential as a research methodology. It can even provide an answer to those skeptical of postmodernism. Critics claim that Foucault himself is trapped in the modernist discourse on moral codes, ethical training, and free will. The counter argument is that he attempts to uncover the source of the discourse, the character of the ethical substance, and the actual knowledges and transactions by which they manifest. Thus, discourse and ethical substance become the central issue in his analytic method, as
expressed in one of the more common summations of postmodernism, i.e., “incredulity toward metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv). Here, his theory, terminology, and schema for the ethics of the self have provided a new and productive analytic method that has been suitable for application to Hellenism, Kantianism, the military, and even his own theories.

In Figure 5, the terminology of Foucault’s schema from Figure 2 is re-arranged to illustrate the content and sequence of analysis applicable to his individual ethics that arose from the genealogy of Kant and the Hellenists. In this figure, the analysis starts with preparation, the first step in the formation of an ethical subject; then, it is followed by perception and participation.

**Figure 5. Foucault’s Ethics, Ethos, Telos**

![Diagram of ethics, ethos, telos]

**7.3 Application to Military Case Study**

Foucault’s theory on ethics has enabled a systematic case study of ethics and ethos in military culture. It has provided a framework that includes aspects not normally addressed in the mainstream research on military affairs and certainly not in official manuals. When Foucault’s theories on power-knowledge and the format of his ethics of the self are combined, the concept of a moral domain differs markedly from the traditional military idea of moral codes and actual behaviour. As portrayed in the Venn diagram reproduced at Figure 4 above, the goal, or telos, according to the military, is to increase the area where moral codes, identified as ethos, overlaps with actual behaviour. In Figure 6, immediately below, Figure 4 has been slightly altered to indicate that the area of overlap is actually the telos. If Foucault’s
schema was re-arranged into a Venn diagram, *Figure 7*, ethical substance serves as the foundation for power-knowledge. Moral codes are just one of many knowledges ready for use. Ethos, whether or not it exists, becomes a condition of *telos*.

*Figure 6. Espoused Military Ethos versus Military Culture (Telos)*

Adapted from diagram (DGLCD, 2005: 2).

*Figure 7. Military Ethics of the Self and Power-Knowledge as Venn Diagram*

Adapted from diagram (DGLCD, 2005: 2).

It is possible to conduct an analysis that uses four overlapping concepts: Foucault’s theories of power-knowledge, the schema of the ethics of the self, the content of Foucault’s ethics, and the military’s moral codes; see *Figure 5*. The latter two have parallel categories where Foucault’s preparation,
perception, and participation relate to the military’s professionalism, honour, and governance. The sequence of analysis used in this book is also flexible so that a study could begin with any one of the aspects of Foucault’s ethics of the self. If a researcher gathered a sample of bureaucratic practices, for example, the analysis could begin there. The transaction would be an instance of power-knowledge, a self-forming activity, preparation, and a means of military governance. Once the role of perception and free will have been taken into account and actual behaviour has been observed, it would be possible to deduce a *telos* and determine if it is conducive to an individual ethic or group ethos. From the *telos*, one could identify an ethical substance and a set of supporting discourses. This returns the researcher to the bureaucratic practice as an interaction that represents all of the foregoing influences.

