Loyal and Elegant Subjects of the Sublime State: 
Headgear and the Multiple Dimensions of 
Modernizing/-ed Ottoman Identity

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Illustration 4: ‘Üsküdar İskelesinden Çikanlar,’ Aydede vol 1 no. 74 (14 Eylül 1338 (September 27th, 1922)), 4.


Illustration 6: ‘Resim Sergisinin Küşādı Münāsibesiyle [At the Opening of the Painting Exhibition],’ Aydede, vol 1 no. 28 (20 Temmuz 1338 (August 2nd, 1922)), 1.


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Note on Transliteration, Transcription and Dates

Unless indicated otherwise all transliterations, transcriptions and translations from the Ottoman Turkish and Turkish are mine. I transliterated the Arabic script of the original Ottoman texts using the transliteration system of the İslâm Ansiklopedisi; whereas transcriptions are in conformity with the New Redhouse. Original texts are provided in brackets or footnotes. A view texts are cited from transliterations and transcriptions, in these cases I have used the transliterations or transcriptions used in the respective texts.

I converted Hicri and Rumi dates to Miladi ones using the conversion engine available online at http://www.nabkal.de/kalrech2.html.
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“The Europeanized can be of all religions and nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, and from all classes of society. He sports the outfit rigorously adopted by the government officers. It is the ceremonial costume, the ‘black coat’ of the progressives. It consists of the red fez, the black setri and black trousers. But the excessively Europeanized, very common among the rich classes, pushes things much further. [...] In Constantinople, Smyrna and other large cities of the empire, one comes across bourgeois of exquisite and more modern taste who are not afraid to replace their fez, in an urban manner, with that marvel of elegance, the victorious top-hat. At all times, they take care to carry a fez in their pockets, in case they need to present themselves to a backward-minded authority.”

In this study I am scrutinizing the politics of dress in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic. Beginning with the implementation of new dress codes, which included the introduction of the epochal fez as the modern standard within the military and the state bureaucracy, in 1826 and 1829 respectively, introduced by Mahmud II, I analyze debates about and incidents related to appropriate headgear, especially for men. My focus is on shifting power relations along various axes, demonstrating what an analytical focus on masculinity and dress might reveal about the meta-discourses on modernization, westernization, secularism and nationalism during this period. I scrutinize debates and controversies about headgear and the way performative dressing acts and the regulation of dress were intertwined with the drawing of borders and projects of state- and nation-building. I am thereby looking at power struggles within the Ottoman elite, the impacts of the politics of dress on different strata of Ottoman society, and the construction of a body politic as a modernizing measure. My focus on dress in

1 Osman Hamdi Bey and Victor Marie de Launay in Les Costumes Populaires de La Turquie en 1873 term the setri/setre as an Ottoman style frock coat, see Victor Marie de Launay and Osman Hamdi Bey, Les Costumes Populaires de la Turquie en 1873 (Constantinople: Levant Times & Schipping Gazette, 1873), 13.

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general and male headgear in specific aims to highlight the importance of the body in the transformation of power structures and the way this was accomplished in the late Ottoman period. Economic and political conditions in the late Ottoman Empire were to a large extent set by European colonialism and imperialism and the specific location of the Ottoman state within these power structures. I seek to relate these external (and/or internalized) conditions to dynamics within Ottoman society, neither playing down Western colonialist influences/Western European hegemony nor reducing Ottoman politics as solely triggered by them in a one-sided process. Therefore, I regard it as important to scrutinize the Ottoman politics of dress in the light of the globalization of modern male attire, on the one hand, as well as showing what certain incidents regarding the regulation of dress might reveal about the interaction of various groups in certain moments and places and what was at stake when borders and identities were negotiated interdependently. I will trace how the formation of the state and the collective body of its citizens were linked through the construction of male bodies as political spaces. A focus on headgear will help me conceptualize Ottoman modernization beyond the paradigms of Westernization or nationalism, and come to a better understanding of modernity. Headgear was a crucial means in the construction of identities and subjectivities and was employed by the state to reorganize state-subject relations, as well as by these subjects to constitute or challenge their own relation with the state.

Dress is a forceful means of othering, and differences in Ottoman versus European dress as perceived by European visitors of the Ottoman Empire had been a forceful instrument to construct the Orient as European Other. Yet processes of mutual identification were more complex than sometimes suggested.

An instrument for this cultural othering and a source for the study of Ottoman pre-modern dress are costume books, produced by Europeans who traveled in the Ottoman Empire. These books not only formed an imagination of the Orient in the West but also left impressions of Ottoman self-perception and appearance. In this reciprocal perception of East and West European dress was also affected by depictions of Ottoman

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dress. Costume books were still present in the period of transition to a modern mass fashion system, even though their function and centrality in the representation of dress had probably ceased.

The introductory quote is taken from the famous costume album titled *Les Costumes Populaires de la Turquie en 1873* or *Elbise-i 'Osmaniyye* produced on the occasion of the World Exposition in Vienna in 1873. Commissioned by the Ottoman government and produced by the Ottoman official, painter and archaeologist Osman Hamdi Bey (1842-1910) and Victor Marie de Launay (1822-n.d.), also an Ottoman official who came to the Ottoman Empire from France in about 1850 and who was interested in Ottoman art and history; it contained seventy-four photographic plates depicting models with varied attire subdivided into regional units. The accompanying texts provided detailed information on these styles of dress and the respective regions.

The quote from the *Les Costumes Populaires*, however, does not refer to these regional and traditional types. It describes the European, the urban bourgeois, who can appear in the moderate version and the “superwesternized” version, to speak in Şerif Mardin’s terms, who scrutinized of these types were mocked in Ottoman novels in the late nineteenth century.

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4 Silke Förschler in her study on costume books analyzed how mutual influence through the production of costume portraits made in Paris and Istanbul at the beginning of the eighteenth century also changed depictions of dress in Ottoman miniatures. Förschler suggested that a representation of the Orient and the constructions of identity coming along with it were thus produced through mutual exchange. She stresses that dress had been a major instrument to mark the cultural other since the early 15th century. Förschler, ‘Zirkulation und Differenzierung von Motiven des kulturell Anderen. Kostümporraits in europäischen Reiseberichten und in der osmanischen Miniaturmalerei’.

5 de Launay and Hamdi Bey, *Les Costumes Populaires de La Turquie en 1873*.

6 The photographs were taken in a studio in Istanbul, models had been friends of the editor Osman Hamdi Bey, see Osman Hamdi Bey, *1873 Yılında Türkiye’de Halk Gıysileri: Elbise-i Osmaniyye*; Viyana Uluslararası Fuarı için Kurulan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Komisyonu'nun Yardımlarıyla Yayımlanan Eser. / Osman Hamdi Bey, trans. Erol Uyepazarı (İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi, 1999). In Vienna at the exhibition itself mannequins presented a huge collection of clothing in the main gallery of the Ottoman section, see Ahmet Ersoy, ‘The Elbise and the Ottoman Scholarly Mission’, in *Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann (İstanbul: Eren, 2004), 256–70; and Bey and Launay, ‘The Popular Costumes of Turkey in 1873’.

7 Mardin scrutinized the appearance of this type in late Ottoman literature as an object of ridicule, see Şerif Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century’, in *Turkey: Geography and Social Perspectives*, ed. Peter Benedict and Erol Tümer (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 403–446.
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1.1 Modernities

Illustration 1: 'Her yiğidin bir yoğurt yiğişi vardır: Muhabazakar, ortaçı, terakkiperver.'

Illustration 1: 'Her yiğidin bir yoğurt yiğişi vardır: muhabazakar, terakkiperver, ortaçı
[Every man has his way of eating yoghurt: the conservative, the moderate, the progressive].' Cem (1911), in Orhan Koloğlu, Türkiye Karikatür Tarihi, (İstanbul: Bileşim Yayınevi, 2005), 127.

This is a satirical depiction of these masculinities and their stances towards modernization, from a 1911 issue of the journal Cem, entitled “Every man has its way of eating yoghurt: The conservative, the moderate, the progressive.”

Here the style of dress comes along with the embodiment of a certain habitus. Note that the progressive is without headgear. In Hamdi Bey’s and de Launay’s account, the moderate type also wears a fez, the red conical felt hat, and the istanbulin, the collarless frock-coat here called setri, both as markers of Ottoman modernity. The so-called excessively Europeanized fellow dons a top hat and a frock coat that corresponds to the latest fashion.

While Osman Hamdi Bey and de Launay acknowledged the leveling effects of modern dress, they stress that traditional dress was more functional and hygienic. Loose robes, baggy pants and headpieces such as the turban and külah were “mortal enemies

8 See Orhan Koloğlu, Türkiye Karikatür Tarihi, (İstanbul: Bileşim Yayınevi, 2005), 127.
9 Here termed as stovepipe: "tuyau de poele." See de Launay and Hamdi Bey, Les Costumes Populaires de la Turquie en 1873, 13.
of the flu,” they assessed. They were “simple, noble and comfortable,” while Europeanized modern dress was “tight, ungraceful and ridiculous.”

The world fairs had been established from the mid-nineteenth century as a space where emerging nation-states presented their national and imperial might. The Ottoman state, following “this trend without delay,” organized the 1863 Ottoman General Exposition in Istanbul, and participated in 1851 and 1862 in London and the Paris World Fair in 1867. While the Album claimed to focus on the Ottoman commoner and reflected a realistic and comprehensive picture, thereby countering exotica and its Orientalist generalization, at the same time it followed European ethnographic traditions of classification and exoticization of the Other of European or Western civilization under the claim of scientific objectivity. Ahmet Ersoy argues that Osman Hamdi Bey employed European techniques of ethnographic classification to “challenge current western misinterpretations of the Orient.” He “manipulated the Orientalist genre as an instrument to deliver a clear alternative message informed by the larger cultural/ideological agenda” and thereby questioned Orientalist assumptions of the East uncritically produced and reproduced by European artists. What is crucial in this respect is that the Les Costumes Populaires aimed to produce a “late Tanzimat proto-nationalist construct,” by representing a construction of a traditional middle class composed of artisans (esnaf) and their guilds.

By depicting pre-Tanzimat lifestyles, the authors of the Les Costumes Populaires reworked the dynamic past along Ottomanist nationalist lines, by creating unity in diversity, demonstrating “solidarity” and “confraternity” in contrast to the “strict and

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13 Sergi-yi Umumi-yi Osmani.
14 On the Ottoman see self-representation at these fairs see Zeynep Çelik, Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth Century World’s Fairs, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies. - Berkeley, Calif. [U.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1987 12 (Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1992).
15 See Ersoy, ‘The Elbise and the Ottoman Scholarly Mission,’ 259.
16 See Ibid., 265.
17 See Ibid., 265.
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cold uniformity”\textsuperscript{18} of modern (European) garments, as Ersoy argues. The variety of “local costumes” depicted in the Elbise, “age old notions of dress”\textsuperscript{19} as markers of social stability were contrasted to frequently changing modern fashions that, within that logic, implied moral decay. It suggested popular harmony and contained an alternative vision for Ottoman modernization that reworked the Tanzimat reforms along cultural specific lines. The interrelation between this kind of supposed alternative strand of modernization and a supposedly hegemonic Western modernity is of particular interest to me.

I follow the critique Arif Dirlik articulated of approaches that conceptualize alternative modernities.\textsuperscript{20} While on the one hand he acknowledges their counter-hegemonic implications and their endeavor to a “new understanding of modernity”\textsuperscript{21} as a challenge to Eurocentric accounts of modernity, he critically questions the emphasis on culture within these approaches. I will follow this insight throughout my study, tracking the alleged dichotomy between national authenticity and modern universality, which I argue are two sides of the same coin and inherent to modernity. While alternative modernities are conceptualized as a deviation from a presumed Western model, this model itself is an “imaginary abstraction,” as Dirlik terms it.

The question of culture is central here. While theories of alternatives modernities assume that there can be different manifestations of modernity that are culturally determined, this assumes that modernity is cultureless, as Dirlik argues. He references how nation or civilization or other social entities, reifies “the pasts that inform ‘alterity’ in assertions of persistent cultural identity in those very spaces.”\textsuperscript{22} That is congruent with Osman Hamdi Bey’s account in the Les Costumes Populaires, which envisions an alternative Ottoman modernity with reference to assumed authentic national culture. It is perceived as different from an imagined Euro/American model. Dirlik points out that, similar to postcolonial criticism, an analytic shift took place from capitalism to colonization and from economy to culture. I think the most important point, and I agree with Dirlik here, is to consider that both the political economy of capitalism and the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 268.
\item \textsuperscript{19} See Ibid., 268.
\item \textsuperscript{20} I will turn to these in chapter two, i.e. Bill Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial’, ARIEL 40, no. 1 (January 2009): 81–105.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 7.
\end{itemize}
culture of modernity are intrinsically interwoven and interconnected; both are mutually constitutive, as we will see. Dirlik suggests that modernity as a concept is “sufficient to cover the newly apparent historical complexities,” and I largely agree with his objections to concepts of alternative and multiple modernities even though I will take considerations of these into account in order to see what they can accomplish with regards to my questions. Transferred to the question of Ottoman politics of dress and headgear that means while the fez on the one hand could be treated as a symbol of an alternative Ottoman modernity and of Ottoman national identity that was employed to counter European imperialist hegemony, it on the other hand needs to be treated as an intrinsic modern feature in a more general sense. It helped to create modern subjects, to the same extent as it created Ottoman subjects, since it was a means of modern techniques of power that related to other modern dressing practices.

In order to scrutinize modernity it is necessary to study translocal processes instead of individual societies, since modernity emerged within a broad global context. Modernities have become perceived as “alternative” in regard to culture. Especially nationalist anti-colonial movements put emphasis on their being different but modern, or contemporary but native. And even though it is often refused, colonialism and globalization indeed shaped culture around the globe while it itself took shape. Thus, modern culture is the result of translocal processes, and the supposed Euro/American origin becomes blurred through the lens of those studies that take these interactions into account. “It is these interactions that defined spaces of globality that produced modernity,” to quote Dirlik. This is, of course, not to neglect or deny Euro/American hegemony and the power relations implied in the emergence of modern culture.

Often, claims to alternative modernities contain counter-positions to Euro/American modernity that appear in the form of traditionalism and conservatism. That does not mean they are anti-modern. These conflicts over modernity are “very much part of the constitution of societies globally,” as we will later see, and they also appeared within the context of Western European modernization. The notions that are implied by these supposed anti-modern movements are most of the time products of

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23 Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 25.
25 Ibid., 38.
26 Ibid., 22.
modernities themselves, such as the national, the regional or civilizational, or stereotypes of East and West.

The definition of modernity along temporalities and spatial boundaries is problematic. It is rather a self-perception of hegemonic Western European societies that saw and sees the dawn of the modern age within its own space and time, as an improvement from former conditions and beliefs within a narrative of steady progress. Scrutinized from a different perspective, modernity cuts across space and time and appears as “a historical process emanating from a multiplicity of political and cultural spaces.”

How does this culturalist dichotomy appear in discourses on headgear?

Generally, headgear had, before the introduction of the fez, a vital significance in Ottoman society as a marker of rank and religious affiliation. The abandoning of Muslim-connoted headgear and the wearing of headpieces that were considered European Christian, generalized under the term hat, was associated with apostasy, with becoming of the Other, and could be punished by death. European Christian travellers in the Ottoman Empire reported harsh reactions towards their headgear by people they encountered in the streets, such as reports analyzed by Matthew Elliot of seventeenth century travellers, whose wigs or hats had been torn off and stamped on. Yet, as Victoria Aksan points out, cross-cultural, multi-religious realities within the Ottoman Empire, such as those lived by Franco-Leventine families, and the existence of those European figures “turning Turk” and their histories, surely complicate these simple divisions. The turban, even though treated as the badge of Islam, was actually sported by

27 Ibid., 35.
28 Ibid., 26.
30 Theologically this perception was based on the hadith “min tashabbaha bi-qavm fa-huwa minhum” (“who imitates a(ther) people becomes one of them), see i.e. Mirza Tokpınar, ‘Men teşebbehe bi-kavmīn fe-hūve minhum’ Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme’, *Hadis Tetkikleri Dergisi* (HTD) 3, no. 2 (2005): 85–109. In the eighteenth century its equivalent in Christian Europe was the practice of “Turning Turk” as practiced by statesman and travelers such as Comte de Bonneval or Ahmed Paşa. This cultural cross-dressing or “ethnomasquerade” often encompassed more than disguise, as Virgina Aksan points out, but often went along with a certain political or other affiliation of some kind up to cultural passing. See Virgina H. Aksan, 'Who was an Ottoman? Reflections on “Wearing Hats” and “Turning Turk”’, in *Europa und die Türkei im 18. Jahrhundert/ Europe and Turkey in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, Bonn University Press, 2011), 305–18.
31 Matthew Elliot, 'Dress Codes in the Ottoman Empire: The Case of the Franks', in *Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 117.
many Ottoman non-Muslims as well. If a distinction was made, it was then mostly with respect to color. Thus, the meanings of practices of dress have to be queried in between fixed symbolic meanings and the more fluid material realities.

After the introduction of the fez, the turban lost its symbolism, at least insofar as it does not appear in the archival sources which report on conflicts about headgear that mostly deal with the fez and the hat, as well as the kalpak, a cap made of asthrakan that was donned in many varieties by likewise various Ottoman populations and later became appropriated by emerging Turkish nationalism. In the nineteenth century, the hat acquired the meaning of European imperial domination, and as we saw in the quote above from the *Costume Populaire*, of far-reaching Ottoman modernization.

Two incidences that took place in the mid-nineteenth century illustrate this array of meanings carried by the European hat. These two cases revolve around diplomacy and headgear.

One took place in 1858 on the Mediterranean island of Kastellorizo/Megisti/Meis close to the south-western Anatolian coast. On that island the English consul’s hat reportedly had been thrown to the ground. The Ottoman government inquired into the case. In the following year, 1860, an incident concerned an interpreter of the English consulate in Jerusalem named Tonosi, and another person mentioned by name, characterized as an Ottoman subject/citizen. Both had been arrested because of donning a hat. The document assessed that the wearing of the hat by these persons could not be ignored because both were Ottoman subjects of high social standing: “Because these are ‘well known’ people of high social standing, it is not acceptable that citizens of the sublime state don a hat.” The document issued by the foreign ministry on the issue of Tonosi and his companion discussed whether it was necessary to react so strongly and with such harsh measures to those wearing hats, as the English embassy had made a complaint on this. The significance of the document reporting the case lies in the nexus

32 It was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1552 until French occupation in 1915. The island was mostly inhabited by orthodox Christians.
33 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office, BOA) HR.MKT. 270/92, ca.1858.
34 I am not sure about this name: it is spelled طنوسى, might also transliterated as Tunusi, Tunosi, etc.
35 BOA HR.MKT. 337/90, 21 Zi’l-kade 1276 (Juni 12th, 1860).
36 “Ma’lûm valâdârî oldûğu üzere tab’iyye-i devlet-i ‘âliyye-i bulunan kimesnelerin şapka giyimeleri yolunda bir şey değil,” BOA HR.MKT. 337/90.
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drawn between dress, citizenship and social position.\textsuperscript{37} The strong objection of Ottoman government to the wearing of the hat and the fear of its spread indicates that it considered this as disloyalty to the Ottoman state, renunciation of Ottoman citizenship, and a danger for public order.

1.2 The Significance of the Study of Modern Bourgeois Dress

At the center of my study of dress is the entangled history of modern fashion, which spread throughout the globe with the help of industrializing capitalism. The consumption of clothes is a matter of market and economy as it is part of a “cultural process to construct identity.”\textsuperscript{38} Besides, a focus on social structure, agency and practice became crucial to the study of clothing.\textsuperscript{39} I regard clothing as a practice with which to negotiate and constitute gender, class, national, ethnic, religious and other boundaries of social distinction in the making of modern identities and political entities. I treat modern fashion as a global phenomenon which took place under Western hegemony while, the West itself locally pluralized. Even though my study revolves to a great extent around the hegemony and spread of bourgeois styles, I seek to show how “dress influences travel in all directions, across class lines, between urban and rural areas, and around the globe.”\textsuperscript{40} That means the notion of emulation of certain styles needs to be broadened, if not replaced, by concepts like “bricolage, hybridity, and creolization”\textsuperscript{41} and/or mutual exchange, as in the concept of entangled histories.\textsuperscript{42}

Diane Crane poses the important question of who adopted certain styles and why. Rather than focusing on the appearance and disappearance of different styles, her focus shifted to the contexts in which a certain piece of clothing or style was worn. Crane’s approach helps to make sense of the Ottoman and Turkish politics of dress, as she uses dress

\footnotesize{37} It is emphasized that Tunus’ companion had changed his citizenship several times, sought refuge in Russia earlier and then returned to the Ottoman Empire. BOA HR.MKT. 337/90.
\footnotesize{39} Ibid., 370.
\footnotesize{40} Ibid., 372.
\footnotesize{41} Ibid., 372.
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“as a strategic site for studying changes in the meanings of cultural goods in relation to changes in social structures, in the character of cultural organizations, in other forms of culture.”

In her book *Fashion and Its Social Agenda* she elaborates the historical as well as sociological aspects of dress by scrutinizing dress in nineteenth century societies up to the contemporary examples from France, England and the United States. She emphasizes how clothes construct social identity and how dress is a means toward the interpretation of culture. Methodologically important for me is her emphasis on the active role of dress in the creation of behavior. She states that people enhance their agency by manipulating the meaning of dress, an observation that is crucial for my own study which traces how meanings of dress relate to the appropriation of certain items. According to Crane, with the industrialization of Western societies, dress came to indicate primarily class and gender in contrast to more nuanced social stratification by dress before.

“One of the most visible markers of social status and gender and therefore useful in maintaining or subverting symbolic boundaries, clothing is an indication of how people in different eras have perceived their positions in social structures and negotiated status boundaries.”

1.2.1 History and Meaning of the Hat

In contrast to the European Christian hats that are mentioned in sources of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, those hats that appear in my sources have a quite recent history, though often the exact kind of hats neither in the older or more recent sources are mentioned. Thus it makes a lot of sense to look at developments of styles in Europe and especially to make reference to the development of a bourgeois style after the French Revolution which replaced the clothing style of the nobility. The French Revolution is regarded as a turning point in terms of dress, thereby the tricorne was

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43 Diana Crane, *Fashion and Its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing* (Chicago [u.a.]: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 22 and 23.
44 Ibid.
45 See Ibid., 3 and 4.
46 Ibid., 1.
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replaced by the top hat.47

Diane Crane provides an overview of what the hat meant in the 19th century.48 In order to better understand late Ottoman politics of dress and the appropriation of bourgeois dress codes, it is helpful to note, as Crane concludes from her study, that hats in Western Europe had mainly been a signifier of social status, even though sometimes it was used to transgress class boundaries. Interestingly, in her research on the diffusion of middle-class styles throughout different social strata in France England and the USA, Crane found that most types of hats which were introduced in the 19th century were first worn by a broader population until they became the symbol of a certain class. In addition the meaning of modern hats was gendered. How did the fez fit into these gendered meanings of modern headgear? Similarly to other items of dress the fez used to be a rather gender neutral piece of dress worn by men and women as well as different strata of society but was adapted into the bourgeois dress code and its meanings throughout the nineteenth century.49 Crane states that the hat in western Europe had been an outstanding item in the social distinction among men. Even though bourgeois women wore hats, they had a different meaning. Remarkably, the hat was also worn inside, indicating a different definition of public space that included offices and other workplaces. The spaces marked by the wearing of the hat were mainly male connoted, as she argues. Customs relating to the hat, such as “hat tipping” which expressed deference, were especially suitable to establish class boundaries performatively.50

Crane describes the relation between gender and the hat as follows:

48 Crane, Fashion and Its Social Agendas, 82-87.
49 I have only hints to pre-nineteenth century practices of the wearing of the fez, but secondary literature frequently mentions the wearing of the fez by women. That does not exclude that the women and different social strata wore the fez in a different style and manner.
50 And the rejection of those customs could be a powerful sign of resistance to the acknowledgement of social hierarchies. A prominent example are the revolutionary movements in England of the seventeenth century, where levelers, commoners, baptists and related groups denied this act of deference to the authorities. See Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, [Nachdr.]. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 2003), 105 and 118.
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“Since men represented their families in public space, men's hats, rather than women's, were used to indicate the status of the family. Women's head covering during this period were more varied and more individualized than men's. Women's hats exemplified conspicuous consumption instead of relaying coded signals referring to social rank.”

In the areas studied by Crane, some kind of hat was donned by almost all men throughout the nineteenth century as well as in the early twentieth century. Related to the wearing of hats in the public sphere she cites a study on hat-markers in France concerning access to certain spheres of public life guarded by the hat: “possession of a hat was an acknowledgement of the codes that governed admission to the particular sphere of public life in question.” The same happened with the fez as its wearing was obligatory for those men who wanted to hold a public office. That it was kept on at indoor workplaces is often considered as a contrast to Western European practices, yet as we have seen, that was not valid for the first half of the nineteenth century, at least what Crane's findings concerns.

The kind of hats which were worn in Europe and the USA since the early nineteenth century guaranteed a great extent of uniformity, as did the fez, and thus supported a nationalist and in general identity-based politics. Crane recounts that less than a dozen types of hats were in use at that time. She scrutinized when and where certain types of hats—top hats, cloth caps, straw hats—appeared and which strata of society wore them.

“The patterns of diffusion of these types of hats were different in France and the United States. In France, each social class used hats differently. In mid-century, the upper and middle classes wore top hats, in the last quarter of the century, they wore the top hat for formal occasions and the bowler for business and less formal occasions. By the end of the century, they were still wearing the top hat and bowler, along with felt hats and, in summer, straw hats, straw boaters, and panamas.”

51 Crane, Fashion and Its Social Agendas, 83.
52 Ibid., 83.
53 Ibid., 85.
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Various interpretations of the meaning of the hat are reviewed by Fred Miller Robinson in his monograph on the bowler hat.\footnote{Fred Miller Robinson, \textit{The Man in the Bowler Hat: His History and Iconography} (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1993).} All these accounts had in common a consideration of the hat as an extension of the mind, an issue that was repeatedly addressed when the European brimmed hat was introduced in Turkey in 1925.\footnote{Such as in Orhan Koloğlu, 'Şapka Devrimi Kafanın Dışına Degil, Içine Yönelikti [The Hat Revolution aimed at the Inside of the Head not its Surface]', \textit{Toplumsal Tarih} 14, no. 83 (2000): 21–24.} It is a view that needs to be revised as I will later show, since within the theoretical approach that I apply to a certain extent the body-mind dichotomy becomes obsolete. Moreover I think headgear is crucial to the construction of the body through codes of conduct and other disciplinary measure that come along with modern dress.

In addition, Miller mentions psychoanalytic approaches to the meaning of the hat that are grounded on Freud’s view that the hat was an extension of the genitals and was as such gendered. That might be a quite biologically deterministic view, yet it provides insight into how the gendered meaning of the hat was perceived and related to masculinity. The hat in that regard is the visible expression of masculinity, considered as the possession of male genitals and expression of male power. Thus it epitomizes a hierarchical gender order and male dominance. Yet Miller gives preference to those approaches which view hats as an extension of the mind. Thereby he favored C.G. Jung’s interpretation that considers the hat as an “image of the self”, the hat epitomizing the self.\footnote{Robinson, \textit{The Man in the Bowler Hat}, 156.} With references to my remark above I would add that this image of the self also encompasses the body.

Very helpful for the analysis of modern Ottoman headgear is Margrit Pernau’s study of headgear and bourgeois identity in India, because she analyzed how headpieces other then the top hat or other Western European types of hat became part of bourgeois identity.\footnote{Pernau speaks of middle classes in the plural and their sober dressing, that replaced aristocratic styles, while she defined these classes through a group of professions. I think she does not separate clearly between bourgeois and middle class in her English text on the subject, and does not problematize this terminology. See Pernau, 'Shifting Globalities - Changing Headgear: The Indian Muslims between Turban, Hat and Fez'.} Pernau regards headgear as a means to create as well as express identity on both the personal and collective levels. She considers it to be “a reliable indicator of community.”\footnote{Ibid., 251.} In her study on the turban as an item of bourgeois identity, she states that...
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its meaning was not restricted to Islam and religion and that the Mughal turban was rather a symbol of a “translocal and transimperial universe, based on the reference to Persiante culture, albeit in a strongly localized version”\textsuperscript{59} which consequently showed that religion was not the main point of reference of the Mughal dynasty and state. Here a parallel can be drawn to the Ottoman case insofar, that the fez, as well as the other headpieces that appeared in my sources, such as the kalpak carried a multidimensional meaning, that can likewise not be reduced to religion or any other marker of identity, and were rather part of the global phenomenon of the rise and spread of bourgeois identity.

In European bourgeois dress, as it emerged after the French Revolution in differentiation to aristocratic styles, headgear was a basic element, since the body had to be covered from head to toe. This further underlines the significance of the modern hat and headgear in general as essential and outstanding part of modern bourgeois dress. Some even questioned the doffing of the hat, considering it an anxious health danger as a person may catch a chill while the head was exposed.\textsuperscript{60} Beyond health concerns, the covering of the body indicated social hierarchy, while bourgeois women emphasized parts of their body through their dress, such as the use of crinolines, they also exposed their bodies on special occasions, i.e. in the ballroom, while men remained covered. Men and women of lower classes also had to reduce the layers covering their bodies in order to be suited for work.\textsuperscript{61} The bodily practices were to a large extent compliant with ideas of conduct and bodily display in the Ottoman Empire, that also required the body to be covered. We will see in Chapter Five that next to the appropriation of bourgeois styles by Ottoman men, also Ottoman women’s dress adapted to these bodily practices, such as the wearing of the corset and the adaptation of other pieces of dress to it, as well as appearance of female hats adorned with flowers. Yet the open display of female bodies and the common socializing of women and men was a controversial issue.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 255.
\textsuperscript{60} See Ibid., 239, 240 and 152.
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1.2.2 Globalization of Male Attire and the Production of Modern Bodies

Structuralist approaches to dress, such as that by Roland Barthes, conceptualize clothing as language and speech acts and interrogated meanings, in contrast and critique of costume history that was more or less descriptive. Thus, structuralists helped to reconceptualize the study of dress, yet their works are more appropriate to frame fixed meanings. An anthropology of clothing, on the other hand, additionally scrutinizes dress and its impact on social organization as well as social change and transformations.

A number of authors traced the change from a more decorative dress for men to the tailored suit, considered as a plain sober dress, and the global dissemination of this style of dress. Thereby the modern three-piece suit became the sign of male respectability. I consider Ottoman and Turkish politics of dress as part of sartorial globalization.

Robert Ross, who scrutinizes the globalization of modern male dress from the sixteenth to the early years of the twenty-first century, assesses “that, in the long term, the rules for external covering have to be internalized,” departing from the taxonomical approach of classical studies of the history of dress, being rather interested in social history. He also distances himself from an ethnographic approach to dress and the

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62 In terms of terminology fashion theory differentiates between clothes and dress, the former as the single items to be worn and the latter a more encompassing notion items of clothing worn and combined on and with the body. See Hansen, 'The World in Dress'.
64 See Odile Blanc, 'The Historiography of Costume: A Brief Survey', in Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Feroqhi and Christoph Neumann (İstanbul: Eren, 2004), 50 and 58.
67 Ross, Clothing, 8.
othering of its subjects. "The history of most [...] sartorial regimes has been the history of struggle – class, gender-based, ethnic or national." He discusses how, especially in France and in England, “a culture of fashion and many of the characteristic features of later European dress” emerged. He concentrates in particular on a phenomenon and period known as the “Great Masculine Renunciation”, by which male dominance in the public sphere was signalled by sober, mainly dark clothing, and the exclusion of women from public affairs by the brightness of their clothing, and indeed the impracticality of much of what they wore.

Similar to Ross, Katrina Honeyman emphasizes the modes of production and their social and cultural context which enforced or even founded the predicaments for modern male dress and the way it produced gendered bodies. Looking specifically at the inter-war years in the early twentieth century when the modern man's suit reached its peak of popularity, she argues that it is crucial to understand the relationship between production and consumption. She points out that the marketing of the suit, next to its association with respectability, suggested a more egalitarian society. Yet it was sharply contrasted with women's dress, which became more elaborate and complicated. She analyzes the way men were attracted to this style of dress, i.e. through the establishment of a masculine form of shopping environment. She scrutinizes the way the retailing sector was structured by certain ideas of masculinity and how the shops and consumers were constructed as male, and how buying a suit was associated with the appropriation of a certain kind of masculinity.

In "The Hidden Consumer" Christopher Breward concentrates similarly on the emergence of a male consumer culture which came along with department-store marketing, retail techniques and a ready-made clothing industry between 1860 and 1914 in England and specifically London. He provides a profound account of men's dress and gender in the second half of the nineteenth century. Despite a certain move towards

68 Ibid., 4 and 5.
69 Ibid., 8.
70 Ibid., 3.
71 Ibid., 9. Another author who traces the globalization of dress and masculinity is Wilbur Zelinsky. He traces the spread of the standard suit through a "deterritorialized social space" Zelinsky, 'Globalization Reconsidered: The Historical Geography of Modern Western Male Attire,' 83.
72 Honeyman, 'Following Suit'.
73 See Ibid., 442.
74 Christopher Breward, The Hidden Consumer: Masculinities, Fashion and City Life; 1860 - 1914 (Manchester [u.a.]: Manchester Univ. Press, 1999).
functionality in men’s dress as commonly assessed, Breward discovers the “survival of ‘elaboration’ and ‘elegance’ in masculine models of physical beauty” next to an emphasize on middle class ideals of professionalism and respectability. He stresses that dress and accessories were not merely symbolic but also the “very substance of bourgeois confidence.” The dress of the working class was also regarded as uncivilized to a similar degree as that of racialized Others of colonial discourse, even if the proletariat or peasant at certain times and moments provided “a stereotype of nationalistic popular sentiments.” Dress was and is a question of material as well as cultural capital which only the middle classes, as he terms this social spectrum, could provide. Not dressing that way was associated with immorality and a lack of discipline in the European as well as colonial environment. Breward also elaborates on how the feminization topos of the late nineteenth century was countered by “highly moral readings of manliness.”

Taken together, these accounts on the development and spread of modern Western male attire provide important information about the relation of economic globalization, colonialism and the formation of modern male identity which help to clarify the politics of dress in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

1.3 Dress and Bourgeois Identity

A number of studies inspect the emergence of modern dress in interrelation to bourgeois identity or culture and its global dissemination, especially throughout the nineteenth century. That brings about the question of the definition of bourgeoisie. The perception of a common bourgeois culture as the main characteristic of a common bourgeois identity has been criticized because of its normative implications and focus on the normative level that leaves out individual experiences of bourgeois existence and

75 Ibid., 77.
76 Breward similarly to Pernau conflates the terms bourgeois and middle class, a spectrum that reached for him from “shopkeeper to stockbroker.” Ibid., 77 and 254.
77 Ibid., 87.
78 Ibid., 89 and see also 88.
79 Ibid., 241.
disregards ambivalences. Nevertheless, for my study, perceptions of a common bourgeois culture are still important, since it enables a broad definition and provides a clue to the importance of certain styles of dress that express and enact bourgeois hegemony. I will focus on individual practices that attained meaning within this setting of burgeoning bourgeois hegemony. My approach focuses on the reciprocal relations between norms and individual practices. Thus, I am interested in how a certain notion of bourgeois culture became hegemonic while it was generated in negotiations between those who appropriated it.

If not defined in strictly economic terms, the distinction between bourgeoisie, as those in the possession of the means of production, and middle class becomes obsolete to a certain extent. Immanuel Wallerstein in that sense talks about “salaried bourgeoisie”: “They are clearly bourgeois along the axis of life-style or consumption […] less along the axis of capital or property rights.” One might also say that the middle classes were those who appropriated bourgeois habitus and thus were in the possession of cultural capital, a habitus which embodied social structure.

My treatment of the notion of bourgeoisie and of class in general follows Pierre Bourdieu’s definition of social class, which emphasizes practice and the relational character of identities:

“Social class is not defined by a property (not even the most determinant one, such as the volume and composition of capital ) nor by a collection of properties (of sex, age, social origin, ethnic origin-proportion of blacks and whites, for example, or natives and immigrants-income, educational level etc.), nor even by a chain of properties strung out from a fundamental property (position in the relations of production) in a relation of cause and effect, conditioner and conditioned; but by the structure of relations between all the pertinent properties which gives its specific value to each of them and to the effects they exert on practices.”

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Thus, concerning the appearance of bourgeois culture and bourgeoisie in the Ottoman Empire, I follow authors such as Edhem Eldem, who include late Ottoman social practices and identities in the broader context of the global emergence of bourgeois culture.\(^\text{85}\)

1.3.1 Modernity and Bourgeois Identity

Modernity, as I treat it, can be understood as an intervention related to bodies, space and time, that can have various outcomes.\(^\text{86}\) I will refrain from attributing to modernity a fixed set of characteristics and rather view it in its ambiguities. That entails a consideration of modernity as a discourse rather than epoch. Michel Foucault contributed crucially to our understanding of modernity as a confluence of certain techniques of power that were rather productive than repressive, producing the modern subject through discourse. The intersection of power and knowledge is thereby a productive web that produces subjects through subjugation as well was constitution.\(^\text{87}\) The advantage of this view is that subjectivity can be understood as processual and identity as fluid rather essential or substantial. Discourse itself is thus an instrument of power, of productive power.

Etymologically “modern” denotes the contemporary, but beyond that, it is a mode of social organisation that comes along with the appearance of modern socio-political institutions such as the nation-state, school, hospitals, the military etc. These emerged in the context of European Renaissance, Reformation/Counter-Reformation, and Enlightenment, yielding a certain European self-perception associated with change and progress, and a feeling of superiority over supposedly traditional societies. In philosophy, a perception of the autonomous rational human mind replaced those of divine providence. It brought about a notion of rationality and the rational organisation of social life that sought to make civilized behavior equivalent with modernity, an equation

\(^{85}\) See Edhem Eldem, ‘The Bourgeoisie of Istanbul’, in Urban Governance Under the Ottomans: Between Cosmopolitanism and Conflict, ed. Ulrike Freitag and Nora Lafi, SOAS / Routledge Studies on the Middle East (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014). Until recently it was controversial if an Ottoman (Muslim) bourgeoisie existed at all, since narrow Eurocentric definitions made Ottoman bourgeois culture invisible.


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that justified European claims to superiority and thus their colonialism. Hence modernity is closely related to the colonial and imperialist expansions of European nation-states, and it developed along with particular power relations and newly emergent technologies of power.

Yet, beyond European self-perception as the cradle of modernity, the emergence of the discourse of modernity, together with European colonialism and the ambiguities inherent to modern discourse, all suggest a more complex approach. I think it is important to carve out the agency of the so-called periphery versus the imperial center in two respects: this is to consider the Ottoman Empire in the making of the West, rather than simply as the construction as its Other and the mutually engendering relation of central state versus subject/citizens. In my case this means scrutinizing how the politics of dress shaped state-subject/citizen relations.

Ross explores the becoming of relationships between “clothing and discipline, and between clothing and particular forms of behavior” from the end of the seventeenth century onwards. According to Ross, beginning in the later seventeenth century, the dress of soldiers was used to instill new forms of discipline. This went along with the introduction of new military tactics. Rulers and states tried to expand military discipline to the entire population by authoritarian social engineering, especially in the struggle against its perceived “backwardness,” as a modernizing measure. For Ross the relation, between dress and behavior is unidirectional; he assumes that a certain attitude leads to a certain choice of dress. However, I argue, drawing on theories of social embodiment and habitus, that the relationship between body and dress is rather reciprocal, and that the body and its habitus are rather shaped by the choice of dress as is the meaning of a certain pieces of dress.

Martschukat, in his elaborations on the history of masculinity and its accomplishment by discourse analysis, comments on the problematic of the relations between discourse, often considered as the level of the normative, and individual

88 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies, Key Concepts Series (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 1998), 144-147.
89 Ross, Clothing, 104.
90 Ibid., 106.
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experience. He points out that discourse, in contrast to how it is perceived by critics of
the notion, is rather interchangeable with what Foucault later termed as dispositiv. That
means discourse is not opposed to individual experience but is rather inseparable. They
have a reciprocal, mutually constituting relation. Discourse thus comprises, besides the
linguistic/verbal level, also institutions, objects and procedures. Individual expressions
then are to be regarded as complex and hybrid interpretations of normative perceptions.\textsuperscript{92}
An account of discourse or dispositiv that includes practices and institutions means that
discourse does not only speak about certain issues but rather fundamentally produces
them. It enables “historical specific experiences”\textsuperscript{93} that in turn produce discourse and
attendant, historically mutable subjectivities.

For my study of discourses on headgear it is extraordinarily important to suspend
the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. Toward that end, I
follow Wrana and Langer who convincingly argue that bodily practices need to be
considered as speech-acts that gain meaning only through their situatedness within
discourse. In reference to Foucault, they conceptualize the analysis of discourse as praxis,
the way discourse is articulated through practice.\textsuperscript{94} Discourse thereby is defined as a
ensemble of relations, and discursive relations are equal to the relations of verbal and
non-verbal relations. The discourse itself is the border between these two, according to
Wrana. Discourse enables certain bodily practices that constitute subjects. Discourse
analysis in this regard is rather a theoretical framework than a method, enabling a
consideration of discursive practices in their situatedness and interconnectedness.

It is the story of the construction and fixing of meanings on the basis of discursive
formation which produce truth in their own historical sense. Phillip Sarasin, in his study
of historiography and discourse theory, aptly contents that such an approach, the
paradigmatic shift which was brought about by the linguistic turn, does not contradict or
make historical studies obsolete.\textsuperscript{95} As also put forward by other historians, such as

\textsuperscript{92} Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz, \textit{Geschichte der Männlichkeiten}, historische Einführungen
(Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verl., 2008), 59.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{94} Daniel Wrana and Antje Langer, ‘On the Edge of Discourse. Beyond the Differentiation of Discursive
and Non-discursive Practices’, \textit{Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research} 8,
\textsuperscript{95} See Philipp Sarasin, ‘Diskurstheorie und Geschichtswissenschaft’, in \textit{Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche
2011), 61–90.
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Hayden White, historical truth is dependent on the historian’s own presumptions.

Discourse analysis as a method of historiography to scrutinize social relations shifts its focus from historical sources as documents of past realities to the ways they produce meanings and reflect the discursive quality of historical phenomena,\(^96\) thereby a special focus is put on how these phenomena were located at the intersections of power and knowledge. Discourse theory draws on poststructuralist linguistic theory on the nature of language in order to grasp the meanings of historical phenomena, which theorize the relations between signs and objects, signifier and signified. The former is considered not to be arbitrary but rather situated within a system of signs. This brings about the visibility of historical situated knowledges and meanings.\(^97\)

Sarasin mentions four characteristics of Foucault’s method of discourse analysis relevant to my study. The first is to determine the location of historical statements, which is the historical, social and cultural vantage point of a series of resembling statements, the place of legitimate speech, which institutionalization of power that has a claim to truth. The second characteristic is the determination of similarities between statements to create a system of statements in order to determine the borders of a discourse, through the determination of what is unspeakable and relations with other discourses through collective symbols. As a third characteristic one needs to discern what constitutes the borders of the discourse: what is unspeakable and what are the relations to other discourses. As a last step the three preceding steps constitute an archive that contains and organizes all crucial statements. It enables the scholar to trace how discourses produce the social world in its historical specificity,\(^98\) which refers to Derrida’s concept of difference to the materiality of discourse and which defines discourse as an effort to fix meanings, a place “in which fracture, repression and paradoxically spoken utterances occur.”\(^99\)

Post-Marxist discourse theory emphasizes the role of the imaginative as central to the construction of society, in addition to the material conditions of social relations. This view is crucial to a concept of identity that considers the very same fragmentary, polysemous and open-to-modification nature of signs. Societies in that sense are

\(^{96}\) See Ibid., 68.
\(^{97}\) See Ibid., 67.
\(^{98}\) See Ibid., 70.
\(^{99}\) Ibid., 74.
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temporary and precarious enunciations of certain social self-ascriptions.\(^{100}\)

1.3.2 Masculinity and the History of the Body

Taken together, the above summary of scholarly works on fashion and power indicate that a history of dress must be closely linked to the historicity of the body. Even though dress has its own texture and materiality that is distinct from the body, a piece of dress forms the body and can even become part of it. Dressing is a bodily act, like eating or walking. Tony Bellantine and Antoinette Burton propose an approach of what they call “bodies in contact.” It encompasses an attempt to re-narrate world history through the body and the interrelation of bodies, with an emphasis on the concept of Empire, which they define loosely as “a net of trade, knowledge, military power, and political intervention.”\(^{101}\) They are interested in the way colonization and other phenomena are part of empire-buildling and its impact on everyday life and the way modernity is determined by these conditions. World history attempts to show connections between areas which were thought to be distinct, i.e. by tracing pre-modern trade routes and the cross-cultural exchanges they enabled long before the emergence of global capitalism.\(^{102}\)

The body herein is regarded as an actor. It makes visible imperial colonial encounters. The authors recount Mary Louis Pratt’s suggestion of the “body as method.”\(^{103}\) In the colonial context the authors stress the importance of female bodies as targets of colonial discourse and policy, yet they also remark on the lack of analysis of masculinity in spite of its centrality in colonial projects, visible for example in the crisis of masculinity the colonial endeavour evokes for white male bodies through their encounter with the non-white, colonized Other, and the feminization of colonized men, to mention but the most well known examples.\(^{104}\)

The history of Europe’s rise to power is going to be decentered by such accounts. Even though Europe’s rise had profound significance in world history, especially with the expansions after 1760, European culture only constituted itself in the process of imperial

\(^{100}\) Ibid., 77.
\(^{101}\) Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette M. Burton, eds., Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History (Durham, NC [u.a.]: Duke Univ. Press, 2005), 3.
\(^{102}\) Ibid., 10.
\(^{103}\) See Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 1992).
\(^{104}\) Ballantyne and Burton, Bodies in Contact, 7.
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encounters and in interaction with many different societies on the planet.\textsuperscript{105} Despite its hegemony, European power was always contested, and Europe itself remained the center of power only for a very short period of time while new center like China, Japan and others arose.\textsuperscript{106}

The approach of the “body as method” was introduced by Kathleen Canning.\textsuperscript{107} I regard dress as practice which is part of bodily practices like walking. Canning’s model relies on Foucault’s notion of biopower and his ideas of the social body which, she argues, allows scholars to go beyond the notion of the body as merely a metaphor. Within such a framework the body can be thought as “in many ways the most intimate colony, as well as the most unruly”\textsuperscript{108} and thus as a source of resistance. Thereby the body becomes an agent in history to the same degree as factors like capitalism, war etc., being a zone of management, containment, regulation, conformity, resistance and contact tout court.\textsuperscript{109} The analytic task of the body as method, Canning assesses, is to make visible what is hidden behind the body's oxymoronic status, its treatment as a discursive object, as ideological work and as sign and symbol. Ballantyne and Burton call those hidden qualities of the body “the real stories” which include labor, leisure, family, mobility, political economy, household, state. These “bodies as contact zones” are then a powerful analytic tool that allow scholars to navigate between representations and relations of power and domination and agency.\textsuperscript{110}

In 1994 John Tosh argued that masculinity was out of the focus and considered irrelevant for historical study because men's bodies were and are not considered gendered.\textsuperscript{111} That is specifically relevant for my study of headgear, because men's headgear is rather related to the mind than to the body, while women's headgear explicitly marks gender and in addition makes reference to sexuality. That reflects the fact that fezzes and hats are also donned by women, but veils and women's hats rarely by men. An exception are the reports of the donning of women's hats after the promulgation

\textsuperscript{105} See Ibid., 10–11.
\textsuperscript{106} See Ibid., 10–11.
\textsuperscript{108} Ballantyne and Burton, Bodies in Contact, 407.
\textsuperscript{109} See Ibid., 407.
\textsuperscript{110} A phenomenon that the authors call the “real,” see Ibid., 409.
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of the hat law, but these have been rare occasions. He argued that a perception that was elaborated during “the late Victorian heyday of scientific belief” that

“[m]en’s nature was vested in their reason not their bodies. A profound dualism in Western thought has served to keep the spotlight away from men. In the historical record it is as though masculinity is everywhere but nowhere,”112

which even informs historiography up to the present day. The field of Masculinity Studies also within historiography has grown substantially within the past twenty years, so much so that it is beyond the scope of this introduction to provide an overview.113 In their 2005 essay on hegemonic masculinity, R.W. Connell and James Messerschmidt emphasize the importance of male embodiment. According to the authors, men’s bodies are both objects and agents of social practice while bodily processes and social structures are linked by social practice. Wearing headgear is a social practice that produces such gendered bodies.114

Breward demonstrates how fashion, the making of modern male bodies, and nationalism are closely connected. The marketing of men’s fashion in late nineteenth-century Europe increasingly promised “health, vitality and the palpable display of the youthful and attractive manly body.”115

Partha Chatterjee has studied the general predicament of postcolonial nationalism, while its interrelationship with masculinity has been scrutinized in-depth by Mrinalinsha Sinha.116 In her study of colonial masculinity in India, she analyses how a new nationalist elite in India simultaneously refused and relied on colonialisit stereotypes. The colonialisist

112 Ibid., 180.
113 See Martschukat and Stieglitz, Geschichte der Männlichkeiten.
discourse contrasted the ‘manly Englishman’ to the ‘effeminized’ Western educated Bengali elite. The latter rejected their stereotyping as effeminized, and engaged instead in the re-appropriation of masculinity to consolidate power in the nation-state.

Wilson Chacko Jacob shed light on similar dynamics in modern Egypt. His study scrutinized constructions of male identities within the context of European imperialism and nationalism, using masculinity as an analytic perspective to demonstrate how certain disciplinary techniques produced the heteronormative male citizen. Part of Jacob’s argument hinges on the Egyptian discourse about appropriate headgear for men, in particular on the question of whether to wear the fez or not. For Jacob what is specific about this discourse is the way it is characterized by colonialism and by the question of national sovereignty. In contrast to Turkey, where the fez was outlawed together with other headgear in 1925, in Egypt it became a national symbol. For Jacob the quest for national sovereignty is connected to a quest for an identity which embodies male virtues, especially honor. Arus Yumul scrutinized how discourses on male national identity evolved from the Early Turkish Republic to the present day through a notion of civilized bodies. Yumul’s study sheds light on the impact of Orientalist debates about Westernization on nationalized male identities and Turkish modernity. In contrast Deniz Kandiyoti had argued earlier to open the perspective beyond the colonial context. Instead of attributing phenomena relating to masculinity exclusively to colonialism and Western hegemony, it was necessary to consider dynamics of local patriarchies. I agree with her to the extent that local dynamics need to be considered, which is definitely accomplished in the studies of Sinha and Jacob, but I think one needs to be cautious to avoid a binary perspective that equates local with traditional and external with modern.

Much of the discussion on bourgeois gender relations as well as traditional Ottoman social organization hinges on the notions of separate spheres as well as gender segregation. Both notions need to be treated with caution, since they describe an

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118 Ibid., 335.
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idealized picture that in addition needs to be read against the respective conceptions of space. Although I cannot accomplish a study on the transition of gender and space in the course of the long nineteenth century in Ottoman Empire, the construction of the bourgeois home and the nation state and with it the reformulation of public space and its gendered implications needs to be kept in mind as a framing discourse for these developments.

1.4 State of Research

1.4.1 Ottoman and Turkish Politics of Dress

There are a number of encyclopaedic accounts of Ottoman or Turkish dress, the latter more related to dynasty and state and the former tracing dress history to pre-Ottoman times and central-Asian clothing. They provide a useful overview of what was worn when and where and are necessary to trace the persistence and changes of forms and patterns, yet they lack and analytic perspective on the meaning of dress. One of these is Nureddin Sevin’s book that contains many examples of early Ottoman headgear and nineteenth and twentieth century uniforms and headgear which is very helpful to trace the variety and development of styles.121 Another historical overview of styles of headgear is the costume book by İzzet Kumbaracıl.122

One of the most profound and encompassing studies of Ottoman dress is the edited volume *Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity* by Suraiya Faroqhi and Christopher Neumann.123 It discusses methodological tools of the study of dress as well as a number of

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122 İzzet Kumbaracılar, *Seruşlar* ([s.l.]: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Yayın, 1985).

123 Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann, eds., *Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity* (İstanbul: Eren, 2004).
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case studies from the material aspects of Ottoman dress to dress regulations and conceptual questions such as gender and religion. The volume gives an analysis of the pre-Mahmudian Ottoman sartorial regime as well as an account of Westernized Ottoman dress in the nineteenth century. Christopher Neumann's analysis of two eighteenth century inventories of Ottoman viziers provides evidence of the diversity of dress even of two persons of the same rank, countering the generalizing depictions in costume books. A similar study has been accomplished recently for the mid-nineteenth century by Edhem Eldem, who studied the inventory of Mehmed Cemal Bey, that covered the years 1855-1864. In terms of headgear, the huge amount of fezzes is remarkable here, one more indicator of the success of its implementation. In the same edited volume on dress in self-narratives Elke Hartmann's contribution on Armenian Militiamen (fedayis) and their dress is an excellent case study on the interrelation between bourgeois dress and national costume and the way both are used for self-fashioning in different contexts.

Relating to nineteenth century dress reforms and their significance, an essay by Donald Quataert provides the most important and inspiring contribution as he refers to the socio-cultural consequences of these reforms and puts emphasize on the importance of the Mahmudian dress reform for the restructuring of the Ottoman state and Ottoman society. Charlotte Jirousek gives an account of the economic aspects of the transformation of dress codes in the Ottoman Empire with the emergence of an industrial fashion market and the introduction of a “mass fashion system” in the urban centers of the Ottoman Empire. According to Jirousek industrialization changed the form as well as

127 See Quataert, 'Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’. John Norton also provides a brief overview of the dress codes in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. He puts emphasize on the extraordinary variety of Ottoman dress before the Westernization of dress and derives the importance of and the emphasis on dress in Turkey until the present day from its historical importance. Left aside is the question whether this is a sufficient explanation of modern Turkish politics on dress; his effort to explain the extraordinary importance of dress in Ottoman and Turkish politics is worth mentioning, even though I think it is better understood from a transnational perspective. See John Norton, 'Faith and Fashion in Turkey’, in Languages of Dress in the Middle East (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997), 149–77.
meaning of dress. She attests to an accelerated change of styles of dress among the Ottoman elite in the eighteenth century and compares the situation to industrializing England at the same time. Patterns of consumption changed as more commodities circulated which could be afforded by more and more people. While initially forms of dress remained unchanged, after the Mahmudian reforms and industrialization, clothing production in Western styles were increasingly adopted by urban elites. She argues that “[b]y the 1850’s it is possible to find portraits of Ottoman gentlemen who are clearly being dressed by the finest European (or European-trained) tailors” and “[b]y the end of the nineteenth century, the shops of Pera were providing the latest fashions in ready-to-wear to Muslims as well as non-Muslims.” Western department stores that were located not only in Pera but also in the historical city became crucial to the distribution of these products, as analyzed by Yavuz Köse.

Ottoman women took a crucial position in these changing production and consumption patterns, as Donald Quataert points out. Textile production and the gendered division of labor is a crucial element of the link between gender order and clothing. At home as well as in small manufactories women contributed to the production of yarn, cloth and clothing. Industrialization brought women into low paid wage earning positions and thus contributed substantially to the establishment of the global clothing industry. Within the Ottoman Empire a focus on women reveals that often assumed strict divisions of labor according to gender can be questioned by a focus on textile production. For the Ottoman example this means that women need to be considered as a workforce in order to get a complete picture of changes in Ottoman textile production due to industrialization and globalization. While the Ottoman guilds and their participation in textile production declined sharply, it was often assumed that

130 See Yavuz Köse, 'Vertical Bazaars of Modernity: Western Department Stores and Their Staff in Istanbul', in Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labour History, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Gavin Brockett (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), 91–114; An overview over the modernization of dress through the nineteenth century is also provided Aysal Necdet, 'Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Giyim ve Kuşamda Çağdaşma Hareketleri', Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi 10, no. 22 (2011): 3–32.
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Ottoman textile production did the same. Instead, a shifting perspective reveals that a shift of guild to non-guild labor took place, moving production into small households and workshops, where often women produced textiles for local and global markets and processed European-manufactured-factory-spun yarn. According to Quataert, the socio-economic effects of these shifts in the labour market are hard to determine. On the one hand the import of European-spun yarns meant the loss of jobs in traditional manufacturing, and women thus became employed at low wages in the expanding textile sector in other areas. Thus, the female workforce replaced formerly guild-bound production. Low paid as their work was, they were not able to sustain a whole family with their wages, and their full-time work remained a supplement to the family income.

Ottoman women’s dress itself was effected by changes in the modernization process but did not hinge on spectacular legislation, like the laws introducing the fez or the hat. Still, they were effected by these laws. They also adapted the new dress codes which came along with the socio-economic transformations in the 19th century, and when the hat law was issued in 1925 women’s dress in the urban centers was also to a great extent modernized. The banning of the veil and the wearing of the hat by women were regulated by local administrative regulations.

Madeline Zilfi scrutinized how Ottoman sumptuary laws in the 17th and 18th century had been gendered in a way that women, along with Ottoman non-Muslims, had been targets of clothing regulations that served to strengthen patriarchal solidarity among Muslim men throughout social strata. Nancy Micklewright studied in depth the adoption of modern dress by women in Istanbul in the nineteenth century, which was a matter of economic possibilities and availability as the latter grew steadily. She points out that with the adoption of European dress a “completely different conception of dress and style” was adopted, away from loose-fitting, interchangeable, layered dress to

132 See i.e. Anastasia Fallerou, ‘Ottoman Turkish Women’s Clothing between Trade, Tradition and Modernity’, in From Traditional Attire to Modern Dress: Modes of Identification, Modes of Recognition in the Balkans (XVIth - XXth Centuries), ed. Constanţa Vintilă-Ghiţulescu (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publ., 2011), 175–93; Cihan Aktaş provides a broad historical overview over developments in women’s dress and discussions around it, but relies on secondary literature only. Cihan Aktaş, Tanzimat’tan Günümüze Kılık Kıyafet ve İktidar, Nehir Yayınları: İnceleme - Araştırma Dizisi; 30 5 (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1989), and Cihan Cihan Aktaş, Tanzimat’tan 12 Mart’a Kılık-Kıyafet ve İktidar, 2. Basım., Kapi Yayınları; 71 Araştırma-Inceleme 20 (İstanbul: Kapi Yayınları, 2006).

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tailored, form-fitted garments.\textsuperscript{134}

The modern fashions women sported were in public covered by a çarşaf or a similar long concealing piece of dress. These outer garments, however, were subject to change and fashion. In that regard Reina Lewis remarks on the significance of the hat, as a piece of outer wear, that might have had a even greater significance for women's dress than the alafranga inner wear.\textsuperscript{135} Lewis comments on the consequences of the adoption of modern dress by Ottomans on the Western Orientalist gaze which thereby lost its exotic object.\textsuperscript{136} In her work she makes visible the active contribution of Ottoman elite women in the making of the West through their travel and cross-cultural dressing. She also points out how these women always walked a fine line between subverting and reaffirming these "hegemonic Orientalist knowlegdes" by their play with and performance of identities.\textsuperscript{137}

Even though the fez is often perceived as a male item, it was quite common for women to don it, before and after its introduction as part of civil and military uniform by Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{138}

A recent publication by Serap Kavas uses the concept of developmental idealism to frame Ottoman and Turkish politics of dress theoretically. Her theoretical implications are similar to mine, taking the global dimension of these politics of dress and its ideological foundations into account. She takes praxeological considerations into account to grasp the meaning of the body in this setting, whereby she assesses that “shape and image of the external body became an index to ascribe meaning and value to the self.”\textsuperscript{139} 

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} See Reina Lewis, \textit{Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem} (London [u.a.]: Tauris, 2004), 228.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 231.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Reina Lewis refers to Homi Bhabha’s notion of colonial mimicry and the “mimic man” in reference to these Ottoman women's dressing practices, which might challenge “naturalised sureties of colonial identity,” but as well stabilize or re-inscribe them as part of a contradictory dynamic, Ibid., 232.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} On this see i.e. Ayşe Zeren Enis, \textit{Everyday Lives of Ottoman Muslim Women: Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete (Newspaper for Ladies)} (1895 - 1908), 1st ed., Tarih Dizisi, Libra Kitap.- Istanbul 60 (Istanbul: Libra Kitap, 2013).
\end{itemize}
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Yet besides a few references to the Ottoman women’s journal *Hanimlara mahsus gazetesi* and quotes from Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk]’s talks, her study is based on secondary sources. And even though I agree with many of her assessments, she grounds her study on a modernity-versus-tradition dualism, where modernists are always automatically opposed by religious reactionaries, who counter the modernization project, not taking into account how conservatism was not necessarily contradictory to modernization.

1.4.1.1 Ottoman Headgear

Concerning Ottoman male headgear before the introduction of the fez, the studies of Ottoman gravestones decorated with headpieces, such as the one performed by Hans-Peter Laqueur, need to be mentioned.\(^{140}\) They reveal the extraordinary importance and variety of headgear in the Ottoman social order, even after a person’s death, in the time before Mahmud II new dress codes and after. The importance of headgear and their depiction on gravestones is also manifested through clothing practices in Sufism with its distinct headpieces that had ritual significance and distinguished the different orders. There exists a whole genre that exclusively deals with the *tac*, the dervish hats, such as a text by Müstaqim-zade Süleyman Sadeddin edited by Helga Anetshofer and Hakan T. Karateke.\(^{141}\) In addition to the studies of the Ottoman turbans such as Rosita d’Amora’s,\(^{142}\) depictions of diverse headpieces throughout the centuries can be found in encyclopaedic accounts in the form of costume books, such as the one edited by İzzet Kurumbaruğlar.\(^{143}\) Charlotte Jirousek provides an historical account of European and Ottoman Headgear,\(^{144}\) and Beverely Chico gives an overview on the turban and other pieces of male headgear in the Middle East.\(^{145}\)

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143 Kumbaracılar, Serpuşlar.
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A study of sources related to Mahmud’s reform of military dress and especially the wearing of the fez has been conducted by İsmail Hakka Uzuńçarşılı. Another study on headgear in the Ottoman Empire is Patricia Baker’s essay “The Fez in Turkey” in which she traces the introduction of the fez and its abolishment by the hat law, providing an account of the ambivalent meaning of the fez as a symbol of modernization and conservatism.

Concerning the appearance of different kinds of headpieces next to the fez in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Mehmet Emin Elmacı treats the controversy of kalpak versus fez with recourse to many different kinds of sources. The boycott of the fez, proclaimed after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908, and the search for “the national hat” associated with it has been dealt with extensively with rich use of sources from Ottoman journals by Y. Doğan Çetinkaya. Cevdet Kirpik, in his study on conflicts about fez versus hat in the late Ottoman Empire, deals with some of the state archival sources I will also treat in my research. His account is the most detailed, to my knowledge, of the becoming popular of the hat in the Ottoman Empire. Kirpik considers the 1890s as the decade when the hat became increasingly popular among Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslims. He suggests that hat and fez respectively embodied different ideas. That fits the assumption uttered by quite a few authors who commented on the issue of Ottoman and Turkish headgear, that headgear is linked to a person’s attitude in terms of pro- or anti-modern. Yet, it is a suggestion that I would view rather critically. I also do not think that the fez symbolized necessarily a different conception of modernity, but rather that the fez-hat conflicts expressed tensions within modernity. Yet, it is often assumed that the hat was favored by those later termed Westernizers, but this distinction is problematic, as the concept of the “West” as a useful analytical category has to be questioned critically.

149 See Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu: Bir Toplumsal Hareketin Analizi, 1. baskı., İletişim Yayınları; Araştırmalar - İnceleme Dizisi 161 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004); recent account on the hat links changes and developments and debates about men's headgear to transformation in Turkish Ottoman poetry: Erhan Allan, Ölçü Kaçarken: Şapka, Şarkı, Şehir ve Şiir (İstanbul: 160. Kilometre, 2012).
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1.4.2 The Turkish Hat Law

In this study I will discuss some of the implications of the Turkish hat law in the last chapter. Thus I want to introduce the research done on the hat law that contributed to my reflections on Ottoman and Turkish headgear.\footnote{On general clothing styles during in the early republic period see: Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan, *Cumhuriyet Modalari: 75 Yilda Değişen Yaşam, Değişen Insan, Bilanço ’98* Yayın Dizisi (Beşiktaş, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1999).}

Even though it is often assumed that the hat law of November 1925 addressed only men of Turkish citizenship, this is not exactly the case. Formulated gender neutrally it outlawed all headpieces besides brimmed European hats theoretically for all Turkish citizens. The hat law was applied to women as discussions about female teachers wearing hats and girls and women in vocation schools show, i.e. the wearing of hats in the school for nurses in 1925.\footnote{Ayten Sezer Arığ, *Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2007), 69. Sezer Arığ mentions reports on women wearing hats published in the daily *Cumhuriyet* of September 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th, 1925, see Ibid. 59, FN 27.} Yet, in accordance with a gendered notion of citizenship, it was more often applied to men, but Mustafa Kemal addressed women as well, as potential wearers of hats, as well as administrative orders and authorities that guarded the implication of the law.

Many accounts of the hat law take a teleological approach and consider the repressive measures that made its implication possible as unavoidable. Most of the time they rely on contemporary sources that propagate the hat as a measure that lead “the Turks” from the valley of barbarity to the peaks of (Western) civilization.\footnote{Some examples of these kind of approaches: Tülay Duran, ‘Bir İnkilab Modeli ’Şapka İnkilabı’, *Belgelerle Türk Tarhi: Dün, Bugün, Yarın, Özel Sayı* 44–46, no. special issue (1988); Tülay Duran, ‘Bir İnkilab Modeli “Şapka İnkilabı” II’, *Belgelerle Türk Tarhi: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, no. 47 (1989): 14–21; Mustafa Selim İmece, Atatürk’ün Şapka Devriminde Kastamonu ve İnebolu Seyahatleri, 1925, Türkiye İş Bankası Atatürk ve Devrim Serisi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959); Selami Kılıç, ‘Şapka Meselesi ve Kılık Kıyafet İnkilabı’, *Atatürk Yolu* 16, no. 4 (November 1995): 529–47; Mahmut Goloğlu, *Devrimerler ve Tepkileri: 1924-1930* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1979); Arığ, *Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma*.} One study conducted by Ayten Sezer Arığ is worth mentioning because it includes usage of archival material from the Turkish Republican Archive (BCA) and the archive of the Ministry of the Interior (EGM) and depicts many cases that dealt with conflicts concerning the implementation of the hat law.\footnote{See Arığ, *Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma*.} In detail she recounts the regulations of religious garb in the 1930s, their implementation and reactions to them. She specifically provides...
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insights into how different religious communities within Turkey received these regulations. Another approach I want to highlight, even though it by and large lacks primary sources, is İslam’da Başlık by Orhan Koloğlu.\textsuperscript{155} While he takes a similar modernist approach like most depictions of the hat law, he situates it in a broader historical and international context. This enables a more differentiated perspective on the meaning of the introduction of the hat. Koloğlu shows the meaning of the fez and hat in the context of European imperialism and changing meaning of these headpieces under the influence of various nationalisms. In addition, he traces the interdependence of headgear, nationalism and imperialism in other Islamicate societies and their reaction to the hat law in Turkey.

Another analysis which draws on these interdependences is Houchang Chehabi’s comparative account of Dresscodes for Men in Turkey and Iran.\textsuperscript{156} By means of dress reform for men, especially headgear, he compares the modernization process in both countries. In Iran in 1927 the “Pahlavi hat,” which resembled the French kepi, was introduced, and in 1935 the “international hat” was introduced, as the brimmed hat was called. Chehabi analyses the close interrelation between national independence in both countries, the “liberation” from imperialist influence and the change of headgear and its meaning.\textsuperscript{157}

Critics of the Turkish hat law were often classified as religious fanatics, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk used the law to eliminate all his “real”, prospective or alleged, opponents. In a recent publication on the Turkish hat law Camilla T. Nereid breaks with this often repeated dichotomy of progress and reaction. Instead of following the Kemalist paradigm which grants legitimacy to only one version of modernization she follows a model of multiple modernities and traces five different versions of it.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{157} In addition local studies on the implementation of the hat law have been conducted, such as: Dönüş Başarır, ‘Şapka İnkılâbının Konya Basını ve Komuoyundaki Yankıları’ (Yüksek Lisans, Selçuk, Sosyal Bilimleri Enstitüsü, 1995); Gürcan Bozkır, ‘Şapka Devriminin İzmir Basımdaki Yankıları’, Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi/Journal of Modern Turk Turkish Studies 1, no. 1 (1991): 109–53; Burcu Özcan, ‘Basına Göre Şapka ve Kılık Kıyafet İnkılabı’, (Master Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2008).
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There are several accounts of the protests against the hat law which draw on newspaper articles, material of the Independence Tribunals and archival material from the state archives.\textsuperscript{159} Information about and literature on the protests against the hat law are quite scarce. We do not have accounts of the events by the protesters themselves, and all studies on the reports and analysis on the events rely on the heavily censured newspaper articles and information given by the Independence Courts. Mete Tunçay critically studies the Kemalist one-party regime, scrutinizing also the implementation of the hat law and pointing out the drastic measures taken against opponents of the hat law, but offers no interpretation going beyond the modernist versus reactionary binary.\textsuperscript{160}

In the most resent monograph on early republican reforms with a focus on the politics of dress, Hale Yilmaz analyzes the interrelation of nation-building and modernization played out in the implementation of the hat law.\textsuperscript{161} Beyond a focus on open resistance her objective is to trace this implementation as well as forms of daily resistance through sources provided by material from the archive of the Ministry of the Interior and the Republican state archive. In addition, she also broadens the perspective from an analysis of men’s dress to politics of dress directed to women.

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\textsuperscript{160} See Tunçay, \textit{Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması}. Also Sakal Fahri goes beyond common depictions of the hat law by drawing on archival material which provides evidence of some difficulties concerning the implementation of the hat law, such as the question how prayer could be performed while wearing a hat. He draws attention to the fact that refusal of the hat was not always a matter of reactionism or religious fundamentalism but a merely economic one. People just could not afford to buy ready-made dress and hats imported from Europe. See Fahri Sakal, ‘Şapka İnkılâbının Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yönü. Destekler ve Köstekler’, \textit{Turkish Studies. International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic}. 2, no. 4 (2007): 1308–18.

\textsuperscript{161} Hale Yilmaz, \textit{Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey} (1923–1945) (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2013).
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1.5 Sources

“The contradictory attempt to ‘know’ the past, to become acquainted with the human beings who made it, leads us through archival sources that refuse to yield clear pictures. But because the archives provide unique clues about power relations, and about the human, moral, and philosophical quandaries faced by the people who produced them and by the people whose shadows inhabit them, we cannot afford to do without them.”

In this study I am mainly referring to sources from the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office), that deal with incidents related to male headgear. Most of the cases took place in Istanbul and its periphery, the Aegean region and the Balkans. These incidences appeared in a period from the mid-nineteenth century to World War I. I treat the fez boycott of 1908/1909 by means of some Ottoman and Turkis journal articles that discuss the advantages and disadvantages of certain headpieces, especially fez versus kalpak, as well as discussions about the European hat in the years before the promulgation of the hat law in 1925. For the period after World War I I also analyze the brief discussions on headgear that took place in the national assembly, as well as caricatures from the satirical magazines Aydede and Ayine. To trace the development of Ottoman male styles throughout the nineteenth century, I also looked at photographic collections, such as that by Engin Özendes. In chapter three, relating to the introduction of the fez by Mahmud II., I also draw on the work of the Ottoman chronicler Ahmed Lütfi Efendi.

1.6 Outline

In Chapter Two I refer to the appearance of nineteenth century bourgeois identity, modernization and the introduction of the fez in the Ottoman Empire. I discuss the application of postcolonial theory to the study of the Ottoman Empire and how this relates to late Ottoman politics of dress. Furthermore I introduce theories of alternative

1 Introduction

and multiple modernities and their relevance for an analysis of modernization in the Ottoman Empire. In the last part of the chapter I will analyze some sources and cases that deal with the implication of the obligatory wearing of the fez for civil officials introduced by Mahmud II and consider their implications.

Chapter Three deals with conflicts that appeared around headgear during the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909). Most archival documents I found that address headgear, are from that period. These Ottoman state archival documents treat incidents that took place in the Bulgarian Ottoman borderlands and the Aegean coast, in foreign and non-Muslims schools in the Ottoman Empire, and some other spaces. There I elaborate on the spacial dimension of identity construction and the negotiation of national territory through politics of dress as well as negotiations between local agents and the central state.

In Chapter Four I discuss the globalization of modern male attire and how it shaped discussions on consumption and masculinity. I argue that the phenomenon of the Ottoman dandy as a consumer of Western goods and its derision need to be considered within a global framework of late nineteenth century discourse on masculinities and their interrelation to modernization. It will become apparent that the globalization of modern male attire and with it Ottoman politics of dress are inseparable from Western European colonial endeavors and its civilizing mission.

Chapter Five is concerned with the politics of dress after the Young Turk coup d'état in 1908, with a focus on the fez boycott and a few other incidents. I follow the question if the search for a national hat, that came along with the fez boycott after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in fall 1908, brought about any significant changes in the politics of dress and identity. Even though the fez, due to the boycott other developments, became increasingly unfashionable among some individuals and parts of the population, and even had been replaced by the kalpak in some public offices and foremost for military ranks and police forces, its wearing was still reinforced on other occasions. Especially the wearing of the brimmed European hat was still opposed and repressed by Ottoman authorities, be it among employees of the railway or by Ottoman Muslim children promenading prominent public spaces with their fathers.

