When Knowledge Travels.

Expert Networks in African Security Policy: Case Studies of AU and ECOWAS.

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<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Andean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHC</td>
<td>African High Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Africa Leadership Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AU PSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>AU PSOD</td>
<td>African Union Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIT</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3IS</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Comunidade de Países de Lingua Portuguesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CROP</td>
<td>Comparative Regional Organizations Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical Institutionalism</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
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<td>IR</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Mediation and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMOG</td>
<td>Military Observer Group in Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDII</td>
<td>Rational Design of International Institutions project</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandese Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Regional Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Regional Security Governance</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Single Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1. Research Puzzle and Research Question

*There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new order of things* (Machiavelli 1513, 19).

Severe conflicts from the 1980s onward would, along with the repercussions of the end of the Cold War, transform the regional security order in Africa. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone challenged ECOWAS’ (legal) peacekeeping capabilities in their member states’ territories. Even though it had adopted protocols\(^1\) regarding peace and security responsibilities, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) lacked a clear legal basis for its interventions in these conflicts (Hartmann 2010, 80). However, the adopted protocols only referred to interstate wars—whereas the ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone constituted a new kind of war, and thus required different types of reaction and intervention. As these wars included a range of non-state actors who have been less interested in taking over sovereignty in the classical sense, opting rather for control over diamond fields, these new identity- and resource-based intrastate wars challenged the existing security order in West Africa dramatically (Francis 2006, 140).

Almost simultaneously, the genocide in Rwanda shocked the African continent. From April to June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were murdered and another estimated 2 million were displaced in what is today known as one of the worst atrocities of modern times (Englebert and Dunn 2013, 79f.). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) not only suffered from being unable and unwilling to intervene in Rwanda but also, more generally, from hiding behind its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. By lacking a robust peace and security mandate, the OAU by then was perceived as highly ineffective—and thus incapable of dealing with the severe conflicts on the

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continent (Engel and Porto 2010, 1f.). Additionally, the international community’s waning interest in Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War’s end, as well as changing geopolitical interests among the great powers, have changed the continent’s self-perceptions regarding how to deal with questions of peace, security, and development (Babarinde 2013; Franke 2006; Tardy and Wyss 2014).

Thus, the two most powerful African regional organizations (ROs) at that time had two things in common: First, despite having adopted peace and security protocols, both suffered from ineffectiveness and imprecision regarding their peacekeeping mandates. Second, ECOWAS and the OAU were challenged in their self-perceptions of their very own peace and security responsibilities in light of decreasing support from the international community. To sum up, the decade after the end of the Cold War emphasized the high functional need for both ROs to ensure effective security mechanisms. But what options did these two ROs have available in designing their new security mechanisms? They could have either crafted completely new institutions to deal with the specific demands on the African continent or they could have looked around to see what was already there in other such organizations.

By adopting the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” in 1999, ECOWAS institutionalized its shift of emphasis toward peace and security (ECOWAS 1999). The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) that had been established by the 1999 protocol represents the main decision-making body in peace and security matters of ECOWAS, and is designed after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Only one year later, the OAU would decide to transform itself into the African Union (AU) by adopting the so-called Constitutive Act. Article 4 (h) dismisses its former non-interference doctrine by explicitly calling for the “right of the Union

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2 The OAU had adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 (OAU 1993b).
3 The term “security mechanisms” is used synonymously with that of “security organs,” meaning the institutionalized security responsibilities of ROs. By speaking of security mechanisms or security organs, this thesis refers for example to the Peace and Security Council of the AU, the Panel of the Wise of the AU, or the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS.
to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (OAU 2000c). The subsequent “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union” (PSC Protocol) institutionalized the main AU peace and security bodies (AU 2002b).

What did the AU do, meanwhile? Having the same options available as ECOWAS previously, the AU’s decision-makers did not create new institutions either—being influenced rather by already-established mechanisms. The Peace and Security Council (PSC), as the main decision-making organ, shares some striking institutional similarities with the MSC, and therefore also with the UNSC. Furthermore the AU established a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Peace Fund, a Panel of the Wise, and an African Standby Force (ASF). All of these institutions can be found under ECOWAS too, and partly also within other African ROs such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development4 (IGAD) (Hartmann 2016; Levitt 2003; Murithi and Mwaura 2010).

The question that still remains open is why. For what reasons has ECOWAS established a security organ that is similar to the UN? And why did the AU follow suit, not only in establishing a similar main decision-making body like that of the UN and of ECOWAS but also indeed an entire overall structure akin to that of ECOWAS? These questions are not only interesting in the light of institutional-design debates. It has been discussed at length why states act through organizations (Snidal and Abbott 1998), and why they design them in the ways that they do (Koremenos et al. 2001). Conventional approaches explaining the specific institutional design of international organizations (IOs) as well as regional ones either point toward endogenous factors, such as state interests or collective norms (Acharya 2009a; Solingen 2014), or they explain that institutional design by exogenous factors, such as hegemonic states (Katzenstein 2005). These rather vertically driven explanations have recently been complemented by the more horizontally driven approaches of diffusion theory, which argues that organizations influence each other in their institutional design.

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4 The third chapter of this thesis deals with the similarities in the institutional design of these organs in detail.
(Jetschke 2017). By investigating the growing phenomenon of such organizations closely resembling each other, this thesis positions itself right at the center of these key debates. It enriches the study of diffusion mechanisms in general, but also sheds light on the role of knowledge and information in shaping international relations. As complexity and uncertainty grow, decision-makers are increasingly relying on expertise. As this is often unavailable inside their own organizations however, experts and networks of experts represent therefore one important source of knowledge for these decision-makers. As they have gained importance in general IR debates, as crucial go-to sources for solving international cooperation problems (Haas 1992b), those experts also need to move to the center of diffusion debates as essential stakeholders—ones that not only possess the required knowledge but also share it with other organizations. Additionally, the questions raised are also interesting given the aforementioned changing relations between the international community and African states and organizations after 1990. An increasing interest in finding “African solutions for African problems” would not only be found in Africa itself, but also on the international stage. Processes of increasing “African agency” in international politics have consequently been part of discussions ever since then (Beswick and Hammerstad 2013; Brown 2012; Brown and Harman 2013).

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5 The statement “African solutions to African problems” is a difficult one. After being (cynically) used to describe the withdrawal of the international community from Africa in the 1990s, it was reappropriated by the AU and El-Ghassim Wane in the mid-2000s. Since 2014 it has been used academically by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, with its launch of a new platform in the form of a publication called the Journal of African-Centred Solutions on Peace and Security (Abdalla 2016, V).

6 The rising difficulties that the UNSC faces in dealing with changing peace and security issues worldwide have led to increased calls for regional arrangements to play their part too in assuming peacekeeping responsibilities (Wilson 2008, 184). It was Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN secretary general, who first underlined the importance of a stronger involvement of regional arrangements in peace and security issues. In his Agenda for Peace, he explicitly refers to “regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts [that] could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, § 64).
1.2. State of the Art and Research Gaps

Institutional design has been the subject of academic discussion for a long time now; two different explanations have been predominant herein (Katzenstein et al. 1998; Keohane and Nye 1971; Martin and Simmons 2002). The first mainly draws on functional arguments to explain regional cooperation. These functionalist approaches posit that regional cooperation is the result of independent decision-making in one region or part of the world. Thus, regional institutions are the result of specific cooperation problems that need to be resolved (Hasenclever et al. 2002; Koremenos et al. 2001; Zürn 1997). According to this view, regional integration is the outcome of the problems that states face; furthermore, it is characterized by independent decision-making. As such, functional approaches are able to explain the emergence but not the similarity between regional institutional designs.

A second approach emanates from the assumption of interdependency within and between world regions. Following this reasoning, ROs do not exist and/or act in isolation—while hence only certain models of regional integration disseminate (Jetschke 2010; Jetschke and Lenz 2011; Risse 2016). Research on diffusion—which can be understood as the process through which ideas, norms, and values spread across time and space (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gilardi 2016; Strang 1991)—has evolved into a nascent academic field. A growing body of literature is thus now concerned with ROs making decisions based on those of peers, “because of [the] material, social, and cultural connections” (Duina and Lenz 2016, 1) between them. In this vein, many scholars have explained similarities in the design of ROs by stressing the latter’s interdependent decision-making processes—and thereby offering a rather new perspective in the emerging field of comparative regionalism (Börzel and Risse 2012; Gilardi 2013; Jetschke and Lenz 2011).

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7 States can either face endogenous problems, such as economic interdependence, or exogenous challenges, such as globalization, and have to respond accordingly (Börzel 2016; Jetschke 2017; Risse 2016). The mainstream theories of regional cooperation and integration put a strong focus on the state as the main actor involved in and driver behind the related processes (Mansfield and Milner 1997).
There is currently a debate about whether diffusion is to be seen as an outcome or a process. While some researchers stress institutional convergence as an indicator of diffusion (Holzinger et al. 2008), others underline the process nature of the latter and criticize the concentration on outcomes alone (Risse 2016). As research on diffusion becomes more elaborate, the same holds true for research on its underlying mechanisms too (Elkins et al. 2006; Holzinger et al. 2008; Schimmelfennig 2012). The literature thereby mainly refers to three broad classes of diffusion—learning, emulation, and competition—and is rich with different examples of related processes (Dobbin et al. 2007; Gilardi 2016; Simmons et al. 2006). However existing studies on diffusion mechanisms are mainly quantitative, and their operationalization and measurement of relevant mechanisms often unspecified. The current literature overlooks the evidence for social mechanisms, while qualitative studies that not only describe diffusion mechanisms but go deeper into them to explain why decision-makers opt for a certain institution or policy are absent (Maggetti and Gilardi 2015). This study aims, then, to rectify this situation.

When it comes to the stakeholders involved in diffusion processes, the research is not as advanced as it is for the related mechanisms. Jetschke and Lenz (2011, 457) are among the few scholars who have included actors in their theoretical reflections, doing so by differentiating between virtual, formal, and informal channels of diffusion. Systematic and broader reflections, as well as empirical research on stakeholders, are noticeably missing, being currently limited to single-case studies such as that of Alter (2008)—she analyzes the role of jurist advocacy networks in the establishment of courts of justice. Botto (2009), meanwhile, describes the role of academic networks in Mercosur; Saldias (2010) shows the influence of transnational jurist networks in the Andean Community (AC) in the process of adopting an EU-style court.

Although diffusion research is mainly characterized by processes of information transfer, the crucial question of who its various stakeholders are remains still

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8 By virtual channels, Jetschke and Lenz refer to the transfer of information between decision-makers via communication technologies. Formal channels describe interregional interactions between ROs, whereas informal ones denote expert networks as one important such channel for information exchange between decision-makers (2011, 457).
under-researched at present. It has been discussed that globalization processes lead to a more complex world, one in which international-policy coordination becomes evermore difficult to achieve. Decision-makers therefore increasingly rely on knowledge that is not always available inside their own organizations. As the research has shown, and as noted earlier, these decision-makers therefore need to increasingly consult experts possessing the relevant knowledge in order to be able to understand and hopefully solve global problems. Those experts and their networks therefore have a tremendous impact on international-policy coordination, as they not only hold the requisite knowledge but also share it with decision-makers too (Haas 1992b, 1f.). Until now, there have been only a few studies that recognize those expert networks as channels of diffusion—and that consequently have combined the researching of epistemic communities with that of diffusion processes too. As those stakeholders have the core task of sharing their knowledge and information within diffusion processes, their role needs to be much more at the center of our interest as well. Questions such as who is involved and how still need to be answered, and so this thesis aims at taking the first steps toward doing precisely that.

In sum, diffusion theory is not only able to explain similarities between ROs but also to identify the underlying mechanisms leading to institutional similarities. Research on diffusion is already well elaborated and documented for numerous different organizations (Börzel and Risse 2012; Hastrup 2013) and regions (Acharya 2004; Jetschke 2010) by now. But the existing research focuses mainly on the European continent alone, and furthermore neglects the crucial role of stakeholders. What is still missing, then, is not only more extensive research on the Global South, but also on the key influence of those expert networks bringing indispensable knowledge into decision-making processes. How they interact with decision-makers remains under-researched, as does how they are interconnected and how exactly they share their knowledge with different organizations worldwide.
1.3. Theoretical Argument

This thesis is based on the assumption that decision-makers in ROs do not act in isolation but rather within an interdependent system. Following diffusion theory, it is argued that decisions made in regional or international organizations influence decision-making processes in other organizations too. What follows is a conscious process of adopting institutional features from other regional and international organizations. This does not lead to the complete adoption of a given institutional design, but rather to an intentional process of partly selecting certain design features (Duina and Lenz 2016; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Jetschke 2010).

The present thesis is also built upon the conjecture that so-called new wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau challenged ECOWAS’ ability to solve crises in West Africa. The waning interest of the international community in Africa as a whole has additionally forced ECOWAS to renew its existing security structures. Having learned not only from those crises but also from the experiences of the UNSC—as the organization deemed to have a suitable security institution—ECOWAS thus established within its own walls a security council similar to the UN one. According to diffusion theory, learning processes could be observed herein.

This thesis is furthermore based on the assumption that the OAU rawly experienced its own impotence during the genocide in Rwanda. Having being faced with the unwillingness of the international community to intervene itself, the OAU also realized the stark need for a new security mandate—as well as more suitable security structures. As ECOWAS had already established its own new security structures, the OAU/AU learned intimately, then, from the experiences of that RO—this due to the close ties between these two organizations. Following

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9 This assumption of interdependence is not limited to diffusion scholars only, and long predates the influence of game theory and the rational-choice literature. Already in 1944, anthropologists would put “stress on diffusion, that is, the process of adopting or borrowing by one culture from another various devices, implements, institutions, and beliefs” (Malinowski 1944, iii). Cultural transfer scholars would argue along similar lines. By referring to the emerging hybridity of cultures, Edward Said stressed that “all cultures are involved in one another [...] all are hybrid, heterogeneous” (1993, xxv).
diffusion theory, social-learning processes have been the predominant ones in the establishment phase of the APSA.

The present thesis follows the argument that these learning processes are facilitated through stakeholders sharing their knowledge. Decision-makers in ECOWAS have been advised by individual think tanks, but relevant knowledge has been generated mainly by personal networks of influential persons within ECOWAS, AU, and the UN. The AU—as the organization most closely simulating ECOWAS’ design—has been strongly advised by expert networks, ones that have acted as knowledge-holders as well as knowledge-sharers. As such networks could build their knowledge on the experience of ECOWAS—in the establishment of whose security structures they were partly involved—then the AU too could subsequently establish similar structures.

These stakeholders serve as one major explanation for why we can observe different kinds of learning mechanisms existing between ECOWAS and AU. Whereas ECOWAS in their decision-making process “only” had the UN as a role model and organization with a similar decision-making organ for peace and security issues to look to, the AU—emerging later in time—could draw much more on ECOWAS for inspiration. As argued for social-learning-diffusion mechanisms, organizations learn exceptionally well and swiftly from close peers—such as from ROs existing on the same continent (Meseguer 2004, 2005, 2009). Facilitated hereby are learning processes involving networks of experts who hold and share their knowledge both with decision-makers and among themselves (Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992b; Risse-Kappen 2008).

1.4. Research Design and Case Selection

This thesis is realized using a qualitative research design. Aiming at explaining social processes and their underlying causal mechanisms as fully as possible, a qualitative research design is particularly useful for these ends (Dresing and Pehl 2013, 5). The thesis thus strives to analyze the interactions of actors and mechanisms, in order to explain their complex causal relations (Scharpf 2000, 56). A qualitative research design permits the analysis of the
raised questions in-depth, and is therefore able to successfully reconstruct the observed social processes.

This research is designed as a comparative study of two cases, ECOWAS and AU, asking why the security mechanisms of both share similarities not only with each other but also with the UNSC. ECOWAS—as a subregional organization with a predominant hegemon and fifteen mainly francophone members within its ranks—differs significantly from the continent-wide AU, which encompasses all African countries as member states. Whereas ECOWAS started in 1975 with the clear goal of ensuring only economic cooperation, the OAU—predecessor of the AU—initially aimed at pushing back colonialism and restoring sovereignty to African states. This study aims, then, at tracing the processes leading to both of their institutional designs, in order to explain which mechanisms underlay them and what kind of stakeholders have been influential therein.

Accordingly, this work is realized using a multimethod approach. The first step of this involves undertaking content analysis. Various protocols of meetings and other legal documents (policy papers and background material) are analyzed, in order to gain more detailed insight into the different meetings and procedures leading to the institutional design of the security mechanisms of both ECOWAS and AU. In the process of procuring official documents of ECOWAS and OAU/AU, several difficulties have arisen. First, while both organizations do have web pages and electronic archives neither possesses all the relevant documents—and are thereby not comparable with the electronic archives of the EU or the UN for example.

Second, although an archive, as well as the registry of the Legal Counsel, are to be found at the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa, which between them do possess a number of legal documents, they still do not have all the relevant ones filed however. Third, both organizations do not produce minutes from meetings that are available to researchers. Therefore, it is much more difficult to trace

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10 These documents have been partly researched on the web pages of the AU and ECOWAS, but were mainly found in the archive of the AU as well as in the registry of its Legal Counsel. The author would like to thank all the involved persons in charge, particularly Mr. Sirak Tesfaye from the African Union Archive as well as Dr. Papa Mamadou Diop from the Office of the Legal Counsel of the AU.
processes without being able to look at the records from the relevant meetings. To address these difficulties, interviews were conducted to close the knowledge gaps arising from not being able to access all the relevant documents. Thus, thirty structured expert interviews were undertaken in total.\textsuperscript{11} Using the data derived from content analysis and the interviews, historical process tracing is employed in order to “trace causal mechanisms” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 1). Specifically, those lying beyond the respective decision-making processes; they are examined so as to identify and explain the underlying mechanisms leading to institutional similarities in ECOWAS and AU.

1.5. Overview of Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into two parts. Whereas the \textbf{first part} (chapters 2–5) aims at conceptualizing diffusion processes between security institutions, the \textbf{second part} (chapters 6–9) aims at fully explaining these.

Following the introduction that forms \textbf{chapter one}, the \textbf{second chapter} then gives an overview of current research gaps and elaborates on the state of the art regarding the institutional-design literature. It discusses existing theories explaining institutional design, with a particular focus on diffusion theory.

\textbf{Chapter three} consists of an analytical description of the security mechanisms of ECOWAS, AU, and the UN. The institutional design, as well as respective legal competencies in the peace and security arenas, of these three organizations are systematically compared.

\textbf{Chapter four} presents the theoretical framework of this thesis. It outlines the core assumptions of diffusion theory, and derives ones that form the basis for the subsequent analysis.

\textsuperscript{11} Among the interviewees, three distinct groups can be identified. First, academics working on this subject matter and observing these processes for years now. Second, current and/or former UN, AU, and ECOWAS staff. Third, experts as well as UN, AU, and ECOWAS officials involved in these processes, interviewed based on their experience vis-à-vis the policy-making choices leading to the specific institutional designs.
Chapter five presents the methodological framework and the research design. It explains the case-selection criteria, as well as the chosen methods of data collection and analysis. Further, the scope as well as limitations of the present study are also discussed.

Chapter six is the first analytical chapter. It illustrates how conflicts in the past have shaped the self-perceptions of ECOWAS and AU, and reveals to what extent those events can explain the emergence of the witnessed institutional designs of the two organizations.

Chapter seven is concerned with the first case, ECOWAS. By looking at the interdependencies between organizations, the ECOWAS-AU-UN triangle, as well as Nigeria’s hegemonic influences, it is explained how influential stakeholders (namely, Nigerian ones) have shaped the learning processes leading to the security institutions now present within ECOWAS.

Chapter eight illustrates the diffusion process vis-à-vis the AU. By looking particularly at the establishment processes of PSC, the CEWS, and the ASF, the chapter explains how the AU has learned from ECOWAS’ own experiences—and how think tanks and expert networks have brought relevant knowledge into these social-learning processes.

Chapter nine summarizes the findings and concludes the study. It addresses the key contributions and implications of the present work, and gives an outlook on what is yet to come from this emerging research field.
Part I: Conceptualizing Diffusion in Security Institutions
2. State of the Art

This thesis aims at explaining why the security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS resemble each other, and furthermore why they share similarities with the UNSC. It also examines what role expert networks have played in the establishment processes of the security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS. It is argued that severe crises served as triggers for both organizations to rethink their existing institutional structures. Based on diffusion theory, this work posits that both organizations were, in the process of establishing new organs, influenced by (design) decisions that had already been made in other regional and international organizations elsewhere around the globe. For ECOWAS, as the first of the two ROs to have established security organs, the UNSC was the main role model herein. The OAU, meanwhile, heavily relied on the experiences that ECOWAS made with its priorly established security organs. In this process of accumulating know-how, expert networks played a crucial role not only by holding but also by sharing their knowledge—leading to learning processes in organizations. It is argued that expert networks have played a particularly important role in the social-learning process of the OAU. They not only facilitated the learning process with ECOWAS, as an RO that has close connections to the OAU, but have also brought knowledge and experience from ECOWAS into the decision-making processes of the OAU.

This diffusion argument is innovative for three reasons: First, it can explain institutional change within the security organs of AU and ECOWAS. The institutional design of security organs is generally rather stable, and only rarely subject to change. As visible in the UNSC, reforms of existing security institutions often fail due to great power interests (Gould and Rablen 2014). Although security as a policy field has changed tremendously in the past seventy-five to eighty years, and furthermore threats have recently come to include a far greater number of non-state actors, the security institutions of IOs nevertheless rarely adapt to these new challenges (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016).

Second, diffusion theory describes by definition horizontal decision-making processes—ones in which states voluntarily adopt policies based on
interdependent decision-making. The African continent has hitherto been mostly depicted by applying a rather vertical decision-making scheme. The image of Africa as an underdeveloped continent with weak states is still predominant, with only the influence of great states often at the front and center of interest (Hartmann 2016).

Third, wide-ranging in the rational-choice literature is the assumption that states design organizations to further their own goals, and organizations are thus the core preference of states (Koremenos et al. 2001). This thesis will show that decision-makers in African ROs learn from the experiences of other African ROs, and form their institutions accordingly. In contrast to the rational-design literature, the diffusion approach stresses the importance of stakeholder interaction—and thereby underlines the ability of organizations to adapt to changing circumstances by learning from each other.

Summarizing the existing literature on institutional design in general and on diffusion processes in particular reveals that—although significant research has already been conducted—key gaps can nevertheless still be easily identified. First, quantitative studies on diffusion mechanisms have had only limited success in explaining underlying processes in-depth. Although there have been studies regarding specific diffusion mechanisms, more detailed and in-depth research is still needed. As part of this qualitative studies are also necessary, so as to answer questions such as how and where exactly diffusion takes place.