This method’s productive potential can be demonstrated with a more detailed example drawn from the military case study: the rules and practices related to the non-responsive complaint system. The individual is left feeling helpless and with little room to participate in governance. If the complaint concerns a moral dilemma, rules and practices block the possibilities for individual ethical behaviour. The heterotopia reinforces the effect of exclusion and leaves the complainant no recourse but to resign, desert, submit, or withdraw commitment. The ideal military member, the *telos*, is an ethics-less person and a useful instrument of the state. Such a *telos* is compatible with the inside-outside, space-time ethical substance and its supporting discourses of militarism, expeditions, and disciplining effects of a bureaucracy. These are conveyed through the teaching of brand-recognition state narratives, moral codes of selflessness and obedience, and disciplining effect of military regulations. Hence, the subject is not prepared to deal with a complaint system balanced in favour of executive control. The result is a person who feels helpless and excluded. The sequence of analysis, certainly, is not a coherent or unified cycle. According to Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge, it is unpredictable, marked by non-sequiturs, and crossed by other power-knowledge nets that would require extensive research. For example, historical narratives are vulnerable to revisionism and there are controversies surrounding the application of other discourses, such as military-sociology, the psychology of personality type, the neuro-physiology of free will, global political and economic relations, and the tactics of invasion and occupation.
The theories and analysis presented in this book can be applied to specific issues related to individual ethics and institutional ethos in Canadian military. In the remaining sub-sections, recommendations will be made in the following areas: engagement in public life, the militia, unions, conscientious objection, and military force structure and personnel selection.

### 7.3.1 Engagement in Public Life

The term “public life” is used here in the context of the case study to refer to activity conducted by persons alone or within organizations intended to influence historical narratives, knowledges, and sites of power-knowledge. Some that have already been mentioned in the case study are the public statements and writings by individuals such as Michael Ignatieff, Jack Granatstein, Michael Byers, and Steve Staples, and organizations such as the Historica-Dominion Institute, the C.D. Howe Institute, the Conference of Defence Associations, and the Center for Policy Alternatives. Engagement in public life can include joining the struggle for narrative supremacy to introduce alternatives to the statist expeditionary discourse, both the combat and humanitarian aspects. It can also include creating power-knowledge sites that provide modes of subjection and self-forming activity affecting the likelihood of recruits to join, the relationship between the executives and the rank and file, and the practicability of secondary conscientious objection. Of course, engagement in public life itself fulfills the ethical telos of Foucault, Kant, and the Stoics.

### 7.3.2 Military Trade Unions and Professional Associations

Such combinations of people can promote open and fair social contractarianism. There is no tradition of trade unions and professional associations within Canadian military culture. The idea of unionization would fall into a cultural vacuum with no supporting reference points in statism, historical narratives, or power-knowledge policy and practice. To the contrary, combinations of military personnel seeking to improve conditions of service, curb abuse of authority, and avoid the risk of poor tactical decisions have had to resort to mutiny or at least conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline.
Hence, efforts to unionize would meet with strong resistance from executives and require a significant change in the opinion of rank and file members and the population at large. Nevertheless, military unions would contribute to informed consent and act as advocates for rank and file personnel regarding power-knowledge manipulations of conditions of service, promotion, complaints, and conscientious objection. Unions could also offer alternative historical narratives, such as that of the militia, and counter the disciplining effect of power-knowledge and the heterotopia.

The impediments to organizing activity begin with *Queen’s Regulation and Orders 103.14 “Offences Related to Mutiny,” 103.16, “Disobedience of Lawful Command,” and 103.595, “Conspiracy.”* All provide for severe penalties for anything resembling a union membership drive. Even if the rank and file could manage to generate political pressure to gain the right of association, it is quite probable that Parliament would side with military executives. Under the *Canadian Human Rights Act, Part I, article 15, sub-para 9, on Universality of Service,* for example, the Canadian military is given the right to send any member of the regular force anywhere at any time. It is also unlikely that the population would support the rank and file. Again, there is no precedent for this solidarity in Canada. In comparison, mass demonstrations did help the military to organize and gain recognition of a union in the Republic of South Africa despite explicit prohibitions in military and constitutional civil law and the determined resistance of executives and politicians (Heinecken, 2006). South Africans, however, had a recent and successful experience with civil protest (Heinecken, 2006).