As my sources show a gap during World War I, in Chapter Six I take up the threat at around 1920 and briefly treat early Republican discussions on headgear and some
aspects of the promulgation of the hat law. I refer to Ottoman Turkish satirical periodicals of the early 1920s and their depictions of headgear and bourgeois styles of dress to discuss some aspects of this period’s discourse of dress. Journal articles help me to carve out continuities to earlier Ottoman debates about types of headgear as well as the significance attributed to headgear by these authors. Concerning the Turkish hat law of 1925 I address the discussion of gender and the family in Turkish President Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk]’s speeches that he held to propagate the wearing of the hat. Moreover I elaborate on the relation of secularism, religion and modernity and the polarized discussion of the hat law, in which all its opponents are termed as Islamic anti-modern religious reactionaries. I discuss the relation of modernity and religion with regard to the hat law, as well as to the concept of mimicry and the modern character of religiously founded lines of arguments against the hat law.
2 Ottoman Modernity and Bourgeois Culture: The Era of the Fez

This chapter will link the nineteenth century Ottoman dress reform to the emergence of bourgeois identity, and to the questions of modernization and Westernization. I will show the significance of dressing for the establishment of social order, looking at the multifaceted way modern bourgeois identity came into being on a global scale, and at how modernizing 'non-Western' states appropriated bourgeois cultural forms for their own purposes. Ottoman endeavors to modernize must be viewed within its entanglement with the nation-building project, which was “dominated for a century or more [...] by the effort to form and politically mobilize a national bourgeoisie.” Politics of dress were a crucial part of these efforts.

In the nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire existing legislation concerning dress was replaced by regulations that prescribed modern clothing for military and officials with the fez as an outstanding feature. However, legislation was not the only area which influenced the shift in dress codes. The reform had partly been initiated through permanent and increasing transgressions of existing Ottoman prescriptions. As early as the eighteenth century, Western European items including clothing have become more common amongst the Empire's subjects. This was due to the growing trade with western Europe and its changing patterns as part of the economic globalization and of the capitalist expansion of industrializing nation-states.

My leading questions will be the following: How can Ottoman modernization be conceptualized through the practice of dress and situated within a global system of capitalist modernity? I assume that politics of dress and relating practices reveal further information about the formation of modern identity on the one hand, and about techniques of modernity in general on the other hand.

For this purpose, I will first discuss notions of modernization and Westernization in

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1 Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789 - 2007* (New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2010), 13. Findley observes a continuity in these nation-building efforts from mid-19th to 20th century, thus emphasizing similarities between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic until the 1960s.

2 Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain had been and remained the main European trading partner of the Ottoman economy. Only later in the century, with the beginning of direct foreign investment in the 1880s, Britain lost out to Germany and especially France, which became the major foreign investor with a share of 30 to 50 percent. See Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: Tauris, 1997), 85.
their interrelation with colonialism, as well as refer to social, political and economic transformations that can be linked to the emergence of middle classes and modern bourgeois culture in the Ottoman Empire. In the second part of this chapter I study conflicts evolving around headgear and the politics of dress in the Ottoman Empire in order to come to a deeper understanding of the meaning and implications of the dress code introduced by Mahmud II in the 1820s.

2.1 Ottoman Empire and the Postcolonial Debate

One objective of my research is to situate the analysis of the Ottoman Empire in postcolonial politics and theory, since the Ottoman Empire even though not directly colonized was subject to European colonialist endeavors. The Ottoman Empire was located at the near margins of the emerging industrial capitalism like other powers, such as Russia and Austria-Hungary. It was initially much neglected by the study of Orientalism and subaltern studies, as an imperialist aggressor itself, or at least not as affected by European colonialism. Both views hinge on each other, but are not helpful to sufficiently explain Ottoman politics and the society, as the Ottoman Empire clearly was subject to European imperial endeavors and at least informal colonial politics. I think, that a crucial part to understanding Ottoman modernity is its place in the colonialist setting.

Since the late 1990s it has become more common to scrutinize Turkey and the Ottoman Empire through the perspective of postcolonial studies. The field became so extended that some review essays appeared summarizing the discussion. Vangelis Kechriotis argues for a critical application of the postcolonial agenda to Ottoman studies in order to make visible how “history and culture are utilized in politics in order to forge patterns of hierarchy” for the “study of power structures across diverse ethnic or religious boundaries.” In his essay on postcolonial studies and the Ottoman

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3 On this location of the Ottoman Empire in the European political geography see Brian Silverstein, ‘Sufism and Governmentality in the Late Ottoman Empire’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29, no. 2 (30 August 2013), 174.


5 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies,’ 43. See also Reina Lewis,
Empire, he points out that the Empire wasn’t included since it was considered as “not effectively colonized.” Kechriotis considers the first endeavors to include the Ottoman Empire into the study of colonialism and its ramifications as undertaken by historians of the nineteenth century as one of the colonizing states rather than colonized itself, rather critical. In “Ottoman Orientalism” Usama Makdisi argues that “Ottomanists, [...] have paid little attention to a notion of Ottoman imperialism” that Ottoman elites employed in the effort to create a modern nation-state. To make his point Makdisi uses the Ottoman perception of Arab lands as uncivilized and backward by Istanbul-centered Ottoman reformers who in contrast constructed Ottoman modernity as civilized and progressive. Kechriotis opposes Makdisi’s proposition that this Orientalist othering of some groups of Ottoman society decisively led to the formation of Turkish national identity. Similarly, Selim Deringil argues that the Ottoman elite adopted the mindset of its Western European enemies, a process he terms “borrowed colonialism.” Yet, in Deringil’s view “within this context colonialism was a ‘survival tactic’ and, therefore, the Ottoman Empire was very different from “the aggressive industrial empires of the West.” Indeed contributed the new dress codes also to the construction of an internal Other of Ottoman modernization that lacked the qualities necessary to challenge European claims to superiority. This ‘backwardness’ was considered as an obstacle to challenge western European hegemony.

Deringil emphasizes the impact of European colonialism on Ottoman self-perception. He shows that during the Hamidian era, the reign of Abdülhamid II, the Ottomans elites were keen about their international reputation and made efforts to counter Orientalist


6 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies’.
8 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies,’ 41. I do not agree with Kechriotis’ critic of Makdisi’s assessment, but believe that this kind of othering it is central, not just to the formation of Turkish modernity, but to modernity identity in general.
10 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies,’ 39.
representations in the international media. At the same time, they orientalized their own periphery.\textsuperscript{11} Ottoman efforts to manipulate its international image show the impact of colonialist discourse on the Ottoman Empire and an Ottoman understanding of colonialism that was “[…] as complex as interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.”\textsuperscript{12} These Ottoman politics scrutinized by Deringil deal with the question of how to counter European imperialism with regard to discussions on the desired degree of Ottoman Westernization. I think Deringil’s account on Ottoman self-perception is helpful and crucial for the study of dress, because many of the implications of his study come into effect here. Nevertheless, the adoption of colonialist attitudes by local elites towards their respective population is not a case of Ottoman exceptionalism, but appears in many different colonial settings, as we will see later.\textsuperscript{13}

In my own point of view, the colonialist experience deeply shaped Ottoman and Turkish state- and identity-building, but from different dimensions. The Ottoman elites reproduced colonialist discourse and practices. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire was not a colonialist state in the same sense as the Western imperialist states which drew economic surplus and other kinds of power from their colonialist dominance in the Middle East and elsewhere. Even though the Ottoman state tried to adopt and was partly successful in adopting colonialist practices, the state and its inhabitants were in a deeper sense affected by western European colonialist politics. Nevertheless, the adoption of colonial practices by the Ottoman Empire had far-reaching consequences that can be traced to this day, be it in the construction of identities, bodily practices, everyday life, and state- and nation-building.

Kechriotis himself argues for a comparative approach and against a model of Ottoman exceptionalism: in comparison with parameters set by the “imperial turn” in historical research, the Ottoman Empire should be compared to other empires,\textsuperscript{14} as should the

\textsuperscript{11} See Deringil, \textit{The Well-Protected Domains}, therein especially Chapter 6 and 7 “Ottoman Self Image Management and Damage Control” and “The Ottoman Self Portrait,” 135-165: Ottoman diplomats fought popular Orientalism, such as theater plays, by demanding from high officials to stop performances of these plays, see Ibid., 142-143.


\textsuperscript{13} This phenomenon is one of the main objectives of Partha Chatterjee’s study on nationalism in India. See Partha Chatterjee, \textit{The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories} (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).

\textsuperscript{14} That entailed questions such as: Was contempt towards Balkan peoples similar or same as European
perspective that was provided by the presence of other empires in the Ottoman Empire taken into account, such as the impact of the capitulations or status of extraterritoriality for many individuals. Loss of ground in the international power balance led to the use of the capitulations for interventions in Ottoman domestic affairs. Non-Muslim subjects could profit from the presence of colonial powers. In Kechrioti’s view, “this describes a picture where the ruler and the ruled, the colonizer and the colonized, the dominant and the subaltern, were continuously changing roles.” That also concerns Ottoman politics of dress where these power relations were negotiated through the question of headgear.

Moreover, the Christian middle class’ sense of superiority and its mission civilisatrice within their vision of Ottoman society beyond nationalist and separatist passions lead to fissions between ethnically distinct elites. This led to rivalry between ethnically-marked middle classes and their claims to Ottomanism and concerns that the Young Turk version of Ottomanism would bring competing concepts of it to extinction. These different concepts of Ottomanism became for instance negotiated in the conflicts between proponents of the hat and those of the fez or other pieces of headgear. Furthermore Kechriotis asks whether the debate about colonialist overtones in Ottoman discourse can be extended from the 19th century to the period after 1908, with its critique of Tanzimat reform endeavors, and a new kind of bureaucratic and military elite. He also asks if the emergence of a new middle class which sought to take over control of lower classes, and the new hegemony established by these middle classes had the quality of internal colonialism. I think that its definitely worth to extent Kechriotis considerations on the colonialist mind set of Ottoman elites to the Young Turk period. In terms of politics of dress and the question of headgear this becomes especially apparent in the promulgation of the Turkish hat law in 1925 and its orientalist othering of those who did not comply to these kind of social etiquette.

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16 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies,’ 42.

17 Ibid., 43.

18 The Young Turk period here defined as the period from 1908 till the end of the one party regime in Turkey in 1950. See Zürcher, Turkey; and Erik J. Zürcher, 'Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908-1938’, in Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 151–179.
Fatma Müge Göçek emphasizes as well the strength of a postcolonial approach that concentrates on power relations in order to dismantle them by analysis of power-knowledge relations. At the same time she questions postcolonial theory's ability to fully grasp Ottoman modernity.\textsuperscript{19} The aim of postcolonial theory was “destabilizing the detrimental impact of 18th- and 19th-century western European modernity on the rest of the world,” deconstruct Western hegemony, and challenge and question its impact.\textsuperscript{20} Thereby, it enabled to depict the fluidity and flexibility of social boundaries, and it challenged “Eurocentric, Orientalist formulations that had reified differences and divides, anachronistically mapping onto the empire binarisms introduced much later by European colonial rule.”\textsuperscript{21} She assesses that sometimes it was difficult to differentiate between Western and domestic practices, and thus the local content of European colonial impact remained unclear. Moreover would a focus on Ottoman formal political power neglect how different groups negotiated power and relations between them. Erroneously, the motor of change in the Ottoman realm, she argues, was often located in Europe. An issue that was as also criticized by Isa Blumi in his various studies, that I will later refer to.\textsuperscript{22} Yet Göçek in this essay criticizes Blumi for constructing a monolithic West opposed to the Ottoman Empire. I would rather suggest that the problem is that Göçek in contrast to Blumi conceptualizes the Ottoman Empire as something apart from the West. Whereas I consider the West as created by various dynamics within the Empire itself or within global dynamics in which the Ottoman Empire participated.\textsuperscript{23} Yet she rightly points out and my studies also later will show, that

“the nature of the interaction between the Ottoman state and its officials on the one side and the local populace on the other was complex, in that it significantly varied not only from one province to the next but also over time.”\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{19} Göçek, ‘Postcoloniality, the Ottoman Past and the Middle East Present’.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 550.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 552.
\textsuperscript{23} See Göçek, ‘Postcoloniality, the Ottoman Past and the Middle East Present,’ 555.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 555.
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She negates the usefulness of a postcolonial approach to grasp these dynamics, and argues that “Blumi dismisses provincial variation in regard to relations with Western actors.” On the other hand I think that Isa Blumi’s studies simply focused on local agency in relation to the central state’s and Western dominance, various appropriations, and resistance to modern forms and practices. These were really helpful to think through my own cases which deal with center-periphery relations. Albeit, Göçek, similarly in my opinion to Blumi whom she actually criticizes, takes a critical stance towards the term modernization and its application to all different phenomena of Ottoman governance appearing in the period considered as modernization of the Empire. This provides a special challenge to the analysis of phenomenons of modernization, because they are just too easily considered from a Eurocentric analytical point of view as emanating from and resulting in Western dominance of which the Ottoman Empire was excluded per se. And yet, hegemonic power structures indeed went along not only with the East-West dichotomy but as well traverse. Thus, the complexity of the Ottoman concept of governance is quite compatible with postcolonial theory rather than beyond its scope, as Göçek argues.  

Recent scholarship elaborated the colonial context of Ottoman modernization. This is not to neglect Ottoman agency and self-interest in the modernization project, but to pay attention to historical, cultural, social, and economic conditions under which they took place. This leads to the question in which way postcolonial and subaltern studies dealing with directly colonized territories might be applied to the informal colonialism exercised on the Ottoman state and its population. In his essay, Boğac Ergene asks what a postcolonial critique of subaltern studies may have to teach Ottoman historiography.  

He concludes that the methodological contributions made especially by Gyan Prakash and Gayatri Spivak opened up opportunities to reread Ottoman sources and overcome their limited scope to make the heterogeneity of discourses visible. He is especially interested in the question of how to read subaltern voices from (state) archival documents. To put it in more general terms: how to make subaltern voices visible, and in that context, how to conceptualize relations between different strata in society and what that implicates on

25 See Ibid., 557.
the historian’s relation to the subject of history and to knowledge. These questions refer to the matter of if subaltern subjects have the ability to speak at all, which are related to points Gayatri Spivak put forward in her discussion of sati. Another question touches subaltern-elite relations and the permeability of cultural and socio-economic boundaries. This includes an approach which regards the category of subaltern not as a homogeneous entity, but as undetermined, hybrid, and fluid. These questions also become relevant when looking at incidences related to headgear that are recorded in state archival documents: How was the wider population concerned with the spread of modern bourgeois dress and manners? How did this play out in the interrelation between the state and its populations?

In terms of subaltern-elite relations, Ergene refers to Stuart Hall’s concept which stresses interaction and dialog and the crucially “mimic” character of these relations. He also drew on Florencia Mallon’s approach on the reading of subaltern voices from archival sources by applying a postmodern literary analysis rather then trying to extract the truth from these materials. This kind of approach creates a dialogical relation between the historian, his subject, and the sources. The quest is making subaltern voices visible, and that aims at countering colonial and nationalist history which ignored them. This comes along with some specificities as to where to find the voices of the subalterns if no documents exist, and poses the question of if “the rebel always speaks the language of the oppressor.” Thus there is a need for the application of methods which make visible the “subaltern hidden transcript” through revealing “blind spots, ruptures, and silences” in hegemonic discourses.

In historiography about the Ottoman Empire, leftist historians in the 1960s to 1980s struggled with countering the existing narration which idealized Ottoman social relations in terms of social cleavages. They analyzed Ottoman society with a historical materialist approach and its focus on modes of production. That enabled them to make social struggles visible, yet it neglected non-economic factors of social structure and the religious and cultural diversity of Ottoman society. The latter is also the case in my

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28 Ergene, ‘Maduniyet Okulu, Post-Kolonyal Elestiri ve Tarihte Bilgi-Özne Sorunu: Osmanlı Tarihçiliği İcin Yeni Dersler Mi? [Subaltern Studies, Postcolonial Critic and the Subject-Object Problem in History: New Lessons for Ottoman Historiographie],’ 34.
29 Ibid., 44.
analysis, that shows how cultural symbols like headgear attained meaning within a complex and diverse social system, without disregarding the economic conditions behind their spread and appropriation as well their proscription.

The neglect of culture and religion by the leftist historiography left the impact of Islam and its language as a variable in social struggles, as Ergene put it, to conservative and nationalist academics. In the 1990s different approaches emerged, such as Linda Darling’s, that shed a light on Islam as a legitimating factor of the dynasty and the state. These authors pointed out that Islam and its customs functioned to unite the state and its subjects, and achieve social peace expressed in the notion of the “just and genuine Muslim state.”

Ergene yet suspects another problem here, which was the lack of a critical approach. This led, amongst others, the interpretation of the lack of insurrections during certain Ottoman periods as social harmony, and was not able to spot conflicts in state-subject relations and sources of conflict or suppression. These approaches were not able to make the social differences visible that were oppressed by the legitimizing structures, when the alleged well-being of the populace was just an instrument of power to keep social peace. These also encompassed overlooking alternative conceptions of justice, and the conflicts they provoked finally lead to struggles of the central state with local power holders. This lead Ergene back to the postcolonial epistemological approach and its attempt to read archival sources according to their silences and absences. Thus this puts the historian into dialogue with these sources. Through them, her or his historical subjects’ aim is to make fault lines, silences and suppressions visible. Thus, what is needed, Ergene concluded, is a combination of “critical orientation with sensitivity to the cultural, religious and discursive peculiarities of Ottoman social structure.”

Over the past twelve years since Ergene posed his question, quite some contributions have been made to prove his hypothesis true, some of which I want to introduce here. One approach to re-situate the Ottoman Empire in the colonial context is a reference to Dipesh Chakrabaty’s project of Provincializing Europe. Especially

30 “Adil ve hakiki Islam devleti.” See Ibid., 46.
31 Ibid. 42.
32 Ibid. 42.
discourses on Westernization implying essentialized notions of the West and Europe leading to constructions of a 'backward Orient' versus 'the modern, civilized and progressive West', an issue very relevant for the study of the modernization of dress, necessitate the questioning of the conceptualization of these notions and their usefulness as analytical categories. Andrew Davison applies Chakrabarty's concepts to Ziya Gökalp's theories, who was one of the main ideologues of Turkish nationalism, and situates him within this anti-colonial framework. In his opinion, Gökalp's thoughts can be interpreted within Chakrabarty's term of the subaltern split, where European categories become adopted by colonized subjects who at the same time reject its dominance. This would lead to what Chakrabarty designated as the Provincializing of Europe. Davison's insights transferred to the study of dress draws attention to the relation of the colonialist discourse to Ottoman/Turkish nationalism, which in this context cannot be considered isolated.

Likewise, the Ottoman author Ahmet Midhat's and the Young Turk Ahmed Rıza's thoughts were scrutinized though the lense of postcolonial theory. Ömer Turan suggests to count Ahmed Rıza among the Ottoman intellectuals who took a stance towards colonialism, and thus to considers Rıza's book *Bati'nin Doğu Politikasinin Ahlaken İflası* from a postcolonial perspective. Turan criticizes the absence of the Ottoman Empire from postcolonial studies due to Edward Said's argument in *Orientalism* that the Ottoman Empire was an imperialist state itself. He also argues that postcolonial studies focused on a specific kind of colonialism that doesn't include informal colonialism. He considers Ahmet Midhat as a very important figure for the analysis of late nineteenth century discourses on Westernization. Mehmet Saraçoğlu examines

34 Andrew Davison, 'Ziya Gökalp and Provincializing Europe', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26, no. 3 (2006): 377–90.
36 *The Moral Failure of the West's Eastern Politics*
Midhat’s utopian book Müşahedat as a response to Orientalism on both a thematic level as well the problematic level of Orientalism. Midhat engages in a theoretical debate about the differences of late Ottoman Islamic and modern-Western world views. In his delineation of an ideal Ottoman society, Midhat constructed a world which is modern and Ottoman. Saraçoğlu proposes that Ahmet Midhat represented a “non-nationalist side of the Ottoman experience with modernity,” which had later disappeared with the emergence of the Young Turk thought. Albeit, Midhat, he argues, had already focused on issues relating to the confrontation of the Ottoman Empire with the West, a perspective that had later been translated into exclusionist Turkish nationalist visions.

Turan argued that next to the study of center-periphery relations as accomplished by Deringil, a way to open a postcolonial perspective on the Ottoman Empire was to add Ottoman intellectuals' reaction to European hegemony to postcolonial critique and analysis. I think that beyond intellectual history, it is necessary to consider cultural and political phenomenons in light of the imperialist impact, and combine these two levels of analysis. Individual statements need to be considered within the larger framework of state- and nation-building and shifting relations of power and domination between the Ottoman and other states and within the Ottoman Empire. This opens up the possibility to consider phenomenons other then explicitly anti-colonial statements, and to analyze shifting relations of power and domination within Ottoman society.

It is therefore necessary to transcend the sharp distinction between Islamic civilization and the modern West, which has been perpetuated by the historian Bernard Lewis amongst others, and include Islamist critics of the West into the postcolonial paradigm. Even though this distinction is “no longer endorsed in established scholarly

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38 See Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (Tokyo: Zed Books Ltd in Komm., 1986): The distinction between thematic and problematic is employed by Partha Chatterjee in his analysis of postcolonial nationalism. He differentiates between the claims made by postcolonial nationalism (problematic) and its justifying structures (thematic). While on the level of the problematic of nationalism Orientalist assumptions of a non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign Oriental subject are refused, the thematic of nationalism on the other hand adopts essentialized conceptions of East versus West.


literature on the Middle East [...] it has been reproduced in Turkish intellectual history and has been embraced by various Islamist and secular thinkers [...]”\textsuperscript{42}. This has been taken into account when scrutinizing the critics of the West. To understand the developments during the Republican period, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of anti-Western critiques of the Late Ottoman Period, of which Cemil Aydin gave a detailed account from various perspectives, which help me in considering my sources.\textsuperscript{43}

Selim Deringil offers a comparative approach to the analysis of the intellectual encounters with the West between the Ottoman Empire and Japan.\textsuperscript{44} Beyond certain differences, the Ottoman Empire being part of the European state system since early modern times and Japan’s distinct policy of isolation, intriguing similarities provide him grounds for comparison. According to Deringil, for both states a perceived threat from the West led to an encompassing modernization process triggered by war: in the case of Japan the Opium War in China in 1840-42, and in the Ottoman case the European powers’ intervention against the invasion of Anatolia by Muhammed Ali of Egypt. Both modernization projects were seeking “a place in the world” for their state, and questioned the degree to which reform was imposed by the West or result of internal impetus. In the end, the Ottoman Empire, together with Japan, had become the only non-western powers not being colonized and furthermore recognized as Great Power. Deringil encourages further comparative study on intellectual encounters and their way of constructing modernity in order to answer questions on the relation between them and state politics towards western imperialism. A different aspect of the comparison between Japan and Ottoman polity was stressed by Binnaz Toprak who scrutinized economic developments in relation to cultural transformation.\textsuperscript{45} She concludes that Japan’s success in modernization relied on its interpretation of modernization as industrialization while republican Turkey concentrated on cultural transformation. Even though I doubt that this is a sufficient explanation for economical “success” or “failure,” her study is nevertheless relevant in regards to a comparison of various discourses on Westernization and modernization.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 441.
\textsuperscript{43} Aydin’s study is complemented by Ahmet Kuyas’ essay on anti-imperialist thought from the Young Turk Period to the 1930s. See Ahmet Kuyas, ‘Yeni Osmanlilar’dan 1930’lara Antiimperialist Düşünce’, in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, ed. Ahmet Insel (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).
\textsuperscript{44} Selim Deringil, ‘Intellectual Encounters with the West: The Cases of Turkey and Japan’, New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 35 (2006): 65–83.
In order to grasp emerging and possibly competing concepts of the West and modernity in the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary not to restrict the scope to Ottoman Muslims but to take views and experiences of Ottoman non-Muslims into account. A comparison between Greek and Turkish nationalism concerning East-West dichotomies and the notion of tradition is accomplished by Haris Exerzoğlu.\textsuperscript{46} Despite their differences, he assesses that Greek nationalist and Islamic agendas made similar references to tradition while at the same time appropriating Western knowledge. Views towards the West of the rum (Greek-Orthodox) population of the Ottoman Empire were often as ambivalent as those of Muslims even though a greater affinity to the West and modernity was imputed on them. The promotion of Greek nationalism contained a distancing from the West and Western dominance even though it enjoyed great popularity and support among the dominant European nations.

Haris Exertoğlu studied how Christian Orthodox intellectuals in their thoughts on modernization conceptualized the East-West dichotomy in relation to the Greek nationalist project.\textsuperscript{47} His study provides important insight into the social complexity of existing relations to the West within the Ottoman Empire. In the center of the discourse on the West was Western power, and in relation to nationalism, its power to “corrupt” the Other in its cultural authenticity: At the same as time Ottoman state authorities treated certain groups such as nomads as non-modern and uncivilized, and thus legitimized their subjection, among Ottoman Greeks the question that was discussed if Turks were unable to civilize and barbaric, or as the other side of the coin could be regarded as noble savages. Thus, the the East-West dichotomy formed relations between the different Ottoman communities.

Yet within Ottoman communities views on the West and images of the West were not uniform. What can be generalized is the widespread symbolic use of the East-West dichotomy and the construction of meaning through it. According to Exertoğlu, personified images of the West as “archetyped characters of Western penetration [...] generated discourses about community and the self.”\textsuperscript{48} Even if the discourse on the West


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 45.
carried different and competing meanings, reference to the West and the unequal relations to the West were inherent in these interpretations and appropriations. This encompassed the internalization of the fundamental polarities of Western discourse such as East-West, civilization-barbarity, modern-tradition. These dualities were at play and structured the imagination, even when utterances were meant as a distancing from and a critique of the West.

What constituted a difference from a complete adoption of Western hegemony was the perception of the West as a threat that questioned the universality of the Western discourse. This became apparent with the rise of Greek orthodox educational institutions and curricular, as Exertoğlu depicts, and their ambivalent relation of tradition and modernization. The Greek-speaking urban elite who established these institutions emphasized references to Greek tradition and attributed it a central role in legitimizing the nationalist project. They promoted “indigenous” religious, national, and moral values. Reference here was not made to Western culture, but to a notion of the East and a renaissance of Eastern Greek Orthodox identity, explicitly distinct from modernity. Still, this was, Exertoğlu states, not a conservative reaction, but part of a modernist discourse located within modern educational institutions and intended as a measure to keep pace with the modernizing process. In that, Rum reformers and intellectuals denounced the “aping” of European manners and adoption of Western ways and constructed the West as the other of Eastern identity. The self was to be recovered and civilized through Eastern values. Greek nationalists regarded the East as the location of tradition and culture which had to be restored.49 Thus foreign/Western Christian missions were considered as a threat. Affiliations of the East with Islam were not considered by Rum reformers, rather they associated the East with Hellenization as a means to enter modernity without imitation.50 This ambivalent relation to the West was shared by many Greek-speaking intellectuals and as we will later see is inherent to the discourse of modernity itself.51

Exertzoğlu's investigation enables to grasp the complexities of Ottoman society that cannot be understood by simple binary divisions between East and West or Islam and Christianity. The ubiquitousness of references to tradition and to modern bourgeois

49 See Ibid., 52-53.
50 Ibid., 53.
51 Exertzoğlu situates Greek nationalist discourse and its stance towards the West within Partha Chatterjee's analysis of postcolonial nationalism. See Ibid.
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culture is something that will keep reappearing in the discourse on headgear and throughout this study.

2.2 Concepts of the West and Multiple Modernities

It already became clear that one area of study of the influence of hegemonic European or modern paradigms is the topos of Westernization.\textsuperscript{52} The concept of the West was central to the efforts of Ottoman modernization. Viewed from the perspective of international relations the Ottoman state stood in manifold and contradictory relations to the West. On the one hand, it was a part of the West as a part of the Concert of Europe. On the other hand, Orientalist fantasies kept constructing the Ottoman Empire as the other of the West or of Europe. The West is not meant as a fixed geographical entity but as a concept which contains many aspects of modernity, and in a certain (Eurocentric) understanding is even congruent with the latter. The concept of the West emerged with modernity. It is an imagined space within which modernity was located. The Ottoman Empire actively contributed to the making of the West as much as “available perceptions of the West were integral part of the way individual subjects and social groups made sense of the World and themselves.”\textsuperscript{53}

Linked to the postcolonial approach are the question of modernity, the relation of the Ottoman state to modernity, and the notion of modernity when trying to locate what was modern and what isn’t. Is it useful to draw on approaches that work with notions of alternative or multiple modernities instead of drawing on a monolithic notion of modernity that’s inevitably linked to that of Western civilization? Or is it rather useful to extend the concept of Western modernity to global dimensions?\textsuperscript{54}

One of the questions asked is when did modernity appear in the Ottoman Empire,

\textsuperscript{52} An essay by Engin Deniz Akarlı, dealing with changing relations of center and periphery in the era of European imperialism, traces the entanglement of Ottoman politics, European imperial domination and threat, changing attitudes towards Westernization, and the changes brought about by the establishment of the Turkish Republic; see Engin Deniz Akarlı, ‘The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—An Overview’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26, no. 3 (2006): 353–66.

\textsuperscript{53} Exertzği̇l, ‘Metaphors of Change: “Tradition” and the East/West Discourse in the Late Ottoman Empire,’ 45.

\textsuperscript{54} I have already mentioned Arif Dirlik’s substantial critic of approaches of alternative and multiple modernities; see Arif Dirlik, ‘Thinking Modernity Historically: Is “Alternative Modernity” the Answer?’, *Asian Review of World Histories* 1, no. 1 (January 2013): 5–44, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.12773/arwh.2013.1.1.005.
or when the Ottoman Empire became modern. Additionally, to what extent is modernity connected with industrialized capitalism, state organization and subject-state relations, and the creation of citizenship and bourgeois society? Şerif Mardin claims that modernity in the Ottoman Empire can be traced back to the 16th century if “understood as the development of pragmatic rationality in administrative practices and diversion from the Islamic code.”

Alev Çınar argues that one should talk rather of “creative adaptation” of modernity in non-Western contexts than of servile imitation or an inorganic imposition from outside or above. By opening the view to multiple modernities, one would avoid disregarding forms of modernity which weren't common or existent in Europe and aren't recognized.

“The claim that modernity is an exclusively European product becomes a self-fulfilling hypothesis, because other forms of modernity that do not comply with European norms either are conveniently categorized as belonging to the realm of the pre-modern or traditional or are simply disregarded as anomalies altogether.”

In addition to a definition of modernity for this study beyond modernist terms, it is also important to critically scrutinize Ottoman and Turkish definitions of modernity and what they included and excluded.

İbrahim Kaya criticizes perspectives that equal modernization to Westernization in non-Western societies, thus denying an option of non-Western modernities. Therefore he develops from the Turkish case a notion of modernity which contains a plurality of modernities. In his study of the ideas of İzmirli İsmail Hakki, M. Özervarlı discusses alternative approaches to modernity next to materialist perspectives in the late Ottoman Empire. He analyses how modernity was discussed in religious circles. He also shows that tradition was rather a part of modernity than its opposite.

Ottoman modernization discourse functions within the narrow framework of

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56 See Ibid., 2.
57 Ibid., 3.
58 Ibrahim Kaya, Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience (Liverpool Univ. Press, 2004).
thought of the “the West and the Rest,” a premise still valid for contemporary Turkish society. My interest here is twofold: I want to scrutinize both how Ottoman politics contributed to the construction of this dichotomous concept and the consequences of this dichotomy for Ottoman society. And maybe also a third point: What existed beyond bipolar constructions: “alternative modernities or alternatives to modernization?” Which kinds of conceptions of difference appeared? And how were concepts of the West and modernity employed to construct a national bourgeoisie?

I will draw on Stuart Hall’s thoughts on the emergence of the West as a historical concept with the wake of European colonialism. According to Hall, the idea of the West appeared with European expansion in the fifteenth century and was deeply entangled with colonialism. Western societies came to be regarded as modern societies. The West became the space of modernity, and understood as advanced, developed, industrial, capitalist and secular. In addition, the idea of Europe as the first center of the West was tightly infused with Christianity. The West as a historical construct became the category used to measure and classify societies along the standards of a certain type of modern society, which saw the West as the exclusive retainer of modernity, set against all “the Rest.” Hall states that while this type of society first emerged in Western Europe, the West is not located exclusively there. By now, any society acquiring certain characteristics could become a Western society. In Europe such processes took place with the brake from feudalism, and at many different levels: economical, social, political and cultural. The West functioned as a value system similar to an ideology. Yet in order to fully grasp the meaning of the West and its power, Hall suggests to treat it as a discourse, a system of representation, that can be analyzed by looking at the discursive strategies which produce it. It is then a coherent entity which incorporates the self-image of Western societies. Opposing to its Other by idealization and degradation and through fantasies of desire, it fails to recognize and respect difference and imposes European

62 Exactly when, where, which and how changes took place could be further differentiated from a historical point of view to prevent teleological and homogenizing tendencies of an analysis of modernity. That includes the historization of such notions as capitalism and feudalism.
categories and norms on societies regarded as different. The Rest became essential to the construction of the West, which constituted itself through the colonizion of the Other, while the Other - or the Rest - was already an active part of this process through strategies of resistance and appropriation. The appearance of modernity in western Europe (and then in the West) was conditioned by interrelations with what was considered the Other, as regards to these parts of Europe. At the same time, Western hegemony became more and more established and it remained the model, the prototype, and the measure of social progress: “It was Western progress, civilization, rationality, and development that were celebrated.”

A last point I want to stress is the significance of the discourse of the West and the Rest

“as formative for the West and 'modern societies' as were the secular state, capitalist economies, the modern class, race, and gender systems, and modern, individualist, secular culture - the four main 'processes' of our formation story.”

For my own study, I will focus on how the subject of the West and the Rest were negotiated through the politics of dress and on the importance and visibility of this discourse.

Headgear was a crucial means in forming first Ottoman and later Turkish modern identity, and a crucial means in expressing and negotiating relations to the West. It was a marker of difference and equality. The concept of the West versus the Rest assumes that there is only one model of and one road to modernity that is congruent to a certain notion of the West. Anti-colonial movements and theories argue that modernity does not necessarily need to be Western. This is where concepts of multiple and alternative modernities come into play. The example of headgear shows the complexity of processes of identification and the difficulty to produce unequivocal and distinct meanings of certain symbols and practices. According to Bill Ashcroft,

“alternative, or non-Western modernities emerge either by the development of hybridized cultural forms through the appropriation of those of Western modernity or by the introduction of innovative, and thus truly alternative forms of modernity.”

64 Ibid., 225.
65 Ibid., 225.
66 Bill Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial,’ *ARIEL* 40, no. 1 (January
Yet he emphasizes that “neither of these forms has emerged out of thin air.” Theories of alternative or multiple modernities put emphasis on the dynamic relationship between Western and colonized or non-Western societies, between those states regarded the cradle of Western modernity and the Rest. A key thought of this framework relates to the reciprocal character of these relationships, in contrast to the modernization paradigm which regards modernization as a process of diffusion from a flow of knowledge, techniques, forms of government, institutions, and practices from the West to the East. Instead, Ashcroft points out, it was important to note that many postcolonial researchers and activists considered Western modernity as an outcome of the interrelations between colonial centers and peripheries. Later modernizing states had not depended on a Western European model that they were more or less keen to copy. Rather, Ashcroft assesses, multiple forms of modernity did emerge during the process of modernization, not just as alternatives to Western modernity, but also within the West. In fact, from the beginning different forms of modernization existed and developed within global dynamics. Thus one of my research questions is whether the conceptualization of Ottoman modernity is rather an alternative model to Western modernity, a copy of Western modernity, a part of Western modernity in a way that it was subsumed under Western hegemony, or rather an active contributor to the making of the West?

Bill Ashcroft talks about the way global modernities appropriated, adapted and transformed modernity while he stresses that modernity was much more adapted rather then adopted, a process which contains a (re-)creation of modernity. The fact that
modernity consists of a multiplicity of characteristics and different kind of modernities which put emphasis on its different traits was often overlooked. Thus modernity should not be reduced to things such as a capitalist economy, even though that was an important feature of it. In her study on modernity and Islam, Alev Çınar also emphasizes that the notion of modernity contains multiple dimensions as constitutive parts of social, political and economical life.\textsuperscript{71} An analysis of (non-Western) modernities thus needs to consider which of the elements of modernity are addressed on one hand, and needs to be careful not to overemphasize certain characteristics as ultimate measures of (Western) modernity on the other hand.

Within these lines, Ashcraft draws on Charles Taylor's differentiation between a cultural and a-cultural notions of modernity. The former was a teleological concept that considered a certain form of economical progress and structure as inevitable and neglected that its becoming was related to a certain cultural milieu.

“The inevitable effect of this was that globalization came to be seen a-culturally so that the diffusion of capital, industrialization, urbanization and the spread of education implied a unified world and a homogeneous program of development available to all.”\textsuperscript{72}

In a similar manner, Dipesh Chakrabarty assesses that modernity was often viewed from a political perspective, encompassing state, bureaucracy and capitalist enterprise, disregarding “certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of Europe.”\textsuperscript{73} Thus, as Ashcroft remarks, modernity takes the form of both particular conditions as well as a certain mode of representation.

The notion of multiple modernities was introduced by Samuel Eisenstadt.\textsuperscript{74} His concept was directed against classical theories of modernity such as Marx's, Durkheim's and, to a great extent, Weber, who assumed that modernity as a cultural program and its basic institutional constellations would spread with modernization completely

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{71} Such as discourse, culture, historical epoch, lifestyle, movement, project mindset, constitutionalism, secularism capitalism, industrialization, democracy. See Çınar, \textit{Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey}.
\bibitem{72} Ashcroft, 'Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial,' 89.
\bibitem{73} Chakrabarty, \textit{Provincializing Europe}. as cited in Ashcroft, 'Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial,' 85.
\end{thebibliography}
throughout societies. In contrast, Eisenstadt notes, modernizing societies refuted homogenizing and hegemonic characteristics of the “Western program of modernity”, and gave rise to multiple ideological patterns which were still distinctly modern.\textsuperscript{75} These multiple forms of modernity evolved under the influence of respective local conditions and experiences. Joint anti-Western and anti-modern themes did not make their modern character extinct. Likewise it didn't abolish Western modernity as a crucial and ambivalent reference point.

To Eisenstadt an important point of understanding multiple modernities was to distinguish modernization from Westernization, as he considered both as maybe intersecting but not identical. A view that I would consider critically, and contrasts Eisenstadt's account to such as Ashcroft's or Stuart Hall's. Eisenstadt regards Western patterns thereby as an authentic precedent amongst others and as a reference point.\textsuperscript{76} The question arising here was if there was a common core of modernity in its multiple forms. An answer might be found in Eisenstadt's definition of the history of modernity or of modernity itself. He describes it as a “continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs,”\textsuperscript{77} where multiple actors on different levels of society and kinds of institutions produce unique expressions of modernity.

Modernity as it emerged in Western and Central Europe, according to Eisenstadt, had as its cultural and political program “distinct ideological as well as institutional premises”\textsuperscript{78} such as shifts in the conception of human agency, and the questioning of social, ontological, and political orders. Additionally, modernities respond to these same problematics, and in their answers they also remained within the very same. Another crucial element of modernity was the construction of boundaries of collectivities and collective identities. Thus modernity in that sense can be defined as a permanent negotiation between the general and the particular, between equality and difference. Eisenstadt also notes that internal antinomies in general are a characteristic of modernity, such as between freedom and control, or autonomy and restriction, individual and collective, constructional or primordial definitions of collective identities, or modern and traditional. These clashes between different conceptions of state and society and

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{76} See Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{78} See Ibid., 5.
conflicts arising from that were crucial to societies' self-perception as modern.\textsuperscript{79}

Meltem Ahıska offers the term Occidentalism to provide a fresh framework of analysis of Ottoman and Turkish modernity.\textsuperscript{80} She argues that the East/West dichotomy and a certain perception was constitutive of both Turkish modernity (which for her also encompasses Ottoman modernization) and its historiography. Therefore, accounts on Ottoman and Turkish modernity very much concentrated on the framework of either the success or failure which also takes reference to a Western model perceived as original. This is because both models and Turkish modernity itself are based on temporal and spacial imaginations relying on backward versus progress and East versus West dichotomies. While modernization theory prescribed a linear progression of modernity, it at the same time essentialized space. Thus the above approaches to Turkish modernity remained “within the problematic of imitation,”\textsuperscript{81} where modernity moves from the Western centers to the margins, neglecting the complexity and crisis of (Western) modernity itself. In order to re-conceptualize the analyses of Ottoman and Turkish modernity, it was required to ask how notions like impact, influences or imitation can be conceived. Ahıska also suggests the application of hitherto neglected tools of postcolonial theory to dismantle dichotomous constructions of progress and tradition, West and East, and a historical representation of self and other along these lines. Albeit, Ahıska is also critical of concepts of alternative of multiple modernities because of their dismissal of the power of Western hegemony.\textsuperscript{82} Therefore, she proposes the use of the notion of Occidentalism, which on the one hand included Western powers, and on the other hand took agency of the postcolonial subjectivity of the Other into account. In addition, the concept enabled to make visible the contribution of the Other to the construction of the West and the multiplicity of notions of the West. In contrast to approaches of alternative and multiple modernities, Ahıska argued, Occidentalism acknowledged the inscription of Western dichotomies into the project of modernity and thus of alternative modern identities.\textsuperscript{83} With regard to Turkish nationalism, she makes the important remark that

\textsuperscript{79} See Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 357.
\textsuperscript{82} Even though as we have seen above this is not the case. Ashcroft as well as Eisenstadt take Western hegemony in serious consideration. See Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial’, and Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’.
\textsuperscript{83} Although that is exactly what Eisenstadt does, see Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’.
within Turkish nationalism different notions of the West existed once at the same time, and through an Occidentalist perspective these can be made visible. In addition, the concept enabled to consider the unequal power relations implied into the concept of the West, and how postcolonial elites used it to achieve hegemony in their respective nation-states.

2.3 The Making of Bourgeois Identity and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond

In order to decenter the western European modern experience and European agency in the modernization process, it is crucial to take care of internal Ottoman dynamics of change and transformation. Modernization of dress and conflicts about modern headgear in the Ottoman Empire appear in a different light when situated within and related to Ottoman dynamics of change. Kemal Karpat argues for a broad analytical framework in order to analyze changes in the social and political structure of Middle Eastern society. His study traces how in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, responses to outside stimuli were conditioned by internal Ottoman dynamics. His analysis starts at the end of sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, a period long before the acceleration of European influence, when social dislocations in the Ottoman Empire triggered processes of change of the social structure. The rise of communal leaders brought up a new social force which broke up traditional arrangements. The dynamics developing from there were for Karpat a starting point to study, from a historical functional view, patterns of social stratification and structural change in the Ottoman realm, stretching from the Balkans to North Africa. He has a special focus on how these social structures were conditioned by economic forces, the industrial revolution, and Western free market economy. Furthermore, he traced the rise of a new political cadre within these settings and the differentiation of the political system, and

84 That does not mean these changes took place isolated from inter- and transnational dynamics. Yet looking at Ottoman internal structures provides a different perspective on the modernization process, and a deeper understanding of its specificities.
how both were related to social differentiation. The latter encompassed changes in occupation, ownership patterns, income levels, and cultural political values. Karpat defines as the basic problem of the Ottoman state conflicts between ruler and ruled or government and society.

Economically the period was characterized by changes in Ottoman trade patterns. Following wars with Russia, the Ottomans had lost hegemony in the Black Sea trade. In addition, integration into capitalist world economy changed Ottoman trade balance from export to import, as Karpat emphasizes. Formerly being an exporter of manufactured goods, now the Empire increasingly sold raw materials and foodstuff on the international market while trade with the West increased significantly in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Integration into capitalist world economy also led to a disruption of internal trade. In the Balkans, the emergence of new social groups which were merchants or manufacturers, nationalist intellectuals and popular leaders within that process led to a nationalist uprising. Out of these developments Karpat concludes that it would be reductionist to explain these occurrences, meaning the rise of Balkan nationalisms simply as “cultural antagonisms,” even when they had been used for mass mobilization. Instead, they should be considered as

“antagonisms between de facto bourgeois land-ownership, a capitalist system of production with capitalist investment and hired labor at the social level, a feudal type of authority at the government level.”

Changing trade and consumption patterns made imported looks, created from imported European-produced clothing, became symbols of wealth and status. These transformations and the spread of modern European fashions can be considered as crucial as the state imposed modern dress codes in the 1820s and their subsequent dissemination among an emerging Ottoman bourgeoisie and middle classes. Their appearance is related to Ottoman socio-political and economic structures and their transformations as well.

Social structure in the Ottoman Empire before modernization, according to Şerif Mardin, was often characterized by an idealized model of an autocratic monarchy with

87 See Karpat, 'Transformation of the Ottoman State'.
88 Ibid., 61.
the ruling class on one side and the ruled on the other, but could also be considered from the perspective of a more diversified stratification of the population that was confronted with competing elite groups.\textsuperscript{89} In differentiation to European feudal states, social scientists have often remarked that the Ottoman state, due to its system of ‘slaves’ as executives in the government, lacked a hereditary aristocracy. Yet even though this system and other measures stabilized the Ottoman state and dynasty, numerous exceptions to this ideal existed. The same is valid for the non-hereditary character of fiefs. For example, Muslim Turcic Princes and Byzantine barons and other vassal states had privileges of their own, and often fief holders’ sons could keep their fathers’ land. There were also a number of exceptions to the ideal of Ottoman landownership which theoretically kept all agricultural land as \textit{miri}, and which did not prevent influential persons from claiming property rights. The lower strata was composed of merchants and artisans on the one hand, and peasants on the other. Even though officially not equipped with a huge amount of power, they exercised influence to a certain amount through organization in guilds, village councils, and tribes, and enjoyed through them far-reaching autonomy.\textsuperscript{90} Hence, the often attested lack of an Ottoman (Muslim) middle class needs to be objected and revised.

The emergence of an Ottoman Muslim middle class stood in correlation to the central state’s struggle with local authorities, the \textit{ayan} and newly emerging local powers, and the so called \textit{derebeys}, as Karpat argues. During Mahmud II’s reign, their land was seized and redistributed. The property group emerging from this redistribution formed “a sort of a new middle class” who “set the tone of the political developments of the country.”\textsuperscript{91} In addition to economy, a reorganization of bureaucracy took place. New offices were introduced and officers trained in a newly established school, and with its differentiating and extensive competences bureaucracy strengthened. This further contributed to the establishment of a modern capitalist order as “ideas of Western economic liberalism penetrated bureaucratic thought.”\textsuperscript{92} In the light of these

\textsuperscript{90} Mardin, ‘Historical Thresholds and Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness,’ 9.
\textsuperscript{91} Karpat, ‘Transformation of the Ottoman State,’ 66.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 70.
developments, economic as well as inner-state structures, the Tanzimat decree of 1839 was an edict which “merely expanded upon and crystallized ideas and policies developed and implemented in the past.”

The imperial rescript of 1856 however, according to Karpat, marked a turn in Ottoman modernization politics from a statist policy of voluntary modernization to the imposition of the will of outsiders, namely the European Great Powers, on the transformation process. The release of the edict coincided with the end of the Crimean War, the Paris Treaty of 1856 and admittance of the Ottoman Empire in to the community of nations. Thus “after the middle of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire gradually became subjected to a policy of semi-colonialism.” Meanwhile its own elites, educated in the newly established facilities such as the Galatasaray Lise appropriated colonial power techniques and developed colonialist attitudes towards their ‘own’ population. This new phase of Ottoman modernization was accompanied and shaped by new means of communication and transportation established after 1860, such as the telegraph (set up 1855-64), railways (from 1866), and the modern press.

Expressions of the newly emerging Ottoman Muslim middle-class were intellectuals such as Ibrahim Şinasi (1826-71), Ziya Paşa (1825-80), Namik Kemal (1840-1888) or Ahmet Midhat. They were the first to theoretically justify and develop an ideology for modernizing measures of the state on the institutional level. They argued for the implementation of a constitutional order and representative structures, criticized the propertied and agrarian commercial Muslim and non-Muslim groups and the order established through the capitulations. In this context new dress was especially stressed by Ziya Paşa as a devastating factor for the local industry. Another concern of the Young Ottoman thinkers referred to the politics of identity which they regarded important in order to secure loyalty of the subjects to the government. Through the concepts of vatan (homeland) and citizenship, ethnic, religious, and local divisions should be superseded.

Eisenstadt considers the far-reaching and substantial implications military and economic imperialism and colonialism had for the formation of modernity. In colonial and semi-colonial societies, these implications often led to the adoption of modern

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93 Ibid., 70.
94 Ibid., 71.
95 Ceride-i Huvadis and Tercüman-i Ahval established 1860. see Ibid., 70.
96 Ibid., 73.
representative, legal and administrative institutions, and the construction of modern nation-states. European expansion had undermined local structures in many areas and especially colonial elites attempted to appropriate modern institutions in order to “participate in the modern universal (albeit initially Western) tradition.” Eisenstadt argues that while these elites and societies also rejected certain aspects of modernity, “Western formulations” were hegemonic in the “cultural program of modernity.” Yet Eisenstadt points out that processes of appropriation were, amongst others, accelerated and motivated by the endeavor to redefine center-periphery relations. Thus from these appropriations of modernity, its reinterpretations and reformulations “new cultural and political programs” emerged which incorporated the tension of being a part of the modern world, yet with ambivalent attitudes towards modernity and the West.

Fatma Müge Göçek analyzed the link between consumption of modern goods, Westernization in general, and the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a new social group. The vantage point of her study is the widespread assumption that social change in modernizing societies is linked to the bourgeoisie as a main agent in these processes. Thus, when scholars analyzed non-Western societies they attested the lack of a group carrying the characteristics of western European bourgeoisie. Then they often concluded that there was also a lack of social dynamics and change. Without completely dismissing existing theories on the function of the bourgeoisie in social change, Göçek critically applies them to the study of Ottoman social change, tracing the emergence of an Ottoman bourgeoisie without neglecting internal Ottoman dynamics.

In England and France, the bourgeoisie had gained control over developments contained in the rise of capitalism and related state-making while establishing itself as a new social group. They became equipped with new social and political resources which gave them the power to shape a new image of society through a new material culture. This culture, according to Göçek, was established in the areas of civilization, space, and

97 Eisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities,' 14.
98 Ibid., 14.
99 Ibid., 15.
101 Her main argument, that has been criticized and refuted, is that the segmentation of Ottoman bourgeoisie into commercial and bureaucratic was one of the main factors for the decline of the Empire. Her argument of the strict division of the Ottoman bourgeoisie along religious lines cannot be maintained since a Muslim commercial elite existed as well when internal trade is considered. On her line of argument see Ibid.
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fashion. Domestic space was functionally reorganized along the lines of private and public, and decorated with ever-changing fashions of new equipment, the rapid change of which symbolized and embodied progress. This new lifestyle required a new code of behavior and definitions of good manners. Bourgeois lifestyle came along with a newly emerging concepts of the West and Europe which diffused throughout big parts of the globe by the means of political, economic and military power. What is interesting here is not just the diffusion of the very same, but its interconnectivity to dynamics within the Ottoman society in order to be sensitive to Ottoman factors of social change that were beyond western European influences. Thus, it was necessary to let go of ahistorical models of social change which generalize from Western European experiences. Göçek started out from Weberian and Marxist models going beyond their generalizations and restrictions regarding non-Western societies, regarding them as despotic and thus socially stagnant. In studies based on Weber as well as Marx, the state often replaced the bourgeoisie as an agent of social change, next to the interaction with the Western Europe. Yet Göçek derives from these assumptions three elements to analyze social change in the Ottoman Empire. These are households, sultan and the state, and war and commerce with the West. Fatma M. Göçek defined Westernization on the one hand as “the adoption of goods, institutions, and ideas”, but puts special emphasis on its interaction with Ottoman social structure and its effects on the agency of social groups. Thus Göçek's approach provides a basic vantage point for my study since she frames Westernization as dynamic process which focuses on the agency of local subjects.

Göçek understands Westernization, in the beginning, first of all as the consumption of goods from Western Europe when those became items of luxury in the 18th century, and their import sharply increased. The Ottoman government's initial reaction was to restrict the spread of these goods through sumptuary laws and inhibit their use to transgress social boundaries. Yet these strategies proved ineffective and Ottoman upper class households went into competition and tried to enhance their social position by the consumption of these new products from Western Europe. Thus products from

102 She argues that these concepts began to form with European overseas discoveries and coincident Muslim attacks on Europe. Europe became a replacement for Christendom or Christianity, while the West was the term used to designate European powers from the outside. See Ibid., 5.
103 Ibid., 157, FN 62.
104 Ibid., 37-38.
industrializing Europe became a means to both reinforce or undermine social boundaries used by different social groups.

Regarding the introduction of Western material, cultural conduct, and the way it was reorganized along the lines of private and public, Selçuk Esenbel compares Ottoman and Japanese approaches to the use of Western cultural forms and their spread. While concentrating on elites, she assumes those set the parameters for Westernization as it was approached by these societies and later adopted by the middle classes. She stated that their decisions shaped top-down processes of modernization of the general public.

In terms of a notion of Westernization, she claims to provide a “history of Western culture beyond its borders”, hence in accordance with a view that incorporated non-Western societies into the production of the West. As for the Ottoman Empire she concentrated on Muslim elites, leaving non-Muslims out of her scope. In order to better understand Westernization, she proposes to look at culture and the private instead of the state and its institutions. Also, she claims to apply an alternative analytical account of Westernization to the “presumption of similarities and difference”, and focus on what she called eclectic cultural environments. Her endeavor was to make out the meaning of Western culture when it was incorporated in the areas of attire, household environments, and manners. My own study considers both: state induced dress codes and the appropriation of modern headgear by the (male) population, in accordance or in contrast to the state's measures; I view both mostly through the perspective of the state, as it is recorded in state archival documents and the correspondence between different state offices. Esenbel reminded of the ambivalent and manifold meanings of cultural forms; something that I am also going to show in the meanings of headgear. She provides the mecelle as an example of such cultural forms. These were introduced in 1876 as an Islamic civil code that could be counted as an example of invented tradition, as they were modernizing legal reforms in Islamic garb. For Esenbel, they exemplify the fluid nature of what is Western or modern, and possible shifts in meaning inherent to modernizing measures. The social and political meaning of Western culture and its use thus lies beyond practicality, personal taste, and symbolism, and must rather be regarded in

106 Ibid., 146.
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accordance to Nobert Elias as “reorganizing the cultural content of the rational and emotional aspects of the individuals and society in immediate terms.”

Esenbel also refers to headgear and considers it as the location of traditional culture and authenticity. Next to the wide spread of Western goods and manners into private Ottoman homes and she attests an emphasis on the strengthening of “the Empire in its own indigenous character” which was expressed, as she noted, especially in an “obsession” with headgear, as she puts it, male and female, or male headgear and female veil, as sensitive areas. Concerning the characterizing of the appropriation of Western dress, Esenbel terms its “eclectic combination” which nevertheless was strictly regulated in its form in the public sphere. I will show that the significance of headgear was more diverse than she indicated, that references and adaptations were made to the traditional as well as the modern, and that meanings shifted and intersected in between these two ends.

Göçek uses Ottoman inheritance registers in order to trace the consumption of Western goods in the Ottoman Empire and their distribution among the elites, and the newly emerging bourgeoisie between 1700-1820. Those enable her to show that “Ottoman Westernization was a phenomenon that did not remain limited to the elites in the empire but also emerged among the populace at large.” Through the same sources, she reads that increasing consumption of Western goods took place among the emerging Ottoman bourgeoisie specifically in contrast to stagnant consumption patterns of older elites. Thus the rising social status of the newly emerging elites was indicated by the rising consumption of Western goods. Among those goods consumed textiles ranged on the third rank, behind clocks and watches, and thereafter pistols and muskets. During the period analyzed, the possession of Western goods rose to the highest decree amongst the

107 Ibid., 156.
108 Ibid., 161.
109 I am quite skeptical of whether Esenbel fulfills her claim to go beyond an approach to similarities and differences of Ottoman and Western culture since what she does in the end is to count which cultural forms, manners and items had been adopted in which social spaces. This attributes quite a fixed meaning to the respective things and forms of behavior. I do not see ambivalent and fluid meanings here besides the example of the mecelle she provides in the beginning. Eventually she renders it more explicitly in the Japanese case, i.e. women’s hairstyle in Japan, which were first Edouardian but later returned to local traditional styles. But she does not point to the ambivalent meaning of the fez for instance. See Ibid.
110 Ibid., 161.
111 Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, 97-98.
populace. Göçek regards this as an indicator of a rising commercial bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{112}

I demonstrated that together with social, political and economic transformations, the spread of items of modern bourgeois culture in the Ottoman Empire preceded the official introduction of modern dress. Now I will turn the attention towards the emergence of the fez as newly appearing marker of Ottoman modern identity.

\section*{2.4 The Fez and Modernization of Dress}

The introduction of a new dress code by Mahmud II needs to be viewed behind this background of already far reaching social and economic transformations that brought about the adaptation of modern cultural forms and Western European items. Both, social transformations and the reforms implemented by the state, took place behind an ongoing discourse on the West and the Rest where the Ottoman State aimed at positioning itself through a number of modernizing measures. One of these was the introduction of a new dress code, first as part of military reform but then as a more encompassing endeavor to reorganize state-subject relations.

Official introduction of modern European dress began shortly after the abolition of the Janissary military order and the subsequent establishment of a new army called “Mohammedan Victorious Soldiers,” found on June 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1826 (11 Zilkade 1241). A code of regulations including dress-codes for the new army was released the following year.\textsuperscript{113} As headgear the şubara\textsuperscript{114} combined with a Turban was introduced at first, worn until 1827, combined by some ranks with a turban, to be worn in its place by others. It had been the former headgear of the Bostanciyan, the “Imperial Gardeners”, who guarded the Imperial Palaces and the seafront along the Bosporus.\textsuperscript{115} It was then replaced by the fez.

Often-repeated narrations of the origin of the fez or inspirations which led to the introduction of the fez as part of official dress are presumably a reverberation of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[112] Ibid., 107.
\item[114] A sort of a felt cap.
\item[115] In Ottoman archival documents the discussion of the şubara appears in a letter of the grand vizier to the sultan, where he reports that it was not resistant against sun and rain and of no good quality in general. See BOA Hatt-i Hümayun (HAT) 50810.
\end{footnotes}
contemporary historical accounts such as that of the Ottoman official chronicler Ahmed Lütfi. He attributes the initial use of the fez as a part of a military uniform to Koca Husrev Paşa, a marine captain. Yet the use of the fez was quite common in the Ottoman Empire already for centuries, especially amongst sailors. What was new is that it replaced most other kinds of headpieces throughout the nineteenth century, thus becoming a means of homogenization and Ottoman identity-building.116

First of all, the introduction of a new dress code in the army is striking and tells about the character of Ottoman dress reform. Along with the reform of military education, it led to a new quality of the seizure of the state on its subjects’ bodies, and lead to the altering of practices, not just appearance. A remark by a contemporary observer depicts the scope of the new uniforms. Adolphus Slade, a British officer, quoted by Bernard Lewis in his famous “Emergence of Modern Turkey”, comments on the changing practices of the cavalry through dress and accompanying altered riding techniques and equipment. He expounds the disadvantages of the new clothing and stresses the significant consequences this kind of dress had on established daily practices.117

The second step was a law issued by Mahmud II in 1829 which, by the introduction of modern dress for civil officials, “sought to replace ancient community and occupational signs of differentiation by dress.”118 The law meticulously described a variety of different forms of dress for men, yet it specified only one single headgear: the fez, a conical red felt hat.119

116 It had come along with the introduction of French education for the new army, also inspired by Husrev Paşa. Before that, military training took place according to Prussian manners. See Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, ‘Asâkir-i Mansure’ye Fes Gıyırlımesi Hakkında Sadr-ı Azam Takriri ve II. Mahmud’un Hatt-ı Humayunu’, Belleten 18, no. 70 (1954): 223–30; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed., Oxford Paperbacks. - London [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960-135 (London [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Pr., 1968), 99-103. Another impression of the contemporary perception of the fez in terms of its multiple origins, which was perpetuated throughout the following century, provides an imperial degree of issued in spring 1835. The specification of the kind of fez provided for the new army was as follows: “The fez for the victorious army might a from Tunis, Egypt or Europe [...].” line 6. 7, BOA HAT 489/23976. A civil servant was told to order one sample each in order to decide which ones would be chosen (line 7).

117 See Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 112, FN 40.

118 Donald Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’, International Journal of Middle East Studies: IJMES 403, no. 425 (1997). This code was introduced for all officials, with the exception of those in religious ranks. In contrast to the Westernization of men’s clothes, existing regulations for women’s dress were reinforced by Mahmud II. See Cihan Aktaş, Tanzimat’tan Günümüze Kültük Kıyafet ve İktidar, Nehir Yayınları: İnceleme - Araştırma Dizisi; 30 5 (İstanbul: Nehir yayınları, 1989), 63. On the implementation of the new dress code amongst civil officials see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808 - 1975, 1. publ. (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), 49.

119 See Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’, 412 and Patricia
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“This 1829 regulation, whose drama actually matches that of the destruction of the janissaries, pushed aside a centuries-old Ottoman tradition in which headgear had provided the crucial and central marker of identity, status, and rank.”120

In his study on the fez, Donald Quataert states that clothing regulations had been powerful tools to reshape state and society, no less then bureaucratic reform, fiscal centralization, and military action.121 The old elites' dress codes were suspended in favor of an uprising bureaucratic and military elite.122 In addition, the measures introduced by Mahmud II deleted visible differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. The new dress code including the fez quickly spread among well-off Muslims and non-Muslims in the urban centers. Concerning the kind of clothes that were adopted by the Ottoman officials, in his account on the history of Turkish dress, Nureddin Sevin resembled the Ottoman style of the late 1820s and 1830s to those of contemporary military officers in Europe with slim trousers, single-breasted and a frock coat.123

The imperial decree which regulated the new dress code reasons the reordering of official garments with several elements: the permanent and growing transgression of accepted standards, and the move away from legal (Islamic) requirements by ordinary people's, officials' dress, as well as by members of the Ottoman court. According to the decree, until now Islamic dress had been sufficient as a protection of the body. However, it did not meet contemporary needs of embellishment and pomp brought about by the "passage of time and the victory over the dangers of nature."124 Hence as reasons for the new dress code, the document adduces on the one hand the appearance of ostentation, and on the other hand the transgression of various prescriptions. Thus the decree gives in to what it labels as adornment and luxury. This seems to have been the apparent spread of modern European dress, yet at the same time the sultan claims to restrict its

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120 Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 412.
121 Ibid., 403.
122 See Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 65.
use and forms through the introduction of the very same.\textsuperscript{125}

Mahmud II displays the change of dress as a return to the simplicity and purity of the early days of Islam as expressed in the appearance of prophet Mohammed's descendants, as well as in pious or religious dress in general. Hence the modernization of dress is displayed as a return to Islam's roots. Is that just a legitimizing strategy or a way of integrating Islam and modernization? I think it is on the one hand a legitimizing strategy, but it also links Islam to modernity, modern dress displayed as being in accordance with the essence of Islam. Extravagance and pomp were unacceptable, Mahmud II states, while “shine and brightness” produced by pious dress was to be preferred from a reasonable and canonical religious point of view. In addition it was beneficial for the financial and physical well-being.\textsuperscript{126}

In the imperial decree, the words Europe, European, modern or Western are not mentioned. Neither do the names of the pieces of dress, such as trousers, skirt, or coat appear, just the fez is mentioned explicitly. The other pieces of dress are only specified in terms of cloth, color and kind of decorations. That may have several reasons: First, it probably enhanced the acceptability of the new dress code. But could it also be that terms such as Western, European, and so on were only attributed in retrospect to these kind of measures during the following decades when the Orientalist and imperialist othering of the Ottoman Empire took different qualities, and this kind of dress also took a different meaning.

Styles introduced by the decree developed throughout the century, and influenced by fashions and modes of production in Europe and Ottoman preferences. The fez also varied its shape and color, from a more decorated, embroidered and voluminous style to a purer, narrower form and light to dark red or even black.\textsuperscript{127} Carter Findley in his account on civil officialdom describes the adoption of the new dress as follows:

\textsuperscript{125} In his study of the modernization of male dress and the appearance of bourgeois styles Christopher Forth presents an example of the British aristocracy's demands for more sober styles. See Christopher E. Forth, \textit{Masculinity in the Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the Body} (Basingstoke [u.a.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 50.

\textsuperscript{126} Mahmud II does not mention about whose physical and financial well-being he is concerned. While elaborating on restrictions of extravagance of his state officials, Mahmud II stresses that travel expenses for officials to obligatory participation in religious and political events would continue to be met, probably in order to anticipate concerns that cutback of expenses would touch other spheres as well. Lütfi, \textit{Vakanıvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi}, 268-273, (Volume 2, Appendix 18).

\textsuperscript{127} For the different shapes and colors of the fez and their special names see Reşat Ekrem Koçu, \textit{Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü}, Sümerbank Kültür Yayınları 1 (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1967),115-116.
During the Tanzimat, the normal civil official costume became the combination of fez, the modified frock coat known as istanbulin, and trousers, an ensemble familiar in portraits of the period. The istanbulin combined the knee-length skirt of the European frock coat with a closed front and standup collar, supposedly adopted to spare elderly officials the torments of starched shirtfronts and neckties. 128

The abolishment of long-established headgear by Mahmud II's legislation is depicted by Chronicler Lütfi Efendi as a relief or liberation from "the weight of huge and small kavuks." 129 Minds, Lütfi Efendi states, were now with the abolishment of the janissary order, untroubled by them. He interprets the 1829 dress decree as an intervention to counter disorder in terms of headgear which had appeared after the destruction of the Janissary order. 130 He contradicts however his own remark by his utterance that given the lack of regulations regarding headgear, some began to put on headpieces even more voluminous then the previously worn kavuk. 131 After the

128 Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1989), 213. Different versions and the development of this style can be found in Sevin, Onüç Asırlık Türk Kiyâfet Târihine Bir Bakış, 123-124. On Ottoman officials' dress before the dress reform see Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, 68. See also Mehmet Lale, 'Sultan Mahmud II and the Fez Revolution', in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation, ed. Kemal Çiçek, Philosophy, Science and Institutions 3 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 91–95. Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Süsülüği, 113-14, FN 64. In the name of the new military unit, Victorious Muslim Soldiers, the sultan appealed for the loyalty of his Muslim subjects, while his 1829 law threatened to jeopardize their status. For some of the regulations of military attire see imperial decrees BOA HAT 17584, 17614, 17647, 17890,18446 and 18671; and Lütfi, Vakanûvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, 148 and 269-73, (Volume 2).


130 A lack of popularity of the kavuk as minister's headgear had obviously existed before as a series of documents of the year 1815 show: A number of state ministers had been wandering around with a şal (wollen shawl which could be worn as scarf, girdle, waistband, sash or turban on their hat. In several imperial decrees they were admonished not to do so and told to wear a kavuk at any time and place, and not to walk around with garments that did not suit a minister's glory and were unsuitable for certain weather conditions. See i.e. BOA Hatt-ı Hümayun 718/34228. According to Reşat Ekrem Koçu the şal had become fashionable at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century, especially among young men. Koçu assesses that it was an ancient headgear of marine soldiers and in 1811 Mahmud II restricted the wearing of a şal to them. See entry şal in Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Süsülüği, 214.

131 "kavukdan büyük kocabaşları" Lütfi, Vakanûvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, 147-148 (Volume 2). The kind of turbans called kavuk could reach the size of three or four times of a human head. The sultan's
introduction of the fez, which followed this short period of disorderly appropriation of headpieces among civil servants, a certain leveling of hierarchies expressed through appearance took place. Lüfti Efendi also comments on it and states that it then was not possible anymore to distinguish between different civil officials. What became visible instead were differences between these civil servants and religious scholars (ulema) which were thus regulated by a new dress code. Does Lüfti Efendi suggest that the new regulation had been made to differentiate between civil servants and religious functionaries? Does he take the result as the origin here? The new law indeed created the ulema as a religious class which until then had just “been only one among several medieval orders” due to the absence of a clergy in Islam. Now, however, it had become singled out as such. Similar to civil servants, the different ranks within the ulema became less visible through the simplification and assimilation of their dress.

The function of the fez as a means to diminish some internal borders was contested on several levels. I want to provide two examples to show by whom and by which means contestation was conducted. During the first decades after its introduction, only a few conflicts around the wearing of the fez appear in archival documents. All these incidences deal with the manner of how the fez could and should be worn, and were no questioning or refusal of the fez in general.

In 1835 several cases appear. In one, people were exhorted not to wind a turban around the fez, in another case servants were urged to wear a fez in order to differentiate them from their turban-wearing ulema masters. In another discussion in state offices, the sultan negotiates if ministers and some other officials were allowed to attach jewels to their fezzes. Finally in 1844 precautions are made by the state against those who oppose the wearing of a badge on his fez by an Armenian notable, which he got awarded for his loyalty to the Ottoman state.

In the first decade of the new dress regulation, it was still discussed if the wearing of the fez could be combined with a turban, of which an imperial edict of 1835 provides kavuk’s were the largest, created of fabrics longer than 60 meters. See Chico Beverly, ‘The Turban and Male Headgear’, in Berg Encyclopedia of World Dress and Fashion 5: Central and Southwest Asia, ed. Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, Engl., vol. 5 (Oxford: Berg, 2010), 477–84. 479.

133 Ibid., 124.
134 BOA HAT 465/22800.
135 BOA HAT 697/33640, BOA HAT 330/19079;  BOA HAT 697/33640.
136 BOA HR.MKT. 7/34 (ca. 1844).
Directed to all high ranking officials such as the minister of finance, scribes in the imperial offices, advisors of the imperial mint, and high military officials, it treats the question of if civil servants and others could wear turbans over their fezzes. The copy of an imperial edict was sent to the local administrations and all imams as well as military officers in order to warn and inform them on the current regulations “so that this impolite behavior and disapproved line of conduct does occur” anymore. The edict sent reaffirms for whom the dress codes are valid. Who should wear a fez without a turban is not specified in this decree.

Another imperial decree issued in 1835 expressed outrage about the bridging of a social gap by wearing a turban instead of a fez. It states that servants of the ulema should wear a fez, not a turban, in order to differentiate efendi from hizmetkar (master from servant). In this regard an order should be released to counter this “deceitful wish (murād-i mekkār)” which was assumed behind the wearing of the turban, without specifying what this wish was.

Instead of leveling social differences, in this case the fez is used to preserve or build up difference and, as mentioned above, help to build up the ulema as a distinct religious class with turbans and long robes. The document emphasizes that the fez functions to pertain a visible difference between efendi and servant: “in order to differentiate them from their masters each one wears a fez [...].” The rest of their outfit was not altered. Of what kind this clothes were, isn’t mentioned. I suppose it was the same as those of the ulema they served, otherwise it would not been mentioned: “Their dress will remain as it has been previously and not touching any of their garments [...].” In further proceeding, the grand vizier (vekaletpenahi) and minister of war (serʿasker paşa) were assigned to negotiate the matter and inform the şeyhülislâm (fetvapenah) about the results.

Due to their close ties and involvement with the Ottoman court, most of the higher ranks of the ulema had a supportive stance towards Mahmud II’s reforms, since it secured...
their positions. And as becomes apparent in the presented case, the reform in dress could be used by them to mark a socially distinct position, being the only Ottoman group which could keep their turbans.

In the same year some high officials in Istanbul as well as the provinces - including the grand vizier and the governor of Bosnia - demanded to attach a jewel or jewels to their fez. Accordingly that was not very welcomed by the Sultan Mahmud II. He did however give permission that this kind of fez could be worn on holidays but definitely not on other occasions, as some imperial decrees note. I am referring to this incident because it connects the wearing of the fez to premodern politics of dress in the context of sumptuary laws and their restrictions of display of luxury as a means to maintain social boundaries. In addition, it provides an idea how the fez was used to create social distinction and display status and rank, discussion that faded in later archival documents and discussions.

Three different documents provide information on this affair. For me, it is an example of the shift from old to the new order. Exquisite dress in the documents is discussed as a privilege granted to meritorious officials in the Ottoman government. The first document, sent by the governor of Bosnia, named Vecih, to the ketâb-ı bâb with the request to wear the jewel-decorated fez also poses the question of to whom else the privilege might be granted, and on which occasions other than holidays might it be worn. Accordingly, Vecih Pasa suggests who else might be awarded the honor to wear

144 Dispute about ministers attaching jewels to their fezzes: BOA HAT 697/33640, BOA HAT 330/19079; BOA HAT 697/33640, and some other documents from the year 1835.
146 It seems the affair had been initiated with a letter send by Vecih Paşa, Vali of Bosnia, where he requested if he and other “sincere persons (muhlis)” could be honored by wearing the aforementioned jeweled fez.
147 The official agent for business with the Ottoman government.
this kind of fez. He explicitly links this kind of a fez to the matter of honor and pride, and thus puts forward a certain concept of honor linked to the old order. The example shows that for a short while and on certain occasions, the fez functioned within the old order of power, of privilege, and sumptuary laws where luxury in dress was granted as a favor by the sultan.

The affair had been initiated by the fact that the grand vizier donned a fez decorated with jewels. How did the message spread to the provinces? Actually, this kind of fez was to be reserved for ministers, but Vecih Bey wants to know if its use could be extended to other “sincere persons (muḥlis).”\textsuperscript{148} In addition he asks if this fez could be worn not just on holidays but also at meetings with “officials of foreign countries,”\textsuperscript{149} a request that the sultan denied. However, the governor asks the kethüda to urge the grand vizier to inquire regarding the sultan’s opinion on the matter. Another one of his requests is the reimbursement of the expenses spent for these fezzes. In his response, the sultan agrees to that. The affair then ends with a letter by Vecih Paşa who praises the sultan for admitting the wearing of the fez by certain officials on holidays.