Second, diffusion theory does not take into account what root causes can underlie decision-making processes. How certain regional and international organizations act is often based on what has happened in the past. Therefore, diffusion theory should not only research the interdependence between stakeholders, nation-states, and organizations, but should also stress much more the interconnectivity between past and present decisions.

Third, much more systematic research is needed in order to identify the decisive stakeholders in these diffusion processes. As policy-making no longer involves only nation-states but increasingly non-state actors too, with uncertainty among policy-makers simultaneously also on the rise, then expert knowledge is now being widely used to advise those policy-makers on a wide range of issue areas. It
is widely accepted that non-state actors—such as transnational networks of judges and other epistemic communities—play a crucial role in the various stages of decision-making, including in the process of developing the institutional design of a given RO. Empirical research on transnational policy networks is well elaborated, but is nonetheless still almost entirely non-existent for diffusion processes however. As such, it is now necessary to relate research on diffusion mechanisms much more closely with the involved stakeholders.

Fourth, most of the research on institutional design focuses on the Global North. There have been numerous studies in the field of Europeanization research explaining how the EU has disseminated its influence around the globe. Until now there has been very little research on diffusion processes in the Global South though, such as between the countries or between the continents that constitute it. As a consequence, research on African ROs has been heavily neglected—and thus now urgently needs to be expanded.

This chapter gives an overview of the current research debates in the field. Regarding the emergence of institutional design, we can distinguish between explanations based on independencies among international stakeholders and those based on interdependencies in the international arena. Still-dominant integration theories assume that regional cooperation results from independent decision-making in certain areas of the world, or within regions. The state of the art of this research strand is described in the first part of this chapter (2.1.). Theoretical explanations include those based on functional necessity (2.1.1.), approaches based on random co-evolution (2.1.2.), and analyses based on coercive external pressures (2.1.3.). A further chosen approach emanates from the assumption of interdependency between regional and international organizations. According to diffusion theory, ROs do not act in isolation—and the actions of one affect the decisions of others. Chapter 2.2. therefore describes the state of the art of diffusion theory. After elaborating general diffusion theory assumptions (2.2.1.), the current literature on diffusion mechanisms is examined (2.2.2.)—and that specifically on the role of stakeholders in diffusion processes scrutinized (2.2.3.).
2.1. Institutional Design Research
2.1.1. Functional Theories

Functional-institutionalist theories explain the emergence of ROs with the collective action problems caused by economic interdependence, to which decision-makers respond rationally (Keohane 1984). Rational-institutionalist ones answer the question of why institutions emerge with the functions that they need to perform. Examples can be found in the description of the US Congress, and how its rules support stable legislation (Hall and Taylor 1996, 943). Other rationalist approaches in IR see institutions as mechanisms for states to lower their transaction costs. It is argued that in an anarchic system with complex interdependencies, states demand international cooperation and set up international institutions so as to enhance problem-solving (Martin and Simmons 1998; Moravcsik 1993; Shepsle 1989). For ROs, this argument is even more prominent due to geographic proximity. Globalization and global markets are seen as major drivers for regional cooperation, as regional trade and economic relations are easier to manage than global ones are (Breslin et al. 2002; Schirm 2002).

After having chosen to establish an institution, relevant parties need to also decide on its institutional design. Rationalist-functionalist approaches postulate that this design is determined by the type of cooperation problem that needs to be solved, as well as member states’ preferences. Hence, international as well as regional organizations are partly perceived as being “radically different” (Koremenos et al. 2001, 761). Other functionalist strands identify key similarities, and explain them with higher levels of interdependency. The more interdependent states are, the more externalities are created—ones that result in higher levels of regional institutionalization (Haftel 2013; Hawkins et al. 2006). Problem-structural approaches unfold in line with these arguments. Thus, comparable levels of (regional) integration lead to institutional-design
similarities as the demands for specific institutions align (Haftel 2007, 2013; Krapohl and Fink 2013; Mattli 1999b).12

To sum up, rationalist-functional approaches conjecture that ROs are the result of specific cooperation problems that need to be solved, as (economic) interdependency calls for cooperation between states. Results are either radically different designs or similar ones, if the cooperation problems faced are also analogous. Rationalist-functional theories therefore underline the significance of region-specific factors, and largely ignore international or other exogenous ones. By doing this, they assume however that ROs act independently from each other.

2.1.2. Random Co-Evolution

In contrast to functionalist theories, random co-evolution approaches emphasize configurations of state preferences. In order to explain institutional similarities, they assume that the random co-evolution of institutional design is observable if similar interests or ideas exist. This is in line with constructivist theories, which also focus on the role of ideas in regional-cooperation processes (Duina 2006; Johnston and Acharya 2007). In rationalist approaches, we also find similar arguments—that is, stating that international institutions are to be seen as the outcome of specific interest constellations. Therefore, states use IOs to promote their own objectives and choose the institutional design accordingly (Koremenos et al. 2001). Similar to functionalist theories, it is argued herein that member states’ preferences, the number of member states, and the respective cooperation problems are all decisive factors for institutional design (Böhmelt and Pilster 2011). A further important one is the degree of development of the states concerned. The design of institutions whose member states are rather developed and democratic differs radically from those institutions constituted by less developed countries (Milner and Kubota 2005; Solingen 2008, 2012). As

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12 It is Ernst Haas (1970, 2004 [1958]) who has—most prominently—argued that cooperation problems in the future need to be solved with the help of regional institutions that originally aimed at economic cooperation, and only later expanded their mandate to political issues too. Lindberg (1970), Malamud and Schmitter (2011), and Schmitter (2009) have all argued in a similar vein.
they vary both within and between regions, similarity of institutional design due to random co-evolution is considered a rather rare occurrence. To sum up, theories of random co-evolution play only a minor role in explaining institutional-design similarities. Similar to functionalist theories, they posit the independent decision-making of ROs as being responsible for determining factors that are in fact region-specific.

2.1.3. External Pressures

Another strand of the current literature explaining institutional-design similarities underlines the importance of powerful actors or hegemons pressuring member states into adopting certain design choices. These realist and international political economy (IPE) theories assume that international as well as regional organizations are founded by powerful states or hegemons to realize their own specific goals (Katzenstein 2005; Krasner 1976). Hegemonic stability theory argues that powerful states—whether outside or within the region—even help facilitate regional integration, by offering direction and by moderating in case of tensions (Gilpin 1987; Grieco 1997; Mattli 1999a). There have also been recent approaches ascribing the ineffectiveness of ROs to the absence of a hegemon or external powerful actor (Fawcett and Gandois 2010; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Herein it is argued that powerful states such as China, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, and the US support the emergence of regional integration due to their own geopolitical interests, and furthermore have enhanced cooperation in numerous policy areas (Börzel 2016, 45).

Theories of IPE assume that regionalism is a consequence of, and rational response of decision-makers to, changes in the international economy. Recent such approaches have argued that increasing integration and interdependence on

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13 One example is the US, who acted as external hegemon in the creation of the European Community and also supported the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in creating a security community (Acharya 2001; Gruber 2000). More recently, scholars have argued that the EU supports regional integration efforts worldwide (Schimmelfennig 2012; Teló 2007).

14 There are also examples where powerful states or hegemons are not willing to act as such in order to enhance regional integration. South Africa has greatly supported the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), but is much more hesitant in undermine its leading role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Lorenz-Carl 2013).
the global level is leading to greater institutionalization worldwide. As a result, regional cooperation and integration are being strengthened (Mauro et al. 2008). Furthermore, regional-integration processes are progressing parallel to rising overall integration at the global level. Consequently these approaches expect the increasing regional integration of member states who are upwardly integrated in global structures, and therefore develop similar regional institutions (Dees et al. 2007).

To sum up, IPE and hegemonic theories include exogenous factors in their attempts to explain the institutional design of regional and international organizations. However these exogenous factors are described as being either globalization forces or coercive pressures. In the case of the latter, it is assumed that ROs are interdependent—but that interdependence arises from the relationship with the (global) hegemon, and not among the ROs themselves. Concerning globalization, external factors are seen as decisive—but institutional-design similarities are explained as independent answers to common pressures. IPE and hegemonic theories thus also ultimately overlook the interdependent nature of the decisions taken by regional and international organizations.

2.2. Diffusion Theory

2.2.1. Development of Diffusion Research

There is a growing literature on diffusion processes between different regional and international organizations.\(^{15}\) Originating from sociological institutionalism, diffusion theory claims that there are global scripts about institutions—ones that are carried around the world (Boli and Thomas 1998; Meyer 1987; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). A vast number of works (e.g. Börzel and Risse 2012; Gilardi 2013; Solingen 2012) refer to either Strang’s definition of diffusion as “any process where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining nonadopters” (1991, 325) or alternatively (e.g. Elkins and Simmons 2005; Jetschke and Lenz 2011;}

\(^{15}\) The appearance of the term “diffusion” as such in journal titles in Sociology and Political Science increased from fifteen to twenty occurrences per decade by the 1950s to thirty-seven per decade by the 1990s (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 36).
Weyland 2005) to Rogers’ classical definition of diffusion as a “process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (1983, 5).

Despite having different research focuses, three assumptions unite the diffusion theory literature: First, that diffusion is a consequence of interdependent decision-making (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gilardi 2013; Jahn 2006; Jetschke and Lenz 2011, 2013; Solingen 2012). Second, in most of the research, diffusion is characterized as a phenomenon that occurs in distinct waves. The literature often refers to diffusion waves or clusters by speaking of temporal and geographic spreads of innovation (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Walker 1969; Weyland 2005). Third, these works refer to the decentralized nature of diffusion—wherein the numerous stakeholders take decisions voluntarily, in the absence of a coordinating authority (Börzel and Risse 2012; Jetschke and Lenz 2011; Maggetti and Gilardi 2015).

Based on these three conceptualizations, there has been intense academic discussion regarding how to best contemplate or understand the various sources, processes, and mechanisms of diffusion. First, it has been discussed whether and if so to what extent we need to distinguish between single and multiple diffusion sources. Generally speaking the EU is considered a single stimulus, whereas Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are seen as multiple different diffusion sources (Kim et al. 2016; Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014). Second, the academics grapple with how to discern what it is that actually diffuses. What are the objects of diffusion? Lenz and Duina (2016) refer to problem definition, problem framing, and problem articulation. Risse’s differentiation (2016) between three diffusion objects is in a similar vein. He argues that regional cooperation and regional integration can be objects of diffusion, as can institutional-design features and specific regional-governance practices in certain policy areas.

Third, very recently debate has arisen about whether diffusion needs to be conceptualized as an outcome or as a process. Some research strands see institutional convergence as the most important indicator of diffusion (Holzinger et al. 2008; Jetschke and Lenz 2013; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Other
approaches argue, meanwhile, that diffusion is related to a process and so cannot be measured only by its outcomes. Accordingly, the different phases of diffusion as well as the interactions between involved actors need to be taken into account (Duina and Lenz 2016; Jahn 2015; Risse 2016).

In recent years numerous studies applying diffusion research to different world regions or policy areas, as well as to specific institutions, could be found. Research regarding the diffusion of institutional design around the globe is vast and very insightful. Baccini et al. (2014) show that different trade agreements around the globe form institutional-design clusters. Similarly, Duina (2006) describes how the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has played an exemplary role in constituting trade agreements elsewhere and subsequently. Alter (2012, 2014, 2016) convincingly elaborates how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has diffused, resulting in eleven copies of it being discoverable around the globe. The increasing similarity of the AU to the EU has been elaborated on by Packer and Rukare (2002). As an example from the Middle East shows, meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has also been inspired by the EU with regard to its institutional design as well as its founding charter (Fawcett 2013). Lenz (2012) and Buzdugan (2013) discuss how European integration models have diffused to SADC and its common-market objectives. Anja Jetschke (2010, 2012, 2017) elucidates, furthermore, how ASEAN has adopted European-style institutions despite its explicit “ASEAN way.”

However most of the diffusion research is still focused on diffusion processes from the Global North to the Global South. Despite some examples from Asian ROs, diffusion research within the Global South is still by and large absent (Risse 2016, 96). Acharya (2009a) and Dash (1996) depict how ASEAN has been a model for the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Diffusion processes from Mercosur to the Pacific Alliance have also been described (Tvevad 2014), as have those between Mercosur and SADC (Mattheis 2014). A notable exception from the otherwise exclusive scholarly concentration on the Global North is the Comparative Regional Organizations
Based on content analysis of the founding and amending treaties of eighty regional and international organizations worldwide, CROP explains any discovered similarities and diffusion mechanisms. Furthermore, based on its extensive codebook, it has become possible to explain diffusion processes of RO institutional design as well as norm and policy area diffusion too (Jetschke et al. 2018).

Furthermore, recent literature has been concerned with the diffusion processes of single policies and policy areas. Hiro Katsumata (2011) shows that ROs develop similar policies, based on the example of ASEAN and its establishment of new cooperative security agendas that can also be found with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Kurt Weyland (2005, 2006) explains the diffusion of social security reforms based on the Chilean-style pension privatization of the 1980s. Furthermore, Brooks and Kurtz demonstrate in their analysis of capital-account-liberalization strategies in Latin America from 1983 to 2007 how the transfer of innovations is “conditioned by the legacy of a country’s pre-debt crisis economic development model” (2012, 95). Similarly, Elkins et al. (2006) show that the spread of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) is driven by competition over foreign direct investment. The diffusion of environmental standards in the US, from California to the federal government, is described by Vogel (1995) meanwhile.

A significant part of diffusion research is concerned with that of norms. Even only implicitly, the spread of norms has long been an important aspect of international politics. A famous example is Samuel Huntington’s (1991) “third wave of democratization,” which can be considered a diffusion process. Explicit diffusion studies, meanwhile, describe how democracy moves between neighboring countries (Brinks and Coppelde 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Starr 1991). Constructivist approaches also underline the role of ideas and identities in diffusion processes. Acharya (2009b) explains differing regional cooperation between Europe and Asia by way of the role of identity in the latter region. Other

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16 CROP is conducted at the University of Göttingen, Germany, under the guidance of Professor Dr. Anja Jetschke. The author was herself previously part of the CROP research team.

17 For an excellent overview of policy diffusion research in Political Science, see Graham (2013).
scholars have researched the role of legal culture in economic-integration efforts (Duina 2006), or the role of identity in the establishment of regional-security communities (Kupchan 1997). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) famously describe the norm cascade, and how norm dynamics relate to political change. One of the few examples of research regarding norm diffusion in the Global South is that of Dwarka and Attuquayefio (2014), who argue that norm diffusion in Africa has not been unidirectional and that the AU has been heavily influenced by ECOWAS—particularly in the peace and security field.

### 2.2.2. Literature on Diffusion Mechanisms

A central focal point of the diffusion literature is concerned with the mechanisms through which institutions and policies diffuse. In defining what mechanisms can be considered relevant herein, the research varies greatly. In their conceptualization of diffusion from a horizontal perspective, Jetschke and Lenz (2011) exclude vertical mechanisms such as coercion or material incentives. Other scholars such as Börzel and Risse (2012), Gilardi (2013), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), as well as Simmons et al. (2006) include those direct mechanisms in their considerations that denote the specific processes through which hegemonic stakeholders exert their influence.

What unites most diffusion researchers is the underlying decision logic. Being located on a continuum, the two ends constitute the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness respectively (March and Olsen 2006). Figure 1 below shows how the various horizontal mechanisms are situated on this continuum.

**Figure 1: Horizontal Mechanisms of Diffusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic of consequences</th>
<th>Logic of appropriateness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rational learning · Bounded learning · Social learning</td>
<td>Emulation · Mimicry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jetschke and Lenz 2011, 461
The mechanism “rational learning” is associated with the logic of consequences, as it describes how rationally acting stakeholders try to achieve fixed goals and preferences so as to maximize the benefits for themselves (Meseguer and Gilardi 2009; Sommerer 2011). Moving further to the other side of the continuum, Jetschke and Lenz (2011), Meseguer (2004, 2005, 2009), and Hall (1993) still categorize mechanisms such as “bounded learning” and “social learning” under the logic of consequences, but ascribe them with elements of the logic of appropriateness. Many examples of this can be found in the literature. Yeo (2008) as well as Jetschke and Murray (2012) show how decision-makers in ASEAN have adopted EU-style institutions through learning processes. How the Washington Consensus led to a spread of liberal economic policies during the 1980s and 1990s through learning processes has been analyzed by Williamson (1990). Related to this, Tommasi and Velasco (1996) demonstrate how critical economic situations in Latin American countries during the 1980s led to learning processes vis-à-vis numerous models in other countries elsewhere. Kurt Weyland (2004) explains, meanwhile, how rational learning is the underlying mechanism in the adoption of market reforms in a number of Latin American countries.

Moving a little further along the continuum, the mechanism “emulation” is a well-debated aspect of diffusion literature, and included in the categorization of Jetschke and Lenz (2011) as well as Risse (2016). Emulation is considered to be the process in which states adopt policies because of their normative and socially constructed characteristics, and not because of their objective features (Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Polillo and Guillén (2005) show how states adopt policies to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Similarly, Lenz (2012) describes how Mercosur and SADC took on certain institutional arrangements from the EU via emulation. Other scholars argue that emulation can be also understood as norm diffusion. Examples include the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and its role as a “teacher of norms” (Finnemore 1993) or Henri Dunant, founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who defined what is permitted during times of war and what is not (Gilardi 2013).
On the very end of the continuum, the mechanism “mimicry” is assigned to the logic of appropriateness. As visible in figure 2, this mechanism is also to be found in the categorization of Risse (2016)—which is also built on the same decision logic, but contains both so-called horizontal and vertical mechanisms of diffusion.

**Figure 2: Horizontal and Vertical Mechanisms of Diffusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct influence</th>
<th>Logic of consequences</th>
<th>Logic of appropriateness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Norms socialization and persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive incentives and negative sanctions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect diffusion/Emulation</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>Normative emulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesson drawing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mimicry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Risse 2016, 89

Mimicry as a diffusion mechanism describes the search for legitimacy and appreciation. Meyer and Rowan (1977) posit that certain states adopt specific policies or institutions to express belonging to a certain community of states. As noted, Börzel and Risse (2012), Gilardi (2013), Risse (2016), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), as well as Simmons et al. (2006) all include so-called vertical or direct diffusion mechanisms in their theoretical considerations, in contrast to Jetschke and Lenz (2011). One of these is the mechanism “coercion,” which is allocated to the logic of consequences. Risse (2016) identifies the 1999 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on the Western Balkans of the EU as one example of forced regional cooperation. Biersteker (1990) claims that the attachment of conditions in processes of financial help provision by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank can be considered coercive mechanisms. Similar examples can be found within the EU, as it often attaches conditions—such as the reform of domestic policies and institutions—to its financial assistance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Another main diffusion mechanism is
“competition”\textsuperscript{18}, which describes processes in which states adjust their behavior in the direction of supposed best practices. Elkins et al. (2006) and Busch et al. (2005) outline how states compete over attaining higher employment rates or greater economic growth in order to meet certain required criteria. Similarly, standard globalization studies operationalize competition as economic and financial openness toward other countries (Garrett 1998).

2.2.3. Literature on Diffusion Channels

Not only have diffusion mechanisms themselves been subject to intense academic discussion, but so have (albeit to a much lesser degree) the channels through which any relevant information and practices actually spread. As already mentioned, Jetschke and Lenz (2011) are among the few scholars to have systematically looked at what they call “diffusion channels”. They define these as those “through which information and practices diffuse” (ibid., 457). Taking into consideration that receiving information about certain practices in other organizations is a prerequisite of diffusion processes occurring, they distinguish between three types of diffusion channel—virtual, formal, and informal ones. The following section will give an overview of current research on the three categories.\textsuperscript{19}

According to these authors, virtual channels are best understood as ones facilitating the transfer of information between decision-makers via modern communication technologies. In practice, this can be as trivial as decision-makers actively looking on the internet or in newspapers for relevant information, as Duina (2006) has shown. After having actively searched on the internet for strategies used in other world regions, decision-makers then adopt the researched approaches. But as it is hard to show causalities between using

\textsuperscript{18}This review will concentrate on those diffusion mechanisms scrutinized by most scholars in the field. Mechanisms such as “positive incentives/negative sanctions” and “norms socialization and persuasion” (see figure 2) are rather minor ones that are rarely considered in other academic research. What Risse (2016) calls “lesson-drawing” is termed “learning” by other scholars.

\textsuperscript{19}As the informal channel is the most relevant one for this particular thesis, the author will only briefly present current research on the other two channels here.
(modern) communication technologies and adopting strategies that have been previously researched, there is hardly any existing literature on virtual diffusion channels. What can be observed, however, is increasing news coverage of the policies and strategies of ROs, and particularly the EU. Until today, it has remained unclear to what extent such coverage influences decision-makers in their choice of policies.

The formal diffusion channel describes interregional communication and exchange. According to Jetschke and Lenz (2011), interregional relations are the single most important channel for ROs. In 1990 the EU had two institutionalized interregional fora, and in 2007 already twenty-nine (Smith 2008, 103f.). Yeo (2008) has shown that regular exchange between ROs in such interregional fora can lead to socialization processes for the involved stakeholders. On a quantitative level, Cao (2010, 2012) has worked on networks and their impact on diffusion processes vis-à-vis fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies. Beyond that, very little academic attention has hitherto been paid to explaining diffusion processes via formal diffusion channels.20

The third, and for this thesis most important, form hereof is the so-called informal channel, which refers to non-institutionalized interactions between decision-makers on the one side and non-state actors21 on the other (Jetschke and Lenz 2011, 458). Transnational expert networks do not occupy formal state positions, but they do possess essential knowledge. Due to increasing complexity

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20 Interregional exchange in general has been researched quite extensively by now. A few examples are: Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger (2005); Farrell (2007); and Lombaerde and Schulz (2009).

21 The term non-state actors is used here so as to distinguish this research from those approaches in international affairs wherein intergovernmental relations are understood as ones in which governments are unitarian, and so non-state actors are seen to play no role (Halliday 1991, 197). This Weberian notion of the state had exceptional influence on scholars of political realism such as Morgenthau and Carr (Biersteker 2013, 247). But not only classical realists transferred this concept of the state into their own works; Moravcsik (1993, 1997) also includes it in his reformulation of liberalism. Although acknowledging the role of societal actors, Moravcsik retains the nation-state as a gatekeeper between national and international policy. Similar arguments can be found in Wallerstein’s (2004) world system theory. He heavily relies on Weber, by stressing that national sovereignty includes a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and that nation-states are the only legitimate stakeholders (ibid., 43). The same holds true for the constructivist Alexander Wendt (1999) as well, who replicates this concept of government-centrism in his own research.
in international relations, decision-makers rely on knowledge that often is limited to specific groups of experts. Transnational networks are one important provider hereof, and thereby exert key influence on decision-makers.