Although military unionization is widespread on the European continent, the practice has made no significant gains in the Anglo-West. Members of the Australian Defence Force have made the most progress, but their association is only a consultative body with no decision-making authority and no right to take labour action (Smith, 2006). There are many reasons for the difference between continental militaries and their counterparts in the Anglo-West, some related to Lynn’s army typology model discussed above in the section on the militia. The most significant differences are related to the extent and duration of conscription for mass-reserve armies. The civilian population, being subject to mandatory service, was motivated to support unions to avoid mistreatment of the rank and file. Currently, the
militaries of continental Europe are represented by 35 military trade unions in 22 countries, and cooperate within a federation called the European Organization of Military Associations, known by the acronym EUROMIL (2008). Even the UK and France, which have resisted and limited the role of unions, are under increasing pressure from international human rights case precedents to recognize the rights of military workers (Pruefert, 2003). EUROMIL unions, it should be noted, deal with conditions of labour in a manner similar to civilian unions. They do not normally address issues of importance to individual ethics and institutional ethos, such as conscientious objection and the political and moral justifications for expeditions.

There is an indication, however, that the Canadian military rank and file think they might benefit from a union. In a questionnaire survey of Canadian army personnel in 2005, thirty percent of respondents reported that they agreed with the following statement: “a civilian-style union or some other type of professional organization outside the chain-of-command’ was a good idea” (DGLCD, 2005: 39-40). About thirty percent disagreed, and the remainder were neutral (DGLCD, 2005: 39-40). As with matters of moral development, it is probable that individuals who said they were in favour of an association would act otherwise when faced with resistance from their peers and superiors, especially if it harms their promotion prospects.

7.3.3 Canadian Militia

There is a strong tradition, however, for the role of an armed militia in Canada. The militia is an alternative interface between the military and individuals, which is subject to fewer power-knowledge constraints than the regular forces. Since the organization already exists, it would require no bureaucratic reforms. Likewise, the militia has its own discourse and historical political narratives with important elements standing outside statism. Hence, it has the best prospects for the application of Foucault’s ethical content to the Canadian military.

The militia has a long history and a stable legal foundation in Canada. In fact, the sources of Anglo-Canadian common law governing domestic and expeditionary forces of this nature date from the
crusades and quasi-feudal sources on the continent (Madsen, 1999: 4; Lynn, 1996: 531.). Wealthy individuals in Canada, like feudal lords, could pay for and deploy their own militia regiments as late as the 19th Century. For example, Donald Smith, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, and a prominent railway, oil, and newspaper baron, was discontented with Parliament’s decision not to send troops to South Africa for the Boer War. As a consequence, he raised a private unit of cavalry called the “Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians)” in 1900 (Strathcona's, 2008). The military historian John Lynn has developed a typology of armies that can place militias in context vis-à-vis regular and reserve forces (Lynn, 1996: 536-539). He does not rely on historical narratives or events such as great battles and wars. Instead, he employs methods that parallel Foucault’s ideas on discourse, power-knowledge, and telos. Lynn also draws a distinction between the army types that emerged on the European continent and those on the Anglo-Western periphery. By the 19th and 20th Centuries, armies on the European continent responded to geopolitical pressures by raising “mass-reserve” conscript armies. Reserves, in this case, were fully trained conscripts subject to obligatory and immediate mobilization. Regular forces in the colonies, meanwhile, were supplemented by local militia and aboriginal peoples rather than semi-regular reserves (Lynn, 1996: 536-539).