Even if an example like this exists, the fez also functioned as a means to diminish aristocratic privileges. It can be related to the birth of constitutionalist ideas in the Ottoman Empire, even though that might not have been the intention of an autocratic ‘inventor.’ As I will show later, the fez and the development of its form towards sobriety and simplicity fitted quite well into notions of bourgeois respectability and late nineteenth conceptions of masculinity. As such, the fez helped to build up a new class and a new structure of society. Subjects became related to each other and constituted differently through the fez.

The mentioned, disputes about what could be attached to the fez and how the fez was to be worn conditioned discussions in the first decades after the promulgation of the new dress code. After that, these conflicts about jeweled fezzes and these fezzes themselves disappeared. As far as the archival material that I have examined, the fez was not explicitly the subject in conflicts about excessive consumption anymore, nor did it imply social distinction. It was instead merely used to negotiate ethno-religious distinctions and/or national identity.

\textsuperscript{148} BOA HAT 697/33640.
\textsuperscript{149} BOA HAT 697/33640.
2.4.1 Resistance against the Fez?

In the archival records I found no cases of open resistance or protest against the fez. Other authors also remarked that apparently the new dress code including the fez introduced by Mahmud II did not provoke a lot of open resistance. It was widely accepted especially among the upper classes. Yet some opposed the new headgear.\(^\text{150}\)

Donald Quataert argues against the common assumption that rejection of the fez was merely religiously motivated.\(^\text{151}\) Instead he locates its refusal primarily among the Ottoman working class and assesses this resistance as a manifestation of a distinct working class culture, Muslim as well as non-Muslim.\(^\text{152}\) Quataert agrees that the popular classes might have rejected the blurring of religious difference by the fez, but still offers another explanation which regards opposition to the fez as a reaction towards Mahmud II’s free-trade economic politics. Worn by “Muslim and non-Muslim bureaucrats and by the non-Muslim merchants,”\(^\text{153}\) the fez represented by these politics expressed itself in measures such as the attack on monopolistic privileges of the guilts and the signing of the Anglo-Turkish Convention in 1838. According to Quataert, resistance against the fez appeared in Istanbul as well as in the provinces.\(^\text{154}\) Quataert attributes the abandoning of Mahmud II’s plans to apply the new dress code to the wider populace to the success of the popular resistance.\(^\text{155}\) Victoria Aksan depicts the situation quite differently when she

\(^{150}\) The statement about the absence of resistance was made by Niyazi Berkes as noted by Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ FN 75; and Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey. 124-125. Quataert argues on the basis of either resistance to or voluntary adoption of the fez. It would be interesting to scrutinize how during the reign of Mehmed II The fes reform was implemented, given that any sources existed to answer this question. See Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 404.

\(^{151}\) Quataert names Niyazi Berkes and Ismael Kara as advocates of this position. I rather understood Kara’s account as an analysis of the ulama’s attitude towards the Hamidian regime and not as argument for the religious character of their political attitudes or as pure anti-Westerization, see Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 124; Ismael Kara, “Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition”, in Late Ottoman Society - The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdağla, SOAS RoutledgeCurzon Studies on the Middle East; 3 (London [u.a.]: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 162–200.

\(^{152}\) Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 414. On the abolition of the janissaries and its anti-working class dimensions see Ibid., 404.

\(^{153}\) Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 414. On the abolition of the janissaries and its anti-working class dimensions see Ibid., 404.

\(^{154}\) Ibid., 416. Quataert refers to Ömer Demirel and Adolphos Slade as a references for the existence of resistance against the fez, see Ömer Demirel, II. Mahmud Döneminde Sivas’ta Esnaf Teşkilâtı ve Üretim-Tüketim İlişkileri, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları; Kültür Eserleri Dizisi, 107. 107 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1989). 57, 89 and 81; and Adolphus Slade, Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, [et]c. and of a Cruise in the Black Sea, with the Capitan Pasha, in the Years 1829, 1830, and 1831 (London: Saunders and Otley, 1833).

\(^{155}\) On remarks regarding the wrapping of the fez see Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, 114; he states that acceptance of the fez among lower classes rose when they were allowed to wrap the fez with a cloth, while the military from then on just put on a plain fez. Does his remark contradict the
assesses that the introduction of Western dress in the army was a “contested topic and resisted on every level.”

2.4.2 The Fez and Ottoman Non-Muslims

The modernization of dress in the Ottoman Empire also meant a step towards the transformation or dissolution of the Ottoman millet system as an important component of Ottoman social and political organization. Thus questions of dress were also a negotiation of boundaries along religion and ethnicity.

The social organization of the Ottoman Empire is often referred to as the so-called millet system, roughly meaning that non-Muslim religious communities exercised a certain autonomy in their social and political organization. This was more of a set of arrangements rather than fixed administrative rules or structures. The term millet, which can indicate religion, religious community or nation, had come to designate non-Muslim Ottoman communities, mainly Christian-Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish, even though it could also denote Christians outside of the Ottoman Empire or, as was sometimes after the initiation of the nineteenth century reform period, also applied to Muslims.

Christians and Jews within the Ottoman realm were regarded as “people of the book (ehl-i kitap)” and therefore gained specific protection and social status within the Ottoman Muslim order. They were granted protection by the Islamic authority and were able to deal autonomous in civil issues. That encompassed education, marriage, divorce and inheritance, which were regarded as religious matters. The heads of the Ottoman non-Muslim communities were the heads of their respective churches, such as in the instance of the Orthodox patriarch, and the whole administration was done by church clergy.

Quataert also refers to Kocu’s statement: “By wearing fezes wrapped in a wide variety of fabrics, workers aimed to differentiate themselves from the Ottoman official classes, international merchants, and other laissez-faire advocates who had so quickly adopted the plain fez. They spurned the path of emulation and pursued that of identity solidarity. And as photographs of Ottoman workers make clear (Figures 4 and 5), many continued to do so for the remainder of the 19th century. These photographs also seem to show that the headgear for Muslims and non-Muslims was the same; […].” Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 417.


Selçuk Akşin Somel, ’Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period’, in Late
2 Ottoman Modernity and Bourgeois Culture: The Era of the Fez

In the Ottoman Empire dress codes had been an important instrument of differentiation along ethno-religious lines. Among other things, special emphasis was put on the differentiation of Muslims and non-Muslims in their outward appearance along color, forms of dress, and other features.\textsuperscript{159} Fatma Müge Göçek mentions a decree issued in 1729 which discusses the use of Jewish versus Muslims turbans. The authorities expressed concern on the wearing of so called Jewish turbans by Muslims and prohibited this practice. The Ottoman government thus used turbans to keep up divisions between religious groups and took care that these were not undermined by everyday practices.\textsuperscript{160} The decree directly addresses the producers of these turbans “who have invented turbans which look, Allah forbid, like turbans of the Jews and have caused sin and evil consequences to many Muslims by mistake from making such turbans.”\textsuperscript{161}

Up until 1826 the Ottoman authorities demanded adherence to existing dress codes. A document provided with the seal of a person called Mustafa […]\textsuperscript{162} requested that Ottoman non-Muslims\textsuperscript{163} would not wear colors, headpieces, and dress “peculiar to the Muslim population,”\textsuperscript{164} such as putting on a “large kalpak (\textit{büyük kalpak})” and wearing the color black.\textsuperscript{165} If people did not follow these instructions they would be punished, and an imperial decree was to be delivered to the rum and Armenian patriarchies. The discussion about dress codes in the document is very closely related to submission of non-Muslim subjects to Ottoman Muslims, and the adoption of Muslim dress is regarded as disrespectful. The 1829 imperial regulation abrogated this old order of established dress codes and backed it up by new clothing regulations.

\textsuperscript{159} For the development of Ottoman clothing laws before Mahmud II, their contents and their political and social functions see Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’.

\textsuperscript{160} A distinct Jewish headpiece for men in the Ottoman Empire was called \textit{boneta}: “this was a dark cylindrical hat widening slightly at the top; around its lower part was a small turban crossed above the forehead.” Esther Juhasz, ‘Jewish Dress in Central and Southwestern Asia and the Diaspora’, in Berg Encyclopedia of World Dress and Fashion 5: Central and Southwest Asia, ed. Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, vol. 5 (Oxford: Berg, 2010), 39. The wearing of the \textit{boneta} ceased with the introduction of the fez. Before Mahmud II’s dress reform the \textit{boneta} was the main characteristic of differentiation, since Ottoman Jewish dress in general resembled local varieties and otherwise “tended to follow Ottoman urban dress styles,” besides specific colors and shoes. See Ibid., 47.

\textsuperscript{161} Taken from Ahmmed Ahmad Rafiq, \textit{Hicrî on Ikinci Asruda Istanbul Hayatı <1100-1200>; Ahmet Refik, Türk Tarih Encümeni Külliyati / Türk Tarih Encümeni. - İstanbul, 1925 17 (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930), 86-88, 103-4 as cited in Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, 39.

\textsuperscript{162} The rest of the name illegible, see BOA Cevdet Dahiliye (C.DH.) 206/10290.

\textsuperscript{163} “\textit{ehl-i zimmet re’üyâ tu’fâsu},” BOA C.DH. 206/10290.

\textsuperscript{164} “\textit{ehl-i İslâma maḥşüs},” BOA C.DH. 206/10290.

\textsuperscript{165} BOA C.DH. 206/10290.
A document from 1844 indicates that the fez became an important yet controversial element in the relations between Ottoman communities.\textsuperscript{166} In the central Anatolian district of Kayseri, a person denoted as an Armenian \textit{kocabaşı},\textsuperscript{167} a non-Muslim (\textit{zimmî}) member of the district council called Azerioğlu Serkiz, was honored for his achievements with a special badge to be attached to his fez, to be manufactured in the imperial mint. That incidence provides hints to the spread of the fez and its use in the Ottoman provinces by local administrators. In this case it not only marked a certain equality among different Ottoman groups, but also emphasized special merits achieved by an Armenian subject. Yet a conflict seems to have risen around this matter. There obviously had been worries that complaints against this decoration or even attacks against the \textit{kocabaşı} might appear, especially from among the other members of the local council. The Armenian patriarch had expressed worries about attacks against Azerioğlu Serkiz as becomes apparent from the letter sent by the grand vizier to the head of the district of Kayseri (\textit{kâ’immakâm}). There the grand vizier demanded protection for Azerioğlu Serkiz from the \textit{kâ’immakâm}.

The significance of the Azerioğlu Serkiz decoration might have been part of a more general effort to win over local notables on one hand, and to constrain their power by state centralization on the other hand, for instance through the establishment of local administrative councils.

A similar case of contradictions between central state orders and reactions of local population regarding dress codes and the equality of Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims appeared in 1853 in the provincial district of Gördes, a part of the province of Manisa in Western Anatalia.\textsuperscript{168} The case is documented in two different letters: One is a petition in the Greek language and letters sent by the Greek Orthodox community to a Greek Orthodox religious authority.\textsuperscript{169} The other document carries the seal of the ecumenical

\textsuperscript{166} BOA HR.MKT. 7/34.
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Kocabaşı} before the \textit{Tanzimat} reforms meant \textit{muhtar} [municipal administrator] and also carries the meaning of “\textit{millet başı} [community leader],” see entry \textit{Kocabaşı} in Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, \textit{Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü}, [2. baskı]. (İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1971), 285; and Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Period’, in Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, ed. Kemal H. Karpat, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 618.
\textsuperscript{168} diocese of Philadelphia
\textsuperscript{169} Thanks a lot to Paris Papamichos Chronakis for providing me with a summary of the Greek text of the petition included in the documents of BOA MVL 261/39.
Patriarch in Istanbul Germanus IV (1852–1853), sent by him to the Supreme Council (meclis-i vala) at the Ottoman court, written on the behalf of the local Christians and their complaints.

A group of Greek Orthodox families had sent the petition in Greek language, dated July 22nd, 1853, to complain about the violation of their rights by Muslim inhabitants of Gördes. They had been exposed to cruel attacks by the Muslims, were asked by them why they wore a fez and why they still celebrated Christian holidays. The Greek Orthodox inhabitants complained that their “Ottoman neighbors” have for the past two months been harassing them. The Muslims, they complain, had called them “cuckolds”, “pezevèkides” and “infidels (giaour)”. The Muslim Ottomans had also occasionally beaten up Greek Orthodox persons at the market. Several other incidents are mentioned. All this took place, the petitioners remark, while the Sultan issued favorable and positive orders for the Greek Orthodox. How can we, they wonder, respect the royal orders when our Ottoman neighbors harass us, asking “why do you infidels wear a fez?” The petition concludes by requesting the religious authority and the Holy Synod to intervene.

This case and the case of Azerioglu Serkiz show that the adoption of the fez by Ottoman non-Muslims was supported by the central government, yet it provoked sometimes resistance by the local population, in the streets as well as among members of administrative bodies. While the Greek Orthodox in Gördes were willing to wear the fez, they did not consider themselves Ottoman, denoting only the Muslims which attacked them as such. In his letter to the Supreme Council, the Patriarch does not adopt the terms used by the Greek Orthodox authors of the petition and speaks of the Muslim population (ahâli-yi İslâm) and the re‘âyâ (flock), a term often applied to non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. Since the Patriarch is located in Istanbul, I want to suggest that he speaks the language of the center which has somewhat different concepts of identity. At that time they attempted to include non-Muslims into the meaning of Ottoman, which the population in Gördüs - Muslim as well as Greek-Orthodox - obviously did not, even though

172 BOA MVL 261/39.
173 BOA MVL 261/39.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
the *rum* claimed this identity through wearing of the *fez*.

This is similar to the case of Azerioğlu Serkiz, who was awarded by the central state for his merits in the service of the state. Similar to the eumonical, this time the Armenian Patriarch had to intervene in order to protect a *ziimmî* from reactions to a measure of the central government, that had granted him a privilege related to the wearing of the *fez*. The granting of this decoration might have been linked to the emergence of a new middle class, as assessed by Karpat; the Armenian kocabaşî, as an equivalent to the newly emerging Muslim local powers that he referred to.\(^{176}\)

Here we can see how modernization measures such as the wearing of the *fez* and the reorganization of provincial administration interacted with each other as well as with the complex relations between different Ottoman social groups. The *fez* here added completely new dimensions to these relations, as a sign of reconstitution of state-subject relations as well as relations among the population itself. Notions such as Westernization or Europeanization are not able to grasp this situation, because this concerns modernization in a more general way, as a new form of power, rather then the adoption of certain practices and items from western Europe. The *fez* as it is used in this way is also not an item of Ottoman traditional culture but used very differently, namely to reorganize Ottoman society. Important here is that the *fez* functions as a reference to the national as well as to the modern at the same time, that is why it was particularly contested, in contrast to other modern items of dress that do not appear in the sources at all. That leads me back to my introductory remarks on postcolonial study, because the relevance of the *fez* can only be understood in relation to the global ramifications of European colonialism and postcolonial nationalism, such as Ottomanism, that resulted from it. The *fez* also attained its specific meaning within this colonial setting, but again, not just as an item of Ottoman particularity, but also of global modernity.

\(^{176}\) See Karpat, 'Transformation of the Ottoman State,' 66.
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In 1876 the first Ottoman constitution was introduced and a parliament established. This is regarded as the accomplishment of Young Ottoman intellectuals and state elites, who were motivated by their resentment against the Tanzimat reform edicts of 1839 and 1856. These thinkers argued that the reforms were only introduced due to foreign pressure. At the same time, they propagated reforms that – in their eyes – were to protect Ottoman interests. This first constitutional period did not last long. Already in February 1878 Sultan Abdülhamid II suspended the constitution and the parliament to establish an autocratic regime.

The period of the reign of Abdülhamid II. (1876-1909), saw massive economic and social change, and was politically marked by the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877/78, followed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 where peace conditions were set. As a result of the war, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its European possessions and a large portion of its Christian population. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent states. The conference in Berlin was a demonstration of European power, where the drawing of borders and the creation of states were decided upon. In 1876 the Ottoman state had declared bankruptcy, which was followed by the installation of the Public Debt Administration in 1881. Ottoman financial autonomy was thereby handed to foreign debt holders who administered from then on Ottoman state revenues. In general, the last decades of the nineteenth century were a period of administrative, cultural, and financial reorganization, which saw the Ottoman Empire lose most of its European possessions as well as its financial autonomy.

As a consequence of the political situation, the politics of dress during that period attempted to reinforce the integrity of the Empire. I am going to show how the political

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situation reflected on the level of the politics of dress. A well-known example is the Hamidian government's attempts to prevent Ottoman subjects who stayed abroad from wearing hats. Sometimes used as a disguise from Ottoman spies, it was in generally judged as an act of disloyalty to the Hamidian regime. Thus in the 1880s several attempts were made to prevent Ottoman subjects from wearing hats when they stayed abroad.4

1889 and onwards saw the foundation and rise of the constitutionalist Young Turk movement in opposition to Abdülhamid II’s reign, as successors of the first generation of Young Ottoman reformers.5 In contrast to the promotion of Ottoman multi-ethnic identities during this period by the central state and other actors, emphasis of political movements partly shifted to ethnic nationalism. The influence of ethnic nationalism, however, should not be overrated and a-historically projected backwards. In spite of the independence of a number of Balkan states, the impact of ethnic nationalism among the Ottoman elite was still limited. Isa Blumi treats the generation of the Young Ottomans as characteristic of this late Ottoman phenomenon: “This would prove especially true with the rise of the Young Ottoman generation, a cohort at once loyal to their communities or origin and to the Ottoman state in which these communities participated.”6 In his view, the newly founded states in the Balkans were much more intermingled with the Ottoman experience and policy as was commonly admitted.

According to Selim Deringil’s study, one of the main characteristics of the period was the culmination of a legitimacy crisis which had begun with the reign of Mahmud II.7 Deringil points to the critical aspects the period had for the legitimation of power, and he describes it as both “formative and disruptive, both creative and destructive.”8 Formative in the sense that different forms of infrastructure - from educational to industrial - were established during the era, as well as a normative order disruptive of the former “fabric of society.” Deringil claims that passive obedience was replaced by a claim of conformity to this normative order. I think the phenomena I am tackling with in this chapter are an

4 BOA İ.HUS 27/1312M-102; BOA Y.A.RES. 71/27; BOA İ.DH. 979/77308. On the case see also Cevdet Kirpik, ‘Fez - Şapka Çatışması’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 162 (September 2007), 14.
6 Isa Blumi, Foundations of Modernity: Human Agency and the Imperial State, Routledge Studies in Modern History 9 (New York [u.a.]: Routledge, 2012), 44.
8 Ibid., 11.
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expression of these endeavors.

Among other things the Ottoman government and administration countered the precarious situation on the Ottoman borders and of the Ottoman state’s sovereignty and its own crisis of legitimacy by measures to strengthen Ottoman identity. In the following I analyze a number of cases of Ottoman politics of dress, or more specifically headgear, and demonstrate how these where applied to construct identities and draw borders by negotiating both interdependently. The first case indicates how these politics were carried out it in agreements with foreign companies which invested in the Ottoman Empire and regulated their employment politics.

My analysis is guided by the following questions: what kind of identities and subjectivities these interventions seek to produce? What kind of activities of its subjects the Ottoman provincial or central administration regarded as problematic? and finally - what kind of interests and agency become visible on side of the individuals or subjects who are targeted by these state interventions?

3.1 Headgear of Employees of Foreign Companies in the Ottoman Empire

In September 1887 (1303) the Ottoman state reorganized the granting of concessions to foreign companies concerning dress and citizenship of their employees.9 These regulations coincided with the first wave of direct foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire, which occurred between 1888-1896.10 The government requested a survey on the kind of dress worn by employees of these companies, since such reports would not exist yet. The companies specifically targeted, were the Rumeli Railway company and the company for the supply of water in Istanbul.11 It had been observed that all of their employees donned hats.12 Both companies, as proceeds from the minutes of

9  BOA MV. 24/36; BOA DH.MKT. 1451/63.
10  Zürcher, Turkey, 84-85.
11  Two thirds of this investment of foreign capital was in railways, see Ibid., 85.
12  This situation is nicely documented in a photograph taken 1891 at the construction site of the railway from Istanbul to Ankara, constructed by the Ottoman Anatolian Railway Company, which had been established by the Deutsche Bank. Students of the Military Academia visit the sites. Many of the workers depicted wore hats, most of them brimmed felt hats, some also peaked caps (on the margins of the picture some persons’ crumbled fezzes and turbans appear, it isn’t clear if they were railway workers, too), see Engin Özendes, Photography in the Ottoman Empire: 1839 - 1923, 1st ed., (İstanbul: YEM Yayın, 2013), 230-231.

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the Council of Ministers, had mostly foreign employees and in addition many non-Muslim Ottoman employees. The practice of wearing hats would lower the chance for Ottoman Muslims to get employed and earn a living. Thus the Ottoman state wanted to link the granting of concessions to foreign companies to the preservation of the Ottoman dress code and imposed the wearing of the fez obligatory for all employees of foreign companies, regardless if they were Ottoman citizens or not. The contract of the water supplier was to be reworked according to the new measures. Exempted from both prescriptions, Ottoman citizenship and the wearing of the fez, were memurin-i feniyye, foreign engineers, and experts employed by the Ottoman government, who secured the transfer and implementation of imported technologies from European countries.

As Cevdet Kirpık, who dealt with these cases in his study on labour in the Ottoman Empire, shows that the decision made by the Council of Ministers was implemented in the following years. Concessions granted to foreign companies now contained clauses that stated that besides engineers, experts and management, all workers had to be Ottoman citizens, even though the implementation of these restrictions wasn't always achieved. Kirpık remarked that next to the purpose of securing employment opportunities for Ottoman Muslim workers, another dimension of the obligatory wearing of the fez was to secure national sovereignty on a symbolic level.

The Ottoman government attempted to regain or preserve economic and political control through this intervention in the politics of dress. Concessions to foreign companies were only granted if they respected this symbol of Ottoman sovereignty. Their economic activity on Ottoman territory should not give them political power. If employees of the respective companies wore the hat, they would be shifted to European control. They were on a certain level no longer Ottoman subjects and citizens but under the authority of the states to which the companies belonged.

This is also an example which allows us to elaborate on the meaning of the hat which carries here the dimension of foreign investment and the Ottomans’ ambivalent

13 The principle executive and legislative council of the Ottoman Empire introduced by Mahmud II.
14 BOA DH.MKT. 1451/63.
16 Ibid., 48.
17 In some concessions this was further restricted to just engineers; on the obligation to wear the fez see Ibid., 65-69; and on clauses regulating the employment of Ottoman workers Ibid., 166.
18 Kirpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 65.
attitude towards it.\textsuperscript{19} It also becomes apparent that the religious dimension cannot be separated from it. Thus the restriction of Ottoman sovereignty and its economic power is symbolized by the wearing of the hat of the employees of foreign companies who are mostly Christians.\textsuperscript{20} While the Ottoman state was not interested in preventing foreign investment, quite the opposite, it sought to set the conditions.\textsuperscript{21} But the European hat was thereby not just a symbol of the intrusion of European capital but also its counterpart, the European workers movement.

Besides the creation of employment opportunities for the Ottoman workforces, apparently the Ottoman authorities feared the spread of socialist ideas by European anarchist workers.\textsuperscript{22} Thus the employment of Ottoman workers was also meant as a measure to prevent strikes and other forms of workers' resistance. Hence in regards to Westernization, what the Ottoman state supported was the import of European technologies of power for its own purpose, and the conscious and active fight against ideas that question authority and which could be of use to the Ottoman population. The same question also delimited equal treatment of Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim workers. Non-Muslim Ottoman workers seem to have been more active in union activities together with foreign workers, and on that account have been dismissed from their workplaces.

The wearing of the hat by engineers was not regarded as dangerous as it was for the workers. It shows that from the Ottoman perspective, one hat was not like the other. On one hand, the hat of the engineers and other experts was tolerated because of the need and desire of the transfer of technology and knowledge, which the Ottomans deemed necessary. On the other hand, the hat of the workers and their radical/critical ideas had to be kept out. It depends on which kind of hat and who wears it, because it

\textsuperscript{19} While the Ottoman government favored foreign investment, its terms were set to Ottoman disadvantage; see Findley, \textit{Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity}, 139; and Şevket Pamuk, \textit{The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913} (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987).

\textsuperscript{20} Foreign investment came along with a colonialist division labor, where companies were run by Europeans, the middle management consisted of Europeans and Ottoman Christians, and most of the laborers were Muslim Ottomans, see Findley, \textit{Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity}, 168.

\textsuperscript{21} Yet, that was a difficult task because due to the capitulations Europeans in the Ottoman Empire were exempted from Ottoman Law. See Ibid., 139. In addition, European companies negotiated in these concessions for extremely favorable conditions for themselves. One example of such was the building of railways, where a kilometer guarantee payment was granted to them, thereby eliminating almost all risks for the investors. See Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, 85.

\textsuperscript{22} See Kirpik, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 70 and Findley, \textit{Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity}, 168.
can be assumed that the workers' hats were not the same as those of the engineers.

Thus the rift constructed by the hat was not just along religious lines; it also pointed at the question of class. The hat was regarded a threat not only to national sovereignty but also as a threat from the lower classes who questioned the claim to power/privileges of the ruling class.  

3.2 Fez-Wearing Obligation for Ottoman Christians

The next case I am going to treat took place in 1894. It is significant because the documents on this incident contain an imperial decree which regulated the headgear of all Ottoman Christians no matter of their official function. It is an effort to include the wider population beyond official ranks into legislation on headgear. Thus it provides evidence of the effort of the Hamidian government to make the fez obligatory for the entire Ottoman population.

The affair appears first on July 14th, 1894 via an imperial decree signed by the chief clerk (serkâtb) of the imperial scribal office. It contains a report that some Ottoman Christian subjects donned a hat, which was declared unacceptable because the fez was the common attire of all Ottomans. Via this order Abdülhamid II requests that the Council of Minister's released a “serious decision” to order all Christians belonging to the Ottoman citizenry to wear the fez “under any circumstances.”

This request was implemented two weeks later when the Council of Ministers issued a decision on the case which reveals more details on the issue. The ministers confirm that the fez was the “official distinguished sign of all subjects of the sublime

23 Mahmud Muin mentions the granting of concessions to foreign companies that contained the condition that their employers wore the fez in his 1908 article in Donanma ‘Our national headpiece and Fezzes.’ I analyze this article in Chapter Five. See Mahmud Muin, ‘Serpüş-i Millimiz ve Fesler [Our National Hat and the Fezzes],’ Donanma (1 Temmuz 1326 (July 14th, 1910), 396-402.
24 BOA Y.A.RES 27/7 consist of two documents, one issued by the Council of Ministers, the other by the Grand Vizier; BOA İrade Hususi (İ.HUS.) 1312/M-102/27, July 6th, 1894. For this genre of imperial decrees (irade) see Yusuf Sarnay and Yusuf İhsan Genç, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi, genişletilmiş 3. baskı., Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı (İstanbul: T. C. Başkanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2010), 300.
25 “ciddi bir karar,” BOA İ.HUS. 1312/M-102/27, July 6th, 1894.
26 “tâbi‘yeylerini-i osmâniyyeyi hâ’iz olan bir-cümle hristiyanların daхи bi‘eyyi hâl fes iktisâ eylemeleri şımında,” İrade Hususi, BOA İ.HUS. 1312/M-102/27, July 6th, 1894.
27 The same file contains a letter by the Grand Vizier which presents the template of the imperial decree drafted by the council to the sultan, see BOA Y.A.RES 27/71.
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state.” The ministers claim that “the necessity for all Ottoman subjects to wear the fez is caused by servility and loyalty [...]), and specifically for its Christian members “the Christian subjects who know their duties which consist of an oath of fidelity, significant parts of the population, adorn their servility always with the fez.” The fez was a sign of those who those were proud to belong to the citizenry of the Ottoman Empire.

The decree, however, is not confined to the Ottoman citizenry and is addressed in the next step to Christian state officials who donned the brimmed hat, and the same time to foreign state officials who resided in the Ottoman Empire. Both groups received an admonishments to wear the fez instead, and were threatened to be expelled from their positions if they would not follow this request. Another group that was addressed were Ottoman merchants who wore a hat. The document claims that they should wear the fez when they applied to the state departments. This would be judged as a demonstration of their devotion to the Ottoman state, and be favored and supported by the ministers they applied to.

These documents show that the Ottoman government undertook efforts to force all Ottoman subjects, and specifically Christians, to wear the fez. In these endeavors all Ottoman Christians in general are addressed, i.e. there is no distinction between Armenians and Greek Orthodox. Yet as the second part of the document indicates, the government addresses some groups - the mentioned state officials and merchants - more explicitly. Still, there is no further information in the documents on the identity of these people and what prompted the sultan to initiate such a decree at that moment.

From the perspective of the Ottoman government, the fez was not an exclusive (Ottoman) Muslim garment, as usually perceived by outsiders. It seems that the fez had a twofold meaning. As it was embraced and adopted by many Ottoman Christians, it might have had the meaning of participation and citizenship. We do not know to which extent its refusal can be related to a defiance of Ottoman identity and state or protest against Muslim hegemony.

What might have been the political background of this legislation on the fez?

1894 was the year of the beginning of the Armenian crisis, with several Armenian

29 “teba’a osmâniyeyin ‘umûmiyetle fez giyimleri levâzım ‘ubûdiyyet ve sadâkâtdan olmasi [...]” BOA Y.A.RES 27/71, document a) line 4.
30 “teba’a hristiyanıyyeyden ‘uhde-‘yi sadakata terettüb eden vezâ‘if-i ma‘hûsûseyi bîlen bir çok halk mefârik ‘ubûdiyyetini hemiçe fes ile tezyin etmekde olub,” BOA Y.A.RES 27/71, document a) line 4-5.
uprisings and massacres against the Armenian population. The Hamidian regime felt threatened from within and without. It was unpopular within and outside the Ottoman Empire. Even though Abdülhamid II received backing by great parts of the Muslim population, he was opposed by the relevant parts of the Ottoman elite. Thus opposition was rising in the following years, and it attempted a coup d’etat in September 1896, which was thwarted before its accomplishment. The decree which is introduced above probably stood in relation to the tense internal situation which tragically culminated in the Armenian massacres between 1894-1896. It appears that Abdülhamid II sought to secure the loyalty of his subjects through the conformity of dress and compensate the crisis of legitimacy, as it was analyzed by Selim Deringil, amongst other measures, through the affirmation of common identity of all Ottoman citizens.

3.3 Outlawed Variations of the Fez

Although Ottoman policies advocated and sometimes enforced the wearing of the fez by Ottoman Christians, contrary positions existed as well and interventions were made to prevent them from doing so. Yet the proponents of such an agenda remain unclear. In spring 1899 (1315) unknown authors claimed that the fez was a Muslim item and complained about Ottoman Christians using it. More precisely, they complained about the way Ottoman non-Muslim appropriated or used the fez. The author accused locals Christians and especially Armenians of wrapping a slim veil (tül) around their fez as a sign of grief, and some of them of even wearing a black fez with a short and slim veil wrapped around it as sign of community affiliation. They argue that the original shape and appearance of the fez must not be changed because it was Muslim, meaning it should not be changed by non-Muslims. At the same time the author(s) of the document criticize the similar appearance (müşabehat) of Muslims and non-Muslims, and request a decree which outlawed the described style of fezzes. Providing more details about the mentioned

31 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 142; and Zürcher, Turkey, 94. In 1896 an Armenian group seized the headquarters of the European owned Ottoman Bank, threatening to blow it up. Thus unleashed reprisals on the Armenian population in Istanbul, where up to 8000 Armenians were massacred.
32 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 144.
33 See Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains.
34 BOA Y.PRK.BŞK 56/81; the exact dating of the document is uncertain. The year 1889 is provided by the archival classification but not on the document itself.
fez, they contend that people had begun to wear this kind of fez in the last days of Sultan Abdülaziz's reign (1861-1876), and that it had been outlawed already back then. Nevertheless people continued to wear it and thus they claim that the banning of it should be reinforced. This would designate the people wearing the fezzes as merchants (carşılı). Even though the document does not carry a date, a recipient, or a signature, it can be attributed to the reign of Abdülhamid II because it belongs to a collection of documents which had been presented to him or his scribes.35

There is no further information about if the case was treated or any decision taken. Still, it is an interesting and revealing case about the adoption of the fez by different groups within Ottoman society as well as the surveillance executed about the proper use of the fez. As in other cases, it is obvious that the fez was treated differently in accordance with the situation. While Ottoman authorities desired the adoption of the fez by Ottoman Christians, they also set the terms, as the banning of the wrapped fez by Abdülaziz I and the claim for its renewal treated show.

The following year, in April 1899, another kind of black fez appeared as a target of state interventions.36 At the time artisans produced a kind of fez, as a report of the Ministry of Interior says, that did “not suit those wearing it.”37 It was a black fez lined with a silken cloth and a short tassel and it resembled, the report continues, and as kind of headpiece that resembled those “some foreigners use in their bedrooms and lounges [or recreation rooms],”38 its use was not compatible with Islamic customs. The Ministry of Interior informs the security forces of the city of Istanbul and the Ministry of Police that the production and wearing of the mentioned fez was prohibited. It says that all provinces and state offices will be informed about the prohibition of this fez and the security forces were instructed undertake necessary measures.

The last two examples show that efforts were undertaken to produce a uniform appearance of all Ottoman citizens through the fez. It was therefore not just a local matter, but one of the whole Empire as an effort to create unity, even though it can be doubted how far reaching these measures were.

35 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı, Sarınaş and Genç, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi, 342.
36 BOA DH.MKT. 2192/36, 2 Nişan 1315 (April 18th, 1899).
37 “iktisat edenlerin simalarına yaksınamak,” BOA DH.MKT. 2192/36, line 2.
38 “ba’zi ecdnibi yatak otalarinda ve teneffüs mahallerinda istimal eyledikleri,” BOA DH.MKT. 2192/36.
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3.4 Sanctions against Unauthorized Muslim Dress

A rare case of state intervention in the wearing of Islamic dress appeared in June 1893.\(^{39}\) The cook (başaşçı) of the Austrian embassy, called Bokayis, presumably a Christian, was seen in the streets wearing a white turban, a long antari and a vest (hursta). He had walked, dressed like this, through the market in Büyükdere, a quarter in Istanbul, visiting stores and pubs. Employers of the municipality saw him like this and prohibited this kind of appearance, and made him to remove his turban. According to the records of the municipality, he was not allowed to wear these clothes, as they were reserved for Muslims. Even though Bokayis religious affiliation is not mentioned, it is obvious that he was non-Muslim, since the reasoning to ban his wearing of these clothes was grounded on this.\(^{40}\) The municipality of Istanbul blames him of exposing himself to public view with a dress that is specific to Islam.\(^{41}\) The incident is reported through a document sent by the municipality to the imperial scribal office at the Yıldız Palace, the residence of Abdülhamid II.

3.5 Hats On- and Off-Stage

Besides the Ottoman government’s and administration’s endeavors to prevent the use and spread of the brimmed hat by powers perceived as foreign, Ottoman subjects adopted the hat voluntarily. Thus they became the target of repressive measures on the sides of the state. An early case appears in August 1889 and documents a stage performance.\(^{42}\) The records of the Ministry of the Interior contain a report sent to the Ministry of Police consisting of a complaint about Muslim actors’ style of beard (“half beard (yarm sakał”) and the wearing of hats in the theater. The report says that the authorities in charge were informed about the ban of this practice which had been enacted, because wearing the hat was illegal in Islam. The wearing of the hats on stage, according to the author of the document, had received attention among the population.

\(^{39}\) BOA Y.PRK.ŞH 4/41. 2 Haziran 1309 (Juni 14\(^{th}\), 1893).
\(^{40}\) The documents to not mention if Bokayis was an Ottoman or Austrian citizen. In earlier periods visitors to the Ottoman Empire from Europe or elsewhere had to retain their dress worn at home, only when they traveled they could don Muslim dress for protection. Since the appearance of modern dress in the Ottoman Empire, that did not matter anymore.
\(^{41}\) “İslama mahsus bir kıyafetle kendiini teşhirde”, BOA Y.PRK.ŞH 4/41, line 3.
\(^{42}\) BOA DH.MKT. 1648/134, 5 Ağustos 1305 (August 17\(^{th}\), 1889).
and rumors about the actor's courage to do such a thing had began to spread. The municipality of Istanbul also had been informed, and it ascribed quite an amount of importance to the matter, according to the author.\footnote{On the tasks and composition of the Istanbul municipality see Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden: Brill, 1971-94 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2004), 286-287.} During the entire description of the affair neither the location or name of theater nor the name of the play performed on stage are mentioned. From that I conclude that neither the play nor the stage performance or the theater as an institution became attacked, only the appearance of the mentioned actors. A reference to Ottoman identity is missing in the document. The actors are just denoted as Muslim, and the frame of reference of the critique of their appearance is also Islam.

I will continue with another document, also from the Hamidian Era but issued almost two decades later. In this case, the hat is not on stage but donned by a person in the audience of a play staged in a hostel.

3.5.1 The Case of Ezine Orman Katibi Mehmed Efendi

In June 1907, after he had been reported of donning a hat while watching a theater play, an Ottoman official, Mehmed Efendi, a scribe at the state forestry administration (orman katibi) got into trouble. Subsequently he got arrested and dismissed from his office.\footnote{BOA BEO 3109/233116.} The case took place in the district Ezine in the Marmara region, part of the historical Province of the Archipelago (Vilâyet-i Cezair-i Bahr-i Sefid) and the contemporary province of Çanakkale. It is recorded in an exchange of letters between the Grand Vizier and the ministry of the Interior, as well as the interrogation records of witnesses who had been questioned on the case. Mehmed Efendi had filed a petition in order to retain his office, and the whole procedure had been passed on by the head of the district (kā’immakām) to the central government for them to decide if the matter should be entrusted to a court or rather dealt with administration internally.\footnote{BOA BEO 3109/233116, June 4th, 1907. The seal is illegible.}

The scene took place at the hostel where Mehmed Efendi lived and at the same time the theater play was staged.\footnote{According to the records reporting on the case the owner of the ḥān was Arslan Efendi, son of Yaşar Ağa, others say the owner was Yaşar Ağa himself.} The men interrogated on the case were Rasım bin Mustafa
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Efendi, a reserve head sergeant (redif serçavuşu), Arslan Efendi, son of of the owner of the hostel, a person called Ibrahim, then Aşıkzade Rüşdi Efendi, officer at the financial administration, Süleyman Efendi, son in law of financial inspector Osman Nuri, and the kahveci (coffee maker) İsmail Çavuş (sergeant).

Rasım bin Mustafa Efendi, when asked to describe the scene and if he saw Mehmed Efendi wearing a hat, he testifies that he had seen Mehmed Efendi wearing a night gown and the mentioned hat. He designated the mentioned hat as “rum şapkası”, literally an Ottoman Greek Orthodox hat. During the play, that he watched with his friends, he had heard people say, that Mehmed Efendi donned a hat so, he, Rasım Efendi, had turned around to look at him. He states that he saw him - first holding the hat in his hand, then putting it on his head, walking around with it among the crowd while taking it off and putting it back on frequently. After a while the financial director's son in law, Süleyman Efendi had approached Mehmed Efendi and asked him: “What are you doing? The crowd is watching you! Aren't you ashamed? Mehmed Efendi had not reacted and remained silent, however, and turned away, as did Süleyman Efendi.

Arslan Efendi, son of of the owner of the hostel, testified he had talked to Mehmed Efendi and asked him “don't you feel ashamed to wear a hat just like that, is this compatible with Islam?” whereupon Mehmed Efendi had replied: “It is.” Arslan Efendi claims, that this hat, had not been not Mehmed's own, but that of merchant Alexander that he had borrowed. After being approached by Arslan Efendi, Mehmed had returned the hat to Alexander. But later, Arslan Efendi had heard, that Mehmed donned the hat again.

In his second interrogation Rasım Efendi expounds that the crowd's attention arose when Mehmed Efendi had entered the room and that he obviously did not bother about it. The interrogators asked him, what the hat was made of: “was it felt or straw or not?” They asked what colour it was, and what might have been the reasons of Mehmed Efendi.

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47 Rasım Efendi was interrogated two times: On June 2nd, 1907 and June 5th, 1907. It seems that the interrogation was conducted by different persons because questions and answers are similar. The second interview provides a few more details.
48 The following witnesses confirm this information: Rüşdi Efendi, scribe at the financial administration (mali kalemi mülazimlerinden), Hüseyin Efendi, assistant head secretary of the district governor (tahrirat katibi muavini), Süleyman Efendi, reserve head sergeant (redif serçavuşu), and another Süleyman Efendi, son in law of the financial inspector (mali müdiri).
49 "Ne yapıyoruzsun ahali sana baksın ʿayb değil midir?" BOA BEO 3109/233116.
50 “Utanmazsınız böyle şabka giyizmek, İslam'a yakın mı?” BOA BEO 3109/233116.
52 He said he had heard it from an official called Hassan Fehmi and adjutant Hüsnı Efendi.
53 “Örme, hasır midir değil mi?” BOA BEO 3109/233116.
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wearing it. Rasım Efendi replies that the hat was of black colour, that he had also heard it was merchant Alexander's hat, and that he had no idea of Mehmed Efendi's motivations. Asked what he new about Alexander, Rasım said he just knew he was a merchant and also stayed at the hostel.

The next witness is the financial officer Aşıkzade Rüşdi Efendi, who, like all other witnesses, affirms he had no enmity with Mehmed Efendi and knew him because he came to his office once in a while. He also describes the hat as black, but claims he did not recognize of what material or shape it was.

Another witness, Süleyman Efendi, son in law of financial inspector Osman Nuri, narrates his encounter with Mehmed Efendi that evening as follows:

“I was watching the play, leaning against the railing on the upper floor. Methmed Efendi came and stood by my side, wearing his antari, his night gown, and hat and watched the play. When he turned to me, I realized he was wearing a hat. I asked him: 'what is it on your head, aren't you ashamed?' He said nothing, turned his head away, and continued watching the play.”

Finally, Mehmed Efendi is interviewed himself. The interrogators first asked him where he generally was spending his evenings. Whereupon he replies that usually his stayed in his room in Arslan Efendi's hostel. The interrogator then want to know from him if he usually changed his dress immediately when he came home in the evenings or later when he went to bed. In reply Mehmed Efendi declared that he sometimes changed when he went home and sometimes when he went to bed. Then they want to know if he commonly put on a fez when he got changed. He answered that sometimes he put on a fez and other times the kalpak of the people of Kaşgar.

On the respective evening he had put on the mentioned kalpak. He was asked to show this headpiece, which he did and confirmed that it was the one he had worn that

54 “Ne maṣṣada buni giymiş?” BOA BEO 3109/233116.
55 Loose robe, in this case probably a kind of night gown.
56 “hānin üst katında ki gezinti maḥallinde parmaklığı dayanarak oyun seyrediyorum Meḥmed efendi gecelik antaristyle ve başında şabka olduğu halde yanına geldi ve oyunu bakıyor idi, kendisine toğru cevirek dikkat ettiğiniime başında şabka olduğunu gördüm. Ona başındaki nedir ‘ayb değilmidir diye su’ul ettiüber sıkıat ederek ve başına çevirerek seyre devam etti.” BOA BEO 3109/233116
57 According to the record his age was 28.
58 Kasgar is the westernmost city in China, located near the borders of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Upon this Süleyman Efendi is interrogated a second time in order to confirm that the mentioned kalpak was the headpiece worn by Mehmed Efendi he saw, which Süleyman denies. He says the concerned headpiece had been of grey color and not black as the one he was shown now. When asked if the mentioned headpiece had a brim he provides a closer discription, that is as follows:

“Its crown was indent, the material of the fringe put outwards, and its brim roled up.”

Also the other witnesses do not recognized the kaşgar kalpak as the piece donned by Mehmed Efendi that evening. According to the witness İsmail:

“The mentioned hat was somewhat dark-colored with a brim. I realized that it was timber merchant Alexander’s hat when I saw him the other day.”

The kind of hat described by the witnesses might have been a homburg or fedora hat, both having “a central crease on the top and a slightly turned brim.” While the homburg is made of stiffened felt, the fedora's material is softer. Both types had become popular in the late nineteenth century.

The fedora emerged in 1880s, and according to Beverly Chico, in her encyclopedic account on hats and headwear, represents a shift in the spread of headwear styles. Instead of adopting aristocratic and royal styles, expanding middle classes embraced fashions which were made popular by stage productions and actors. It inhabited a niche between formal and casual headwear and won out as a the more comfortable alternative over the bowler hat. Along with the growing popularity and acceptance amongst higher classes of cloth caps, Beverely Chico regards the popularity of the fedora as a demise of Victorian rigidity.

59 I could not find a depiction or description of a Kaşgar/Kasghar kalpak, but I imagine it was similar to what is known as Khirgiz kalpak, since it has a brim and thus could be confused with a European brimmed hat.
60 “Tepeşici çıkr kenarları da'ir madda hârice toğri koyuverilmiş ve şemssiper haddini kıvırcuk şerete idi.” BOA BEO 3109/233116 page 6, line 10-11.
61 “Mezkır şabka kenarlı siyahı gibi bir şey olub ağac tüccarı Aleksanderinin giydği şabka olduğunu ertesi günü gördüğümde anladım.” BOA BEO 3109/233116, page 7, line 10-11.
63 Ibid., 163-165.
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In contrast, the homburg was made popular through its adoption by the later King Edward, then Prince of Wales, after his stay in Bad Homburg and by that turned into an expression of elite status by those who wanted to display wealth and class. Even though the top hat was the most prestigious expression of a high social status, the homburg became an accepted compromise between stiff uncomfortable headwear and the softer, more informal fedora. The spread of the homburg shows that the spread of styles through rulers and kings did not cease to exist entirely.

Back to Mehmed Efendi’s case: confronted with all those witnesses who declared that he had been wearing a brimmed hat, Mehmed Efendi still insisted that he had worn the kasgar kalpak instead. He blamed people’s perception of him donning a hat on the darkness inside the hostel. By no means, he contends, had he held merchant Aleksander’s hat in his hand nor put it on his head. Furthermore, he assesses that he had many witnesses to attest to it, but could not remember their names right now.

In the end the ministry of the Inner decided that it had been inappropriate to arrest Mehmed Efendi and that the matter should be dealt with administration internally.

This is in an example of the negotiation of identities and production of modern subjects in and through spaces such as the modern state and the theater. Performances on stage and the theater as a public space are of considerable significance here. The intervention against the hats on-stage might have taken place because of the play the actors performed, but the document does not mention the name of the play or anything which makes it possible to indicate the contents of the play.

In her analysis of Ottoman cartoons, Palmira Brummett notes that the theater amongst other forms of art had been a key symbol for social change. That made it a vulnerable place for the construction of Ottoman identity in the tension between self and other. The theater, according to Brummett, had a special fascination in Ottoman society amongst Western arts that became popular in the Ottoman empire, and she explains it with the long history and tradition of Ottoman theater. She considers it a space for the constitution of Ottoman identity, also in respect of gender relations, since it was a space where men and women mixed. In post-revolutionary cartoons, Brummet notes that the

64 Named after the German spa Bad Homburg.
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theater stage appeared as a metaphor for the Ottoman Empire, which was situated in a period of transition between real and unreal, past and present. It was a symbol of the modern, celebrated by Westernized elites, especially after 1908, when it was freed from the restriction (allegedly) imposed on it by Abdülhamid II. Yet the satire magazines also voiced critique of the elite and exclusive character of the modern theater and its adherents, who ignored the needs of other strata of the population.

The history of the modern theater can be dated back to the turn of the 19th century, under Selim III. The first theater was constructed with active support of the sultan. Two more were built during the reign of Mahmud II. They held regular performances of European troupes, and from the mid-century on plays written by Ottoman authors were also brought on stage. In 1860 the Ottoman theater, also known as Gedik Paşa theater, was built in Istanbul. This too took place with the approval of the sultan, who regularly visited the performances.

Suraiya Faroqhi treats the Ottoman theater as a part of luxury consumption as it was a space that confirmed the social status through the display of people's wealth. She argues that while Ottoman play writers aimed to educate their audience, the public itself rather enjoyed the entertainment and thus made the visiting of a theater a social event. She also asserts that the theater was a space encountered by a highly heterogeneous crowd in terms of gender and ethno-religious background, which makes it important on the grounds of identity-building. Thus the theater became a space of affirmation of social status through interaction of the audience amongst each other and the actors and stage. In that regard it was also a space of social control as the provided cases indicate. In Faroqhi's words: “Socio-political hierarchy is indicated by the goods which a given group was or was not permitted to wear.”

What does, however, the banning of the hat for Muslim off- and on-stage indicate? It was the distinction of a distinct Ottoman bourgeois style, and in this special case an Ottoman Muslim style. In neither case - be it the ownership of a hat by merchant Alexander or the wearing of hats on stage by Ottoman non-Muslims – did the Ottoman

66 See Ibid., 205.
67 See Ibid., 206.
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authorities render the wearing of hats by Ottoman non-Muslims problematic. Accordingly, this incident provides another example of the selective and somehow arbitrary implementation of modern Ottoman dress codes, where divides along national and ethnic identity became relevant or stressed in varying degrees and for various purposes.

3.6 Headgear and Citizenship: Reji Kolcusu Şükrü

A couple of years earlier, in march 1903 another case of the sanctioned donning of a hat by an Ottoman Muslim appeared. Şükrü Efendi, an inspector of the tobacco monopoly (reji)\(^{70}\) declared he would wear a hat and leave Ottoman citizenship because of a conflict between him and the law scribe Cemal Efendi. The reports on the incident, which took place in Ayaş in the province of Ankara, do not elucidate the background of the dispute between the two of them. The report of the incidence consists of two documents. One is a report of the district governor of Ayaş (kāʿimmakām) and a member of the financial administration to the Grand Vizier, the other is a draft issued by the scribal office of the ministry of Interior, to be sent to the governor of the province of Ankara. The central government, after being informed about the case, did not take action itself, but passed the case on to the administration of the province of Ankara. The report to the Grand Vizier described the incidence as follows: judicial court scribe Cemal Efendi visited the district governor Ismaʿil Hakkı Bey at home to report on a dispute he had with reji inspector Şükrü Efendi. The report mentions the presence of a number of other people at Cemal Efendi’s: a hoca, a person called Mehmed Ağa, and his son in law lieutenant (mülâzim) Osman Efendi - who were presumably counted as witnesses. The next day they had met again with the district governor and other witnesses at a government building (daʿire-i hûkûmet) to discuss the issue. The governor declared that they could pass a sentence on him on that occasion, since Şükrü Efendi by declaring that he “will abandon Ottoman citizenship and put on the hat of another state,”\(^{71}\) had exerted ungratefulness towards the sultan and now needed to apologize in order to gain mercy.

\(^{69}\) BOA DH.MKT. 681/8 (16 Mart 1319 (March 28\(^{th}\), 1903)).

\(^{70}\) Regié de Tabacs, founded in 1884. A European capital, mostly French as one of the “European economic bastions inside the Ottoman Empire,” next to the Ottoman imperial bank and the Public debt administration. Its profits were divided among the PDA, Regié shareholder’s and the Ottoman government, see Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 139.

\(^{71}\) “terk-i tahbîyyetler”
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All this had taken place two months before this document was written. The documents do not provide more information about the underlying conflict and Şükrü Efendi's motivation to wear a hat. For me it's worthwhile to note that the case seemed important enough for the local authorities to report to the central government, yet the Sublime Porte was not willing to deal with the case and passed it on to the provincial government. The wearing of the hat is not explicitly linked to religion but to citizenship, thus identity in relation to the state was constructed through this notion, rather than religion. Putting on a hat here meant change of nationality and not apostasy, even though that might have been implied. Whether or not the conflict had anything to do with the tobacco monopoly and its revenues which directly went to foreign debt holders via the Public Debt administration isn't clear. It's also remarkable that it isn't the wearing of the hat itself, but just the intention to do so in combination with the announcement to abandon Ottoman citizenship provoked the interference of authorities.

After providing these scattered examples of state interventions concerning its subjects' headgear, which I think help in drawing a sketch of the politics of the dress of the Hamidian period, I will continue showing a number of sources which display the negotiation of identities in borderlands and the constitution of the borderline as a space itself.

3.7 Territoriality and Dress

Eisenstadt mentioned the interrelated negotiation of national territory and identity as an intrinsic modern feature. He assesses, that the construction of political and cultural boundaries are closely interconnected and thus the construction of space and identity. Yet the drawing of boundaries and the negotiation of identity took place in a field of tension between inclusive and more universalistic terms and thus were never unequivocal in their meaning. Hence an emphasis on territorial and other boundaries was always confronted with the very same questions. A sample of documents from the Hamidian period exemplify the close interconnectivity of the politics of dress as a means for the construction of identity and the negotiation of borders on different levels. The

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respective state's claims to territory were made through the bodies of its subjects/citizens.⁷³

3.7.1 Eastern Rumelia

The province of Eastern Rumelia, located south of the Balkan mountains, came into being with the Berlin Treaty of July 13, 1878. The whole region was known as Northern Trace and is today's Southern Bulgaria. The name Eastern Rumelia was a creation of the participants of the Berlin Conference. Once the heartland of Ottoman state-building it was now shifting to the periphery of Ottoman influence.⁷⁴ Its capital was Plovdiv in today's Bulgaria. The new Ottoman province exercised certain administrative autonomy, but remained under Ottoman political and military jurisdiction. The province was governed by a Governor-General appointed by the Sublime Porte. It remained autonomous until 1885 when it was incorporated by a coup d'état into the Bulgarian kingdom which was still nominally but not factually under Ottoman suzerainty. Therefore the region was still an Ottoman province de jure until 1908, when Bulgaria proclaimed independence officially. In this setting, the contested status of Eastern Rumelia reflected a number of conflicts about dress fought out between the central government and different provincial agents.

**Aleko Paşa**

On the evening of May 25th, 1879 (13 Mayis 1295), a case which provoked quite an amount of disturbance involved the recently appointed first Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia. The question at hand was what he would wear for his inauguration whereas he wanted to leave Istanbul the next day.⁷⁵ Different central state offices interfered when

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⁷³ As Isa Blumi has pointed out, negotiation of identity in the Ottoman Empire did not necessarily take place within the framework of modernity, but involved local agents who might have acted beyond eurocentric imaginations. Thus it would also be important to consider the present cases not just within the narrow framework of modern national identity, but as expressions of local involvements with modernity which are not necessarily modern. This is unfortunately a task I am not able to accomplish here. See Isa Blumi, Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen, 1878 - 1918, 1. ed., Analecta Isisiana 67 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003). On Ottoman borderlands see also Olga Démétriu, *Capricious Borders: Minority, Population, and Counter-Conduct between Greece and Turkey* (New York [u.a.]: Berghahn, 2013).

⁷⁴ The province Rumelia had been part of the Ottoman Empire already since the fourteenth century.

⁷⁵ BOA Y.A.HUS. 161/22.
rumors emerged that he intended to go without "Ottoman dress" including the fez.

The officers at the Sublime Porte suggested that the Aleko Paşa would not be receive a friendly welcome in Rumeli Sarki in that kind of dress. Thus under the initiative of the central government, a telegraph was issued to stop the departure of Aleko Paşa to Eastern Rumelia on the following day. More information about the futures Vali's intentions regarding dress were demanded immediately. The central state expected Aleko Paşa to reconsider his decision and to make declaration that he will wear the fez and Ottoman dress, otherwise his journey was to be postponed. They expected disturbances from the populace if he appeared without “Ottoman dress” and fez. The correspondence on the case displays excitement on side of the state officers involved. The sultan had also expressed worries about the situation and attributed high importance to the issue. He expected a statement by Aleko Paşa regarding which kind of dress he intended to wear. State officials - amongst them the Minister of War - discussed whether he should be allowed to depart the next day before the issue of his dress was resolved: “If he considers to go without a fez, it seems appropriate to postpone his departure.” and in another document: “If he eventually considers going without wearing Ottoman dress and fez, he puts forward that it is appropriate to postpone his departure.” Aleko is asked to issue a statement regarding which kind of dress he intends to wear in his official capacity. The decision of allowing him to travel to his inauguration depends on his answer.

There is no mention in the documents of what kind of dress he intended to wear instead. The kind of dress regarded as proper Ottoman dress is described in the following, though no details of which pieces it consisted and how they looked like were provided: “[...] if he wears clothes which officers of the sublime state wear” and “[dress which] belongs to the office of the governor and is an attribute of [his] citizenship.”

According to the regulations, the governor of Eastern Rumelia had to be Christian.

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76 Also known als Vogoridis Paşa, see Sinan Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali: (1839 - 1922): Prospografik Rehber* (Beylerbeyi, İstanbul: İsis, 2003), 125.
79 “libâs-i me’mariyet-i devlet-i alyyye’yi labis olduğu halde,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 161/22.
80 “va’ifge ve sifât-i tabi’yette ‘a’id,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 161/22.
81 See article 13, Berlin Treaty.
Aleko Paşa (5 April 1822- 17 July 1910), respectively Aleksandr Stefanov Bogoridi or Aleko Vogorides, was governor of Eastern Rumelia from May 1879 until May 1884. Like his father Aleko Paşa himself was an experienced Ottoman statesman. Born in Istanbul in 1822 he went to several middle European countries for education. In the Ottoman Empire he held different high ranking positions such as member of the state council and minister of public works, post and telegraph. As to one source he was an activist of the Bulgarian renaissance. His biography suggests a pro-Ottomanist stance and I found some hints that he suppressed separatist movements during his post as governor in Eastern Rumelia. That might even be the reason why he did not continue his post after 1884. Still he was loyal to the Bulgarian state which is underlined by his candidacy to the Bulgarian throne in 1886. On a photograph which was taken during his time as governor he is wearing a kalpak which was at that time still more an item of Bulgarian identity than of Ottoman identity. A hint to Aleko Paşa’s relation with the Ottoman central government is provided by a New York Times article from October 21, 1879, one and a half year after his inauguration. A short note announced that Aleko Pasa had refused to visit the capital even though he had promised to come there twice a year to report on the situation in Eastern Rumelia. His refusal had caused displeasure among the officials at the Sublime Porte.

The case is further enlightened by the details provided on Aleko Paşa’s appointment by the account of Henry A. Layard, who was British ambassador from 1877 to 1880. Layard considered Aleko Paşa as unfit for the post, because of he imputes him a pro-Russian attitude. He also reported on conflicts with the Grand Vizier Edhem Paşa due Aleko Paşa’s conduct as ambassador in Vienna. That led to his recall, whereupon Aleko Paşa went to Paris instead where he, according to Layard’s knowledge, “wrote violent and offensive articles against Turkey in the public journals.” Concerning the incidence itself, which for Layard proves that Aleko Paşa “would be completely under the

82 His father Stefan Bogoridi already had been a high ranking Ottoman statesmen. According to one lexicon article he even had been one of the most influential Ottoman politicians. Amongst other positions he had been a member of the Tanzimat council and the first Christian Orthodox governor of the island of Samos.
83 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bogoridi. I could not find this confirmed, but do not want to leave it unmentioned.
85 Ibid., 558.
control of the Bulgarian's and the Russian party,”86 he reports that Aleko Paşa had replaced the fez by a kalpak as soon as he reached the Bulgarian frontier. Yet initially, and here Layard also provides more information of the kind of dress that was designated as Ottoman in the documents mentioned above, Aleko Paşa had intended to wear the “usual uniform of the provincial governor and Turkish functionary.”87 Before that the Russian commander of Eastern Rumelia seems to have approached and advised him to don a European hat upon is arrival, as the wearing of the fez would provoke protest and even unrest among the Bulgarian population in Eastern Rumelia. Upon this Russian intervention the Ottoman sultan even appealed to the Layard as the British ambassador to stress the importance the wearing of Ottoman dress by Aleko Paşa had for him.88

The case of Aleko Paşa is a rare case where other clothing, and especially Ottoman official's dress, together with headgear is discussed and given importance for the construction of Ottoman identity and the transgression of dress codes. The denotation of a certain style of dress as Ottoman is also singular to this incident. Through his journey with “Ottoman” dress to the autonomous province, the central government expected Aleko Paşa to strengthen the affiliation of Eastern Rumelia with the Ottoman state. His case reminds of Isa Blumi’s depiction of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite, their sometimes-ambivalent position towards the Ottoman state, and their respective communities which make them appear both as agents of Ottoman state policies and supporters of newly founded nation-states on former Ottoman territories.89

**Disputes about Headgear of Eastern Rumelian Militia and Gendarmes**

In March 1881 authorities in Eastern Rumelia turned to the central government in Istanbul and complained that attempts were made to force Muslim gendarmes and militia in Eastern Rumelia to give up established greeting practices they designated as Islamic.90 This form of greeting of called *temennâ* (شَكۡرٍ) involved kissing of the fingers of the right

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86 Ibid., 559.
87 Ibid., 559.
88 See Ibid., 559-560.
90 Muslim soldiers in Rumeli Şarki were forced to wear hats and Muslim gendarme are supposed to salute instead of *temennâ*, by doffing their kalpak. BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
hand and then tipping of the forehead with these fingers. Gendarmes and militia were expected to take off their headpiece for greeting instead of saluting by *temennā*, while the headpiece in question was a kalpak. According to the Treaty of Berlin, the gendarmes and local militia in Eastern Rumelia had to be composed proportionally to the religion of its inhabitants. Their task was to keep internal order in the province. In the present discussion only the Muslim gendarmes and militia were addressed. Besides the abolition of *temennā*, the introduction of peaked caps for the these police forces is mentioned. The administrator in Eastern Rumelia who sent a letter to the central government in Istanbul to picture the problem did not mention who wanted to introduce the raising of the headpiece for salute. They put forward that the matter actually had already been solved in internal regulations, issued also in 1881, which dealt with military strategy and esteemed dress code and conduct in the Eastern Rumelia as part of “internal regulations on Eastern Rumelia (Rumeli Sarki Nizamname-i Dahiliyyesi)” issued by the Grand Vizier. Communication on the issue took place between prime ministry and ministry of war.

Taking off one's headgear when greeting another person is considered as a sign of deference and respect in many parts the Western world, but was not common in Islamic

91 I could not find further information on the *temennā* (تمنا) and its supposed Islamic character, i.e. if it was exclusively used by Muslims. The spread of the term which does not exist in any relevant references. Furthermore the notion only exists in Turkish, not in Arabic as far as I could see. Yet it seems to be existing in Urdu, carrying a similar meaning.

92 An author of a document issued by the prime ministry suggested that raising of the kalpak was introduced during the stationing of Russian soldiers in the region, BOA ŞD. 1999/32, line 9.

93 See Berlin Treaty, Article 15: "Die innere Ordnung in Ost-Rumelien wird durch eine, von einer Ortsmiliz unterstützte Gendarmerie aufrechterhalten. Bezüglich der Zusammensetzung dieser beiden Korps, deren Offiziere vom Sultan ernannt werden, soll, je nach der Oertlichkeit, der Religion der Einwohner Rechnung getragen werden." http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Vertrag_zwischen_Deutschland_%C3%96sterreich-

Ungarn_Frankreich_Gro%C3%9Fbritannien_Italien_Ru%C3%9Fland_und_der_T%C3%9Ckerkei_-
%28Berliner_Vertrag%29; "Internal order shall be maintained in Eastern Rumelia by a native gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia. In the composition of these two corps, whose officers shall be named by the Sultan, account will be taken, according to locality, of the religion of the inhabitants.” According to an 1884 census about 20 percent of the population of Eastern Rumelia were Turks (used as synonym for Muslims), and about 70 percent were considered as Bulgarians. See Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830 - 1914, 1. print., Turkish and Ottoman Studies (Madison, Wis. [u.a.]: Univ. of Wisconsin Pr., 1985); or Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden: Brill, 1971- 81 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2002), 370: "The Muslim population (Turks, Pomaks, Albanians, Circassians) of Eastern Rumelia before the war, according to a British report, consisted of about 290,000 people as against 450,000 non-Muslims, mostly Bulgarians. In a matter of two years the Muslim population was reduced to about 120,000 people or by roughly 60 percent)."


95 BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
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contexts. But Muslim practice is just one aspect that was used to argue against the raising of the hat. Several references are made in the documents, i.e.: “This issue is profoundly unacceptable because together with it being irreconcilable with military practice, it is contrary to the Muslim confession [...].” Local and central state administrators adduced arguments against the introduction of the raising of one’s headpiece for salute on the level of military practices, religious and local customs, and national consciousness. A subject invoked repeatedly is religious freedom. On those grounds the administrators demanded an exception for Muslim soldiers from the hat-raising practice. In addition to religious freedom, the authors say that it was a matter of local customs and everyday Muslim practices, national consciousness, and the temperament or constitution of the people. They contend that therefore the issue went beyond military matters, and one should bear in mind what was custom and esteemed in the region of Eastern Rumelia. The reference made to national consciousness is not defined further. It remains open as to what kind of identity millet refers to in this case. And yet it is given an extra emphasis, stating that “beyond being [a matter of the] law this concerns national consciousness.”

In their discussion of what was common military practice, state officials include the practicability and convenience of taking off one’s headgear in military praxis, specifically concerning members of armed military. According to the authors of the documents, it is not common in European armies to take off one’s headgear during military activities, meaning that soldiers just practice saluting with a hat when they were unarmed and inside of a military barrack. Thus they are strengthening their argument by pointing out that it is not always common in Europe to take off the hat.

This controversy again depicts Rumeli sarki as a contested border land to be defended by the establishment or perpetuation of dress codes. The opponents of the abolition of the temennā for Muslim militia and gendarmes make no reference to a common Ottoman identity but instead to religion via Islam. It is not clear if they open up

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97 “şu važ’iyet uşul-i ‘askerîyye’ye meyvâfi olmamağa beraber meşheb-i İslâma meşhâreti cihetle esâsen gazî-i câ‘iz olgundan [...]”, BOA ŞD. 1999/32 (line 2).
100 “ahlâk-i millîye,” BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
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a broader scope when they talk about local populace and their customs, including non-Muslims:

“Because it is self-evident that local customs and habits of the populace are something to be applied, and that among the Muslim segment of the population it is not common to open the head [raise one's headgear], there is therefore no chance to raise the kalpak or [any other] headpiece anyway. By the internal regulation four hundred, paragraph one, it will be made explicit that members of the militia will attain freedom to perform the duties of their confession.”

Even though both sides of the local and central administration refer to religion to legitimize their argument to keep up the practice of temennâ, they emphasis the other points mentioned to a similar degree. In this case arguments pro or against a certain practice of dress were grounded on many different levels, as well as local practices related to international (European) standards. Reference to European military practice, local customs and national consciousness might have been included to strengthen the argument in favor of the maintenance of temennâ beyond a religious framework. Local customs might have been included to pay tribute to the autonomous status of Eastern Rumelia. In contrast to other conflicts which had more of an internal Ottoman character, the level of international politics was included here directly which made it insufficient to argue exclusively on the level of national or religious identity. This is the only case analyzed that contains a reference to religious freedom. That must have been related to the codification of it in the Berlin Treaty, which was used by Ottoman officials to argue against the raising of the police forces’ hats.

The other issue which had provoked unease, the claim that Muslim soldiers should wear peaked caps, was obviously resolved through an instruction that the peaks of the hats shall be destroyed while the raising of the kalpak remained an open question. In Eastern Rumelia a special regulation was in preparation to introduce the lifting of the

102 “Ādāt-i mahalliyə ve mizāc-i ahâliye taḥtib edilmiş bir şey olduğu bedihiyatdan bulunduğundan ve he’yet-i ıslâmiyye beyinden ətən başını açma ədəti ətən olmədən də əhələ kalpək ve serpüş çıxarmağa imkân olmayacaq əgəri nizânmâne-i dâhilinin dört yüz elli birinci maddesinde milis efrədî vezârf-i meşəhiyyəlerin irâsinca her yer hürriyete nə’ül olacaqları.” BOA ŞD. 1999/32.

103 On religious freedom see article 61 Berliner Treaty (http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Vertrag_zwischen_Deutschland,_Österreich-Ungarn,_Frankreich,_Großbritannien,_Italien,_Rußland_und_der_%C3%BCkreich._%28Berliner_Vertrag%29).
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kalpak. At the same time, the Prime Ministry released an order that the raising of the kalpak would be banned temporarily according to the above-mentioned internal regulation until the final decision was being made through a military regulation for Eastern Rumelia. Until then signs of respect would be payed through a hand-sign in accordance with local customs and habits in order to preserve confessional requirements. The state authorities postulate that future military regulations had to be phrased according to these prerequisites.

On September 1883 the government in Istanbul and the local administration of Eastern Rumelia continued their discussion about the gendarmes’ and militias’ headgear. This time the conflict about greeting by lifting the kalpak was no longer mentioned. Instead, the matter of peaked caps or brimmed hats turned up again. The administration of the province Edirne in Eastern Thrace informed the central government that Muslim gendarme officers were about to resign because all gendarmes and militia in Eastern Rumelia now had to wear a “hat (şapka) during summertime and the kalpak only during the winter. The administration designated the newly-introduced hat to be Russian while the kalpak, they said, could be regarded as national:

“In the province of Eastern Rumelia the kalpak, worn by gendarmes and militia and designated as national will now be replaced with a hat which is known to be special to Russian soldiers.”

According to the telegram sent by the Edirne administration to Istanbul, the whole matter so far was just a rumor and they were waiting for clarification from the Eastern Rumelia within a month. There is not further information on the outcome in the file.

The information about the kalpak - and in contrast to it a headpiece worn by Russian soldiers - is confusing, since actually in 1881, Alexander III introduced a new

104 BOA ŞD. 1999/32 (line 18-1).
105 “Vazı’ıf-i meşhebiyyelerin icrasinca kalpak çıkardırmak usulundan men ile ’âdât ve ahlâk-ı mahalliye tevfiken işaret-i ihtiramiyyenin el ile icra eyitdirilmis. [According to confessional duties will the doffing of the kalpak be prohibited and in accordance with local principles will signs of respect be conducted with the hand].” BOA ŞD. 1999/32 (line 19-2).
106 BOA Y.PRK.UM 6/10 (September 10th, 1883).
nationalist army uniform with a variation of the kalpak as headpiece.\textsuperscript{108}

In both cases the term Ottoman is not mentioned. I found Muslim and local or national without further specification as identity categories set in contrast to Russian. The term Europe is used here as a point of reference to argue for similarity, not for difference. Thus the central state regards Russia here as the main threat to Ottoman integrity.

\textit{Konstantin Atnarof Rotkof and his Christian Hat}

On November 1886 in the Ottoman-Bulgarian borderlands, in the district of Ropçoz, now Devin in Bulgaria, a quarrel around a hat which carried a depiction of a crucifix appeared. A letter from the Ministry of Interior informed the administration of the province of Edirne that a person named Konstantin Atnarof Rotkof, who lived in the village \textit{Pavlasko},\textsuperscript{109} arrested by the police on his way to the market-place, and was being accused of wearing a hat with a crucifix attached to it.\textsuperscript{110} It says “the reason for his arrest is [...] that he had a crucifix depicted on his hat while he went to the market which is located within our borders.” \textsuperscript{111} Obviously Rotkof visited a market on Ottoman territory and there drew the attention of the local police because of his hat. The official representatives of the provincial governors of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in Istanbul (\textit{kapıkethüdahiği}) had requested his release from the Grand Vizier.

In this case, the often-drawn link between the brimmed hat and Christianity is openly displayed. It is further linked to Bulgarian identity and received as an offense and a threat to Ottoman territorial integrity on the sides of the intervening police. The explosive nature and symbolic content of the incident is better understood by the fact that it is connected to the contested unstable situation at the Bulgarian Ottoman boundary with the recent annexation of Eastern Rumelia. The market place was somewhere close to or in the territory of it.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{108} In Russian the kalpak was called \textit{papakha}. The kalpak was a common headgear of people, Christian as well as Muslim, in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus its symbolism quite flexible. See Christine Ruane, The Empire’s New Clothes: A History of the Russian Fashion Industry, 1700 - 1917 (New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2009), 159-160.

\textsuperscript{109} پاولسقو, BOA DH.MKT. 1380/65.

\textsuperscript{110} BOA DH.MKT. 1380/65.

\textsuperscript{111} “bizim ḥudud dahiğinde bulunan [...] pazarına giderken polis tarafından tevkiif olunarak [...] ve merkümün sebeb-i teşkii ise şapkası üzerinde bir laci resmi bulunmasından ‘ibaret olduğundan.” BOA DH.MKT. 1380/65.

\textsuperscript{112} I cannot read the name of the market place properly, something as Istov, Astov or Ustov.
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Eastern Rumelia had been occupied by Bulgaria the year before and the status quo officially recognized by the Ottoman government in January 1886. The district or town Ropçoz, where the hat-wearing person lived, had been part of a region whose Pomak (Bulgarian Muslim) inhabitants had refused to be part of the newly created province Eastern Rumelia (1878) and instead remained a part of the Ottoman Empire, forming the unrecognized autonomous region of Tamrash.113

Why Ottoman officials who wrote the document put emphasis on the obvious fact, that the mentioned market place was within Ottoman borders, remains somewhat unclear. Rotkof lived on Ottoman territory anyway, since the former unrecognized Republic of Tamrash was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire again in 1886. In addition, it may have been difficult for Ottoman policemen to arrest someone on Bulgarian territory, let alone be able to move around. Probably it was emphasized to draw a link between the questioning of Ottoman sovereignty and the hat. At that time it was not uncommon in the Ottoman Empire, especially for Christians, to wear hats. Was the hat a problem or the crucifix? Probably both in combination at that time and place, shortly after the annexation of Eastern Rumelia.