Alter (2008, 2012; Alter et al. 2012) convincingly shows how transnational jurist advocacy networks shape different regional courts based on the model of the ECJ. With the specific example of the Court of Justice of the AC, Saldías (2010) illustrates how transnational jurists have proposed an ECJ-style court to the AC based on their prior EU experiences. Similar processes have been observed by Dent (2008), outlined in his article about the influential role of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in regionalism processes in East Asia. Additionally there have been studies on epistemic communities in research centers funded by the European Commission aiming at transferring regional integration knowledge to other world regions (Sanchez-Bajo 1999). These select examples suggest that transnational non-state expert groups have significant influence on decision-makers; more research is needed, however, to be able to make more detailed, concrete statements hereon.

2.2.3.1. Transnational Policy Networks

Horizontal perspectives on policy-making date back to the 1940s, when they were first introduced into the academic discussion. By researching the interdependency between government, bureaucracy, and organized interests, scholars at that time argued that constellations of stakeholders do indeed matter (MacIver 1948). A distinct policy-network approach could only be established in the 1980s however, when it finally became consensual wisdom that the interactions between the numerous stakeholders involved in the policy-making process do indeed have an impact on its outcome (Kenis and Schneider 1991). This “major shift [...] from hierarchical control to horizontal coordination” (ibid., 36) described a pivotal societal transformation now unfolding, as well as its impact on contemporary policy-making. With the geopolitical and world-economic changes now occurring, interconnections across national borders were also on the rise—meaning that horizontal coordination was not only taking place.
within national boundaries, but to an increasing degree transnationally too (Risse-Kappen 2008, 459). As rich as the literature on policy networks certainly is, the perspectives therein on the application of this concept are just as diverse. Most scholars are still discussing whether there is already in place a sufficiently far-reaching theory on the impact of policy networks on public policy-making, or whether alternatively it is still a rather loose concept describing only policy-making in general (Börzel 1998; Lang and Leifeld 2008; Rhodes 2006; Schneider 2009). In the following a brief overview of policy-network approaches is presented, while critiques regarding their actual impact are also discussed. Additionally, research describing specific actor groups is introduced.22

2.2.3.2. Policy Networks: A Theory in the Making?

Given the great variety of policy-network approaches and their applications that exist, a number of different overviews of them can be found (Börzel 1998; Lang and Leifeld 2008; Rhodes 2006; Schneider 2009). R. A. W. Rhodes (2006, 426) categorizes policy networks as attempts to describe governments as work, as the reformation of public management, and also as a theory for analyzing government policy-making. Those works dealing with policy-network theory can be distinguished between ones on Great Britain (Rhodes 1988, 1997), on the rest of the European continent (Börzel 1998; Kickert et al. 1997), and on the US (O’Toole Jr 1997; Salamon and Elliott 2002). Based on this first categorization, Rhodes (2006, 431) distinguishes between two broader schools of thought differing in their respective attempts to explain network behavior—the power-dependence approach (Rhodes 1988, 1997) and the rational-choice approach (Scharpf 1997).

Tanja Börzel (1998), meanwhile, casts the different understandings of policy networks along two dimensions: first, she disaggregates quantitative from qualitative network analysis and, second, she differentiates between policy networks as a typology of interest intermediation and contrariwise as a specific

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22 Policy networks are treated here as the generic term for all specific actor groups made up of non-state actors of relevance in given policy processes.
form of governance. Treating policy networks as a specific form of governance is mostly attributed to scholars of the so-called Max Planck School, such as Renate Mayntz, Fritz Scharpf, Patrick Kenis, Volker Schneider, and Edgar Grande. According to them, modern societies are “characterized by societal differentiation, sectoralization, and policy growth which leads to political overload” (Börzel 1998, 259) and “governing under pressure” (Jordan and Richardson 1983, 1).

Based on growing complexities worldwide, functional differentiation is leading to actor groups that are specialized in certain key issue areas. This so-called informatization trend is closely related to the growing need “for scientific expertise in the policy-making process” (Kenis and Schneider 1991, 36). It is important to state that, in the academic discussion, policy networks include all of the stakeholders involved in drafting and implementing policies in a specific domain. Interactions between public and private actors are defined as informal and non-hierarchical, interests as interdependent and solution-oriented (Börzel 1998, 260). In contrast to the dominant government-centric approaches, policy networks demonstrate a transforming relationship between state and society—by underlining the involvement of a plurality of actors in the policy-making process. Scholars therefor argue that policy networks do not merely act as a new analytical tool, but also represent a genuine turning point in the structure of polities (Mayntz 1993, 5).

Lang and Leifeld (2008) follow Börzel’s view of policy networks being an in-between method (they also point here to qualitative as well quantitative network analysis) and theory. Regarding policy-network theory, they differentiate between five schools: namely, organizational state and political exchange; elites and world system; participation and social capital; governance and interest procurance; and, issue networks, epistemic communities, and advocacy coalitions (which will be described in the next section).

Although these approaches do certainly have theoretical foundations, Börzel is not the only one asking whether policy networks are a “method, model, or theory” (1998, 254). The policy-network approach has often been criticized for not being able to “take us much further” (Dowding 1995, 136). Detractors castigate the
policy-network approach for its inability to generate a far-reaching general theory that can enrich existing explanations of the policy process (Dowding 1995, 136). Although there is a rich literature about the empirical translation of the policy-network concept into measurable impacts on the policy process itself (Jansen and Schubert 1995; Schneider et al. 2009), the question concerning additional value remains a critical one—and further research can thus ultimately only help to validate the policy-network approach.

2.2.3.3. From Epistemic Communities to Advocacy Coalitions

Another strand of literature points to the specific actor groups who, based on shared beliefs, provide specific resources to the policy-making process. In contrast to most of the other research emanating from heterogeneous policy networks, these scholars proceed on the contrasting assumption of homogenous networks existing (Börzel 1998, 258). The most prominent approaches herein include epistemic communities (Haas 1992b), advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984), and issue networks (Heclo 1978).

The concept of epistemic communities, prominently featured in a special edition of International Organization in 1992, was first introduced by Peter Haas. He defines them as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992b, 3). Haas argues that based on the growing complexities in world politics, decision-makers now heavily rely on knowledge produced by experts. What distinguishes the membership of epistemic communities from that of other groups involved in policy-making is the authoritative claim to knowledge and shared beliefs as well as principles, in order to influence outcomes.

Haas and others have successfully applied this approach to empirical research, especially in the field of environmental policies (Haas 1989, 1992a)—but also in the security sector too (Adler 1992). Transnational advocacy networks have been postulated by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) meanwhile. What is
unique to their network approach is how they are “organized to promote causes, principled ideas and norms, and often involve individuals advocating policy changes” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 91). In their book Activists beyond Borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998), these two authors show how activist groups have had an impact on such diverse issue areas as opposing slavery, promoting human rights, and supporting environmental politics. Another approach vis-à-vis how such networks influence policy-making has been presented by Kingdon (1984). He defines policy entrepreneurs as political stakeholders who promote ideas based on their own interests. The core element of his research thereby lies in the process of how policy entrepreneurs manage to initiate policy change by putting their ideas concretely on the agenda.

Empirical research on how exactly policy entrepreneurs spread policy innovations has been done by, among others, Michael Mintrom (Mintrom 1997; Mintrom and Vergari 1998). The concept of issues networks goes back to Heclo (1978), and contains the idea that they will be formed in the policy process based on certain ideas and expectations. In contrast to epistemic communities, issue networks are dynamic—while members can be very heterogeneous, as they come together only based on shared interest and outcome orientations (Leifeld and Malang 2009, 380).
3. Institutional Design of Security Mechanisms

If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa’s rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full exploitation of our material and human means, in the full interests of all our peoples. “To go it alone” will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations, and threaten our liberty (Nkrumah et al. 1963, xvii).

When African leaders came together in Sirte, Libya, in 1999, they had already experienced a decade of ingrained and high-intensity conflicts in Africa for which the OAU could not find an appropriate answer. “In dire need of solutions to its critical problems” (Adejo 2001, 132), they had to rethink their prior approaches in the areas of peace, security, and development. By declaring their commitment to transforming the OAU into the AU, deep-rooted reform of the former institutions of the OAU was thereby initiated (Adejo 2001; Engel and Porto 2010, 2013; Franke 2008).

This transformation can be understood as a signaling by African leaders of a fresh start in the new millennium. Without the influence of the erstwhile great powers of the Cold War era, African leaders have instead tried to find “African solutions to African problems” (Hartmann 2016, 271)—especially against the backdrop of changing security challenges. By transforming the preexisting OAU into the newly founded AU, the African heads of state and government emphasized the wish for peace, security, and stability on their continent (OAU 2000c, preamble). In 2002 they adopted the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,” whereby they established a series of new institutions and elaborated the so-called African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The PSC Protocol established the Peace and Security Council as the AU’s control center—albeit with it being supported by numerous other institutions, such as the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning
System, the African Standby Force, and the Special Fund (Engel and Porto 2010; Sturman and Hayatou 2010).

One of APSA’s core characteristics is “its polycentric and multi-level nature” (Franke 2013, 73). The AU, as the main, all-embracing organization on the continent, relies heavily on other African ROs when it comes to the implementation of policies as well as to acquiring local expertise and technical capacity. African ROs such as Southern African Development Community, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have also enhanced their peace and security ambitions by strengthening and/or establishing related mechanisms.

Among the aforementioned African ROs, ECOWAS stands out. Originally established only to foster economic cooperation in West Africa, ECOWAS expanded its focus to security cooperation in the 1990s—and therein developed the most advanced security mechanism on the African continent to date (Gandois 2014; Hartmann 2010; Obi 2009). The revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 together with the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” of 1999 paved the way for the institutionalization of ECOWAS’ emerging security ambitions.

A closer look at these mechanisms reveals some interesting observations regarding their institutional design. The PSC of the AU and the MSC of ECOWAS not only look very similar to each other but also share interesting parallels with the UNSC. But why, in fact, do they share these similarities? Until today, a systematic comparison of African security organs and their institutional designs has been missing. Research dealing with institutional design is still too Eurocentric, while non-Western organizations moreover rarely play a role in the academic discussion anyway. This dissertation in general and this chapter in particular are thus first steps toward systematizing the security organs of AU and ECOWAS, by comparing them both to each other and to the UNSC. The definition of institutional design utilized here is taken from Acharya and Johnston, who cast it as “those formal rules and informal rules and organizational features that
constitute the institution and that function as either the constraints on actor choice or the bare bones of the social environment within which agents interact, or both” (2007, 15).

The following chapter gives an overview of the emergence, as well as the institutional design, of the named security institutions. It is organized as follows: It will first give an overview of the security ambitions of the OAU, and of the gradual transformation phase into the AU and its APSA. Subsequently, ECOWAS’ shift from economic to security cooperation and its related institutionalization is elaborated. After clarifying the institutional design and (legal) competencies of the security mechanisms of both AU and ECOWAS, the UNSC will then be analyzed using the same scheme.

3.1. Organization of African Unity/African Union

The earliest of the numerous efforts that would be undertaken over the years to establish joint African security cooperation date back originally to the beginning of the 1920s, intensifying during the decades that followed.23 Calls for the uniting of the military forces of African countries so as to fight together against the colonial powers became louder as the struggle for liberation slowly gathered pace (Franke 2006, 3). It was Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, who articulated the idea of an African High Command (AHC) and promoted the establishment of an African Legion at the All-African People’s Conference in 1958. Only a handful of African leaders24 initially supported this—perceived as radical—suggestion by Nkrumah, but the underlying idea of a common defense

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23 An article in the Communist Review from 1922 claims that “no opportunity should be lost for propagandizing the native soldiers in the colonial armies and for organizing secretly a great Pan-African army in the same way as the Sinn Fein built up the Irish Army under the very nose of England” (Anonymous 1922).

24 Particularly nationalist leaders, such as Liberia’s President William Tubman, refused to join in with the pan-African idea of a common military system, as they feared the eventual political unification of the continent (Franke 2006, 4). These profound aspirational differences, in combination with conflict over the developments during the Congo crisis and the war in Algeria, are often cited as the reasons for the splitting of African states into opposing groups (Franke 2006, 2008).
project had nevertheless now been planted in their minds at least (Touray 2005, 637).

The Casablanca group—a collection of states that supported Nkrumah—and the opposing Monrovia group—constituted of Liberia, Nigeria, and most of francophone Africa, who together were against the political unification of the continent—managed to approach each other so as to establish the OAU in 1963 (Franke 2008, 318). As the ongoing differences between the two groups “allowed neither a supranational organization nor a stronger defence structure” (Touray 2005, 637), the newly established “Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration” was ultimately a rather weak institution. Its main functions included the management of interstate conflicts, but not only were very few actually referred to it for mediation but also financial shortfalls quickly emerged as member states failed to pay their contributions to the organization’s budget. The OAU’s Defence Commission—established by Article 20 as a specialized commission to be supervised by the Assembly—was instructed to coordinate and harmonize the member states’ defense policy. Although the idea for an AHC was controversially discussed among member states, meetings regarding institutionalized security cooperation took place a number of times under a variety of different guises, such as African Defence Organization, African Defence Force, or African Peace Force (Franke 2008, 318).

The OAU, which had come to encompass in the meantime all fifty-three African countries,\(^{25}\) started its operations with high hopes for the continent. The founding members did not plan anything less than total unity and solidarity among African countries as well as their intensified coordination and cooperation to achieve a better life for the people of Africa, to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence—alongside the eradication of all forms of colonialism from the continent too (OAU 1963, Article 2). One of the most cited and discussed elements of the charter is the principle of “non-interference,” as written down in Article 3 and to which all other ROs and IOs were also adhering at that time. It guaranteed

\(^{25}\) Morocco withdrew in 1984, in protest after the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic to the OAU, and would reenter the AU only in 2017. As of 2018, the AU is made up of fifty-five member states.
all member states that no fellow OAU member would be allowed to intervene in their domestic affairs. Often criticized as an excuse for not going into action, Article 3 of the charter made the organization incapable of “acting as a credible disinterested mediator in the internal conflicts of member states” (Touray 2005, 638f.). In addition, a lack of financial resources and somewhat unclear legal frameworks further complicated the OAU’s work in the areas of peace and security.

The end of the Cold War would mark a lasting milestone in African history. Not only the high number of devastating conflicts witnessed on the continent but also the waning interest of the international community—and these developments being coupled with a now very dynamic political landscape in African countries too—led the OAU to eventually rethink its own security and development strategies (Franke 2006, 10). During an all-African conference, attended by more than 300 delegates, in Uganda in 1991, African leaders consented to the reform of the OAU’s approach to African security challenges. They agreed on a unified strategy, one combining efforts in areas of security, development, poverty reduction, and stability. The final Kampala Document proposed the foundation of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) (Nathan 1992, 212). In the process of establishing the CSSDCA, African leaders found their role model for it in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Similar to the CSCE, the CSSDCA is working within the framework of four so-called calabashes, or baskets—namely, security, stability, development, and cooperation. As a follow-up the Kampala Document was presented in the meetings of ROs such as ECOWAS and the Frontline States,

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26 The CSCE—also known as the Helsinki Process—was a platform via which the US, the Soviet Union, and thirty-three other West and East European countries worked together toward improving interstate relations, based on three fields—namely, security, economic cooperation, and human rights (Nathan 1992, 212).
and at OAU summits in Abuja in 1991, in Dakar in 1992, and in Cairo in 1993—but was never actually adopted.27

Almost concomitantly the OAU secretary general, in his report “Proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution” of 1992, called urgently for reform aimed at institutionalizing the organization’s efforts to better cope with outbreaks of violent conflict. Given responsibility for conceptualizing this mechanism, African leaders presented their revised version of the proposal during the OAU summit in Cairo in 1993—and ratified it too. By adopting this declaration, OAU member states hoped for the better anticipation, prevention, and resolution of the continent’s multiple violent conflicts. Civilian as well as military missions for conflict-afflicted areas were provided for. Besides this, a specific organ—comprised of members of the Bureau of the Assembly, which had to be elected annually, and also of the chairpersons of the Assembly—was established to coordinate the various activities under the umbrella of the new mechanism. To avoid any repeat of the previous financial problems, a special fund—made up of allocations from the OAU’s regular budget as well as of donations from both the continent and abroad—was created (Touray 2005, 639). The newly founded mechanism brought fresh stimulus to the OAU and its conflict-prevention approaches. In the following years, the OAU sent several military-observer missions to a number of different African countries—such as Rwanda (1991–1993), Burundi (1993–1996), and the Comoros (1998–2002).

At the same time, the OAU would be increasingly criticized as an elite club of dictators—a common refrain heard during the 1990s. Far away from the daily reality of African people, overloaded with bureaucracy, incapable of solving problems caused by severe conflict and extreme poverty—these are only some of the negative attributions to the OAU during its last years of existence. The oft-cited and heavily discussed principle of non-interference in member states’

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27 The Kampala Document could not be adopted at the mentioned summit due to the absence of political will and lack of input from member states. As the Kampala Document proposed radical change in Africa, numerous heads of state feared a loss of sovereignty (Nathan 1992, 216). However, during the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999, Nigeria’s President Obasanjo called for the reconsideration of the Kampala Document, and proposed that the year 2000 should be declared the “Year of Peace, Security and Solidarity in Africa” (OAU 1999).
internal affairs left the OAU with the stigma of a perceived inability to manage the new African landscape that had emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War’s end (Adejo 2001; Engel and Porto 2010, 2013).

A fourteen-member committee, which had been set up to review the current OAU charter, submitted a report to the OAU summit aimed at bringing together the interests of all member states. Needless to say compromises were difficult to reach, especially against the backdrop of the so-called Libyan Initiative.28 Despite these difficulties, and based on great efforts being made, African leaders met in Sirte in September 1999 for an extraordinary OAU summit—where they declared their will to transform the OAU into a newly established African Union (Adejo 2001, 133). On July 11, 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted, and the legal and institutional foundations for this new organization were thereby built. Numerous observers certified that there was substantial will to genuinely transform the OAU, and not to just create another toothless tiger. By giving itself a new vision and a clear mandate, the OAU enlarged its influence on the continent (Engel and Porto 2010, 2).

Additionally, an Assembly of Heads of State and Government, an Executive Council, a Pan-African Parliament, an Economic, Social, and Cultural Council, and a Court of Justice were all created too. The Commission’s clout was upgraded considerably as well, by now giving it a clear political mandate. The stipulated objectives, as set out in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, are inter alia: sovereignty; the territorial integrity and independence of AU member states; the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent; the promotion of democratic principles and institutions; popular participation and good governance; and, the successful coordination of policies between both existing and future Regional Economic Communities (OAU 2000c). Newly adopted principles on which the work of the AU are based are inter alia: the respect for the rule of law; the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, the upholding of the

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28 This idea, authored mainly by Muammar Gaddafi, envisioned a federation of African states. Many of Libya’s African peers did not support it, but also did not directly criticize it either. It is to be presumed that the North African member states of the OAU intended with this proposal to improve their foreign relations (Adejo 2001, 133). In 2009 the AU Assembly adopted a plan to implement the United States of Africa by 2017.
sanctity of human life. According to Article 4 (h), it is “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”

As the achievement of peace and security on the continent is at the heart of the Constitutive Act, the necessary institutional framework for achieving this was soon to be established. On July 9, 2002, the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council” of the AU was adopted in Durban, South Africa—entering into force on December 26, 2003. Article 2 of the protocol defines the PSC as a “standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (AU 2002b). To these ends, it is supported by the already-founded Commission and the newly established Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force, and the Special Fund. Its goals encompass, inter alia, the promotion of peace, security, and stability, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, as well as the development of a common defense policy among AU member states (ibid., Art. 3).

The PSC consists of fifteen members, of whom ten are elected for two years and five are elected for three years—based on the “principle of equitable regional representation and rotation” (ibid., Art. 5) of the Executive Council. With its regional membership and shorter terms of office, as well as the non-existence of a veto, the PSC is therefore more the equal of the MSC of ECOWAS. As will be

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29 In 2003 the AU amended the Constitutive Act and extended the right to intervene to “a serious threat to a legitimate order, to restore peace and stability to the member state of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council” (Engel and Porto 2010, 3).

30 Interestingly, the “big five”—South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt—wanted to ensure five permanent seats for those member states with the biggest economic and military capacities on the continent. All the other member states refused to accept this proposition however, dismissing it by referring to the principle of equality as set out in the Constitutive Act (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 62).
shown in chapter 8, for the PSC the UNSC has thereby acted as an example of core lessons to be learned—mainly due to the latter’s own problematic structures. The PSC is responsible for the promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa, for early warning provision and preventive diplomacy, as well as for peace-making and peace-support operations and intervention. Additionally, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction both also fall under the auspices of the PSC, as do humanitarian action and disaster management too (AU 2002b, Art. 6). In collaboration with the chairperson of the Commission, the PSC is responsible for the anticipation and prevention of disputes and conflicts, the undertaking of peace-making and peace-building functions, the authorization of the deployment of peace-support missions, as well as the recommendation of intervention in a member state’s territory to the Assembly—along with the implementation of a common defense policy among AU member states (ibid., Art. 7).

A pivotal role is held by the chairperson of the Commission: they are responsible not only for brings matters to the attention of the PSC or the CEWS but also for ensuring that the decisions taken by the PSC are actually implemented (ibid.). To support the PSC, as noted a Panel of the Wise was established. Comprised of five highly respected African public figures, it is mainly responsible for supporting conflict prevention (ibid., Art. 11). For both the anticipation and prevention of conflict, CEWS was established and furthermore equipped with observation and monitoring centers and units (ibid., Art. 12). In order to realize peace missions, the ASF was founded—to “be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice” (ibid., Art. 13). Its work is supported by a Special Representative and a Force Commander, as well as by a Military Staff Committee. The latter advises the PSC in all matters related to military needs. The newly established Peace Fund is, meanwhile, responsible for the provision of necessary financial resources (ibid., Art. 21). Figure 3 provides an overview of the peace and security structure of the AU.
3.2. Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS was established on May 28, 1975, as a subregional economic organization comprising fifteen member states. Its predecessor, the Customs Union of West African States, dated back to 1959, and was exclusively created for the reallocation of the custom duties that had been levied by the West African coastal states (UDEAO 1966). In 1975, with the Treaty of Lagos, the organization was renamed, and member states now had to adhere to the exclusive economic direction of the new body. Taking European economic cooperation as its role model, Nigeria took over the leading role in ECOWAS (Gandois 2014, 43). Soon after the latter’s foundation, member states identified political insecurity as one of the main barriers to further economic development and the improved well-being of their people (Elowson and MacDermott 2010, 17).