In its nature and purpose, Canada still has a colonial type militia. Contemporary politicians and the military bureaucracy are limited in what they can change. When Britain tried to introduce legislation to make membership in the Canadian militia obligatory in the 19th Century, it was defeated in the colonial parliament. The population as a whole was also wary of being drawn into imperial expeditions and was opposed to unnecessary military spending (Madsen, 1999: 5). Rank and file members of the militia were untrained and only came under British command during emergencies until regular troops could arrive from overseas (Madsen, 1999: 5). British military law was also considered too harsh for a volunteer militia in which people could simply choose not to re-enlist (Madsen, 1999: 13). The Militia Act of 1868 provided a statutory framework but it only passed because it was a condition for the formation a quasi-sovereign Canadian state (Madsen, 1999: 6). The Militia Act, nevertheless, did not oblige militia members to join British expeditions overseas. Requests for troops, such as that for the expedition to
Sudan in 1885, were defeated in Parliament (Madsen, 1999: 27). The Canadian government did not mobilize the militia for World Wars I and II, or for the war in Korea. Instead, it created a separate Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1914, the Canadian Active Service Force in 1939, and the Canadian Army Special Force in 1950 (Madsen, 1999: 43, 77, 109). If military members wanted to join an expedition, they had to volunteer. In 1939, the militia was called out for obligatory service, but only within the borders of Canada in accordance with historical precedent. Since then, members of the militia have volunteered as individuals to augment the regular forces on peacekeeping and combat expeditions. In 1968, the term “militia” was replaced by “reserves” when the branches and corps were unified into a single organization called the Canadian Armed Forces, military (GoC, 2009c). That did not affect the liability to mobilize or any other right accruing to colonial type militias. Hence, the term militia is a more appropriate descriptive. It also remains in informal use. Even the “Total Force” policy declared in a 1987 White Paper, which sought to integrate regular forces and militia, did not challenge the right of militia members to choose to stay in Canada and serve part-time (Madsen, 1999: 141; GoC, 2007h). Militia personnel returning from expeditions only obtained the right to re-instatement in their civilian jobs in 2009 and that was accomplished through labour legislation, not the National Defence Act (GoC 2009b). The reason given is to encourage personnel to volunteer. The change of name was facilitated by a headquarters cadre of full-time militia officers who sought to portray their organization as military professionals almost on par with the regular forces. Notwithstanding the substantial influence of the full-time, headquarters militia, the discourse of the colonial militia remains intact in ordinary communities.

Hence, the militia is a site where individuals can maintain an arm’s length relation with the state if they so choose. The social contract can more closely resemble a democratic transactional leadership model. Militia personnel can hold civilian jobs so many can quit at any time without incurring financial hardship. They do not need to submit to the regular force bureaucracy and command hierarchy in matters such as selection for promotion and the complaint system for substantive issues. Because militia personnel are part of the civilian community and living off base, the heterotopia loses many of its disciplining effect in terms of panopticism, bio-power, and pastoralism. The dynamics between...
executives and the rank and file would be closer to a transactional social contract. Militia members need
less information to understand the terms of service for short-term, lower risk contracts. Most importantly,
militia members can choose not to deploy on expeditions and can be repatriated once overseas with
relative ease. They effectively have the right of selective or secondary conscientious objection.

The Total Force policy mandated that the militia should provide 20 percent of the personnel
deployed on expeditions (GoC, 2007h). If recruits joined the militia in greater numbers than the regular
force, the militia culture would change the current, dominant military telos. It might even allow for an
ethics based ethos. Should the militia not contribute such a cohort, moreover, the ability of the Canadian
military to mount expeditions would be seriously compromised. That would weaken the currently
dominant telos of statist supremacy.

7.3.4 Secondary Conscientious Objection

Expanding the opportunity for conscientious objection, like unionization, is nearly inconceivable
within current Canadian military culture. It would have to overcome the discourse of state supremacy,
supporting narratives of sacrifice and heroism, and numerous power-knowledge impediments. Change
would require political pressure from the public, substantial reforms to regulations and acts of Parliament,
and the acquiescence of executives. As discussed in the above section on conscientious objection related
to power-knowledge, there is very little room for people to object unless they are prepared to make a
heroic, individual stand. A union could advocate change and represent dissenters, however, and being a
member of the militia would lessen the severity of the punishment.

Consider what would have to be reformed. To allow for individual ethical behaviour, it would be
necessary to introduce two new forms of conscientious objection. First, for those joining the military, a
new discourse, and a power-knowledge interface external to the military and the government would have
to be created to make conscientious objection a credible alternative. This would be a direct challenge to
the authority of statism and the mode of subjection that guides the formation of a selfless subject. The
military, the government, and supporters of statism, of course, have a substantial advantage in resources
and access to the population to maintain the status quo. On the other side, anti-militarism groups, now marginalized as protesters, would have to develop a power-knowledge able to counter years of statist self-forming activity in schools, exposure to memorialization, media branding campaigns, financial and employment incentives, and so forth.