Varna

In 1888 another incident in the Bulgarian Ottoman borderland took place, this time at the Black Sea town Varna in the principality of Bulgaria, which also came into being with the Berlin Treaty.114 A local Ottoman commercial agent (tüccar vekili) reports to the Foreign Ministry that local Bulgarians had urged Ottoman subjects to wear a “Bulgarian kalpak” at “places of worship and schools.”115 All three persons involved in the conflict are designated as “three Jews belonging to the subjects of the sublime State and the inhabitants of Istanbul [...].”116 The mentioned persons might have been merchants as the commercial agent deals with the case. It remains an open question as to why the “local Bulgarians” who are not specified further demanded the wearing of the kalpak. Maybe they expected an adaption to local habits and probably they perceived the open display of

113 See Dēmētriu, Capricious Borders, 92.
114 BOA Y.PRK.HR. 11/36 (June 1888).
115 “maʿābed ve mekātib,” BOA Y.PRK.HR. 11/36 (June 1888).
116 “devlet-i ʿaliyye tebāʿasından ve dersaʿādet ahālisinden üç Musevi [...],” BOA Y.PRK.HR.. 11/36 (June 1888).
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Ottoman identity as an offense. The Jewish identity remains in the background even though it was important enough to be mentioned. Yet the case is another indication that Ottoman identity was not necessarily reduced to being Muslim, both from internal, the Ottoman-Jewish, as well as the Bulgarian perspective, and that the fez was its signifier. Cevdet Kırpık, who also mentions the case, annotates that the mentioned Ottoman subjects made a claim on the fez and did not submit to the demand that they should wear a kalpak instead.117

Cuma-i Bala and Bulgarian Identity

On 1903 a quarrel took place regarding “Bulgarians” who supposedly exchanged their kalpaks in favor of the fez.118 In the following correspondence, the governor of the province of Salonika and the Grand Vizier discussed if the they had been forced to do so or if they donned the fez deliberately. On January 3, 1903 (27 teşrin-i evvel 1318) the governor of Salonika in a dispatch to the Grand Vizier suggested that the mentioned Bulgarians did not wear the fez because of their devotion to the Ottoman state: “That they took off the kalpak and donned the fez was not motivated by fidelity.”119 Instead the regiment of Üsküb (Skopje) had forced them and continued to do so after the troops left again for Üsküp. The governor declared that it was not a proper thing to force them to take off the kalpak, since it was their national dress.

The Grand Vizier in contrast had claimed, in a letter written on January 4th, 1903, that it was their free will to wear the fez.120 He assessed that the wearing of the fez by the Bulgarians in Cuma-i Bala, initiated by Tolgar Efendi, commander of the ninth army unit, was a sign of “renewal of [their] fidelity and servility.”121 Nevertheless the Grand Vizier expressed that he was willing to recognize that those Bulgarians affected by these measures had brought forth objections and to acknowledge the “sheep-skin kalpak [as] national dress of all Bulgarians.”122 Even though the fez was obligatory to wear

118 BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document a) (27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1318 (November 9th 1902)) , document b) BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51 (30 Teşrin-i Evvel 1318 (November 12th 1902)); BOA İ.HUS. 1320/Ş-28/100; BEO 1951/146299 (2 Teşrin-i Sani 1318 (November 15th 1902)).
119 “kalpāḳın čıkarub fes iksā atemeleri sä ’ika-yi şadāḳat olmayub,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document a)
120 See BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document b).
disapproval of it by the Bulgarians would eventually be contemplated, he continues. These are quite reserved concessions and the Grand Viziers remarks are not without judgement and thus he declares: “it is contemplated if their [the Bulgarians] desperate and selfish objections are worth to be considered.”

Moreover, the Grand Vizier proclaimed that he had drawn the attention of the authorities in the province Salonika on the issue and ordered inquiries to find out the if fez had been worn by the Bulgarians, and if it had been taken off after the regiment left. The Grand Vizier presumably referred to the same letter (iş’arat-i mahalliyye – local dispatch) as the governor of Salonika in the document dated two days earlier which contained the information that the aforementioned Bulgarians replaced the fez again with the kalpak. This letter of the Grand Vizier seems to be a direct reply to the letter written by the governor.

The Grand Vizierate issued another dispatch on the case to the Ministry of Interior and the General Staff (seraskeriyye), stating that it was improper to prohibit the wearing of the fez by the “Bulgarians” because they were doing it according to their own will.

The location where the incident took place, Cumi-i Bala, is today’s Blagoevgrad in Bulgaria. It remained under Ottoman rule from the end of the 14th until the Balkan Wars of 1912/13. Under Ottoman rule the town had a Muslim majority.

That’s how I think the incident occurred: The governor of the vilayet Selanik intervened because he assumed the mentioned Bulgarians were forced to wear a fez, but the central government concluded after investigations that it was their free will to take off the kalpak, an assumption which the government underlined by the fact that they were Ottoman citizens/subjects. While the Grand Vizier in hiwas reply to the report from the governor of Selanik concludes that such an act of enforcing the fez was unacceptable and should not take place again, later documents, such as the draft from the Grand Vizier's scribal office, assess that the Bulgarians were Ottoman subjects and wore the fez voluntarily.

Remarkably here the headgear was negotiated on the basis of national identity, namely Bulgarian - the counterpart of which was Ottoman. Unfortunately we do not

123 “şimdi fes iktisasyyla mecbûr tıslîyor ise me’yûsîyyet ve ǧarâzkârlarının i’tirâzâtını istîlzâm edeb etmeyeyeceği (even though it is now obligatory to wear the fez, and because it will be contemplated if their desperate and selfish objections are worthy of being considered),” BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document b), line 3-4.
124 See Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830 - 1914.
125 BOA BEO 1951/146299, line 3-4.
learn anything more about the people designated as Bulgarian here. What was their social position? Were they state officials or army officers or was the entire population of the region targeted by this intervention?

In relation to this case another interesting incident appeared that dealt with the military uniform of Muslims in the Bulgarian army. The question posed, in a short note by an officer at of the palace\textsuperscript{126} to a military commander of Salonika\textsuperscript{127} Hüseyin [...] Paşa, was if they should donned the Bulgarian uniform and cap or rather Ottoman military dress. The further proceedings of this incidence are unknown.\textsuperscript{128}

\textbf{Bulgarian Identity}

In that regard let me provide some remarks on Bulgarian identity and its meaning. This and other Balkan identities need to be treated with caution, since as Isa Blumi pointed out in his analysis, their meaning in great parts was constructed retroactively by a nationalist discourse.\textsuperscript{129} Officially recognized non-Muslim communities, until 1830 they were Greek Orthodox, Armenians and Jews. The multi-ethnic character of these groups remained up until the twentieth century. Greek Orthodox, i.e., comprised of ethnic Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbian, Albanian, Romanian, Turkish and Arabic-speaking natives. The production of a separate Bulgarian ethnic consciousness was linked Hellenising efforts of the Greek Orthodox. The influence of evangelical missionary schools finally led to the establishment of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, known as the Bulgarian Exarchate, in 1870. That went along with the official recognition of Bulgarians as a separate ethnic group by the Sublime Porte.\textsuperscript{130} This further contributed to the development of a new ethnically-based Bulgarian community. The Bulgarians and Orthodox Albanians resisted against the hegemonic tendencies of the Greek Orthodox.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{126} The name is illegible.
\textsuperscript{127} The title is partly illegible, too.
\textsuperscript{128} BOA Y.PRK.SRN. 4/21, 17 Nisan 1309 (April 29\textsuperscript{th} 1893).
\textsuperscript{129} Isa Blumi suggests that being Bulgarian prior to 1912 was something very different than what it became afterwards, see Blumi, \textit{Reinstituting the Ottomans}, 6. In addition he argues that solidarity with the Ottoman state prevailed much longer then depicted in most (nationalist) narratives, see \textit{Ibid.}, 5.
\textsuperscript{130} See "Bulgarians" in Selçuk Aksin Somel, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire} (Lanham, Md. [u.a.]: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 46. According to Somel, the Ottoman state took an ambivalent stance towards the exarchate, supporting it against the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the one hand, and endeavored to limit its pan-Slavic activities on the other. See Selçuk Aksin Somel, 'Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period', in \textit{Late Ottoman Society -The Intellectual Legacy}, ed. Elisabeth Özdağla (London: Routledge, 2005), 264-265.
\end{flushright}
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The establishment of the Exarchate went along with the establishment of educational activities independent from the Eucumenical Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{131} The Foundation of an autonomous principality of Bulgaria in 1878 was closely linked to a Bulgarian insurrection in 1876, which led to the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878). In 1908 Bulgaria became a sovereign monarchy.

\textbf{National Territory and Hats in the Aegean and Marmara Sea}

Similar to the case discussed above which took place in Devin in 1886, in the same year another hat with a special feature appeared on the Greek-Ottoman border.\textsuperscript{132} In contrast to the religious symbol which appeared in Northern Thrace, this time the appliqué was directly linked to the claim of national territory: The hat of a Greek national was confiscated when he wanted leave Turkey for Greece from Izmir. A map attached to its lining depicted some Aegean islands and places on the Aegean coastline. Dated November 1, 1886, a document sent by the Ministry of Interior to the Grand Vizier discussed the incident.\textsuperscript{133} The Ministry of Interior remarks that the appearance of such a hat could negatively influence Ottoman-Greek relations. The import of the hat would not be permitted because the Greek claim on Asia Minor was a source of permanent conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman ambassadors in Europe and especially in Greece should find out, the ministry claimed, where this hat had been manufactured and how widespread its use was. The authors expressed confidence that the matter would be solved in such a way that its import to the Ottoman Empire would be stopped. In addition, the Ottoman government expected a letter of apology from the Greek government, even though they did not regard them as initiators of the affair.

They emphasized that no diplomatic consequences should be drawn from the appearance of the aforementioned hat. It was solely the responsibility of the factory that such a hat, which had attached the map as an embellishment, was produced and distributed. According to the main police station in Aydin, the shops there and on the

\textsuperscript{131} See Somel, 'Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,' 258; see also the article in \textit{Encyclopaedia of Islam on millet}; Ursinus, M.O.H., 'Millet', in \textit{Encyclopaedia of Islam}, Second Edition., ed. Bearman, Bianquis, and Bosworth, 2014; and Halil İnalcık, \textit{Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1992)}; and Karpat, 'Millet and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Period'.
\textsuperscript{132} BOA DH.MKT. 1383/105, 15 \textit{Teşrin-i Evvel} 1302 (October 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1886), document b).
\textsuperscript{133} BOA DH.MKT. 1375/55, 20 \textit{Teşrin-i Evvel} 1302 (November 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1886).
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peninsula Aynaroz (Mount Athos) in today's Greece, which potentially sold these hats had been searched, but no other hats of the kind were found. The State called for the most suitable intervention in that case. On a diplomatic level, no results could be obtained concerning the banning of the production of this hat.\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Lesbos}

In 1895 a conflict concerning local administrative councils in the Island of Lesbos\textsuperscript{135} reflected concerns among government officials over headgear and male national identity. The conflict revolved around the issue of irredentist Greek nationalism among the population of Lesbos, and tensions between Christians and Muslims in local administrative councils. Christian members of the councils had appeared with hats in the councils meetings instead of the fez. Corresponding with the administrators of the island, the Ministry of Interior was concerned about the nationalist leanings of some Christian council members, as well as about having a Christian majority in the council. In a measure that was intended to reestablish the authority of the Ottoman Empire, the central government forced Christian administrators to wear the fez if they wanted to keep their political mandate.\textsuperscript{136}

The local administrative councils set up by the 1864 provincial regulations were part of the bureaucratic reorganization of the Ottoman Empire, and became an arena in which the local population and the Ottoman state negotiated ethnic, religious, national as well as gendered identities.\textsuperscript{137} M. Safa Saraçoğlu in his analysis of Ottoman governmentality refers to Michel Foucault's definition of governmentality which implies the analysis of a complex form of power directed towards the population. His unique

\textsuperscript{134} My question here is if the two incidences (\textit{hac resim} and \textit{harita}) can be related to each other even though one is connected to the delineation of national territory, and the other to religion.

\textsuperscript{135} The island of Lesbos was a part of the Ottoman Empire from from 1462 to 1912.

\textsuperscript{136} BOA DH.MKT 11/17.

\textsuperscript{137} During the Tanzimat, before the Reform edict of 1856 secured equal access to official posts, these councils were the first institutions of state administration where non-Muslims participated on a regular basis, even though as Carter V. Findley points out, these were not actual official ranks and far beyond a step toward legal equality of Ottoman non-Muslims. See Carter V. Findley, \textit{Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History} (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1989), 33. On the aspect of governmentality in regard to the function of these councils see: M. Safa Saraçoğlu, 'Some Aspects of Ottoman Governmentality at the Local Level: The Judicio-Administrative Sphere of the Vidin County in the 1860s and 1870s.', \textit{Ab Imperio}, no. 2 (2008): 1–32. On the local councils see also Stanford J. Shaw, 'The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement Before 1876', \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 1, no. 1 (January 1970): 51–84, doi:10.1017/S0020743800023904.
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study on late Ottoman governmentality allows to evaluate Ottoman bureaucratic transformation in a different light and in contrast to conventional historiography grants agency to members of society in relation to the state. He argued that in the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire at the local level a “judicio-administrative sphere” emerged that local agents could utilize. The local administration councils, which were in the focus of Saraçoğlu’s study became a space were identity was contested and constituted especially between competing nationalist projects and between state and society. The case of Lesbos is an example of this reorganization of state power and demonstrates how headgear was employed to negotiate this very interrelationship. At the same time it shows how the state directed its measures of modernization toward the male body in the service of nation-building, although these actions initially focused mostly on political elites.139

The unequal distribution of seats in the council of Lesbos amongst the communities was mentioned in these documents as seats had to actually be distributed evenly among Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims.140 Exceptions could only be made when not enough Muslims would meet the required standards of wealth. The situation on Lesbos reflected some major lines of conflict emerging in Ottoman society during the nineteenth century. Tuning with European domination, some members of the Christian communities had acquired higher status and wealth through trade activities. The economic gap between Muslims and Mon-Muslims had widened with the integration of the Ottoman Empire into world economy and the legal protection that some Ottoman Christians gained through the capitulations.141 Therefore, with the introduction of local councils and the consequent question of who was to represent the Ottoman state, the Christian majority in Lesbos acquired a new weight.142 In this documented incident, state officials differentiate Ottoman men along ethno-religious and class lines. Christian members of the local councils are asked to conform to modernized Ottoman identity symbolized by the fez, because by wearing the hat they would disassociate themselves and their

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138 Saraçoğlu, ‘Some Aspects of Ottoman Governmentality at the Local Level’.
139 See Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 109.
140 Members of the councils were elected by and amongst the local notables in a complicated procedure, Saraçoğlu, ‘Some Aspects of Ottoman Governmentality at the Local Level’. 19-22.
141 See: Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, 44.
respective community from the Ottoman state. The case also demonstrates how an eventually new class of merchants and manufacturers gained a formal voice in political decisions.143

*Büyükada*

Already in August 1893 (1309) the wearing of the hat on another coastal island arose displeasure within the Ottoman government, this time on *Büyükada* in the Sea of Marmara.144 Once again, the treatment of the case involved presumable the relation of Ottoman Christians to the Ottoman state, though not explicitly mentioned. In a letter by the ministry of Interior to the Municipality of Istanbul two cases were treated in relation to each other.145 The major part of the dispatch dealt with the spread of bad smells on Büyükada, and a smaller part referred to the mayor and the administrators of the municipality of the island walking the streets with their hats. The hat-walking incident was linked to spread of a bad smell in the area of the beach. Even though no reference is made to the mayor’s identity, and neither his name nor ethnic or religious identity or any other description were mentioned, I assume that issues of citizenship and national belonging are negotiated here. Inhabited by in the majority by Ottoman Greek Orthodox, the Prince Islands appeared as a location in the struggle for nation-building and the construction of national identity, and the mayor and his staff probably were Ottoman Christians, too.146 Otherwise, if they would had been Muslim, reference to the violation of religious codes would have been mentioned, I suggest.

The Ministry of Interior gave attention to the matter because *Büyük Ada* was “an important place,”147 and thus it was unacceptable that such a condition, meaning the bad smell and its unmentioned cause, would continue. It was seen as “dangerous and

143 See Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700 – 1922*, 109.
144 *Büyükada* is the largest of the Prince’s islands in the Sea of Marmara close to Istanbul, administratively they belonged and still belong to the municipality of the Istanbul province as a separate district.
145 BOA DH.MKT. 120/11, (14 Ağustos 1309 (26 August 26th, 1893)).
146 Population numbers are only available since the Ottoman population census carried out in 1914. Before then the Prince Islands were not listed separately. There the population of all nine islands together is listed as a total number of 11,087, among them 1,586 Muslims, 8,725 Greeks, 569 Armenians, 79 Jews, 5 Greek catholics, 56 Armenian Catholics, 6 Protestants, 8 Latins, 5 Suryani and 21 Serbians. See Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830 – 1914*, 170-171.
147 “mühim bir mahalle,” BOA DH.MKT. 120/11.
harmful” and “a violation of refinement.”

148 Even though the district governor had asked the mayor to take action, he had remained idle in this matter and the discomfort of the population caused by the smell continued, the document says. While urgent action was required, the mayor and his administrative staff preferred to walk around idly with their hats. They were thus represented by the ministry as some kind of a dandy prototype and urban flâneurs who were not capable of fulfilling their ascribed tasks while the populace suffered under their vanity.

### 3.8 Clothing and National Belonging in Ottoman Non-Muslim and Foreign Mission Schools

Schools in the Ottoman Empire became another space to negotiate Ottoman sovereignty by the means of dress. Education was a contested terrain since Ottoman efforts to modernize education competed with foreign states' missionary endeavors and Ottoman non-Muslim schools. Hamidian politics put enormous efforts into the expansion and transformation of the Ottoman education system. More than 10,000 schools were founded during Abdülhamid II's reign. These educational endeavors formed a conscious effort to confine and counter the ambitions of other agents who wanted to gain influence on these grounds within the Ottoman realm. Nation-building and the establishment of a notion of citizenship went along with the growing accessibility to education.

I will introduce a couple of cases which took place between 1895 (1311) and 1901 (1317) and that dealt with school uniforms and more specifically with appropriate headgear at schools. The first of these took place in 1896 (1311) in a Christian (Bulgarian Orthodox?) school in the Thracian village Tarfa where the Ministry of Education accused a teacher from the local school of wearing a hat.

149 On the same year central state interventions targeted the Armenian school in Istanbul where a teacher had invited his students to wear a hat while state authorities insisted on a return to the fez.

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148 "muhill-i nezaket,” BOA DH.MKT. 120/11.
149 See Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 1. publ (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 45-48.
150 On the establishment of an Ottoman education system see also Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire 1839 - 1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline*, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy. - Leiden [U.a.]: Brill, 1994- 22 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2001).
151 BOA MF.MKT. 302/43.
152 BOA DH.TMIK.M. 5/44; BOA MF.MKT 323/22; BOA DH.TMIK.M. 70/9.
Additionally, in 1896 the French school in Bursa stood at the focus of inquiries on its clothing practices. According to a report issued again by officials of the Ministry of Education the school administration had induced their students to don some sort of uniform hats. In 1898 (1313) authorities, this time in Beirut, again dealt with a French school. They interfered in the wearing of caps with an inscription saying “Le petit Français.” The last case in this series took place in 1900 (1315) and interfered with school uniforms of the Romanian Trade School in Salonika.

The relation of the Ottoman state to Christian community schools was determined by the Reform edict of 1856. Before that, no well-defined policy of the Ottoman state concerning these school existed. In the edict the “sincere bond of citizenship” was verbalized, including a right to create schools for every non-Muslim community. These had to be supervised by the state. A legal framework for these schools was provided in 1869 with the Regulations for Public Education (Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi). It differentiated between public and private schools: the former were government schools, and the latter were set up by individuals and initiatives. The Ministry of Education or the provincial educational administration examined the curriculum and approved course contents to see if they were in accordance with public morality and state policies. This was necessary to receive the official permit.

On the provincial level, the application of these regulations took some time and only in the Hamidian period a more efficient control was established through the expansion of a provincial-level educational administration. In 1896, a regulation on the duties of provincial educational directors came into force with structural shortcomings which restricted the implication of that regulation. The Ottoman State had difficulties to finance the growing provincial bureaucracy and hence to provide enough officers to fulfill these tasks. Finding persons with the abilities needed for these posts who had the knowledge of the different languages in which classes were held in these schools and in

154 BOA MF.MKT. 383/11 (3 and 4 Kanun-i Sani 1313 (January 15th and 16th 1898)).
155 BOA MF.MKT 550/28. Later, between 1905-1910 a view more cases that dealt with school uniforms and hats appeared, but these took place in a different context. See BOA MF.MKT. 825/70; BOA BEO 3510/263239; DH.MUL. 35/-1/15; MF.MKT 1154/15 ; DH.MUL. 101/62.
156 “revâbit-i kalbiye-i vatandaş,” BOA MF.MKT 550/28
158 Ruhsat-i resmiyye, see BOA MF.MKT 550/28; and Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 270-272.
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which the schoolbooks were written, posed another problem. Most of the affairs I am dealing with in this chapter took place with the involvement these educational directors introduced in 1896.

Selçuk A. Somel writes about an extreme politicization of Christian community schools in the last quarter of the nineteenth century which became expressed in Balkan irredentism. In reaction to that he argues, the Ottoman state violated the official regulations by the measures it took towards these schools. That was especially the case when the state played out different communities against one another, as in the example of the Bulgarian and Greek Orthodox. The government's support for their schools changed according to the political situation and strategy of the central administration. Christian community schools became a means of "manipulation of competing interests for the sake of imperial territorial integrity." 

The school in the Bulgarian Village Tarfa in Eastern Thrace

At the end of the year 1895 local authorities launched an inquiry regarding a teacher of the Christian middle school in Tarfa in Eastern Thrace. He had appeared in school wearing a hat and thus was summoned to the muhtar (local administrator), where he did not appear for an investigation of his citizenship and an examination of his papers. Subsequently the director of Middle Schools of Çatalca (Çatalca i’daği müdiri) transferred the case to the Ministry of Education, as the police and the Prime Minister (nezaretpenâh) had ordered him to do.

The case starts out with the discussion of new regulations concerning Christian schools in the Ottoman Empire. According to the school inspectorate, those regulations which had recently been issued had not yet been implemented as it informs the governor

159 Somel states that these deficiencies caused the frequent employment of supporters of separatist organization as teachers at these schools. Ibid., 270-272.
160 Ibid., 272.
161 BOA MF.MKT. 302/43; Tarfa in the district Terkos, is located in Eastern Thrace, close to Istanbul. It was a village in the sancak Çatalca. Today Çatalca is part of the municipality of Istanbul.
162 Middle (i’daği) schools were a sensitive issue in the Ottoman education system because they were a missing link between Ottoman primary schools and higher education, see Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 57.
163 BOA MF.MKT. 302/43 (11 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (Decemver 23rd 1895)). On the struggle for spheres of influence and national identity between the Ottoman and its neighboring states in border regions in Rumelia carried out through schools see Ibid., 70-71.
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(mütesarrif) of the sancak (subdivision of a province). Moreover, the inspectorate linked the prevalence of languages other than Turkish in class to the wearing of some kind of cap, called kapela.

First of all, the director of the middle school administration declared that there was a misunderstanding concerning the implementation of Turkish as a medium of teaching at village schools, such as in Tarfa, next to the above mentioned case of the hat-wearing teacher. In both cases he awaits instructions on how to proceed. Thereupon the Inspection des Ecoles non Muslumane et Etranger of the Ministry of Education intervened, declaring, as instruction to the school administration, that the mentioned teacher had to wear the fez, because it was a “marker of citizenship (ʿalāmet-i tābiʿyeyet),” if it turned out that he actually was an Ottoman citizen. In addition, the inspection mentions another point which was the application of a “harmful program and books” in class. The teaching of these programs and the use of these books, whose contents are not specified further, was to be prevented, and teachers, male or female, without a diploma/certificate (şehadetname) should not be kept. A couple of weeks later a final dispatch, dated January 20th, 1896 (8 Kanun-i Evvel 1311) on the affair appears, is issued by the Ministry of Education, and is addressed to the middle school administration of Çatalca. It confirms the decision made by the Inspection des Ecoles non Muslumane et Etranger.

The teacher’s religious identity is not at question here. The permit for him to wear a brimmed hat or not and his duty to wear a fez are exclusively linked to the question if he was an Ottoman citizen or not. Nevertheless religious identity is also of some importance here since the affair is discussed in relation to regulations concerning non-

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164 BOA MF.MKT. 302/43, document a) (7 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (December 19th, 1895) ; School inspector to governor (mütesarrif) of the sancak (subdivision of a province); document b) 8 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (December 20th, 1895); School inspector to unknown recipient; document c) 11 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (December 23rd, 1895), director of middle schools of Çatalca (Çatalça iʿdadi müdiri) to Ministry of Education; document d) 28 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (January 9th, 1896), from Inspection des Ecoles non Muslumane et Etranger to unknown recipient; document e) 1 Kanun-i Sani 1311 (January 13th, 1896), Ministry of Education to director of Middle Schools of Çatalca (Çatalça iʿdadi müdiri).


166 BOA MF.MKT. 302/43.


168 ‘müzir program ve kitâb,’ BOA MF.MKT. 302/43.

169 According to the “Regulations for Public Education (Maarif-i Umumiyye Nizamnamesi)” of 1869, instructors at private schools needed a work permit called şehadetname, see Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 270.

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Muslims Ottoman schools and dealt with by, amongst others, the *Inspection des Ecoles non Musulmane et Etranger*. As an ethno-national category, Bulgarian identity is mentioned by the officials since they designated Tarfa as a Bulgarian village, yet this is not further discussed. By the reference to the decree that regulates the teaching in Ottoman Muslim and Christian schools, the discussion about the teacher’s headgear is linked to a broader discourse on the status of non-Muslim schools specifically, and the status of the Ottoman non-Muslims in general. The document combines the fields of dress, citizenship and nation-building and provides an example of its interwoven negotiation.

The Armenian School in Yenikapi, Istanbul

Another incident in this series took place at the Armenian school in Yenikapi, a quarter in Istanbul located on the Marmara sea, on the southern shore of the peninsula of the historical city center. The school’s name was *Mosediciyan* or *Mosdiciyan* (موديچیان), and was located in the neighborhood *Sanduk Beruni* (صندوق برزین). Dated May 21, 1896 (9 Mayis 1312), the Minister of Police (Zabıtye Nazarı) issued the first document on the case appearing in the records which was addressed to the ministry of education. The Police Ministry accused the school’s teacher Kigork (کیگورق) of telling his students to shun the fez and to wear a hat in its place while arguing that the school was not an Ottoman but a European one. Kigork himself was designated as Romanian citizen. The minister considered Kigork’s behavior a “malicious act (bedahane)” and an indicator that he was a “mischief maker (erbab-i fesad).” On May 28, 1896 (16 Mayıs 1312) the Ministry of Police had also informed the Ministry of Interior of the case, whom in turn also addressed the Ministry of education and notified the Commission of Accelerated Procedure (*Tesriʿ-i Muʿamelat Komisyonu*), who was entrusted with the case. The following step was having

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171 BOA DH.TMIK.M. 5/44, *Dahiliye Tesriʿ-i Muʿamelat Komisyonu*: document a) 9 Mayis 1312 (May 21st, 1896); document b) 16 Mayis 1312 (May 28th, 1896); MF.MKT 323/22, document a) 16 Mayis 1312 (May 28th, 1896); document b) 27 Mayis 1312 (June 8th, 1896); document c) 28 Mayis 1312 (June 9th, 1896); document 22 Hazıran 1312 (July 4th, 1896); DH.TMIK.M. 70/9: document a) 22 Hazıran 1312 (July 4th, 1896); document b) 29 Hazıran 1312 (July 11th, 1896).

172 BOA DH.TMIK.M.. 5/44: document a) 9 Mayis 1312 (May 21st, 1896) and document b) 16 Mayis 1312 (May 28th, 1896): these two documents are identical, one is a draft and the other a fair copy.

173 BOA DH.TMIK.M. 5/44: a) 9 Mayis 1312 (May 21st, 1896), line 5.

174 This commission had been established to implement several administrative reforms urged by England, France and Russia which also dealt with Armenian political participation. According to Nadir Özbek's
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an inspector sent to the school. A document issued by him on June 8, 1896 (27 Mayıs 1312) provides more details about the school itself.\textsuperscript{175} First of all, he spelled the name of the school differently than in the other documents of the case.\textsuperscript{176} The inspector’s spelling is Moşedudeciyan or Moşdudeciyan (مشدودخیان) which, according to him, was at the same time the name of the Romanian citizen who managed the school. The school had about seventy students, male and female. Some of whom had Russian ancestors while some had Ottoman ancestors. Ten of them, he assesses, had always worn a fez, while others put on their own fezzes after he issued a warning. The remaining students who did not possess a fez were told to procure one for themselves within five to ten days. The principal assured that until then all students would wear a fez. He does not mention the teacher who was made responsible for the wearing of hats in the other dispatches nor does he mention the wearing of hats at all. Furthermore, the inspector declares he could not find harmful books or similar material which were against the regulations.

The next day, on June 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1896 (28 Mayıs 1312) the Inspection des Ecoles non-Musulmane & Etranger issued an urgent letter to the school inspection with a statement on the affair, declaring that the wearing of hats had to be avoided because “it will violate the students’ attributes and qualities of citizenship.”\textsuperscript{177} Instead, “by any means, a manifestation of the submission to the regulations of the state”\textsuperscript{178} was required. Hence the teacher had been warned “in appropriate language, that the students would not confuse and violate the citizens/subjects’ ideas and minds with harmful suggestions.”\textsuperscript{179} Moreover, the document contains the information already provided by the school inspector himself in his report. The documents available in the files of the Ministry of Education suggest that they closed the case with a report to the Ministry of Interior account, these reforms had already been set in the Berlin Treaty of 1878 but not been realized yet. Nadir Özbek, ““Anadolu Islahatı”, “Ermeni Sorunu” ve Vergi Tahsilkarlığı, 1895-1908’, Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, no. 9 (2009): 58–85; and MF.MKT 323/22 (16 Mayıs 1312 (May 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1896)), issued by the Commission of Accelerated Procedure (Tesri‘-i Mu’amelat Komisyonu) of the Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Education.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{175} Unfortunately some of the writing is faded, and thus difficult to read: MF.MKT 323/22: document b) 27 Mayıs 1312 (June 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1896).
\item \textsuperscript{176} I could not find any other information on the school and the way its name might be spelled.
\item \textsuperscript{177} “ṭālebenin sıfāt-ı tābiʿyyetlerini ihlāl edecek,” BOA MF.MKT 323/22: document c) 28 Mayıs 1312 (June 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), line 4.
\item \textsuperscript{178} “niẓāmāt-ı devlete her vechile iẓḥār-ı inḳıyād,” BOA MF.MKT 323/22: document c) 28 Mayıs 1312 (June 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), line 5.
\item \textsuperscript{179} “iṭfāl tebaʿanın efkār ve eẕhānını teşvīş ve telkīnāt-ı muẕırrde bulunmaması lisān-ı münāsible [kendisine] tenbīh),” BOA MF.MKT 323/22: document c) 28 Mayıs 1312 (June 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), line 6, 7.
\end{itemize}
which repeated information and statements provided above.\textsuperscript{180} A couple of days later, in conclusion of the affair, the Commission of Accelerated Procedure of the Ministry also sent a copy of this letter to the Ministry of the Police.\textsuperscript{181}

\textit{Armenian Schools in the Ottoman Empire}

The incident at the Mosediciyan Armenian school needs to be considered against the background of the situation of Armenian schools in the Ottoman Empire, and the repressions against the Armenian population between 1894 and 1896. According to Somel, prior to the nineteenth century a considerable educational network of Ottoman Armenian schools did not exist besides a few monastic and other schools.\textsuperscript{182} Similar to other religious communities in the Ottoman Empire, Armenians were not a linguistically homogeneous group. Armenian was just spoken by a number of well-educated members of the community while around 1870, about half of the community spoke Turkish while the other half spoke various mixtures of Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian. Turkish was used for religious as well as daily purposes. The great majority of Armenians belonged to the Armenian Apostolic church, which was officially recognized by the Ottoman authorities under the reign of Mahmud II (1415-1481). Prior to the 1860s the Armenian community was administered by a coalition of clergy and bankers with close relations to the Sublime Porte. Similar to the Greek Orthodox community, the rise of a merchant class within the community led to the strengthening of this Armenian middle class’s role in community affairs which introduced different and new political ideals inspired by constitutionalism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{183}

The gap in Armenian schooling was filled by American Protestant missionaries in Anatolia. Armenian schooling was triggered in an effort to counter these activities, and especially the newly emerging middle classes put emphasis on the development of a schooling network. The curricula of these schools contained criticism of religious fundamentalism and were critical of the Armenian clergy and old community structures.

\textsuperscript{180} The Ministry of Education justifies the police investigations on the case with a directive issued by the Grand Vizier on the supervision of non-Muslim and foreign schools on April 28, 1896: BOA MF.MKT 323/22: document d) 22 Hazıran 1312 (July 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), line 4. The content of the directive is not mentioned.
\textsuperscript{181} BOA DH.TMIK.M. 70/9: document b) 29 Hazıran 1312 (July 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1896).
\textsuperscript{182} Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 267-270.
\textsuperscript{183} In 1863 an Armenian constitution was introduced (\textit{Nizamname-i Ermeniyan}) which was approved by the Porte, Ibid., 268.
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Somel also states that they contained anti-Ottoman and anti-Muslim propaganda, thus provoking the attention of Ottoman authorities in the Hamidian period leading to repressions against these schools. Classes on “the history of the Armenians and the Armenian church” were banned. That ban was avoided by teaching these classes orally. In 1893 the Union of Armenian schools was abolished.\textsuperscript{184}

Repressions against the Armenian population culminated in the massacres of 1894-96. Schools were hit the hardest among the community institutions by these events. Many teachers had been involved or were said to be involved in Armenian revolutionary activities, Somel argues, and thus the schools weakened by their arrest or death. Generally the Armenian schools suffered of a shortage of teachers all the time. Catholic and Protestant missionary schools welcomed the weakening of the Armenian schools and happily filled the gap.\textsuperscript{185}

\textit{The French School in Bursa}

The next case which was extensively discussed by several ministries took place at the French _decrypt_ school in Bursa, which belonged to the catholic Assumptionist congregation (\textit{Esompisyon Ruhani Şirketi}).\textsuperscript{186} Informed by a letter of the Administration of the Bursa province and received on November 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1896 (\textit{23 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312}), the Ministry of Education took action against the wearing of hats by all students. According to the ministry, the students were mostly Greek Orthodox (\textit{rum}), Armenian, and Armenian- Catholic Ottomans.\textsuperscript{187} In a dispatch to the Grand Vizier dated November 10\textsuperscript{th},

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 269.
\textsuperscript{185} As a result foreign missionary activities, Catholic Armenians were recognized already in 1830 and in 1850 Protestants were also officially been recognized. Ibid., 258; and Ursinus, M.O.H, ‘Millet’.
\textsuperscript{186} It was named after and probably also located at the decrypt_ quarter in the historical town center of Bursa. The origins of missionary schools can be traced back to the 15th century. They were first established by a catholic order in the Kosovo region and Shkoder in the Balkans, in Izmir, Kayseri, Sivas and Trabzon in Anatolia and at Mount Lebanon, in Palestine, and Northern Iraq in the Arab Provinces. Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 258.
\textsuperscript{187} BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29), chronological order: document a) 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312 (November 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1896): Education Minister to Grand Vizier; document b) 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1896): Grand Vizierate to Foreign Ministry; document c) 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1896): Ministry of Interior to Grand Vizier; document d) 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312, Grand Vizier to Bursa vilayeti; document e) 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 November 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), Bursa Valisi to Grand Vizier; 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1312/ 3 Receb 1314, Grand Vizier to Foreign ministry; document f) 4 Kanun-i Evvel (Dezember 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), Foreign Minister to Grand Vizier; document g) 4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (Dezember 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), Grand Vizierate to Foreign Ministry; document h) 9 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (Dezember 21\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), Grand Vizierate to Ministry of Interior; document i) 9 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (Dezember 21\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), Grand Vizierate to the Ministry of Education.
1896 (29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312), the ministry also criticized the regular raising of the flag, the arms drill (nişān taʿlimi) and music classes with a trumpet or a horn (boru). The head of the school was an archpriest (baş papası) named Monsieur Marie Xavier. The Ministry of Education had issued him a final warning, but he remained relentless. Thus the ministry called for his dismissal and suggested that the parents of Ottoman students should be given the “necessary advice, officially or unofficially, to send their children to national schools.” To prevent the wearing of this “unconventional cap” the Ministry of Education had informed the heads of the respective religious communities. Thereupon, the ministry continues, measures to stop this practice had already been implemented but the music lessons, flag raising and arms drill continued. Which kind of measures were these is not mentioned. The ministry assesses the situation as “something to be avoided, now and in the future” without mentioning explicitly what they considered problematic about it. Furthermore, the ministry did attest that such incidents had not occurred before at that school and only began with the employment of above mentioned head priest Monsieur Marie Xavier who had been transferred recently from the town of Izmit because of similar reasons.

Finally the minister of education calls the Ottoman government to take urgent measures against these missionary activities as he calls them, expressing that he fears unrest among the students. Moreover, he says, the government should send a letter to the embassy telling them to stop the improper practices mentioned above, as it was apparent that Monsieur Marie Xavier’s ideas were “harmful and fanatic.”

A couple of weeks later, on November 15th, 1896 (3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312) and November 19th, 1896 (7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312) Grand Vizierate passed the information on to the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Interior, emphasizing that the school did not experience nor tolerate such practices previously and thus they were just related to Monsieur Marie Xavier’s appearance. Moreover also on November 19, 1896, the Grand

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188 I could not find out what was problematic about this item (boru).
189 “[…] ifālānın müküttib millilerine nakîl zimminda vellilerine icâbına göre resmen veya ğayrî resmen vesâyâyı lâzîme […]” BOA A.)MKT.MHM. 655/29, 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312 (November 10th, 1896), line 5.
192 Izmit is located about 100 km northeast of Bursa at the very east corner of the Sea of Marmara.
Vizier requested information regarding several cases from the administration of the province of Bursa via telegram: the illegal confinement of some innocent Armenians, the ban for Armenian children to visit foreign schools, and the arrest of two Protestants.\textsuperscript{195} The governor of the province Bursa provided a reply on the same day claiming that such illegal confinement had not taken place, and that there was no ban for Armenian children to visit foreign schools. He added that the arrest of the two Protestants had been communicated duly to the Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{196} Yet he also commented on the above mentioned occurrences at “a foreign school” whose name he does not mentioned here. He provided further details of the case, claiming that the students dared to walk the streets with their caps and would not stop doing so. Parents of the students who were Ottoman citizens, he continued, had been advised by the Ministry of Interior “officially and unofficially” to send their children to “national schools”. Parents of Ottoman Orthodox-Greek, Armenian, and Armenian-Catholic students had been told in addition by “appropriate means”\textsuperscript{197} that if the wearing of the hats would not be avoided, they would receive the necessary warnings.\textsuperscript{198}

On December 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1896 (4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312) the Foreign Ministry issued a response to the letter sent by the Grand Vizierate with the information it had received from the French Embassy.\textsuperscript{199} The officials of the embassy downplayed the incidents by assessing that “this kind of dress and caps, as those of the students, was worn everywhere and especially even in Istanbul.”\textsuperscript{200} Moreover the music lessons were a part of the school curriculum, but only those students who wished to would participate. And since the above-mentioned students consisted of local Greek-Orthodox and Armenians, those who did not want to wear those clothes were free to do so. Concerning the arms drill, it was true that it existed as “an old pillar”\textsuperscript{201} which had been used as a target for projectiles, but now was not in use anymore. Students would definitely not receive an

\textsuperscript{195} See BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1896) Grand Vizierate to the provincial administration of Bursa.

\textsuperscript{196} See BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), governor of Bursa to Grand Vizier.

\textsuperscript{197} “vâsta-yi münâsibe” BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29.

\textsuperscript{198} BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1896), line 5-7.

\textsuperscript{199} BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29, 4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (January 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1897), Foreign Minister to Grand Vizier, reply to BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1896) Grand Vizierate to Foreign Ministry.

\textsuperscript{200} “şakîrdânın her yerde ve ‘ilâh-’uşûşi dersa‘ûdet’dê bile o yolda elbîse ve kasket giydikleri […]” BOA A.]MKT.MHM 655/29, 4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (December 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1896).

\textsuperscript{201} “eski bir direk” BOA A.]MKT.MHM. 655/29, 4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (January 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1897), line 10.
arms drill. Accordingly, the accusations against the mentioned priest were untenable. After that, the case was closed. The Grand Vizierate issued three more letters: to the Foreign Ministry, to the Ministry of Interior, and to the Education Ministry respectively. Final reports on the case repeated the information provided by the French embassy. The wearing of the dress and the hat was not obligatory and thus not problematic, and the participation in music classes was voluntary. The Grand Vizier continued that the raising of the flag was performed on Sundays by members of the French community in Bursa and thus was not directly related to the school and the classes. The target was intended for the exclusive use of the teachers, but at the moment was not even used by them. Saying this, the Grand Vizierate largely refuted the charges made by the Ministry of Education and the other offices involved which asked for its intervention and for the dismissal of the principal.

The French School in Beirut

The next inquiry concerning clothing at schools appeared roughly a year later. In January 1898 (1313) another French school was affected by inquiries of the Ottoman authorities. The authorities took offense to the wearing of hats with the inscription “Le petit Français” by students of the French school in Beirut. Two documents exist of the case, both issued on January 15th, 1898 (3 Kanun-i Sani 1313) by the Ministry of Education. One of the them is addressed to the Grand Vizier, signed by a member of the Encüman-i Teftiş ve Muayene (Council of Inspection and Examination) Mustafa Reşid Şihab, the other to the education director (müdir) of the Beirut vilayeti. Mustafa Reşid Şihab criticizes that the school administration accepted the wearing of the mentioned hat as a

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202 The school was known by the name Ferir: BOA MF.MKT. 383/11, 3 Kanun-i Sani 1313 (January 15th, 1898), a) Encümen-i Teftiş ve Muayene of the Ministry of Education to the Grand Vizier, b) Ministry of Education to the education director (müdir) of the Beirut province. There were four French and four British schools in the province of Beirut in 1888 as well as a good number of missionary schools. Of all the students of the foreign and non-Muslim schools in the province, approximately a third to a half were Ottoman subjects (even though the governor of Beirut talks of about 90 percent). On these numbers and Ottoman efforts to counter the establishment of foreign schools in Beirut and prevent their attendance by Ottoman students see Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 51-54.

203 Introduced in 1886, the Encüman-i Teftiş ve Muayene (Council of Inspection and Examination) was part of the Ministry of Education and dealt predominantly the with supervision and censorship of foreign-language publications and, as becomes evident in this case, the inspection of foreign schools. See Ali Akyıldız, ‘Maarif-I Umumiyeye Nezareti’, in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi, ed. İlyas Üzüm and Mustafa Çağrıcu, vol. 27 (Ankara, 2003), 273-74.
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distinguished feature of all students. This was evidently undesired and attracted attention from a religious and political point of view, he argued, because among the students were Ottoman citizens and residents of Beirut. In the first document the Grand Vizier is called to investigate the degree of conformity and loyalty to the Ottoman state among the students. In the other document, the director of education in the province of Beirut is called to undertake measures and ban the practice. Whether these measures were taken and investigations took place is not noted in the records.

Romanian Trade School in Salonika

The last case I am going to treat on this matter took place in Salonika. The incidence initially appeared in the records in spring 1900 (1315), and was picked up again in August 1901 (1317). The authorities were busy with the illegal opening of trade schools in Salonika, one denoted as Romanian, the other French.

On March 12th, 1900 (28 Şubat 1315) the director of education of the Province Salonika issued a letter to the Ministry of Education in order to obtain information and instructions on proceedings related to the Romanian Trade School Romanya Ticaret mektebi (Romanya Ticaret mektebi), which had recently opened in Salonika without possessing the necessary permit. According to the director, the school had attracted attention when its students appeared in uniform dress, which was a garb made of dark blue broadcloth, its collars embroidered with yellow and white flowers on both sides. This embroidery the director stated, resembled that of police uniforms. This kind of clothing was combined with a cap (kasket) which was bordered with a ribbon and decorated with some sort of emblems. By and large, the inspector sums up, the students who were dressed in this garb resembled foreign captains (shipmasters) and for this

204 BOA MF.MKT 500/28: chronological order: a) 28 Şubat 1315 (March 12th, 1900), Education Director (müdir) of the Province Salonika to Ministry of Education; b)25 Mart 1316 (April 7th, 1900) Inspection des Ecoles non-Musulmanes et Etranges to unknown recipient; c) 5 Nisan 1316 (April 18th, 1900) Education Ministry to provincial administration of the Salonika; d) 14 Ağustos 1317 (August 27th, 1901) Governor of Province Salonika to the Ministry of Education.

205 The opening of foreign schools without permission was a common practice. According to a report issued in 1893 by the Ministry of Education, 341 of the 392 Protestant and American Schools in the Empire had no such permit. See Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 77-78. According to the Educational Regulation of 1869, the Ottoman government could close down nearly every private school, although it rarely made use of it. See Ibid., 128.

206 The writing does not provide further description of which kind or whose emblems this was. It might have been the school's emblem.
reason attracted the attention of the people in town. He adds that a similar practice also appeared in another recently-opened school, the French trade school. The account of the director provides insight into the landscape of foreign schools in Salonika. To compare and evaluate the practice at the school, the director refers to clothing practices at other schools in Salonika, stating that at the Italian, French, German and English schools the students did not wear any kind of uniform dress, in contrast to the Bulgarian School and the Military Academy. Those students' dress was bordered with either red or blue ribbons, but they did not don peaked caps but a fez. In addition, their attire was not embroidered, unlike that of the Romanian school's students.

Upon the request of the education director, the Inspection des Ecoles Non-Musulmanes et Etranges issued a report on the affair, adding the remark that Ottoman students attended these schools and thus rendered these clothing practices problematic. Furthermore, the inspectorate suggested that the adoption of these designs should be corrected and explained:

“...the students attending the aforementioned school are Ottoman subjects, it is therefore improper for them to wear clothes that may make them look like foreigners, and the matter should be corrected and explained. The exception to this are uniforms worn by students of foreign and non-Muslim schools.”

Following this, the Ministry of Education forwarded the report to the Governor of Salonika and charged him with the affair.

The case was picked up again a year later. In August 1901 (1317), the Governor of the province Salonika issued a letter to the Ministry of Education where he reported that the dress of two students of the Romanian Trade School had recently provoked public attention. Their dress, he declares, was not the uniform of non-Muslim schools, combined with a hat. Whether it was about it not being the official school uniform but

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207 Mekatib-i Gayri Mülisme ve Ecnebiyye Müfettişlik.
208 BOA MF.MKT 500/28: document b). The Inspection des ecoles non-musulmanes et etranges was part of the Ministry of Education see Akyildiz, ‘Maarif-i Umumiyye Nezareti,’ 273-274.
209 “Meşkûr mektebe devâm eden tâlîbe devlet-i ‘âliyye teba’asından oldukları halde diğer ecnebi ve teba’a mekteplerini tâlîbesinin zîyy ve kıyâfetleri hârcinda ve bir ecnebi teba’ası şekilde târzında gösterilmesi münâsib olmayıp bunun hüs-ni sûretle tebdilî esbâbîn istifâsî buyûrulması [...]).” BOA MF.MKT 500/28, b) line 6-8.
210 BOA MF.MKT 500/28, c) line 14.
211 BOA MF.MKT 500/28, d).
212 If not why was it problematic? See BOA MF.MKT 500/28, d) line 2.
another kind of dress that was problematic is not specified here. Both were told that they
had to wear a fez while staying in their hometown Bitola (Manastır), which was also
communicated to the governor of same province, in order to check their behavior.
Moreover, the school should be urged to finally implement the rearrangement of its
uniforms, as was decided in April 1900 (1316).

Thus the Ottoman government was not able nor willing to implement the change of
dress on the Romanian Trade School, nor did it take any action against its illegal
establishment. The government might have not had the means or interest in taking
serious action against the school, while still surveying closely the behavior of Ottoman
students at these schools.

3.8.1 Non-Muslim Ottoman Schools and Missionary Schools

The cases analyzed above must be considered in the light of the modernization of
education in the Ottoman Empire and its relation to the establishment of Christian
missionary schools. In his book on education in the late Ottoman Empire, Fortna
analyzed the tensions between Ottoman endeavors to transform its system of education
and the presence of foreign missionary and non-Muslim schools.213 This is especially
valid for the 1880s and 1890s, when the number of the latter grew significantly. Fortna
regards this competitive context as crucial to the understanding the Ottoman
undertaking. Education was regarded as one of the most important means of social
change on one hand, while it also enabled to control its pace and undesired effects such
as the feared loss of culture or morality on the other hand.214 Thus schools could function
as intermediaries between binary oppositions such as progress and tradition.

Beyond these perceived threats, Fortna stresses that Ottomans/ the Ottoman state
also experienced more immediate threats such as “foreign banks, battleships and
commanders.”215 Fortna suggests that those influences on the Ottoman education system
have hardly been considered, specifically the function of the educational system to
recapture Ottoman agency in that regard. The development of the educational system in
the late nineteenth century was unique because of the conditions provided. On the other

213 See Fortna, Imperial Classroom.
214 See Ibid., 43-44.
215 Ibid., 44.
hand it was still a part of a global phenomenon where many states undertook endeavors to create national systems of education which did not exist before.

In this new level of state intervention in people’s lives, the function of education was partly taken away from the family - which seemed no longer fit for this task - and transferred to state institutions. Thoughts on this were lent by the likes of Émile Durkheim, whose ideas had significant influence on Ottoman reformers, and who talked about the failure of the family and its replacement by schools.216

In the competitive Ottoman field of education, Western missionary schools were the most obvious protagonist. They increasingly attracted Ottoman subjects and were thus hard to ignore for Ottoman officials.217 As the examples provided above show, they attempted to minimize the influence of these schools on their subjects/citizens. Fortna counts three groups of competitors in the educational field, while ranking members of non-Muslim groups and neighboring countries such as Greece or Bulgaria as second and third in the list behind missionary schools. All three of them appeared in the examples concerning dress. The Ottoman officials' stance towards them was ambiguous, the feeling of threat countered by their efforts to emulate them served as an example, as they were the first modern schools in the provinces.

That the incidences at the schools dealt with here took place in a period where Ottoman authorities put special emphasis on education. They also manifest themselves in the appearance of the first Ottoman education yearbook in 1898.218 Compared to Ottoman schools, the foreign schools were exceptionally well-financed, which additionally attracted students through reduced fees or no fees at all. This whole situation produced an inclination on side of the Ottoman students towards the respective states who found these schools. Thus the question of dress and identity became intertwined with the question of loyalty to the respective state, and thus French schools for example produced French citizens, not Ottoman. In many provinces students did not have a choice other than attending foreign schools, because Ottoman ones plainly did not exist.219 That was also a predicament for Ottoman authorities who aspired for the education of their subjects.

216 See Ibid., 46-47.
217 See Ibid., 49.
218 See Ibid., 53.
219 See Ibid., 57.
According to Somel, Christian community schools gained importance with the spread of the ideas of European Enlightenment among non-Muslim literati, which implied the growing influence of notions of progress and individualism. At the same time, an expansion of Evangelical mission activities took place, along with the foundation of schools. Those schools offered instruction in a local vernacular which was welcomed by local populations who did not know the liturgical language of the church. Their diffusions of pragmatism and focus on natural sciences, Somel argues, was conditioned by the diffusion of Evangelical Christianity. These schools strengthened or produced a certain consciousness of ethnic belonging indicated by language. Moreover, their offering of classes in modern Western languages contributed to the emergence of a generation of Ottoman non-Muslims which grew up in a different cultural milieu, and who became critical of their own communities and clerical administration. The old elite as well as the Sublime Port were concerned about these disturbances of the old order and undertook measures to curb missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire. These restrictive politics were short-lived for the time being, and ended by the Reform Edict of 1856. It provided full freedom for all non-Muslim communities to open schools. Somel attributes this step to the diplomatic support offered by the great powers to the Ottoman Empire against the expansionist aspirations of the Russian Empire, and military support in the Crimean War (1853-1856). In the face of separatist movements and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877/78, the Hamidian government tightened control over foreign and community schools in the 1870s and applied a kind of politics which for the first time created a competitive environment amongst the different Ottoman communities. This change in politics to Christian community schools and foreign schools provides the background of the incidences depicted above. They appeared in an environment where these schools were under surveillance and regarded as spaces for the growth of separatist movements under the influence of foreign imperialist powers.

220 In some cases it came along with nationalist thought in non-Muslim communities, first among the Greek Orthodox who undertook efforts to Hellenize non-Greek Orthodox people in schools attached to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Before that, according to Somel, instruction, just like in Ottoman Quranic schools, was dominated by religious subjects and their educational level, and can be compared to as well. The language of education was mostly the same as the liturgical language of the churches. Schools were administrated by the clergy and instructors which were also mainly from the clergy. See Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 258.

221 See Ibid., 259.

222 See Ibid., 259.
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In the Bulgarian case, Pan-Slavic activities were triggered by the aftermaths of the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877-1878. The treaty of San Stefano secured an autonomous greater Bulgaria, and vast regions of the Balkans were also secured. Even though the treaty was revised at the Berlin Congress, Bulgaria became an autonomous principality. In these contexts, Bulgarian schools were used as an instrument to establish Bulgarian cultural hegemony in these territories, and to broaden the influence of the Exarchate which led to bloody confrontations between their supporters and supporters of the ecumenical patriarchate. In this civil war, similar conditions in Balkan schools became a means to acquire cultural hegemony.\(^2\)

The struggle for dress in schools underlines how crucial education was for the establishment of national identity. Through its lack of domestic schools the Ottoman state feared to miss the opportunity to educate loyal citizens.

For the Ottoman government, the establishment of foreign schools was not a minor threat. Thus the occurrences of foreign missionary and Ottoman non-Muslim educational advances were taken very seriously by Ottoman officialdom and regarded as a peril to the state's sovereignty.\(^3\) The occurrences referred to in this chapter have to be viewed within that framework.

In the five cases treated above, Ottoman students' citizenship as it is constructed through dress was discussed. In all these cases Muslim identity is not explicitly mentioned and Ottoman citizenship put in the foreground. In one of the cases, the French school in Bursa, Ottoman students are designated as either Greek-Orthodox, Armenian or Armenian-Catholic. The students of the Armenian school in Yenikapi are identified through their ancestors as either Russian or Ottoman, but no further attributes are provided. Meanwhile, for the French School in Beirut and the Romanian Trade School in Salonika the marker 'Ottoman' was held sufficient. I assume that at least in the latter of two cases, Ottoman Muslim students also attended these schools and were addressed by Ottoman state intervention. This is due to the fact that Ottoman state schools were still too rare to provide education for a broad populace. In one case, the school in Tarfa, only he teacher is engaged in the affair, but again authorities only inquire about his citizenship, not his religion, which is not mentioned at all. The emphasis on Ottoman

\(^2\) See Ibid., 264.
\(^3\) See Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 41.
citizenship might have resulted from the fact that in most of the cases the state's intervention refers to Ottoman non-Muslims. Yet it also demonstrates the interrelation of modern education, nation-building and Ottomanism that took effect here in its endeavor to educate loyal citizens regardless of religion. In all cases, the wearing of the hat is problematized and more or less in the center of the investigations. Other pieces of dress are of no concern, except the case of the Romanian Trade School. Besides the mentioning that in Beirut male and female students attended the school, more information about students' identity, like their age, are not provided. It is striking that all the cases dealing with non-Muslim and Armenian schools took place in the aftermaths of the Armenian crisis and cease afterwards.

3.9 Concluding Remarks on Territoriality and Borderlands

State officials, local agents, the central state and its officials all negotiated national territory. Isa Blumi stresses that there isn't necessarily a difference between a state's subjects and state officials. This approach, he insists, includes agents who move beyond the modernization paradigm and thus helps to avoid eurocentric views which depict change as always imposed and initiated by Europe or the West. Even though to a certain point borders were drawn on maps and fought out by wars, they nevertheless have been before and in between negotiated in everyday life, and in encounters by different agents moving on different levels and with different agendas.

Throughout this chapter I traced the negotiation of national territory in Ottoman border lands. To understand the significance of this space, it helps to view these borderlines as on the cusp between becoming nation-states and competing empires and nationalisms; not just as demarcation lines, but as spaces themselves. This makes their entangled history, which is the common and reciprocal history of center and periphery, visible. The spacial dimension of identity construction and subjectization in these borders lands de-essentializes identity and integrates histories of 'the West and the rest' within transnational spaces. These spaces contain different concepts of culture and identity within and beyond the modern framework. Meanwhile, nationalist imaginations overlap

225 See Stephan Günzel and Franziska Kümmerling, eds., Raum: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart [u.a.]: Metzler, 2010), 187.
226 See Ibid., 181.
with imagined but powerful cultural dichotomies, local conditions and interests of local agents, as well as capitalist and imperialist activities.

Homi Bhabha locates the production of culture within border areas or borderlines, conceptualized as spaces in-between or third spaces.\textsuperscript{227} The transfer of his framework of analysis from the context of literary production and art, transnational migration, and hybrid postcolonial identities to Ottoman border lands entails that the production of national identities are inseparable from the “territoriality of the global citizen” and their post-national, trans-national and de-national identity, as Günzel phrases it.\textsuperscript{228} What I want to suggest is that the parallel and interdependent construction of the national and the transnational are set at the same time and space through conditions set by war, global capitalism and discourses on modernity, colonialism and imperialism. Thus interactions between the Ottoman government, provincial state officials, local agents, central European and local powers demonstrate and prove the inseparability of histories of the West and the rest.\textsuperscript{229}

The fluid meaning of cultural or religious symbols such as clothes and headgear, and apparent efforts to fix their content challenge the rigid concepts of cultural difference. I consider the cases presented above as negotiations of representation which can be used to demonstrate the invented character of essentialized national identities and founding myths. These identities are virtually worked out on the margins of national spaces. Borderlines therefore function as powerful discursive formations, both in the metaphorical sense and as a phenomenon.\textsuperscript{230}

Mary Louise Pratt’s notion of contact zones and transculturation might be helpful to grasp Ottoman encounters with Western clothing.\textsuperscript{231} She uses these notion to analyze contacts between European colonialists with societies which did not have contact before. This is not the case with the Ottoman state because of its manifold relations and geographical proximity to central Europe. Still, it might be helpful to apply these notions

\textsuperscript{227} Homi K. Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture}, Reprint. (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 1994), 217-218.
\textsuperscript{228} Günzel and Kümmerling, \textit{Raum}, 181.
\textsuperscript{230} See Günzel and Kümmerling, \textit{Raum}, 181.
\textsuperscript{231} See Mary Louise Pratt, \textit{Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation} (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 1992), 4-5.
to characterize the processes commonly referred to as modernization or Westernization in order to get away from the presumed centrality of modernity and the West, and the one-sidedness of the processes of transfer. This can be done in order to point out that the metropolis was determined by the periphery to the same degree as the periphery by the metropolis. That might also be the case of Istanbul as the center of the Ottoman Empire with its periphery as was demonstrated by the given examples. The attitudes of Creole elites and their appropriation of and subjection to colonialist power techniques bare great resemblances with Ottoman elites.232

The incidences in the Ottoman borderlands and other contested spaces such as schools depicted throughout this chapter display dynamics between different agents, such as the Ottoman central government, provincial administrators, other local actors and the European great powers. Even though all this took place under the influence of a certain Western hegemony, I think that in order to provide a better understanding of these interactions it is important to highlight the agency of all these actors.

Isa Blumi, in his comparative account of processes of transformations in the Arabic Peninsula and the Balkans throughout the nineteenth century, stresses the part of local powers “who shaped the region’s relations with the outside world.”233 For the Arabic peninsula, this also implicates that within a comparative imperial history the British, French, and Ottoman were all imperial agents busied with centralizing reforms as basis for future imperial state expansion. He suggests a “different geographical centering” in order to understand power dynamics before Britain achieved imperial hegemony in the Gulf region.

In the case of the Balkans, this shift in perspective mainly affects the construction of national identities and their reification in nationalist historiography after San Stefano and the Berlin Treaty (1878). More than by the realities on ground, they were determined by European interests against Russia’s expansion. These were specifically the interests of European banks who owned lands in the regions and the redemption of Ottoman debts. At the same time, maps depicting the newly drawn borders were “disguised ontological fiction[s]”. These borderlines “naturalize a spacial order” that was dictated by these

233 Blumi, Foundations of Modernity, 36.
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interests rather than by the “ethnic realities” as such they were read.\textsuperscript{234} The cases depicted about are examples of the negotiation of this spacial order between local agents, European powers and the central state. In reference to borderline studies, Blumi regards these maps as spaces of authority used to interpret the past and fix existing humans contingencies on the basis of which the state still interacted with its subjects. To make these contingencies visible, borders need to be conceptualized as a social process and “broad zonal institutions” rather than markers of separation and difference, which “helped to create new forms of social interaction.”\textsuperscript{235}

Yet measures were implied to consolidate the separating character of the Ottoman state and its north-western neighbors. International treaties comprising of measures of state expansion attempted to transform conditions in favor of Western capitalist interests, thus managing economic productivity more effectively. These state-building measures also involved the tightening of border controls. Especially after 1878, newly drawn borders in the Balkans with the Berlin Treaty, emphasis was put on (re-)territorialization through i.e. more rigid surveillance of the taxing of cross-border trade. In contrast to the Ottoman-Greek border, after 1878 those in the Balkans became more conventional in character. Nonetheless, their character as markers of state sovereignty has to be handled with care considering the failure to control local economies and the considerable resistance of communities which led to a “crisis in the marking of boundaries”\textsuperscript{236} in the region. Local agents’ interventions brought about renegotiation and the redraw of boundaries. Blumi proposes, in reference to Homi Bhabha and Edward Soja, the application of the term “third space” in order to analytically grasp the situation and challenge the monolithic functionality of the modern border land.\textsuperscript{237}

Blumi claims that ethno-religious categories and politics involved in these

\textsuperscript{234} See Ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{235} See Ibid., 53. Blumi uses the “blurred character” of the Ottoman-Greek border as an example which enforced the interaction between Greek and Ottoman officials, and at least in the first place reinforced their corporation rather than separated them. Thus the border created institutions of mutual exchange rather then discrete entities. On a broad range of studies, geographically and historically, see also Kemal H. Karpat and Rober W. Zens, eds., \textit{Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes}, Publications of the Center of Turkish Studies/The University of Wisconsin; ZDB-ID: 21609834 2 (Madison, Wis.: The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 2003).
\textsuperscript{236} Blumi, \textit{Foundations of Modernity}, 54.
monolithic understandings of the border are insufficient to explain resistance against the boundaries drawn after 1878. Beyond being nationalist, it had comprised a “multiplicity of local concerns” and turned against the subjugation of “previously autonomous communities.” Rather then in favor of the newly found nation-states, these communities fought to remain within the Ottoman Empire. Maps which manifested these borders in this respect were tools of the state which defined the modern world and dominated by the West. Thus the production of space through maps and formal treaties naturalized and normalized identities through a spacial order that “distinguished one territory from another.” Yet this tool to define the modern world dominated by the West did not occur without resistance and contingencies. It is thus necessary to reconsider this order of difference and power which “separates the world into bounded units on the maps.”

Carter Findley identifies two currents of change for the Hamidian period: a secularist, which expressed itself through the modern press, and its institutions and religious movements. Both of which, while competing with each other, also intermingled and converged to epitomize Ottoman modernity. They formed the two wings of an Ottoman Muslim middle class which I will trace in the following chapters.

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239 Ibid., 61.
240 Ibid., 77.
242 Did the 1896 attempted coup d'état trigger investigations on the hat (many school issues take place in 1896), or were the school cases just related to Armenian crisis? See Zürcher on actions against the opposition following the Armenian crisis, which led to the sending into internal exile of all known Young Turks to Tripolitana. Albeit, shortly thereafter many of them returned and accepted posts in the Hamidian government and administration, see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 87.
4 The Gender of Modernity and Ottoman Dress

Military uniforms have been used as a means to produce modern, civilized bodies and to formally display equality among a nation’s (male) inhabitants. At the same time in the civil realm, the three-piece suit became an equivalent garment in the creation of modern male identity. In the Ottoman Empire official westernization of dress began in the military and was then extended to civil officials. The uniform became one means to produce civilized bodies, however, everyone did not conform to these new standards. The following example provides a clue as to the limits of Ottoman military reform and the fears which accompanied the public appearance of those who resisted the disciplining measures.

In 1897 Laz members of the navy were dismissed because of their (inappropriate) behavior and clothing. In a letter to the sultan's scribal office the navy commander Hasan Rami Paşa reported the unkempt appearance and undisciplined behavior of some marine volunteers, who had been sent from Istanbul. After a couple of Laz navy volunteers appeared wearing uniformed or military dress, but with their bandolier and water-bottles around their waists and each of them wearing a turban in a way incompatible with “imperial military dress,” they roamed the streets of Istanbul, “with their armed and wild dress,” drawing the attention and disapproval of foreign embassies and local residents. Their and some other’s dismissal had been requested. One or two of them attacked one of the Sultan’s adjutants and navy Kolağası (Senior Captain) Naim Bey and attempted to tear of his clothes. Thereupon, for the sake of the soldier’s “holy honor (şeref-i mukaddes)” and “military order and morals on the imperial navy” they were dismissed from the navy and sent back to their homeland.

It is not evident if these marines had resided in Istanbul before joining the military, but it is known that the central government undertook measures to send Laz migrants back to their homeland.

1 BOA PRK.ASK 126/8 (1897).
2 On Hasan Rami Paşa (1842-1923) see Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali: (1839 - 1922): Prospografîk Rehber (Beylerbeyi, İstanbul: İsis, 2003), 77. He became naval minister in 1906 but was dismissed after the Young Turk seizure of power.
4 “müsellehât ve vaşêsîyânê kîyâfetlêrîyle,” BOA PRK.ASK 126/8 (1897).
5 Hasan Rami Paşa does not mention who requested their dismissal.
6 “süfün-i şâhânedê ki âdâb ve intizâmâtî ‘askeriyye,” BOA PRK.ASK 126/8 (1897).
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comprising the Laz-speaking population of the south-eastern Black Sea coast or in a broader sense comprising roughly all Muslims from that region. The Laz had been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the mid-fifteenth century, and many of them migrated into Istanbul in the early modern period. Unlike other social groups members of the Laz population did not hold many important political, economic or social highly valued positions. The male migrants to Istanbul were often employed as boatman, lighterman and dockworkers. Laz settlement in Istanbul fundamentally changed with the outbreak of the Ottoman-Russian war in 1877, which brought many Laz refugees into the city. Lack of employment increased their marginalized positions. As outsiders to high official circles, the Lazi population of the Ottoman Empire provided an image of the uncivilized other to the modern Ottoman bureaucrat. Nevertheless, they had an ambivalent position that also becomes apparent by this incident. Meeker remarks, that the Laz people were still insiders to the imperial system and comprised a considerable Ottomanist population with palpable influence. Also local Lazi elites were able to defend their interests towards Istanbul. In popular culture, such as the Karagöz shadow plays, Lazi people were commonly depicted as “slow-witted rustics.” Politically the Lazi derebeyes, provincial lords, enjoyed feudal independence until the beginning of the 19th century. Both their political independence and the geographic remoteness of the eastern Pontic mountains formed a suitable image of the Laz as unruly and backward.

The given example of the expelled Laz marines reflects their ambivalent position. While their voluntary accession to the army displays some degree of inclination to the Ottoman state they were not willing to subdue to certain imposed requirements. Or the other way round: Ottoman elites did not appreciate the way the Laz marines wanted to contribute to Ottoman military endeavors and therefore relinquished them their service.

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10 Michael E. Meeker, A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity (Berkeley [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 2002), 187.

11 Where Ottoman non-Muslims feared because of their far reaching Europeanization while Muslim ‘minorities’ such as Laz and Kurds were feared because of their backwardness?
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4.1 Modern Masculinity and Dress

While the Laz sailors were dismissed for the behavior that disturbed military discipline as well as 'civilized' urban culture and the Ottoman's international reputation, modernization brought about another urban dweller. This figure, the late nineteenth century dandy, was considered anything but uncivilized, and yet he also embodied a certain lack of discipline and 'honor.' The dandy's surplus of modern existence involved a lack of manliness, his figure revealing a tense relation between modernity and masculinity.

In order to understand Ottoman endeavors to alter and thus modernize clothing habits and its interrelation with discourses on masculinity it is necessary to look at the production and spread of Western European textiles and the growing commodity culture which accompanied them. The latter, and its supposedly effeminizing impact, as it was expressed in discourse on the dandy, was a similarly prominent issue in Ottoman public debates about male fashion and national identity in the late nineteenth century, as it was in central Europe at that time. In late Ottoman novels and satirical press urban upper class men were frequently ridiculed because of their predilection for Western commodities, especially clothes. This critique was part and parcel of heated debates about Westernization and its relationship to national identity. In their novels, authors like Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem and Ahmed Midhat present the urban dandies' supposed subjection to European imperialism as a loss of masculinity. Şerif Mardin depicts the figure Bihruz Bey in the novel Araba Sevdasi (Love for Carriages) by Recaizade Ekrem (1846-1913) as archetypical of the super-Westernized dandy, a man with an inclination for clothing who followed the latest fashions, proudly wearing them in his urban environments.

In his ground-breaking analysis of the 'Bihruz-Bey syndrom', Şerif Mardin paved the way for an understanding of the modernization of Ottoman masculinities using one of the late nineteenth century Ottoman literary dandies as a prototype of an expression

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13 See Şerif Mardin, 'Superwesternization in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century', in Turkey: Geography and Social Perspectives, ed. Peter Benedict and Erol Tümertekin (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 403.
14 See ibid., 406-407.
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of undesirable modernization. In Ottoman novels he traced the phenomenon of the derogatory depiction of so-called super-Westernized Ottoman men and identified Ottoman women’s emancipation and men’s Westernization as two recurring topoi. Mardin suggested that men’s consumption of Western goods and adoption of habits was observed even more suspiciously than women’s.

While Mardin offers an analysis immanent to Ottoman society I will show here that the Ottoman dandy as an overtly modernized type was rather part of a global phenomenon discussed broadly by contemporaries and scholars. The Ottoman dandy was not a singular figure but appeared throughout the 19th century in modern urban contexts around the globe. In the following I will scrutinize how the practice of dressing and the consumption of clothes were related to modern masculinity.

Throughout the nineteenth century, following the development of a mass fashion system, consumerism became associated with femininity, which stood in distinction to developments in men’s fashion and the broadening market of male attire. Therefore, bourgeois identity and its ideals of restrain and repudiation had to be reconciled with

15 In Ottoman and modern Turkish the term for dandy is züppe. According to Nurdan Gürbilek it also encompasses the meaning of snob, which in my understanding as well as hers, is very similar to the general definition of dandy. That means dandy might be a “blatant imitation and the state of openly seeking association with the “superior” other and rebuffing those regarded inferior” as well as “exaggerated attention to personal appearance.” Nurdan Gürbilek, ‘Dandies and Originals: Authenticity, Belatedness, and the Turkish Novel’, The South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2 (2003), FN 18.

16 A more recent attempt by Brittany Hynes to explain the despise of the Ottoman dandy/ the negative depiction of the Ottoman dandy by Ottoman authors draws on the modernization and heteronormization of sexuality in the Ottoman Empire and wider Middle East and thereby likens the Ottoman dandy to the premodern figure of the amrad and the practice of love and desire for these young beautiful beardless males, as analyzed by Afsaneh Najmabadi. Brittany Haynes, ‘Transforming Masculinity and Male Sexuality in Modernity from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic’, Lights 2, no. 3 (Spring 2013), 62; and Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 2005). The despise of the dandy, Brittany argues, went along with the silencing of this homoerotic practices by orientalist modernizations discourse. I think, while heteronormativity and sexuality are central to the analyses of the modern dandy, he is not just a premodern remnant of the amrad but a genuinely modern phenomenon as its appearance and problematization in Western Europe show. On sexuality and modernization in the Ottoman Empire see Dror Ze’evi, Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500 - 1900 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2006). On the treatment of same sex/ passionate relations between men in the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire see Selim S. Kuru, ‘Yaşanan, Söylenen ve Yazılan: Erkekler Arasından Tutkusal İlişkiler’, Cogito, no. 66–65 (2011): 263–77.

17 An excellent study on the discourse of modernity and consumption within the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community and beyond has been conducted by Haris Exertzoglou, ‘The Cultural Uses of Consumption: Negotiating Class, Gender and Nation in the Ottoman Urban Centers During the 19th Century’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 35, no. 1 (2003): 77–101, doi:10.1017.S0020743803000047.
what was going on in the fashion market. As a number of studies show, European fin-de-siècle discourse on masculinity was busy with a (re-)affirmation of masculinity. As Christopher Breward suggests in his study of male consumer culture in the late nineteenth century, the fear of emasculation was linked to questions of fashion and dress. The sense of crisis of masculinity at the end of the century, he argues, led to the use of a certain muscular manliness from the past as a sartorial template combined with “masculine fashionable identities” of the future and their formal values. These references to the past and future formed, according to Breward, the principles of male dress of the period. Studies of dress and modern masculinity are replete with what Flügel has called the “great masculine renunciation”, which comprises the shift of men’s styles away from splendor, flamboyance and lavishness towards an expression of masculinity through hardness and austerity materialized by stiff, hard and tight dress with unobtrusive colors.

“A gentleman could no longer be recognized by the splendour of his apparel, but rather by the quality of the clothe he wore, the skill of its tailoring, and also by his posture and general mien.”