Recurring challenges like conflicts and natural disasters over the years have led to ECOWAS constantly searching for appropriate response mechanisms by which to address these problems. This is why ECOWAS adopted as early as 1978 the

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31 At the time of its establishment, ECOWAS saw itself as the first West African RO bridging the francophone-anglophone gap. In fact, many (especially) francophone states perceived ECOWAS as a Nigerian-led instrument to strengthen its own hegemonic status (Söderbaum and Hettne 2010, 24).
“Protocol on Non-Aggression” and in 1981 the “Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence” (Birikorang 2013, 89), and thereby went along with the emerging wish of African leaders to act in a more self-determined way in the area of security cooperation. Decreasing engagement by international security actors in African conflicts was preceded here as well, while the wish to find “African solutions to African problems” became stronger than ever. In the 1978 protocol member states enshrined not attacking or even engaging in aggression with each other, committing to solving problems peacefully instead. The 1981 protocol, which was signed in Freetown, Sierra Leone, provided for a non-standing military force to counter possible threats by external aggressors. As both protocols referred only to interstate conflicts, the non-consideration of civil wars soon became problematic (Hartmann 2010, 78). However neither protocol was ever actually implemented until the 1990s.

Established originally as an RO having the exclusive aim of facilitating economic integration, ECOWAS took over a radical new mandate in the 1990s. Due to the increasing number of devastating conflicts in West Africa, ECOWAS had to rethink its current conflict approaches and initiate new response mechanisms. Particularly, intrastate conflicts such as in Liberia (from 1989) and in Sierra Leone (from 1991), alongside the fear of a spillover to the whole region, forced ECOWAS into action. In addition, the international community’s diminishing tendency to engage with the African continent resulted in ECOWAS needing to act in a more self-determined way in the areas of conflict prevention, management, and resolution (Birikorang 2013; Gandois 2014).

Having intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone, member states changed the RO’s conceptualization from rather short-term emergency approaches to long-term capacity-building. Until then, the possibility of sending peacekeeping forces into a member state’s territory had not been provided for in the founding treaty. It was particularly the Liberian crisis that caused ECOWAS to starkly notice the non-existence within its ranks of institutions and provisions to effectively cope with this kind of conflict (Gandois 2014; Hartmann 2010). By adopting a revised treaty on July 24, 1993, in Cotonou, ECOWAS not only changed institutional-wise but also now established for itself a clear security and democracy-protection mandate.
too. Article 58 of the new treaty, which came into force in 1995, foresaw the creation of “appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts” (ECOWAS 1993, Art. 58)—such as a regional peace and security observation system and peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{32} Another major change in the revised treaty was the introduction of the supranational principle. By the “partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community within the context of a collective political will” (ibid., preamble), ECOWAS took a step away from the previously conventional ad-hoc decisions made by member states.

With the earlier “Protocol on Non-Aggression” and “Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence” never actually being implemented, ECOWAS needed to formulate innovative security protocols so as to specify its newly established concepts. The “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security”—adopted in 1999, and perceived as one of the core protocols in the area of peace and security—outlined the goals and criteria for future collaboration among member states. ECOWAS had, for many observers, herewith adopted the most comprehensive and ambitious protocol regarding peace and security in the West African region to date. It not only captured areas of collaboration and the respective organs in charge of peace and security operations, but gave also security directives for conflict situations—as well as providing for both a civilian and a military force (Elowson and MacDermott 2010, 24).\textsuperscript{33} In Article 25, there is a clearly distancing from the earlier principle of non-intervention.\textsuperscript{34} A serious threat to peace and security in the region, significant and massive violations of human rights as well as the rule of law, and the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically

\textsuperscript{32} Interestingly, the treaty’s provisions for peacekeeping forces were only made after ECOWAS’ deployment of them to Liberia—making clear how ill-prepared it was to even carry out such operations (Birikorang 2013, 90).

\textsuperscript{33} After the protocol came into force, ECOWAS intervened in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and then played a very active role in peacekeeping there in the decade that followed (Gandois 2014, 43).

\textsuperscript{34} According to its 1975 founding Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS was bound by principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention (Iyi 2016, 5).
elected government are, inter alia, circumstances wherein ECOWAS now had the right to intervene (ECOWAS 1999).\footnote{Interestingly, this protocol was created not only in the aftermath of the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but also as a reaction to the highly controversial intervention by NATO in Kosovo (Abass 2000, 211).}

Article 4 of the protocol refers to the involved institutions, namely the already-established Authority and the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS alongside the newly founded MSC. The Authority—the highest decision-making body not only regarding the mechanisms but also of ECOWAS itself—is inter alia responsible for matters of conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping, security, and humanitarian support (ibid., Arts. 5 and 6). The Secretariat of ECOWAS, meanwhile, has the right to initiate fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation, and reconciliation activities as well as to implement the decisions made by the MSC. It serves both the MSC and the Defence and Security Commission (ibid., Art. 15).

The MSC is constituted by nine out of the fifteen member states, with those representatives being elected for two years and having the possibility of reelection. By acting on behalf of the Authority, it decides on and implements all policies for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping and security, as well as authorizes all forms of intervention and the deployment of any political and military missions. With meetings at the ambassadorial and ministerial levels, as well as that of heads of state and government too, the MSC thus operates on three governmental levels (ECOWAS 1999, Arts. 8–14).

Organs assisting the MSC are the Defence and Security Commission (DSC), the Council of Elders, and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The DSC consists inter alia of chiefs of defense, officers responsible for internal affairs and security, as well as experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It gives technical, logistical, and administrative advice regarding peacekeeping missions (ibid., Arts. 18 and 19). The Council of Elders, consisting of eminent individuals with experience in the peace and security area, is expected to play a role in mediation and reconciliation (ibid., 20). Article 21 defines ECOMOG as
“stand-by, multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment,” for monitoring, peacekeeping and the restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention, as well as peace-building, disarmament, and demobilization and policing activities (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 22). For many observers, the institutional design of the MSC is a nod to that of the UNSC (Hartmann 2013, 2016). Figure 4 gives an overview of ECOWAS’ peace and security structure.

Figure 4: ECOWAS’ Peace and Security Structure

Source: Author’s own compilation (based on ECOWAS 1999).

For ECOWAS and its security mechanisms, the events of the first decade of the new millennium were there for them to undergo a practical test. The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in July 2002 was a first milestone, as the MSC—as foreseen in the protocol—approved the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to that country. The ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) was soon to be followed by one in Liberia (ECOMIL) too. Although both of these missions did certainly face operational challenges, it was soon obvious that ECOWAS had indeed learned its lessons from ECOMOG I and II in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.
3.3. United Nations

The League of Nations had been created in 1920 as a result of World War I; the United Nations was established in 1945 as a direct consequence of World War II meanwhile, with its aim being the safeguarding of peace for subsequent generations. Since then, the UN has become more institutionalized and its areas of responsibility increasingly differentiated—while its membership has expanded from fifty to 193 states. Adopting the UN Charter in 1945 could be understood as an answer to the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, and yet this was only a compromise. The great powers harbored fundamentally different opinions on the design of the UN, and could only agree on a kind of collective security system that would set rules for the international community—ones to which the great powers themselves would not adhere, though. The charter is also criticized for not being as precise as it needs to be when it comes to non-compliance with rules, to priorities, or to the exact competencies of the UN organs (Falk 1971; Gareis and Varwick 2014; Grewe 1984). But the UN Charter can still be understood as a “constitution of the international community” (Fassbender 1998, 531), one that not only managed to survive the twentieth century but that also furthermore gave the international community a universally accepted legal framework to work within.

The UN itself consist of several—partly independent—organizations, agencies, and programs. As established in Article 7 of the charter, the UN consists of six main organs: General Assembly, Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. If the UN is the most essential international body for the maintenance of peace and security, the UNSC is its most powerful organ when it comes to such issues. It comprises fifteen member states, of which five—China, France, Russia, UK, and the US—have permanent seats and the veto right for any non-procedural matter. The ten remaining seats are elected non-permanent member states that serve for a two-year term. These ten seats are divided between five regional

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36 The UN Charter was signed by fifty founding member states. Poland, who could not be there for the inaugural conference, would join the UN later as its fifty-first founding member state (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 19).
caucusing groups: one country from Eastern Europe, two from each of the Western European and Others Group, the Latin America and Caribbean Group, and Asia, as well as three countries from Africa (Gould and Rablen 2014, 1f.).

The Security Council is able to perform its duties at anytime, and the president calls for meetings if he deems them necessary or if a UNSC member, the General Assembly, a UN member state, or the secretary general alternatively does. Each member state has one vote, but distinctions are made between the respective decisions. Whereas those on procedural matters need an affirmative vote of nine members, decisions on all other matters need an affirmative vote of nine members but also the concurring votes of the five permanent members as well (UN 1945, Art. 27). Article 29 of the UN Charter determines the establishment of subsidiary organs. At present, there are three different categories hereof: committees, peace missions, and international criminal tribunals (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 48).

Article 34 of the UN Charter prescribes, meanwhile, “the right to investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” The UNSC is thereby not only the most powerful organ within the UN, but also—and foremost—it is unique in global politics. It has the responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and is equipped with extensive powers to this end. Not only can it investigate any dispute as per Article 34, but can also recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment at any point in time (UN 1945, Art. 36).

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37 This is among the biggest sources of criticism regarding the UNSC. The main one is a lack of efficiency regarding, or even the blockading of, important decisions—that based on permanent member states’ own individual preferences. The second such criticism relates to the non-existent (geographical) allocation of political power within the UNSC (Gould and Rablen 2014, 2).

38 The presidency of the UNSC rotates on a monthly basis, based on the alphabetical order of member states’ names (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 48).

39 The Rules of Procedure of the UNSC determine that no more than fourteen days are allowed to elapse between sessions. In practice, the UNSC meets on a daily basis—even several times a day in fact (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 48).
Whereas its tasks under Chapter VI (Arts. 33–38) remain rather moderate, Chapter VII rules specifically on the use of force. After having determined the existence of any kind of threat to peace (Art. 39), the UNSC can subsequently either apply economic sanctions (Art. 41) or, if these are insufficient, order a military intervention (Art. 42) instead. In accordance with Chapter VIII, the UNSC can “utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority” (Art. 53). Its prominent position within the UN matrix is also reflected in the fact that its decisions are binding for member states, while the General Assembly is obliged to honor UNSC decisions when it comes to the acceptance of new member states and the election of the secretary general as well as judges for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 48). For a schematic overview of the peace and security structure of the UN, see figure 5.

**Figure 5: UN Peace and Security Structure**

![UN Peace and Security Structure Diagram]

Source: Author’s own compilation (based on UN 1945).

### 3.4. Systemizing Security Mechanisms

After having examined each of the three security mechanisms separately, this section will now compare them so as to demonstrate the similarities in their institutional design. Close observation of the two African ROs reveals some interesting insights. First, it becomes obvious that for both—AU and ECOWAS—economic and/or political integration were the initial reasons for cooperation. As the continent has been and still is particularly affected by violent conflict, extreme
poverty and a lack of development thus pose major obstacles for the economic prosperity of African countries. Realizing that political stability is a sine qua non for economic growth, both African ROs have hence added mechanisms aimed at preventing, managing, and solving violent conflicts.

Second, interesting similarities on the international and continental levels can be observed. The PSC of the AU and the ECOWAS’ own MSC seem to follow the model of the UNSC, particularly regarding questions of membership and the right of intervention. Furthermore the whole structure of the APSA—with its PSC, Panel of the Wise, CEWS, ASF, and its Peace Fund—seem to follow the ECOWAS structure. In the latter, we can also find the MSC, a Council of Elders, an Early Warning System (ECOWARN), a Standby Force, and a Peace Fund (see table 1).

Table 1: Security Structures of AU and ECOWAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African Union</th>
<th>Economic Community of West African States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-Making Body</strong></td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
<td>Mediation and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediation Body</strong></td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
<td>Council of Elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standby Force</strong></td>
<td>ECOMOG/ESF</td>
<td>ASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Warning System</strong></td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
<td>ECOWAS Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Peace Fund</td>
<td>Peace Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation (based on AU 2002b; ECOWAS 1999).

Why is this observation of close similarity relevant? Research on the institutional design of peace and security mechanisms is particularly interesting given the fact that the institutionalization of these is responsible for every single organization achieving its goals (or not). By designing a given mechanism in a certain way, regional and international organizations ensure the correct translation of their principles and ambitions, as formulated in their constitutions, into concrete
policies and actions (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016, 315). This argument can be also found in the Rational Design of International Institutions (RDII) project by Koremenos, Snidal, and Lipson. Their research is based on the assumption that “institutions matter” (Koremenos et al. 2001, 762), this thesis follows this argument.

As systematic approaches to the institutional design of African security mechanisms are still absent, it is the first part of this dissertation. The already-described mechanisms of AU, ECOWAS, and the UN are compared based on criteria elaborated out of the findings of the institutional-design literature. The first is *membership*, and denotes the number of actors participating—thus revealing how exclusive or inclusive a particular mechanism is (Johnston and Acharya 2007, 21f.). The differentiation between permanent and non-permanent members is additionally added in.

The second criterion is also one used by Johnston and Acharya (ibid., 22), and refers to the *scope of issues* that are attributed to an institution. In the present case, the mechanisms are thus compared regarding whether they deal with the whole spectrum of conflict management or only parts of it (e.g. only with conflict prevention). By comparing *formal rules*, a third criterion is added from the prior work of Johnston and Acharya. Ranging from consensus to supermajority, it describes how institutions come to their decisions; their voting procedures are thus characterized in detail. Whether a mechanism is *intergovernmental* or *supranational* is a fourth criterion, and represents the degree to which member states monopolize capacities within ROs. If member states have a significant influence on the decision-making and implementation process, researchers speak of intergovernmentalism. Supranationalism, meanwhile, can be found where member states do not monopolize these aspects of policy-making (Marks and Lenz 2016, 514). Additionally, the fifth and sixth criteria of *possibility of a veto* and the *right of intervention* on the part of member states are added in respectively.
Table 2: Systematization of Security Mechanisms of AU, ECOWAS, UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td>partly: 15 out of 54</td>
<td>partly: 9 out of 15</td>
<td>partly: 15 out of 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 for 3 years + 10 for two years regional represent.</td>
<td>7 elected by authority + 2 chairmen</td>
<td>5 permanent + 10 non-permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope of Issues</strong></td>
<td>narrow: only peace and security activities</td>
<td>narrow: only peace and security activities</td>
<td>broad: not only peace and security activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Veto</strong></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes, permanent members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rules</strong></td>
<td>simple and two-thirds majority</td>
<td>two-thirds majority</td>
<td>affirmative vote by 9 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competences</strong></td>
<td>inter-governmentalism</td>
<td>inter-governmentalism/ supranationalism</td>
<td>inter-governmentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right of Intervention</strong></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation (based on AU 2002b; ECOWAS 1999; UN 1945).
As the comparison in table 2 shows, the peace and security organs of the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN demonstrate similarities across three different aspects. First, only some member states—and that also only for a certain period of time—are represented in the mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS, as is also the case in the UNSC. As with the UNSC, the AU’s own PSC has fifteen member states. Although it does not have permanent members like the UNSC does, the PSC still shares a similar mechanism by having five members for a three-year period and ten members for a two-year one—that also based on regional representation too. In the MSC of ECOWAS, meanwhile, similarly nine member states only are represented. Alongside the current and immediately preceding chairmen, who both enjoy automatic membership in the MSC, seven additional member states are elected.

Second, voting procedures are also comparable. Security mechanisms of both AU and ECOWAS decide on relevant matters with a two-thirds majority (for procedural matters, the AU sees a simple majority as being sufficient); the affirmative vote procedure for the UNSC is comparable to this (the UN also distinguishes in their voting rules between procedural matters and all other ones). Finally, the right of intervention in member states’ territory applies to all three of the UNSC, PSC, and ECOWAS.

Why are these observations important to study? First, systematic reflections on African security mechanisms and their institutional design are still absent to date. Research on institutional design is still mainly focused on the European continent, and expanding only slowly to non-Western institutions. Similarly, what research does exist mainly covers a given IO only either as a whole entity or in an economic sense. These observations are also of crucial importance because explanations regarding any similarity of institutional design in security organs can further enrich the discussion about the role of institutional design in general. Taking functionalist approaches into consideration here, while the emergence of institutional designs can be explained their similarities cannot.

Second, and related to the first point, the question of in what sense some African security mechanisms have been modeled after the UNSC has not been answered yet. Also, why some of the institutional features of the UN have been adopted but
others neglected remains opens—best illustrated by the membership question. To address these research puzzles, a closer look at the processes leading to final decisions (on institutional design) is necessary. There is broad consensus in public-policy research that the formulation of new policies involves numerous different actors. By having a strong impact not only on the agenda-setting process but also that of policy formulation too, expert networks are seen as being particularly important stakeholders. Pioneering related research mainly focused on domestic policy, but has since also captured foreign policy analysis—especially its role across different policy areas. Until now research has been missing regarding the role of expert networks, as well as their provision of information, in the process of designing IOs and ROs. This is particularly interesting given the fact that international policy advisors have played, and indeed still play, a considerable role in African security policy.

Third, and also related to the second point, research on expert networks is mostly focused on only one single subgroup. Work has by now already been done on epistemic communities, policy entrepreneurs, or advocacy coalitions. The present dissertation strives, however, to give a systematic overview of all involved actor groups, such as consultants, think tanks, and seconded staff—further to the aforementioned subgroups too. By mapping out which expert network groups exactly have been involved in the process of establishing (similar) security mechanisms in Africa, existing research on their differing impacts on decision-makers can hereby be enriched.
4. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework that forms the basis for the empirical analysis that then follows. It sets the theoretical grounds for the thesis, and helps to categorize the findings that will be presented in part II of this thesis. This chapter is structured as follows: As diffusion theory is the main school of thought out of which this work is built, the basic ideas informing that theory will be discussed initially. This commences specifically with the basic assumption of interdependence (4.1.1.). As the diffusion mechanism “(social) learning” is at the center of interest here, this is what will be scrutinized in section 4.1.2. The following section 4.1.3 then examines the role of expert networks in diffusion processes. The chapter concludes with a summary of the theoretical principles introduced, and with the derivation of assumptions that will form the basis for the subsequent empirical analysis.

4.1. Diffusion Theory

4.1.1. Assumptions of Interdependence

At the heart of diffusion research lies the assumption of interdependence between regional and international organizations. It is thus argued that diffusion processes are “characterized by interdependent, but uncoordinated, decision making” (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 35). This means that actors do make their own decisions—that is, without being coerced by great powers or important donor countries—after having considered the choices of other stakeholders too. Organizational models, rules, and norms that have been established in one setting influence other such ones elsewhere too. It is suggested that the development of organizations cannot be understood without taking other organizational peers into consideration. In this way, material, social, and cultural connections between organizations lead to interdependent decision-making processes too (Duina and Lenz 2016, 1).
Thus, diffusion theory conjectures that the phenomenon can be observed when “government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries” (Simmons et al. 2006, 787). Additionally, it is argued that the adoption of a particular policy is voluntary by nature (Holzinger and Knill 2005; Jetschke and Lenz 2013; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Having said that, diffusion can also be seen as the consequence of interdependence within and between nation-states and/or at the international level too (Gilardi 2013, 454).

In regionalism research, diffusion is applied in answering the question of why similar institutional designs emerge in different locations around the globe. Diffusion theory argues that “there are global scripts of what constitute legitimate institutions and that these scripts are emulated across the globe” (Risse 2016, 87). Following this reasoning, diffusion theory stipulates that there is a difference between whether there is only one single source of diffusion (such as with the UNSC being the only security institution for ECOWAS) or, rather, a number of stimuli (such as with the UNSC and ECOWAS’ MSC for the OAU) present (Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014). Furthermore, current diffusion research stresses that diffusion refers to processes and not outcomes. According to Duina and Lenz (2016, 6), diffusion is not necessarily measurable by institutional convergence alone. Thus it is argued that diffusion is also to be found in the processes leading to institutional design, discoverable by focusing on the connections and interactions of stakeholders (Jahn 2015).

4.1.2. Mechanisms of Diffusion

4.1.2.1. Learning

In learning mechanisms, organizations or states that are faced with a problem requiring institutional change look around for suitable solutions. As the consequences of policy change are not certain, they are searching for policies, rules, and institutions that have effectively solved similar organizational issues in an effective way—and thus attempt to import them to their own unique setting (Dolowitz and March 2000; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Risse 2016). Accordingly, it
is argued that institutional design originates in more successful contexts, with states and organizations learning lessons from the examples of other—often more robust—peers. Thereby, learning as such refers to a process in which previously held beliefs change due to new evidence (Haas 1990; Meseguer 2009; Sommerer 2011).

The learning mechanism in diffusion theory stipulates that decision-makers or other individuals inside or associated with an organization closely observe the policies or institutions of other ones, doing so in order to be able to evaluate the latter’s effectiveness in solving particular cooperation problems (Jetschke 2017, 178). They may rely on reports of experts or other policy evaluation papers, or alternatively on the assessments of other countries possessing insight. Thus decision-makers compare the outcomes of organizations that have already introduced a new policy or institutions with those that have not experienced such change, in order to assess the likelihood of these measures succeeding in their own setting. Such learning processes can be rational if the decision-makers apply the law of statistics. But they can also be bounded, should decision-makers mainly rely on “cognitive shortcuts that may introduce errors in the process” (Gilardi 2013, 464).

As is very apparent, learning processes are complex. It is argued that decision-makers do not necessarily all rely on the same information in the same way, as the processing of information is a selective and individual process (Gilardi 2010). Furthermore, in learning processes, decision-makers may neglect information that does not match their preferences, as their ideological position may be in opposition to that which the available information itself puts forward (Volden et al. 2008).

Thus, decision-makers make use of the experiences of other countries or organizations in order to be able to better estimate the likely consequences of the introduction of new policies (Gilardi 2013, 463f.). Sometimes also referred to as “Bayesian updating,” learning is considered a rational process in which actors—who have already-existing beliefs regarding the consequences of a given policy—update their prior assumptions as a consequence of the information coming from other stakeholders.
4.1.2.2. Social Learning

One such type of learning is social learning. Herein, decision-makers do not necessarily learn from more successful organizations but from those with which they have a close connection. The latter denotes any kind of interaction that underlines how far organizations are aware of the policies and institutions of peers. The means by which these close connections are sustained are geographical proximity, language, culture, and/or a shared colonial history (Jetschke 2017, 178). This special form of learning is promoted by sociological theories. According to these, stakeholders learn more easily from close peers or from states and organizations with whom they share an intimate relationship. Therefore information and ideas are communicated between them much more easily and significantly faster, as communication channels and networks already exist and meetings happen on a much more frequent basis anyway (Hall 1993). This “learning from cultural reference groups” (Simmons and Elkins 2004, 175) is based on the assumption that shared beliefs and values can shape diffusion channels. Accordingly, organizations that share a similar cultural background are more likely to adopt the same policies or institutions—as they perceive “common values as a useful guide to their own [appropriate] behavior” (ibid., 176). However these social-learning processes entail risks for the policy adopter, as decision-makers may only learn selectively and not screen all available information—only that emanating from their close peers (Jetschke 2017, 178f.).