The second form of conscientious objection would have to allow for selective dissent and right to disobey orders or de facto practices. It too requires informed consent, but more importantly, there must be a power-knowledge supporting individuals who refuse to act against their conscience. Individuals would have to know enough to decide whether to participate in a particular expedition, use certain weapons, and act in ways that violate, or might violate, Canadian and international law. That would have to resist the pressures to conform and understand the concept and content of discourse, critique historical narratives, and manipulate power-knowledge. Such extensive preparation would also have to originate from groups external to the military with few resources and limited access to personnel. Given the strength of the heterotopia and the rarity of individuals who are capable of this kind of philosophical perception, the prospects for selective conscientious objection to constitute an ethos are slight.

While writing about the Australian Defence Force’s policy on selective conscientious objection, Joseph (2003) comes to a similar conclusion albeit from a different point of departure. He agrees with the discourse of statism by recognizing that service before self must be an “absolute expectation” (Joseph, 2003: 15). Similarly, he claims that military policy in a democratic state could not be so objectionable as to give rise to many ethical dilemmas and that the obligation to uphold military values and unit cohesion is a “reasonable expectation” (Joseph, 2003: 12, 15). Hence, he assumes that individuals seeking to exercise selective conscientious objection would always be a small minority whose objections could be accommodated. But Joseph recognizes the importance of information for objectors and recommends that they be given adequate time, information, assistance, and freedom from “undue pressure” to understand better the implications of their decision. He also recommends that objectors be allowed sufficient resources to prepare their case for adjudication before a quasi-judicial panel (Joseph, 2003: 15-17). This policy has not been accepted by the Australian Defence Force. Conscientious objection is still subject to
the Australian *Defence Act 1903*, Section 61a, which only apply to conscripts in time of declared war. Volunteers have no rights of objection. No mention is made of selective conscientious objection (GoA, 2008; Coombs, Rayner, 2003).

Thus, in Canada, the process of attracting and enrolling recruits and the laws and regulations governing selective conscientious objection do not conform to the ethical content favoured by Foucault. Individuals must be free to deliberate and act on their second order volition in matters they deem to be of moral significance. In the case of such a one-sided moral obligation, Foucault and Bass and Steidlmeier would consider the social contract to be null and void (Foucault, 2003: 17; Bass, Steidlmeier, 1999).

### 7.3.5 Military Force Structure and Selection

The following proposals address the core elements of the military’s bureaucratic and cultural power-knowledge network. Effective reform of executive control, especially the selection system, would require substantial change from without; something this book has argued has been nearly impossible under the political regimes that have formed governments in Canada since Confederation. Nevertheless, the suggested reforms illustrate how key power-knowledge sites would have to be reconfigured to apply Foucault’s ethical content to the Canadian military and still fulfill the needs of statism.

An attempt to reconcile statism and ethics, firstly, would depend on a prima facie assumption that the military and its expeditions are not violating Canadian and international law and that the individual can deliberate and act with a meaningful degree of free will. The force structure would then be aligned to satisfy three ends: generate professional, deployable forces; devise a system of constraints on executive authority; and establish an ethos that accommodates individual ethics. To do this, the military would be organized into three separate branches: deployable forces, personnel specialists, and a general staff.

The deployable forces would meet the needs of statism by focusing on tactical and technological capabilities necessary for domestic deployments and foreign expeditions. Selection for jobs and promotions would be limited to internal competitions open only to members of the same tactical formation at the same garrison. Personnel would remain at one location to avoid postings that weaken the
effects of the heterotopia. Individuals would remain in key positions, especially command, for up to ten years to optimize professional skills, train successors, and identify and complete reform projects (Jans, Schmidtchen, 2002: 81-104). Officers and soldiers could belong to the least mature Stages One and Two of professional and moral development as outlined by Forsythe et al (2002). They could live traditional military roles, (e.g., crew weapon platforms), and work in small units where leaders and followers can build personal relationships with the potential to satisfy psychological needs for primary group inclusion and exclusion.