Brändli characterizes transformations of male appearance throughout the nineteenth century as a development “vom grazilen Biedermeierpüppchen zum Röhrenmenschen.” The tube-like shape of the late nineteenth century dress had already been noticed by contemporaries. The cut of men’s clothes became less and less form-fitting. The tail-coat, once combined with tight fitting trousers, remained a basic garment throughout the nineteenth century but, in contrast to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was later combined with loose trouser and often gave way to the

20 Christopher Breward, *The Hidden Consumer: Masculinities, Fashion and City Life; 1860 - 1914* (Manchester [u.a.]: Manchester Univ. Press, 1999).
22 Ibid., 50.
frock-coat, which covered more parts of the underwear, which was to be hidden as far as possible. At that time it was unacceptable to take off the coat and display the shirt beneath, as it was considered part of the underwear. In addition in the 1870s the sack coat appeared and spread. Overcoats were cut amply and angularly. The waist-coat, which was initially held in bright colors and heavily ornamented, became much more unobtrusive and invisible.  

The new kind of dress was meant to compensate the flaws brought about by the perceived crisis of masculinity attending modernity. Dress, thereby, attained the function of a second skin and second nature. From the point of view of many contemporaries modernity had deprived the male body of its natural strength and vigor, and dress was therefore to compensate for that loss. Dress obtained the function to both conceal and display the body at the same time. Its form replaced the features of the body and no longer accentuated them, as lavish dress had done before. According to Christopher Forth, a modern critique of extravagant aristocratic styles appeared in the seventeenth century, emerging with the renunciation of aristocratic styles which was characteristic of the newly emerging social classes. 

The space male bodies inhabited was thus extended to incorporate their dress in order to express masculinity while male interest in fashion was at the same time criticized as emasculating. This brought about a paradoxical relation of masculinity to fashion and consumerism in which the latter were simultaneously restoral and threatening for the former. Through these politics of dress the relation of the male body to masculinity was redefined. Ottoman politics of dress took part in this redefinition.

4.1.1 Uniformity and Bourgeois Dress

The uniformity of the standard suit which increased towards the fin-de-siècle correlates with a militarization of men's appearance and male identity. Katrina Honeyman terms the men's suit the uniform of respectability, crucial to hegemonic male

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24 Ibid., 144–146.
25 In Britain contemporary observers, also from within the nobility, criticized men’s relation to extravagance and preferred sober styles and also Rousseau commented on clothing “offering the appearance of a well-built body instead of bodily vigor itself.” Christopher E. Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the Body (Basingstoke [u.a.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). On the increasingly plain styles of men's dress see also Ross, Clothing, 32 – 36.
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identity. The new ways of production of dress permitted such a look of uniformity. A standardization that appeared at the end of the nineteenth century, it promised egalitarian structures and democracy even though it actually produced new kinds of hierarchical order and social distinctions. The promotion of equality was used by the producers of these kinds of dress, who suggested that a respectable look was now affordable for lower classes as well, albeit social distinctions were not expressed by splendor and lavishness but rather refined cloth and expensive qualities which could only be afforded by a minority of men.

Sabina Brändli en détail follows the transformation from more elaborate forms of male dress, which also accentuated the male body (such as the display of the calves or the penis and testicles through close-fitting cuts and paddings and an accentuated waist) to a body-concealing style common in the late nineteenth century.

In reference to Brändli I want to remark in more detail about the development of styles of dress throughout the nineteenth century that make clear its characteristics and how it evolved. Characteristic of this process is a gradual shift from aristocratic to bourgeois styles, reflecting social hegemonies in transformation. These changes of style were enabled and supported by new means of production and distribution. They began with the emergence of the three-piece suit after the French revolution, which comprised a tail-coat, long trousers and a short waistcoat. In the beginning this suit did not resemble very much what is today known as standard men's suit; its cut was quite different, as was the embroidered, patterned and multi-colored fabrics and adornments used for it. According to Brändli, in the German-speaking world, the plain, dark colored style characteristic of the bourgeoisie established after 1830.

Newer symbols of bourgeois hegemony, such as the top hat, first had to be established. As such the top hat could first even arouse public disdain, and in the late eighteenth century the wearing of it

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27 On the deconstruction of this myth see Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann. What was promoted as a democratization of dress was actually part of a ongoing social differentiation. That contrasts to Crane's approach who views the democratization thesis in a more affirmative mode. See Diana Crane, Fashion and Its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing (Chicago [u.a.]: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
28 Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 180.
29 For a long term survey on the meaning of colors in textile production and the significance of black and dark colors in Christian Europe see Jane Schneider, 'Peacocks and Penguins: The Political Economy of European Cloth and Colors', American Ethnologist 5, no. 3 (1 August 1978): 413–47.
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even led to arrests in some cases.\textsuperscript{30} Brändli argues that the increasingly dominant, unobtrusive appearances, color and styles, including headgear and beard, retained a political meaning and significant distinctions.\textsuperscript{31}

In the German-speaking realm late nineteenth century plain dress was accompanied by a trend for bearded faces, mustaches, whiskers, as full beards increasingly replaced formerly shaved faces. This trend helped to reinforce the trend to display certain male values in appearance and stressed male authority while it hid facial features and expressions, thusly disguising men’s sensibility. Waxed mustaches additionally underlined military discipline, which encompassed an always upright posture, reinforced in civil dress by heavily starched clothes.\textsuperscript{32} In the Ottoman Empire a similar fashion appeared. Ottoman examples of waxed beards, militaristic odor and underlining of an upright posture can be found on carte-de-visit of an Ottoman lieutenant from 1890 and a portrait of an artilleryman named Ahmed Selahaddin, which dates to 1896. Both depictions also provide an impression how well the cylindrical shape of the Fez fit into the picture of the “Röhrenmensch,” at the time hegemonic in central Europe.\textsuperscript{33} Generally the beard fashion in the Ottoman Empire corresponded to that assessed by Brändli for the German speaking world, as many photographs suggests. Generally mustaches prevailed, sometimes full beards, especially by older men.\textsuperscript{34} Yet, in the Ottoman photographs whiskers hardly appear. Brändli dates the beginning of the trend for beards in the 1850s and its decline after WW I.

Next to the promotion of equality in the trading of the standard suit, Honeyman attests to a desire for conformity among men by the early twentieth century. In the Ottoman situation, this trend for conformity or uniformity finds its expression in the disappearance of cases referring to sumptuary restrictions. While there are still incidents and discussions on the attachment of jewels to the fez, regarded as a sign of flamboyance,

\textsuperscript{30} Brändli, \textit{Der herrlich biedere Mann}, 136.
\textsuperscript{31} The development towards sober male styles and the association of fashion with femininity culminated in the disappearance altogether of depictions of male styles from the fashion magazines in the 1870s, where Brändli traced the development of clothing styles. Ibid., 143.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{34} For examples of the predominance of the mustache see Özendes, \textit{Photography in the Ottoman Empire}, 229, 230 and 231.
in mid-nineteenth century onwards there are no such cases about extravagant appearances appearing in archival documents. Maybe with exception to the wearing of the hat by some individuals, but might that be a move towards another kind of conformity rather than towards extravagance!? The standard suit as a means to express conformity, for Honeyman, was a symbol of a stereotypical masculine identity. Divergence from that appearance and its identity were regarded with derision. It needs to be stressed that this, however, was only valid and possible for those that could effort bourgeois clothes and lifestyles.

Producers themselves, as Honeyman documents for Leeds, a leader in the production of suits, were keen to promote suits as a means of leveling social differences. In contrast to the actual function of modern bourgeois dress as a sign of distinction, they saw their activities drawn by a commitment to social justice. Their verbalized aim was to “enable the man of limited means to ‘dress like a gentleman’,” and they saw dress as an means of democratization. Honeyman argues that instead of democratization taking place, social distinctions rather became invisible. She states that “Leeds multiples ensured that most men could effort a tailored dress of reasonable quality,” but this only in the period after WWI, as only then was mass production established to such an extent. This fact is also interesting to keep in mind for a consideration of Turkish Republican politics of dress in the 1920s, where a new clothing regulation correlates with these enhanced means of mass production.

That in turn means throughout the long nineteenth century, even in the centers of modern mass production, it was hard for men of lower classes to attain an appearance of a higher social standing. In terms of masculinity, Honeyman argues that the standard suit provided men “with a sense of place” in modernity. As such modernity can be thought of as a space and a certain attire; the standard suit, provided access to this kind of space. Wearing this suit, Honeyman argues, represented collective, idealized male behavior. Hence, a different kind of dress means a transgression of social norms. The importance of dress, and its symbolic validity in that sense, stem from the social requirement to adopt a distinctly masculine identity, regardless of the social position otherwise.

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35 As Robert Ross has pointed out, English production was leading in the spread of modern male attire. Ross, Clothing.
36 Honeyman, ‘Following Suit,’ 429.
37 Ibid., 430.
38 Ibid., 441. Analytically I think it is problematic to attribute gender a priority before class, both for me
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Brändli argues that late nineteenth century sober dress produced sharp social distinctions, i.e. against women, racialized Others and lower social classes—despite the democratic pretext. The material means to reach the seemingly simple bourgeois male style were quite high and could not be afforded by many. To appear orderly and clean not only assumed financial means, (men complained about the costs of cleaning, which had to be calculated thoroughly) but also an acquired, composed habitus of bourgeois understatement. Those who lacked these requirements, but aspired to acquire bourgeois reputation, were entrusted to the formerly aristocratic realm of representation: bourgeois women with their lavish dress and men regarded as socially or racially Other. While they remained within the dictates of fashion with its rapid changes, bourgeois men's dress was subtly nuanced.39 Dress codes were elaborate and differed from occasions. To imitate the simple male style was not easy at all.

While lower class men's efforts were relegated to the realm of representation, bourgeois culture became a sign of power which those possessing it defended against outsiders. Bourgeois culture was essentially male; in terms of dress its female part did not refer to the same values, such as reason and moderation, but became the measure for non-bourgeois existence. Thus throughout the nineteenth century polarisation of gender difference in dress also became a characteristic of bourgeois identity and bourgeois gender order. Dress reform movements aimed at the leveling of these differences were opposed fiercely.40

It is within this logic that the Ottoman dandy must be situated. Not (only) his consumerism, nor only his lavish appearance, but also his aspirations for social enhancement were at stake. The measure was if he was suited to enter respectable society be part of the ruling elite. However, were there any differences between dandy figures in Western Europe and colonial societies? What influence had discourses of Westernization and modernization made to the construction of the dandy?

Comparison with Western European countries show that the Ottoman discourse on the dandy was far from unique but rather came along as a inherent companion to modernization. Western European countries and also inhabitants of their settler colonies in the Americas were competing amongst each other for the masculinity of men via the

39 Brändli, *Der herrlich biedere Mann*, 252-253.
40 See Ibid., 262-263.
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repudiation of effeminacy. Sartorial reform in favor of an expression of austerity was a
common measure.\footnote{Ross, Clothing, 32.}

‘Degenerated’ aristocratic masculinity characterized by both luxury and squander as
well as lavishness and extravagant styles were to be replaced by the styles of the rising
bourgeoisie. Thus a discourse on clothing and consumption was pivotal to the
construction of modern masculinity. While elaborated styles of bourgeois identity
became crucial for the construction of modern identity as such, too much emphasis on
dress and style were read as effeminacy. Forth regards this ambivalent function of
material culture as a source of resistance to gender norms and rebellion against a
dominant middle class culture created by these men themselves.\footnote{Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 55.}

To him, the tensions
within the middle classes and between different perceptions of masculinity reveal that
there was more to the definition of modern hegemonic masculinity than just discipline
and respectability, which he terms as a “right to comfort.”\footnote{Ibid., 59.}

Therefore, the question is which position the late nineteenth century dandy
inhabited, if he subverted hegemonic class and gender norms or if he was an expression
or personification of bourgeois male identity and dominance. Forth considers the dandy
not as an expression of bourgeois power but as some sort of classless figure:

“The dandy represented himself as declassé and thus not bound to any particular class,
a posture that could render him suspect in an age when the bourgeoisie was
consolidating its political and cultural identity.”\footnote{Ibid., 55.}

The question thus follows: did the Ottoman dandy also entail a critique of middle
class respectability?

In the course of the nineteenth century and the transformation of men's fashion the
dandy took on different positions, as Brändli chronicles.\footnote{Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 128.}

While at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, as trend-setters dandies pushed developments towards a society
dominated by bourgeois values, paradoxically at the same time they fashioned themselves
as aristocrats and were insulted as such. Concerning female fashion, Brändli shows how
bourgeois styles developed in close correspondence with older aristocratic ones while at the same time dissociated from them. As such, the dandy developed from a trend-setter of male fashion, derided but not despised, to a counter figure of the sober bourgeois male subject of the late nineteenth century, that called male uniformity into question.\textsuperscript{46}

A look at the eighteenth and nineteenth century discourses on health and masculinity helps to illuminate the phenomenon of the dandy and modern masculinity. According to Forth’s study, the ideal male body was imagined as of good health, meaning physically fit, muscular, always held in an upright posture. These physical and aesthetic traits were linked to moral integrity. Good health and a disciplined and self-contained body were identified with growth, development and agency.\textsuperscript{47} This bodily ideal entailed a preoccupation with boundaries and bodily closure unique to modernity. Somatic integrity was regarded as a prerequisite for firm ego boundaries, opposed to female bodies, which were conceptualized as porous and leaky.\textsuperscript{48}

Forth shows how the ideal of an athletically trained male body came along with “lamentations about the physical weakness of modern men”\textsuperscript{49} on the one hand and a valorization of weakness and illness within middle and upper class circles on the other:\textsuperscript{50} “[...] health problems could be embraced as a proof of man’s willingness to endure physical distress in the name of some higher ideal.”\textsuperscript{51} Health problems resulting from an inactive lifestyle were literally celebrated, with men flaunting their diseases regarding their “civilization illnesses” proudly as an indicator of their elite status. Paradoxically scorned males bodies, such as those of workers and racialized others, figured contrasting ideals of modern middle class masculinity, producing a disjunction between elite and popular bodies.\textsuperscript{52} Thus, contrary to the ideal of a muscular male body, the civilizing process and modernization were perceived as effeminization as civilized society was diagnosed with a lack of masculinity. Modernization became associated with physical

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 148-149.
\textsuperscript{47} Forth, \textit{Masculinity in the Modern West}, 67.
\textsuperscript{48} See Ibid., 72.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 74.
\textsuperscript{50} See Ibid., 77.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{52} While haunted by the "diseases of civilization" these privileged bodies had privileged access to medical care and "did not suffer epidemic diseases and other health issues to the same extent as popular classes." Ibid., 77.
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degeneration and nervous, weak bodies. In the colonial setting, within this paradoxical discourse of civilization, the weak modern man was opposed to the “strong savage” to the same extent as the Other was depicted as effeminate.53

Thus pleasure and ease which allegedly caused moral effeminacy were countered by a glorification of pain. “The ability to endure and invite pain”54 became a yardstick of civilization and masculinity. Bodies useful for the emerging concept of the nation needed to be exposed and endure exertion, aggression and violence. These bodies were needed in order to “forge the nation through warfare.”55 The establishment of personal boundaries through the ritual of dual, which became central to the construction of eighteenth and nineteenth century masculinity, became transferred to the political level and the construction of the body politic through warfare. In this psychosomatic identification with the nation, affronts to the latter were experienced as attacks on an individual man’s body. Central to both the defense of the personal and the collective body was the concept of male honor, both of which were central to emerging nationalism. Nationalism itself became a means to cure an assumed loss of masculinity during the civilizing process.

These concepts of bodily boundaries and identification with the collective body of the nation are central to the formation of modern subjects. Forth emphasizes that modern concepts of individual freedom cannot be detached from warfare as a techniques of civilization. Docile bodies, produced by modern military discipline, according to Forth, were closely related to the freedom of the individual, or in the words of a contemporary: “[...] the autonomy of each person constitutes the measure of his obedience.”56

In terms of dress, that entailed the introduction of the military uniform or in civic life the three piece suit. Both drew attention away from dress itself to the body and made “nation-building and man-building coextensive processes.”57 The French revolution explicitly aimed at reforming manhood by invoking classical images of the male bodies in contrast to the impotent and bloated bodies of the aristocracy. The mayor of Paris

53 Ibid., 85.
54 Ibid., 115.
55 Ibid., 122.
57 Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 126.
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proclaimed in 1789: “The men of the free nation will be physically larger, more handsome, more courageous; morally they will be more virtuous and better.” Next to the classical ideas, nationalist reformers praised the bodily constitution of idealized ancestors and promoted a return to these. In Prussia, too, the state came to be seen as a biopolitical entity where the nation was figured in the male body as opposed to the personification of the kingdom or empire in the person of the ruler, and the initial emphasis of German reformers on Bildung instead of martial prowess was replaced by the idea of “regeneration through violence.” The introduction of compulsory military service in 1813 served these purposes to form equal citizens in combat.

One of the feared consequences of physical weakness was the diminution of gender differences. Modern biology and the insights gained by Darwinism suggested that highly developed sexual dimorphism was a sign of a high level of civilization, progress evident in man becoming more masculine and women more feminine. “Degeneration discourse implied that the conditions of modern civilization created obstacles to the ‘natural’ differentiation of the sexes that evolutionary theory promised.” Discourses on masculinity received feminist claims to gender equality thereby as a threat to progress, the reduction of gender differences and the altering of gender relations were perceived as a harm to the male body. Thus, for an understanding of the relation between modern dress and gender it is crucial to note that progress was understood as the polarization of gender binaries. In the hegemonic discourse of the time, a questioning of this gender dichotomy was perceived as a threat to modernity and progress, whether the feminist movement claiming equal rights or men transgressing the prescribed sober styles or even people from the “non-West.”

Another threat to bourgeois male hegemony became the rise of a lower middle class, often in the figure of the office clerk, the white-collar workers. Denigrated as weak, unhealthy, nervous and dubious these sought to enhance their “low degree of status and autonomy” by the means of consumption. While proper dress was “a crucial means to

58 Ibid., 128.
59 Ibid., 131.
60 See Ibid., 131.
61 Ibid., 146.
62 See Ibid., 148.
63 See Ibid., 143.
64 Ibid., 154.
achieve status and respectability" this "store-bought" version of it generated doubts about these men's authentic masculinity. The educated middle-classes viewed this kind of consumerism as a mark of effeminacy, associated with a "soft" consumer lifestyle of this new urban middle class. German nationalists criticized this lifestyle as un-German.

New urban middle class men countered these claims with various strategies. On the one hand, they proudly presented their increased status by displaying fashionable appearance confidently:

“In Victorian London it was not uncommon for single clerks and shop workers to compensate their grey working lives with flamboyant displays of colour in their clothing, and in their free time many manifested an effete sartorial style as fashionable ‘gents’ and ‘mashers’ at music halls or even aspiring ‘bohemians’ in the drinking halls of Soho.”

This strategy was combined with countering the blame of effeminacy with an orientation towards proletarian masculinity or proletarian male bodies and the display of naked muscular bodies, which became very popular around 1900. This bodily culture was simultaneously an affront towards bourgeois bodily practices as well as a return to the blame of muscular degradation and effeminacy.

In reference to Flügel's paradigmatic utterance of the “great masculine renunciation” Christopher Breward assesses the late nineteenth century discourse on dandyism as dealing with the fact that, at least for certain men, the matter of dress was not just characterized by renunciation. Instead, he puts forth that for men, fashionability played a more important role than often admitted and therefore, cannot be reduced to women's dress. Men's fashion itself became an instrument to counter the supposed effeminizing effects of commodity culture and bodily decline. In terms of clothing production, according to Breward, this effort to reconstruct a perceived loss of masculinity went along with a sartorial shift from bespoke to ready-made clothes, which took place during the same period. Breward goes on to show that the production of ready-made clothing and the new tailoring system enabling it, came along with an

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65 Ibid., 157.
66 Ibid., 156. On music halls, masculinity and fashion see also Breward, The Hidden Consumer.
67 See Breward, ‘Manliness, Modernity and the Shaping of Male Clothing,’ 165.
68 See Ibid., 166.
renewed interest in the body, the studying of its anatomy and geometry, providing “maps for the navigation of ideal fashionable body.” All these concerns about the body, masculinity and fashion in Western Europe have to be taken into consideration when analyzing Ottoman modernization of politics of dress.

4.2 The Globalization of Modern Male Attire and European Colonialism

The advent of European economic domination is closely related with cloth production: It came along with the shift to an export of dyed and finished cloth from, especially, England to world regions, like South East Asia, which formerly produced its own precious textiles that were now replaced by imports. Before the seventeenth century these regions, the Middle and Far East and Southern Europe, had been producers of brightly dyed cloth. A shift in economic and social patterns occurred when these dyeing techniques were adopted in Northern Europe.

British economic interests played a great part in the forging of sartorial strategies. Since the late eighteenth century Britain exported mechanically produced cotton textiles to India, and the sale of these textiles required the wearing of these styles by people in India. In addition it provided the British colonialists with a certain control of what people would wear, i.e., Manchester saris instead of full Western dress. Indian styles were carefully scrutinized and textiles were produced specifically for the Indian market, such as codified in John Forbes Watson’s *The Textile Manufacturers and Costumes of the People of India*, published in 1866.

4.2.1 The Emergence and Spread of the Three-Piece Suit

Ottoman politics of dress need to be considered in relation to the global spread of modern, mass-produced clothing. Robert Ross locates the first steps towards modern male attire, the three-piece suit, in 1666 with Charles II. From there, he traced shifts

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69 See Ibid., 167.
70 Ibid., 166.
71 See Schneider, ‘Peacocks and Penguins’.
73 See Ibid., 40.
74 Jirousek assumes two paradigmatic shifts in "Western dress: A first shift to modern men's suit in the mid-th-eleventh century, and another at the end of the eighteenth with the move to more modest,
towards modern dress in Britain and France, showing how early European colonial encounters influenced these material practices. Charles II. declared his shift in clothing practices explicitly as an effort to demarcate his appearance against French styles, in order to reject French hegemony. He read his new dress as an adoption of “Eastern fashions” which demonstrated the arbitrary designation of assumed origins of cultural goods and practices, especially in the demarcation of Orient versus Occident. Still, even if this designation was arbitrary, it was not random, and Ross suggested that it was also a move to promote Indian cotton, in light of the first commercial encounters of the East India company, while at the same time the former came to be perceived as a competitor to British wool. These labels of clothing styles and the economic and political considerations accompanying Charles II.’s decision to change his styles of dress provide a window to the global dimensions of the production and consumption of modern dress.

Another aspect of the global development of clothing styles appears in Charlotte Jirousek's study of Ottoman influences in Western dress. While in earlier studies she argued for essential differences in the principles of Western in Eastern dress, her research on the topic revealed that apparently basic forms of modern men’s suit had been adopted from the East. These were bifurcated trousers, the shirt, the vest and the outer coat, all of which were made suitable and adapted by European tailoring and tastes.

To begin with, trousers, as Jirousek argued, had been essential garments to Ottoman dress, for men as well as women, while in Europe, according to her, bifurcated trousers or pantalons only appeared first in the sixteenth century among sailors, who wore a so-called 'mellon hose', constructed very similarly to the shalwar. Another garment long in use in the 'East' were front-opening coats. Those first appeared in Europe during the First Crusade, and also showed the “hanging sleeve effects” known from the Ottomans, as well as fur-lined coats. During the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, coats became a common repertoire of European fashion. Vests, too, are an item of clothing with Eastern origin, becoming widespread in Europe with the first step

75 See Ross, Clothing, 30.
76 See Ibid., 30.
77 See Jirousek, ‘Ottoman Influences in Western Dress,’ 242.
78 See Ibid., 241.
79 See Ibid., 239.
towards modern man’s suit in the seventeenth century, when the ensemble of trousers/breeches, shirt, vest or waistcoat, outer coat and cravat was first introduced. It replaced the doublet or tunic combined with a hose and still differed distinctly from the modern standard suit as it appeared at the end of the eighteenth century. Jirousek clearly detected an “oriental influence” to this new kind of dress and attributes to the coat of the new dress a “striking resemblance to the janissary coat.”

Buttons were another item in use in the Middle East and Central Asia long before Europe use. While in early medieval Europe brooches, pins and laces served as fasteners, evidence of buttons in Europe first appeared in Paris in the thirteenth century. Coats, also an essential part of Eastern dress, had been adopted from the tenth century onwards. With them a closure with horizontal bands, joined at the front with buttons and loops, appeared and in the twelfth century coats were used for layering, also well known in the Eastern clothing tradition, with short or long sleeves common. In the seventeenth century a variety of coats with Eastern leanings made of Indian cotton became fashionable. Also the introduction of a military uniform, together with the first standing army, in France in the last quarter of the seventeenth century most probably took inspiration from the Ottoman Empire, where the Janissaries wore uniforms since the fifteenth century.

Concerning headgear Jirousek considered it “one of the most dramatic borrowings form East to West.” Again a shift in Western stress on headgear appeared with the Crusades. Before that, Jirousek attests to headgear only a marginal role as an indicator of rank and affiliation and stresses the essentially functional use of hoods and hats. Turbans first appeared in the eleventh century became an explicitly Oriental feature of European dress between 1380-1450 in the forms of chaperons or roundlets and as well as wrapped turbans and again Ottoman turbans, those worn at the court and casual ones, were prominent in Europe in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They all disappeared in the mid-sixteenth century but had a regular resurgence with reawakening

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80 See Ibid., 242.
81 See Ibid., 240.
82 See Ibid.
84 Jirousek, ‘Ottoman Influences in Western Dress,’ 244.
85 See Ibid.
86 See Ibid., 244–246.
fashions of *turquerie*. Jirousek also suggested that the bicorn took leanings from the East namely from the Mamluk's headgear prominent during their reign over Egypt.\(^\text{87}\) Plums, a central Asian item of status and prowess continued to be used by Ottoman Turks, attached to European men's headgear form the 1490's onwards, which had to be imported via Middle Eastern trade routes.\(^\text{88}\) The mutual influence of supposedly occidental and oriental dress shows that demarcations between “the East” and “Europe” were not as clear-cut as often thought. They were permeable and contingent even though in continuous reaffirmation from both sides.

Later, with the introduction of new modes of production and distribution in the nineteenth century “the style of clothing which had been developed in Europe and the United States began to spread through out the globe.”\(^\text{89}\) It acquired the meaning of being civilized and “correct clothing together with the mastering of the body was a major element of the ‘central axiom of modernization, the passage from barbarianism to civilization’.”\(^\text{90}\) Hence, the wearing of European dress became equivalent to being modern and civilized. This mind-set became most obvious in the civilizing mission of the Christian missionaries, as one of the pillars of European colonialism. They played a crucial part in the spread and regulation of modern dress. While propagating *civilized* dressing of colonized people, they also carried on this mission in their Christian heartlands. Civilized dress was set in accordance with European mores. Decent dress became equivalent with the adoption of a certain notion of moral behaviour and conduct. While on the one hand they promoted “civilized dress” as an indispensable part of Christian identity, they also in many cases regulated the particular kinds of dress to be worn by converts in the colonies and by that guarded the maintenance of difference and thwarted extravagance. Therefore, being civilized was inseparably linked to Christianity through outward appearance and manners. The history of the Christian missions, thus, is also a history of the globalization of Western dress. The missions controlled access to cloth and styles of dress. Sumptuary laws issued in these colonial contexts ensured the claim to supremacy of the Europeans, i.e. by the prevention of “immodest display of extravagance.”\(^\text{91}\)

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87 See Ibid., 245.  
88 See Ibid., 246.  
89 Ross, *Clothing*, 69.  
90 Ibid., 72.  
91 Ibid., 92.
The implications of these politics of dress went far beyond outward appearance. Within the paradigm of the modernization of power and labor it contained the dimension of social discipline. Ross convincingly argued that the ideas carried and embodied through the spread of modern dress became a means for the capitalist economy. It entailed that the subjects in the colonies and also working classes at home were willing “to perform labor [...] at minimum wages.”

On the other hand colonized people used Western dress to claim acceptance and equal status towards the colonialist and thus appropriated it for their own purposes. Hence, modern European dress attained the double function of discipline and resistance entailed in the subjectivation process. Ross assumes a common sartorial history of colonial societies brought about i.e. in Africa the “virtually reclothing of half a continent,” within what he terms a major shift of African material culture between 1880 and 1950. With the appearance of modernized elites in many colonized regions in Africa, from at least 1880 onwards, and their claim to “full acceptance in to the system of the British Empire,” Ross assumed a shift in colonialism to establish indirect rule by the British. That entailed how the British favored “indigeneity” and countered Africans endeavors of modernization, sometimes in opposition to but sometimes in collaboration with the missionary ’civilizing mission.’ That included British opposition to the adoption of European dress and the favouring of folklore models of dress which produced the desired forms of ‘indigeneity.’

Magret Pernau argues that in India a shift in British colonial politics of dress came along with an altering of colonial rule from informal or indirect rule, initially considered as a more effective and lower-cost version, to a far-reaching presence of colonial administration. Pernau connects this shift to direct colonial rule to the fashioning of the three-piece suit and the appearance of bourgeois styles and its prescriptions of a sober look for males. The top hat thereby became a sign of assumed cultural superiority appearing in place of the tricorne. Male sobriety was contrasted to embellishments in

92 Ibid., 82.
93 Ibid., 121.
94 Ibid., 124.
95 See Ibid., 124.
96 Ibid., 123-124.
female styles and also embroidered Oriental styles, both of which were regarded as uncivilized and effeminate. These kinds of middle class values incorporated by the three-piece suit and the top hat were further promoted through the arrival of evangelical missionaries in the 1830s.\(^9\)

While these strategies were relatively successful concerning the wider population, Indian elites followed their own interests and transgressed the boundaries set by British interests. They drew there own sartorial boundaries and selectively adopted European styles predominantly at work in other public occasions, and then switched to Indian dress at home or during leisure times. While some attempted and succeeded in passing as respectable Europeans, most men preferred hybrid styles.\(^9\)

However, these hybrid styles became a target of ridicule, from both the British and also within Indian society. A famous figure was the Bengali baboo, a figure who presented a threat to British dominance as a rising Western educated Bengali elite.\(^1\)

The British attempted to restrain these local elites’ claims to equality by stressing the Indian character of their identity and labelling their hybrid styles and general appearance as effeminate. It was a struggle over the border of respectability and bears obvious similarities to the Ottoman dandy who was ridiculed in a similar way to disgrace a rising middle/upper class.

### 4.2.2 Adoption of and Distancing from Local Dress by European Colonizers

Throughout the sixteenth century British colonialists in India, as merchants and missionaries, made no efforts to propagate or maintain their appearance and practised acculturation through the adoption of local Indian dress. However, with the continuing rise of colonialism these widespread practices became outlawed and British officials were put under pressure to abandon them. Colonial power was marked increasingly by a sartorial order that aimed at maintaining a visible difference between colonizer and colonized.\(^1\)

The British themselves, as also pointed out by Robert Ross, had their own struggles.

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98 See Ibid., 258.
99 See Tarlo, Clothing Matters, 48.
100 See Ibid., 50. On the stereotype of the Bengali baboo see also Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century, Studies in Imperialism (Manchester u.a.: Manchester Univ. Press [u.a.], 1995).
101 In 1830 an ordinance banned the adoption of Indian dress by British officials, see Ross, Clothing, 75.
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centering dress. In the early days of British colonialism employees of the East India Company and others readily adopted Indian dress, a practice that was banned in 1830 in order to “preserve impeccable British standards.” British enhanced sartorial fastidiousness was linked to a felt need to distance themselves from the Indian population that opposed colonialism and claimed equal rights through the adoption of British dress. In contradistinction the British further elaborated the nuances of their appearance and applied other measures to maintain sartorial distinctions.

Hence, “British obsessions to overdress,” as Tarlo phrased it, and the preoccupation with nuances of distinction coincided with developments of Indian men's dress towards the adoption of European dress in various degrees. Rigid British dress codes were attempts to make British identity less accessible for colonial subjects and, presumably, also for lower classes in Britain itself. The imitation of British appearance ought to be as hard as possible. These efforts to maintain difference sometimes clashed with British claims to civilize colonial people. It led to the appearance of a number of styles which kept the civilizing mission and the spread of raiment of civilization within controllable boundaries maintaining British dominance.

Dutch colonialism pursued a different politics of dress. Dutch colonial staff were urged to maintain the dress worn at their home countries much earlier, already in the seventeenth century, while Indonesian converts to Christianity were allowed to don Dutch dress. The Portuguese, on the contrary, maintained from the beginning their dress in the fear of the inquisition which regarded the abandonment of prescribed styles of dress as apostasy. Obviously colonial order was established and preserved amongst other means by an order of dress and thus could be subverted by defiance of the same.

4.2.3 Sola Topi, Fez and Top Hat

Throughout the nineteenth century the top hat remained the most respectable headpiece, even though some kinds of felt hats appeared, i.e. during the 1848 revolution as a part of revolutionary dress. Later in the century straw hats became fashionable as

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102 Tarlo, Clothing Matters, 37.
103 Ibid., 38.
104 Ross, Clothing, 39.
headwear for the summer.\textsuperscript{105} The cylindrical shape of the top hat was the repetition of the leading principle of uniformity and ostentatious nonchalance apparent in cut of the clothes of late nineteenth bourgeois male dress, i.e. sleeves, trouser legs, trunk.\textsuperscript{106}

For British colonial rule in India the top hat proved insufficient as a demarcation from aspiring Indian elites. Thus from the 1870s onwards the sun helmet took its place as a marker of British claim to superiority, and it became a “[...]demarcation of the danger the Orient held for Europeans.”\textsuperscript{107} The \textit{sola topi} or pith helmet was a means deployed by the British to accomplish sartorial distinction from the Indian population. It is one of the many examples where headgear became a major sign of distinction in the colonial setting. Ross and other authors report that the compulsory wearing of the \textit{sola topi} in British India by colonial officials as a marker of the British claim to superiority in India was widely despised because it was extremely uncomfortable.\textsuperscript{108} Nevertheless, it served its purpose and helped to strengthen the labeling of Europeans as \textit{topi walas} (head-wearing people),\textsuperscript{109} suggesting that the establishment of the wearing of brimmed European hats as a sign of imperial domination was part of colonial politics itself, not just its expression.

Magret Pernau more specifically elaborated on the question of headgear in colonial India in relation to British rule. She particularly focused on developments leading from the Mughal turban as an encompassing headpiece worn after the establishment of Mughal rule to the development of elaborate regional styles from the 18\textsuperscript{th} century onwards.\textsuperscript{110} The development and preservation of these distinct styles was supported by the British colonial rulers, who saw it as a means to prevent political unity. The development of these elaborate “Indian” styles took place parallel to strict restrictions to the adoption of the dress of the Indian nobility by British colonial personal. The British colonial rulers fostered the differentiation of distinct ethno-religious styles of headgear in

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\textsuperscript{105} See Brändli, \textit{Der herrlich biedere Mann}, 144.  \\
\textsuperscript{106} See Ibid., 199 and 263.  \\
\textsuperscript{107} Pernau, ‘Shifting Globalities - Changing Headgear: The Indian Muslims between Turban, Hat and Fez,’ 67.  \\
\textsuperscript{108} Headgear also played its part in the mechanization of clothes production insomuch as the first example large-scale production, which took place in South London in the eighteenth century, were hats. See Ross, \textit{Clothing}, 26-27.  \\
\textsuperscript{109} See Tarlo, \textit{Clothing Matters}, 32-38.  \\
\textsuperscript{110} Pernau, ‘Shifting Globalities - Changing Headgear: The Indian Muslims between Turban, Hat and Fez,’ 255.
\end{flushright}
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India as a measure to strengthen colonial rule.\textsuperscript{111} Also from the 1870 onwards, at the same time as the appearance of the \textit{sola topi}, emergent Indian Muslim middle classes, in their efforts to create respectable styles, employed the Ottoman fez to create an Indian Muslim modernity. Pernau read this use of the fez as the symbol of a newly emerging Islamic piety and of pan-Islamism but to a greater extent as a Pan-Indian symbol.\textsuperscript{112}

The fez, then, with its cylindrical form, carried a basic principle of bourgeois men's dress as it was established throughout the nineteenth century. The fez itself followed this trend and developed its form towards a more strictly geometrical one. While the kind of fezzes depicted from the time of its introduction under Mahmud II. were quite high and voluminous, on the top broader than at the rim, sometimes without the sharp contours known later, with an enormous tassel further blurring its shape, at the end of the century they had became shorter with a sharper cut with a short unobtrusive tassel that often did not appear in photographs taken from the front.\textsuperscript{113} Photographs also suggest not just a chronological development but also a differing of forms according to social strata, as such that later in the century the stiff straight fezzes were worn by military and civil elite and those with a slightly different form, more narrow on the top and a bit shorter, by men from lower classes.\textsuperscript{114} Nevertheless, I could not tell from my material if certain shapes of the fez had been restricted to certain social strata.

The politics of dress were crucial to postcolonial nationalism and challenged

\textsuperscript{111} See Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Also Abdülmeclid (1839-61), Mahmud II's successor, was portrait with a huge fez with a big tassel. Mahmud II's and Abdülmeclid's fezzes might also indicate the prevalence of the ruler's headpiece as a marker of outstanding position. That also becomes apparent by the painting depicting Amhed I (1603-17). His headpiece and the way of presenting it appears not so different from Abdülmeclid's. See Jennifer Scarce, 'Principles of Ottoman Costume', \textit{Costume} 22 (1988): 12–31. For this research I could not track how linear the process from softer to the stiffer shapes was. Remarkable in this regard is the fez with which Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876?), is generally depicted, which was a very short and conically shaped; it almost looks like a soft felt cap, and is very far from the stiff impression the Fez normally provides. See i.e. Özendes, \textit{Photography in the Ottoman Empire}, 152. Yet, this was not the only form of fez present at that time, the cylindrical stiff shape also present in the 1860, such as the one worn by Server Paşa in 1865, see Ibid.,151. For an early example of the nineteenth century Ottoman fez see Mustafa Reşid Paşa's portrait in Selçuk Aksin Somel, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire} (Lanham, Md. [u.a.]: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 264. On the shapes of different fezzes see also Ahmed Rasim, 'Fes Hakkında', \textit{İstişare}, no. 7 (Teşrin-i Eviel 1324 (October/November 1908)): 316–20, where he quotes historical sources of fez descriptions.
\textsuperscript{114} See Özendor, \textit{Photography in the Ottoman Empire}, 155 and 158.
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European claims to dictated dress codes that would secure their claim to superiority. As in the Ottoman case, there are many examples of how headgear became a marker of difference and national identity.115 It was a piece of dress not as easily given up as others and marked national affiliation, such as in India where “too it was headcovering which was the most likely to remain unchanged.”116

4.2.4 National Costume versus Civilized Dress?

Forth emphasized that one strategy which served to reconstruct masculinity, morally as well as corporally, and thus, counter the perceived threat to male power by modernity, was nationalism.117 In the construction of national identity, engagement with clothing and consumption were pivotal. Sumptuary regulations, as we have seen applied to the Fez in chapter three, were not just a premodern phenomenon but stood also at the wake of modernity.118 An aspect of the appearance of the dandy was his association with cosmopolitanism.119 He appeared in the cosmopolitan quarters of the cities. Cosmopolitanism was associated with the anti-national, and thus the effeminate was also the anti-national.120 Nationalism was not only a dominant paradigm of the period,121 or at least some kind of proto-nationalism, but was also to become the main cure for the colonial threat.

When the claim to equality made by the appearance of South and West African elites dressed as British ladies and gentlemen did not lead to recognition, some West African countries turned to sartorial nationalism. So did anglophone West Africa adopt lose cotton robes instead of British style suits. These were promoted by the Dress Reform

115 Ross, Clothing, 81.
116 Ibid., 81.
117 See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 47. For more about nationalism see Ibid., Chapter 5.
118 As Brändli assesses for the German-speaking world, in the first half of the nineteenth century international fashion was pondered against the establishment of national costume. These discussions, however, disappeared and gave way to the triumph of bourgeois fashionability. See Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 166.
120 Keya Anjaria traces the reappearance of the dandy from Ottoman to Turkish Literature in the 1980s and detects thereby a transformation: In her analysis the dandy turns from a upper class traitor of the nationalist cause to a compatriot, who is part of the masses. See Keja Keja Anjaria, ‘The Dandy and the Coup: Politics of Literature in the Post-1980 Turkish Novel, Üç Beş Kişî’, Middle Eastern Literatures 17, no. 3 (2014): 263–82, doi:10.1080/1475262X.2014.997575, 268
121 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised ed. (London [u.a.]: Verso, 2006).
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Society, founded in 1887. Ross noted a “considerable and surprising degree of coincidence between the forms of colonial policy and politics of dress,” caused by the difference between French and British colonialism, where the French in contrast to the British did not prevent the adoption of European attire and simultaneously offered much easier access to French citizenship.

Also, in Indian’s men’s dress, a shift occurred, partly as a consequence of experiences that racist prejudices and structures could not be overcome simply by an adaptation of British appearance and behavior. Tarlo pointed out that even though the British colonizer attempted to orientalize their Indian subjects and prevent the adoption of Western dress, also numerous anti-colonial activists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century opposed its adoption and pejoratively labeled it as imitation. They instead issued calls to wear swadeshi (Indian made) cloth. The first efforts to (re-)define Indian dress appeared in the 1870s, namely with Jyndirindranath Tagore’s attempts to employ dress as a starting point for political change. The aim was to appear respectable without becoming European, and it comprised the invention of a national costume out of the vast variety of Indian dress.

This first attempt to create a sense of political unity through dress as part of an anti-colonial struggle remained singular and did not find wide acceptance. Only in 1905, after the viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, announced the partition of Bengal, a first collective movement of the rejection of European dress emerged. The dhothi, a waist-clothe for men, worn draped, folded and tucked became the symbol of this struggle, which also entailed the boycott and burning of foreign cloth. It remained nevertheless a regional struggle, and from 1910 onwards many men returned to European or semi-European clothes. The choice of dress remained a “private problem” and not a central point of public debate until the appearance of M.K. Ghandi. In terms of headgear, the British colonial sola topi was countered by the Ghandian cap during the struggle for national independence. Many times these headpieces, such as other national symbols and clothes, were cases of invented traditions. So was a black cap worn in Java, called Peci, derived from Dutch petje, which became a sign of anti-colonial nationalist attitude and

122 Ross, Clothing, 136.
123 See Tarlo, Clothing Matters, 11.
124 See Ibid., 58.
125 See Ibid., 60-61.
adopted by the elites to demonstrate solidarity with the masses.\textsuperscript{126}

Postcolonial nationalisms employed various sartorial strategies. European pieces were adopted selectively piece by piece, or mixed styles appeared that combined assumed national or traditional styles with European pieces of dress. In his case studies of Indian and Indonesian nationalism Ross concluded that “the wearing of European dress by prominent Indian and Javanese men was the beginning, though not necessarily the end of anti-colonial nationalism.”\textsuperscript{127} Forms of disciplining the population through dress already employed by the missionaries were adopted by nationalist elites in postcolonial nationalist movement and states. Efforts to bring “backward” people up to date came along with the promotion of particular forms of behavior and social engineering. The restrictions imposed by European colonial laws to the wearing of Western dress generated certain acts of resistance such as the wearing of top hats in church as a claim to equality with the colonizers in the region of today’s Botswana and Namibia.\textsuperscript{128}

The fashion-obsessed dandy became a figure of the anti-national. Specifically, but not only in non-Western countries, he became the imitator of the foreign and thus fitted perfectly into the rhetoric of the degraded urban male who needed to be reintegrated into the nation in order to strengthen the national collective.\textsuperscript{129} Even in Russia this process of terming the appropriation of ready-made clothes by lower rural classes as dandyism occurred, thus limiting the possibility of social mobility or equality that might accompany the appropriation of a certain style of dress.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{126} Whereas Thailand’s government ordered the wearing of hats in the streets by men in 1940, leading to the establishment of hat hiring for those who did not possess one, in case of the appearance of the police. See Ross,\textit{ Clothing}, 111.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 79.

\textsuperscript{128} See Ibid., 102.

\textsuperscript{129} The dandy was a present trope in many countries, i.e. also in Russian satire and plays he became a common figure. See Christine Ruane, \textit{The Empire’s New Clothes: A History of the Russian Fashion Industry, 1700 - 1917} (New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2009), 152.

\textsuperscript{130} See Ibid., 75. Actually the Russian Empire under Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century had been the site of a very early example of state introduced modernization of dress. After his return from a journey in western Europe Peter the Great of Russia initiate d a dress reform by a decree that required the Muscovite population to wear “German dress.” He also ordered men in his vicinity, with some exceptions, to shave their beards. Peter’ s Decree on Wearing German Clothes from 1701 read as follows: “[All ranks of the service nobility, leading merchants, military personnel, and inhabitants of Moscow and the other towns, except the clergy] are to wear German clothes and hats and footwear and to ride in German saddles; and their wives and children without exception are also so to dress. Henceforth nobody is to wear [traditional] Russian or Cossacks clothes or to ride in Russian [i.e., Tatar-style] saddles; nor are craftsmen to make such things or to trade in them. And if contrary to this the Great Sovereign’s decree some people wear such Russian or cossack clothes and ride in Russian saddles, the town gatekeepers are to exact a fine from them, [so much] for those on foot and [much more] from those on horseback. Also, craftsmen who make such things and trade in them will be, for their disobedience, severely punished.” And
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tsar Alexander III also used headgear as a sign of distinction by the introduction of kind of *papakha*, or *kalpak*, in 1881.\(^{131}\)

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century Forth depicts three, interconnected metamorphoses which had an impact on the male body.\(^{132}\) The first was the Social Darwinist discourse that vacillated between the praise of evolutionary progress of Western society versus fears of physical degeneration coming along with its civilization. The second was a change in the social composition of the middle class, in which members of lower classes claimed bourgeois status and privileges. For this upward social mobility dress and other consumer items became pivotal props for the appropriation of a respectable masculinity. The last point was an enforced engagement with bodily exercise, especially of the lower middle classes as a compensation for ostensible effeminacy.

In colonial societies under direct colonial rule the local dandy’s position and his endeavours for social enhancement through the adoption of modern dress were more obvious. Rudolf Mrázek scrutinized the appearance of the Indonesian dandy at the beginning of the twentieth century: “The newly born native dandy was a 'native' who borrowed Dutch clothes to place himself in a 'modern' colonial society.”\(^{133}\)

Since dress in the colonies was an important sign of distinction, the appropriation of European colonialists dress by colonial subjects could question colonial domination and white superiority and claims to dominance. At first, Dutch colonialism used and interpreted this acculturation in a different way: as a method to 'tame' the 'wild native' who threatened Dutch dominance, which proved successful in this way. In the course of time

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this is Peter’s Decree on Shaving of 1705: "All courtiers and officials in Moscow and all the other towns, as well as leading merchants and other townsmen, except priests and deacons, must henceforth by this the Great Sovereign’s decree shave their beards and moustaches. And whosoever does not wish to do so, but to go about with [traditional Russian] beard and moustache, is to pay a [hefty] fine, according to his rank. [...] And the Department of Land Affairs [in Moscow] is to give [such persons] a badge in receipt, as will the government offices in the other towns, which badges they must wear. And from the peasants a [small] toll is to be exacted every day at the town gates, without which they cannot enter or leave the town.” As quoted and translated by James Cracraft “Laws of Peter I,” in James Cracraft, ed., *Major Problems in the History of Imperial Russia*, *Major Problems in European History Series* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1994), 110-111; on these reforms see also Ruane, *The Empire’s New Clothes*; and Christine Ruane, ‘Subjects into Citizens: The Politics of Clothing in Imperial Russia’, in *Fashioning the Body Politic: Dress, Gender, Citizenship*, ed. Wendy Parkins (New York: Berg, 2002), 49–70.

131 See Ruane, *The Empire’s New Clothes*, 160.
these colonialized subjects formed a new force, especially those who acquired an academic education and resisted being defined and categorized by Dutch colonial rulers.\textsuperscript{134} This resulted, in accordance with Brändli’s observations of the German-speaking world, in an obsession with cleanliness, discipline and militarized appearance: colonial officers were urged to wear their white, starched ceremonial uniforms even off duty, which meant an enormous effort to keep this uniform in a nice condition.\textsuperscript{135} Mrázek attributed to the practice of Westernization a rebellious character and a revolutionary potential: “Diving into everything Western, and remaining elusive at the same time, demanded the courage of a guerilla fighter.”\textsuperscript{136} His interpretation of the dandy is the reverse of his depiction of a coward who submits to Western colonial dominance, as was done by late Ottoman authors.

4.3 The Spread of Mass Produced Dress in the Ottoman Empire

The term mass-fashion-system can be applied to the phenomenon of modern dress. It differs from traditional dress, in which clothes are produced not by the means of modern mass production as well as its form of consumption. It is produced in higher numbers and consumed in high rates. Under the mass-fashion-system, single pieces of dress are not worn until they lose their function (through use), but are rather changed when they become outdated. In the Ottoman Empire a mass-fashion-system had been established in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, making ready-made clothes after the latest European fashions available in European warehouses.\textsuperscript{137} The mass-fashion-system system brought forth the polarization of gendered appearance in the Ottoman Empire just as it did in Europe, as Charlotte Jirousek has argued. She shows that while Ottoman basic garments were the same for men and women, those in Europe were cut entirely differently.\textsuperscript{138} Men wore first a hose and later trouser, while women wore skirts without bifurcated undergarments of any sort, whereas Ottoman dress foresaw the wearing of a şalvar as a basic undergarment for everyone. Both Ottoman men and women wore a similar style of layered garments with similar pieces combined.

\textsuperscript{134} See Ibid., 132.
\textsuperscript{135} See Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. 234, and Ibid. 217.
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Another basic difference between Ottoman and European clothes, according to Jirousek, was that in Europe from the fourteenth century onwards clothes had been tailored so as to reveal or stress the contours of the body and individual fit. In contrast, Ottoman clothes were shaped in a way to conceal the body. The Ottoman dress consisted of a basic shirt and baggy pant combined with layered coats, vest, jackets, sashes and headgear. According to Jirousek this basic style was not subject to major changes for centuries since the sixteenth century, even though traditional dress, as she terms is, was never static either, but differed substantially in the rate of change to mass-fashion. Yet, as I think it is important to emphasize, basic items of modern mass fashion also remain beyond changing fashions, as can best be seen in the permanence of the men’s standard suit. Fashion thereby is not just a taste-driven change but more crucially a socio-economic system. Thus, with the transition from the traditional to the mass-fashion system, following Jirousek’s terminology, the meaning of dress as well as its form changed. A significant example of a change in the fashion system in relation to social relations is the gendered meaning of dress. With the introduction of the mass-fashion system gendered appearances became polarized. In the Ottoman Empire this began in the eighteenth century, i.e. with the altered cut of the antari, its neckline becoming wide and deep and its upper part tighter. It was combined with a kind of extremely large headgear, and the silhouette thus produced resembled European bodies and headgear of the same period, as Jirousek demonstrates.

In the 1860s, the istanbulin as an Ottoman version of the frock coat appeared and spread especially among the civil officials. It had a shortened, popped collar and was, with variations, in use until the Republican period, while single-breasted frock coats with short turned town collars were still in use. Parallel to this, according to Nureddin Sevin, jacket and trousers became en vogue. Regarding European fashion, the models of Parisian and London tailors at that time appeared in Istanbul after five or six years. Sevin also discusses multi-colored redingots, which were popular during this period.

139 Jirousek, 'The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire,' 218; and Jirousek, 'Ottoman Influences in Western Dress.'
140 Jirousek, 'The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire,' 210; and Scarce, 'Principles of Ottoman Costume'.
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Koçu defines setire, setre, setri as "a term used for coats of European shape." That means setre designates different kinds of jacket, such as a frock coat or sports jacket, cut in a European style. The redingot in contrast was the frock coat which became fashionable in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdülhamid II. It was loosely cut and closed with two buttons before the breast, a second row of buttons just for embellishment. Its color was mostly black, sometimes grey, and it was combined with trousers of the same color and cloth. According to Koçu the gray redingot was exclusively worn by very rich Westernized men, thus denoting extravagance. The denotation of the wearing of gray as extravagant points to the adoption of late nineteenth century sober styles which made the slightest variation a marker of divergence. The redingot was combined with a vest and shirt. The istanbulin, introduced through the reign of Abülmeclid and worn also during Adülaziz' reign, was completely closed with buttons on the front. Koçu argues that it was specifically invented for those older Ottoman statesmen who had trouble getting used to the uncomfortable starched shirts with their stiff collars. Thus, the istanbulin with its closed front, was invented to prevent them from the wearing of starched shirts and collars as well as the necktie (boyunbaği).

In accordance with global trends of modern male fashion, during the Hamidian period Ottoman men's dress became more sober and less decorated, and European fashion had become widely established among the elites. This was also indicated by the abandoning of the istanbulin-style frock coat in favor of the redingot, which had closer resemblance to those worn in Europe: "The normal European frock coat (redingot), worn with vest, starched shirt, and necktie, took over [...]."

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144 “göğüsü iki düğme ile iklenip kapanır,” Ibid., 196. See entrance Redingot in Ibid., 196-197.
145 Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, 196.
146 Ibid., 134.
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4.4 Gender and Women’s Dress in the Late Ottoman Empire

Women of the Ottoman elite altered their dress significantly with modernization under the system of Western fashions. Different approaches to transcultural exchange between Ottoman and British women become apparent according to Reina Lewis’ study on the biographies of several women, British and Ottoman citizens, who engaged in practices of cultural cross-dressing. She stresses the great extent to which boundaries between imaginations of Orient and Occident were blurred by these practices or had already been blurred, as they never really existed as rigid boundaries, while at the same times these women reaffirmed binary constructions of East and West.

While Ottoman male styles basically adopted European clothing items, with some exceptions such as the istanbulin and the fez, the modernization of Ottoman women’s dress implied the “invention” of completely new items of dress or a reinterpretation of already existing ones. Nora Şeni depicts how the çarşaf appeared next to the ferace as an outer coat. It was a two-piece item that consisted of skirt and cape, and thus induced the transition to the wearing of a skirt, in contrast to the common wearing of baggy pants. And the entari/antari, a long blouse, was altered and became like its European counterpart thereby radically transforming Ottoman women’s dress as it enabled the use of a corset, an item of extensive controversy for its encroachment on the female body and morality. Women’s headdress was also affected by these changes. Among the upper and middle classes the hat become quite common; it was combined with a veil attached to it. Women’s wearing of the fez gave way to the new fashions, and ceased completely in favour of more fashionable headpieces. It appears that in women’s fashion the fez became

148 Despite the sartorial differentiation of religious communities Ottoman on legal grounds it is assumed that Christian, Jewish and Muslim women dressed similar, see Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Introduction, or Why and How One Might Want to Study Ottoman Clothes’, in Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 24.
149 Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism.
150 The ferace itself had a quite recent appearance. A fact that cautions to be careful about the view on the stable character of preindustrial styles, the changes that brought about not neglected. On the appearance of the ferace in the eighteenth century see Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Female Costumes in the Late Fifteenth Century’, in Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 87.
151 See Nora Şeni, ‘Fashion and Women’s Clothing in the Satirical Press of Istanbul at the End of the 19th Century’, in Women in Modern Turkish Society, ed. Şirin Tekeli (London und New York: Zed Books Ltd., 1991), 29; on the replacement of the ferace see Ibid., 31; On these kind of developments concerning Ottoman women’s dress in the nineteenth century see also Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism.
152 See Şeni, ‘Fashion and Women’s Clothing in the Satirical Press of Istanbul at the End of the 19th Century,’ 35.
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obsolete earlier than it did for men’s fashion, having never really acquired the meaning of an explicit marker of Ottoman modernity.\textsuperscript{153}

Lewis attributes specific significance to the wearing of the hat for both Ottoman men and women in the politics of dress and the appropriation of Western dress. While indoor dress had been Europeanized to a great extent, as several authors demonstrated, the wearing of the hat marked a different level since it came along with the gendered construction of space. While women's Western dress in public was mostly covered by some sort of overcoat, such as the ferace or carşaf, and even though these were already altered or even invented to accommodate the new styles underneath, the hat secured a different level of visibility, as Lewis asserts.\textsuperscript{154} She attributes a “synecdochial function” to the hat, for both the male and the female version. Thus, even though Ottoman men’s and women's dress both had been Westernized to a great extent, in public space it was staged differently. While women’s dress was equipped with a “Ottoman cover,” men's dress, even though it had some specificity, such as the İstanbulin, was fully Westernized in the streets as well as at home.\textsuperscript{155}

Because of this altering and accustoming of modern dress to Ottoman practices and styles, as Reina Lewis suggests, it might be more proper to talk of adaptation rather than adoption. Therefore, while European dress could be a vehicle to induce modernity, it is uncertain and parochial modernity that is produced. Lewis points out that European clothes, though adopted widely by both elite Ottoman men and women, “were already indigenized into the specialized protocols of Ottoman dress.” Thus the adaptation of European dress took place within connections between imperial European power and local powers, which encompassed patriarchies as well as class systems. Within these dynamics class positions were secured and established through “association with colonizing powers.”\textsuperscript{156}


\textsuperscript{154} Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism, 228.

\textsuperscript{155} Actually that is a question that needs further research, i.e. from autobiographies to see what kind of dress was sported for which occasions.

\textsuperscript{156} Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism, 6; that has been elaborated extensively regarding the Indian male elites by Sinha, Colonial Masculinity.
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4.4.1 Urban Jungles and Bourgeois Homes

The concept of borderland discussed in the previous chapter has been used in the field of women’s dress by Onur Inal, who draws on the example of port cities to reveal a mutual exchange of cultural goods between British and Ottoman women that transgressed the Westernization paradigm. Ottoman women adopted European fashions increasingly from mid nineteenth century on, and even before that styles had been altered due to contact. The adoption of Western dress occurred in a much more informal manner, contrary to men’s dress introduced by imperial decrees. And (upper and middle class) women used to wear hybrid styles with varying combinations of Ottoman and European pieces of dress in contrast to the almost complete Western style men. Notwithstanding, Ottoman dress was completely abandoned by the 1860s/1870s in certain social classes.

The change of consumption patterns in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire came along with a transformation of gendered spaces and gender relations. These transformations were triggered significantly during the Hamidian period. Elisabeth Frierson analyses the gendered meaning of these patterns and how they developed. She regards the 1890s as crucial in this respect because the main factors conditioning socio-economic transformations, the print sector, the education system and commerce, expanded exponentially during that period. These factors led to changing state-society relations in which basic terms of social interactions, such as the meaning of religion and its

158 See Anastasia Falierou, ‘Ottoman Turkish Women’s Clothing between Trade, Tradition and Modernity’, in From Traditional Attire to Modern Dress: Modes of Identification, Modes of Recognition in the Balkans (XVIth - XXth Centuries), ed. Constanța Vintilă-Ghițulescu (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publ., 2011), 175–93. On the global spread of the newest styles, in this case designed for females, and with it bourgeois identity from the fashion center Paris, where designers took their inspirations from local styles on a global scale see Kristin Hoganson, 'The Fashionable World: Imagined Communities of Dress', in After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, ed. Antoinette M. Burton (Durham, NC [u.a.]: Duke Univ. Press, 2003), 260–78.
159 The interrelation of modernization of dress and the reorganization of gendered spaces needs further study. Christine Ruane already remarked for the dress reforms of Peter the Great in the eighteenth century that these brought about a change in gender relations through a transformation of gendered spaces. In that case it meant the common socializing of men and women on certain occasions, that did not exist before. See Ruane, ‘Subjects into Citizens: The Politics of Clothing in Imperial Russia’.
160 Frierson concentrates on developments in Istanbul as example par excellence for these tendencies. See Elisabeth B. Frierson, ‘Gender, Consumption, and Patriotism: The Emergence of an Ottoman Public Sphere’, in Public Islam and the Common Good, ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden: Brill, 1971- 95 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2004), 99–125.
implications to determine social relations, became redefined. Unlike many accounts which stress the rigidity of Hamidian censorship and the conservative traits of Abdülhamid's regime Frierson pointed out that the print sector developed to a much greater extent than usually acknowledged, as did its readership, due to growing literacy rates.\textsuperscript{161}

Concerning gender identities, in this case women's identities, the education system made its contributions to change, too. Women on the one hand became better educated and were on the other trained for professional careers within the education system and beyond. In terms of consumption they became visible as consumers while they also took part in production through the professionalising of female skills, such as sewing and weaving, as well as in newly found factories and workshops. These women appeared in and shaped public spaces due to their employment in wage labor, and they represented transformed consumption patterns with their changing styles of dress. This new culture of display, promoted by new departments stores, which sold Western fashion, thus was a crucial part of the transformation of a gendered political economy. While men's fashion was characterized by a call to uniformity and drabness, the regulating emphasis on women's dress was put on modesty. Even though especially Muslim women did not openly display their latest Western fashions, their outerware was not untouched by these trends and it became distinctively embroidered, ornamented and colored. These were regarded by some forces and actors in society as transgressions of accepted boundaries, but interestingly Frierson shows that repressive interventions were mostly unsuccessful and women continued these clothing practices undeterred.\textsuperscript{162}

New styles of women's dress and the Westernization of dress in general had several economic effects that were also linked to gender relations. Female workforces and migrant workers provided a cheap workforce for the Hamidian regime to support and establish Ottoman textile enterprises to counter European dominance of the market. The textile sector also had close ties to the growing print market, especially illustrated by women's magazines, which promoted the newest fashions as well as the purchase of local products.

Within the domain of the home the modernization of dress and other items also shaped gender relations. With reorganization of space inside the house towards

\textsuperscript{161} See Ibid., 105.

\textsuperscript{162} Frierson objects the assumption that these modernized practices, such as dress, were restricted to a few elite women, but encompassed at least the middle classes. See Ibid., 116.
functionality and the spread of Western furniture the former *selamlik*, the space where men met with other men, was transformed into a living room where men and women of the house received their guest and appeared both “to present the best formal image available” braking partially with former gender segregation. Thus, the home could be both a public space for the presentation of the newest fashions and a private sphere where different dress codes might find expression.

In her comparison of Ottoman and Japanese adaptation of Western culture, Selçuk Esenbel especially focuses on dress and related codes of conduct and the home. According to Esenbel, in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, Japan in the Meiji period had an explicit program of encompassing Westernization to prove that the country was ‘civilized’ enough to obtain a revision of unequal trade treaties and thus restore sovereignty.

Nevertheless, similar to the Ottoman Empire, a critique of this approach to Westernization existed. Similar to the Young Ottomans’ critique of the Tanzimat politics as imposed by the West, the rising middle class in Japan criticized the Meiji bureaucracy for embracing standards set by the West. In Japan, another famous example from the nineteenth century, an edict issued 1872 had made Western clothing compulsory for government officials. Additionally, in 1876, the frock coat became a must for business men. The critique expressed by the Japanese middle class was especially directed towards the official Western garb of Meiji elite. This critique emerged after the Japanese-Russian War in which Japan regained national sovereignty, including the revision of the trade treaties with the West. One intellectual explicitly linked Western dress to emasculation by stating “we the Japanese can dispense with wearing the Western morning coat and its trappings and proudly wear our manly hakama again.”

In this quote it is striking that Fukuzawa Yukichi refers to dress worn in private

167 A traditional kind of trousers worn over the Kimono.
spaces, the morning coat, and he touches thereby one of the main difference between Ottoman and Japanese adoption/appropriation of Western dress. While Ottoman elites accomplished an almost full shift to Western dress inside the home for both men and women, in Japan it became widespread practice to wear fully Westernized dress outside the home and change into Japanese dress at home.

Nevertheless, if we return to the case of Orman katibi Mehmed Efendi, presented in Chapter Four who showed up in his entari combined with, allegedly, a hat, this hypothesis might be questioned. Either the entari here was a European morning coat, labelled as entari because of the resemblance and similar function of both, or he combined it within a mixture of private and public space because he was in his (temporary) home, where a public event took place, the theater play. I suggest that he felt very comfortable because it seems he just donned what he liked and what he would not have displayed in a different (public) space, that is, a morning coat, of whatever origin or belonging, along with a Western hat. Both items he would have usually not displayed in public, but as he felt himself at home at the hostel and display himself wearing these garments, he was undoubtedly surprised by the ensuing criminal prosecution of his dress.

Discourses about the dandy were closely related to a gendered perception of the city. While urban centres were often perceived as the centre of civilization, they were also the home of the laboring classes, which represented, in a racialized manner, the limits of the civilizing process. Hence, Christopher Forth argues, was the city racialized as the Other and gendered female, a “jungle” to be conquered by bourgeois men when strolling at night. Forth compares the nocturnal conquering of the towns by these men with the exploration of forbidden realms of their bodies. The dandy became the other side of the “public face of bourgeois masculinity.” Elif Bilgin, too, regards the interrelation of masculinity and modernity as crucial to the analysis of transformations in the realm of the public sphere. For her the modern notion of public space was constructed as a masculine space. Through the reorganization of space the public man became established through the figure of the flâneur and the stranger. Bilgin considers the Ottoman dandy a more precarious figure then his central European counterpart.

169 Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 61.
170 Ibid., 59.
flâneur generally walked on the edge of what was permissible and most of the time beyond. Even though the dandy was regarded as deviant from the norm in Western metropolis, too, she concludes that the Ottoman dandy’s perceived effeminate appearance had a different and greater political significance.  

In Britain, the new plain style that began to spread in the late eighteenth century became a demarcation line against women and foreigners, particularly the French. The new style meant in spatial terms also the exclusion of women from public space. Thus it was a style that symbolized male dominance with a new livery: “It was, of course, a style in which the distinction between the sexes, and between the spheres which the sexes should inhabit, was maximized. The men were drab, understated and powerful: the women fluffy, decorative and without a place in the public world. Men were fully covered, except for the head and the hands; at various periods, and on suitable occasions, women might display their shoulders and parts of the upper chest. […]” For Ross these divergent principles of male and female dress signified the exclusion of women from the world of business.

4.4.2 Sexuality

The gendered discourse on fashion not only reinforced binary gender categories but also produced perceptions of sexual deviance and the construction of the homosexual as an ontological category. Men’s preoccupation with dress became associated with male same-sex relations and passions. This discourse on sexuality contributed to the normalizing tendencies of the hegemonic discourse on masculinity of that period. Already with the dawn of the modern age luxury consumption had been linked also very closely to sexuality. Male consumers of luxury were imputed to exercise same-sex relations or other sexual acts regarded as deviant. Before the establishment of a notion of homosexuality men were accused of sodomy, which could comprise a variety more acts besides same-sex relations i.e. masturbation.

As Dror Ze’evi demonstrates the nineteenth century Ottoman discourse can be reinforced by the gendered discourse on fashion not only reinforced binary gender categories but also produced perceptions of sexual deviance and the construction of the homosexual as an ontological category. Men’s preoccupation with dress became associated with male same-sex relations and passions. This discourse on sexuality contributed to the normalizing tendencies of the hegemonic discourse on masculinity of that period. Already with the dawn of the modern age luxury consumption had been linked also very closely to sexuality. Male consumers of luxury were imputed to exercise same-sex relations or other sexual acts regarded as deviant. Before the establishment of a notion of homosexuality men were accused of sodomy, which could comprise a variety more acts besides same-sex relations i.e. masturbation.

As Dror Ze’evi demonstrates the nineteenth century Ottoman discourse can be

171 See Bilgin, ‘An Analysis of Turkish Modernity through Discourses of Masculinities’.
172 Ross, Clothing, 32.
173 Ibid., 37.
characterized by a silencing of sexually explicit utterances and same-sex practices.\textsuperscript{175} Thus even though sexuality is not explicitly mentioned in the discussions around headgear I suggest that what was engendered by that silencing was the production of a heterosexual masculine subjectivity in the course of nation-building via headgear. Therefore while talking about the construction of citizenship and belonging, interdependent relations of gender, sexuality and class were under negotiation. They can be found in the construction of bourgeois respectability, and one should not be irritated that they are not negotiated explicitly but are still deeply embedded in the struggle for an independent nation-state. The nation-state cannot be imagined without them.

I argue that the concern about headgear in this period was also rooted in concerns about the establishment of a respectable bourgeois masculinity. Thus, sexuality as a constituting factor should not be singled out or overemphasized; rather, it needs to be considered that “fashionable identities through the class determinants [...] also shaped the pattern of sexual discordance.”\textsuperscript{176} Concerning the dandy’s social position and the more general meaning of the dandy figure for the constitution of modern identity, Breward further argued that his

“ironic exposure of the eroticism and the arbitrariness of the commodity was itself a function of spending power and social status marked by the psychopathology of affluence, an affluence that touched the construction of masculine identities at all social levels. Thus the new figure of the homosexual, while attracting opprobrium for this presumed association with material excess and its inappropriate display, also reflected previously established anxieties regarding the connections between gender, class and consumption.”\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{175} Ze’e\textsuperscript{v}i, Producing Desire. On a position that critically reviews the historical study of sexuality in the Ottoman Empire see Serkan Delice, ‘Friendship, Sociability, and Masculinity in the Ottoman Empire: An Essay Confronting the Ghosts of Historicism’, New Perspectives on Turkey 42 (2010): 103–25, doi:http://dx.doi.org.595713270.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/10.1017/S0896634600005598.
\textsuperscript{176} Breward, The Hidden Consumer, 247.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 247. On homosexuality and urban life see Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West.
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4.5 Is there an Ottoman Dandy?

Mardin considered the Bihruz-Bey-syndrome, the Ottoman literary discourse on the
dandy, as a symptom of the disintegration of traditional cultures manifested in the
cleavage between conservative Muslim society and life-styles in the European quarters of
Istanbul, that is, between urban culture and rural society. Beyond this dimension of
conservative reaction to the urban dandy, Mardin regards conflicts within the Ottoman
elite, between Tanzimat grandees and the Young Ottoman generation, as an origin of the
dandy topos. The young Ottomans, he assesses, criticized the excessive consumption and
preoccupation with fashion of the Tanzimat reformers, who were busy confirming their
social position and displaying their wealth.

According to Mardin it was the lifestyles of these first generation of Ottoman
modernizers, and especially their children’s, which Ottoman novelists depicted as
decadent. It was common to display the dandies’ daily life as consisting merely of
preparations for promenading as, i.e., Recaizade Ekrem comments in his novel Araba
Sevdasi (Love for Carriages) on the young protagonist: “He dresses at the most expensive
tailor in town, he goes to town only to buy suits or to have a haircut.”178 To Mardin,
Ottoman novelists who mocked the dandy in contrast represented and promoted the
lifestyle of the lower middle class, a kind of puritanism characterized by “work and
thrift” and Ottoman nationalist aspirations. While the Ottoman dandy was imagined as a
cosmopolitan who might even deny his Ottoman identity, just like Felatun Bey in Ahmed
Mithat’s novel from 1876, who uses the name Plato to built his alter ego.179 Furthermore,
Mardin derives the Bihruz-Bey-syndrom from the political and economical structure of
the Ottoman Empire, the characteristic dichotomy between ruler and ruled with no
autonomous social powers such as urban middle classes. Thereby he designates the
Ottoman economic system as balanced by redistributive practices permeated from pre-
Selcukian times. Hence, conspicuous consumption, he concludes, throughout the
centuries, had generally been a virtually non-existing feature of Ottoman politics. These

178 Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century,’ 408. On
the satirizing of these alafrange male types in late nineteenth century Ottoman theater plays see Metin
179 The novel is called Felatun ile Rakım Bey after the two protagonists who each personify the ideal
negative or positive male ideal of the Young Ottoman novelists. See Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in
the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century,’ 406.
ethics had only been interrupted by the introduction of private property, accompanied by
the accumulation of wealth. The disdain of the urban dandies had, thus, Mardin assesses,
an anti-capitalist dimension and was an expression of protest by those who could not
profit from private property.\textsuperscript{180}

On the other hand Mardin acknowledges the quality of the urban dandy in his defiance
of social norms and the critique of social control towards subjects transgressing these
boundaries his practices entailed. Thus the “dislike to conform to the norms of the masses”
Mardin argues can be used to show problems of the secular versus religious dichotomy, since
critics of the dandy were not necessary religious reactionaries but modernist reformists.\textsuperscript{181} In
sum Mardin states that “the anti-Bihruz attitude [was] a tri-partite alliance of persons of
lower class origins who climbed up on the band-wagon of modernization, alienated members
of the elite – and to the extent that their attention was drawn – lower classes.”\textsuperscript{182}

Beginning with the 15th century Christopher Forth traces the construction of
modern masculinity in Western Europe with a focus on perceptions of the male body and
the way it was rendered problematic. Thereby, he assesses a fundamental tension
between modernity and masculinity, generated by the dialectic character of modernity
itself. The term \textit{crisis} is located in the centre of this ambivalent character, in which being
modern or civilized was perceived as effeminacy. The Ottoman discourse on the dandy
was part of this gendered discourse on civilization. The discourse of a crisis of
masculinity was recurrent in modernity because of the ambiguities produced by
modernity itself, expressed i.e. in the simultaneity of progress and decline endemic in the
double logic of modern civilization. Related to masculinity, this meant that modernity
simultaneously reinforced and destabilized representations of masculinity, as Christopher
Forth argues.\textsuperscript{183}

I regard Ottoman politics of dress as an expression of the “paradoxes that lurk at the
heart of modernity’s relations with masculinity and the male body.”\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{180} See Ibid., 422-423. According to Mardin, another interpretation is offered by Berna Moran, who sees
the dandy himself in his naiveté as a victim of greed for profit. Berna Moran, \textit{Türk Romanına Eleştirel
Bir Bakış: Ahmet Mithat’tan Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’a}, 7. baskı., vol. 1 ( Çağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim
Yayınları, 1998), 86.
\textsuperscript{181} Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century,’ 415 and
436.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 425.
\textsuperscript{183} See Forth, \textit{Masculinity in the Modern West}, 5.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 5.
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of masculinity in modernity was also a crisis of the (male) body, whose superiority was put at the basis of the argument for male dominance. Modernity was perceived as a loss of the virile male body, and modernization was an attempt to regain this perceived loss and “essentialized embodied masculinity becomes the object of loss and grief.” Various strategies were employed to restore this perceived loss of male dominance and power. Dress was used as a means to restore the male body as the centre of power. The notion of crisis metaphorically points to the body, Forth argued, in reference to Connell.186

The notion of crisis itself needs to be treated with caution. Evocations of a crisis of masculinity must be considered as techniques of patriarchy itself rather than a symptom of its dissolution, hence, a means to modernize male supremacy. Martschukat and Stieglitz remark that crisis is mentioned in relation to masculinity numerous times, that it appears to be almost permanent.187 The invocation of a crisis of masculinity reinforces a binary gender order and a heteronormative sexuality. While it polarizes male and female and essentializes gender differences, it also suggests an essentialized masculinity (and femininity). Thus, a hegemonic masculinity confirms its dominant position by marginalizing deviant masculinities with reference to the term of crisis. Thereupon, when treated with this in mind, the employment of the notion of crisis can be helpful to trace the becoming of essentialized notions of gender and their employment to counter claims of equality of marginalized groups, of women as well as marginalized masculinities. Thus the Ottoman dandy was trapped between countering European efforts to maintain colonialist hierarchies and the overlapping ambiguities of modern masculinity.