As Rogers (1983) notes, diffusion is a special form of communication. For him, the latter “is a process in which participants create and share information with one another” (ibid., 6). Haas (1980), meanwhile, underlines the point that information is knowledge that is generated for decision-makers. According to him, knowledge is

*the sum of technical information [...] which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal* (ibid., 367f.).
Accordingly knowledge—being often of a technical nature—is diffused among elites, and spreads as a kind of policy innovation among decision-makers aiming at finding effective solutions to presenting problems. Following this reasoning, social-learning processes are channeled based on shared norms and beliefs. Epistemic communities are one major stakeholder in the evolution of this kind of knowledge, and are therefore not only essential for the policy-making process in general but also for social-learning mechanisms in particular (Haas 1992b). Thus, the exchange of information among specific actor networks is the core of the diffusion approach and an integral part of all diffusion mechanisms. How specific networks play a role in the learning mechanism will be described in the following subchapter.

4.1.3. Stakeholders of Diffusion

4.1.3.1. Channels of Diffusion

As already outlined, the “exchange of information among connected actors is the presumed motor behind diffusion” (Simmons and Elkins 2004, 175). Consequently, those actors among whom ideas are interchanged are also at the center of interest here. In diffusion theory, it is argued that information is “channeled” along specific kinds of actor network. The present thesis follows these arguments, and furthermore posits that ideas and information are particularly intensely exchanged among actors who share close relationships with one another.

As already indicated in the description of the mechanism “learning”, networks play a fundamental role specifically in social-learning processes (Jetschke 2014, 8). Actors who are well-connected with each other are not only able to exchange information more effectively, but also to learn faster from their close peers. Frequent and direct meetings between organizations can thereby count as “well-established channels of communication” (Simmons and Elkins 2004, 175). These frequent meetings, and the accompanying well-established flow of information, leads to knowledge about what works in a given setting and what does not.
already shown by Haas (2004 [1958]), regular negotiations and the maintenance of organizational relations can lead, therefore, to crucial learning opportunities.

4.1.3.2. Non-State Actors in Diffusion Processes

While speaking of policy processes in general and diffusion ones in particular, most research refers to state actors as being the key stakeholders herein. Classical theories claim the nation-state has a monopoly over legitimate political action in both domestic as well as foreign policy (Nölke 2004, 15). But it is now widely acknowledge that non-state actors play a fundamental role in today’s policy realms too. The growing uncertainty arising out of increasingly complex problems being faced in international politics has made coordination “not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult” (Haas 1992b, 1). As argued by Haas, knowledge and information are important dimensions of power. Thus knowledgeable experts are one possible provider of a key resource to help state actors to identify problems, and also for the proposition of specific policies to address them (ibid., 2f.).

As uncertainties rise and the demand for information and knowledge constantly increases, expert or specialist networks emerge and strengthen. These networks become important actors on the national as well as international levels, as decision-makers rely on experts’ knowledge and hand over responsibility to them (ibid., 4). Thus such transnational networks “seem to have a major impact on the global diffusion of values, norms, and ideas” (Risse-Kappen 2008, 459). Jetschke and Lenz (2011, 458) include those expert networks that (at least partly) consist of non-state actors in their categorization of earlier discussed informal diffusion channels. By doing this, they identify these informal channels as transnational networks characterized by direct but non-institutionalized interactions between state and non-state actors—and thus as crucial in diffusion processes. In the present thesis, it is argued specifically that the AU consulted expert networks in the establishment process of its security structures. These expert networks were particularly valuable in bringing in knowledge of already-existing institutions, particularly from ECOWAS—as one organization having close ties with the AU.
4.2. Summary of Assumptions

Having presented the theoretical foundations, the following part will now summarize briefly the assumptions underlying the present thesis—these are then examined in detail later, in chapters 6 to 8.

The research here is based on the assumption that decisions in ECOWAS and the AU have been made dependent on those already taken in other regional and international organizations elsewhere. As neither organization acts in isolation, their decisions regarding the new institutional design for their security structures have been taken in relation to choices made previously by other similar organizations.

The present thesis is also built on the position that the so-called new wars in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone challenged ECOWAS’ ability to solve crises in West Africa. The decreasing interest of the international community in getting involved additionally forced ECOWAS to revise its security structures. Having learned not only from those crises but also from the experiences of the UNSC—as the organization itself already possessing a suitable security institution—then ECOWAS would establish a Security Council similar to the UN one.

This thesis is furthermore based on the assumption that the OAU experienced firsthand its own powerlessness during the genocide in Rwanda. Having had to also face the unwillingness of the international community to intervene, the OAU soon realized its urgent need for a new security mandate as well as more suitable security structures. As ECOWAS had itself already established new such security structures, the OAU/AU consequently intensively learned from the experiences of that RO—specifically on the basis of the close ties existing between the two organizations.

The argument that these learning processes are facilitated through stakeholders sharing their knowledge is one that the research presented here also adheres to. Decision-makers in ECOWAS were certainly advised by individual think tanks, but in fact relevant knowledge was mainly generated by personal networks of influential (Nigerian) stakeholders within ECOWAS, AU, and UN. The AU, as the
organization following ECOWAS in time, was itself also strongly advised by expert networks, ones acting as both knowledge-holders and knowledge-sharers. As these networks could build their knowledge out of the prior experiences of ECOWAS—in the establishment of whose security structures they were partly involved—the AU thus ultimately established similar structures.
5. Research Design

The following chapter gives an overview of the methodological basis and research design of the present work. It elucidates the reasons for case selection, and outlines the qualitative research design of the thesis alongside discussing its both limitations and applications. Furthermore, it describes the data-collection process. As part of this, it divulges the selection process regarding experts chosen for the interviews as well as the exact guidelines for the latter. It reveals how the interviews were conducted, and critically reflects on their realization. The data that formed the basis for the additional document analysis is also presented and discussed. The chapter concludes with the presentation of the chosen methods of data interpretation.

Although the data generation and interpretation process has in principle been led by theoretical and methodological reflections, sometimes these considerations could not be fully realized during the research process. As a result, it is not only important to shed light on the theoretical groundwork but also on the practical dimensions of the research process itself. The chapter therefore also considers these pitfalls, and discusses how any such discrepancies have been handled in the present study.

5.1. Research Design

5.1.1. Case Selection

The present thesis is a comparative case study. It looks at the institutional design of the AU and ECOWAS, and asks why their security mechanisms both share similarities with the UNSC—as well as how those commonalities have evolved over time. Following Yin, this question falls under the categorization of an explanatory case study as it “deal[s] with operational links needing to be traced over time” (1994, 6). Hall (2006, 24f.) argues in a similar vein when he states that systematic process analysis with a historical focus is particularly useful to demonstrate causal linkages vis-à-vis research questions. A growing interest in explaining complex causal relations in the social sciences has been identified by
Bennett and George (2004, 9f.), who also argue that case studies are particularly valuable herein.

Why have the present cases, of the AU and ECOWAS, been selected, and why does this research focus on these two and not on other African ROs or on cases across continents? As this research represents a diffusion study that argues for interdependencies between cases, independent case selection—as typically applied in conventional case studies—is by definition not applicable here. After having examined the institutional design of other African ROs, it became obvious that AU and ECOWAS are the ones that share the most similar institutional-design features (as already elaborated on in chapter 3). Other African ROs such as SADC, COMESA, or ECCAS do all have security organs, but are either not as institutionalized or not as similar to each other as AU and ECOWAS are. The same points also hold true when considering ROs on other continents too, as no other RO in Asia, the Americas, or Europe has similar security mechanisms to these two cases—namely, a Security Council (except for the UN, as addressed previously) as well as analogous security structures.

Based on the assumptions of diffusion theory, institutional-design similarities are explained. That is why only those ROs having similar institutional designs have been selected for the present thesis. The AU and ECOWAS are not only compared to each other (cross-case comparison); also conducted is a within-case comparison, to investigate why certain design features within these two ROs take the forms that they do. This is realized in the subsequent analysis chapter, specifically by taking an in-depth look at single security mechanisms such as the Early Warning System, the PSCs, the Panel/Council of the Wise/Elders, the Standby Forces, and the Peace Funds of these two ROs. It will thus be examined why certain mechanisms have the actual institutional designs that they do, and further whether in certain sub-institutions specific mechanisms can be observed or not.

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40 The logics of a most similar system design or a most different system design (Mill 1875) are not applicable here, as both strategies posit independent case selection. As diffusion studies per se assume interdependence between cases, these logics simply cannot be applied in this particular study.
A closer look at the two cases reveals certain interesting characteristics. The AU and ECOWAS vary on numerous aspects with regard to the so-called independent variable. Whereas the AU is the only continent-wide RO comprising all African countries, ECOWAS is a subregional organization covering only a limited part of the African continent. As the countries in Western Africa were in the main French colonies previously, ECOWAS is predominantly made up of francophone nations. The AU contrariwise includes both francophone as well as anglophone countries. A leading stakeholder in ECOWAS meanwhile is Nigeria, a clear hegemon striving to enforce its own goals. The AU, on the other hand, has in its ranks strong and influential states such as Nigeria and South Africa but no such one dominant hegemon. Whereas the OAU, as the predecessor of the AU, was established mainly to fight colonialism and nurture a common African spirit, ECOWAS was very clearly founded as an alliance aiming originally at economic cooperation alone. Both organizations widened their mandates to security cooperation only at later stages. Concerning the so-called dependent variable, the institutional design of their security mechanisms, both ROs share significant similarities. Table 3 gives an overview of the abovementioned characteristics.

Table 3: Overview of the Characteristics of Selected Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divergent Characteristics</th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of RO</td>
<td>Continent-wide</td>
<td>Geographically restricted to West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglophone or Francophone</td>
<td>Anglophone and francophone countries</td>
<td>Francophone countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemon</td>
<td>No clear hegemon</td>
<td>Nigeria as clear hegemon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original Purpose of RO</td>
<td>Fight colonialism</td>
<td>Economic cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The author will not hereafter use the labels independent and dependent variables, as these apply much more to quantitative research. However, for the introduction of case-selection techniques, these two labels have been utilized once to make that selection process clearer and more transparent.
The aim of the present thesis is not to identify or isolate those characteristics or aspects that cause a certain outcome. These considerations are particularly useful if the research at hand aims at asking what leads to a certain outcome. The present study, however, is interested instead in the question of why a particular outcome has occurred. This research aims thus at tracing the processes that led to the actually witnessed institutional designs of AU and ECOWAS, and at identifying the underlying mechanisms thereof.

5.1.2. Qualitative Research Design

The present thesis is based upon a qualitative research design. It aims at explaining social processes and their underlying causalities as comprehensively as possible. By looking at the causal mechanisms lying between conditions and results, qualitative research designs focus on single or small-N studies (Gläser and Laudel 2004, 24). Qualitative research designs are also particularly useful to reconstruct complex social processes and for dissections of meaning (Dresing and Pehl 2013, 5). As most of the cases lie in the past, qualitative research needs to analyze the interaction of actors and mechanisms to explain these complex causal relations (Scharpf 2000, 56). The present thesis aims at doing exactly this: illustrating as comprehensively as possible the processes of the past that have led to the institutional design of the security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS, with particular focus on stakeholders and mechanisms. This research objective reveals...
that a quantitative research design would not be adequately able to answer the raised questions. Not only that, the author also does not have as her aim finding statistically significant correlations or realizing a larger case study so as to generalize the findings (Brüsemeister 2008, 19ff.; Gläser and Laudel 2004, 23f.). Therefore, by using a qualitative research design, the author is able instead to analyze the introduced research questions in-depth, and to draw concrete conclusions based on the reconstruction of the observed social processes.

5.1.3. Limits and Applications

Deciding for a certain research design comes with many advantages and disadvantages. As already elaborated, a qualitative research design allows the researcher to go into cases in extensive detail. It is possible herewith to trace causal mechanisms, and to identify important factors leading to certain outcomes too. But qualitative designs also have their disadvantages, ones that will now be discussed.

The research topic here is too detailed to include more cases, something that would allow for a generalization of the results. Not being able to generalize findings is a major critique that qualitative research is exposed to. Thus, the conclusions of the present thesis cannot be extended to other ROs and IOs. However this subject does permit an in-depth study, which would not be possible with quantitative research. Critiques have also been made of qualitative research’s intransparent operationalization of the respective variables, making their verifiability impossible. In the present thesis, such problems are minimized as the operationalization is made very clear and outlined in detail. A further critique is the interpretation of the data. In comparison to quantitative research with its statistical analyses, qualitative data analysis is solely based on the personal interpretations of the individual researcher. The author has also tried to minimize this issue by presenting the interpretation of her research to other scholars on numerous occasions.
5.2. Data Collection

The data that forms the basis for the present thesis originates from two different sources. On the one hand, thirty expert interviews were realized; on the other, document analysis of treaties and protocols as well as press releases was also conducted. Using different sources—also referred to as data triangulation—has the advantage of enhancing the credibility and quality of the data set (Patton 1999, 1189).

If data triangulation is undertaken, questions concerning the relevance of single sources are to be asked. Are, for example, both sources utilized equally in the interpretation of data (Miller and Fredericks 1994, 27f.)? In the present case, this question is not as relevant as in other ones. The different data sources used here have a rather complementarily nature. They have been chosen with the aim of giving the whole picture vis-à-vis the processes scrutinized within both AU and ECOWAS. The expert interviews were conducted so as to attain the personal views and impressions of involved stakeholders meanwhile. They revealed different perspectives on the processes, based on respective roles and responsibilities therein. These different points of view have been additionally complemented with findings from the document analysis. This results in a comprehensive and detailed picture of the processes in question. In the next section, both data sources—expert interviews and document analysis—will be scrutinized.

5.2.1. Expert Interviews
5.2.1.1. Selection of Experts

To approach the research subject and to gain a broader impression of the relevant processes, expert interviews were chosen as the main method of data
collection. But what exactly is an expert, and indeed an expert interview? Following the definition of Gläser and Laudel, “experts are persons that have obtained particular knowledge about social circumstances, and expert interviews are a method to acquire this knowledge” (2004, 10; author’s own translation).

Two characteristics are crucial in these observations. First, experts themselves are not the object of research but are of interest as witnesses to the relevant processes. Second, these experts have a special and sometimes even exclusive position in the respective social structures (ibid.). This confirms where and to what end expert interviews should be applied so as to generate insights and ultimately explanations: the reconstruction of social situations or processes. The expert interviews thus make this key information available to the interviewer or researcher (ibid., 11).

To realize the expert interviews, it was first necessary to identify those persons who even possess the information required to be able to reconstruct the described processes. In order to pick out such experts, it is necessary to ask the following questions: Who has the relevant information? Who is able to give precise information? Who is willing to even give out information? Who is available for interview (Gordon 1975, 196f.)?

Who has the relevant information and who is available for interview? In the present case, it turned out that two groups of individuals have the relevant information as they were present during the processes in question. First, heads of states and prime ministers of those countries that have been members of the AU and ECOWAS. Due to their high-ranking positions, it was not possible to interview them however. The second such group consists of relevant stakeholders at the operational level, both for the AU and ECOWAS. Among these individuals, some have also taken up high-ranking positions in the UN and thus were difficult

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42 Other methods such as experiments or observations are not suitable for the present study (Bortz and Döring 2006, 321ff.). As the processes in question have already taken place, their observation is no longer possible. Due to the complexity of the relevant processes, experiments are neither possible nor expedient meanwhile.

43 The author is aware of the risk of selection bias regarding chosen experts. Path dependencies and snowball effects may be the consequences of interdependencies between experts, so that it is only those experts it was recommended to speak to by their peers who are in a certain group. The author sought to avoid that risk by very careful research on the involved experts, being double-checked by decision-makers as well as other experts.
to even reach. But in the main they were both contactable and available for interview.

In order to identify the relevant persons, a multilevel procedure was applied. The starting point was a list of names given to the interviewer by an involved person. Based on this list, emails were written to the persons named on that list and interviews subsequently arranged. One part of every single interview was to identify other individuals relevant to the process in question. In this, multiple overlaps could be observed and the interviewer was thus able to obtain a detailed picture of both who was involved and who has the relevant information. Research on experts identified in relevant documents and scholarly articles was additionally undertaken. The search for new experts to serve as interviewees was continued until that point in time where further interviews would not yield any new findings vis-à-vis the processes, and thus empirical saturation might occur (Krüger 2000, 333; Krüger and Wensierski 1995, 196).

Who is willing to give out information? This question is an extremely relevant one, based on two observations. First, security policy in general is a very sensitive subject and information is often classified and thus not intended for the general public’s consumption. Some of the contacted experts would not be available for an interview being put forth in a scientific publication. For those that were conducted, the interviewer assured the interviewees of anonymity in the handling of their statements.

Who is available? This might seem a trivial question at first, but in fact it is an essential one in the data-collection process. It proved to be useful to begin with persons lower down in organizational hierarchies. Most often, these individuals are more easily accessible for interview, and also have more detailed knowledge on the operational level (Gordon 1975, 203). In the present case, this question concerning availability was crucial due to two aspects. First, it was problematic to find experts—as the relevant processes took place around twenty years ago, and so some of those individuals have since either retired or passed away. Second, some of the persons that were crucial to the relevant processes in the AU and ECOWAS in the 1990s and 2000s are now in very high-level positions. As they
are or have been African heads of state or high-ranking UN officials, they were
not available for interview.

To obtain as much information as possible, it is often necessary to consult various
different people. This is important for two reasons: first, different people have
different information about the various aspects of the relevant processes. Second,
talking to different people about the same processes enables the verification of
prior statements (Gläser and Laudel 2004, 113). In sum, talking to different
people allows the interviewer to attain a more complete impression of the
phenomenon in question.

5.2.1.2. Guideline

The most important classification of interviews is regarding their degree of
standardization. If an interview is completely standardized, the actions of both
interviewer and interviewee are standardized. In half-standardized interviews,
only the actions of the interviewer are however; in non-standardized interviews
none of the stakeholder’s action are standardized (Gläser and Laudel 2004, 39).
Whereas standardized interviews are mostly found in quantitative research, non-
standardized ones are mainly conducted as part of qualitative studies. Among the
latter, there is an important distinction between guided, open, and narrative
interviews. Narrative ones are used to reveal the longer stories of the interviewee,
often after a first complex question. Open interviews do have a given subject
matter, but not a guideline forming the basis for the conversation. Guided
interviews, meanwhile, contain both a defined subject matter and a guideline for
questions. It should be noted that neither the order nor the formulation of
questions is binding, and any ad-hoc queries that are absolutely necessary to
obtain the whole picture do not have to be present in the original guideline (ibid.,
39f.). The author decided to work here with guided interviews, as a certain
guideline for questions was needed for all experts—but some flexibility in the
conducting of the conversations was also absolutely necessary too.

The guideline of the interview was divided into three parts. The first aimed at
welcoming the interviewee, and included a short summary of the research
question. The current position of the interviewee as well as their relationship to the process in question were asked. The second part formed the main one of the interview. Questions such as to what extent the relevant person was personally involved in the investigated process and their specific tasks therein were posed. Furthermore, the interviewees were asked to outline the process leading to certain institutional design choices, and also to assess the influence of certain decision-makers herein too. The third and final part concerned the personal network of the interviewee. They were asked to name persons who they had worked with in the scrutinized process, or ones whom they know were involved in or important to it.44

The guideline performed a pretest. Based on three interviews conducted in that pretest and on the respective feedback, the guideline was improved and sharpened. Thereby, the order and especially the formulation of individual questions was eventually modified (Kuckartz et al. 2008, 20).

5.2.1.3. Performance of Interviews and Critical Reflection

To establish contact initially, potential interviewees and experts were first contacted by email. This communication contained a brief summary of the present research project and the procedure constituting the interview. What sounds mundane is in fact an important step, as it deals with the selection of interview partners and the preparation of the interview (Seidman 1991, 41). After receiving replies, appointments were arranged and the guideline sent to the interviewees. In preparation for the interviews themselves, the interviewer researched information regarding each interviewee’s person and position to avoid unnecessary questions and the disturbance of the conversation’s flow (Helfferich 2011, 182).

Twenty-nine of the thirty interviews were realized as individual interviews by the same interviewer. Only in one case did the original interview partner ask to invite two more interviewees to the conversation. As group interviews can influence the course of conversation, individual interviews are preferred in qualitative research

44 The guideline is attached in the appendix to this thesis.
designs (Myers 2009, 125). Twenty-eight of the thirty interviews were recorded. As two of the interviewees did not agree to being recorded, the interviewer transcribed their words verbatim from memory. It proved to be of enormous benefit to record the conversations, as “listening, writing, and thinking all at the same time” (Thomas 1995, 16) is extremely difficult.

Of the thirty interviews, twenty-two were conducted personally across three countries. In Germany, interviews were held at the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Federal Ministry of Defence. In the US, experts were met with at the International Studies Associations’ Conference in Baltimore, as well as in New York City at different research institutes. Most interviews were conducted at the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and with think tanks situated there too. In contrast to the twenty-two interviews wherein the respective parties spoke face-to-face, eight were conducted via Skype or over the telephone. This was necessary as some of the experts live in locations only accessible for the interviewer by means of inefficient and unsustainable overseas travel. Interviews via Skype and telephone were thus realized with experts living in Belgium, Canada, Norway, South Africa, the UK, and the US. Six interviews were conducted in German, the other twenty-four in English.

After completing the expert interviews, all of the recorded ones were transcribed using MAXQDA Software (Kuckartz et al. 2008, 29). This transcription represents an inevitable and extremely important basis for the future interpretation of these interviews (King 1994, 25). In the transcripts, non-verbal expressions were excluded and dialects polished— as well as interruptions and any incomprehensible passages noted (Gläser and Laudel 2004, 188f.). Any information that might lead to the identification of the interviewee was deleted so as to guarantee their anonymity.