Specialist units co-located with the regiments would control the personnel selection and complaint processes independently from the command hierarchy. The chain of command would be only one source of information and have no decision-making role in the selection or streaming system. Specialists would also provide the health care, legal services, audits, and inspections that apply military panoptic, bio-power, and pastoral discipline. With a stable garrison population, specialists can build a comprehensive file on every individual to be used in selection and training. Most importantly, as much information as possible should come from direct observation of behaviour and socialization in order to minimize the use of performance evaluation and survey techniques. Specialists can be at Stage Two of professional maturity, which would be sufficient to follow bureaucratic routines and develop technical competence.

The general staff would attempt to shape military culture, lever the power-knowledge of the bureaucracy and the heterotopia, and manage relations with civilian executives and politicians. It would have full authority over deployable formations, personnel specialists, and the bureaucracy. The general staff would manipulate the content of moral codes, historical narratives, memorialization, the military brand, and other aspects of power-knowledge in order to improve governance, expand informed consent, and make selective conscientious objection an acceptable and viable option. To do so, the general staff options could make greater use of the militia and empower an ombudsman and inspector general staff with strong mandates independent of the command hierarchy. Selective conscientious objection could be made more practicable with the inclusion in each unit of advocates dedicated to the protection of the
rights of the objector. The general staff would also reform military tactics and technology so they evolve with geopolitics and changes in the host society. General staff officers should be at least in Stage Three of professional maturity so they can accept and develop new cultural norms. The executives should strive to reach Stage Four so they can be sufficiently detached from military culture and receptive to alternatives.

Personnel selection specialists would be tasked to identify and sort members of varying personality types and stages of professional maturity. First, everyone would spend the initial third of their military employment in the deployable force to attain technical competence and experience the culture first hand. With the information available from the extensive personnel files, specialists would either leave the person in the deployable formations or stream them to the specialist units, the general staff, and the public and private sector. After this streaming, deployable officers and members of the rank and file would pursue advanced tactical and technology training; specialists would study within their corresponding civilian disciplines; and general staff officers would undertake post-graduate studies at civilian universities in organizational, political, and cultural academic fields. The emphasis would be on the philosophy of postmodernism and its application.

7.4 Future Research Questions

The research methodology can be expanded in at least two ways. The sources of ethical content, here limited to Foucault, Kant, Epictetus, and Epicurus, could be augmented or replaced by other groupings of Western philosophers. In particular, Pierre Bourdieu’s thoughts on the dynamics of social exclusion would be relevant to institutions such as the military and other hierarchical heterotopias (Bourdieu, 1977). He was mentioned above in relation to the selection system. The tension between the pragmatics of modern bureaucratic knowledge and non-modern historical narratives can be explored in the context of Jean-François Lyotard’s conception of postmodernism (Lyotard, 1984). He advocated recovering some suppressed narratives, such as the militia tradition, from the hegemony of modernism. From antiquity, the Skeptics and Cynics could help define the role of perception and participation in
governance for ethical individuals. Their dialogues and direct action could find a place in the military as rare, media-oriented events, especially in cases of selective conscientious objection.

There are many instances where other academic disciplines intersect with genealogies of power-knowledge in the military. Disciplines discussed above included sociology, history, political science, media studies, psychology, neurophysiology, and organized labour. These and others can contribute more information to an analysis of Foucault and the military. They could also serve as a starting point for a genealogy of an issue in another discipline that intersects with the military. Young (1995), for example, has traced how the construct of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder began as a study of train accidents in the 19th Century, shell shock in WWI, and battle fatigue in WWII. After the Vietnam War, public pressure, new psychological theories, and more war have led to the diagnosis and treatment bureaucracy that exists today. The title of Young’s book, *Harmony of Illusions*, refers to the number of factors that finally coalesced at one site; some from cause and effect, others haphazardly and by coincidence, but all bound together at one site by power-knowledge.