Elif Bilgin in her analyses of modernity and masculinity in the late Ottoman and Turkish context regards the literary Ottoman dandy as a unique cultural figure.188 She attributes the different perception and significance of the Ottoman dandy to the centrality of masculinity to a notion of modernity which was perpetuated here. Here, modernity was intrinsically in fusion with a masculinist centrality of culture, where masculinity was a

185 Ibid., 6.
186 See Ibid., 6.
187 Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz, Geschichte der Männlichkeiten, Historische Einführungen (Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verl., 2008), 64-69.
product of male activity.\textsuperscript{189} Therefore, feminine or effeminate appearance not only meant emasculation for this particular man and for Ottoman culture in general, but also being anti-modern. Thus, the overt display of modernity termed as over-Westernization became associated with being anti-modern. That was actually not different from the discourse in central Europe, but it might have implied a greater threat towards national sovereignty and independence. That means, if we follow Bilgin's argument about the specificity of the Ottoman dandy, that the symbolic meaning was similar but the (feared) consequences of that kind of behaviour might have been different.

Yet, the dandies appearing in the Ottoman discourse of masculinity are quite similar to the rising lower middle class clerks, referred to by Christopher Forth. Depicted as social climbers and newly rich, they also attempted to enhance and underline their status by consumption and the display of dress.\textsuperscript{190} Thus, the way the the Ottoman dandy was depicted through literature and caricatures might also have been an expression of the perceived threat to their status of more established ranks of the Ottoman social strata.

Berna Moran, in his analysis of late Ottoman novels also traces the dandy stereotype, and defines them as “Europeanized people who turned into admirers of the West.”\textsuperscript{191} He stresses that the Ottoman dandy was not a uniform figure, but one that changed according to political and social conditions, transposed differently in the respective author's vision as well. Moran mentions the literary figures Felatun, Bihruz and Meftun as three different manifestations of the dandy. Berna especially discerns a shift of the depiction of the dandy in Ottoman and later Turkish literature after 1914. While before, the dandy had been depicted as a victim of Western imperialism after 1914 he could use his Westernized identity and admiration for the West for his own profit. While they had been depicted as awkward fools before, now they became shrewd and scheming characters, as Moran assesses.\textsuperscript{192}

A main theme surrounding the dandy is conspicuous consumption, the way the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Bilgin, ‘An Analysis of Turkish Modernity through Discourses of Masculinities,’ 64.
\item See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 154.
\item “Tanzimat züppeleri zararlari kendilerine olan birer budala sayılır. 1914’ten sonraраКiler ise, göreceğimiz gibi çıkarıcı ve kurnazdırırlar. Alafrangalık onlarda para yapma olanakları sağlayan bir ziyiometdir (The Tanzimat dandies count in each case as fools giving harm to themselves. Whereas those appearing after 1914, as we will see, are selfish and shrewd. European manners are for them an attitude that ensures their profit).” Ibid., 67. On later dandy figure see also Anjaria in reference to Finn: Anjaria, "The Dandy and the Coup: Politics of Literature in the Post-1980 Turkish Novel, Üç Beş Kişî," 270.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
dandy deals with money. In the famous late Ottoman novels, the dandy owns a heritage which he spends thoughtlessly on luxury goods or looses because of his foolishness and credulity. Figuratively he represents Ottoman society which is fooled by European capitalism, personified by Ahmet Mithat in his novel Felatun Bey ile Rakım Efendi as “hatted inhabitants of Beyoğlu [başı şapkalı Beyoğlu ahalisi]” who themselves did not give in to the temptations of consumer culture present in their daily surroundings. Such thriftiness was rather more a bourgeois/middle class virtue than Ottoman tradition, as Mardin suggested it. The different types of dandies in Ottoman novels represent different approaches to modernization.\(^{193}\)

In terms of the changing cut of clothes towards the feature of the “Röhrenmensch” as scrutinized by Sabina Brändli, Moran makes a noticeable remark by mentioning the tight trousers worn by Felatun.\(^{194}\) Obviously, Ahmet Mithat regarded the close fit of trousers as a marker of a deviant masculinity. Remarkable, too, is that Moran stresses the similarity between Felatun and Rakım as contradicting types in Ahmet Midhat’s novel. Both were Europeanized men and the line between Ottoman dandy and Europeanized Ottoman were gradual, as might have been those between modern man and dandy in general. That is another hint to how close the discourse on the Ottoman dandy was to those in central Europe.

The congruence between central European discourses on masculinity and the topos of the Ottoman dandy is further underlined by Nurdan Gürbilek’s study on early Republican controversies about masculinity that elaborate on the the late 19\(^{th}\) century topos of the westernized dandy.\(^{195}\) Her analysis of the dandy and snob\(^{196}\) provides a link between the dandy in late Ottoman literature and the dandy figure in Western European literature. Similar to Moran Gürbilek traces the dandy's changing social position: From her analysis she concludes that in the late 19\(^{th}\) century Ottoman Empire the “superwesternized” 'dandy’ was constructed against the moderate Ottoman with his distinct (from “the West”) but modern identity, whereas the dandy of the Turkish Republic stood against a provincialized mass of Orientalized others.

Gürbilek considers Serif Mardin’s sociological approach insufficient to explain the

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194 Ibid., 41.
195 See Gürbilek, ‘Dandies and Originals’.
196 The snob is another urban male figure that appears in modern literature, very similar to the dandy. Gürbilek uses both notions interchangeable: See Ibid., FN 18.
predominance and reappearance of the dandy. Instead, she takes nationalist discourse into account and considers the dandy as an expression of the dilemma of the modern nationalist desire for originality, in which the dandy, next to the ‘unrefined provincial’ becomes the abject other of the original self. While the dandy epitomizes the incomplete, the distorted, and the foreign, the provincial embodies the failure to reach an authentic national self. Hence, both are despised. The dandy is always already ‘too’ Westernized while the provincial is a “man of primitive taste” who is not able to modernize.

In congruence with the developments of male identity Brändli analysed, Gürbilek locates the emergence of the derogative depiction of the dandy at the end of the nineteenth century. It appeared with the strengthening national movements and their search for authentic national identities. Young Ottoman authors, thereby, established the distinction between “Tanzimat snob” and national self, an artificial boundary in Gürbilek's account.\footnote{197 See Ibid., 603.} With its unsuccessful search for authenticity, which could never be reached, this “obsession with originality” had a consequence for male identity, since attempts to essentialize both the local and the foreign had been in vain.\footnote{198 Nurdan Gürbilek phrases this phenomenon as the “double deformation of the foreign and the local.” Ibid., 605.} Gürbilek convincingly points out that for modern men the choice could only be made between the pretentious snob and unrefined provincial, two faces of the same figure.\footnote{199 See Ibid., 621.} One was either too modern or helplessly provincial, a “man of primitive taste.” What is important in my case is that Gürbilek does not reduce this dilemma to the Ottoman case, but poses it as a modern dilemma in general,\footnote{200 See Ibid., 623.} similar to Forth's account of the problematic relationship of modernity and masculinity. Modernity with regard to gender, was conceived as the loss of real and authentic masculinity. Modern masculinity represents the dualism between self and other, while the poles sides of this binary, the ‘local’ and the ‘foreign’, are always already distorted, thus there never existed an original self or other. Thus the search for an original national self loses itself in the accusation against supposed imitation.

Gürbilek’s analysis provides the link between the problems discussed in my archival sources and the discourse on the dandy. They are both at the heart of the futile quest for an original modern national identity, which can never be found. It finds its expression in the ambiguity of signified and signifier and in their relationship. Both their meaning and
relations are continually redefined and escape attempts to fix their location. The attempt to
fix the meanings of certain items of clothing contains the impossible effort to essentialize
identities. As such the dandy is the modern figure par excellence, the embodiment of every
modern man, because the effort or attempt to be a modern man includes its failure, the
perception of either being too modern or provincial. This explains the similarity between
modern urban man and the dandy, such that between Felatun and Rakim Efendi, as
remarked by Berna Moran, and the similarity between Bihruz in the novel Carriage Affair
and its author Recaizade Ekrem. Gürbilek convincingly argues that his critique of Bihruz is
also a self-critique and the Young Ottoman generation and not a critique of an other
group, such as the allegedly decadent Tanzimat reformers. Recaizade and the literary
movement he founded, Servet-i Fünun, had themselves been criticized by Ahmed Midhat
and later authors for their alleged decadence, escapism, artificiality and rootlessness.
Therefore, Gürbilek assesses, the national self was not to be found in the romanticized
Turkish peasant but in the gap between dandy and the imagined authentic national self:

"Hence the Carriage Affair gives us the chance to think about the inevitable snobbism
not only of the Ottoman dandy, but also of the Turkish writer, critic, and reader,
since what is called Turkishness itself involves at the very origin the currently
irrevocable rift between a snobbish self and an authentic one, between an alafranga
self and an alaturka one."

The dandy stereotype hides the impossibility of being a modern and authentic self.
And it provides the illusion of the existence of an authentic national self. The hatred of
the dandy as inauthentic and unreal hides the fact that there is no authentic self. The
generation of the dandy stereotype was nonetheless essential to nationalist discourse. Its
creation was an expression of the desire of authenticity. Its existence “is the guarantee
for our feeling genuine ourselves.” In reference to Henri Lefebvre, Gürbilek argues that
the dandy is an example of the “consumption of signs,” as in Carriage Affair, where the
real protagonist is the carriage as an object of desire, as well as the modern novel. Both
are objects which are sought in order to be modern. The same is valid for the brimmed
hat, which perfectly represented both the desire to be modern and to be an authentic self.

201 See Ibid., 615.
202 Ibid., 616.
203 Ibid., 608.
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It was the sign of modernity and the desire for an authentic national self, and it explains why it was desired and despised viciously at the same time. Its adoption became a tool to close the gap between metropolis and periphery. Even though the Republican adoption of the hat was perceived as break with the Ottoman Empire, through the abolishment of the fez, as the marker of an Ottoman national self, it was a continuation of the late Ottoman discourse of the dandy as well as its nationalist politics of dress:

“And it is no coincidence that the dual identity called Turkishness, that bipolar modern self involving both the state of drifting toward the foreign ideal and the effort to go back to an original self, that desire to be another and the fear of loosing oneself in the other, is always preoccupied with exteriorizing the figures of the snob and the unrefined provincial in order to be autonomous and original itself.”204

Gürbilek relates the global dandy phenomenon, with reference to Rene Girad, to the global spread of desires and aspirations, next to the spread of capital, and the mimetic nature of all desire.205 Hence, the problem of mimicry and imitation was not just a problem of so-called belated modernity, but of modernity itself. The dandy, or the snob, expresses the desires of the modern self, not just in the late nineteenth century, because it is “the tasteless caricature of our own desires.”206 That also explains why it was often rather a literary figure than a real person.

The critique uttered towards the dandy relates to his ambivalent position towards modernity, which is at the same time an expression of the ambivalent position of masculinity and modernity. While creating an aristocratic odour, his existence comes along with modern consumer capitalism. According to Walter Benjamin, the urban flâneur, as a type of dandy defined through his relation with his urban environment, belongs to the margins of the bourgeois class as well as to the margins of the city.207 His uncertain economic position and uncertain political function made him a marginal figure in relation to the hegemonic bourgeoisie, yet emblematic of modernity.208 The dandy as

204 Ibid. 621.
208 See Gregory Shaya, ‘The Flâneur, the Badaud, and the Making of a Mass Public in France, circa 1860–
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flâneur was a familiar character in the nineteenth century and a immense body of literature exists on his appearance.209 The figure is central to a number of analysis of modern urban life and it was frequently used to “trace the class tensions and gender divisions of the nineteenth century city.”210

The difficulties of appropriating bourgeois habitus through dress becomes apparent in the comment of a British journalist, Edwin Pusg, in 1908. He mocks the efforts, in his eyes unsuccessful, of a young working class man to appear fashionable. Even though this person possessed “suitable clothes for any occasion”211 he was not able to perform to the journalist's expectations, since his appearance “reeked of cheapness”212 and he was “blind to those fine shades and delicate nuances of costume and speech and deportment.”213 As such, Pusg considered his performance unconvincing and felt disturbed by his public presence.

Ottoman dandies had with other, i.e. Parisian, dandies, their uncertain class position in common. A characteristic of the masculinity demarcated as dandy is that it aspired to a different (always superior?) social position than it actually inhabited. That makes them the focus of critique by those who already possess this social position (of power) and thereby are attempting to preserve their privileges. Yet, to consider the transgression of respectability as a resistance against social norms, one needs to proceed with caution, as Forth himself points out in the conclusion of his chapter. It was part of the dominant discourse to assess civilizational behaviour as a kind of veneer underneath which other, abjected forms of masculinity regularly appeared. These breakthroughs could be an affirmation of masculinity to the same degree as respectable gentlemanly conduct:214

“That the stereotypically muscular and coarse masculinity of the warrior, proletarian or peasant is often presented as more ‘authentic’ than that of the bourgeois does not necessarily upset the social system that allows the latter to exercise power in a more general and effective sense.”215

209 See Ibid., 47.
210 Ibid., 47.
214 See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 151-152.
215 Ibid., 21.
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That underlines that the dandy can be or is a hegemonic figure in spite of his rhetorical degradation. Actually, the dandies’ hegemonic position is underestimated or misjudged, blurred or distorted.

4.5.1 Late Ottoman Masculinities

Carter Findley recognizes the integrated position of the dandy as an embodiment of an overtly modern figure. He exemplifies three male types of intellectual orientations and respective masculinities in the late Ottoman Empire: The mystic Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil, who exemplifies the marginalization and transformation of Muslim mystic identity and practices; the literary figure Ali Nizami, as another Ottoman dandy figure; and the renowned statesman İbrahim Hakki Paşa as a prominent representative of a new post-Tanzimat generation of the Ottoman elite. While all three are modern figures, Findley puts emphasis on internal Ottoman dynamics at the modernization of identity, next to the impact of Western European ideas.

Findley attributes the genesis of these male types to an imbalance between four major strands of Islamic learned culture: religious studies, mysticism, the philosophical scientific tradition and a worldly literary culture. This imbalance appeared, according to Findley, throughout the nineteenth century Ottoman reform process, where the latter, the adab tradition, “extended its scope of worldliness towards the West.” Scribal officialdom, which was attached to this literary culture with its manifold functions, created a cultural dualism that came with the introduction of Western ideas, but which developed its own dynamics. Civil officials as the successors of the pre- and early Tanzimat scribal service consequently became the vanguard of political and intellectual innovation, which had far flung consequences for the texture of Ottoman society, as Findley elaborates in his social history of this social strata. The three male types introduced by Findley exemplify this transformation and thereby provide insight into late Ottoman constructions of masculinity.

Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil (1823-1910) was an Ottoman official who Findley characterizes as more dervish than official, given his life-style. While working for the

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216 See Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, 174-209.
217 Ibid., 174.
Ministry of War he pursued manifold mystical religious and magical practices which, according to modern standards, looked superstitious and thus outdated. Throughout his lifetime he associated with several mystical orders, among the Mevlevi and Nakşibendi as the ones he was attached to most firmly. In Findley’s words

“Aşçı Dede was a spiritual denizen of the “tangled magic garden”, and one valuable point about his memoirs is the proof they offer that a mid-level civil official could find it habitable as late as the beginnings of this century.”

Findley does not conceptualize this mystic as the other of modernity even though he lived in a world not acknowledged by it. He was a type in the emerging modern Ottoman world which did not survive the developments to follow and became a stereotype against which modernity projected itself until well after it had ceased to exist. “In-between the worlds” is the characterization Findley offers for an already well known figure, the Ottoman dandy. For him the super-westernized over-privileged Ottoman elite men, with their excessive consumption habits, were insufficiently modernized. To Findley, despite their lavish display of Western goods and habitus they did not embody/represent Western power and dominance but rather a failed (Ottoman) modernization. They were just the spendthrifts (mirasyedi) of their fathers’ achievements, on material and cultural terrain as much as the embodied the perceived failure of the Tanzimat bureaucrats as a whole by consolidating their power on the cost of Ottoman society and maybe also the Ottoman state.

The dandy depicted by Findley is Ali Nizami, a figure from a novel written by Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar, as late as 1952 which provides an idea of the persistence of the dandy motif in Ottoman-Turkish literature. Findley labels Ali Nizami as “Playboy and Şeyh,” who he counts, in reference to Şerif Mardin’s analysis, among the group he terms “frenchified playboys (alafranga çelebiler).” Like the figures analyzed by Mardin, Ali Nizami has a passion for fashion expressed in his vast collection of canes and shoes.

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218 Ibid., 184.
220 I would rather translate this as “Europeanized gentlemen,” since frenk was used in Ottoman for European in general, fransiz would be French in turn. And çelebi in my perception does not have the pejorative connotation of the notion playboy. I think this more neutral translation of the term leaves more for an encompassing analysis of the dandy phenomenon.
Interesting is the turn in his fortune, which is not the obligatory bad end which commonly “cultural rootless” dandies suffer in this genre but rather his reorientation from consumerist spendthrift to piety and self-proclamation as şeyh. Of course, considering his dandy nature, that does not bring him back to his roots, which seem to be lost forever, but it is a step towards losing his mind. His desperate search for consolation from his mental suffering leads him to fatalism, “Muslim resignation (müslüman teveküllü),” and from there to a mental asylum.\(^{221}\)

Even though the novel was written in 1952, it can be considered as the continuation of the late 19\(^{th}\) century Ottoman novels, employing very similar topoi. Important for my further analysis of the dandy is the equation of excessive Westernization and consumerism with Muslim fatalism, both set in contrast to a nationalist worldview, which propagated a different concept of identity. Another point I find striking is that the dandy again only appears as a literary figure, in contrast to the more real sufis, Islamists and eminent statesmen.

This latter kind is personified in Findley’s last examples, the Ottoman Paşa İbrahim Hakkı, who embodies “new ideas, new roles and a new man.”\(^{222}\) He represents the hegemonic type of masculinity contrasted to the Islamic mystic and the Westernized dandy as presumably abjected figures, a “new personality type in elite circles.”\(^{223}\) İbrahim Hakkı was the civil official Westernizer devoid of the negative connotations of the dandies’ attitudes. He belonged to the successor generation of the Tanzimat bureaucrats and did not carry the attributes of corruption and failure ascribed to them. Yet he was still part of Ottoman culture in the sense that he bore the characteristics of the Ottoman scribal caste in a modernized mode, in his intermediate state between administrative, political and intellectual functions and activities. He embodied Ottoman authority in a modernized version: “He, too, was rotund and bewhiskered, as a statesman had to be in those days, but in a fairly dapper, up-to-date way.”\(^{224}\) His habitus transgressed the beliefs of Ottoman conservatives but was not suspicious in the sense of excessive modernization. What disturbed conservatives about his behavior was his easy-going movement in public space in defiance of a pride of place, which the former regarded as a sign of Ottoman

\(^{221}\) Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 193-194.  
\(^{222}\) Ibid., 195.  
\(^{223}\) Ibid., 198.  
\(^{224}\) Ibid., 198.
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decay.225 Yet, from another point of view he was the type to rescue the Ottoman state, not to ruin it, like the dandy (or the mystic in his superstition). One of his outstanding characteristics which secured him these qualities was his Ottoman education. Unlike many other Ottoman bureaucrats who studied abroad or at foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire, as I have depicted above, his career was a result of recently established Ottoman educational facilities. After he graduated in 1882 from the school of administration (müلكيye) he began his career in several state offices until he finally became Grand Vizier in 1909, as the first alumni of that school. Before he had been the first Ottoman in the position of legal counselor of the Sublime Porte and thus co-director of the Legal council of the Foreign Ministry, a position previously occupied by foreign experts. In addition to his official posts he worked as teacher at the Law school and school of Commerce and as author of extensive treatises unique to Ottoman legal history.

Where are the Laz sailors located within this typology of late Ottoman masculinities? The most outstanding feature here is their socio-economic position. In contrast to the male identities presented by Findley, the sailors did not belong to the elite. Remarkable to a similar extent is their subjectivity in relation to modernity. The dismissal of Laz sailors and their exclusion from urban space took place within the setting of dress as sign of civilized behavior and modern masculinity. With their rejection of the military uniform, they did not behave in accordance with what Honeyman termed a desire for conformity expressed in the standard suit or military attire.226 Ottoman elites and other modern men might have aspired the bodily features of the Laz sailors, but despised their “uncivilized” behavior. Their manpower became considered useless for the Ottoman army without the qualities of a modern disciplined body.

Yet, modern clothing also brought about its pitfalls. The interventions made by the Ottoman authorities concerning headgear treated in the previous chapters and the

225 Did his “egalitarianism” go as far as sympathy with anarchist thought? According to his record in Son Sadrazamlar he visited an anarchist conference in Rome, even though that seems hard to imagine. See Ibid., 197 2nd paragraph and FN 96 on the same page and Findley’s reference to Ali Çankaya, Müلكiyet Tarhi ve Mülikiyetler (Ankara: Örnek Matbaası, 1954); on his life see also İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1950). Findley on egalitarianism in Ottoman politics: “The social framework in which Ottomans attempted to apply the policy of egalitarianism was thus unstable – in a way not noted in policy statements, demography altered perceptions of interest that the administration should represent.” Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, 35. Findley suggested that discourses on political participation in the late Ottoman Empire took place under the ground of shifting social framework which also changed perspective on what he called egalitarianism.

226 See Honeyman, ’Following Suit,’ 428.
controversies about men’s consumption habits and their relation to fashion are linked to each other by the discourse of modern masculinity. Şerif Mardin's analysis shows the difficulty to grasp the dandy phenomenon, its meaning and the social position of the dandy. If the Ottoman critics of the dandy promoted the lifestyle of the lower middle class, it seems much more plausible, as Gürbilek argues, that the critique of the dandy was much more a self-critique as much as a critique of the Tanzimat grandees and their representative lifestyles. They mocked their own aspirations for social advancement and the flaws the adaptation of a modern bourgeois habitus brought about. Hence, a common feature of the dandy was social mobility: The dandy pretended to be someone he is not, but aspired to be. While he might be from various social backgrounds, the common feature is that of imitation of social elites.

Nonetheless, the common appearance of the dandy as a literary figure also shows that his appearance more generally epitomizes the ambiguous relation between masculinity and modernity. While in the Ottoman Empire men's effeminization was related to excessive Westernization and the threat of European imperialism, there are many similarities to the European dandy. Modernity and modernization were regarded as a threat to virility. Western (Metropolitan) European and Ottoman discourses are linked by concerns about consumption, which explains the importance of clothing as one of the most important items of modern mass production. All dandies had in common that they were accused of excessive consumption, which was considered as a female trait.
5 After the Young Turk Coup d'Etat: National versus Modern Hats?

Since 1904/5 the oppositional movement in the Ottoman Empire gathered momentum from the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war and its implications for anticolonial movements, which the historical defeat of the European imperial powers brought about. The subsequent Russian revolution and other constitutional movements inspired the Ottoman oppositional groups as well. In July 1908, a group of young officers of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), also known as Young Turks, challenged Sultan Abdülhamid's autocratic regime by a coup d'etat. The sultan finally had to give in to their claims to restore the constitution and reconvened the parliament. The new regime was confronted with an armed insurrection in April 1909, spearheaded by the religiously conservative Ittihad-i Muhammedi (Muhammeden Union), but carried out by different fractions of the opposition. The CUP succeeded in suppressing the mutiny with the dispatch of the so-called Action Army (Hareket Ordusu). Subsequently Sultan Abdülhamid II. was deposed and replaced by his brother Mehmed V., the revolt providing an excuse to get rid of him, even though it seems he himself had not been a driving force behind the uprising. The period following saw a great number of legal amendments, with a huge number of new laws and regulations, such that it’s considered a new period in Ottoman legal culture. This chapter traces the question of the transformations brought about by the Young Turk seizure of power, investigating its implications on the politics of dress and how these were related to discourses and contingent transformations of gender.

3 The 1889 foundation of the İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti (Ottoman Unity Society) by students of the Military Medical College is generally assumed to be the first organizational attempt of the Young Turk movement. It was later named İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP). See M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 195. Eligible for vote of the vote of secondary voters of the new parliament were taxpaying men from twenty-five and older, see Ibid., 195.
4 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 197.
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5.1. Young Turk Coup d'Etat and its Implications on the Politics of Identity and Difference

Even though the Young Turk period did not bring about dramatic transformations of gender hierarchies, debates about “women's place” in society intensified and became institutionalized. Women's organizations and women's modernized identity became a target of satire, whereby modern Western dress became a symbol of social disorder and (Ottoman) decline. That was again not an Ottoman singularity but, as Palmira Brummett underlines, a phenomenon that appeared as a point of critique in the western European press as well. The advent of mass fashion and with it department stores became, from a nationalist point of view, an expression of moral degradation and with it the supposed decay of patriarchy.⁵

Nonetheless, the satirical press analyzed by Brummett neither considered the old regime, epitomized by Abdülhamid's regime, nor the new Young Turk's as a cure to Western European imperialism. Fashion satire illustrated this view in the juxtaposition of military uniform and three piece suit, the first considered as symbol of the failure of Ottoman military reform and the latter as sign of Ottoman surrender to Western cultural imperialism”⁶. The satirical press saw in the Young Regime a continuation of the old regime in new clothes, which was civil Western dress.

The colonial context was ever present in this period's satirical press in such a way the domestic issues were always interpreted in relation to a “possible colonial outcome.”⁷ Considered as a threat to social order from a 'foreign' force, the relations between foreign and indigenous became negotiated in terms of gender. In Brummett’s words, the treatment of gender relations in Ottoman satirical press were a “subset of the larger question of the Empire in the world and the place of the Ottomans in Western society.”⁸ Hence, those factions of the satirical press that uttered concerns about the destabilisation of gender hierarchies under the Young Turk regime feared that this would sweep away

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⁷ Ibid., 257.

⁸ Ibid., 220.
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the last reminders of the old stabilizing order, which in itself was considered a reason for decay. Here, European imperial threat was used as an argument to preserve existing gender hierarchies which were imagined as essential to the restoration of Ottoman sovereignty. Thereby “fashion became [or rather continued to be] an implement of critiques of European imperialism and the social ills and cultural transformation contingent upon it” and the “struggle for control of the symbolic repertoire was distilled into images of dress that bespoke allegiance and identity without words.”

In her analysis of a caricature from August 1909 Brummett suggests that modern styles were at that time peux a peux diffused down through different levels of Ottoman society and not restricted to a very small elite anymore, yet that still had its limits. Fashion satire often considered fashionable European dress as a sign of collaboration with imperialist powers. Yet it also had a positive image as a marker of success since being fashionable and modern could also mean being progressive, civilized, enlightened and having a share in world power, as Brummett states. Fashion satire targeted members of the elite, men as well a women, and specifically members of the government for the consumption of European goods and services. For the skeptics of these practices Western fashion meant the personification of the Western victory. And also on the economic level excessive consumption of fashion became increasingly regarded as anti-national. Shrinking or rare national resources were spent on the latest dress styles and not for the well-being of the nation, as the arguments ran.

Fashion satire continued to mock the dandy that had made his appearance in the late nineteenth century Ottoman novels. According to Brummett, cartoon satire expressed concern at the “dandification of Ottoman society,” by which it meant the subordination under European imperial dominance. One figure which personified that

9 Ibid., 221.
10 Ibid., 222.
11 See Ibid., 226.
12 Brummett is contradictory with her utterances about the targets of Ottoman fashion satire, stating first that mainly elites and especially members of the government were criticized, and later argues that in contrast to French/European satire not the critic of the ruling class but of foreign domination was prominent, see Ibid., 221 and 255.
13 The topos of the dandy continued into the Young Turk Period not just in satire related to fashion but also in a more general sense. Two examples Brummett mentions are poems published Kalem and resp. Alem, published 1908 and 1909: Alem 2, 11 and 28 August 1324 (September 10th, 1908); Kalem 2: 11 and 28 August 1324 (October 1st, 1908), see Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 64.
14 Ibid., 64.
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image was Chic Bey. He incorporated the threat of European cultural hegemony which sold out the motherland in the name of progress.\textsuperscript{15} The satirical press set Chic Bey in contrast to the gazi warrior, the hero of the frontier as an epic heroic figure representing Ottoman military success and dominance.\textsuperscript{16} Female figures in traditional dress appeared in the revolutionary satirical press as allegories for the honor of the nation, as symbols of resistance and patriotism and as territories owned by men.\textsuperscript{17} Dressed in bourgeois modern fashion women were often associated with “subordination, consumption and dishonor.”\textsuperscript{18} Modern fashionable women were illustrated as traitors, opposed to women in traditional garments as a victims of imperialist aggressors. The Ottoman state or parts of its former or present territory were often depicted in female allegories, European imperialist states as male figures.

Nevertheless, the polarizing symbolism was not unequivocal. Ottoman cartoonists interpreted the dualism of modern and traditional in manifold ways. Some saw this as a dilemma not as an opposition between evil and good, but rather between the choices “prisoner of the harem” and “fashion slave.” Brummett underlines that while European styles were sometimes used as a markers of subordination and dishonor, they could in other cartoons as well appeared as a symbol of progress and success, and of European education, which provided the individual with privileges. The depiction of traditional clothing ranged from associations with resistance and anti-imperialism to reaction/conservatism.

Headgear in these representations plays a predominant role, especially for women, as they wear enormous hats while men are often bareheaded, sometimes wearing a peaked cap. It seems that the wearing of hats was much more common in the depiction of women than for men. This suggests a different symbolic meaning for women’s and men’s hats. Might it be that for women the hat was more an embellishment while for men it was more an indicator of status? Was the hat for women an indicator of individualism, of fashionability, while for men it was a homogenizing item, an item of national belonging?

\textsuperscript{15} See Ibid., 221.
\textsuperscript{16} See Ibid., 221. See also Kafadar and his elaboration of Ottoman frontier society which formed Ottoman statehood in its foundation period. Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1995).
\textsuperscript{17} Here, in accordance with Yuval-Davis study on gender and nationalism, female figures were depicted in the satirical press as symbolic border guards of the national, Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation, Politics and Culture (London [u.a.]: Sage Publ., 1997).
\textsuperscript{18} Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 247.
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Or what else could have been the difference between (Ottoman) women's and men's hats?

In regard to hats it strikes me that hats were an outstanding marker of modern fashionable women. Many of them are shown with enormous hats while modern men often depicted next to them wear a fez or no headgear. Did these depictions imply a critique that women went even further than men regarding modernization? Or was it a sign that modernization of women was regarded as more problematic, or that the hat for women meant something else and modernization took a different form for females than it did for males? I think the latter is true, while it does not exclude the other options. What is also striking is that in the archival sources, more often men are exhorted for wearing hats. And also in sum there are more documents speaking against men wearing hats. There are some decrees and maybe other documents which interdict in women's dress but none is exclusively on headgear.

Brummett mentions two items which were typically included in the depiction of modern fashionable women which were plumed hats and ubiquitous parasols. What did these items specifically express or mean. Coming back to the fact that women were more often depicted with hats, it opens up to questions: were hats for women more in vogue and were they more accepted than hats for men (even though they were criticized), and finally was it more common for women to wear hats than it was for men? Was that because national identity was constructed and thought as male and therefore the fez, as an expression of Ottoman national identity was much more important to keep than traditional women's headgear since the fez not only expressed Ottoman identity but also Ottoman national autonomy and modernity at the same time. An example of the depiction and problematization of a woman wearing a hat appeared in December 1909 in the periodical Kalem: A man refused to take his wife to the theater unless she took off her huge flowered hat.\(^{19}\) It needs further study to what extent that was similar or differed from male fashions and their moral assessment.

Transgression of dress codes was also a transgression of social boundaries of gender order. The appearance of modern dress stood in interrelation to the construction of modern public space and was often associated with the entering of women into public space.\(^ {20}\) Brummet points out that the question of fashion was linked to questions of space and

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19 See. Ibid., 228.
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gender: “the same women who advocated Western dress were often depicted as violating political and social boundaries. They represented the possible encroachment of women into previously male-only spheres.”

Deviation in dress marks the transgression of boundaries, that means wearing a certain kind of dress simultaneously constructs space. Actually Ottoman spatial order was confused by the modernization of dress. That entailed not just discussions about women’s rights and entering into public sphere, but also the construction of a new heteronormative gender order, as analyzed by Afsaneh Najmadabi for the Iranian case.

Modernized patriotic men directed their desire towards the nation, imagined as a female. Spousal affection was a crucial element of nationalism as it was an analogy to the love of the country. Love for the homeland was conditioned by mutual affection of the heterosexual married couple, or by romantic love in general. Women magazines discussed compassionate marriage and egalitarian gender relations.

According to Findley “the desire for new gender roles and enlarged possibilities for women was not limited to the radical Westernizers” but included also conservative authors, who with their imaginative literary works contributed to socio-political change.

In terms of socio-political organization and gender relations in the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic a crucial aspect repeatedly treated is the transformation of the Ottoman household into the nuclear family as the smallest unit of social and political organization. Regarding gender hierarchy Nükhet Sirman has framed this transformation as the transition of patriarchal power from the father to the husband. It came along with the claim of male members of the rising middle class as heads of small households to equal status. Beyond equality between middle class men, the status of (bourgeois) women became an issue up from mid 19th century with the appearance of an Ottoman women’s movement in the 1860s.

21 Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 - 1911, 252.
22 Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 2005).
23 See Ibid., 184.
24 Findley discusses Ahmed Mithad’s and Fatma Aliye’s works within this framework and employs them to argue that transformation of gender relations was desired by so-called Westernists as well as conservative authors. Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1989). 190.
26 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity.
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One of the main issues of middle class men's claim for equality was spousal choice, as a major element of the reproduction of huge households. It mingled with women's own claim for equality but did not question male dominance in general, as it came along with the shift of power from father to husband as the head of household. Many studies have treated the modernization of patriarchy and the emergence of the modern housewife with it.  

Findley, hence, situates the emergence of the Ottoman women's movement parallel to the emergence of bourgeois self-consciousness, parallel to the growing women movements in western Europe. Specificities of the Ottoman case lay in the status of Ottoman/Muslim women who, in contrast to European/Christian women, i.e. had the right to own property, and thus enjoyed a somewhat different status.

The question of spousal choice was closely related to rising middle class consciousness, as it was in the Ottoman case. Thus, while the house as a unit of production and consumption gradually disappeared, gender relations became reorganized towards the ideal of the conjugal couple, mostly within the terms of clearly defined hierarchical gender relations. To the same extent that relations between individual members of the nation were imagined as equal, and nationalist ideology used as a cover for existing socio-economic differences, spousal relations became imagined as a unit of mutual affection rather than an institution of patriarchy. Sirman relates reconsiderations of gender to Partha Chatterjee's suggestions on the (re-)construction of authenticity that came along with the anxiety of losing national sovereignty.

Social realities reflected a trend towards small households already within the Hamidian period, at least in Istanbul. Muslim middle class households consisted of nuclear families to a huge proportion, whereas extended households constituted only a minority. Prosperous Istanbul families' households consisted of three or fewer members according to the 1885 census; in 1907, they numbered 46 percent. Less then three percent were polygynous in 1885. And of 16 percent of extended households in 1907 less then

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27 Patriarchal household as the basic unit of the state: "[...] the codification of the patriarchal households the basic unit of property and administration further facilitated social control." James C. James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*, Yale Agrarian Studies Series (New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2009), 67.


29 See Ibid., 181.

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four percent were grand multigenerational ones. The rest included just the widowed mother of the husband as an additional member.31

Duben and Behar traced changes in family and gender relations from the mid-nineteenteenth century to the 1930s based on demographic material, Ottoman Turkish periodicals and novels.32 Drawing on demographic data Alan Duben and Cem Behar observed a very early transformation from huge households to small family units in Istanbul. Independent from class marriage and fertility patterns differed greatly from that of the rest of the empire with relatively late and equal marriage ages of both men and women and few children.33 Nevertheless, they consider these demographic patterns central to transformations of the whole Empire/Republic. They compare demographic data with ongoing discussions about the modern bourgeois family.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, modernization came along with a perceived crisis of male identity and dominance. These concerns came to the surface in the discourse about transformations of the family. What was perceived as a crisis of male virility came along with concerns about women's morality, which allegedly loosened with the vanishing grip of patriarchal control over sexuality.34 Behar and Duben, in their analysis of Ottoman periodicals, assess that a perception of the dissolution of the traditional household or family appeared only after 1910. It was connected to the perceived loss of fatherly authority and a shift towards arrangements between conjugal couples. Yet, that left “domestic gender roles,”35 as they term it, untouched. The sexual division of labor was the core of the modern family. Worries about the spread of female immorality through modernization came along with the concern that women might refuse to perform housework. Thus, similar to the perceived crisis of masculinity, the discourse on the crisis of the family functioned to stabilize hierarchical gender relations

31 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 181.
33 Also demographical studies of rural areas suggest the organization of most households around nuclear families, see Donald Quataert, 'Ottoman Women, Households, and Textile Manufacturing, 1800-1914', in Shifting Boundaries: Women and Gender in Middle Eastern History, New Haven, ed. Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), 162. He argues that in rural Anatolia no more then 30 percent of all households were multiple family households.
34 See Duben and Behar, Istanbul Households, 199.
35 See Ibid., 199.
and a gendered division of labor, with a confinement of women to household and child rearing duties, even though WW I led to the employment of many women outside of the house. Also the modern concept of romantic love was considered a threat to traditional social order, where arranged marriage were considered a guarantor of its persistence. In public debate, Duben and Behar locate the first appearance of the issue of women’s rights in the 1860s in the magazine *Terakki.* The discourse emerging from there did not entail, as I stated before, the questioning of prescribed gender roles, but rather established separate gendered spheres of labor and identity.

Even though the conjugal couple appeared as an ideal of Ottoman reformers and authors, female seclusion as a characteristic of elite Ottoman households constituted a problem for the modern appearance of Ottoman men in the eyes of European observers as well as in their own critiques. The appearance of modern living rooms in bourgeois homes entailed common socializing of men and women. Yet, while the interior of Ottoman elite household changed, high ranking Ottoman men generally preferred to appear without their spouses at social events, whereas Europeans in the Ottoman Empire would appear with their wives. Thereby Ottoman man lacked a major element of male bourgeois respectability and status which entailed a ‘well-chosen’ wife who was able to pass the requirements of bourgeois sociability. Thus, Ottoman men of letters demanded a Western education for girls and women not just for the sake of equal rights, but as a necessity to achieve bourgeois identity and status. That means, while women where kept away from social events out of considerations of female modesty and seclusion, their husbands also were concerned about their lack of bourgeois etiquette, which prevented them from bringing their wives along. The combination of these factors led to the persistence in the division of elite homes between *selamlik* and *harem*, where the former became a bourgeois living room in function and appearance and the harem became its ‘oriental’ counterpart.

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36 Ibid., 214.
38 Serkan Delice comments on the appearance of women in public space: "It is my contention that there is a persistent in-betweeness and anxiety in these narratives which oscillate between idealization and denunciation of the increasing visibility of male-female relationships in public space." Serkan Delice, 'Friendship, Sociability, and Masculinity in the Ottoman Empire: An Essay Confronting the Ghosts of Historicism', *New Perspectives on Turkey* 42 (2010): 103–25, doi:http://dx.doi.org.595713270.eur.sbb.spk-berlin.de/10.1017/50896634600005598, 120.
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With the shift from Hamidian to the Young Turk period, Brummett, in a study on the relations of gender and empire, concludes that perceptions of gender had not been fundamentally altered. Drawing on studies that emphasize the continuity between both periods, she assesses, that empire was still a major point of reference and the resurrection of its order, or a supposed traditional order, was considered a guarantor of the resurrection of the Empire’s glory. She bases her study on a re-evaluation of three models of Ottoman modernization with regard to gender: One account that assumes the Ottoman society and state as backward and unable to modernize; the other is based on the assumption that Ottoman society was in the process of modernization, though it was conditioned by certain factors such as imperialism; while the third consisted of the assumption of Ottoman exceptionalism, based on the belief of moral superiority of the East. The latter is the model favored by Brummett in terms of prevalent notions of Empire, where Ottoman female chastity made up for the losses in terms of Ottoman imperial power. Brummett regards a specific understanding of gender as the basis for Ottoman exceptionalism, which was the framing of imperial glory and superiority within a notion of honor which contains female sexual modesty. While this is not very different from Partha Chatterjee’s account on the Nation and its fragments, where he shows that cultural specificity is gendered female and put at the core of national identity, Brummett also emphasis that discourses about gender were class-based in the first place. During the Young Turk Period, she argues, empire was the political unit which was the point of reference. Nevertheless, I think it is important to note that notions of empire might have shifted during the course of time, and that especially the appearance of forms of modern governance might have changed the character of power and domination in the Ottoman Empire significantly.

In terms of shifting concepts of gender Brummett argues, together with other authors, that the Hamidian and Young Turk period were linked cultural visions as well as

39 See Palmira Johnson Brummett, ‘Gender and Empire in Late Ottoman Istanbul: Caricature, Models of Empire, and the Case for Ottoman Exceptionalism’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 2 (23 November 2012): 283–302.
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institutional changes. Concerning dress she refers to Nancy Micklewright, who assumes that most changes in dress already took place between the 1830s and 1860s. Throughout the Hamidian period, she argues, concepts of gender culture and space had became reorganized through institutions of female education, the women's rights movement, newspapers and advertising directed to women, new technologies which brought about newly gendered dress, and gendered entertainment, as well as common socializing of men and women in activities such as skating and theater. These developments led to the rearticulation of gender simultaneously to the desire to restore the old order and with it the Empire's glory. For Ottoman reformers, women's advanced social status was at the same time a measure of the progress of the state, as women's chastity and moral purity a guarantor of the perseverance and strength of the Ottoman state. Were these seemingly contradictory views two sides of the same coin? How did the discourse on women's chastity and women's progress relate to each other? Was the progress of women associated with the nation and their chastity with Empire? What can be said without doubt is that the household and the family were a basic site of modernization and stood in close interrelation to concepts of gender and the state.

5.2. Ottoman Railway Employees, Dress and State Power

Concerning incidents relating to men's headgear, the Young Turk Period starts with a matter already treated throughout the Hamidian period, namely the activities of foreign companies and investors within the Ottoman realm. In 1887 a survey of those companies' institutional changes. Significant changes in dress as well as mentality already appeared throughout (or had already appeared before) the Hamidian period. Concerning dress she refers to Nancy Micklewright, who assumes that most changes in dress already took place between the 1830s and 1860s. Throughout the Hamidian period, she argues, concepts of gender culture and space had became reorganized through institutions of female education, the women's rights movement, newspapers and advertising directed to women, new technologies which brought about newly gendered dress, and gendered entertainment, as well as common socializing of men and women in activities such as skating and theater. These developments led to the rearticulation of gender simultaneously to the desire to restore the old order and with it the Empire's glory. For Ottoman reformers, women's advanced social status was at the same time a measure of the progress of the state, as women's chastity and moral purity a guarantor of the perseverance and strength of the Ottoman state. Were these seemingly contradictory views two sides of the same coin? How did the discourse on women's chastity and women's progress relate to each other? Was the progress of women associated with the nation and their chastity with Empire? What can be said without doubt is that the household and the family were a basic site of modernization and stood in close interrelation to concepts of gender and the state.

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employees’ dress had been conducted and the granting of concessions bound to the wearing of the fez by its employees, with exception of the management and engineers. At that time one of the companies concerned was the Rumeli railway company, and railway companies are those targeted again in 1908 for the headgear of their employees. It is not by chance that the Rumeli railway company appears here as an actor since the building of the railway was a highly ambiguous endeavor. Even though the Ottoman government considered them necessary for the desired economic development of the state and for military mobilization, the building of the railway meant interference of and dependence on Western European companies and loans.

The major part of the Ottoman railroad network had been built in the from the 1880s under Abdülhamid II’s reign. Before that, some lines had been built in Western Anatolia by British investors, in pursuit of their commercial interests. Railways were just one of the new or improved means of transportation established throughout the nineteenth century with the appearance of steam engine technologies. These steamships and railways accelerated the volume of commerce and vice versa and increased Western economic diffusion. Thus, transportation technology had a massive impact on the perception and construction of space; it not only changed the conditions of trade but also of traveling. Precarious Ottoman sovereignty got into even more dire straits due to the economic influence the establishment of railway tracks in the Ottoman realms brought with foreign companies and state loans to build them. Hence, the railways, in modernization theory commonly associated with progress as a core element of modernity, once more underlined the close relation of modernization with imperialism, creating on the one hand investment opportunities of Western European capital and on the other hand a means to distribute Western European goods. It would not be too far fetched to argue that imperialism entered the Ottoman Empire via railway. At least, the development of the Ottoman railway system brought with it the creation of spheres of influence by respective imperialist powers, staging their inter-imperialist rivalry on this terrain. Thereby, railways became a very specific and multidimensional spatial investment. Despite the imperialist powers’ own interests, Ottoman decision-makers

47 BOA ZB. 326/80; BOA DH.MKT. 2618/10; BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40.
48 For information on the railway system see Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300 - 1914 (Cambridge: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), 805.
49 See Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 120.
50 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 166.
hoped to gain something for their own purposes.\textsuperscript{51}

The matter of headgear of Western European companies' employees as I depicted in chapter four already went back to 1887, when the granting of concessions for foreign companies was linked to the obligation of wearing the fez.\textsuperscript{52} Concessions granted in the following decades indeed contained a clause which prescribed the wearing of the fez by these companies' employees. That was valid for the railway building encounters, too, such as the concessions granted for the subsections of the Anatolian line between Haydarpaşa and Ankara, Eskişehir – Konya as well as the Anatolia – Baghdad line.\textsuperscript{53} The same obligation was introduced for port and dock workers as employees of foreign companies as well as concessions granted to Ottoman companies.\textsuperscript{54}

The mandatory wearing of the fez went along with the desired replacement of foreign workforces by Ottoman staff. This is illustrated by a decree dated 1903 concerning the obligation to wear the fez for all officials and employees (\textit{memur ve müstahdem}) at the railway lines, together with the instruction to replace all foreign workers by those with Ottoman citizenship within five years, except high ranking officers.\textsuperscript{55} Cevdet Kırpık, in his study on workers in the Ottoman Empire, mentions a document issued in 1905 dealing with the replacement of Armenian and Greek Orthodox workers by Muslims. The document reasoned the Armenians and Greek orthodox had promoted the Bulgarian cause and thus had to be dismissed.\textsuperscript{56} Hence, the politics of dress exercised on workers of the railway companies belong to the wider context of the management and control of labor by the Ottoman government. Employment and the


\textsuperscript{52} Cevdet Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914)’, (unpublished doctoral thesis, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004), 64, FN 247. He refers to BOA İrade Dahiliyesi 82247, September 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1887.

\textsuperscript{53} Dates of the concessions that were granted, differ within Kırpık's account; he refers to Arhangelos Gavriel, \textit{Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu ve Bağdat Demiryolu Şirketi-i Osmaniyesi İdaresinin İç Yüzü} (Dersaadet (İstanbul): Mahmut Bey Matbaası, 1327); see Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914)’, 64-66, see there especially FN 248 and 250.

\textsuperscript{54} See Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914)’, 65.

\textsuperscript{55} 22 Zılıhce 1320 (March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1903). See Ibid., 65, FN 250. As cited in Gavriel, \textit{Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu ve Bağdat Demiryolu Şirketi-i Osmaniyesi İdaresinin İç Yüzü}.

\textsuperscript{56} For a table listing the workers of the Eastern Railway company according to nationality, see Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914)’, 53; and Gavriel, \textit{Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu ve Bağdat Demiryolu Şirketi-i Osmaniyesi İdaresinin İç Yüzü}, 85. Kirpik refers to BOA, Y.A.HUS. 491/55. 26 Temmuz 1321 (August 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1905).
control of labor were used as a means of keeping Ottoman integrity and creating Ottoman national identity. Despite the interferences of Ottoman authorities in the previous decades and more recently, railways employees continued to wear hats. Obviously, the matter had not been solved by concessions, and the imposition of the wearing of the fez could not be accomplished, as an exchange of letters between different state offices in 1908 indicates.

The issue re-emerges with a letter of a Major general (mirliva), head of the artillery department to the Police Ministry (Zabtiye Nezareti). It is a report from the inauguration of construction works carried out the the Eastern Railway Company (Şark Şimendifer Kumpanyası). At the ceremony, which he presumably attended, the company’s clerks had exclaimed: “Long live liberty (Yaşasın ｈürriyet)!” Yet, he notes, it would have been a much greater joy, if in addition it had been possible to denote them as Ottoman clerks, by way of replacing their hats with the fez. A couple of days later, the addressed Police Ministry approached the Ministry of the Interior with the mirliva’s complaint and forwards his letter, stating that it would be of the utmost satisfaction to all Ottomans if the aforementioned clerks donned the fez. The next institution involved was that of Trade and Public Works (Ticaret ve Nafia Nezareti), which was informed by the Ministry of the Interior on September 29, 1908. The author of the document presumes that the mentioned subjects were Ottoman citizens who would be well advised to confess to their national belonging, as the fez was the badge of the Ottoman people/nation (‘alāmet-i ｋavmiyye-yi osmāniyye). A reply of the addressed Ministry of Trade and Public Works only returns on December 19, 1908, almost three month later, to the Ministry of the Interior. Therein it informed the latter that the company had decided that all employees are going the wear the fez and that the necessary amount of fezzes had been ordered at

57 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40. On the case see also Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 65.
58 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40.
59 According to Kırpık it is unknown if the concession granted for the establishment of the Eastern Railway company (Şark Şimendifer Kumpanyası) contained a clause on the wearing of the fez. See Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 66.
60 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40, 10 Eylül 1324 (23. September 23rd, 1908), this document is the nice copy of BOA DH.MKT. 2618/10, 9 Eylül 1324 (September 22nd, 1908). Interestingly during this correspondence the designation of the company changes from Şark Şimendifer Kumpanyası (Eastern Railway Company) to Rumeli Şimendifer Kumpanyası (Railway Company of Rumelia) – why?
61 BOA DH.MKT. 2618/10, 16 Eylül 1324 (September 29th, 1908).
62 BOA DH.MKT. 2618/10, line 5-6.
63 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40, 6 Kanun-i Evvel 1324 (December 19th, 1908).
the imperial fez factory in Hereke. An article published in İttihad ve Terakki, put forward that employees of the Eastern railway company had “since always” donned the same hats, as those of the Austrian railway company. The author(s) of the article declare that “it strikes out chords, that our [railway] officers, wear something else then the national headpiece (серпüş-i milliyye).” The author(s) consider the wearing of the Austrian hat as “quite harmful,” without specifying what kind of harm it provoked. But now, they had heard, within the next couple of days, the Austrian hat would be replaced by the fez. The matter already appeared in July 1908 in an the periodical Donanma (Navy), in an article concerning headgear by Mahmud Muin. He states that while up until the Young Turk Revolution the railway officers had worn a hat, that was changed to the fez after the beginning of the second constitutional period.

This intervention which intended to reinforce the fez as an Ottoman symbol took place at a time when the fez would at last partly depart from its meaning as a symbol of Ottoman citizenship to a symbol of reactionary religiosity and subordination to imperialist European powers.

5.3 The Fez Boycott and the Question of National Headgear

The Young Turk era began with political turbulences that also included the struggle over headgear and its symbolism. It culminated in a boycott against Austrian goods that started with protest against the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary’s Habsburg Emperor Josef II on 5 October 1908. As an organized movement it was formed by the a coalition of member of the CUP and the port worker’s guilds, while the government did “not offer effective resistance to the annexation.” The boycott spread

64 Here again the railway company involved is denoted as Şark Simendifer Kumpanyası (Eastern Railway Company.)
65 See Şark Şimdıfer Me’murları [Officers of the Eastern Railway Company], İttihad ve Terakki, 15 Kanun-i Evvel 1324 (December 28th, 1908), 2; see also Kırpuk, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 65-66. The same issue of İttihad ve Terakki, also on page two, reports on the boycott against Austria-Hungary.
66 Mahmud Muin, ‘Serpüş-i Millimiz ve Fesler [Our National Hat and the Fezzes],’ Donanma (1 Temmuz 1326 (July 14th, 1910)), 396-402
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throughout the Empire, but in many regions had only short-lived support. Among the Austrian products that were boycotted was the fez, which was next to sugar one of the major Austrian goods exported to the Ottoman Empire. Most of the fezzes worn in the Ottoman Empire were produced in Austria. The boycott not only led to a refusal of the fez but also unleashed a discussion about what kind of headgear would be appropriate.

In what follows I scrutinize the extent to which the renunciation of the fez was also a turning away from Ottomanism, as a concept of Ottoman citizenship and belonging transgressed existing and newly emerging ethno-religious boundaries. How (and why) did the trans-confessional popular participation in the fez boycott result in the campaign for a nationalization of economy (milli iktisat) with explicit reference to Turkish-Muslim nationalist character and the final surrender of an Ottomanist vision of equal citizenship?

The 1908 seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted a territorial loss that triggered a broad (public) discourse on identity in the ongoing political transformation process. Identity in the Ottoman Empire was reconsidered along with economic reasoning due to the import of Austrian goods. It is important to note that the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not the only decisive political event in fall 1908. A couple of days after the Austrian annexation, Bulgaria declared independence and also Crete departed from Ottoman suzerainty and entered into union with mainland Greece.

While I found only a few archival sources on the the fez boycott, the proliferation of journal articles on the matter is vast. I will concentrate here mainly on the part of the fez boycott and peripherally consider its broader scope, meaning the boycott of other goods. The fez boycott was already quite extensively treated by other studies, yet I think it is indispensable to include it within the broader scope of my research considering the central place it takes in Ottoman discussions about headgear.

The boycott began immediately, within seventy-two hours, after the annexation through blocking the entrances of Austrian shops in the Ottoman Empire by the crowds that had demonstrated against the annexation; it lasted until the end February 1909. The

68 See Ibid., 140.
69 Ibid., 123.
71 Donald Quataert, "The Ottoman boycott against Austria Hungary," in Quataert, Social Disintegration
fez was one of several Austrian products affected by the boycott, which developed a
relative strength since the Austrian government feared to lose power in several aspects.
The Ottoman economy received fourteen percent of its import goods from Austria, while
it did not have to fear a return boycott of its own goods as exports to Austria were not
high.\textsuperscript{72} Goods important from Austria were mainly sugar, cloth or garments and the
mentioned fezzes. The Austrian governments’ reactions to the boycott itself suggest that
a concern about the further worsening of their relations with the Ottoman Empire.
Donald Quataert considers Austria’s reaction to the boycott as an expression of its
limited power and on the other side surprising strength of the Ottoman Empire. Thus,
through its refusal the fez gained another highly symbolic dimension as a sign of
Ottoman autonomy, contrary to its former symbolic power as a marker of Ottoman
modernity.

The Young Turk coup went along with the intention and hope to stabilize the
Ottoman state’s sovereignty, but these hopes were dashed quite immediately. The political
events even put the newly achieved power of the Ottoman government in danger, as with
the loss of Bulgaria, Crete and the final loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Young Turk
government feared and actually received discredit. And these events were only to be the
beginning of what continued with the Balkan Wars of 1912/13 and WWI. Brummett also
provides a short summary of how the boycott was discussed and depicted in the satirical
press.\textsuperscript{73} Similarly to Quataert she assesses the boycott as an opportunity that was used by
the Ottoman public to counter the powerlessness of the Ottoman state towards the
European Great Powers. While Brummett points out that in the long-term economic level
its effect was negligible, it had an impact on Ottoman internal economic organization.
Zürcher argues that the boycott had as much an impact on Austria as on the Greek and
Armenian importers, while Quataert puts forth that those involved in trade with Austrian
goods had enough other products they could sell.\textsuperscript{74} Brummett emphasizes that the boycott
was an act of symbolic drawing of boundaries after the failure to keep European armies,
entrepreneurs and influence out of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881 – 1908, 121.}
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 122.
\textsuperscript{73} See Brummett, \textit{Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 176.}
\textsuperscript{74} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey, 109;} and Quataert, \textit{Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire,
1881 – 1908, 124. On the difficulties to estimate the economical impact of the boycott see \textit{Ibid., 141-143.}
\textsuperscript{75} Brummett, \textit{Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 175-176.}
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note that the boycott stretched from Istanbul through the whole Empire up to North Africa. Thus, she concludes that the boycott was very much an instrument to enhance national unity and to refashion Ottoman citizenry. The boycott made visible the interrelation of foreign economic penetration, labor and the evolution of socio-political and “nationalist” movements, which she states need further analysis.  

5.3.1 The Boycott in Ottoman Newspaper and Journal Articles

The boycott against Austria-Hungary and with it the fez boycott received broad coverage in the Ottoman press. I want to provide some examples of that coverage and look at the way Ottoman identity was negotiated there.

Tobias Heinzelmann gives a detailed account of how the boycott was perceived and propagated in the satirical magazines Karagöz and Kalem, highlighting important aspects of the broader meaning of the boycott. He stresses the close succession of Bulgarian independence and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That can be explained in mutual backing of these events by Russia and Austria-Hungary, who promised each other not to intervene militarily in these matters. Both events, Heinzelmann argues, were a "hard blow," that meant a loss of prestige for the Ottoman government, and as such it was also perceived among the Ottoman population. Subsequently, on the 8th of October, a huge demonstration was held in Istanbul which called out for a boycott.

Both journals analysed by Heinzelmann regard the annexation as a military conquest disguised in the garb of civilization. Thereby, they endeavor to deconstruct orientalist discourse and its barbarian versus civilization dichotomy by turning it on its head. Authors and illustrators of Kalem and Karagöz criticized that Austria considered itself more civilized than the Ottoman Empire. They attempted to refute this assumption with examples showing that rather Austria itself was barbaric, not the Ottoman Empire.

Heinzelmann asked why the annexation was perceived as a military act since the

76 Ibid., 175-176.
77 See Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 148, FN 30.
79 See Ibid., 31-34.
80 See Ibid., 133 and 138.
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Austrian military had occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina already since the Berlin Conference. The symbolic act of annexation, however, received this broad popular attention and was perceived as more serious by the Ottoman public than the actual military appropriation. Heinzelmann relates this to hopes that a potential shift in power relations in favor of the Ottomans would help to reintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Empire. The Ottoman perception of the annexation reveals the importance of symbolic negotiations and manifestations of power. It was also a test for the Young Turk regime and Heinzelmann emphasizes that both journals criticized that the Ottoman government in the Bosnia-Herzegovina question followed a similar path in foreign politics as the ancient regime. The agreement that the Ottoman state received 2,5 Million Lira indemnity in return was designated by Karagöz and Kalem as a sell-out.81

In the material analyzed by Heinzelmann the fez also appears as an issue of the boycott. On the 16th of November 1908 Karagöz published song lyrics written to the melody of a traditional Karagöz song, the name of it an eponym of the very popular Ottoman shadow theatre and the periodical itself. The song propagated the kalpak as the headpiece to be preferred and praised its beauty in contrast to the fez. Anticipatorily it predicted the end of the era of the fez, though this took only place only with its ban in 1925.82

Doğan Çetinkaya provides the most extensive account on the fez boycott as part of the boycott against Austria-Hungary.83 He mentions numerous sources and has traced the discussions on headgear in journals and newspaper of the time. His analysis reveals the broad support of the boycott and the readiness to abandon the fez for another kind of headgear. Many alternatives were brought up of which the kalpak became the most popular and visible, as the one introduced officially as an alternative to the fez. Çetinkaya regards the prospect of a change of headgear as a factor of motivation to participate in the boycott, based on the assumption that the fez was unpopular, to a certain extent anyhow. Liked or not, he concludes, certainly the fez was the most tangible and visible sign of the boycott. It facilitated participation in the boycott and in addition made that participation visible.84

81 See Ibid., 138.
82 See Ibid., 130.
84 See Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 148.
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The experimenting with alternative national hats, and in a way a newly initiated search for a national hat, started subsequently to the proclamation of the boycott. I think this is a crucial point in nation-building even though one might discuss its success, with contradictory outcomes. As I mentioned above the fez boycott was a first step towards a movement of \textit{milli iktisat} (national economy) that entailed multiple animosities and atrocities against non-Muslim Ottomans.\footnote{On \textit{milli iktisat} (national economy) see Zafer Toprak, \textit{Milli Iktisat - Milli Burjuvazi: Türkiye}, Türkiye Araştırmaları 14 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995); and Zafer Toprak, Türkiye'de Milli İktisat: 1908 - 1918, 1. baskı. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012).} Albeit, for now, non-Muslim Ottomans were actively involved in the boycott and supported the search for a new headpiece as a sign of national unity. Thanks to Çetinkaya’s analysis of Ottoman Greek newspapers these voices can be heard. One newspaper, for example, reports that most Ottoman Christian orthodox exchanged the fez with one of the alternatives. Interestingly the same article states that especially in the rural areas the fez was exchanged for alternative headgear.\footnote{On the more general attitude of Ottoman Greeks towards the boycott see Çetinkaya, ‘Muslim Merchants and Working-Class in Action,’ 147.} That shows the spread of the boycott to remote areas and the fundamental difference between the introduction of the fez, which took place obviously from above, introduced by the sultan, and its replacement from below.

People had started to appear in public with different kind of hats shortly after the boycott was started. In place of the Austrian fez they wore white fezzes which were made of undyed woollen felt, locally produced fezzes, which were only available in limited numbers, and \textit{arakiyye}, which was another kind of felt hat, as well as the \textit{kalpak}. The latter, as I said before, received broad acceptance. People staged mass events where they demonstratively took off the fez, threw them to the ground and sometimes trampled on them. Shortly after that the kalpak was made part of official dress codes. Subsequently different state offices introduced the kalpak as their official headgear, and at the inauguration of the national assembly on 3 July 1908 the kalpak was proclaimed to be the new national headgear, although it provoked a quite lively debate whether one could be forced to wear the kalpak instead of the fez.\footnote{See Çetinkaya, \textit{1908 Osmanlı Boykotu}, 148 FN 30. On the decision whether to wear the fez or kalpak in the national assembly, debt administration and \textit{pul} administration: see \textit{Kürd Tevvin Gazetesi ve Terakki} (29 Teşrin-i Sani 1324 (Decemver 12th, 1908)), 24. There had obviously as been conflicts on the issue, but unfortunately I cannot comment on this here because the document I found that deals with the case is missing. It is BOA BEO 258849/3452.}

Çetinkaya provides a lengthy quote of an article by Ahmed Rasım in the daily...
newspaper *Sabah*. He argues in favor of the boycott and gives advices on what to do in the situation. He states that now it was necessary on the one hand to extend local fez production and on the other hand revitalize that of the kalpak. Ahmed Rasm criticizes how the Ottoman Empire is treated as a self-service store by those from outside, probably the European great powers, but at the same times warns against being too upset and annoyed about that. For him it was more important to concentrate on potential measures to counter that image, rather then anger, which was of no use. Instead, the Ottoman society should find alternatives which could replace Austrian products, and at the same time the Ottoman economy should start producing those items itself. The Ottoman population, meanwhile, should refrain from dressing up and instead concentrate on winning. The result, if successful, would be manifested in monetary wealth and then “if we have money, we can even attach jewels and eagle feathers to our head”.  

By this reference to former Ottoman practices of display of wealth and status, the adornment of Ottoman kavuks and turbans, which ceased gradually with the introduction of the fez, Rasm links the right of excessive consumption to the prosperity of the state instead of individual wealth and status. Yet, he does not take into account the unjust distribution of wealth which allows only a few to reflect a prosperous national economy via individual consumption. Thus, his appeal was restricted to a small elite whom he calls on to display modesty in favor of national prosperity. He thereby links the well-being of the national economy and sovereignty to the conduct of its elites and relates the consumption of Austrian goods to extravagance and luxury. Rasm does not consider the display of wealth as a vice per se, but as legitimate in relation to the condition of the Ottoman state. He calls Ottoman elites to moderation, because they are the ones who can afford luxury, as long as the state is in trouble. Why he invokes the topos of excessive consumption in the relation to the fez, which was not at all an item of luxury, but of bourgeois modesty, might come down to the fact that as a foreign product it considered luxury per se, even though that might not have been valid for the age of globalized mass production, and the higher quality of Austrian fezzes.

In terms of the production of headgear, Cetinkaya mentions that many Ottoman writers who commented on the boycott thought the change of headgear would bring

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88 Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 149.
89 There were also efforts to produce other local ready made clothes besides the fez, see Ibid., 155-156.
advantages for the Ottomans. In contrast to the fez, they argued, headpieces such as the kalpak and \textit{kece külah} were much older then the fez. The tradition of kalpak and \textit{külah} manufacturing was centuries old and provided a quality that could not be so easily copied by Austrian producers. That was a line of argument which regarded the fez as not originally Ottoman, and therefore it should be replaced by ‘real’ authentic national headgear. Here also, in my perception for the first time appears the argument that the fez was actually a Greek piece of dress, one that was reiterated late especially when in 1925, under the Republic, the fez and other headgear was to be abolished. In contrast to the time of introduction, not least by the lack of a vivid press and therefore public discussion, but also by other reasons, when the fez was made obligatory for civil servants no such discussions on authenticity and national identity took place. Even if the fez had the function of homogenization and nation-building it was not introduced as an authentic piece of dress expressing essential Ottoman identity. On the contrary, the fez came to express Ottoman identity after its introduction. That does not mean \textit{arakiyye, külah} or kalpak were actually more authentic, it was just the they were treated as such.

Quite opposite opinions on the fez and its boycott appeared, too. Some authors argued that alternative headpieces which had been proposed to replace the Fez were not adequate. They regarded the fez not as a piece only introduced hardly a century in the past but as a century old tradition. They labelled the \textit{kalpak} “Circassian” and and thereby inauthentic, as such not Ottoman or Turkish item, and they regarded it together with the \textit{arakiyye}, which was designated in a pejorative manner “camel hair colored,” as not worth of Ottoman fame and glory. For its opponents the fez was a symbol of despotism, a sign of Ottoman weakness, disassociated from the Ottoman state’s strength and power, while those alternative kinds of headgear subsumed under the designation “national fez” symbolized constitutionalism and the beginning of a new era.\footnote{See Ibid., 151.} In search for national authenticity, Ottoman journal authors undertook efforts to define a “typically” Ottoman or Turkish \textit{kalpak} which could not be confused with the Bulgarian or other \textit{kalpaks}. Some considered Circassian \textit{kalpaks} as originals to be adopted.\footnote{See Ibid., 168.} The \textit{kalpak} was made a reference to pre-Ottoman Turcic times and the Ottoman Turks common history with other central Asian peoples or communities.
An article of the newspaper *Tanin*, whose editor Hüseyin Cahit was a member of the CUP central committee, reports enthusiastically about the dynamics developing through the boycott of Austrian goods and its consequences for Ottoman headgear.\(^92\) At the beginning of his article the unspecified author provides his impression of the changing appearance in the streets. During the month following the beginning of the boycott, he observes a sudden and completely new view appearing in the streets, which he finds amazing. Watching people walking around with new headgear, “new fezzes”\(^93\) he calls them, gave him the impression of the appearance of completely “new Turks.”\(^94\) Enthusiastically he terms this experience as actually watching the renewal of the nation before his eyes. Hence, he attributes an enormous power to headgear, the ability to built a new nation, that consists in his eyes of all male members of Ottoman society, if we consider who donned the “new fezzes.” That means in his understanding these national hats reached way beyond the surface touching the substance of the national community, rebuilding it from scratch.

The author uses the term “Turks” here, when he talks about the new nation, but in the following switches to Ottoman when talking about the national collective. He says that Ottomans were quite aware of the fact that most of the fezzes came from Austria and in order to fulfil their promise not to buy “rotten Austrian goods” they were ready not to wear them. On the other hand, it was also a well known fact that the Fez factory in Hereke did not produce enough fezzes and “missed the perfection” to provide enough fezzes for all in the Ottoman lands. The people by themselves, he continues, found a solution pretty fast and started to wear *arakiyye* and *külah*. The fact that these other types of headgear worn during the boycott were called “new fezzes” shows that at least the authors of the Ottoman press were quite aware of the function of the fez as an item of nation building that could not so easily be replaced by a variety of local headpieces, should it fulfil a similar purpose. The author of this article also points out that the wearing of alternative headgear became common all over the Ottoman realm.

The author of this article presents himself quite enthusiastically about the possibilities opened up by the fez boycott. Pointing out the “new fezzes” were much cheaper then even a fez of lowest quality they could become ideal “national hats” which

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93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
had been worn anyways already by most Albanians in the Ottoman Empire. The economic dimension opened up by these new hats could not be exaggerated in the eyes of the author and will be discussed in many other articles on the subject. He points out the possibilities of building up a national economy and regards the new fezzes as means to catch up with Austria in terms of economic development. By industrializing the production of the new headpieces also would the shape be perfected and thus industrialization and enhancement of Ottoman outward appearance and inner cohesion went together.

The author regards the adoption of the headgear virtually as a cure for all sorts of problems of the Ottoman state, especially in terms of nation-building and the spread of nationalism. He considers the shift to new headgear as a beginning of patriotism (vatanperverlik) among the Ottoman population. He talks about the Ottoman nation here, without mentioning who might be included or excluded. In his eyes new headgear evoked national consciousness. He even talks about embodiment (tecessüm) of the nation by means of them, by making the unity of the nation visible (was that not the case with the fez). This remark suggests that even more people (men) donned the new headpieces than did the fez before, otherwise it would be hard to understand why these created a greater unity than the fez. It also suggests that the “national fezzes” included broader segments of Ottoman society into the nation than the fez, as an item introduced from above and donned by the elites, would.

The fez boycott evoked much hope among some authors of national renewal, and the change of headgear was associated with the renewal of strength of the Ottoman nation and consequently with the renewal of the strength of the state. Headgear appeared once more as a symbol of power and strength. It might be compared to a crown or turban as a sovereign symbol of power. For these authors, together with the return of constitutionalism, the new fezzes symbolized the power of the people, even though that power remained quite limited and without real consequences in participation. For many, especially the non-Muslim Ottomans, this symbolic power rather turned against them, proving the destructive potential nationalist struggles.

Other were less enthusiastic about the power of “national fezzes,” such as Mahmud Muin in his article that appeared in July 1910 in the journal Donanma (Navy) titled “Our
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national hat and the fezzes.”95 For him the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been a blow (darbe) against the Ottoman state following the proclamation of the second constitutional period, leading to the boycott. He remarks that the boycott went along with a rising and enormous hatred against the fez, and the replacement of the fez by kalpak, kece külah and many other types of headgear. Yet, it is important to note that Mahmud Muin points out that even before the boycott strong resentments against the fez existed. That might explain why the Fez boycott received such great response. Muin mentions that fez wearers were pejoratively designated as “red fez wearers (kirmizi fezliler),” but does not mention if it was a specific social group which was termed like that or the wearer of the fez in general. He also does not mention why the wearing of the fez was assessed in such a negative way and by whom. There had been efforts to replace the fez as the headgear of the military, he continues, and it was now hardly possible to argue publicly in favor of the fez. Unfortunately, he does not mention which objections exactly were brought up against the fez. In addition to the military he talks about the introduction of a “strange kind of headgear” for the police, assumedly some sort of kalpak and a competition for the adoption of the kalpak among all different kind of state officers. He complains that also most daily newspapers propagated against the fez. The points brought up against the fez, he says, had been repeated for several years.

What becomes clear in the following is that the author is quite critical of the Young Turk government and connects critiques of the fez with certain phenomenon coming along with the constitutional period which he objects. Not mentioning clearly what he means by that, he designates the Young Turk attitude and character as “crazy pamperedness (mecnūnāne şimārlık),”96 stating that there own pamperedness ended to a certain degree with the anti-Unionist actions of 31st of March (31 mart olaylari). His incentive for this article, as he says, was to provide the people with information in order to convince his readers of the advantages of the fez, since at the moment they were not capable of serious judgement and needed to change ideals.

Emphasizing functionality Mahmud Muin undertakes a sort of scientific approach to the matter of headgear. Certainly what is more interesting is what lay behind his line of argumentation, from what point of view he vividly defend the fez. He starts out with a

95 Mahmud Muin, ‘Serpüş-ı Millīmiz ve Fesler [Our National Hat and the Fezzes],’ Donanma (1 Temmuz 1326 (July 14th, 1910), 396-402.
96 Mahmud Muin, ‘Serpüş-ı Millīmiz ve Fesler,’ 396.
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lengthy elaboration on color theory, mainly on the absorption of light resulting in the question which color was most suitable for headgear. He contends that, since black absorbed a biggest amount of light, black hats were less breathable and thus less functional than red or white hats. Obviously, he alludes to the black color of the **kalpak** versus the red fez. His next point is the breathability of different types of headgear, which of course he concludes was more favorable in red or white headgear. I want to take a look at his line of argument on the material aspects of headgear to find out what may lay behind it and why the fez was so important for some to the same degree it was despised by others. What can be concluded by his line of argument regarding the symbolic importance of the fez and other headgear? In terms of the production of the fez, Muin elaborates on different materials coming to conclude that silk and wool, again in terms of transportation of heat, are best suited. Yet silk he deems too expensive, and thus he chooses wool as the preferable material for headgear. Muin’s argument very much follows a track which relates male appearance and thus male fashion to rationality.