By conducting a pretest of the guideline and careful multistep selection of interviewees, the author has sought to minimize concerns regarding the reliability of her research. However, some aspects related to the data-collection method

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45 Most of the interviews were transcribed by the author herself. Some were transcribed on commission due to time constraints.
“expert interview” now need to be discussed and critically reflected on. As already noted, the selection of interview partners was a mindful and drawn-out process. Nevertheless it is clear that the thirty experts were not an exhaustive selection of relevant parties, but merely a representation of the knowledge available to the interviewer. Due to the unavailability for one reason or another of certain relevant experts, not all persons involved in the establishment of the security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS could be consulted.

A second point is the nature of the research subject. As security policy is a rather sensitive issue, it remains unclear to what extent relevant information was not shared with the author due to obligations of confidentiality on the part of the experts. A third point is the intercultural differences between the interviewer and the interviewee in some cases. It is unclear to what extent certain interviewees might have been wary of being criticized for having helped establish ineffective security mechanisms in Africa by a young, Western, and female scholar. While never intentional, the interviewer did still experience some—albeit only very few—such moments, and with them a refusal to answer yet again to another Western scholar seen to be patronizing African stakeholders. This was ultimately only rather an impression and cannot be definitely proved, but does needs to be acknowledged as a possibility in the interpretation of the data.

5.2.2. Document Analysis

It is important to note that document analysis is used to complement the data extracted from the expert interviews. The latter are the primary data source here, with document analysis being only utilized to extract information not otherwise available from these interviews.

In the course of the document analysis, official legal documents from the AU as well as ECOWAS were examined. These included treaties, protocols, strategy papers, communiqués, minutes of meetings, and press releases from the respective organizations. Researching official documents proved to be difficult. Whereas the main legal documents could be accessed on the web pages of the respective ROs, other legal ones such as minutes of meetings or protocols needed
to be researched in the AU archive itself and in the office of the AU Legal Counsel. The problem with this was twofold. First, certain documents have not been archived or alternatively could not be found by the staff working in the archive and for the Legal Counsel. Second, a considerable number of documents proved to be classified and thus not available to academic researchers. An overview of all of the documents that are included in the document analysis can be found in the bibliography.

5.3. Data Interpretation and Research Method

As noted, the data for the present thesis has been generated from two different kinds of collection method: expert interviews and document analysis. It is once more important to stress that the data from the expert interviews functions as the main data source, and that obtained from the document analysis is only complementary to this.

All data has been processed in MAXQDA. This software tool for computer-based qualitative text analysis has the advantage that a comprehensive amount of data material can be handled. Also, transparency of the data-interpretation process is high as all steps taken along the way can be retraced. Additionally, MAXQDA is easy to handle as the data only needs to be digitalized for it to be processed (Kuckartz 1999, 32ff.).

All data is subject to qualitative content analysis. This procedure extracts information from text, in order to process the relevant data separately from the original source material. Therefore, the extracted information is reconstituted and edited based on an analysis matrix that is theoretically consolidated (Gläser and Laudel 2006, 191ff.). Mayring (2002, 114ff.) differentiates between three kinds of qualitative content analysis: content-analytical summary; explication; and, structuration. For the present thesis content-analytical summary seemed to be the most useful tool, as the data is arranged according to specified criteria. These categorizations are based on theoretical considerations, and single-text passages are thus assigned to individual categories within this system.
In sum, content-analytical summary proceeds as follows: First, the category system is elaborated based on theoretical considerations. Second, individual categories are defined very clearly. Third, individual text passages are assigned to those single categories.

As the aim of the present thesis is to discover causal mechanisms\textsuperscript{46} and related processes, process tracing is applied here. According to Blatter et al. (2007, 135), process tracing is the most suitable method for identifying and validating causal mechanisms within complex processes. Further, as George and Bennett point out,

\textit{in process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case (2004, 6).}

As this statement makes clear, process tracing is, then, the methodology best suited to the purposes of the present thesis. In particular systematic process analysis—as developed by Hall (2006, 27)—is utilized, as a special form of process tracing. The following four steps form the basis of systematic process analysis: The first, theory formation, consists of introducing and elaborating on the theoretical considerations that underpin the present research (chapter 4). Deriving predictions, as the second step, mainly refers to the formulation of these based on the previously mentioned theories (chapter 4). The third part, making observations, is the empirical work, and mainly consists of actually conducting field research and collecting relevant data (chapters 6–8). Drawing conclusions, as the fourth and final part, is characterized by the comparison of the observations in the field with the earlier-formulated theoretical predictions meanwhile (chapter 9).

\textsuperscript{46}Causal mechanisms are defined here as “a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan 1996, 52).
Part II: Explaining Diffusion in Security Institutions
The second part of this thesis presents the findings of the qualitative analysis. As outlined in part I, the prerequisite for the establishment of the security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS was the specific conflict history of the African continent. How certain conflicts affected the continent’s self-perceptions and shaped decision-makers’ wish for more effective security mechanisms is thus illustrated, as is how a lack of action on the part of the international community in the late 1990s also decisively influenced the situation (chapter 6 for both points).

As the theoretical chapter has shown, interdependence is the fundamental criterion for diffusion processes occurring. Therefore, the chapter concerning ECOWAS (chapter 7) and the one examining the AU (chapter 8) both open with an elaboration of how interdependent decision-making has shaped the institutional design of these two ROs’ security mechanisms. Chapter 7 continues with its core focus on ECOWAS, and how learning mechanisms have shaped its specific security organs. It thereby describes the AU, UN, and ECOWAS triangle, and how influential stakeholders have interacted within this three-way configuration. Besides this, it also outlines how Nigeria, and influential individuals within that particular country, strongly influenced ECOWAS’ thinking about security cooperation. The chapter closes with a consolidation of the learning processes of ECOWAS, and how both previous interventions as well as Nigeria’s own hegemonic ambitions have interplayed in these learning processes.

The AU’s pathway to its APSA is described in chapter 8. After illustrating the interdependent decision-making processes, the subsequent section then analyzes how the PSC has evolved over time and furthermore how networks of experts have influenced this process. Thereafter, the conceptualization phases of CEWS and ASF is elaborated on with a specific view to the role of think tanks and staff exchange therein. Chapter 8 closes by looking at the consolidation of the social-learning mechanisms that it was possible to observe.

Excerpts from the interviews are periodically cited as evidence in text boxes to substantiate the different points being made. As not all text passages are used in the analytical chapters, the full transcripts as well as the sound files of each and
every interview are available on the attached CD. Furthermore, passages from the researched print documents will be cited in text boxes as well.
6. The Need for Effective Security Mechanisms

West Africa is globally the subregion with the highest number of experienced military coups and of interventions in civilian politics (Francis 2001, 11). In states such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the consequences of the end of the Cold War as well as weak domestic political structures led to severe conflicts breaking out. It was the circumstances of this post–Cold War environment that would precipitate ECOWAS’ feeling and urgent need for more effective security structures. The aforementioned conflicts in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone not only influenced ECOWAS but also challenged the OAU as well. Even more devastatingly, the genocide in Rwanda not only changed the African continent forever but also made it very obvious that the existing security mechanisms were not sufficient.

Historical events can serve as triggers. According to historical institutionalism, institutions remain stable until they are faced with an external shock. This so-called punctuated equilibrium would, in the present case, clearly be the end of the Cold War. The changes occurring around 1989/1990 were fundamental ones, and in a way as radical as any other previous development on the African continent. Relating thereto, historical institutionalists pay particular attention to critical junctures—“interaction effects between distinct causal sequences that become joined at particular points in time” (Skocpol and Pierson 2002, 701). The cited interviews and documents in this chapter make very evident that, for the present case, the conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as well as the catastrophe in Rwanda can—along with the multitude of other conflicts on the continent—all be perceived as such critical junctures.

These conflicts, seen as being only the tip of the iceberg when it came to deep-seated tensions on the continent, caused a fundamental shift in the thinking of both AU and ECOWAS decision-makers—as it was clear to everybody involved that something had to change. Even the rational-design literature would agree on this point, as such scholars argue that institutions are modified when new
situations emerge—“because they [institutions] are better suited to new conditions or new problems” (Koremenos et al. 2001, 767). This is also in line with diffusion theory, which argues that learning processes are triggered by political or economic problems requiring an institutional change in order for leaders to be able to address them (Risse 2016, 90). To sum up, these different theoretical strands all concur that for institutional or policy change to happen then severe problems or extreme situations need to precede that. In other words, they postulate that crises trigger a shift in thinking that ultimately leads to policy change too.

The following chapter shows how the continent’s recent conflict history, having its roots in the repercussions of the Cold War ending, explains the timing of the establishment of the security mechanisms of both AU and ECOWAS. The fact that these conflicts laid bare that existing security mechanisms were not sufficient further propelled the already urgent need for more effective ones being designed. Additionally, the neglect of the international community is another crucial aspect that influenced these mechanisms’ (re)design, as it highlighted how they needed to work far more effectively if the manifest problems on the continent were to be dealt with without exclusive dependence therein on external help. These developments shaped the thinking of decision-makers in the sense that the latter now wanted to show the international community that they would be able to handle their own security problems henceforth. As will be shown in the following chapter, AU and ECOWAS both responded to their very own challenges in their very own ways—but also in ones that were influenced specifically by already-existing mechanisms elsewhere. ECOWAS was the first African RO that looked at what kind of mechanisms it could establish. After having made the first steps toward more effective security governance, the OAU later followed in its footsteps. By adopting similar institutions to ECOWAS, the OAU had clearly been influenced by already-existing security structures then.
6.1. First Attempts at Regional Security Cooperation

6.1.1. Organization of African Unity

Already back in the 1960s, regional security cooperation in Africa had been a subject of discussion. Kwame Nkrumah, president of Ghana at the time, would reflect on the interference of international (great) powers in the (former Belgian) Congo as well as the non-existence of regional cooperation. He noted that,

> *if at that time, July 1960, the independent states of Africa had been united, or had at least a joint military high command and a common foreign policy, an African solution might have been found for the Congo; and the Congo might have been able to work out its own destiny, unhindered by any non-African interference* (Nkrumah et al. 1963, 138).

Nkrumah’s vision of an Africa of independent states was built upon the OAU’s own one of “the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny” (OAU 1963, preamble), and the right of every African country “to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence” (ibid. Art. 2). Furthermore the OAU charter stipulates the “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration” (ibid., Art. 3), and, with Article 7, established a Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. As its “mandate was limited to inter-state conflicts, and few such conflicts were referred to it” (Touray 2005, 638), the Commission soon became redundant (Kabia 2011, 121; Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 58).

However, in its first years of existence, conflicts and other security threats during the 1960s did cause the Commission to think about peace and security strategies at least. Particular the conflicts between the newly independent Algeria and...

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47 Right at the first meeting of the OAU Defence Commission in 1963, a “Supreme Military Command Headquarters” and a “Union Defence Council” were suggested by Krumah’s representatives (Van Walraven 1999, 330). In fact those two organs resemble the PSC and the ASF that the AU eventually did establish, in 2003. According to Klaas Van Walraven (ibid., 332), these suggestions were originally rejected due to external influences and also to the lack of a hegemonic country arguing forcefully in favor of such arrangements.
Morocco in 1963 and 1964 and between Somalia and Kenya from 1963 to 1967 respectively already posed challenges to the newly established OAU. Both under the auspices of the OAU, and after an intervention by Ethiopia and Mali as well as the mediation also of Zambia in the latter case, peace talks could be established (Babarinde 2013, 274). The border conflicts that would be increasingly observed in the 1960s led the OAU to set down in writing the principle of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs—and moreover to adhere to it for decades after.

In the following years, a Defence Commission, an African High Command, and an African Defense Organization were proposed but never actually realized, due to their rejection by the majority of member states (Kabia 2011, 121; Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 58).

The following years and decades on the African continent were characterized by numerous different civil wars as well as intrastate conflicts, such as the Somalian-Ethiopian wars (1977–1978, 1982, and 1988), the civil war in Chad (1978–1987), with an intervention therein by Libya, and the Tanzanian-Ugandan war (1978–1979). These violent episodes not only challenged the efficacy of the OAU ad-hoc dispute settlement committees that were convened frequently back then, but also called into question that inscribed principle of non-interference (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 59). When Tanzanian troops intervened in Uganda in 1979, discussions about the OAU’s efficacy in resolving conflicts in general and about the principle of non-interference in particular would intensify. At the OAU Assembly meeting in Monrovia in 1979, the idea of an African peacekeeping force gained more traction and a declaration of human rights was also drafted (Thomas 1985, 112). Shortly after, an Inter-African Force (of the OAU) intervened for the first time in the Chad conflict. It did so “with no proper ceasefire to monitor, [a] lack of clear political goals, an ambiguous mandate, [a] lack of commitment by warring factions, and differences in opinion by OAU member states about the objective” (Kabia 2011, 122). To sum up, the OAU’s effectiveness in resolving the abovementioned conflicts had been deemed to be very limited.

The end of the Cold War made the situation on the African continent even more problematic, and also increasingly complex. Strategic support from the great powers or other Western countries steadily decreased, resulting in the collapse of
numerous African states as well as a dramatic increase in the number of civil wars witnessed on the continent. Conflicts broke out in Liberia (1989), in Somalia and Sierra Leone (1991), in Algeria (1992), and in Burundi (1993). According to Hawkins (2003, 61), nine of the ten worst conflicts of the last decade of the twentieth century would take place on the African continent.\textsuperscript{48} Although the number of UN peacekeeping operations did initially increase in the early 1990s, these rapidly declined after the events in Somalia and Rwanda—as the UN feared thereafter becoming heavily embroiled in further such disasters. Among African decision-makers, there was a feeling of disinterest in African affairs on the part of the international community—which was preoccupied first with the Gulf War and then with the conflict in Bosnia (Kabia 2011, 123). This feeling of being neglected by the international community finally forced the African continent into a fundamental rethink about how to best respond to its contemporary peace and security issues (table 4).

\textbf{Table 4: Perceptions of Changing Circumstances}

| We have noted the changing East-West relations from confrontation to cooperation, the socio-economic and political changes in Eastern Europe, the steady move towards the political and monetary union of Western Europe, the increasing global tendency towards regional integration [...] These, we found, constitute major factors which should guide Africa’s collective thinking about the challenges and options before her in the 1990s and beyond in view of the real threat of marginalisation of our continent (OAU 1990, 1). |

This declaration not only depicts the OAU member states’ awareness of the changing zeitgeist within the international system, but also emphasizes their wish for a strengthened continental organization able to deal with the new situation far more effectively (table 5).

\textsuperscript{48} The ten-bloodiest conflicts of the 1990s were (in descending order per the number of casualties) those in: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, Zaire, Burundi, Bosnia, Liberia, and Algeria (Hawkins 2003, 70).
Table 5: Wish for Greater Self-Determination

At this crucial juncture when our continent is emerging with difficulty, from a phase in its history that focused mainly on political liberation and nation building, and is about to embark on a new era laying greater emphasis on economic development, we need to strengthen the Organization of African Unity so that it may also become a viable instrument in the service of Africa’s economic development and integration. Consistent with this goal, we re-dedicate ourselves to the principles and objectives enshrined in its Charter to our faith in ourselves and to our continent, with greater determination to be masters of our destiny (OAU 1990, 4).

They recognized that the severe conflicts on the continent hindered the further political as well as economic development of Africa, and therefore decided to push for a more effective peace and security mandate for the OAU. Thus, from May 19 to 22, 1991, 300 African decision-makers from government and civil society came together in the Kampala Forum to discuss issues of security and stability. The later named “Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation” constituted a milestone, linking security, stability, development, and cooperation as sine que nons for Africa’s progress, and furthermore proposed to the OAU the establishment of a continental peacekeeping force and an Africa Peace Council comprising eminent persons (Kabia 2011, 123).49

Influenced by the proposed ideas of the CSSDCA and the ongoing debates, Salim Ahmed Salim, then OAU secretary general, declared that the RO “should be enabled to intervene swiftly in situations where tensions evolve to such a pitch that it becomes apparent that a conflict is in the making” (OAU 1992b). He proposed that the original OAU ad-hoc approach to peacekeeping had turned out to be ineffective and that there was a severe need for a better—and formally institutionalized—mechanism. Although some African heads of state had initially been reluctant to support this proposal due to the implications of a strengthened

49 Institutionally, the OAU was partially reformed with the treaty creating the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991. Article 5 of this treaty allowed the Assembly to sanction those member states that “fail to honour its general undertakings under this treaty” (AEC 1991). This article has never been used in practice, but has, according to observers, set the ground for the subsequent sanction mechanisms stipulated in Article 23 of the Constitutive Act (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 60).
OAU for their own national sovereignty, the majority of them did agree to work on a more central role for the OAU in peacekeeping issues (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 8). The OAU summit in Cairo in 1993 took up this idea, and the various heads of state and government in attendance agreed to establish a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as well as a division—located within the Secretariat—to be responsible for the effective management of conflicts.

Established in 1995, the Mechanism also opted for a Central Organ that was responsible for the overseeing of decisions on continental security. By aiming to take all necessary measures to prevent and resolve conflicts, it had a clear anticipatory and preventive focus to its work (Kabia 2011, 123). In addition, its tasks include peacekeeping efforts in cases of conflict as well as peace-building ones in post-conflict situations. It also opted for strong cooperation with the UN and other African ROs. Furthermore the OAU decided to establish several supporting units, such as an Early Warning System, a Field Operations Unit, and a Peace Fund (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 1f.). With 5.2 million refugees and 13 million internally displaced persons across Africa in the year 1993, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention was challenged enormously right from its inception.

6.1.2. Economic Community of West African States

The Economist described the continent as “Hopeless Africa” in the year 2000, by referring to the bleak situations in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan. The first post–Cold War decade especially would be characterized by severe intrastate conflicts. According to the UNDP Human Development Report (2002), 220,000 people died in wars between states from 1990 to 2002 alongside the nearly 3.6 million more who perished in intrastate ones in the same period. As shown in figure 6, compared to other world regions with significantly lower numbers of such deaths, Africa had

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50 For more details, see AHG/Decl. 3 of the OAU.
to mourn over 1.5 million conflict-related casualties between 1990 and 1999 alone.

**Figure 6: Casualties from Conflict 1990-1999, by Region**

Source: Author's own compilation (based on UNDP 2002, 17).

And what of West Africa—the region encompassing all of the countries represented by ECOWAS? Robert Kaplan (1994) once portrayed this region as having the potential to be a real danger to international peace and security. The West African subregion is home to approximately 382 million people, representing roughly one-third of the entire African population. Consisting of anglophone, francophone, and lusophone countries, the region not only has a diverse colonial history but also significant divergence in sociocultural, ethnic, and linguistic terms (Francis 2006, 140f.). The West African countries are also often ascribed to the group of least developed or underdeveloped countries, and thereby remain heavily dependent on external support. Since independence in the 1950s/1960s, the region has experimented with a variety of political

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51 The anglophone countries are the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Lusophone ones consist of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo make up the francophone countries, meanwhile.

52 Only Cape Verde and Ghana are in the Medium Human Development category according to the UNDP Human Development Report of 2016. All other ECOWAS countries are ascribed to the Low Human Development one (UNDP 2016, 198).
systems—from multiparty governance, authoritarian one-party governments, to military dictatorships.

ECOWAS—as noted originally established to further economic integration in the region—has been challenged by severe conflicts ever since its establishment in 1975. The 1970s were characterized by violent military coups d’état, numerous interstate wars and border disputes, as well as by the Biafran civil war in Nigeria. These conflicts, and the politically unstable situations accompanying them, caused a number of ECOWAS member states to realize that peace is a sine qua non for economic development. In an already violent atmosphere, the attempted invasions of mercenaries in Guinea, in November 1970, and in Benin, in January 1977, gave impetus to the expansion of ECOWAS’ mandate to security cooperation (Kabia 2011, 2).

In 1978 ECOWAS member states adopted the “Protocol on Non-Aggression” that urged member states to “refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression” (ECOWAS 1978, Art. 1) against each other. Because of intraregional tensions between the francophone and anglophone blocs, the seven francophone states (with the exception of Guinea) already adopted their own “Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence” (ANAD) in 1977. Although the francophone countries form a numerical majority in the region, they still feared Nigeria’s dominance in the economic, political, and military realms as well as its significant influence within ECOWAS (Coleman 2007, 74; Francis 2006, 146; Obi 2009, 53).

As the 1978 protocol did not provide for an institutionalized security mechanism, it was quickly criticized as being pure idealism (Kabia 2011, 2). As a response, ECOWAS adopted the “Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence” in 1981. In this protocol, member states declared “that any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community” (ECOWAS 1981, Art. 2). Member states also agreed to “give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression” (ibid., Art. 3). With these two articles, ECOWAS had for the first time ever adopted ones from other ROs—as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 was a parallel to these.
Additionally the 1981 protocol points out those situations that require action being taken by ECOWAS, namely “any case of armed conflict between two or several Member States” and “in case of internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside” (ECOWAS 1981, Art. 4). Article 5 institutionalized a Defence Council, a Defence Committee, and the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). However this protocol was also heavily criticized, for being ineffective in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict. Additionally, with its concentration on external threats, it neglected not only intrastate conflicts but also did not foresee a role for ECOWAS in the coups d’état taking place in the West African region. The latter circumstance can—as pointed out by many critics—be traced to the individual leaders’ very own regime protection strategies at that time (Francis 2006; Kabia 2011). Needless to say, the non-establishment of the institutions named in the protocol was also strongly dispraised.

Once more the rivalry between anglophone and francophone countries affected ECOWAS’ peace and security ambitions. The francophone ones, as noted, were increasingly fearful of Nigeria’s influence within ECOWAS and of that country’s hegemonic ambitions. Besides this, the francophone countries could not support the call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the continent (ECOWAS 1981, Art. 20) as they had strong military ties with France. Their very own ANAD protocol from 1977 additionally reduced the prospects of success of the 1981 one of ECOWAS. In contrast to the institutions provided for in the ECOWAS protocol, the institutions of ANAD were actually both established and made operational.

53 In fact, traditionally both protocols were somewhat perceived as external military threats to a nation-state’s political sovereignty. Domestic threats—such as intrastate conflicts resulting from bad governance, dictatorship, suppression, or political instability, as created by state elites themselves—were not considered. Critics argue that West African political leaders at that time very consciously decided to exclude these, so as to preserve their own political leadership and in order to further their own specific interests. Some critics even go as far as to reason that by means of the two protocols, and with the help of ECOWAS member states, domestic opposition could be suppressed. Thus, the two protocols can be perceived as ECOWAS’ first attempts at regional security governance—but in fact they were adopted so as to guarantee regime survival (Francis 2006, 147).
The early to mid-1980s would not see the furthering of the security ambitions of ECOWAS’ member states either. It was only the year 1989 and the events set in motion in it that would have a tremendous impact on the security architecture of ECOWAS.