Foucault’s moral theories could be compared to those outside the Western philosophic tradition. Buddhism, for instance, resembles postmodernism in its approach to phenomenology and epistemology, and how it promotes skepticism towards narratives and mental concepts. It differs from Foucault in its belief that engagement in political activism should be measured against the consequences for humanity and is not undertaken as a local act or because it is an urgent personal necessity (Rahula, 1974).

There are topics in the military and the concerns in the field of military affairs that can be pursued further using Foucault’s methodology. The increasing role of private military contractors affects the statist values of exceptionalism and expeditions as symbols of national superiority. Neurophysiology, free will, and ethics are also relevant to the use of robotic weaponry that kill without human intervention, or the use of humans who kill with robotic detachment. Then, there is the ethics of activism in governance for military personnel and the domestic and foreign populations. Foucault’s analytic method can identify the pressure points in bureaucracy and culture that can increase the effectiveness of dissent and resistance. Some areas singled out above are initiatives to strengthen the mandate of the ombudsman, provide well-
resourced advocates for the rank and file, improve conditions for the exercise of selective conscientious
objection, and make available more and better information for recruits, current military personnel, and the
population as a whole.
**Information on Media Sources**

*BCE/CTV News*: CTV News is broadcast on the CTV television network, the largest private network in Canada, with 27 conventional channels. The CHUM radio network has 33 stations. The networks were purchased by BCE on March 7, 2011 (CBCNews, March 11, 2011).

*BCE/The Globe and Mail*: 1 daily newspaper, *The Globe & Mail* (2,003,935), with a market share of 6.2 percent (SSCTC, 2004). BCE, (Bell Canada Enterprises), the largest communications company in Canada, has a 15 percent interest in the paper (CBCNews, March 11, 2011)

*CBCNews Online*: Its website says that it is among “the top three news and media sites in Canada.” The CBC reports annually to the federal Parliament through the Minister of Canadian Heritage. In 2005, the CBC reported revenue of $937 million in government funding and $547 million from other sources. Parliament appropriated $877 million, (59 percent of total revenue). Commercial advertising accounted for $322 million, or 22 percent (CBC, 2005).

*Postmedia Network, formerly CanWest Global*: 13 dailies; total circulation 9,647,293 (largest circulation of a news corporation in Canada); market share 29.6 percent. It includes *The Ottawa Citizen* (1,026,662), *The Edmonton Journal* (984,208), and *The National Post* (1,763,934). Global News appears on 11 conventional television stations in Canada (SSCTC, 2004; CanWest, 2009). CanWest fell into bankruptcy in January 2010 and was sold in July of that year to its Canadian and U.S. bondholders and hedge fund financial backers (*Toronto Star*, 2010). The print operations became Postmedia Network and the Global broadcast division was subsequently sold to Shaw Media.
Independent Dailies: 7 dailies as of 2004; total circulation 1,046,815; market share 3.2 percent. Includes *Le Devoir* (175,887) (SSCTC, 2004). The number of independent dailies declined to 3 by 2009, according to the Canadian Newspaper Association (CNA 2009).

Straight Goods: *Straight Goods* is a private online magazine with 30 shareholders and 17 sponsors, mainly labour unions (*Straight Goods*, 2011). The publisher estimates the news is read by 15,000 to 30,000 individuals each month (Theilheimer, 2007).


YouTube: Regarding the Francisco Juarez speech sponsored by the Vancouver Unitarian Church Social Justice Committee, YouTube reports that there had been 894 views as of August 8, 2007. Juarez’ speech to the Canadian Peace Alliance Conference in Ottawa has been viewed 2,029 views as of February 17, 2009. URL (consulted February 17, 2009): [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iroLoPn-d4M](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iroLoPn-d4M).
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