As I demonstrated before, with modern male attire throughout the nineteenth century, beginning with the French revolution or even before, men’s dress was designed more and more to a real or conceived functionality. That was expressed in a sometimes extreme reduction of ornamentation and a demonstrative plainness. In line with this Muin based his arguments for his preference of the fez on a pure functional basis, and it becomes obvious throughout the text that this has its flaws. He recounts his points many times and obviously runs out of arguments.97

Another point besides functionality is that of hygiene, which makes the fez more suitable for the maintenance of health. Muin repeatedly returned to it, arguing that the fez was easier to clean, and that cleanliness was a special feature of Islam, adding religion to his line of argument. He adds a Muslim connotation to the fez, and does not make any reference to the trans- or interreligious characteristics of the fez as an item of Ottoman citizenship; quite to the contrary, as many of the state archival documents in the previous decades show.

Muin combines religious conservatism with the invention of tradition concerning the fez, which is made an emblem of Islam, and the modernist arguments of functionality

97 Another reason for his focus on functionality were probably the repression against opponents of the CUP.
of dress. He contrasts sober modern male dress to female embellishment and extravagance. In just two lines he remarks on females wearing skirts, the kind of which he does not specify. He notes that this was not his topic and interest but for the reader it confirms his political stance, and secondly, which, might be even more important, his view on the contrasting character of male and female dress. Muin puts emphasis on the matter that the fez worn at official occasions should be determined exactly, in its shape, this taking reference to uniformity and the even tube-like shape. He again praises the low maintenance and ready-to-wear quality of the fez, again in contrast to female dress and to the kalpak: It only needed a shaping and fumigation once in while. The fez was antibacterial, while the kalpak full of microbes. He wonders how it came about that the kalpak could be considered on the same hygienic level as the fez.

Mahmud Muin combines his elaborations on the economic aspects of the production and consumption of headgear with ethical considerations. He calculates yearly incomes and the amount available for the purchase of headgear per year, and demonstrates the low costs of the fez or kece külah in contrast to the kalpak. He argues that in contrast to the high costs the quality of kalpakts was low and they would lose their fur within two days, while the fezzes generally were of good quality. Further, he continues his argument on an ethical basis, arguing that the killing of newly born lambs for the production of the kalpak was against “celestial human feelings.”

He links this ethical argument to the economic dimension, pointing out that this mode of production on the one hand was inefficient, because it was expensive and unsustainable, and on the other hand it was cruel, because as he says it was “an attack against generations of sheep.” He also points out the sustainability of the fez which when out of shape was recyclable, as it could be reshaped and dyed again.

Mahmud Muin does not confine himself to point at external factors of different kinds of headgear. He also touches the issue of embodiment. By returning to the issue of color he elaborates on the positive impact of the fez on the human body. He again turns to the issue of color. He aims at demonstrating the effect the wearing of certain colors

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98 On the invention of the fez as traditional Ottoman see also Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 104.
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had on the body. Not surprisingly it comes down to his perception of the positive impact of the color red, more specifically of the red fez, on the human body. The red color of the fez led the cheeks to appear redder than their natural color; people with a fez appeared just as in the popular proverb as if “redness hid their faces.” But the effect of wearing a red fez, according to Muin, was not restricted to the facial color. It would come along with a feeling of consolation and peace of mind caused by one’s own healthy impression in the mirror. He argues that this had the effect that those wearing a fez not just appeared healthier, they actually became healthier by wearing a fez. The black color of the kalpak in contrast had the effect of giving a complexion that reminded the observer of “infantile convulsion.” In addition the black color was not suited for the cold, he states, as would be seen at animals who changed their fur to white in the winter. Because of all these disadvantages of black colored clothes, Muin assesses, would the wearing of these been abandoned completely anyway.

After these elaborations on functionality Muin turns to what he calls the “political and religious benefits” of the fez. First he refers to Ottoman nation-building in general attesting a recent lack of it. He sets the starting point of Ottoman-nation building with the beginning of the reforms known as Tanzimat-i hayriyye in 1839. Before that, Muin states, neither a national flag (millī bayrak) nor national dress had existed. Thus, he locates national character not in traditional dress or habits but defines it as a degree of unity and uniformity. In its 600-years existence and despite its auspicious status, he says, the Ottoman state was missing national unity. Yet he acknowledges the relative novelty of the idea of national unity, admitting that European states also lacked it until recently. Before the Tanzimat each military commander had made up his own design of flags, of which thirty to forty different existed once at a time and no agreement on a common design could be reached among them. This was similar to language. He mentions the example of the decree issued against Muhammed Ali Paşa of Egypt which had been published in Farsi in the government gazette. Never had the Ottomans been sure about which was the official language of the state, and it shifted between Farsi, Arabic and Turkish. In addition he associates the fez with Pan-Islamism and the

102 Ibid., 399.
103 He refers to the Paris Conference of 1856 (he just says Paris Conference, but it must be that), which concluded the Crimean War. That means he considers European nation building to have taken place more recent then Ottoman, Mahmud Muin, ‘Serpüş-i Millimiz ve Fesler,’ 399.
worldwide recognition of the Ottoman’s sultan as the Caliph of all Muslims. Thus Muin associated Ottoman national identity firmly with Islam. Also European colonialist powers helped to shape the assumed Islamic character of the fez, Muin argues: The clothes of all local colonial armies, be they Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, or German West African, resembled Ottoman soldiers dress, and all of them wore a fez. That most of them or all were Muslim soldiers, he states, contributed to the perception of the fez as a Muslim piece of headgear.

Even though some of Mahmud Muin’s assumptions about the fez might be questioned, his remarks on the different aspects of the fez provide insight into how the discourse on headgear was embedded in other discourses on society, politics and the human body.

Another defence of the fez against its opponents is Mustafa Sabri’s article in Beyanül-hakk. Mustafa Sabri was an example of the conservative elite who considered the boycott, and its popular character, as a symptom of social disorder and unrest, and thus did not approve of it. His arguing for uniformity of appearance might be equal to a desire of social discipline as an instrument of power. The “carnival” according to Cetinkaya a characteristic which made the boycott popular, with its appearance of many different külahs and arakiyyes, was quite a horror to him in distinction to popular perception. Sabri defends the fez against its critics who appeared with the Austrian boycott, or before. His defense has at least two levels: one is economic and the other consists of aesthetic and related arguments. His article is a direct response to an article in the daily Sabah, a proponent of the boycott and another unspecified author of another also unspecified newspaper. He opposes the depiction of the kalpak as a piece of dress with local origin and puts the fez in its place, in a manner of invented traditions, a headpiece donned by Ottomans/Turks “since always.” It is striking that he uses the term Turk, not Ottoman, probably using it in the sense of Ottoman Muslim, not in the strict

105 Mustafa Sabri, ‘İctimā‘iyyāt - Fes ve Kalpak [Sociology – Fez and Kalpak],’ Beyanülhakk (3 Teṣrin-i Sani 1324/21 Şevval 1326 (November 16th, 1908)), 146–149.
107 See Mustafa Sabri, ‘İctimā‘iyyāt - Fes ve Kalpak’; on the positiv popular perception of the fez boycott as “carnival” see Çetinkaya, ‘Muslim Merchants and Working-Class in Action, 64. On the “elite's fear of the masses,” see Ibid., 66.
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ethnically defined sense, even though he does not comment on this. The article in Sabah had argued that the fez could never be Ottoman (note that Sabah used Ottoman), stating that it was not possible to provide the fez an “elegant and plain form.” Again, like Mahmud Muin, the aesthetic standards used by both the author of Sabah and by Sabri, are in accordance with those of bourgeois aesthetic values of men’s dress, outlined in the previous chapter.

Thus, we are dealing with a competition over the compliance with these standards, from the proponents as well as the opponents of the boycott. According to Mustafa Sabri, Sabah’s author terms the kalpak as a choice of good taste and elegance in appearance, a marker of good taste (zevk-i selim). Whereas Mustafa Sabri states the “the Turks” donned never anything else but the fez, and that it was their distinctive and categorical characteristic within as well as outside the Ottoman Empire. Like Mahmud Muin, Mustafa Sabri considers the fez a Muslim item; he does not mention Ottoman non-Muslims at all.

While proponents of the boycott argued that Ottoman fez production was not able to compete the Austrian industrial standards and qualities, and for that reason alone it was necessary to find an alternative for the fez, Sabri argues against this kind of solution to European economic dominance. He instead promotes the expansion of the Ottoman fez production to counter Austrian hegemony, while proponents of the boycott rather propose to escape the competitive situation altogether. Thus, for Sabri, the fez is more authentic to Ottoman identity, while for the boycotters it is rather the kalpak. Sabri finds it necessary to defend the fez against theses utterances which he considers insults (against whom these insults might have been directed he does not mention).

Sabri explicitly distinguishes himself from two other authors he refers to, as a proponent of conservatism delimiting himself against their outspoken endeavor to change. The author of Sabah, Sabri quotes, wanted to change just headgear, while the other unspecified authors had proposed a change more encompassing, namely “ourselves” as a necessary reaction to and measure against Austrian dominance. According to Sabri, these author’s motivation for considering a more or less encompassing social change was critical of the derogatory and contemptuous European

108 See Mustafa Sabri, ‘İctimā‘iyyāt - Fes ve Kalpaḳ,’ 146.
109 See ibid., 147.
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gaze noted by the referred author. He states about Ottoman’s tralleling in Europe: “Feeling anguished under the Europeans contemptuous gaze they eventually had to throw away the fez and don a hat.”110 The unknown author attests a necessity for change, which goes beyond a change of headgear to escape this “humiliating gaze.”111 Sabri did not mention in which respect this change was to take place or if the quoted author talked about it. Yet, it might be fair enough to say that it was a kind of change towards European (bourgeois) standards, represented by the hat. Or is it rather a change towards national unity, since Sabri agrees with this author about a lack of uniform appearance caused by abandonment of the fez and the sudden use of many different kinds of külahs and arakiyyes, among them the kalpak which themselves had a number of different shapes. To cure these ills the mentioned author calls for a uniform design of the kalpak, which had to be “plain and elegant”,112 since those kalpaks donned at the moment differed to much in shape. National unity, here Sabri agrees with the other author, was necessary in order to counter Austrian claims to hegemony and challenge European imperial dominance in general. Nonetheless, Sabri comments, such an item of national unity was already available, and he saw no necessity to invent one: the fez. It would not only express and create unity but represent a “higher value” which was continuity.113 The fez comprised values such as continuity, a sense of what was right, honour, zeal and public spirit. Apparently the public spirit expressed by the fez boycott was not the one Sabri had in mind. On the contrary the huge kavuks, which were yet another thing than the külahs and arakiyyes, represented social order before the introduction of the fez, so maybe kavuk was just as an expression for the social order before the Mahmudian reforms, represented for him as a kind of carnival, social unrest, which in contrast to popular perception and attraction to the boycott for him had an unappealing attraction. In Sabri’s opinion the new headgear did not have the quality to preserve social order, referring here explicitly to the question of class and its boundaries which he argues would become invisible by the diversity of new headpieces. Sabri points out that the new headpieces entailed all kinds of ambiguities, quite in contrast to the fez. The külah would not suit the social status of an “efendi”, these “strange hats (tuhaft serpüşlar)”. Hence Sabri assumes

110 “Frenkleriñ enzär-i istihkârı altında siklarak nihâyet fes attib şapka giymeye mecbûr oluyorlar,” ibid., 147.
111 “naşar-i tezîlî,” ibid., 147.
112 “sâde ve şarif,” ibid., 147.
113 Ibid. 147.
that many of the newly introduced külahs undermined elite identity and authority by blurring social boundaries. Above the threat of social disorder, Sabri senses the threat of a gradual shift towards “mimicry” (taklid), considering the new headgears as an almost inevitable shift towards the adoption of the European hat. In a certain sense he might not be that far from the truth, because global comparisons show the search for national dress did often result in the adoption of bourgeois standards. The unspecified other author actually had proposed the adoption of a hat similar to European caps.

Like Muin, Mustafa Sabri refers to color and the supposed healthy look provided by the fez, while others, the opponents of the fez, obviously argued that the fez would lead the face appear ill (bozuk).

In terms of production Sabri argues that in contrast to fez production there were no kalpak factories at all and thus it appears not logical to him to count on the kalpak as appropriate replacement for the fez. Thus, it would be much more appropriate to strengthen and improve local fez production, rather than a change of headgear. Returning to European stereotypes and contest against Ottoman, Sabri argues that the wearing of külahs would rather strengthen pejorative views about the Ottomans from the European perspective and therefore was not suitable to counter these stereotypes, which depicted the Türks as impermanent and inconstant.\(^\text{114}\) Sabri questions the effect the wearing of the kalpak had against Austrian dominance and power.

As these examples suggest was the European gaze is central both to the proponents and opponents of the fez. Even though they argue with authenticity as a quality of national identity, international standards are important to them to a similar extent.

5.3.2. The Fez Boycott in State Documents and the Appearance of the Kalpak as an Item of Ottoman Identity

Contrary to the rich discussions in the Ottoman press on the boycott, the documents on headgear and the boycott in archival material are just few. That underlines that the boycott was not initiated by the government, its dynamics developed to a great extent outside of it. The issue of the fez boycott is discussed in a number of documents

\(^{114}\) Mustafa Sabri, ‘İctimâ’îyyât - Fes ve Kalpak,’ 148.
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depicting the situation in different parts of the Empire, further illustrating some of the
details which went along with the fez boycott.

In Beirut the boycott of Austrian goods and the related discussion about local
substitutes included the need of a distinction of Sunni identity from Shiite identity as it
was embodied by the Persians.\footnote{See BOA DH.MKT. 2644/69.} The kalpak made of lamb skin was refused due to its
resemblance with the Persian headgear as the document states. Instead the kind of
kalpak suited to substitute for the Austrian fez should be made of camel hair. This
decision is reported to the Ministry of the Interior by the governor of Beirut. He claims to
talk in the name of the people (ahālī), who had first begun to wear the lamb skin kalpak
instead of the fez, to which the provincial government objected. After its intervention,
the governor reports the people “unanimously (mūṭṭaḥidēn)” decided on the production
of kalpaks made of camel hair.\footnote{See also BOA Z.B. 589/78 about violation of dress codes by some police commissioners.}

From Adana the provincial governor reports to the Ministry of the Interior about
the refusal of the fez among the population. Instead of the fez, people had begun to wear
headgear of various shapes and colors. This practice was also adopted by state officials,
soldiers and other individuals (erfād). Given the huge variety of headpieces donned by
various strata of the population, the governor expressed worries about public order. His
concerns are not shared by the Ministry of the Interior, who tells him headgear was not
the main issue here but customs.

This document relates to the fact pointed out by Tobias Heinzelmann, that the
Austrian boycott not only was a matter of protest against the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina but generally against the import of goods from European countries
conditioned by very low Ottoman import taxes that prevented the development of local
industries.\footnote{See Heinzelmann, Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikatur, 132.}

I also want to refer to some documents that reflect discussions about the
introduction of the kalpak as part of official uniforms which took place a couple of years
earlier and provides insight into the treatment of the kalpak as an item of Ottoman
identity. Even though the kalpak became famous only with the fez boycott, in the
military it had come into use already a couple of years prior.

\footnote{115 See BOA DH.MKT. 2644/69.}
\footnote{116 See also BOA Z.B. 589/78 about violation of dress codes by some police commissioners.}
\footnote{117 See Heinzelmann, Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikatur, 132.}
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After insurrections in Macedonia in 1903 the military and gendarmerie were organized under the supervision of the Great Powers. For its accomplishment military officers from Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Great Britain and Germany were sent to the three vilayets.118

In April 1904 a document issued by the office of the Grand Vizier concerned itself with foreign soldiers in the Ottoman army who wanted to wear a kalpak.119 There it is discussed and eventually negated if those foreign soldier could be subsumed under a paragraph that regulated the wearing of kalpaks by certain army units. Initially the Austrian and Russian embassy had approached the foreign ministry to inquire if their soldiers were covered under the above mentioned paragraph. In another document of April about the wearing of kalpaks by düvel-i sitte officers, meaning those of the Great Powers of Europe120 sent by the Grand Vizierate to the chief in command (serasker), the Grand Vizierate reports on the correspondence between Austrian and Russian ambassadors on the dress of the military officers of these states stationed in the Ottoman Empire. Obviously the concerned soldiers stationed in the vilayat-i selasa, the three administrative units comprising the region of Macedonia: in Selanik (Salonika), Üsküp (Skopje) and Manastir (Bitola), the uniform was recently regulated by a decree, which also encompassed the wearing of a kalpak. The regulation issued for the Ottoman officers concerns the gendarme cavalry and artillery soldiers. As the kalpak was part of the gendarme uniform, the Grand Vizierate stated it would not be accepted, in any case, that foreign officers wore a kalpak. That was what the chief in command decided, and the Russian and Austrian ambassadors were informed. In addition, the same French Paşa, here called Corcis Paşa, is also mentioned and was exhorted to follow these instructions, even though this time French officers are not targeted.

The issue reappears in July 1904, dealing with the wearing of kalpak and fez by French gendarmes under the French Paşa Ferik Decorcis.121 The headscribe of the Yildiz Sarayı reports a correspondence with the French ambassador and the French Ministry of Defence on that issue. This time the outcome is that these police officers should wear

119 BOA BEO 2309/173171, 28 Mart 1320 (10 April 10 th, 1904); and on the same issue: BOA Y.A.HUS. 470/44, about the donning of kalpak of the police forces in the Three Vilayets.
120 BOA BEO 2309/173171.
121 BOA İ.HUS. 1322/Ca001/119.
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nothing else then a kalpak made of astrakhan with broadcloth at its top and that other the foreign officers in the service of the above mentioned Paşa should wear the same kind of kalpak.

These cases show that it was quite uncertain if the fez and kalpak were rather part of military uniform, a maker of national belonging and demarcation of Ottoman sovereignty. What is in fact surprising is the wish of these European soldiers, or their commanders, to wear fez or kalpak. Nothing is said about the reasons for the desire to adopt the kalpak.

5.4 Children and Heads of Households: Contesting Public Spaces

The satirical paper Karagöz considered as an outcome and success of the Austrian boycott the strengthening of Ottomanism, or more generally a result of constitutionalism, which had led to the identification of Ottoman non-Muslims with the state. Visually that was expressed by the wearing of some kind of “national hat.” One sign of the awakened loyalty and identification of Ottoman non-Muslims for Karagöz was expressed by the decline of the import of children’s hats. When after the end of the boycott trade with Austria-Hungary had been resumed and the boycotted product became purchased again, among the sugar, clothing, and paper, one product, according to Karagöz, was exempted. The article states that persons responsible in Vienna asked themselves why now that the Ottomans imported the same Austrian products as before, such as sugar, fezzes, clothes, paper and mineral ores, one product was missing: That was children’s hats (cocuk şapkaları). Before, those had been ordered in great amounts. Karagöz observes a change in Ottoman non-Muslim clothing practices, encompassing a shift from the endeavor to resemble Europeans in appearance to the awakening of an Ottoman identity.

123 While the Austrian boycott had often an Ottomanist character, at which the author of Karagöz refers to, in the following years Ottoman non-Muslims became main target of succeeding boycotts. See Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu.
Contradictory to the awakening loyalty and Ottoman identity of Ottoman non-Muslim attested by Karagöz, expressed by the donning of “national hats,” some Ottoman Muslims seem to pursue different ideals. In times of national awaking, archival records show Ottoman Muslims as those inducing their children to wear brimmed European hats as a number of incidents in summer 1910 suggest. Some high-ranking members of the military and civil official appear in the archival records, because their children had been reportedly walking around with brimmed European hats in some famous public spaces of Istanbul. The police reproached their fathers that they had encouraged this kind of dress. The first of these accounts is dated May 21\(^{th}\), 1910 (8 Mayıs 1326). Without providing names it generally reported that some Muslim families would let their children wear hats and that the police had been cautioned about these actions, as well as the families received copies of these police reports. It says that due to summer time, pertinent investigations took place on the part of the police because this kind of practice was contrary to and unacceptable on grounds of Islamic morality and customs (ādāb-i islāmiyye). It’s necessary consequence would was a bad influence—for whom it does not say, though probably on other Muslim families and society in general. Furthermore, the police would from now on pay attention to this issue.

The phenomenon of the public appearance of Muslim children with European hats was not new. Already in May 1902 complaints had been raised against parents letting their children wear hats. A former member of the municipality council of Istanbul (şehremaneti), Mustafa Efendi, sent records of a meeting of the council to the Ministry of the Interior reporting mischiefs and problems they saw in town. Among them was the wearing of hats by children, which Mustafa Efendi stated had been “observed by eye witnesses.” According to Mustafa Efendi the wearing of hats was “strictly forbidden by religious law,” because of its abomination of imitation or mimicry (taklīd), and it was

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124 The first report of these kind of incidents appeared in May 1326 and last in August 1326.
125 BOA DH.MUL. 96/-1/381, 8 Mayis 1326 (May 21\(^{th}\), 1910).
126 This first statement on children of Muslim families wearing hats is mentioned in the same document as another case. I am not sure if these two are purposely linked but I get the impression that this is to a certain extent the case. I think both are subsumed under the violation of “local morals (mahall-i ahlâk),” BOA DH.MUL. 96/-1/381, line 7. A women, called Madame Helen, is accused of taking young school girls (genc mekteb kızları) to her house, a hostel named “Muradyan Han.” Is an allusion to prostitution implied here? The document was sent to the Public Security Directorate (emniyet-i umumiyye müdürüyet-i bahiyyesi). A note beneath the actual report on the case talks about (not) giving information to newspapers on the matter. It also says that the police should provide no space (meydân verilmemek) for this kind of “immoral behavior.”
127 BOA DH.MKT. 511/48, 18 Mayis 1326 (May 31\(^{st}\), 1902).
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“contrary to religion” because it was against “Islamic morals and customs.”

Back to summer 1910: All together sixteen of these cases occurred from May until the end of August. In these documents twenty men were addressed who had been send admonitions.

I want to begin with a case described in detail that took place on Büyükada, the largest of the Princes’ Islands close to Istanbul, in the Marmara Sea. The document issued May 31st, 1902 (18 Mayıs 1326) entitled “Referring to the matter that on Büyükada some put hats on their Children,” deals with two cases, the first of them not actually concerned with children wearing hats, but with headgear in general. It refers to the participation of Muslim children in the celebrations of a European (frenk) holiday, as the documents termed it, Christian Ash Wednesday celebrations. The document termed to the church, where the ceremony took place as “the European (frenk) church,” indicating the conflation of cultural and religious identity. The document, as the others treated below, explicitly addressed the children’s fathers, sometimes grandfathers, as those being responsible for allowing their children to wear hats. What might have been at stake here were these men’s identities and not those of their children.

The police reports that on Ash Wednesday, about a hundred Christian women and students of the adjacent Christian school held a procession, followed by a church service. Irritation and a subsequent police investigation had been provoked by the participation of two Muslim students in the procession: Former General İbrahim Paşa’s eight-year old son and the ten-year old daughter of Büyükada’s former Mayor Hafiz Efendi, reportedly took part in the ceremony and thereby had taken off their fezzes both during the procession and in the church. It is here striking that Muslim children participated in Christian ceremonies, while the case tells us that both boys and girls donned the fez as part of the school uniform.

129 İbrahim Paşa; Büyükada’s former Mayor Hafiz Efendi (1); Hafiz Efendi (2); Şakir Paşa; retired general, Halil Bey; Şehr-i Emanet sabki Reşid Bey Efendi; Fezci Said Efendizade Ali Bey, former governor of Ankara; Ekmekevişat Süleyman; Nuri Efendi; Halil Bey; the president of the naval court Fezizade; merchant and son in law of Ibrahim Paşa, former high military officer is targeted called Şakır Paşa; Safvet Paşa; Ibrahim Bey, son in law of Kıbrıslı Mustafa Paşa; Mustafa Paşa, formerly in charge of the governmental landing pier storehouse (İskele Miiri Anbarı); Abdülsamet Bey, who worked as an interrogator at the court (bidayet mahkemesi – court of first instance); Bekir Paşa; director of the imperial museum Halil Bey; Hasan efendi, a centurion’s son living in Suleymaniyye.
130 BOA DH.EUM.THR. 35/54.
131 Fireng/Frenk in Ottoman Turkish.
132 Is this relevant in reference to the differentiation between fathers, as heads of nuclear families and grandfathers, as potential heads of huge households?
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Even though the document’s title suggests their fathers’ consent with this practice, or even presents them as the initiators of it, in this case Hafiz Efendi is reported to have beaten his son and having expressed his disagreement about his son’s participation and behavior. In contrast the police report suggests that İbrahim Paşa, had sent his children intentionally to the ceremony, since they were students of the above mentioned Christian-school.

The same document engages with another episode that took place on Büyükada. The indicted person was Şakır Paşa, a retired general who was living on the island. He was admonished because his daughters had donned white hats adorned with black ribbons while he want for a walk along the pier with them. The case is also treated individually in an undated draft of a letter addressed to Şakır Paşa. It says that someone had reported him walking, towards evening, along the pier with his two daughters, both 8 years old. Here for the first time the police mentions that the practice of these people, because they were of high social standing, could have a bad influence of the public. Meaning others might follow their example and influence their opinion on the wearing of the hat. The charges pressed and the moral judgements are similar to those in the other examples, this practice being against Muslim customs and expressing ignorance of Muslim sentiments.

Two other men targeted by the police for letting their children wear hats were Halil Bey, former employee of the Istanbul municipality, and Reşid Bey Efendi, former governor of Ankara. The documents on their case were issued on the June 4th, and June 7th, 1910 (22 and 25 Mayıs 1326). The report says that Halil Bey had visited Reşid Bey at his summerhouse (yalı) in Çengelköy, a village on the Anatolian side of the Bosporus. Halil Bey’s thirteen-year old daughter and Reşid Bey’s twelve-year old daughter were viewed walking along the the landing pier in Çengelköy, both donning a hat, the former

133 Was it İbrahim Hakkı Paşa (1863-1918)? He was designated as Westernizer, see Ekrem Çakıroğlu, ed., Yaşamları ve Yaptılarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayınmları, 1999), 1999, vol 1, 626-627. See also Mehmed Galib, Ali Riza, and Fahri Çetin Derin, Geçen Asırda Devlet Adamlarımız: XIII. Asr-i Hicrîde Osmanlı Ricâli (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1977).
134 BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/45.
135 The document contains some more general statements on the matter, that are unfortunately mostly illegible: It is something about relation between the season of the year and the wearing of these kinds of brimmed hats by daughters of exalted officials.
136 Şehr-i emanet sabıkı., BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/66.
137 Ankara vali-i sabıkı, BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/66.
138 BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/66.
described as white with black ribbon. The police in Üsküdar had spotted the girls and reported to the Istanbul police directorate which informed also the Public Security Directorate (emniyet-i umumi müdürlüğü). Again the police reports contain moral judgements of the incidents and base their argumentation for action: these kind of hats did not conform with “the morals and customs of national dress.” Such indifference or ignorance as displayed by these men, the police state, would injure Muslim sentiments and would leave a remaining (dā’imī) impression on the Muslim population. Why is only the Muslim population mentioned? Were there no concerns that the hat would be adopted by the non-Muslim population? Does millī here just mean Ottoman Muslim? In this case there was some confusion about whose daughters wore hats. In the document dated June 7th, 1910 (25 Mayıs 1326) only the twelve-year old daughter of former governor of Ankara Reşid Bey was mentioned to have worn a hat. And the report by the Police director of June 4th, 1910 (22 Mayıs 1326) stated that the former employee of the municipality Halil Bey, visiting Reşid Bey, led his thirteen-year old daughter to wear a white hat with black ribbons while with them, though only Resid Bey’s twelve-year old son was present at the landing pier, and it is not mentioned if he wore a hat or not. Accordingly, the Police director demanded that an admonition would only be send to Halid Bey.

On June 10th, 1910 (28 Mayıs 1326) the police directorate received a response of Halil Bey. He had been the one walking on the landing pier in Çengelköy on the shores of the Bosphorus. He refers to that report that says his thirteen-year old daughter had been watched from a distance wearing a white had on the landing pier, close to Reşid Bey’s house. He asserts that he had received a letter, telling him that his daughter should not wear these kind of hats. But he states first since he lived in Çubuklu, which is farther up the Bosphorus, part of todays district of Istanbul Beykoz, he did not visit Reşid Bey, and on the other hand he did not have a thirteen-year old daughter. So he stated that he was mistaken for someone else, another person also named Halil Bey. Yet, he did not mention if he had a daughter at all.

Two documents, dated June 6th, 1910 and June 12th, 1910 (20 and 30 Mayıs 1326) deal with a number of persons accused of the same offense, who all lived in Göztepe. The
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first one, issued by the police directorate mentions the president of the naval court Halil Bey, retired military officer Hamid Paşa, a person called Doktor Cemal and Fezizade Ali, designated as merchant son in law of İbrahim Paşa.142 The second document, again issued by the Polis Directorate addressed to that of Public Security, talks about Faik Paşa, Fezci Seyyid Efendizade Ali Bey and Ekmekbaşı Süleyman and a person called Nuri Efendi.143 In both documents the mentioned persons, addressed as “Muslim individuals,”144 were accused of promenading with their children wearing hats in the vicinity of Istanbul. The documents neither mention the children's gender or age. There is also no information whether these people were out and about together or if these incidents were spotted in the same place and time but independent from each other.

Another person addressed by the police was Safvet Paşa. The documents dealing with the case stretch over a month.145 It took place in the historical city of Istanbul in the vicinity of Hagia Sophia and thereby adds another venue to the public spaces at which these kinds of events occur. This time it was not one of the places of summer retreat where people took off to escape from city life and maybe their daily duties, where they maybe felt more relaxed than in the center of the old town and maybe less observed. Again we are dealing with an official of the judicial administration. Safvet Paşa had received this admonition because the police saw his daughters, no age is provided, with a black hat walking around in the district of Hagia Sophia. The first letter on the issue is dated June 13th, 1910 (31 Mayis 1326), written by the assistant of the police directorate. This time a date is given when the girl was observed which was the June 10th, 1910. The girls were seen together with a black women. Their parents would live close to Hagia Sophia, in the Yere Batan Mahallisi (Cistern neighbourhood). Safvet Paşa worked for the Ministry of War.

The second document on the issue, presumably a letter to Safvet Paşa or just a report on the matter, dated June 16th, 1910 (3 Haziran 1316) signed by the director of public security (emniyet-i umumiye müdirci).147 Safvet Paşa was a member of the juridical

142 BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/1
143 head of the court bakers
144 Nuri Efendi's position is mentioned, but I could not find out what it was, see BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/50, line 1.
145 "zıvât-i îslâmiyye," BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/50 (hulâşa)
146 BOA DH.EUM.THR. 37/12.
147 BOA DH.EUM.THR 52/61.
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department (muhakemat dairesi) of the War (harbiyye) ministry. I think the letter was
directed to him, because again, it puts emphasis on the moral aspects of the matter. As in
other statements on this issue it pointed out the high social standing of the persons
involved. It says that because these were children of men of highest social standing and
well known and exalted persons the situation was of public interest. These heads of
families were inattentive and ignored the fact that their children wore hats. Here not so
much responsibility but sheer neglect is suggested on side of the state office. That puts
agency away from the heads of families, not as I suggested before all responsibility was
given to them. Is there a complaint that fathers lost authority over family members? That
they neglected their role as head of households? Not only would they neglect there
parental duties, but even tolerate to a high degree their children’s behavior, or even
embrace with enthusiasm the wearing of hats by there children. Again it is said that
these kinds of hats were against Muslim codes of conduct and customs (ʿādāt be ādāb),
but this time not just against dress-codes but in general. By the extraordinary influence
these families were assigned due to there high social standing the author(s) of the
document stated it would stir up general Muslim sentiments.

Safvet Paşa is another rare cases where I found a reply to these admonitions. That
might be because most of the accused persons accepted the admonitions, or at least did
not refuse them, because the only replies I found were contradictory appeals against
these accusations, like Safvet Pasa’s, explaining the situation from his perspective. I think
he adopted a two track strategy. On the one hand he blamed the neighbour’s children. It
was their influence exerted while accompanying his children on the way home from
school, which led to the wearing of these hats. In addition, he sayed that this was an
issue of a one time faux pas and from now on he would take care that his children wore
headpieces conforming with religious and national customs. He emphasized that for him
it was doubly worthy to take care of this matter “since these investigations are due to
religious motivations.”

Then follows the case of Ibrahim Bey, son in law of Kibrisli Mustafa Paşa, who lived
in Fındıklı. The documents referring to the case are dated June 14th and June 15th, 1910
(1 and 2 Haziran 1326) Here one child, age seven or eight, is mentioned, which would

148 Line 1, BOA DH.EUM.THR 52/61, added to the case of Safvet Paşa is a list of names of four children
and their age.
149 DH.EUM.THR. 36/67.
belong to Ibrahim Bey’s family. No further information is provided in the case, like where this child was seen and with whom. The document is almost word by word the same as that on Safvet Pasa’s case. Again the supposed enthusiasm on the part of the families or heads of families in inducing their children to wear hats was stressed. New is that this time the document splits between nation and religion, stating that this practice was “incompatible with national customs and religious practices.”

The report on the following case is dated June 16th, 1910 (3 Haziran 1326). It uses those now well known lines of argument, but provides some information on the case and the proceedings taken by state offices. I am not sure if the person wearing the hat is a child or an adult. She is called Meliha Hanim, designated as “daughter of an exalted family (kerime-i vâlâları).” In terms of space the place where the police watched her wearing a hat is the Galata Bridge which links old Istanbul to the quarters of Galata. So again a prominent public space and in addition placed between the centers of power of the Muslim Ottoman state and the ancient quarters of Levantine merchants. The document does not mention with whom she was when she passed the bridge. What is new is that here the interference of the Ministry of the Interior was demanded, I think by some police department or the public security directorate (emniyet-i ummiye müdiriyeti), it does not bear any sender or receiver. The document states that if there were really among the families of high social standing those who would let their children wear hats with enthusiasm it was important and of general interest to prevent the adoption of this practice by others by stopping the wearing of the hats. Why was it feared that others/the masses would adopt the hats? What was the danger for social order? Which kind of order was feared would break up?

Dated June 13th, 1900 (10 Haziran 1326) the following case is just a short note concerning the daughter of Mustafa Paşa, who was formerly in charge of the governmental storehouse at the landing pier and who lived in Doğancılar, a hillside neighborhood of district Üsküdar, also on the Asian shores of the Bosphorus. His

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150 “if there are really [people], who enthusiastically let their children wear hats (fi’l hakikî sevk-i hevesât țiflana ile şapka giyene varsa),” BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/67, line 6-7.
151 “[…] şî’ar […],” BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/67, line 5.
152 BOA DH.EUM.THR 37/6.
153 BOA DH.EUM.THR 37/6, line 1.
154 Iskele Miri Ambari, BOA DH.EUM.THR 37/6.
155 BOA DH.EUM.VRK 3/32. Again the incriminated person in charge is only mentioned by his former post.
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daughter, Halide Hanım, was twelve years old and watched wearing a hat at a landing pier, the name of which is not provided.

Many of the cases were reported by the police of Üsküdar. Is that because it was a conservative district or because many Ottoman high officials had their (summer) residences in the vicinity of Üsküdar along the shores of the Bosphorus? The document is signed by the police director and addressed to the public security director (emniyet-i umumiyé müdiri)

Again a short note exists on the next case, dated June 27th, 1910 (14 Haziran 1326). The incident again took place on the Princes islands, this time on the small island of Kınalıada. The police department of the island had reported it to the police directorate of Istanbul. The girl was again twelve-years old and her father was named Abdüsamed Bey. He worked as an interrogator at the court. This time the person in charge seems to still hold his post, at least nothing contrary is mentioned. No more information is provided about this case. On June 29th, 1910 (16 Haziran 1326,) another of these incidents takes place in Kızıltoprak, a neighbourhood on the northern shore of the Marmara Sea. Nail Bey, son-in-law of the director of the Yıldız Electric Company, targeted because his daughters had been watched with hats. They were called Fatma and Selma and are twelve and ten years old. According to the description they wore a laced hat made of flax.

In a short note of the Istanbul police director of July 5th, 1910 (22 Haziran 1326,) again a girl was in the focus of attention. This was the eight to ten year daughter of retired Bekir Paşa, who lived in a rented house in Şaskınbakkal quarter in Bostancı. Wearing a white straw hat with laces, she was watched on a boat leaving the Kadıköy landing pier in the company of four women. The police director requested that an admonition was sent to Bekir Paşa.

The following two documents are letters of admonition sent by the director of the public security directorate (emniyet-i umumuiye müdürülüğü). Both documents are almost identical. In the first, dated July 27th, 1910 (14 Temmuz 1326) case a man's
granddaughter, seven years old, was watched wearing a hat. No information where this girl was seen was included. Süleyman Ihsan Efendi was Senior Captain (Kolağa) of a regiment of the Third Army, and he lived in Körbağadere, Kadıköy. This letter could not be delivered as notes on the attached envelope declare as such a person was unknown and not registered in Kadıköy. The other one, issued on August 4th, 1910 (22 Temmuz 1326), is a letter of admonition sent to the director of the imperial museum Halil Bey. Halil Bey’s daughter, called Belkis Hanım had donned a hat, a practice which is termed to have a potentially “bad influence on Muslim views,”163 as the line of argument goes, and thus had to be avoided. Therefore the director was requested not to use this hat anymore.

On August 8th, 1910 (26th Temmuz 1326), the daughter of Hasan efendi, a centurion’s son living in Süleymaniyye, was spotted by the police with a hat decorated with roses in Beyoğlu.164 She had been in the company of a Muslim women the report says. A letter of admonition is requested.165

Many of the police reports stressed the exalted social position of the protagonists. Many of the documents stated that this kind behavior was regarded as inappropriate in regards to national dress-codes and customs and that, if continued, it would leave a permanent impression on the Muslim community, influence public opinion and offend Muslim feelings. The authors of these reports and admonitions justify the state intervention insisting on the purported disturbance that the occurrences had aroused in the Muslim public and on the concern that this behavior would be adopted by the masses. The commotion had caused the Ministry of the Interior to commission a report on the matter of heads of families permitting their children to wear hats.

*Adab*

Most of the documents on children wearing hats refer to the concept of ḍārab-ı milliyê, national or religious customs or manners. In what sense is millî, national, used here? What areas of social life does it cover here? The etymology of the word ḍārab shows that it could open up a whole universe of codes of conduct in different fields and

163 "Enzär-i islâmiyye-i su‘i tes‘iri", BOA EUM.THR 97/86.
164 BOA DH.EUM.THR 98/10.
165 For hat satire of August 1326 and the following year see Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911*, 228 and 412, FN 28.
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that it related to an encompassing understanding of etiquette or social norms. In an etymological sense ādāb meant an all encompassing education and could be used in the sense of “Bildung.” The late Ottoman use of the word is close to or the same as the original Arabic meaning.

Ādāb as it is used in the documents on children wearing hats would actually suggest a meaning like custom or habit. And ādāb, according to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, in its oldest sense actually bears the meaning of habit, hereditary norm, conduct or customs, or values which were something praiseworthy and inherited from the ancestors. Yet ādāb thereafter acquired a much wider sense and lost its meaning of and relation to tradition. From a meaning of high quality of soul and good upbringing in the pre-Islamic Bedouin period it developed a meaning in a specific urban context under the influence of Islam. From the beginning of the Abbasid period on and throughout the whole period of medieval Muslim civilization it carried the meanings of civility, courtesy refinement. It encompassed the etiquette of a broad range of social fields: dress, drinking, eating, boon, companion, disputation, study.

In addition, ādāb had an intellectual dimension, intellectual learning as distinct from a religious one. This meant poetry and the art of poetry, and the first Arab historical and tribal traditions and corresponding sciences: rhetorhic, grammar, lexicography, metrics. The context of this kind of humanistic concept of ādāb was broadened by the contact with Indian, Iranian and Hellenistic cultures, integrating them into the ādāb “kanon.” Next to this broad educational concept existed a more narrow understanding of ādāb. It was related to more functional, one might say vocational, knowledge necessary to fulfil a certain office or task, such as that of a scribe. Or it could relate to the sphere of “belle-lettre.”

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168 1261–1517.
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Millet

The term *millî* of which *âdâb* is used as attribute in many of the documents on children wearing hats derives from the term *millet* meaning religion, religious community, nation. It came into use with the rise of nationalism as a synonym/translation for nation but carried on its religious connotation and use. That is why I think it is important to ask, what was meant by *millî* in these cases in summer? What group of people was hinted at? I think it is an expression of Ottoman Muslim nationalism which included communities and people of other religions to a certain degree depending on time and space, with a stress on Muslim hegemony at many times. Thus these children were not designated as Ottoman children wearing hats but as Muslim children wearing hats. Yet in some of the documents a differentiation between *millî* (national) and *dîn* (religion) is made by the police officers and administrators in charge. Is that of any relevance to understand dynamics, especially politics of difference in the Ottoman Empire and the relation of the different communities among each other in the Empire?

I think some information on the meaning of *millî* is necessary to answer that question. As I said before *millet/millî* then meant nation/national and the question would also be if *millî* just meant national then or if it kept the religious meaning of *millet/milla*. It could mean either religion or designate a religious community or nation. *Millet* in the Koranic context had an identical meaning with religion and that was still valid during the Post-Koranic period and could still be recorded in official Ottoman documents in the nineteenth century.

The use of *millet* in the sense of religious community before the reform period in a contradictory way on the one hand designated Christians outside the Ottoman Empire and on the other hand Ottoman Christians within the framework of the Ottoman millet-system or it could encompass Ottoman non-Muslim meaning Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Roman Catholic Christians as well as Jews.

It was not so frequently used, in the Ottoman realm, for Ottoman Muslims or

169 According to Sâmi, *Kamus-i Türki*, *millî* contained both meanings: Millî - "pertaining to a religion, sect, community, or nation; national"
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Muslims in general.

Millet as in an equivalent for nation or people appeared also already before the nineteenth century (Ursinus in his article in the Encyclopaedia of Islam mentions a sources of mid to late seventeenth century). Millet would appear in the meaning of a synonym for zimmî (non-Muslim Ottomans, protected peoples of the book). Thus when an ethnically or linguistically defined group such as the Serbs or Greeks sought independence from Ottoman sovereignty and lost its zimmî status they were designated as millet. What does that mean now? With its manifold meanings it’s hard to grasp the content of millî or millet referring to different concepts, maybe not at the same time for the group but at the same time for different groups. Zimmî were designated as millet in a sense of non-Muslim Ottoman first and later as movements of national independence as millets in the sense of nation. So millet was a very open notion to designate any kind of ethno-religious-linguistic groups not one at a time but with very fine nuances. So millet used for the same group of people could have different meanings at different times. Or that may not be true or only partly, because Rum milleti in the sense of religious community might designate all Greek Orthodox non-Muslim, all Ottoman Greek Orthodox or the Greek nation after independence.171

Significant for my case is the transformation of the Ottoman concept of millet in the nineteenth century. Kemal Karpat considers the Ottoman millet-system as a means of incorporation of the various groups living within Ottoman territory into the Ottoman system, administratively, politically and economically. Even though theoretically based on the Suras 5 and 49 of the Koran that granted “Peoples of the Book” a certain status under Muslim supremacy, the Ottoman millet system went far beyond granting a privileged but subordinated status. Ottoman non-Muslims, even though administratively organized along religious lines, were positioned in relation to their administrative position to the state. Rather than being subdued to the same condition according to religion, the zimmî status and its accompanying head tax, did not determine the condition of many Ottoman non-Muslims. Individuals’ relation and social ranking thus was not strictly based on religion but rather on the provided service to the state. Thus the administration determined the tax status rather than primarily religion status of individuals.

171 Ibid., 5.
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This complex system of state-subject relations changed significantly throughout the nineteenth century, which came up with well-known dichotomies, which reintroduced/generalized the zimmi status for non-Muslims and made them into so-called minorities in contrast to the Muslim majority.

Before, even though religion was a major part of the framework of the concept of millet, far from ethnic or national connotations, it provided a universal belief system to in many aspects heterogeneous groups. According to Karpat the concept of millet “superseded ethnic and linguistic differences.”\textsuperscript{172} Especially in the Balkans it served, Karpat argues, to integrate “clusters of urban and rural communities” and thus provided a means to control and manage social diversity, beginning with Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{173} But rather than producing a common identity, i.e. as Orthodox Christians, it supported local parochialism.\textsuperscript{174}

Transformations in Ottoman socio-economic organization that abolished the millet system appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century. These entailed, as has been stated before, the rise of local notables, or lay primates, through administrative reforms such as changes in land tenure, Karpat assesses. These measures had massive impacts on state-subject relations. Karpat stresses that the family, as a remainder of the old system, formerly the basic unit local communities, gained extraordinary significances as “the only unit from the old era which retained its structure intact.”\textsuperscript{175} Thus, the extraordinary emphasis on family life during the Ottoman reform era, which is also reflected in the cases on children wearing hats. The family thus became the chief agent in the transmittance and preservation of culture, if the millet is considered the guarantor of cultural in its shifting meanings. Structural transformations that appeared in the Ottoman Empire from the early eighteenth century saw the rise of new social groups, such as merchants and secular intellectuals who opposed the clergy and lay primates of the old millet structure as backward. Even though aspiring national unity on the broader basis they nevertheless sided with the Ottoman central state, a situation also referred to

\textsuperscript{172} Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden: Brill, 1971- 81 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2002), 613.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 620.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 618.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 614; see also Talal Asad on the meaning of the family within the introduction of modern civil codes in Egypt, Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Orig. print., Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003), 230.
by Isa Blumi. Thus, even though the millet-system on first sight favored social organization along religious lines, differences in faith gained weight throughout the nineteenth century and became serious sources of conflict later on, in the form of antagonizing nationalist movements. Nevertheless, Karpat stresses that until 1878, these posed no serious problems to the Ottoman government until 1878. Karpat's account thus cautions to assess references to a Muslim-non-Muslims diversity as phenomena closely related to the social conditions that appeared throughout the nineteenth century, not as a timeless phenomenon of Ottoman social relations in general.

The appearance of a modern concept of citizenship, began with the imperial reform edict of 1839, which first refers to Ottoman subjects as “tabaa-yi saltanat-i seniye,” or Subjects of the High Majesty. The concept of citizenship undermined the autonomy and self-rule of the millets. Hence the new political significance of Muslim character of Ottoman government, by the division of society in minorities and majorities. Muslims claimed special status. Yet Ottoman citizenship, expressed in the concept of Ottomanism, entailed the “idea of regarding as Ottoman subjects all individuals living in Ottoman territories regardless of their faith and language.” Further integration was reached by the new administrative structure, such as local administrative councils, where members, according to Karpat, were not primarily representatives of their respective (non-Muslim) communities, but had been chosen as individuals within the concept of Ottoman citizenship that had established itself until the 1850s, long before, the formal nationality law was passed in 1869.

The presented examples provide insight into the highly contradictory concept of Ottoman citizenship. National custom here designates as well a concept of Ottoman citizenship, with the fez as its outstanding marker, which was disregarded by the mentioned heads of families. They obviously had a different concept of Ottoman citizenship than the authorities who interfered in these clothing practices. They were admonished to adhere to national and religious clothing practices that were part and

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176 The terms “tabaa” or “tabiyet” literally meaning “subject” and “subjection,” acquired the meaning of citizen in modern Turkish, Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History, 639-640.
177 The millets themselves became reformed in the 1860s, see Ibid., 641-642. Thereby the millet’s functions were reduced to religious matters in many of their responsibilities went over to the Ottoman government.
178 Ibid., 639.
outside of the concept of Ottomanism.\textsuperscript{179} Striking in these cases is that the intervening authorities do not argue on legal grounds the fez as the common marker of all Ottoman subjects, but rather on the basis of ethics, morality encompassed in a notion of conduct, that relate to embodied practices. The wearing of hats by Ottoman Muslim children also appears in famous autobiographical accounts such as those by Selma Ekrem (1902-1986) and Halide Edib (1884 – 1964). The former was Namik Kemal’s daughter, the well-known Young Ottoman author. She reports an incident that must have taken place also around 1910, of walking the stress with her hat, and the harassments she suffered.\textsuperscript{180}

In contrast to Selma Ekrem, Halide Edip only started to wear a hat when she was an adult. Nevertheless, a remark by Halide Edib on her fathers’ attitude towards her dress provides insight into how children became the objects of their father’s politics of clothes and the importance a father’s preoccupations with his children’s dress could have. Halide Edib’s father was a secretary of Abdülhamid II, and she herself was an author and very active Turkish nationalist.

She comments, taking about herself in the third person:

“Now her father Edib Bey, secretary of his Majesty Adul Hamid, had a strong admiration for the English and their way of bringing up children. He believed that the secret of their greatness was due to this, and so his method of bringing up his first-born was strongly influenced by English ways as he had read of them in books. He occupied himself personally with her dresses, underclothing, shoes, and stockings – even handkerchiefs. Turkey having, however, not yet entered the road of reform and modernism with a slavish imitation of English outward apparel, he did not make her wear a hat. As a matter of fact it would never have done a thing for him even to express a desire to do such a thing, for hats were the outward and visible signs of Christians, yet he only covered her head in winter with a kalpak (a

\textsuperscript{179} The unequivocal meaning of what might be \textit{ādāb-i milliyye} is not just a question of opposing factions but withing the different reform movements themselves, who that inhabited “multiple temporalities” on their own, see Asad, \textit{Formations of the Secular}, 222.

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snug Caucasian headdress which for some subtle reasons ranks with fezzes and tarbooshes rather than with hats and bonnets) and let her go bareheaded in summer.”181

This remark is found in part one of the book, which treats the period between 1885 and 1908. And the dressing practices Halide Edib recounts probably were from the 1890s. As my documents show, the appearance of Ottoman Muslim children with hats at the latest occurred in 1902, but Halide's father as an employee of the palace might have demonstrated reluctance regarding his position rather than because of objections against the hat. Yet, this example shows again the special meaning of headgear as a marker of identity and the transgression of boundaries.

Halide also comments on how she perceived her own dress in contrast to the other children, pointing out the plainness and bourgeois sobriety as a specific feature of her dress:

“She wore short black dark blue frocks in winter, all English-made, and white linen in the summer. Her arms and legs were bar after the manner of the English children, which shocked her Granny and made her anxious lest she should catch cold.

But the little girls' objections were not as to the weather and its changes. She looked different from other children of her age and class. She attracted attention, and she was envious of the gorgeous-colored silk gowns, frills and ribbons, even jewels, with which other little girls were decked. To this day she feels occasional longings for gaudy clothes and vulgar apparel although her true tastes are quite otherwise.”182

All this took place before the Young Turk coup d'etat. Then, later, in 1909, the dethronement of Abdülhamid, Halide Edib mentions another experience with dress, this time actually wearing of a hat. She recounts it in passing, not as a remarkable incident, as part of her preparations for her first journey to England, when she practiced donning the hat, during “a happy fort-night spent at sight-seeing”183 in Alexandria. She does not

182 Ibid., 19-20.
183 Ibid., 241.
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mention why she decided to wear a hat and how she felt. From that I assume it was not remarkable to her from either the feeling of wearing it nor the perception by other people.

5.4.1. Nationalism or Participation in Global Community

The display of hats in summer 1910 in exposed public spaces was a spatial practice, employed by Ottoman Muslim families, that was closely related to the restructuring of urban spaces. The Ottoman central state, in corporation with local forces, applied a number of measures of urban planning throughout the nineteenth century, such as investment in infrastructure, and the construction of urban landscapes in geometrical shapes and regular forms, including the design of public places and promenades. As we have seen, these became important sites of the negotiation of social relations. That included the negotiation and construction of Ottoman citizenship, especially in these public spaces that were frequented by a diverse ethno-religious groups, in parks, cafés, theaters and promenades.\(^{184}\)

Diane Crane also opens up a perspective to integrate a notion of space into the analysis of dress. She points out that the motivation for working class members to adopt middle class dress was the participation in social activities in the city.\(^{185}\) One of the most common of these activities was walking in the city or countryside. Hence, dress became closely interrelated with the construction of public space and the participation of life in these spaces.\(^{186}\) That could have serious consequences on spatial practices: Crane reports a family in nineteenth century Paris, whose members would not move outside of the house on Sundays because of a lack of appropriate clothes. Participation in the construction of public space required specific styles and items of dress.

These requirements of participation in a global or local bourgeois society might have been contrary to beliefs of Ottoman authorities, as in the cases presented above. The fathers of these children might have had aspirations in mind, very different from the

\(^{184}\) See Yonca Köksal, ‘Urban Space and Nationalism: Changing Local Networks in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire’, in *Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey*, ed. Niképhoros Diamanturos, Thalia Dragonas, and Çağlar Keyder (London [u.a.]: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 35–52; and Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700 – 1922*, 160.
\(^{185}\) See Diana Crane, *Fashion and Its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing* (Chicago [u.a.]: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 42.
\(^{186}\) On the interactions of elite women with public spaces and their related clothing practices see Lewis, *Rethinking Orientalism*, 191.
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nationalist and/or religious fundamentalist views of some Ottoman police officers. The hat for them was a means of participation and inclusion into a certain social stratum that was more important than conforming to a certain notion of ādāb-ı and ādāt-i milliyye. The aspiration of bourgeois respectability by these men, with its decency and modesty, surpassed concepts of national specificities, modern or traditional, and probably was not contrary to notions of Ottomanism for them. Public spaces appeared here as a means of social control, as well as spaces of the constructions (subjectiviation) of modern subjects and citizens, as it took place literally via police admonitions.

Palmira Brummett concludes that after the Young Turk revolution Ottomanism prevailed in Ottoman cartoon satire as a means to assert integrity. Even though it emphasized differences within this unity and used stereotypical binaries to comment on Ottoman society, satire assumed a common Ottoman identity. According to Brummet, the binaries perpetuated in satire were not so much those between Islam and the secular West or Ottomanism and Turkism, but rather those appearing out of the revolutionary present political situation, which were old and new, tyranny and freedom, glory or humiliation and not so much as a struggle between secular constitutionalism and religious monarchy.¹⁸⁷

Brummet argues that the Ottomanism that appeared in the satirical press imagined the nation not necessarily as homogeneous but within the framework of the multi-ethnic Empire: “The nation was not in general, an entity envisioned as having reduced boundaries or ethnic or linguistic homogenisation.”¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the term millī in the modern meaning of nation became popularized by Ottomanism as it was perpetuated in the revolutionary press. At the same time that the satirical press ridiculed the failures of the old as well as the new regime, it reinforced Ottomanism in its rhetoric, Brummett assesses. Ottoman was thought to be an inclusive category, as a locus of unity that implied a existence of a common Ottoman culture.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ The former must be understood as rather projected onto the past later on, then those of the contemporaries. Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 - 1911, 317.
¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 213.
¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 120. Also state elites after the Young Turk coup generally adhered to Ottomanism as Quataert puts forward, see Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922, 190.
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5.5 Conclusions: Politics of Headgear as a Popular Movement and Ottomanism

There is no decisive shift in the politics of dress after the Young Turk coup d'etat. From the point of view of an analysis of archival records, I cannot detect significant changes. Some tendencies though do become visible: The number of archival records is less. That might hint to less interference of the state in matters of dress. The most decisive event in terms of headgear is, of course, the fez boycott. Here also the number of state archival documents is rare. I suggest that the politics of dress during the Young Turk period were to a lesser degree made from the state level than by other actors as in the fez boycott and the wearing of and propaganda for other headpieces instead. State interference still was employed as demonstrated by the series of cases of children wearing hats. And the wearing of brimmed hats by Muslims was still regarded as inappropriate. The fez boycott constitutes an important historical cornerstone in the politics of dress and questioned the symbolic reliance of the fez. However, it was still driven by Ottomanist forces, and no other headpiece could replace the fez, even though the kalpak won popularity. The Balkan Wars 1912-1913, rather than the Young Turk coup, constituted a profound break in Ottoman politics of identity even though this shift is not reflected in state records on the politics of dress. Nevertheless, parts of the policy of the Austrian boycott were continued in the movement for the nationalization of economy under Muslim hegemony, whose foundations had been laid during the boycott through the tensions it had created between Anatolian Greeks and Muslims.

After 1910 the hat and headgear in general almost disappears from archival records. I surmise that this is due to several circumstances. The Balkan Wars and WWI might have made quarrels about dress less relevant and not existential during a war economy. Records might not have been kept so thoroughly during the turmoil of war.

190 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 202.
191 See Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881 – 1908, 155.
6 National Independence and the Turkish Hat Law

One more case appeared regarding the issue of wearing of hats which I want to refer to. On July 10th, 1911 (27 Haziran 1327) a sentence issued in martial court (divan-i harbiyye orfiyye), turned on three men who had been arrested in Istanbul because of the wearing of the hat. Subhi, a suspended policeman, reported to reside in a room above the coffeehouse at the Tavuk Pazari (Chicken Market). Hurşid bin Muhammed a student of Islamic theology (talebe-i ulum) was living at the Fatih medrese (religious college). Sabri Bey lived at Anadolu Hisari. The police report states that investigations had been conducted because the three men donned hats contrary to the Sharia. This in itself is remarkable because the Sharia had not been provided as grounds for state intervention in any of my other cases. Even when it was argued that the respective hats were against Islam, Sharia, as the body of Islamic religious law, was never brought up. As I have shown before, the authorities rather referred to codes of conduct and custom, but not to Islamic law. Even though Sharia is mentioned in the case files, the men were sentenced according to military law.

Surprisingly, contrary to this ongoing prosecution of hat-wearers in 1911, and my previous conclusions on the politics of dress after the Young Turk coup in 1908, the final triumph of the brimmed hat within the state bureaucracy, was suggested by an article in İslam Dünyası published in November 1913. Indeed a couple of years had passed since the fez boycott and the legal persecution of heads of families who let their children stroll around in public spaces in Istanbul. The Balkan Wars of 1912/13 and the coup d’etat of January 1913, that had brought the government under CUP control, had meanwhile changed the political climate. I have no further empirical evidence of the dispersion of the types of headpiece at this point; still, the present article, I think, suggests hegemony of certain men within state bureaucracy that did not actually don hats, especially when being on duty, but who, from the point of view of the more conservative opposition, occupied the positions of radical Westernizers.

İslam Dünyası was published Abdürreşid Ibrahim, a migrant from Russia, a very

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active editor of a number of other journals and author of articles before and after his migration. In its editorial Islam Dünyası was dedicated to the “benefit of Islam (Islam faidesine).” In contrast to previous publications by Abdürreşid İbrahim it mostly addressed Ottoman Muslims. The article titled “Those without hats a week later” suggested that men who applied to administrative authorities with some kind of request and did not wear a hat were always put off from week to week without their paperwork being completed. While those wearing hats could come and go, the waiting room was crowded with fez-, turban-, sikke- or külah-donning men. It seems the author did not restrict his critique to privileging non-Muslims as hat-wearers but rather to Muslims. In his reflections on the reasons for the privileged treatment of hat-wearers in public offices and beyond, he concludes that it is related to a shift in employment politics. Asking himself what kind of men entered public offices, he concluded that in previous days “every idiot” had become pacified by a regular income, that had led to the occupation of administrative appointment by incompetent men. Thus he concludes, quite to my surprise, that it was justified to tell the hatless to “come next week”, as it was justified to give to the hat-wearers “everything they wanted.” This conclusion is quite irritating. On the one hand, it is quite unlikely that in 1914 most men in public offices, if any, donned a hat, and on the other hand, that he really agreed with this practice. Yet, his critique of incapable men in public offices seems to be real. Whatever the case may be, the text depicts hat-wearing men as capable and uncorrupted in contrast to those wearing all other kinds of headgear.

Even though a couple of documents on the regulation of dress during the Balkan Wars and World War I exist, I will continue analyzing here the depictions of and debates about dress that took place from 1919 to 1925.

The armistice concluded in Moudros on October 31st, 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies terminated World War I for the Ottomans. In May 1919 the Greek army, backed by Britain, occupied Izmir and subsequently advanced into Asia Minor. Peace negotiations among the Entente powers took until August 1920, when they resulted in the Treaty of Sèvres. According the Treaty, the Ottoman Empire remained a rump state in northern Asia Minor. Against the peace conditions and the Greek occupation, a national resistance movement took shape in Anatolia and finally led to the revision of Treaty of Sèvres, with the signing of the July Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923.
The Turkish Republic was proclaimed on October 23rd, 1923.

Concerning headgear, in June 1920 the member of parliament Emin Bey suggested that the fez would be replaced by the kalpak officially, but most deputies vote against his request. In a short debate proponents of each item argued for the greater authenticity of their preferred headpiece. Other options besides either a hat or kalpak are not mentioned. Members of the first national assembly between 1920 and 1923, according to numbers provided by İhsan Güneş, predominantly donned the fez, 45%, while 22% wore a kalpak, 18,1% a Turban, 1,2% local headpieces, and a remarkable number of 12,5% did not use any kind of headgear. The numbers provide another hint that the kalpak was far from replacing the fez altogether, but remained restricted to a certain group. Remarkable is also the distinct presence of the turban, often neglected in accounts of late Ottoman and early Republican accounts of headgear. Also, the fact that 12 % went without headgear is of significance in the face of the often uttered assumption that going without headgear was quite indecent in the Islamicate world. The number corresponds to the frequent depiction of Ottoman (Muslim) men without headgear in Ottoman satirical illustration. Further, fezzes are mostly donned by civil officials or those with civil professions, while about 50% of the members with military position don the kalpak. The turban is, not surprisingly, mostly donned by religious men and also by local notables, but also by some state bureaucrats who are not listed as inhabiting religious functions. None of the religious functionaries appears without headpiece, while the can be found among most other professions and positions. İhsan Güneş also listed parliamentarian activities according to headgear; these numbers correspond roughly to the distribution of headpieces in general. Any kind of brimmed hat does not appear at all, which leads to the question about those who preferred to wear a hat. Interestingly then, the lack of any headpiece corresponds to the practice of removing the hat inside of buildings.

During the period of the struggle for national independence the Journal of the

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3 See İhsan Güneş, Birinci TBMM’nin Düşünce Yapısı: (1920 - 1923), 3. genişletilmiş baskı, [Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları / Genel Yayın] Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları / Türkiye İş Bankası (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 104-105.
4 On the discussion of going bareheaded see Orhan Koloğlu, İslarda Başlık (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, 1978), 79; photographs of each of the members of the First National Assembly including their headgear can be found in Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, ed., 1. Dönem TBMM Albümü (Ankara: TBMM, 1945).
Ottoman/Turkish history committee published a survey on Ottoman headgear throughout history, describing different types of turbans and other pieces, their material, names, and by whom they were donned. It mostly concerns headpieces of the Ottoman sultans and court members. In my research I came across some Ottoman and Turkish journal articles that appeared during a period of almost forty years that provide surveys of different headgear or discuss the advantages or disadvantages of certain items. By referring to some of them, I want to draw a line from the debates on headgear during the Hamidian period to the Republican era, as these texts bear some striking similarities. It might be possible through the juxtaposition of these texts to carve out what structured the discourse on headgear and answer the question what characterizes and distinguishes the Republican discourse on headgear from the late Ottoman.

The earliest of these, titled ‘Serpuş (Headgear)’, was published in 1877 (1294) in the journal Muharrir. I picked this text because of the striking similarities to Republican discussions of headgear, especially the discourse on hygiene and functionality but also to point out shifts in dressing practices that cannot be reduced to Ottoman or Turkish developments and discourses, such as the question of the meaning and appearance of brimmed hats themselves.

The unknown author of the text in Muharrir claims to scrutinize what was the most appropriate headpiece by comparing hat to fez and some other headpieces such as wigs. He aspired to enlighten his readers so that they might be able to decide the most suitable piece for themselves. The hat becomes thereby part of a certain discursive formation about health and the body. This provides further clues on the meaning of the hat beyond the surface of the body. It is part of the production of knowledge about the body and its coming into existence through discursive practices.

Concerning the article in Muharrir, leaving aside the author’s elaborations on the

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6 ‘Serpuş,’ Muharrir, vol. 1, no. 7 (1294 (1877)), 217-219; on Muharrir see also Hasan Duman, Bașlangıçdan Harf Devrimine Kadar Osmanlı-Türk Süreli Yayınlar ve Gazeteler Bibliyografyası ve Toplu Kataloğu, 1828 - 1928, ed. Christopher Bailey and Cengiz Ketene (Ankara: Enformasyon ve Dokümantasyon Hizmetleri Vakfı, 2000). Muharrir was published in Istanbul between 1876 and 1878, in altogether eight issues, its editor was Ebüzziya Tevfik (1848–1913), who was active in the Young Ottoman movement.
military helmet and the wig, I am interested in the author's comparison of the fez and hat. The article attributes the origin of what is understood as a hat to the French military in the fifteenth century under Charles VIII. From there it had spread among the European civil population. Its basic form was the tricorne, that altered its shapes during its dissemination among the European population. Departing from this initial description of the hat, in the subchapter "The hat’s harm," the nineteenth century top hat had become a target of the author’s critique. From the assumptions of the European’s self-proclaimed elegance and diligence and “extreme attention and considerations with respect to the preservation of health”, and in sharp contrast to these claims, was the hat these Europeans donned: “Shapeless and unattractive and especially from the aspect of health-care it was hard to imagine something more harmful,” the article assesses. In what follows it becomes clear that the article refers to the top hat and its shape that was contrary to the natural curves of the hat, and inflexible anyway. “These good old black top hats” besides their uncomfortable shape were a “dangerous tool” since it prohibited the circulation of air, entrapping and accumulating it inside. A headpiece that would not adapt to the round shape of the head was unacceptable. It would provoke skin disease and premature hair loss. Accordingly most Europeans (frenks) were bold.9

This does not mean the article opposes brimmed hats in general. When turning to the issue of straw hats, they are depicted quite contrarily as “preferred to all other hats”10, as long as they are “light and thin.”11 Air circulation and the cooling effect of the brim, helping against the heat of the sun, made them superior to other headpieces. The brim receives its own sub-chapter underlining its “scientifically proven” quality of protection of the eyes from the sun. On top of this it helped to avoid public expenses and troubles, probably otherwise caused by the harms coming along with the unprotected exposure to the heat.

Despite the praise of the straw hat, another headpiece comes to be preferred by the article, and that is the fez: With its soft fabric that could adapt to the shape of the head
and its light weight, it was most beneficent and supreme as a headpiece. There was nothing more health-promoting to wear during winter time as a protection from the cold. Yet, to make it suitable for the summer, the fez needed adaptation, with a silk lining or some other suitable material. Somehow irresolute, the article concludes that while the top hat was the worst of all headpieces the fez was the best: “In short, of all headpieces – apart from the advantages of the brim – the worst is the hat and – the lack of the brim disregarded – the supreme one is the fez.”

And despite its praise of the brim, in a concluding reference to Ottoman identity, the article argues that nothing else but the fez was thinkable for the whole Muslim community (ümmet), since the fez was a marker of Ottomanism (Osmanlılık). Thus, the author of the article broadens Ottoman identity not by including all Ottoman citizens but rather all Muslims beyond the limits of Ottoman suzerainty. Nevertheless, the fez and modern felt hats meet here, shortly before the emergence of modern felt hats, that in many occasions began to replace the stiff top hat as the single marker of bourgeois identity.


Now in 1922, the fez was still widely in use, also it has been under attack at latest since the fez boycott. It survived because its manifold meanings within Ottoman society,
despite all efforts to fix its meaning, or attribute it to a certain group or mindset. This flexible function of the fez is emphasized by a caricature published in Aydede in November 1922.\textsuperscript{13} While the kalpak represents the “national,” the fezzes donned in respectively specific way, combined with a certain kind of beard, express certain (ideological) mindsets. The fez tilted to the forehead, with the tassel in front, marks “unity.” Unity probably points at the CUP, but might refer here to Ottomanism, the fez either a sign of Muslim unity or of Ottoman citizenship, or of both. The men in addition sports a mustache. The straight fez, with the tassel at the back, expresses neutrality, and I suggest it comes closest to bourgeois identity, as I suggested before, and thus rather expresses ideals of bourgeois masculinity rather than any national or political affiliation, even though that is implied as well. İtilaf, accord or association, part of the name of the Hüriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (The Freedom and Accord Party) that was active between 1911 and 1913, was the second largest faction in the parliament of 1909, and main opposition to the CUP. It was re-established in 1919, but existed only for a short period. In this depiction İtilaf represents the old regime, the old order, with a buckled fez and a full beard. The last person is designated a socialist, with a fez inclined to one side. Thus the last and the first persons are both a variation of the norm, that is the neutral person, while the nationalist and the reactionary are constituting types of their own as deviations from the norm.

The variety of fezzes and the appearance of other headpieces in Ottoman daily life are illustrated in the following depictions:

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{illustration3.png}
\caption{Illustration 3: 'Kadıköy İskelesi [Kadıköy Pier],' Aydede, vol 1, no 27, (14 Temmuz 1338 (July 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1922)), 4.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{13} ‘Serpüşşarın Dili [The Language of Headgear],' Aydede vol 1, no. 6 (19 Kanun-i Sani 1338 (November 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1922)), 4.
Furthermore the *Aydede* volume of 1922 contains a huge number illustrations of Ottoman “notables,” ministers, civil and military officials in each issue, with emphasis on dress and headgear or on different “male types.” These provide an overview of post WWI styles of dress and especially the headgear worn by them or attributed to their

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14 Similar cartoons can be found in the 1922 volume of *Ayine*, some of them also by Ramiz Göce.
attitude. Also the men’s bodies are depicted in a way that they provide an image of the interaction of dress and bodily features, and the person’s character. Even though kalpaks appear, fezzes are depicted (more) frequently. Of importance thereby is especially the shape and position of the fez. Thereby a relation of the posture and the shape of the fez to bodily conditions is recognizable. ‘Reactionaries’/Conservatives’ are depicted with a crooked posture. That means the fez did not have a meaning in general, but different fezzes carried different meanings and constructed different kind of subjects. Often a stiff straight fez is accompanied by an erect body.

Women are mostly depicted in modern bourgeois dress in elegant and elaborate dress, with caps typical of the 1920s or brimmed hats adorned with feathers, ribbons or flowers.

Male hats appear only in a very few drawings in Aydede.\textsuperscript{15} Just fezzes (mostly), some kalpaks and turbans, while some men are bareheaded. Kalpaks mainly appear in portraits of Ottoman dignitaries and mostly at the heads of military officers.

In addition to Ottoman dignitaries Ramiz Göce and other illustrators also drew different male types, such as the “lover of ceremonies” in an elegant three piece suit with a long flowing coat, a cigarette and a fez, narrowing at its top.\textsuperscript{16} Those types wear even more individually-shaped fezzes than those dignitaries portrayed weekly. There is also a reference to the practice of Ismail Hakkı [Baltacioglu], the Ottoman reformer, who argued against the tassel of the fez.\textsuperscript{17} That means discourses started before Word War I were seized upon. The illustrator depicts Ismail Hakkı with a tassel-less fez and quotes real or alleged speech of his, mocking the contents and seriousness of his utterances on Turkish identity: “Being a Turk means (being a) minaret.”\textsuperscript{18}

In Aydede illustrators make a clear generational differentiation: Only older men are depicted in the styles of conservatives, with looser fitting clothes, crumpled fez and full beards, while most young men correspond to the image of neat appearance.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} For depictions of hats, see i.e. Aydede, vol. 1, no. 48 (10 Hazıran 1338 (Juni 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1922), 2; or Aydede vol 1, no. 79 (2 Teşrin-i Evvel 1338 (November 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1922), 4.

\textsuperscript{16} Aydede, vol. 1 no. 13 (13 Şubat 1338 (Februar 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1923)), 3.

\textsuperscript{17} On Ismail Hakkı [Baltacioglu] see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill, 1964), 403; and his pamphlets on education and conduct: Ismail Hakkı [Baltacioglu] Terbiye-i Avam (Istanbul 1914); and Talim ve Terbiyede İnkılap (Istanbul, 1914).

\textsuperscript{18} “Türk demek minaret demedir,” Aydede vol. 1, no. 14 (16 Şubat 1338 (Dezember 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1922)), 2.

\textsuperscript{19} See i.e. Aydede nr. 15, vol 1, (20 Şubat 1338 (Dezember 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1922)), 2. The generational contrast in clothing style is here visible between father and son.
shape of the fez also relate to social class, the more neat and even, the higher the person’s social standing? The question of age was addressed in a depiction that contrasts the style dress of two old men to that of two younger ones. One each of them in nationalist, militaristic dress and the other in modern bourgeois Ottoman style with suit and fez. There are obviously differences between the two generations in bodily posture and the accuracy of dress. The old man’s dress is tattered and their bodies stooping, whereas the young military officers presents himself in a somewhat exaggeratedly energetic s-shaped posture, while the men in suit and fez looks down on him somewhat pejoratively. The two old men in contrast are on the same level, looking in each others eyes.\(^\text{20}\)


Aydede provides a profile of post-war Ottoman styles and their social meaning, as well as the relations of a person’s physique and character and their dress. Besides the various depiction of headgear and male dress, the depictions of blurred gender

\(^{20}\) ‘Ātti’ (The Future), Aydede, vol 1, no. 15 (20 Mart 1338 (Dezember 15\(^{th}\), 1922)), 3.  
Gençlere nazaren (from young people's perspective):  
1) – Bendenz de māliye'de me’mūrum…. (Your humble servant, I am also an officer at the treasury)  
- Oh oh, ātīmiz qalene/kalma gibi sāğlam …. (Oh oh, our future is stout like our officers/inheritance)  

İlhiyārlara nazaren (from the elderly's perspective):  
2) – Sizin teḳāʿüdiyeyi de ḳısıyorlarmı? (Do they also dock your pension?)  
- Tabi‘i …. gençler düşünmiyor ki āti …. (Sure … the young people, they do not think of the future …)
boundaries by means of modern dress are striking.\textsuperscript{21} Still, the fez prevails also in these depictions. It is hard to draw conclusions from the few depictions, yet I think they serve to illustrate that the uses of modern male dress were not restricted to men, and while on the one hand modern European dress displayed a disparity between male and female items of dress, the possibility of appropriating male or female dress by all kind of persons implied the possibility of blurring these gender binaries. These kinds of illustrations also might imply the fear of feminization through modern dress, as in the illustration titled “Politics of taste: Modern women, modern men.” Striking are the similar body shapes of men and women as in another caricature, similarly titled “Modern women and modern men: The difference between them,” where a person is dressed half as a woman half as a man, with a body shape with a very thin waist, suggesting wearing a corset. Another caricature that shows a female figure wearing a fez and a jacket is subtitled: “Don’t pay attention to my dress, I am still a women … there will be many saying that.”\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} See also illustration ‘Kart Postal’ Aydede, vol. 1 no. 59 (24 Temmuz 1338 (May 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1922)), 1.