6.2. Conflicts That Have Changed the Continent

6.2.1. ECOWAS: Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone

The Liberian crisis was a turning point in the history of ECOWAS. In December 1989, Charles Taylor—a Liberian in exile—invaded that country from Côte d’Ivoire—leading an armed rebellion against the military regime of President Samuel Doe. By June 1990, Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) not only occupied Monrovia and reigned over 90 percent of Liberia’s territory (Coleman 2007, 75) but also controlled the export of tropical woods and of diamonds (Hartmann 2010, 78). This civil war differed from previous conflicts in numerous respects. First, Taylor and his NPFL not only had as their aim replacing the regime but much more the taking control of the country’s diamond fields. Second, the Liberian state apparatus collapsed almost immediately and the emerging war economies quickly posed a severe threat to the security of neighboring states. Third, the end of the Cold War changed the common support system of the US and the USSR—who were both no longer willing to back every regime that they had previously. Thus, the past and common security order was no longer stable.

Referring to the 1981 protocol, Doe requested assistance from the heads of state of ECOWAS—arguing that the insurgency by Taylor would destabilize and destroy the whole subregion (Weller 1994, 60f.). In May 1990, during its summit in Banjul, Gambia, ECOWAS set up a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) consisting of Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo—later included were Sierra

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54 ANAD also provided for the establishment of a regional military standby force. However the involved francophone countries did not deploy this military force under the authority of ECOWAS, but of the UN. This—never actually established—deployment force was seen as an attempt at reducing Nigeria’s dominance in the region, and also at increasing the influence of France there too (Francis 2006, 147).
Leone and Guinea too. The SMC aimed to mediate in the Liberian conflict (ECOWAS 1991, 5). During the first two months of operations, a peace plan was formulated that provided for a ceasefire—in preparation for an interim government in which Taylor would not be allowed to participate. However after the rejection of this plan by Taylor, as well as by Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, the situation soon escalated again (Hartmann 2010; Kabia 2011; Obi 2009). In the following weeks, President Doe would request in a letter that the RO “introduce a ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tensions and to assure a peaceful transitional environment” (ECOWAS 1991, 6).

Following pressure from Nigeria, and with the support of the other three anglophone countries Ghana, Gambia, and Sierra Leone as well as francophone Guinea, ECOWAS would establish and then deploy, on August 7, 1990, its ECOMOG (ibid.). On August 24, 1990, the first ECOMOG troops—operating without any mandate from the UN—arrived in Monrovia; by October of that year ECOMOG had gained control of Liberia’s capital. At the end of November 1990, an ECOWAS summit in Mali reached a ceasefire agreement with Taylor.

55 For further details on the composition and responsibilities of the SMC, see Decision A./Dec. 9/5/90 “Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee” (ECOWAS 1991).

56 ECOWAS was divided on how best to react to the Liberian crisis. Nigeria wanted to intervene because of the close relationship between its military head of state Babangida and Liberia’s President Doe, as well as due to concerns about the security of Nigerians in Liberia; Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, meanwhile, supported Taylor due to their close relationships with the son of Liberia’s erstwhile president Adolphus Tolbert. Both countries condemned Doe, as he had murdered Tolbert senior in the process of coming to power in 1980 (Coleman 2007, 76).

57 There is a vast and rich literature on the Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG (intervention without UN mandate). Among others, see: Aboagye 1999); Adebajo 2000); Aning 1999); Olonisakin 2000); and, Sesay 1999).

58 ECOMOG was established without the approval of francophone Togo and Mali, and in the face of bitter opposition from Taylor himself (Kabia 2011, 3). The ECOMOG-supporting countries—Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia—were also the ones contributing troops to it (Obi 2009, 3).

59 For more details regarding the role and mandate of ECOMOG, see Decision A./DEC. 1/8/90 (ECOWAS 1991, 6ff.).

60 ECOMOG, without a mandate from the UN, was not perceived as coordinated units but rather as a “coalition of the willing” of national military units reporting to their respective commanders (Hartmann 2010).

61 Unsurprisingly the NPFL under Taylor rejected the ECOWAS peace plan, being convinced by its own military strength—he thus announced that his troops would resist ECOMOG. Already in September 1990, President Doe—captured at the headquarters of ECOMOG—was executed by a splinter group of the NPFL (Coleman 2007, 76).
One year later, in October 1991, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, previously opponents of ECOMOG, supported this organ—Senegal even provided troops to it. But even these strengthened ECOMOG troops could not end the violent conflict once and for all. In late 1992 the UNSC imposed, for the first time, an arms embargo (Resolution 788), and thereby clearly was in support of ECOMOG’s role in the conflict. In September 1993 the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) also provided support to ECOMOG (Hartmann 2010, 79). But as the NPFL remained powerful in the countryside and the conflict parties’ constellation became more and more complicated, a dozen peace accords failed. In 1996 a new peace plan, one this time including Taylor in the political process, led to his disarming as well as to elections in May 1997. Under the observation of ECOWAS, Taylor won the election with 75 percent of the vote and thus became president of Liberia. Although the ECOMOG mission officially ended in 1999, the conflict could not be brought to one too. In 1999 civil war broke out again as armed rebel groups formed against Taylor’s regime. ECOWAS, this time with a UN mandate, again took on peacekeeping responsibilities. In 2003 Taylor went into exile in Nigeria, and the UN officially took over in Liberia on 1 October of that year (Coleman 2007, 76).

The civil war in Liberia spilled over to Sierra Leone in 1991. Similar to the Liberian war, it started as an insurgency that was supported by the Liberian NPFL. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a rebellion aimed at overthrowing the government of President Joseph Momoh. A military coup in 1992 against Momoh led to the subsequent expansion of the ECOMOG mandate to Sierra Leone, with it being mainly supported by Nigerian troops. Despite several further

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62 Taylor won the election because he spread fear among the populace; he announced, for example, that hostilities would break out again if he was not elected president (Coleman 2007, 76).

63 Taylor later became the first African head of state to be sentenced to prison (for fifty years) by an international tribunal, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since October 15, 2013, he has been imprisoned in the UK (Englebert and Dunn 2013, 304).

64 There have been suggestions that Foday Sankow, RUF leader, was not only supported by Taylor but also by Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire too. Besides this, it has been claimed that the RUF received training from Libya and that Taylor was therewith mainly seeking revenge for Sierra Leone’s earlier support of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia (Obi 2009, 56f.).
military coups and an ongoing civil war, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was eventually elected president in early 1996.

In November 1996 a peace agreement—under the auspices of the UN and ECOWAS—was negotiated in Abidjan, aiming at demobilizing the RUF and transforming it into a political party (Hartmann 2010, 80; Obi 2009, 7). However, before the agreement became effective, another military coup toppled newly elected President Kabbah and put Major Johnny Paul Koromah in place instead. With Decision A./DEC. 7/8/97 “Extending the Scope Activity and Mandate of ECOMOG to cover Sierra Leone” in August 1997, ECOWAS approved the broadening of ECOMOG’s mandate to Sierra Leone with the intention of reinstating President Kabbah (ECOWAS 1997b, 13). Then in October 1997 a negotiated agreement to reinstate Kabbah was broken by that country’s military junta and, as a consequence, ECOMOG and Nigerian troops—supported by a small UN Observer Mission (UNOSIL)—invaded Sierra Leone in March 1998 and reinstated Kabbah.

In 1999 Kabbah once more had to escape the capital after being attacked by the RUF again. Nigeria enlarged its troop deployment, and three weeks later ECOMOG had the situation under control once more. The peace agreement of Lomé, negotiated in July 1999, officially ended the war and transformed the RUF into a political party. By establishing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the UN deployed 11,000 soldiers there to monitor demobilization. ECOMOG, despite the temporary withdrawal of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, and Guinea, continued its mission in Sierra Leone until 2002 when elections were finally held (Hartmann 2010, 80).

In the 1990s ECOWAS not only intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone, however, but also in Guinea-Bissau. A struggle for power between President Joao Vieira and Chief of Armed Forces Ansumane Mané—in combination with subregional tensions—lead to a civil war breaking out in the country in 1998.65 In June of that

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65 In part these tensions can also be explained by the attempts of Guinea-Bissau, who had close colonial ties with Portugal at that time, to strengthen its relationship with both France and its francophone neighbors Guinea and Senegal. Guinea-Bissau would also join the West African CFA currency zone (Obi 2009, 58).
year, Mané organized a coup to overthrow President Vieira. As a consequence, Vieira not only asked ECOWAS for assistance but also Senegal and Guinea—with both of whom Guinea-Bissau had bilateral defence pacts. In fact, the very day that the coup was announced Senegal already deployed its troops—Guinea followed suit a day later (Obi 2009, 59). Although both countries initially had no official mandate, ECOWAS subsequently still authorized these missions and also organized a round of negotiations with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Comunidade de Paises de Lingua Portuguesa, CPLP).⁶⁶ A first ceasefire agreement between Vieira and Mané was signed on August 26, 1998, but it would be broken soon after. A second peace agreement was negotiated in November 1998 (Kohnert 2000, 47). In April 1999, ECOMOG had to watch the eruption of new violence from the sidelines. After two weeks of combat, Mané took over Guinea-Bissau’s leadership in May 1999—meanwhile Vieira went into exile. ECOWAS troops would already be withdrawn in June 1999, due to the insecure security situation on the ground.

These different conflicts set the ground for the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.” Between them they had also a tremendous influence on how ECOWAS member states, heads of state, and civil society actors⁶⁸ thought about conflict management and resolution, as the following statements of interview section 1 show.

**Interview Section 1: Perceptions of Previous Conflicts in the Region**

| If you look at that, it was basically inspired by the tragic incidence of [...] intrastate conflicts in West Africa, in Central Africa and in the Horn of Africa (#19). |

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⁶⁶ The CPLP consists of Portugal, Angola, Brazil, East Timor, Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe, and appeared herewith for the first time vis-à-vis mediation in the international arena (Francis 2006, 167).

⁶⁷ This second ceasefire agreement stipulated the withdrawal of the aforementioned troops from Guinea and Senegal, to be replaced by ones from Benin, Gambia, Mali, Niger, and Togo. Without the support of Nigeria, ECOWAS did not succeed in deploying the agreed upon 1,500 soldiers however (Hartmann 2010, 81).

⁶⁸ The terms “civil society” and “think tanks” will be used synonymously in this thesis.
The fact that there have obviously been a number of civil wars in the West African region, and [...] they have tried to build upon that past experience, whether it being Liberia or Côte d’Ivoire, or on the ongoing conflict in Nigeria (#8).

And the leaders of that time [...] they also had crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone. And some of the West African Leaders of that time decided they would not wait for external involvement and responded, first to Liberia, and based on their response to the Liberian crises, they were requested by the United Nations [...] to restore democracy back in Sierra Leone (#21).

It also became very obvious that the way ECOMOG had been installed, and how it had performed in every single conflict to date, would determine the subsequent discourse about this newly established security mechanism (interview section 2).

**Interview Section 2: Perceptions of ECOMOG’s Deployments**

It made it very difficult for those consultants who were coming from those two institutions, from ECOWAS and then knowing about ECOWAS and Nigeria’s intervention at that time in Sierra Leone and to think about how the Security Council has really helped. It limited them in terms of what they could imagine for the African continent (#11).

I believe that there have been many hard reasons why ECOWAS has thought about establishing a new security architecture. There is this immediate influence of the previous interventions that have been deployed. This actually influences their thinking very strongly for many reasons. Because they have caused high costs, have been unpopular, had no legal basis and Nigeria has been criticized despite their strong engagement. The francophone countries became restless as well, as they felt that a culture of intervention is spreading in the region (#4).

The violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau not only influenced ECOWAS’ thinking however, but also the later establishment of the continent-wide peace and security architecture of the AU too.
Interview Section 3: Perceptions of West African Conflicts

Quickly, we have been faced with security challenges in that region and there was a clear commitment to then deploy ECOMOG. ECOMOG in the 1990s, 1991 and 1993, combined with some of the tragic events on the continent like the Rwandan genocide, all shaped and contributed in very useful ways to the development of the APSA (#19).

It became evident that there was some new thinking on the continent about recent crises [...] with the realization that post–Cold War interests have changed and African needed to take care of its own interests, coupled with the fact that there was a lot more democratization on the continent (#21).

6.2.2. OAU: The Genocide in Rwanda

As shown in the previous section, very specific conflict experiences shaped ECOWAS's thinking about its own ways of dealing with future conflicts more effectively. This not only holds true for ECOWAS though, but also and especially applies to the OAU too—with the specific case of the genocide in Rwanda of the mid-1990s.

In October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded northern Rwanda in an attempt to force a sharing of power with it. Starting in the same year, the OAU launched several attempts at mediation efforts which led to a ceasefire agreement and an OAU observer mission. The Military Observer Group in Rwanda (NMOG) arrived there in 1991, with peace negotiations then being held in Arusha in 1992—with Tanzania acting as the main mediator (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11). The Arusha Peace Agreement, signed in August 1993, envisaged “the inclusion of the RPF in an integrated national army and [...] the presence of a neutral international force to provide security and [to] supervise the inauguration of the transitional government, demobilization of combatants and creation of a new army, and preparations for national elections” (ibid., 11).

60 Egypt, the former Zaire, and Senegal, the OAU and UN, as well as Belgium, Burundi, France, Germany, Nigeria, Uganda, the US, and Zimbabwe all attended the Arusha talks as observers (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11).
Shortly after, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)—a 2,500-person-strong UN peacekeeping force—arrived in Rwanda and subsumed NMOG due to the OAU’s difficulties in financing the latter (Kabia 2011, 124).

As radical Hutus did not accept the peace agreement, due to the absence of an amnesty for Hutu elites suspected of corruption, militias were thereafter founded by those radicals. Lists of names with leading Tutsis and moderate Hutus were prepared, munitions were arranged, and radio stations such as Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines systematically defamed the Tutsis. As early as the beginning of 1994 General Dallaire had warned the UN about the threat of a genocide, but he was not heard (Bundestag 2007, 6). On April 6, 1994, a plane with Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira on board was shot down shortly before it was due to land in Kigali. Thirty minutes later, the assassination of moderate Hutu politicians as well as of the Tutsi population at large commenced.

Continuing until June 1994, up to one million Rwandans were murdered in total. After Belgium withdrew its troops, UNAMIR—already too weak in terms of material and personnel to make a difference—was further undermined. The OAU begged the UN for assistance; the latter not only refused, but even reduced its deployment to a total of just 270 soldiers on April 21, 1994. Only after the scale of the genocide became public and pressure on the UN increased did the organization bolster its peacekeeping force there. However it did not manage to secure a larger mission, and requested that African countries provide their own troops for UNAMIR. The OAU accused the Security Council of being passive, and committed to deploying troops itself instead. As the OAU had neither the

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70 UNAMIR was based on UNSC Resolution 872, adopted on November 1, 1993. It aimed at stabilizing the country without giving a mandate for military action. Roméo Dallaire, a major general from Canada, was appointed UNAMIR’s chief commander (Bundestag 2007, 6).

71 After the escalation in Somalia, the US was now very reluctant to intervene in other African countries. Among the African countries themselves, Ghana was the only one to contribute troops to UNAMIR (Babarinde 2013, 275).

72 The UN had just recently lost 18 American Rangers, 25 Pakistani peacekeepers, and an estimated 1,000 Somali civilians in its UNOSOM II mission in Somalia. Observers argue that the UNSC was mainly affected by these experiences in its decision to reduce troops in Rwanda (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11).
necessary logistical nor material prerequisites however, then this deployment of troops could only be realized with a five-month delay. In the meantime, the genocide escalated and UNAMIR withdrew (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11f.). It was the military victory of the RPF under Paul Kagame that eventually ended the massacre. The ascent of this transitional government under Kagame, a Tutsi, led to the fleeing of two million Hutus to neighboring countries such as Tanzania and the DRC. These streams of refugees represented further humanitarian catastrophes in the two countries. Additionally, some 2.5 million people were internally displaced within Rwanda itself (Bundestag 2007, 7).

The genocide in Rwanda changed the entire African continent. On the one hand, African leaders were massively criticized for hiding behind the principle of non-interference, as no African peacekeepers were present in Rwanda during the genocide (Babarinde 2013, 275). On the other, the international community was also heavily denounced for its failure to even prevent the genocide (Bundestag 2007, 8f.). It has additionally been argued that the transformation of the OAU mission into a UN one also contributed to the massacre. Margaret Vogt (1998), an influential Nigerian scholar working for ECOWAS, AU, and UN, argues that the failure of the UNSC to take an immediate decision, the fears of Western countries about the safety of their troops and the domestic disapproval of foreign interventions on African soil, as well as a lack of resources and personnel all led to the catastrophe witnessed in Rwanda.

As mentioned above, the genocide changed the continent. It was soon perceived as a catastrophe that should never be allowed to happen again, as the following statements in interview section 4 show.

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73 Afterward, Kofi Annan confessed that the UN could indeed have prevented the genocide. In a speech given in April 2004, he said that “we must never forget our collective failure to protect at least 800,000 defenceless men, women, and children who perished in Rwanda 10 years ago [...]. First, we must all acknowledge our responsibility for not having done more to prevent or stop the genocide. Neither the United Nations Secretariat, nor the Security Council, nor Member States in general, nor the international media, paid enough attention [...]. Still less did we take timely action” (Annan 2004, 1f).
Interview Section 4: Perceptions of Happenings in Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There was a lot of discussion about the reform of the charter. Especially, when in 1994 we had the Rwandan genocide and there were a lot of movements to see how the OAU could become more effective at intervening (#23).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I believe Rwanda has played a fundamental role. This evident failure has been extremely painful for the African people (#26).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ultimate worst was seen on the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 where [...] it became obvious that we should not allow this to happen again (#22).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of course, you have two key events I would say. One will be genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 (#27).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But Rwanda did not happen in isolation. As already described, there were other severe conflicts taking place in Africa at the end of the twentieth century—such as the ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The fact that the 1990s were a decade packed full of severe and deadly conflicts to which existent security mechanisms could not respond adequately changed the thinking of African leaders. As shown below, interviewees mainly referred to the interventions of ECOMOG and the genocide in Rwanda as critical junctures—ones leading to a fundamental rethink of African security policy.

Interview Section 5: Perceptions of Severe Conflicts in Africa

| In terms of the African Peace and Security Architecture, [...] in terms of thinking about what we want to do, [that] was—what I consider to be a turning point in the history of security policy on the African continent. In the early 1990s, you remember that a lot of African countries experienced so much conflict, e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and so on. And Rwanda as a cutting point, right. There was this broader ideational movement among Africans that this cannot continue (#11). |

Furthermore, African decision-makers seemed to be aware of the historical situation and also the accompanying tremendous challenges lying ahead of them. Excerpts of the report of the brainstorming meeting of the CSSDCA illustrate that the situation was evaluated as a unique one, and that changes not only had to be
made but they also had to be made in both radical and sustainable ways. The assessment that economic development could only be achieved on the basis of peaceful societies was once more underlined too. The following excerpts from the mentioned report illustrate very well how the discourse unfolded in the early 1990s.

**Table 6: The Search for Changes in Security Policy**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All the speakers agreed that there is need for a new outlook in Africa. The continent is facing problems of monumental proportions requiring an urgent and radical approach. The conflict situations, the refugees, economic stagnation, environmental degradation and a host of other problems have undermined Africa's security. There is therefore urgent need to take measures to arrest the situation (ALF 1990, 1).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profound geo-political changes have melted borders and radically altered global strategic equations. These changes left in their trail the collapse of the Cold War structures and a search for new alliances and directions (ALF 1990, 15).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let us hope therefore that given how terribly low Africa has fallen, we will accept our historical challenge and become the frontliners in establishing the process that will lay the foundation for security, stability, co-operation and structural transformation in Africa. It is not going to be a quick fix. Rather it is going to be an arduous task. But it is a task that must be performed (ALF 1990, 33).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Debates were not only held in the CSSDCA but also in the OAU itself too. In their official documents, the latter underlined the devastating nature of the experienced conflicts in order to justify new approaches in institutional design (table 7).

**Table 7: Mentioning of Conflicts in Official Documents**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gravely concerned with the proliferation of conflicts in Africa and the immense suffering which they have brought to the people of Africa, as well as their adverse implications for the security and stability of Africa and the socio-economic development of the continent (OAU 1992a, preamble).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems on the continent than the scourge of conflicts in and among our countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families (OAU 1993a, 9).

6.3. Impotence of ROs and Lack of Action by the UN

6.3.1. ECOWAS

In light of the experienced conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS member states signed the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” in Lomé, Togo, on December 10, 1999. Important aspects of how decision-makers thought about the new mechanism were on the one hand a felt sense of impotence on the part of ECOWAS vis-à-vis interventions and on the other the inactivity of the international community.

The outbreak of the first Liberian civil war did not, despite its violent character and its development into a humanitarian catastrophe, entail the immediate involvement of the international community. The US, which had strong ties to Nigeria at that time, had been actively engaged in the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990/1991. The UN of these years had itself been struggling with the new post–Cold War era and its changing circumstances and growing responsibilities (Kabia 2011, 151). ECOWAS claimed that it had urged the UN to help by “warning [that] the situation was getting worse, but there is no help forthcoming. Therefore, ECOWAS countries decided to act together” (Coleman 2007, 98). Thus, it became obvious that the new international order would make it necessary to think about one’s own peace and security strategies. However this inactivity by the international community and former allied great powers, coming with the resulting feeling in Africa of being left all alone, heavily influenced the way decision-makers imagined their new and very own security.

74 Cited interview of Katharina Coleman with Frank Ofei, acting deputy executive secretary (economic affairs) and director of studies, ECOWAS, in 2000 (Coleman 2007, 98).
structures. This becomes obvious when looking at the following official
documents adopted by OAU/AU and ECOWAS.

Table 8: Official Documents Urging International Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONVINCED that the responsibility for security, stability, development and co-operation on the African continent rests not only with the people of Africa themselves but also on international co-operation, support and participation (ALF 1991, preamble).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>While recalling that maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council, WE URGE the United Nations and the international community to pay necessary attention to the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa and actively support the initiatives deployed under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (OAU 2000b, 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPRESSES ITS DETERMINATION to address the scourge of conflicts in Africa in a collective, comprehensive and decisive manner, within the framework of the AU and its relevant organs, and with the full support of the wider international community (AU 2003b, 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWARE that the review of the treaty arises, inter alia, from the need for the community to adapt to the changes on the international scene in order to derive greater benefits from those changes (ECOWAS 1993, preamble).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Sierra Leone, the situation was different as it would be perceived as the “first time that a military junta was overthrown in the name of democracy and constitutional order” (Kabia 2011, 162). Although UNAMSIL had suffered from logistical and financial difficulties—as did most UN missions—it was still perceived as being rather successful, for a number of reasons. In the Guinea-Bissau conflict meanwhile, “the UN only intervened after a rather messy and rather problematic ECOMOG intervention” (Kabia 2011, 168). Following UN

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75 UNAMSIL was deemed successful as it was a first attempt at what Kofi Annan had named “robust peacekeeping,” backed up by the support of the UK and Nigeria. Second, it was adjudged to have managed to replicate the successful UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique (Kabia 2011, 166).
Resolution 1233, UN and ECOWAS were jointly responsible for the organization and supervision of subsequent elections.