\textsuperscript{22} “\textit{Kıyafetimi bakmayın, ben yine kadınım ... diyenler çok olacak [There will be many who say: don’t pay attention to my dress ... I am still a women.]” Aydede vol. 1 no. 78 (28 Eylül 1338 (October 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1922)), 3.
The cartoonists rarely addressed national attire, but it appeared in illustrations once in a while, i.e. one illustration asked for the introduction of national dress for men, just as it existed for women, as the illustrator assessed. And that is his proposal:

Illustration 10: 'Kıyafetimi bakmayın ... ben yine kadınım diyenler çok olacak [There will be many saying: don't pay attention to my dress ... I am still a women],' Aydede vol. 1, no. 78 (28 Eylül 1338 (October 11th, 1922)), 3.


Here an idea of national dress is presented as a slight modification of modern bourgeois dress according to ideas of the character of Turkish national dress: The coat is cut shorter than the usual sack coat of the contemporary up-to-date three piece suit and the trouser legs are cut looser and wider at the thighs than beneath, evoking a slight resemblance with a şalvar. Thus, this author imagines national dress as a variety of modern bourgeois dress, not as a completely different style.


In 1922, the Ottoman-Turkish humorist magazine Ayīne published a caricature entitled “Changing Heads” narrating the history of World War I and the following War of Independence from 1918 to proclamation of the Turkish Republic. It consists of six strips representing different historical moments.23 Set in 1918 the first scene entitled “War” depicts Ottoman soldiers and their German allies, recognizable respectively by the Ottoman military cap kabalak and the Prussian spiked helmet.24 The second strip “After the War” from 1919 shows several headpieces with Ottoman connotations: the fez, the

24 The kabalak is a cloth helmet padded with cork, worn by the Ottoman army in WWI, also known as Enveriye, after Enver Paşa.
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kalpak and the *kabalak*, as the dominant pieces donned during the period. The appearance of the *kabalak* makes visible the participation of the rank-and-file.

The next one down refers to the armistice of Moudros of October 1918, which marked the end of World War I for the Ottoman Empire.\(^{25}\) The image represents an Italian and a British man wearing a military cap, and a French one with a bicorne. The two other men wearing a turban and a fez symbolize the occupied territories on Northern Africa and Arabia. “After the Armistice,” dated 1921, depicts the Turkish War of Independence and refers to the British occupation of Istanbul on March 16\(^{th}\) 1920 and the 1919 invasion of Asia Minor by Greece. The headwear in this image include three European brimmed hats, Greek national headgear, and a military cap. The next sequence called “Peace” addressed the Armistice of Mudanya that took place in the Autumn of 1922 and preceded the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, showing five fezzes and a turban. The establishment of the Turkish nation-state was predicted and anticipated by the last strip “After the Peace”.\(^{26}\) The headgear depicted here are indeed a military cap, several kalpaks and one fez.

The cartoon illustrates the end of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Turkish nation-state through the appearance and disappearance of different types of headgear within Ottoman territory. By representing male bodies as national allegories, the comic strip tells an intertwined history of nationalism, nation-building, and masculinity. At the same time, it documents the conditions of nation-building in the Ottoman Empire, its embedment in international politics. With regard to the interplay between nationalism and masculinity, the strips draw parallels between national characteristics and male identity; they point to the emergence of Turkish national identity after the Turkish War of Independence, depicting men as the actors of the nation-building process. These men are national allegories and actual representatives of the nation. Especially in the last two strips the displayed male figures form a collective national body, characterized by Ottoman or Turkish headgear. What the cartoon did not anticipate, however, was the 1925 replacement of the traditional and local headgear with

\(^{25}\) The negotiation between the members of the Entente following the armistice of Moudros resulted in the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10th August 1920. This divided and distributed the Ottoman territories amongst Britain (mandates in Palestine, southern Syria and Mesopotamia), France (mandates in Syria and Lebanon), Greece (Eastern Thrace and the area around Izmir) and Italy (southwestern Asia Minor). An independent Ottoman territory remained in Northern Asia Minor.

\(^{26}\) ‘Değişen Başlar,’ Ayine, 1.
the brimmed hat as the symbol of modern Turkish identity.

But the hat had not disappeared from the agenda. In September 1923 the periodical *Mahfil*, in the editorial designated as an Islamic journal, discusses the question hat versus fez via a translation from an Egyptian journal.\(^{27}\) The article is a reply to someone named Yusuf Hamdi, who recently in the same newspaper had argued to replace the fez with the hat. It is a statement in favor of the fez, a statement shared by *Mahfil*. It starts out from an aesthetic perspective, the fez was more beautiful than the hat, and then largely draws on arguments of functionality, as well as religion/culture and religious practice. The fez was the only item that distinguished the Easterner from the Westerner, and it was a specific feature of Islamic identity. In regards to religious practice, the hat prevented a Muslim from performing prayer with dignity.

Even though the hat was above all not functional, in windy weather it did not stay on the head i.e., in the expectation of some sort of profit some Egyptians adopted everything harmful from Europe. Conversely in Europe no one exchanged their headgear, since headwear there was fixed and determined. From the Egyptian example the author contends that European dress was not in use before the appearance of the European colonial administration in Egypt. That had been the beginning of a “secret war” against Islamic dress. The article concludes that, in a nutshell, compared to European dress, Muslim dress (*libās-i islām*) was more suitable to maintain health.\(^{28}\)

Besides the fact that similar discussions about the hat also took place in the Egyptian press and that its arguments are adopted and considered relevant and applicable to the Ottoman/Turkish context by *Mahfil*, the repeated emphasis on functionality is striking here, even though other arguments, such as the relation between European dress and colonialism and Muslim religious practice and identity, all appear as well.

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\(^{27}\) Fez ve Şapka [Fez and Hat], *Mahfil*, vol. IV, no. 40 (Istanbul, Safer 1342 (September 1923)), 61.

6 National Independence and the Turkish Hat Law

6.1 Representations of Dress and Discussions about Headgear after the Establishment of the Turkish Republic

Discussion of the hat continued after the proclamation of the Republic and concerned women’s as well as men’s hats.

An article in Sebilürreşād on November 28th, 1923 was bothered by the display and positive comments on the latest European hat pieces for women for the forthcoming winter in the newspaper Vakit.30 The mentioned headpiece seems to be some kind of cap or cape, “of elegant style” made of dark coloured velvet that was combined with an overcoat. Sebilürreşād accused Vakit of propaganda with these kinds of hats for Muslim women. It was clear, according to Sebilürreşād, that by these lines Vakit suggested the adoption of this hat by Muslim women. Sebilürreşād warned of the disastrous consequences that might follow for the country (memleket). Propaganda for the hat would not help anyone besides the hat-makers, the articles continues, for whom the newspaper obviously made its pages available. Those who wanted to Europeanize the country and wrongfully seized its identity would not understand the harmfulness of this behaviour and ignored the sentiments of the people, Sebilürreşād argued, without specifically mentioning the contents of this harm.

In 1924 a number of articles discussed on the issue of wearing hats. In September Adullah Cevdet in İctihad commented on the arrest of a hat-wearing Muslim named Hayreddin Bey, criticizing the persecution of hat wearers by comparing the arrest to the situation to a number of European metropolises. He poses the question, whether a fez-wearing citizen of the respective states would have been likewise arrested. The denial of that possibility leads him to criticize the restraint of freedom in Turkey compared to the mentioned European countries.30

Also in 1924 there appeared the pamphlet Frenk Mukallitiği ve Şapka (The imitation of Europeans and the hat) by İskiliki Atif Hoca.31 In reference to the hadith “min

30 Abdullah Cevdet, ‘Şapka-Fes,’ İctihad, no. 169 (September 1st, 1924), 3414.
tashabbaha bi-qavm fa-huwa minhum”⁵² - “who imitates a(nother) people becomes one of them,”³³ he discusses what kind of modernization is compatible with Islam and argues that the wearing of the hat was illicit.⁴ Next to basing his argument on the hadith he assesses that the wearing of the hat was irreconcilable to the free and independent development of the individual. The pamphlet held a prominent role after the promulgation of the hat law, when real or alleged opponents of the hat law had been persecuted on the basis of their relation to Atıf Hoca and his writing, as was Atıf Hoca himself, who was sentenced to death by the Independence Tribunals.³⁵

In August 1924 Sebilürreşād published an article on the wearing of hats by a growing number of youngsters, showing itself scandalized by the phenomenon.³⁶ During the summer the article states, among the “kids” ( çocuklar), the wearing of white cotton hats gained currency. Even some of their close friends, the authors recount, noticed that their children donned these hats. When asked why, their children stated, they could not find fezzes or kalpak's in the stores and hence bought these hats.³⁷ The merchants themselves had “shamefully apologized,”³⁸ that the vendors always brought these kind of hats from Europe. On market days Muslim girl of thirteen or fourteen appeared with hats, the article continues. And on the ferries, being visible for everyone, Muslims as well as Christians, some Turkish women who imitated (taklîd) the fashions brought to Istanbul by Russian wives during the occupation by French, British and Italian forces sat

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34 His arguments are countered by Vedi Karabay in Vedi Karabay, Şapka Giymek Haram Değil (Hatay: Matbaatü'l-İktisad, n.d.). Another book contains a writes discussion of Süleyman Nazif with Atıf Hoca on the issue: Süleyman Nazif. İmana Tasallut (Şapka Meselesi) (İstanbul: Maarif Kütüphanesi, 1926).
36 ‘Ba’ızı Gençleri’nin Sokaqlarla Şapkalara Dolaşmaları [The Strolling in the streets of some Young People with hats],’ Sebilürreşād (Sırat-ı Müstakim) (7 Ağustos 1340 (August 20th, 1924)), 207.
37 The authors label these stores, that sell hats, dönme stores, obviously assuming that “real Muslims” would not sell hats, just apostates oder (secret) converts like the dönme. On the dönme and their relation to Turkish nationalism see Marc Baer, 'The Double Bind of Race and Religion: The Conversion of the Dönme to Turkish Secular Nationalism', Comparative Studies in Society and History 46, no. 4 (2004): 682–708.
38 “[...] mahcûb olarak itizâre kalkışyorlar,” Ba’ızı Gençleri’nin Sokaqlarla Şapkalara Dolaşmaları, 207, line 5-6.
with their hat-wearing daughters who were older than fourteen, among the men, proudly speaking French. The newspapers reported that some youngsters had started to wear straw hats as well. And some newspapers had inquired the governor on the matter that a bunch of male and female youths donned hats. The governor appeared baffled what to reply, and said he wasn't aware of the hat-wearing practice, and if he got informed about it, he would consider what to do. Currently it was hard for him to imagine that a youngster would take off the fez and wear a hat instead. The writers of Sebilürreşād concluded that he would approach the government in Ankara about the necessary measures. Newspapers were keen to know what the government thought of this significant issue. Moreover, they'd likely conduct a survey on the wearing of the hat. And just as these newspapers had paved the way for Turkish women's appearance in bars, dance floors and stages, their wearing of décolleté dresses and their drinking of alcohol through a survey, the author's assess, the same might happen for the wearing of the hat. That way the hat would spread through different segments of society, from young to old, the authors conclude.

In its August 31st, 1924 issue, Sebilürreşād discussed in a short note the actual affinity of women in Turkey for the hat.39 The women this time were designated as Turkish, not as Muslim, such as in the comment just eight month before.40 Their affinity was towards a new lifestyle depicted by a contrasting image, assessing that the Turkish woman, just as she formerly lay at home in her soft cushions, warbling Asian songs and eating sweets, now goes out to the ballroom to dance. With an attitude the Sebilürreşād considered an Eastern treat, Turkish women, the magazines argued, poured out into the streets, restaurants, theatre and cinemas, while they left the household to elderly mothers and nannies.

Sebilürreşād links modern Western dress to a certain lifestyle that entails the participation of women in leisure activities in public spaces and the neglect of housework.

39 'Baʿżı Türk Қadınlarinda Şapkaya Meyil [Some Turkish Women's Prediliction for the Hat] Sebilürreşād (Sırat-i Müstakim), vol. 34, no. 610 (31 Temmuz 1340 (August 13th, 1924)), 190 – 191.
40 Does this mean Muslim and Turk are interchangeable or is their a difference in meaning?
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6.2 Şapka İnkılabı - A Hat Revolution?

The new Republican regime declared the hat to be a symbol of progress. A campaign waged in summer 1925 propagated brimmed hat as the headpiece to be preferred by everyone. Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] the first president of Turkey, visited several provinces, where he delivered speeches about dress and other issues. Mustafa Kemal himself appeared with a Panama hat.\(^{41}\)

The Turkish hat law of November 1925 was legally preluded by the introduction of peaked caps in the Navy in 1925 and the obligatory wearing of hats for civil servants in September of the same year.\(^{42}\) It thus strikingly resembled the introduction of the fez almost a century ago, even though the hat law itself concerned only headgear and no other items of dress. And also the circumstances of the promulgation of these decrees were quite different, since what was at stake was not the restoration of imperial power under modern signs but the establishment of a Turkish Republic. Yet, similar to both of these fundamental interventions concerning dress was the international recognition as an independent state in the face of Western European imperial powers.

In September 1925 the cabinet issued a decree which ordered “the common and universal dress donned by all civilized nations on earth”\(^{43}\) for all civil servants, which included the wearing of the hat outside and its doffing inside of buildings. This decree was followed by the “Law on the Wearing of the Hat,” the legal text of which read:

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42 Regarding this matter a statement of the president for religious matters Rifat exists, see Gotthard Gotthard Jäschke, Der Islam in der neuen Türkei: Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, Die Welt des Islam 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1951), 45.

43 Resmi Gazete, vol. 3 no. 168 (5 Eylül 1341 (September 5th, 1925)), 445: decision number 2413, issued by the ministers council on September 2nd, 1925: “Tekaya ve Zevayının Seddine ve ilmiyye Sunşı Kivvesine ve Bi’l-umum Devlet Memurlarının Kıyafetlerine Dair içra Vekilleri Hey’etinin 2 Eylül 1341 Türkiye icimi’nda Muttehiz Karâr Uzerine Tanzim Edilmiş Olan Karârnâme.” The decree also included the prescription of a ritual of saluting, which was, inside of buildings accomplished by a nodding of the hat (“salam teatısı baş işaretiley olur.”), outside of buildings by doffing of the hat (“binalar harcinde salam teatısı şapka ile olur.”)
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“All members of the Turkish National Assembly, all officials and employees in local, regional and central state offices are obliged to wear the hat donned by the Turkish nation. The common headgear of the Turkish people is also the hat and the government interdicts the continuation of any practices/habits contrary to this.”

Also the law, if often interpreted as addressing only men during Mustafa Kemal’s hat-propagating journey, actually openly demanded that the hat would be adopted by women as well. This and other hints suggest that the hat law included women, even if it is often interpreted differently. Still, that does not mean it did not have specific implications for masculinity.

The law was implemented with the help of severe punishments, enabled by martial law that was in force since rebellions north of Diyarbakır took place and had been suppressed at the beginning of the year 1925. In March the Turkish parliament passed the “Law on the Maintenance of Order” that provided the government with far-reaching competences such as the authority to outlaw organizations and publications by administrative measure. Furthermore, the government reinstalled the “Independence Tribunals” (İstiklal Mahkemeleri), a court martial introduced during the Turkish War of Independence. The tribunals and the law were utilized by the Turkish government to first suppress the insurrections and later to police any political opposition. On this basis it accomplished an extensive reform program that included the hat law. The law caused open resistance in some Eastern provinces of Turkey and other more subtle forms of everyday resistance to avoid the wearing of the hat.

44 “Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi azaları ile idare unumiyi ve hususiyeye ve mahalliyyeye ve bilümum müessesesata mensup memurin ve müstahdemin Türk milletinin iktisa etmiş olduğu şapkayı giymek mecburiyetindedir. Türkiye halkının da umumi serpuşu şapka olup buna münafi bir itiyadın devamını hükümet meneber.” Şapka İktisisi Hakkunda Kanun,’ Resmi Gazetesi vol 3 no 230 (28 Tesrin-i Sani 1341 (January 10th, 1926)).


47 Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu.


49 See Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri.
In the newly founded Republic, the hat law was subsumed under the term \textit{İnkılab}, meaning reform, revolution, transformation, restructuring. Revolutionism or Reformism (\textit{İnkılapçılık}) was part of the six pillars of Kemalism, the set of ideas of a kind of framework which structured early Republican politics. It had some principles set and subsumed the measure taken to transform state and society. The other four principles proclaimed by the early Republican government were laicism, nationalism, etatism and republicanism. The Hat Law issued in 1925 was one of these measure which encompassed the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the adoption of the Western clock and numerals in 1926, the Latin alphabet and numerals in 1928, Western weights and measures in 1931, the introduction of family names in 1934.

The self-proclaimed radical change of society by the Republican regime needs to be treated with a certain caution, because it mainly legitimated its power by demarcation of old from new. Thus, besides the massive transformations undertaken, many studies have pointed to the Ottoman legacy of the measures, and the dictatorial character of the one-party regime.\footnote{Such as Erik Jan Zürcher, \textit{The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey} (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010); Eric J. Zürcher, ‘The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodization’, \textit{Die Welt des Islams} 32, no. 2 (1992): 237–53; and Michael E. Meeker, \textit{A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity} (Berkeley [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 2002).}

An objection that limits the scope of these measures, it the denial of structural class differences by Kemalism, as pointed out by Zürcher, and thus organizations which acted on the basis of class were considered illegitimate. The same was applied to other kinds of identity politics besides Turkish nationalism. Hence, women’s organizations and the women’s party were banned as well.\footnote{Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, 180.} Class differences made visible by the adoption of new headgear were denied and tried to use to create a homogenous nation. The notion of class was regarded as a European category that could not be applied to Turkish society, yet communist and socialist activists existed and were fought fiercely by the new regime.

\textit{İnkılapçılık} as Zürcher put it - “meant a commitment to ongoing (but orderly and state-led) change and support for the Kemalist reform programme.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 182.} Similarly Paul Demont defines \textit{inkılab} as “radical change with order and method.”\footnote{Paul Dumont, \textit{The Origins of Kemalist Ideology}, in \textit{Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey}, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 34.} Taha and Parla most
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elaborately worked on the definition of early Republican ideology, including the notion of *inkılab*, and also put emphasis on the authoritarian character of the regime and its limited scope in terms of social justice.\(^{54}\)

6.2.1 Mustafa Kemal's Speeches, the Hat Law and Gender

The family, and with it gender relations, is one of the main foci in Mustafa Kemal's talks held in the context of the promulgation of the hat law.\(^{55}\) Modern dress became closely linked to the emergence of the modern bourgeois family. The family as the smallest unit of the nation state has been widely discussed; nevertheless, the importance of this focus on the family cannot be underestimated and is crucial to the formation of modern Turkish identity. Kemal Karpat, in his account of the millet system, and Talal Assad, in his study on the codification of family law, have both emphasized the centrality of the concept of the family to the discourse of modernization.\(^{56}\)

New legal regulations regarding the family were released after the hat law. The hat law can be considered as the basis of Turkish nation-building since it provided a means of Lacanian interpellation as conceptualized as a means of subjectiviation by Althusser. Every single person, thus, could be addressed by the institutions of the state constituted as a modern subject. It was the basis for a number of subsequent laws such as the family law in 1926 and the surname law in 1934.\(^{57}\) Through these “the citizen could now become a subject ruled not by kinship ties or loyalties, but through his own sentiments: love for family and country.”\(^{58}\)

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54 In order to define *inkılab* Taha and Parla compare its meaning to the Ottoman Turkish terms or revolution and reform, *ihtilal* and *ıslahat*. The former hinting to radical change of political and social conditions not necessarily from above, also containing the meaning of revolt. As for *inkılab* these authors opt for a translation of this notion of Kemalist revolutionary ideology as transformationism, Taha Parla, * Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2004), 47.


58 Ibid., 187.
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To get a clue as to the meaning of the hat and the hat reform had for the Kemalist regime, it is helpful to look at the talks Mustafa Kemal held to propagate the hat and its implications. In August 1925 he delivered a speech in the Black Sea town Inebolu and another in Kastamonu, the capital of the Black Sea province named after it.59 A source on Mustafa Kemal's view of the hat law is the so-called "speech" [Nutuk] where Kemal outlines his perspective on the Turkish War of Independence.60

The different talks held on the journey in Kastamonu were structured similarly: Mustafa Kemal began with praising the progressive attitudes of the local population while in one breath he uttered threats towards non-conformists, that were followed by an introduction to his reform program, including headgear. His elaborations of dress and headgear were brief but significant with regard to the Kemalist view on modernization. Mustafa Kemal assessed that current clothes of the people he saw was uncivilized and neither national nor international. Instead dress consisted of hybrid styles, that did not correspond to his aesthetic standards or his standards of taste, by the combination of pieces that did not fit together.

Concerning the question of national dress Mustafa Kemal explicitly argues against the search for an authentic “Turanian” style of dress and instead lists the components of the kind of dress he has in mind:

“I want to speak frankly: On our feet we wear low shoes (iskarpin) or buskin on our legs pants (pantalon), waistcoat (yelek), a shirt (gömlek), a tie (kıravat), a removable collar (yakalık), a jacket of a suit (ceket), and of course to complete the head a hat

with a brim ([siperi şemsli serpuş]). This headpiece is called a hat.”

To delegitimize the fez he terms it futile for Turkish nation-building for its alleged Greek origin, thus disposing it of any Muslim connotation and instead attributing it to the current arch-enemy of the Turkish nation.

In his talk in Kastamonu Kemal further elaborates on the undesired mix of styles in contrast to the list of pieces of dress which should and could be combined. He picks a person from the audience, ridiculing his dress. Thus, wearing certain pieces of Western dress was not enough in his eyes and not a sign of modernization but quite the opposite. Kemal thus asks: “Would a civilized human being wear such strange dress and embarrass himself?”

Actually Kemal disregarded class differences and does not include the option that the addressed person could not afford a full modern suit even if the person wanted to.

Mustafa Kemal embeds his remarks on dress and Turkish national identity in the context of the family and gender. He argues that next to a mindset, the shape of families was a characteristic which set the civilizational level of a society/nation, stating that “the Turkish Republican people need to show through its family life and its lifestyle that it is civilized.”

The juxtaposition of lifestyle, family life and the hat law link the hat and male headgear to male identity and sexuality, and thus render visible the close relatedness of gender, dress and nation-building.

While on the one hand references to the family can be read as a call to gender equality, I think it should rather be read as a reorganization of gender that appealed to women’s place in the family but also referred to the participation of women in other spheres. Underlying gendered constructions of citizenship need to be considered here, since modern concepts of citizenship contained certain ideas of masculinity and femininity that implied hierarchical gender relations.

Kumari Jayawadena analyzed the interrelation of nationalism and feminism, especially in the context of postcolonial nationalisms. She scrutinized how the call for

61 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Nimet Arsan, Atatürk’un Söylev ve Demeçleri, Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları 1 (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1945), 221.
62 “Medeni bir insan alelaceib kıyafete girip kendine gülür mü?” Ibid., 226.
63 Ibid., 220.
64 See Erna Appelt, Geschlecht - Staatsbürgerschaft - Nation: politische Konstruktionen des Geschlechterverhältnisses in Europa, Reihe 'Politik der Geschlechterverhältnisse'. - Frankfurt, M: Campus-Verl, 1994-10 (Frankfurt/Main [u.a.]: Campus-Verl., 1999).
gender equality went along with a discourse on population politics where feminist causes were linked to the reproduction of the nation. A new type of family with “civilized” and enlightened housewives was to secure a healthier nation. She argues that this kind of feminist-nationalist union produced an instrumental discourse on women and the family. The nuclear family was the kind of family identified and thought of as most appropriate with modernity. The call for modern housewives contained the desire to fulfill the needs of the modern man. The nuclear family was to be based on stable monogamous marriage, free choice of the spouses and relationships among the family members based on partnership.66

Turkish nationalism, as utterances by Mustafa Kemal show, linked these emancipatory values to certain virtues and morality. Thus emancipation was only desired within the nationalist framework and within the framework of the heteronormative nuclear family and served primarily the reproduction of a healthy nation. The following quote of one of Mustafa Kemal’s talks conveys this:

“The Turkish Woman should be the most enlightened, most virtuous, and most reserved woman of the world [...] The duty of the Turkish Woman is raising generations that are capable of preserving and protecting the Turk with his mentality, strength and determination. The Woman who is the source and social foundation of the nation can fulfill her duty only if she is virtuous.”67

There was also another critical dimension in the call for female emancipation and gender-equality, which was the ethnic dimension. Emancipation was only meant for Turkish women, those marked or read as ethnically Turkish or those committed to Turkish nationalism. Christopher Huston has commented on this in his analysis of the complex relation Kemalism constructs between emancipated women and ethnic minorities.68 Kemalism/Turkish nationalism confined women’s emancipation to a certain degree to their function in the family which was expressed in expressions such as “millet ana” or “millet kizi”, mother or daughter of the nation.69 Kemal depicts women who deviate from his ideal depiction of the “new women” as a threat to the nation’s image.

68 Christopher Houston, Kurdistan: Crafting of National Selves (Indiana Univ. Press, 2008), 129.
69 See Atatürk and Arsan, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 221-227.
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Women veiling and hiding away from men are considered a threat to the honor of the state and the male citizen’s masculinity. The (re)creation of Turkish masculinity in the Republic, in contrast to the feminization through imperialist European states in the Ottoman Empire, was closely linked to the behavior of women and ethnic minorities.

In his talks Mustafa Kemal’s undertakes the attempt to construct the nation as a homogeneous unit by different strategies: He points out common will, depicts the nation as an organic being, as a suprahistorical entity and attributes certain characteristics such as an inclination to progress. At the same time he marks its borders especially by articulating threats against opponents of Kemalist politics and opponents of Westernization. He argues that national independence was not yet secured or achieved but that it needed to be proved to the Western world by implementation of reforms, stating that no one in the Western world should have a doubt that the civilizational project had been implemented and “the nation has absorbed the entire warmth of the sun of civilization.” He states that Turkish sovereignty was in danger if the reforms were not implemented. Mustafa Kemal evoked the danger of being considered as the other of western civilization and thus in the danger of losing national independence as from a colonialist point of view “uncivilized people” are denied the right to govern themselves. In one of his speeches Kemal equates civilization with a flood which inevitably washes away Turkish society if it does not adapt to its requirements, which are contained in the Kemalist reforms.

It appears in postcolonial states there was a conflict of interest between individual and collective freedom. Not only individual subjects needed to emancipate themselves from repressive structures but also the state itself needed to emancipate itself from European supremacy. Houchang Chehabi points out that states such as Iran and Turkey, which had not been directly colonized, employed a different strategy than states which had been directly colonized. The latter employed “culture” as a terrain void of colonial domination or a place of resistance against colonial domination, while the former relied to a great extent on westernization as a means of emancipation from imperialist domination. Chehabi regards emancipation from imperialist power as the main motive of Europeanization in the respective states.

70 “bu millet medeniyet güneşinin bütün sıcaklığını alınmıştır, masetmiştir,” Ibid., 221.
71 Ibid., 221.
72 See Chehabi, ‘Dress Codes for Men in Turkey and Iran,’ 225.
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Mustafa Kemal links concerns about the image of the nation to concerns about its health and thus picks up discussions about hygiene functionality of dress and especially headgear in the Ottoman context lead before. The hat now is depicted as a healthier piece of dress then the fez and the turban, which is degraded from being sacred to a “dirty piece of cloth.” 73 The fez is made the symbol of a failed modernization, being useless as a protector from the sun with its lack of a brim. In his speeches Mustafa Kemal personalizes the nation by attributing it reason and consciousness and the ability to walk, talk, sleep and get sick. Hence, the hat-wearing nation promises to possess a healthier body and different lifestyle.

Critics of the hat law, who remarked that a change of headgear would fail because it did not change the mind beneath the hat missed that the hat law or any politics of dress are far from superficial, but rather reach far beyond the surface of the body and the mind. 74 Yet, what the law could not change was material inequality, and thus most of the people never reached the bourgeois lifestyle promised by the fashions of the Republican elite. Nevertheless, the masses became effected by measures of social engineering and social control implied by the hat law. Thus even if many people could not fashion a bourgeois lifestyle, their bodies were effected by social engineering and disciplining measures, and body techniques that were an expression of bourgeois hegemony.

These concerns about the health of the nation are closely linked to modern notions of masculinity, as George Mosse has shown. 75 What he depicts for European nationalisms can certainly be transferred to the context of Turkish nationalism and Kemalism, as identity constructions in Turkish nationalism are very similar to those described by Mosse. He draws on the fusion of aristocratic values with bourgeois virtues such as discipline, order and self-restraint in the male stereotype at the end of the eighteenth century. Nationalism came into these constructions of masculinity especially in the late nineteenth century. He also talks about the relation of modernization to masculinity and states that modernization came along with an ideal of masculinity that combined

73 Such as by James de Kay in Sketches of Turkey: “the turban, infinitely varied in shape and color, often ragged, and frequently dirty, suggesting the idea of walking toadstools,” James E. DeKay, Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832 (New-York: Harper, 1833), as quoted in Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 123.
aggressive virility with self constraint. Thus Ottoman and Turkish modernization measures could never be gender neutral even when they aimed at men and women at once, given the inherent gendering of modernity.

This masculine ideal represented the healthy nation which had, according to Mosse, a great continuity over time, especially in its aesthetic forms. That is significant for the analysis of dress because it probably played a big part in producing and constructing an appearance which corresponded to this ideal. The production of this ideal was realized through the construction of a racialized, gendered and sexual other, in which Jewish, black and/or homosexual men were regarded as effeminate. That means within the modern stereotype Oriental men/Ottoman men were the other of modernity per se, and in order to be recognized as subjects by the modern/Western/hegemonic/dominating states, they had to counter the attribute of effeminacy.

If aesthetics were of such importance to modern masculinity, as Mosse argued, it is no surprise that dress was central to the Ottoman modernization process. Those representing the other of modernity also stood for the perceived sickness of the nation. The healthy masculine ideal of modernity further explains the appearance of metaphors like the “sick man of Europe,” which did not only hint at the precarious political situation of the Ottoman state but also to the construction of modern masculinities through recourse to the male body and its perceived physical condition and the way health was constructed through racial and gendered othering. Mosse further elaborates why outward appearance was so importance in the construction of a male ideal of modernity. Beauty, he says, was stressed because this male ideal reflected the enlightenment idea of unity of mind and body. Thus outward appearance provided information about the individual’s character.76

The hats in Turkish nation-building contributed to modern aesthetics in a two-fold way, creating unity and difference at the same time. Made compulsory for all (male) citizens, they contributed to nation-building by homogenizing outward appearance while the construction of this new bourgeois self produced the above-mentioned stereotypes as its other. In Mustafa Kemal’s seven-day speech of 1927, this function of the hat becomes obvious, as he delineates the fez and hat via well known stereotypes. He states:

76 Ibid., 25.
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“Dear gentleman our nation has thrown off the fez off its head, which carried the characteristics of ignorance, heedlessness, religious fanaticism and hostility against progress and civilization, and put on the hat, which is the headgear of the entire civilized world [...].”

6.2.2 Implementation of the Hat Law: Repercussions of the Hat Law beyond 'Islamist Reaction' and 'Cheerful Adaption'

Considering the implementation of the hat law amongst the population Turkish newspapers, historiographic and other accounts produced images of a dichotomy, a split between unconditional excitement for the new legislation on the one hand and a harsh, religious refusal on the other.

Halide Edib provides an insight into the circumstances of the promulgation of the hat law and responses to it.78 Being part of the political elite, yet intermittently persona non grata in the establishment of the Republic, she offers a fresh and unique point of view by carving out the political circumstances that enabled the hat law as well as her impression on what people thought about it. She traces the circumstances that led to the promulgation of the hat law back to the Sheikh Sait rebellion and the release of the Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order) in its aftermaths. She states that the Sheikh Sait rebellion, which she labels as a Kurdish rebellion, had been a trump card in the hands of those who she terms the “extremists” within the CUP who regarded freedom of expression and thought as an obstacle to progress. Mustafa Kemal had stirred anxieties on the possibility of more rebellions and used the atmosphere created by that to enforce drastic political measures. Halide Edip assesses that an atmosphere of state terror was created and used to suppress any political opposition. In addition, the speed and harsh measures to implement the reforms specifically functioned to blur the origin of the Kemalist reforms in the Ottoman Empire and thus produced a false picture of what the Republican Regime accomplished. Contrary to prevalent depictions, Halide Edib expounds, besides “reactionary Islamists”, many other people, if not the majority,


opposed the hat law for various reasons. And “[a]mong all the recent measures [it even was] [...] most seriously opposed in the country itself.”

Hale Yılmaz assumed, in her account on everyday resistance to the hat reform, that “economic reasons, often conjuncture with personal, emotional, generational, social, cultural, or factors helped determine one’s reaction to the new clothing regulations.” On the implication of the hat law Yılmaz referred to the reports of two inspectors, one delivered shortly after the release of the hat law and the other more than a decade later, in 1937, dealing with the Kurds and Turkification efforts on the part of the Turkish state. They show by their utterances that the dress was explicitly regarded and used as a means for the assimilation of Kurds the under the slogan of modernization. The first report was delivered by an inspector, Sami Efendi, who traveled to Van on the Iranian border. He reported on the practices of the Kurdish population of rolling up their conical hats when they went to visit administrative centers. In 1937 a police inspector was disturbed by the outer appearance of Kurds in Tokat, located in the mid Black Sea region of Turkey, when he refers to the “un-Turkish” dress of some men he watched at a public space close to the railway station. He mentions concerns about Turkey’s international reputation at the sight of these men’s dress. To reach a more satisfying appearance from his point of view he suggests that at least they tuck their shirts into their pants.

Regarding the mixture of different styles, especially of local styles with modern dress, Yılmaz draws on examples from South Eastern Anatolia, were people wore a mixture of different styles and also altered between a kind of dress worn when going to the towns and getting into contact with state officials and a more traditional dress when being in the rural areas where they lived. According to Yilmaz this was not regarded as opposition to the hat law but “a practical solution for all parties involved.”

The hat law contained no descriptions on the types of hats that were permissible. Yet a notice of the Ministry of the Interior, referred to by Hale Yılmaz, defined melon, şöştir veya kasket (bowler, felt hat or peaked cap) as “civilized headgear.” Other forms such as

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79 Ibid., 30.
81 Ibid., 29-30.
82 Ibid., 37.
83 Ibid., 36.
the self-invented hats were prohibited. Accordingly brims added to headpieces such as kalpak and külah, with a brim attached that could be folded in on occasions, and the wearing of the brim on the side or back, were not allowed, as the Ministry of the Interior let the provincial governors know.\textsuperscript{84}

“Uncivilized” styles of wearing hats are also documented in other accounts. The line drawn between legitimate and illegitimate ways of donning the hat was very thin, but at least in the beginning it seems that the boundaries between traditional and modern were most rigidly supervised. Irfan Orga, in his autobiographical account \textit{Portrait of Turkish family}, comments on the wearing of women’s hats by men in order to avoid arrest. This suggests that the transgression of gender boundaries through dress and specifically headgear was considered more acceptable than the deviance from what was defined as modern. Houchang Chehabi quotes a travel book by Sir A. Telford Waugh that provides an account of the implementation of the hat law and the various practices involved, reporting that many people donned hats in a way that they resembled banned headpieces as much as possible.

Another deviant practice was the wearing of berets and peaked cloth caps, even though it was permissible. Mango, in his biography of Mustafa Kemal, talks about the hat law and the appearance of peaked caps, too. He comments on the class component of these items, and, different than other authors, he mentions their plentiful appearance in urban settings where many people chose the berets and peaked caps after the promulgation of the hat law.\textsuperscript{85} The peaked cap amongst others the designator of industrial proletariat, could be an item of adjustment as well as resistance. Amongst the street sellers who could not afford any kind of the required headpieces, self-made paper hats came into use, as striking example of the economic character of the modernizing measures.

A practice that was persecuted by the police harshly, at least that as it is suggested by Irfan Orgas report, was the tying of handkerchiefs on the head underneath the hat:

“The old men took to tying handkerchiefs on their heads, placing the offending Christian hat over this, but the police became wise of this use and promptly arrested them. Arrested men were hauled to the police stations in such great

\textsuperscript{84} See Ibid., 36.
numbers that they could not be dealt with and the white handkerchiefs were pulled off the bald plates, the insulting headgear being firmly clamped over the naked, uneasy heads.”

The Republican regime closely linked the wearing of hats to the issue of citizenship and subjectivation. Orhan Koloğlu recounted that people would not have treated their causes if they tried to enter public buildings without a hat. So wearing a hat and knowing the rules of conduct related to it were conditions to be recognized by the state as subject/citizen.

6.2.3 Is Modernity Secular?

Despite the fact that Kemalist elites assigned the religious to the realm of tradition, recently a number of studies have shown that religion and Republican modernity were not as incompatible as often assumed, and quite to the contrary were interdependent in many aspects.

Michael Meeker argued, in his account on the Turkish Republic, based on anthropological study in the province on Trabzon, and historical study of the provincial administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire, that the latter served to build up the Republican political and administrative system. He assessed that “counterrevolutionary practices and beliefs [...] nonetheless served as the hidden devices of the nationalist revolution itself.” Imperial institutions in the old province of Trabzon became part of the Republican system through local elites, and local hocos and aghas become loyal subjects. That does not mean these structures did not modernize, but rather that they evolved along with other transformations of the state.

Similarly did Kemal Karpat argue for the emergence of a modernist version of Islam that differed from previous religious practice. It came along with an emerging landed

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88 Even though I think Meeker’s approach with its emphasis on structures and continuities comes along with some problems, it nevertheless helps to question assumptions of the dichotomy between tradition and modernity and the way provincial society was involved in modernization. However, the significance of notions like “imperial discipline” as a continuum in power relations and the “interpersonal associations” as its basis remain open questions.
middle class that used the emerging public space to model populist Islam to its needs. Karpat attributes this to the Ottoman Empire's unique position in relation to the colonial powers and an independent Muslim state. Kemal thus points out the historicity of religious identity and its blending with modern secular identity. Crucial here is also the discourse of 'the West and the Rest' that is produced by and referred to religious as well as secularizing movements. Cemil Aydin encapsulate it in his comment on the Republican elite's and its Islamist opposition towards the West:

“It is clear that neither was the self-consciously pro-Western Republican elite simply imitating the higher Western model, nor similarly was the self-consciously anti-Western Islamist opposition simply a reactionary rejection in terms of its assessment of Western civilization. Both camps produced occidentalist discourse of the West to formulate and legitimate their domestic reform agendas.”

With those in mind the protests against the hat law, as they place in some Eastern provinces of Turkey need to be reconsidered. Already Garvin D. Brockett carved out the multiple dimension of these protests and framed them as popular resistance. Instead of terming resistance to the hat law as anti-modern, Camilla Nereid defines four different types of modernity in relation to the Kemalist approach that take different stances towards the relation of dress and modernity. Nereid differentiates between

1) “Modernization equals Westernization equals Kemalism statement,” that is the position as it appears in Mustafa Kemal’s talks treated above, where civilization is defined as exclusively and singularly western or European, to which assimilation was deemed necessary.

2) The “Modernization equals democratization and thus differs from Kemalism

89 Cemil Aydm, 'Between Occidentalism and the Global Left: Islamist Critiques of the West in Turkey', Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East: Special Issue on Sex, Gender, and Family Structure 26, no. 3 (2006), 452.
argument” as exemplified by Nereid by the parliamentarian debate initiated by Nureddin Paşa.92 Nereid grounds her arguments on the modernist reasoning of Nureddin Paşa, who appeals to civil rights and liberties guarantied in the Turkish constitution.93

3) The “Modernization equals secularization argument” that is very close to the first definition, and the mental map of Kemalism that divided Islam and the Kemalist project along a timeline.94

4) Within the “Modernization does not equal Westernization thus differs from Kemalism argument” Nereid recognizes “modernizing agents within the Islamic establishment, whose modernist principles were something other than Westernization”95. She considers İskipli Atıf Hoca as representative of this group, whom she terms a “renowned Islamic intellectual scholar”.96 In Nereid’s opinion, the Kemalists disliked Atıf and opposed him because he was “a carrier of continuity from the Ottoman Empire.”97

5) Within the “Modernization equals Westernization thus differs from Kemalism argument” Nereid locates a group she terms “urban intellectuals, who argued against superficial Western mimicry.”98 She considers the novelist Sadri Ertem as a representative of these urban intellectuals who built a counterpart to the Muslim establishment. She depicts Ertem as an advocate of the position that saw Western mimicry as the internalization of inferiority and Westernization as a matter of attitude or rather than style. As an essayist and columnist Ertem “engaged in the discussions around Turkish identity in the post-Ottoman era.”99 He argued for the modernization of Turkish identity but not necessarily in the Kemalist manner. In the context of the Sheik Said rebellion he was charged by the Independence Tribunals, but acquitted later and continued his activities as a writer, becoming one of the “most influential representatives of social realism in Turkey.”100 In two of his writings Ertem particularly dealt with the matter of headgear: “European Hats: The villager with a top hat.”101 Nereid reads Ertem’s fictional

94 Nereid, ‘Kemalism on the Catwalk,’ 715.
95 Ibid., 716.
96 Ibid., 707.
97 Ibid., 717.
98 Ibid., 718.
99 Ibid., 718.
100 Ibid., 718.
101 Avrupa Kafası; Silindir Şapka giyen köylü. It had been published in the newspaper Vakit in 1920.
account as political statements on Turkish society. In a period of rigid press censorship this was a way to express criticism. In *Avrupa Kafası* Ertem elaborated on the relation of attitude and outward appearance in relation to Turkish republican politics of dress. In the known dualist manner he contrasts the European Turkish man to the one with *oriental* appearance. “Ertem thus uses masculine appearance and manner as a means to depict several pairs of dualistic concepts, such as educated versus ignorant, theocratic versus democracy, yesterday versus today, and top hat versus turban.”

But then he differentiates between those who just appear as Europeans and those who have internalized Europeaness or European values. Ertem does not divide between material and mental culture, both come along with each other.

Neireid concludes that the existence of diverse modernizing agents that were considered or considered themselves as legitimating their arguments or actions through religion and were considered by the Kemalist elite as traditional, Muslim oriental Other, prevented an essentialist reading of Islam. I will further pursue to what extent the conception of different types of modernity served to deconstruct certain implications of the modern versus tradition binary, but what it definitely does is situate certain agents within the discourse of modernity and thereby alter assumptions neglecting religion as part of modernizing movements. That is also underlined by Brian Silverstein’s study on Sufism and modernity, where he concludes that “[...] some of the important groundwork for the eventual secularization of the state in the republic was laid by debates among Islamic scholars and Sufi sheikhs like the ones examined in this article.”

Ibrahim Kaya elaborated on the modern character of Islamism, which opposes modernity but nevertheless adopts many of its features. He also draws on the concept of multiple modernities and argues that the West is not necessarily congruent or equivalent with modernity. There are modernities, in Kaya’s view, that did not adopt

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“*Avrupa Kafası*” (The European Mentality), *Vakit* (August 8th, 1929); and Sadri Etem Ertem, *Silindir Şapka Giyen Köylü: Küçük Hikayeler* (s.l.: İstiklal Lisesi, 1933).

102 Nereid, ‘Kemalism on the Catwalk,’ 719.

103 See Ibid., 720.


105 Brian Silverstein, ‘Sufism and Governmentality in the Late Ottoman Empire’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29, no. 2 (30 August 2013), 175.

Western civilization. Yet he completely neglects the influence of the European colonial endeavor to the emergence of modernity in the Ottoman Empire, considering Ottoman and Turkish modernity as well as Ottoman and Turkish Islam as a specific kind of its own. The conditions of Turkish modernity could rather be found, Kaya argues, in the specific quality of Ottoman society, culture and polity as located on the margins of the East as well as of the West. For him a specific aspect of Turkish modernization was the emphasis on gender equality from its beginning, lacking in Western Europe modern societies. As an example he mentions the early introduction of women's suffrage and opening of universities for women.

Kaya considers Islamism as a distinct modernity because it denies liberalism. But what about fascism or other forms of Western European modernities that deny liberalism as well? Kaya has a somewhat essentialist perception of culture that adds its specifics to respective modernisms which are confined to national boundaries, thus operating within methodological nationalism. Kaya also reinforces the binary of the Orient versus Occident, but attributes liberal democracy exclusively to the presumed West as an ostensible homogenenous entity. Nevertheless, at the same time Kaya points out the contingent character of culture and civilization and opposes perceptions of the clash of civilization, such as expressed by Huntington, who constructs Islam as the Other of the modern West. By way of de-essentializing civilization, Kaya essentializes culture, in which he divides presumed civilizations into a number of distinct cultures.

In the end Kaya’s analysis of Kemalism provides a differentiated view that does not necessarily need his differentiation of different models of modernity:

“Thus, Kemalism reflects, first of all, that a project of modernity means the disciplining of the population. However, Kemalism cannot be conceived simply as a disciplining project, because it was also a liberating movement. The tenets of secularism, republicanism, populism, revolutionism and nationalism were important for the sake of liberty.”

The last part of this quote is rather Kemalist in nature, counting the self-proclaimed

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107 See i.e. ibid., 138.
108 Ibid.
109 See Ibid., 144.
110 Ibid., 147.
basis of the Kemalist reforms. However this again is not specific to Kemalism, but again refers to the ambivalences of modernity itself, which claims to be universally liberating, but often acts or appears to be the contrary.

Alev Çınar as well underlined the nexus, as well as the parallels of secularist modernity and Islamic movements. The latter’s intervention in the public sphere had “subversive effects on secularist modes of power and control,”\textsuperscript{111} she argues, but could become themselves part of modernizing project that sought power and control with similar implications. Umut Azak pointed out that secularizing measures were neither an invention of the Republican Regime nor unique to European Christian contexts, but could be traced back to the advent of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. These secularizing reforms were conducted while “Islam continued to be the legitimizing framework even for modernizing reforms.”\textsuperscript{112} This legitimizing function of Islam, however, was not contrary to these measures. Azak delineated the materialist and positivist stance of the new Western educated “intelligentsia” which followed the generation of the Young Ottomans and their attitude towards religion, such as Beşir Fuat, Celal Nuri, Ahmed Rıza. Ahmed Rıza and others, she argues, reconciled Islam with modern ideas.\textsuperscript{113}

One major point was that Islam remained a major factor in the definition of Turkishness even though Islam lost its status as official religion codified in the constitution. But it needs to be emphasized that this took place after a long period of Islamification and Turkification politics of the population turned hegemonic structures into demographic realities.

This is also of importance concerning the redefinition of the hat as an item of national identity in the Republic. Due to the disappearance of large proportions of non-Muslims from the former lands of the Ottoman Empire, by measures of social engineering, forced migration and genocide, a redefinition of symbols was enabled. With the decreasing number of non-Muslims the European hat could be appropriated as an item of Turkish identity and even be used for Turkification measures. Norton in his essay on ‘Faith and Fashion’ in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey mentions that after the release

\textsuperscript{112} Umut Azak, \textit{Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State} (London [et al.]: Tauris, 2010), 3.
\textsuperscript{113} See Ibid., 5-6.
of the hat law, people entered a hat shop abandoned by an Armenian, who had been deported in 1915, in order to supply themselves with the required hats.\footnote{114} I think that is a striking example of how deportations and genocide contributed to Turkish nation-building. Dispossession here took place on different levels, that of the material and symbol level, of properties and commodities. The latter became extraordinarily valuable at that historical moment of the introduction of the European hat. The extinction of the Other within made it possible to become part of the European Other.

Concerning the critics of the wearing of the hat, as they appeared in the periodical Sebilürreşad, it already became apparent that they based their arguments on modernist discourses such as function and hygiene, and at the same time the broad range of the authors of this periodical, according to Esther Debus, opposed secularism, Westernization and constitutionalism.\footnote{115}

These references to hygiene and function indicate the importance of the body and bodily practices in the discourse on appropriate headgear. That is also implied in the question of religious practice, the impracticability of prayer ritual with the brimmed hat and the issue of taklid, of imitation, assimilation or mimicry, which implied the possibility of becoming the assumed Other, not just in appearance but in a more encompassing pervasive sense.

Talal Asad connects the analyses of secularism, his anthropology of secularism, to the analyses of embodied practices, by drawing on the notion of habitus as first defined by Mauss and later elaborated by Bourdieu. Thus secularization’s impact went beyond the surface, and altered religious practices and the body itself.\footnote{116} Thereby a “straightforward narrative of progress form the religious to the secular is no longer acceptable,”\footnote{117} since within the modern nation state “categories of ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ turn out to implicate each other more profoundly than we thought.”\footnote{118}

Asad argues that secularization does not necessarily mean an emancipation from


\footnote{115} Esther Debus, Sebilürreşad: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zur islamischen Opposition der vor- und nachkemalistischen Ara, [Europäische Hochschulschriften / 3] Europäische Hochschulschriften. (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1991); On these Muslim intellectuals see also Ismael Kara, ‘Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition’, in Late Ottoman Society -The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdaiba, SOAS RoutledgeCurzon Studies on the Middle East; 3 (London [u.a.]: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 162–200.

\footnote{116} See Asad, Formations of the Secular.

\footnote{117} Ibid., 1.

\footnote{118} Ibid., 200.
Differences between the secularist and the Islamist projects might derive from the latter's claim to regulate conduct in accordance with religious principles, and the secular nationalist project derives its guidelines from a different source, be it bourgeois or national cultural, whereas the latter might overlap to a great extent to that of religion, I would argue.

Asad refers to the Egyptian discussion of *taklid* and the practice of *fiqh*, Islamic jurisprudence, that involved a reform of the Sharia as a practice of secularization. He thereby contrasts *ictihad* to *taklid*, the former as legal reasoning about disagreements and the latter as "unreflective reproduction of tradition." That provides the discussion of the secular versus religion discussion in the context of the hat law with another dimension, and lets me conclude that *taklid* is not confined to any political faction but that it takes place all the time. Especially the definition of uncritical reproduction of traditional practices does not confine *taklid* to the copying of the alleged Other, but includes every kind of practice. Asad points out that a certain civilizing mission, set within a modern paradigm, was shared by Islamists and secularists alike, and that is also suggested by the recurrent embedding of treatises on headgear in discourses of hygiene and functionality.

The concept of mimicry as becoming the Western colonizer has been discussed extensively in postcolonial literature. In the context of the hat law, and previous Ottoman discourses on modernization, it is desired to the same extent as it is was despised. Arguments oscillate between the advantages of the appropriation of modern techniques of power to warnings of submission to European or Western hegemony.

Beyond the discussion of submission or assimilation Homi Bhabha considered mimicry, even though or precisely because it was an instrument of colonial rule, as a form of resistance to colonialist hegemony or rule. A basic element of it was ridicule or parody. It can be exemplified by the praxis of donning women's hats by men in order to

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119 See Ibid., 191.
120 See Ibid., 196.
123 How does this relate to the maintenance of difference of colonialist policies?
comply to the hat law. By Irfa Organ considered as submission to the hat law it could also be regarded as a form of resistance, by formally adapting to the rule, nevertheless having a subversive effect, such as the transgression of bourgeois gender norms that came along with highly dichotomized forms of dress.

Homi Bhabha, from a deconstructive perspective, takes up the question of identity building within a colonialist setting to argue against the usefulness of the concept of the West at all to explain and to analyze the phenomenon’s relation to modernity. Certainly the figure of the West cannot be completely ignored since it is so prominent in countless approaches to modernization. But it needs to be seriously questioned if accounts of assumed Westernization are helpful at all to explain these phenomena.

In the following I want to relate Bhabha’s notion of mimicry to the phenomena discussed throughout this study and specifically to discussions and discursive formations arising from the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the proclamation of the hat law.

Mimicry for Bhabha was at once a colonialist strategy of assimilation and a form of resistance against colonialist power. The subversive potential arises from a performative conception of identity, potentially reversing discriminatory practice. That makes mimicry an ambivalent phenomenon. One of Bhabha’s definitions goes as follows:

“[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed recognizable Other, as a subject of difference, that is almost the same but not quite. Which is to say the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.”

For the concept of mimicry it is important to note that the identity of the colonizer is no preexisting entity, an original that can be copied. But is itself (re-)constructed performatively in a non-identical manner. Bhabha considered the flawed copies as a subversion of colonialist power because it reveals the character of identity as non-essentialist, revealing the performative character of identity. And the colonialist discussion about mimicry reveals the ambivalence of the colonial discourse that entails the preservation of difference, and with it colonial hierarchy, at the same time it comprises and draws on enlightenment and humanism and its supposed equality,

125 Ibid., 86.
nonetheless undermining the material effects of colonialism and producing sharp distinctions. The colonial hierarchy between “the West and the Rest” is produced by discourses that want the colonized alike but not identical.\textsuperscript{126} The ambivalence of colonialist discourse is that difference is at once disavowed and claimed:\textsuperscript{127} “The menace of mimicry is its double vision, which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority.”\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{126} David Huddart, \textit{Homi K. Bhabha}, Repr., Routledge Critical Thinkers (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2007), 59. 
\textsuperscript{127} Bhabha, ‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,’ 91. 
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 88.
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In my study, I demonstrated that the late Ottoman politics of dress and discourses on the modernization of dress were entangled with the nascent globalization of modern male attire and its implications regarding gender, race and class. I assumed that the politics of dress and related practices would reveal further insights into the formation of modern identity, on the one hand, and about techniques of modernity at large, on the other. And I assumed that seen in a wider frame from a postcolonial perspective would allow to critically interrogate binary oppositions between ‘the West and the Rest’, especially with regard to the Ottoman realm’s role in the making of the West through cultural practices, socio-economic conditions and modernization discourse. In order to accomplish this, Ottoman modernization needed to be reconsidered in the light of these presumptions. I argued that the politics of dress scrutinized here were part of the emergence of an Ottoman bourgeois culture and that, beyond the global dimensions, internal Ottoman dynamics that conditioned the emergence of an Ottoman middle class must be considered in order to properly understand Ottoman modernization in the global context. That enables to challenge accounts which regard Ottoman modernity as implemented from “outside,” as dictated by western European powers, and from this perspective, the Ottoman Empire rightly becomes a modernizing force itself.

The introduction of the fez as a uniform headpiece, in the military and civil sphere, needs to be viewed against this background. The fez is often considered an expression of a failed modernization and failed resistance against European imperialist domination, yet as I have demonstrated, its meaning was rather multi-dimensional, and it very much contributed to the construction of modernity. The fez was as at least as much an Ottoman as it was a modern feature, and it contributed to the construction of modern bourgeois male identity to a great extent in its resemblance yet difference from the top hat. Even though an Ottoman feature, left out its use in other Muslim countries for now, the fez needs also be considered in relation to efforts to nationalize dress in many modernizing contexts, be it in Western Europe or many other places around the globe. Thus, one of my main insights is the close interrelation between the creation of modern, sober bourgeois male looks and the fashioning of nationalism.
The incidences concerning headgear that emerged as clashes/conflicts between Ottomanism and ethnically-connoted nationalisms were thereby part of the negotiation of these identities, between the particularity of parochial constructions of identity and universal concepts of modern identity. The appearance of separatist movements, especially after the Ottoman-Russian War 1877-78, did not mean the obsolescence of Ottomanism or its vanishing, but rather were part and parcel of the construction of modern identity. The interventions of the central state and local authorities and administrations concerning headgear were part of the implementation of modern governmentality that was conjured also due to the legitimacy crisis, as it has been assessed by Selim Deringil, during the Hamidian period, that was rectified by the establishment of a normative order and appeals to its adherence, facilitating governing through the production of modern subjects. This entailed the endeavors of strengthening Ottoman identity to counter the precarious situation at its borders and threats to its sovereignty. Thus, the Ottoman government and administration, in sharp contrast to pre-Mahmudian approach, aspired to a similar appearance of male subjects of the Empire in conformity with Ottoman modern standards. That meant in most cases to enforce the wearing of the fez, especially in situations and spaces that were considered as threatening to Ottoman sovereignty, such as European economic activities in the Empire, precarious borderlands and foreign and missionary schools. The decree, issued in 1894, on the obligatory wearing of the fez for all Ottoman subjects/citizens shows that, at least where the fez was concerned, the inclusion of the wider (male) population into the modern dress reform was desired. This did not concern other pieces of modern bourgeois dress, as far my research indicates.

The cases that took place in the borderlands in the Balkans and the Aegean show the reciprocal history of center and periphery, between the European imperial centers and its colonial and imperial peripheries, through interactions between the Ottoman government, provincial state officials, locals agents, central European and local powers. That also implies the reciprocal history of the national and the transnational, conditioned by global capitalism, modernity, colonialism and imperialism. Certain pieces of dress, such as the headpieces here, were an expedient means to constitute and negotiate these relations.
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Another question is that of the different character of supposedly Eastern and Western dress. Studies have proved the complexity of this issue, be it Jirousek’s study on the adoption of Eastern styles in Western Europe from an early time, as well as the modern features of supposedly “national” dress in the period I scrutinized. While for the Ottoman Empire a development of looser body-concealing dress to the comparably tighter European dress can be discerned, in Europe, very tight body-revealing clothes became replaced by late nineteenth century clothing; the implications for embodiment and the way the body was conceptualized requires further elaboration. Contemporary works must begin from the premise that perceived boundaries between East and West were permeable and contingent, as were citizens’ identities.

As for the appropriation of Western European dress in the colonial context, its double function of discipline and resistance needs to be noted. While it could be perceived as subordination to colonial domination, it was also a sign of resistance, a claim for equal status. When supposed national specific dress was “invented” or employed for the construction of national identity, it must be considered that these often also had the function to produce modern uniformity in appearance, and bringing about normative implications that induced modernity.

All this took place in relation to the globalization of bourgeois male dress, as it appeared in the centers of modern fashion such as Paris or by producers in Britain. It became apparent that headgear was used as a sign of distinction to the same degree it expressed uniformity. It was an outstanding marker of identity, not just in the Ottoman context. As manifested in the appearance of the sola topi it was also used to distinguish Western European colonizers from local populations who themselves had adopted modern bourgeois dress to such a degree that it could not be used anymore to maintain the requisite regime of colonialist distinction. Thus, headgear became a means of politics in many senses; it was used to construct body politics as male, healthy, modern, as well as sovereign. Modern male dress, and specifically headgear, marked the boundaries of bourgeois bodies as it marked to boundaries of states seeking national independence. It affirmed European claims to superiority to the same degree as it challenged them. Yet, the employment of nationalism was not just a means to counter colonialist claims; it was
also a means to reconstruct masculinity in many respects, in face of the perceived threats to it by modernity. This is why the dandy, in his cosmopolitan attitude, in the Ottoman as well as in other colonial contexts, had a double function, as he embodied the threat to male power exerted by modernity as well as by colonialism, both understood as emasculation. Thus, colonialist domination and imperialist threat could be countered by a double strategy: One was the appropriation of modern bourgeois dress, the other sartorial nationalism. Yet these two were not mutually exclusive, but always appeared not just side by side but were inseparable, in constant reciprocal relation.

I have pointed out how late nineteenth century discourse on dress globally dealt with the problematic relation of the male body and modernity induced by the dialectical character of modernity itself. Within this ambivalence, modernity was perceived as effeminacy of male identity and thus masculinity appeared in almost permanent crisis, and thus many endeavors were undertaken to ameliorate this perceived loss. Measures to stabilize masculinity, such as by fashioning nationalist appearance, were at the same time perceived as destabilizing, once attributed a modernizing characteristic such as uniform appearance and modern shapes. The discourse on modern male dress was embedded in the ambivalent relation of modernity with masculinity that determined male fashionability as a condition of modern male identity as well as emasculation at the same time. This paradoxical relation to male fashion became expressed in the figure of the dandy who was very vivid in many modernizing bourgeois environments. In the colonial and semi-colonial contexts it attained a specific meaning of subordination to European colonial and imperial domination, and thus modern colonial masculinity appeared especially precarious.

The dichotomy of progress and decline was endemic to the double logic of modern civilization. Related to masculinity, this meant that modernity simultaneously reinforced and destabilized representations of masculinity, as Christopher Forth argued. Thus the perceived loss of masculinity was not specific to Ottoman modernity nor to other colonial or semi-colonial context but stood in close relation to the perceived loss of the virile male body in modernization contexts globally. Dress was not just employed to counter imperialist dominance but always had the component of the restoration of the male dominance and the male body as the center of power. Dress was so important.
because the crisis metaphorically pointed to the body to-be-restored by the means of dress, while headgear linked the mind to the body and thus had an overexposed position in many senses. The Ottoman dandy, even though perceived as submitting to European hegemony, actually countered colonialist hierarchies at the same time as he dealt with the ambiguities of modern masculinity. 

For subsequent studies, it would be valuable to trace the different positions the dandy figure inhabited throughout time and space, to trace shifts in its social position, such as put forward by Berna Moran and Nurdan Gürbilek, who argued that the dandy’s social recognition fundamentally changed after 1914, at least as it can be traced through Ottoman/Turkish literature, as it changed from that of a victim of imperialism to the employment of his ‘super-modern’ identity for its own profit. A question of further research might be, if this can be traced in journalistic literary genres as well as in the politics of dress, how can be traced through additional sources? Here follows the question, how the Republican hat law and its related discourse of dress and masculinity relate to this process. Can the Republican politics of dress be considered an expression of the hegemonic character of the dandy? I have also shown, with reference to Gürbilek and other authors, the close interrelation of the dandy figure to the search of and desire for national authenticity. The search for an original self always fails, due to a lack of an authentic original self, ending either with the appearance of a dandy figure that is too modern or some kind of parochial identity, assumed to represent national identity that is not modern enough. This is evident in related incidences in the Ottoman Bulgarian borderlands and other spaces to the literary phenomenon of the urban dandy as two sides of the same coin. This is why the derogative image of the dandy, in contrast to its more positive image in the early nineteenth century, appeared with a strengthening of national movements of the late nineteenth century. This is the very same dichotomy as it appeared in the costume album *Les Costume Populaire* by Osman Hamdi Bey and de Launay and their endeavor to sponsor an alternative Ottoman modernity, whereas Osman Hamdi Bey was far from epitomizing his own concept himself. The album thus was the expression of a desire for national authenticity and mourning of its loss and the impossibility of its realization before it ever had existed. The desire for real and authentic national identity was central to the mourning of the loss of virile masculinity that was embodied by the supposed authentic origins of modern national identity. And here the
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notion of imitation into play, and its centrality becomes visible, because the mourning of the loss of authenticity always implied the accusation of fluffy imitation, the failure to be authentically modern or national. Thus, the dandy becomes the epitome of the modern figure, as he embodied this failure. Also in terms of class, the dandy was emblematic of a type who pretended to be someone he wasn’t and thus again embodied failure: a type who aspired to higher social status, either someone of the lower classes who imitated bourgeois identity, or a bourgeois who imitated aristocratic styles. These facets of the dandy make clear that despite its ridicule, it had a paramount position in modern discourse.

This dualism between the national authentic and bourgeois, between modern and traditional, yet appeared not unequivocal and was interpreted in manifold ways by contemporaries. Through Palmira Brummett’s analysis it became apparent that after the Young Turk coup d’etat in 1908 the press treated the appropriation of modern Western styles ambivalently, also honoring the elevation of social status it brought about, next to its aspects of subordination and dishonor in the imperialist setting. Dress considered traditional or national, correspondingly, was perceived as resistance to imperial power as well as signs of reactionism and conservatism. One of the major fields were the dualism between modern and traditional was played out was indeed during the fez boycott of 1908, which inspired extensive discussions on Ottoman national authenticity. Authors commented on the boycott and took sides either for or against it, and thereby argued for or against the use of respective headgear, doing this also on the basis of national authenticity, whereby their favored piece was imagined to represent these traits of authenticity. Coupled with modernist arguments about functionality and hygiene it becomes clear that the national could not exist without the modern.

Striking for the Ottoman satirical press, at least for the period after the Young Turk coup, is the frequent and prominent appearance of enormous women’s hats/ Ottoman women with enormous decorated hats in contrast to the lack of depiction of men with brimmed European hats. That is also a subject that need further study by comparing a huge variety of Ottoman satirical publications and their depictions of headgear as well as study of the meaning of women’s hats in contrast to men's hats, as well as possible common features. That also includes interventions of Ottoman authorities to women’s as well as men’s dress set in relation to these journalistic treatment of the issue.
Further study of late Ottoman dress might include state archival resources that deal with other pieces of dress besides headgear. In that regard, what struck me from the selection of sources which I viewed that dealt with general dress was that most of them addressed what can be considered regional, ethnic, national types of dress, and the unauthorized appropriation of them by other groups (*tebdil-i kiyafet*), a scrutiny of which might reveal more about the discussion of mimicry and its relation to a variety of discourses relating to the politics of dress.

Regarding the fez boycott, it is important to note that proponents as well as opponents of the boycott made their judgments in relation to the European gaze, by taking, next to other arguments, international standards and Ottoman international reputation into account. Another aspect is an emphasis on uniformity, which appears in the writings of a number of authors, interestingly often from opponents of the fez boycott, who saw in the appearance of the huge variety of headpieces a threat to social order. Those authors who praised the “carnival” appearance, as it was termed, recall de Launay's and Hamid Beys vision of unity in diversity as a characteristic of Ottoman identity.

Concerning the different headpieces, it becomes obvious that their meaning was fluid and under constant negotiation. That becomes especially apparent in the case of the *kalpak*, which initially just appears as a marker of Bulgarian national belonging, but which then became part of Ottoman military uniform in the early twentieth century, indicating Turkish Muslim or Ottoman Muslim nationalism during the War of Independence (a period that could not be treated here), and later disappears only to remain a nostalgic point of reference to national(-ist) glory.\(^1\)

The wearing of brimmed hats by children of men, who (formerly) occupied exalted social positions is another example of how modern identity was negotiated between bourgeois universalist standards and national belonging. The fear of these practices spreading specifically among the Muslim population shows that even though these practices were marginal, they should be considered as some efforts, as far as the

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1 The central Asian reference of the kalpak, as the origin of the kalpak itself as well as the “Turkish people,” probably is relevant here, even though not discussed in any of my sources, besides the case of the forest scribe Mehmed Efendi, who claims to have donned a Kasghar kalpak. The relation of the growing popularity of the kalpak as marker of Ottomanism in relation to immigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire needs to be considered.

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interference of the Ministry of the Interior, which were exerted to marginalize them and keep them marginalized, while others regarded them as compatible with Ottoman identity. The appearance of these incidences in prominent public spaces once more demonstrate the significance of space in the negotiation of social relations, as well as the meaning of dress as a spatial practice. Also these cases could be further scrutinized in relation to discussions about dress and identity taking place during summer 1910 that might be found in the Ottoman press, that might have even been reported about and reflected on these incidences or on the wearing of hats by Ottoman children in general.

Another ambivalent relation within modern discourse that appears in these contexts is the question of gender equality and gender relations. While on the one hand, modern bourgeois dress was employed to establish hierarchies among men along the lines of class and race, also in relation to female dress and women’s social position, dress was involved in renegotiations of hierarchies. Ottoman reformers argued for more gender equality, while claims for gender equality implied in modernization were simultaneously conceived as a threat to masculinity, and thus the politics of dress sought to reestablish and strengthen gender binaries. On the one hand progress was understood as a leveling of gender hierarchies, while this leveling was at the same considered a threat to progress. Thus, modern dress was employed to (re-)establish these binaries. I was asking myself how Ottoman politics of dress were related to gender, and what the discourse on headgear might reveal about the negotiation of gender in context of modernization. While Mustafa Kemal, in his talks on dress and the hat, connects the modernization of dress to the institution of the modern family, my other sources mostly do not speak so explicitly about gender relations. Yet, we have seen that modern dress very much relates to the construction of space, at home and outside of the house, that in

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itself was gendered. Here again appears an ambivalent relation between the claims for equality and participation and the strengthening of gender binaries concerning the gendering of spaces and dress. The most striking and obvious fact is that Mahmud's reforms of dress were restricted to men, while the established dress-codes for women continued to exist. We have seen that this did not prevent urban elite women from wearing modern dress, but in contrast to men's dress, that was not encouraged by the state. In terms of headgear it seems that it was not uncommon for women to don the fez. It can be suggested that here a similar difference existed as that between women's and men's hats, as in differing styles and functions. Yet, more information on the spread and styles of these fezzes donned by women are required to answer these questions.

Through the inclusion of sources from Ottoman periodicals much more could also be elaborated on the relation of gender and headgear, as well gender and dress generally. How did the globalization of modern male attire and dress in general relate to the construction of female identity beyond the well-known dichotomy of ideal bourgeois separate spheres expressed in the diverging styles of male and female dress and emerging claims to gender equality. Modern male dress was not just related to men as is indicated by the caricatures published in Aydede in 1922. In a wider scope it would also be instructive to scrutinize what discourses on dress reveal about transformations of gender from before the Mahmudian dress reforms in the 1820s to the early Republican period, with its inclusion of women into official dress reforms, as well as generally incidences related to dress that took place in the decades before the introduction of the fez, as recorded in the Ottoman archives, to those afterwards.

Another question that needs further research is the relation of religious dress to modernity, as embedded in the wider debate about the relation of religion to modernity and nationalism. As I have argued, especially in Chapter Six, religion is not necessarily contrary to modernity, nor situated outside of modern discourse, as the modernist lines of arguments of opponents of Westernization prove. Another striking feature is the, at least, rhetorical reference to modern values such as individualism and civil rights by

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3 Hale Yılmaz as well as Ayten Sezer Arığ have focused on this for the early Republican Period; see Hale Yılmaz, Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey, 1923-1945, First Edition, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, c2013), and Ayten Sezer Arığ, Atatürk Türkiye’nde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2007).
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those labelled as reactionaries, such as Atıf Hoca and Nurettin Paşa. On the other hand, conservative journals such as *Sebilürreşad* related the wearing of the brimmed hat to the dissolution of a hierarchical gender order and gendered division of labour and the appearance of women in (mixed) public spaces.

Concerning the hat law of 1925, I think in addition to Hale Yılmaz latest contribution, that elucidated a number of details on the implementation of the hat law, a number of questions about its significance, especially in the field of the globalization of modern male attire, body politics and the question of postcolonial nationalisms could be further traced, even though I am not sure about the richness of sources available to accomplish this. Besides Gavin D. Brockett’s outstanding endeavour to reframe the analysis of the protests against the hat law beyond the modern versus reactionary binary, no encompassing study on these insurrections has yet been done. That also implies the inclusion of the records of the Independence Courts⁴ that have hitherto not been included in any study. Even though the information that can be extracted from them might be scarce, a reading between the lines might reveal some interesting insights. Also the gendered implications of the hat law need to be reconsidered in relation to Ottoman politics of dress, theories on the relation of modernization and masculinity, and to accounts that assume the hat law was just addressed men and male dress.

Throughout this study I demonstrated how the politics of dress generally and the discourse on headgear more specifically shaped state-subject relations, and how both were thereby constituted reciprocally.

While I have started out scrutinizing the specificities of the Ottoman case within a postcolonial setting and from a postcolonial perspective, I ended with the situation of late Ottoman politics of dress within a broader context of the globalization of dress. While on the one hand all the cases scrutinized here, in a way, were specific to the Ottoman context, nevertheless their significance can rather be conceived within the broader context of the globalization of modern male attire that was crucially conditioned by Western European colonialist endeavors. The examples of conflicts around headgear I have presented point to tensions within modern constructions of masculinity than to

dichotomies of East versus West or tradition versus modernity, as it is revealed by the nexus with discourses on masculinity and modernity appearing globally. It becomes apparent that definitions of modernity and masculinity are neither fixed nor self-evident, but need to be regarded as contingent results of social practices.

The examples I have presented provide insight into the question posed at the beginning of who wears which kind of styles and when. Obviously this is reduced to certain points and places in time and does not provide an all-encompassing overview about clothing practices in late Ottoman society, yet it provides insight into the way different styles acquired their meaning in relation to certain contexts, such as the *kalpak*, hat and *fez* in the north-western Ottoman borderlands.

Considered from Arif Dirlik's critique of the concept of alternative modernities, the *fez* is not a failed modernity but a modern feature in itself, a fact that becomes visible when modernity is reviewed and confronted as a historical concept. But in contrast to approaches of alternative modernities it is not an exclusively Ottoman phenomenon nor an expression of authentic Ottoman identity, but has to be considered within a global context of the modernization of dress that in the first place has modern features and not those of nation-building, even though the latter cannot be separated from the former. The *fez* is an expression of the culture of modernity rather than of Ottoman culture.

Counter-positions to Euro/American modernity that appeared in the form of traditionalism and conservatism are not necessarily anti-modern. These conflicts over modernity are actually what constituted modern societies. I suggest that the conflict between hat and *fez* was rather more productive than repressive, that it was crucial to the production of modern identities in the opposition between the universal and the specific, between the national and the super-westernized in their reciprocal relation. The intersection of power and knowledge, to speak in Foucaultian terms, is thereby a productive web that produces subjects through acts of interpellation. Subjects thereby appear as processual, identity as fluid, performative and contextual.
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