Therefore not only the official documents above show the strong will of Africans to be able to handle their own security problems but also the interviews do too (interview section 6). It becomes clear that decision-makers were not longer willing to depend exclusively on external support. The interviews also underline the importance of timing. As visible in the last one (#21), they set the ground for changes for which the timing seemed to be right; or, as historical institutionalists would argue, a critical juncture had reached.

**Interview Section 6: Perceptions of International Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>And so, the leaders of that time [...] after Rwanda, they also had the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone. And some of the West African Leaders of that time decided they would not wait for external involvement and responded, first to Liberia, and based on their response to the Liberian crisis, they were requested by the United Nations then to restore democracy back in Sierra Leone (#21).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>So, it became evident that there was some new thinking on the continent about recent crises and all of this [...] with the realization that post–Cold War interests have changed and Africa needed to take care of its own interests coupled with the fact that there was a lot more democratization on the continent. So, the whole idea of a bad boys’ club, which all came to power by the barrel and the guns, that was no longer appealing. [...] And so, I think, there was a lot of history behind it but also the timing was just right (#21).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3.2. OAU/AU

The newly established OAU mechanism was born because of the causality of a security environment characterized by a multitude of conflicts occurring on the African continent, ones varying in complexity, scale, and intensity. While some could be ended, new ones soon erupted—such as those in Angola, the Central African Republic, Comores, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11). As could be readily seen, not only Rwanda challenged the newly founded capabilities of the OAU in terms of peacekeeping
but also other severe conflicts did too. The OAU responded in different ways to different conflicts. It mediated and imposed sanctions (Comores), it sent special envoys (Comores and Burundi), and it deployed fact-finding and military missions (Rwanda, Burundi, and Comores). Although the OAU did initially start to establish a certain kind of credibility in handling peace and security issues, its practical performances made obvious that the organization did not—at that time—have the capacity, resources, or experience to handle these conflicts alone. Therefore, support from IOs and/or the international community was not only badly needed but also expected. Accordingly the failure of the international community in Rwanda came as a profound shock to African decision-makers and left them with a feeling of impotence, as the following interviews show.

**Interview Section 7: Disappointment in the International Community**

| The second has much to do with [...] the genocide in Rwanda and the fact that the OAU at that time and the UN failed to prevent the genocide [...]. It was also the key element (#27). |
| Now, if you go to West Africa, East Africa also, there was a crisis in Burundi in which again the international community has failed to respond to (#21). |

Rwanda was not only a turning point in African history due to its catastrophic nature, but also because of the new situation on the continent ensuing from it. While during the Cold War the great powers had been actively engaged in Africa, the decade after its end showed the African continent its decreased global importance. The following statements from a brainstorming meeting of the CSSDCA illustrate just how disappointed and frustrated African decision-makers were.

**Table 9: Fatigue of the International Community**

| The loss of the little strategic value Africa ever had for super-power Cold War rivalries, has come against a background of declining inflows of aid and foreign investment, a crippling debt overhang, and the collapse of major commodity |
prices [...], [and] greater international attention and priority to Eastern Europe (ALF 1990, 16).

There is change everywhere except in Africa. Africa has moved from being at the periphery to the periphery of the periphery of the global economy – the permanent political and underdog of the world, the world’s basket case, the permanent mezzogiorno for which there is little hope! Indeed, in many non-African chanceries—West, East, and other Third World countries – many officials wished Africa would just go away (ALF 1990, 32)!

Africa, the once major client forced into the Cold War era on the hope of maximizing rewards, remained its most impoverished victim and now emerges into the post-Cold War era, disorganized and frustrated, unsure and isolated economically and politically—perhaps more than any other region (ALF 1990, 16).

At that time, the feeling dominated that other regions in the world would attract more attention from the international community. African leaders felt that they had been marginalized at the expense of the involvement of the international community elsewhere, and consequently that the world no longer cared about Africa.

**Interview Section 8: Crises Receiving More Attraction**

When you look at the international community’s response to the crisis of the former Republic of Yugoslavia and its response to the crisis in Rwanda, you can clearly see that the international community did not care about Africa (#21).

What happened in Rwanda, what happened earlier in Liberia, actually led some of the African leaders to believe that they have been marginalized and that they have been abandoned. And that the world was more interested in what was happening in the Balkans. And so it was a time for Africa to begin to own its own problems and begin to own its own solutions and to demonstrate the capacity that if the world does not care, Africa will step up to the plate (#9).

Based on this feeling of abandonment, debates on the African continent remained conducted in a rather passive way only briefly—with them shifting quickly in the direction of self-empowerment. As interview section 9 shows, stakeholders reflected on the current situation in a rather pragmatic way and decided that
radical change was necessary. It was deemed that the reliance on external support would no longer be enough, and that—at least rhetorically—the OAU and the African continent as a whole now had to step up and to develop its own solutions to its own problems.

**Interview Section 9: Empowerment as a Reaction to Neglect (I)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Well, the experience of all of that [Rwanda] showed that you cannot fully rely on external support when it comes to address some specific issues. [...] We can no longer say we simply rely on the UN for the promotion of peace and security. [...] The genocide in Rwanda has shown that external support cannot be fully relied upon (#27).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The second broader background has to do with the fact that there was also a kind of fatigue with the UN system in terms of its ability to resolve African conflicts. As a result, there was a tendency to empower regional organizations to be able to also develop their own capacity [...] There was a need for them to also step up (#11).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The AU has given itself a far-reaching mandate in the area of peace and security based on the experiences in Rwanda where neither OAU nor UN have been capable of intervening. [...] That has been the big learning effect. [...] To take control of its own business and to say: we will take our own responsibilities (#26).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, this empowerment is two-sided. On the one hand, it was based on the assumption of pure necessity as international partners were no longer as reliable as previously. On the other, empowerment was connected with the wish to give a signal to the international community that Africa is very capable of finding its own solutions.

**Table 10: Empowerment as a Reaction to Neglect (II)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa’s experience may be bitter but the lessons are clear. Any rational analysis of the current state of the world leads to an inescapable conclusion that this millennium of the 20th century represents a critical turning point for Africa. It is a great challenge largely because of a long historical dependency imposed on the region by an inequitable international economic system; but, it is also an opportunity stemming from the forced isolation and the realization that acceptance of a radical change is now of vital necessity (ALF 1990, 16).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
We recognize also that it is only through the consolidation of our unity that our continent will move from the periphery to a position where Africa will become an equal and effective participant in the world economic, political and social order. Let us not be under any illusion the rest of the world will do it for us. On the contrary, just as the birth of the OAU was greeted with cynicism by skeptics, there are many who have refused to give our Union any chance of survival, let alone success let us ensure that they are wrong (Essy 2002, 2).

But despite the signaling of its own strength, the OAU was very aware of the fact that it would have to rely on international support in order to be able to respond to crises more effectively. Table 11 shows that the OAU in its official documents not only reminded the international community of its responsibility as laid down in the UN Charter, but also asked international partners for help and support in that stepping up.

**Table 11: Calling for International Support**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>While recalling that maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council, WE URGE the United Nations and the international community to pay necessary attention to the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa and actively support the initiatives deployed under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (OAU 2000b, 5).</td>
<td>Further call on the international community to do its utmost to ensure that globalization serves the interest of all countries without discrimination and, in particular, facilitate the effective participation of our countries in the global trade system, thereby helping us to lay the foundations for durable and equitable growth (OAU 2000b, 20).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. ECOWAS: A Pioneer in African Regional Security

7.1. Interdependence between ROs and IOs

As interdependence is the main criterion for diffusion occurring, the next subchapter is concerned with the interdependent relations between ECOWAS and the UN as well as the AU. Already in its revised treaty document of 1993, ECOWAS underlined its closed cooperation and harmonization of policies not only with the African Economic Community but also with the by then OAU and the UN as well as other IOs too (table 12).

**Table 12: Institutionalized Cooperation of ECOWAS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The integration of the region shall constitute an essential component of the integration of the African continent. Member states undertake to facilitate the co-ordination and harmonization of the policies and programmes of the community with those of the African Economic Community (ECOWAS 1993, Art. 78).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In pursuit of its objective, the community shall also co-operate with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations system, and any other international organization (ECOWAS 1993, Art. 83).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The official legal documents of ECOWAS not only provide for institutionalized cooperation in general, but also—and in particular—for close collaboration on peace and security issues too. In its Conflict Prevention Framework from 2008, ECOWAS set out in detail how close the collaboration between the UN, AU, and itself was planned to be (table 13). Accordingly ECOWAS was heavily influenced by the normative frameworks of other regional and international organizations, and established its own normative foundations very closely in line with those of the UN and AU. As illustrated in table 13, the close security cooperation of ECOWAS, AU, and UN would range from conflict prevention, to peace-building, to the resolution of conflicts.
Table 13: Security Cooperation of ECOWAS, AU, and UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase awareness and preparedness for cooperative ventures between ECOWAS, member states, civil society and external constituencies (RECs, AU, EU, UN, international financial institutions and development/humanitarian agencies) in pursuit of conflict prevention and peace-building (ECOWAS 2008, Art. 28 (e)).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS draws its mandate and legitimacy to shape conflict prevention policies and practices in West Africa from diverse but related regional and international normative framework documents. These include foundation and related legal documents of ECOWAS, AU, NEPAD and UN (ECOWAS 2008, Art. 30).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A firm legal basis underpins the relationship between ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations on the cardinal issue of peace and security. [...] Thus, key ECOWAS normative standards that speak to conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building broadly radiate from the Constitutive Act of AU and the UN Charter, and the related normative standards on peace and security (ECOWAS 2008, Art. 40).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How this cooperation is implemented in practice is shown in table 14. The conflict mechanism of ECOWAS is not only put into effect on the decision of the Authority and the MSC, at the request of a member state, or on the initiative of the Executive Secretary but also at the request of the UN—and previously of the OAU too (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 26). ECOWAS’ standby force, ESF, is also very closely connected to the AU and other RECs, as they need to coordinate strategies and activities.

Table 14: Practical Peace and Security Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The mechanism shall be put into effect by any of the following: [...] e) At request of the Organisation of African Unity or the United Nations (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 26).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS shall coordinate ESF strategy with the African Union, promote exchanges between the two institutions and other RECs, and ensure that ESF activities in the region are in harmony with those of the African Standby Force (ECOWAS 2008, Art. 90 (b)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ECOWAS, AU, and the UN reveal their interdependence not only in their legal documents and normative frameworks but also vis-à-vis personnel and logistical aspects, as will be shown in the next chapter.

7.2. Triangle ECOWAS-AU-UN

Based on the demonstrated interdependence of ECOWAS and other regional and international organizations, the triangle of ECOWAS-AU-UN is thus addressed here. The relationship between the UN on the one hand and the two most important African ROs on the other is a special one. When bearing in mind the fact that all three organizations have peace and security mandates for Africa, it becomes obvious how challenges and opportunities regarding effective and successful cooperation are very closely linked (Ajayi 2008, 2). Out of fifty-seven UN peace operations to date, twenty-four have taken place in Africa. Concerning current such operations, seven out of fourteen are on the African continent. Thus, close cooperation is not only necessary but also crucial for the successful realization of common peace and security aims in Africa.

In order to fulfill these, close cooperation between ECOWAS, AU, and the UN is necessary—and indeed, as noted, already practiced. As illustrated in interview section 10, interviewees confirmed the intimate collaboration between ECOWAS and both AU and the UN on peace and security issues. According to these interviewees, drafted concepts are discussed and partners consulted.

**Interview Section 10: Work Exchange**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What we did is we drafted a concept and we had an expert seminar at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Centre in Accra, Ghana, and there we had UN experts and we had various representatives from African governments and the AU (#15).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes we invite the UN as a strategic partner [...]. There is a constant interaction with partners throughout this process [...]. Partner consultations happen both formally and informally (#19).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, the UN and the AU were operating alongside each other and we anticipated that they would act together a lot, so that was a major influence (#15).

By working together, knowledge is exchanged. As illustrated in interview section 11, expertise from the UN has been available to ECOWAS and AU—and both organizations would make use of it. The last box of interview section 11 gives one example of strengthened cooperation between ECOWAS and AU, particularly on peace and security issues as well as over related institutions.

**Interview Section 11: Exchange of Knowledge**

| So, expertise from the UN was usually available, and almost always [funded by] the UN as part of [its] support, which is important for an institution which does not have the resources it needs to get on (#14). |
| The role of the competent organizations of the UN system should be integrated into the CSSDCA process (ALF 1990, 24). |
| STRONGLY ADVOCATE co-operation in the area of peacekeeping and security between the United Nations Organization (UNO), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and African Regional Organizations (OAU 2000b, 4). |

This exchange of knowledge is also characterized by personnel linkages, as staff move between the three organizations. The interviewee in section 12 described how—most often higher-ranking—officials from African ROs not only move between those ROs themselves but also later on to the UN and its various agencies too.

**Interview Section 12: Movement of Knowledge in ECOWAS**

The relationship between AU and the subregional organizations is very, very close. A lot of people start in ROs and later go to New York. And a lot of very good people that go to New York with their knowledge are very important for the ROs (#6).
One of numerous examples—but a particularly important one—is Margaret Vogt. She not only worked for a number of institutions in Nigeria, such as the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, before joining the International Peace Academy in New York. In 2000 she became chief of staff of the AU Commission chairperson and worked also for UNOSOM II. She was also one of the principal advisers to the UN assistant secretary general for political affairs, was the acting deputy special representative of the secretary general in the UN Political Office for Somalia, and deputy director of the Africa I Division in the Department of Political Affairs at the UN Secretariat in New York (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, ii).

**Interview Section 13: Movement of Margaret Vogt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On the other hand, Margaret has also worked within the UN system and was very much aware of [their security mechanism] (#11).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There was a very important stakeholder, Margaret Vogt, who was also Chief of Cabinet of Konare and has worked a lot on the UN. She was also directly involved in the draft of the PSC Protocol. [...] She was the link to the UN (#2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Margaret was a crucial and highly influential person in the establishment process of peace and security structures in both ROs, as she actively shaped the design of their security institutions (interview sections 13 and 14). As a highly respected intellectual, she brought knowledge from her various post in Nigerian as well as international institutions. Having completed her academic education in the US, she believed deeply in institutions—not only as a result of her extensive work in academia on regional and international organizations but also due to the vast, rich knowledge that she had acquired over a lifetime of serving in those very organizations.

**Interview Section 14: Margaret Vogt (I)**

| I believe that Margaret Vogt has been the most crucial stakeholder (#4). |
Yes, Margaret Vogt was central to a lot of that before she then moved on to the UN (#9).

Others were people who had been groomed within Ministries of Foreign Affairs who are—what I call—hard-boiled technocrats. Some of them had served in some of these institutions in the West, some of them had served in UN, some of them had served in UN-affiliated agencies, and they had seen or studied these various integrationist organizations (#9).

Margaret not only served as a linkage between ECOWAS, AU, and the UN, she also had a very close relationship with the Nigerian administration too. As the interviews in section 15 reveal, she not only worked closely together with Nigeria’s military head of state at that time who—after consultation with Margaret—brought new ideas into the ECOWAS fold. She was also—during her time as chief of staff at the OAU—very close with the chairperson of the Commission, as well as with the head of the AU Conflict Management and Prevention Division too.

**Interview Section 15: Influence of Margaret Vogt**

You remember that Margaret Vogt and her co-author happened to be individuals from the ECOWAS system. Margaret at that time worked for the Nigerian government and was aware of the ECOWAS Conflict Management and Prevention Division, and wanted to some extent to draw on that—and wanted to inform the AU (#11).

And people like Margaret Vogt, they were a group of Nigerian scholars who were policy advisors who were actually able to influence Ibrahim Babangida. That was the military head of state there. And he in turn went to the ECOWAS meeting with his ideas (#9).

The director [...] of the AU Conflict Management and Prevention Division was a Nigerian [...]. He relied heavily on Margaret and V77, [...]. You know, there is a revolving door, these international people work for IOs and then the NGO community. So, they knew each other and I think he brought both together (#11).

77 Names of officials of AU and ECOWAS are written out as they have/had already prominent positions and their role in the respective organizations is already well-known. The names of consultants however are abbreviated with A, B, etc. due to protection of privacy rights.
The question of where exactly a significant part of the exchange of information is taking place is answered by Engel, when he refers to the headquarters of regional and international organizations as “portals of globalization” (2018, 151). He argues that these headquarters have changed in character by moving from small and badly equipped entities to big bureaucracies that are well connected with other such headquarters (ibid., 152). Following this logic, headquarters can be seen as “hotspots of contemporary processes of globalization” (ibid., 152), wherein particular knowledge is not only developed but also exchanged between relevant stakeholders from different organizations. This argument fits well with the diffusion theory one that headquarters represent one possible channel of diffusion. As an example of this Engel describes how the UN, with its *Agenda for Peace*, and the AU with its subsequent report *Resolving Conflicts in Africa. Implementation Options*, influenced each other—particularly in aspects such as norm transfer (ibid., 157). He further describes how the headquarters of both AU and the UN have organized special formats of interaction, such as a Joint United Nations–African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security (ibid., 161). Other types of exchange include meetings between the AU’s PSC and the UNSC, as well as interactions with ECOWAS (ibid., 164).

However, despite being dependent on a close and efficient relationship existing between each other, such organizational collaboration is not free from problems and obstacles. As will be shown in the next chapter, the AU learned a lot from ECOWAS and its exploits in the peace and security area—wherein it has been widely acknowledged that ECOWAS was more advanced and experienced. For the AU—in its own self-perception, the leading RO on the African continent—it was not always easy to admit that it had learned directly from ECOWAS, and that there was hence another RO on the continent more developed than itself (interview section 16).

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78 Famous examples include the debate about the origin of norms such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P) or of humanitarian interventions (Engel 2018, 157).
Interview Section 16: Tensions between AU and ECOWAS

So, there was a sense in which ECOWAS was more sophisticated than the AU. If you have a look at the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS, sometimes ECOWAS justices the AU to get lost. [...] It’s one of those tensions you are seeing (#9).

And ECOWAS has learned all that, and so what they simply did was that a lot of it was then taken to the AU level to form it. AU also learned from what has happened in ECOWAS. ECOWAS has been ahead of the curve so to speak. But the AU people did not want to talk about it and did not want to concede but of the regional economic communities, ECOWAS was really the frontrunner in terms of peace and security frameworks. There was not another person, not EDC, not ECCAS, not the Maghreb Union, nobody, it was just ECOWAS (#9).

7.3. Nigerian Influence on the Security Ambitions of ECOWAS

Whereas for some Nigeria is a “military giant in Africa” (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016, 110), for others it is a “crippled giant” (Osaghae 1998, 1) or a “giant with rickety feet” (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008, 25). However Nigeria still is—without any doubt—a major stakeholder in the West African region. This basic assumption has been not only widely discussed in the literature but also proved by the interviews too (interview section 17).

Interview Section 17: Nigeria as Hegemon in West Africa

In West Africa, there was a clear hegemon, that was Nigeria. There was a clear hegemon that had the money and that had the relevant policy advisors and technocrats to push that agenda on a regional level (#9).

Nigeria always felt as a hegemon and has dreamed of sitting in the UNSC at some point (#4).

Nothing is going to happen in ECOWAS without Nigeria (#8).
Nigeria’s predominance in the subregion is not only determined by its size, population, as well as military, economic, and political resources—which far exceed those of the other West African countries. As visible in figures 7 and 8, Nigeria’s supremacy is mainly based on its material predominance. Figure 7 shows that Nigeria’s relative material power in 2007 was, in relation to its region, over 50 percent. Accordingly, Nigeria’s share of regional GDP (figure 8) was around 80 percent in 2014. As a result, Nigeria pays for roughly three-quarters of the entire ECOWAS budget (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 80).

**Figure 7: Nigeria’s Relative Material Power in 2007 in West Africa**

![Pie chart showing Nigeria's relative material power in 2007 in West Africa.](chart)

Source: Author's own compilation (based own Hulse 2016, 15).

This supremacy is rooted in three main aspects. First, the Biafran civil war in the 1960s—and, as part of that, the extent to which extra-regional powers tried to destabilize Nigeria from within neighboring countries would change its former isolationist policy to a proactive one, wherein regional security could no longer be separated from national security (Francis 2006, 147).79 Second, the discovery of oil in general, as well as the oil crisis of 1973 specifically, made Nigeria not only

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79 After independence Nigeria had originally not been interested in becoming the leader of the West African region. It followed instead a Western-oriented foreign policy, as it perceived its neighboring countries as being too small to be significant to its own development (Ihonvbere 1991).
a key oil producer for the West but also—in comparison to its West African neighbors—a very wealthy country too (Francis 2006, 148). Third, both of these aspects—Nigeria’s experience during the civil war and its increased wealth based on oil production—led to a change in its own self-perception vis-à-vis peace and security matters. Nigeria has, consequently, since developed a rather proactive peace and security policy in the region, as it perceives any threat in the subregion to be one to itself as well.

**Figure 8: Share of Regional GDP (2014) in West Africa**

![Pie chart showing the share of regional GDP (2014) in West Africa.]

Source: Author’s own compilation (based on Hulse 2016, 15).

After the end of the civil war, scholars and policy-makers from the country started to think and talk about Nigeria’s destiny to “lead not only West Africa, but also Africa as a whole” (Hulse 2016, 16). Under Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian president from 1966 until 1975, policy-makers began to discuss the idea of an RO encompassing both the francophone and anglophone countries of the region, one that would not only counterbalance French influence in the region but that would also serve as a medium for furthering Nigeria’s own interests. Although some of the other West African states had originally been against founding such an RO, these initially skeptical states could still be convinced to join ECOWAS. This was

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80 Obasanjo was afterward the (military) head of state of Nigeria from February 1976 until October 1979, before eventually handing over the presidency to (civilian and elected) Shehu Shagari (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003, 171ff.).
mainly due to Nigeria’s wealth, which made it possible to finance infrastructure projects, give loans and political donations, as well as invest heavily in neighboring countries (Ihonvbere 1991, 519). As such, ECOWAS has always represented an attempt by Nigeria to further its own goals based on the domestic situation at hand. The affluent years of the 1970s were followed by ones of economic standing still and military juntas in the 1980s—which also led to the stagnation of ECOWAS. It was under Olusegun Obasanjo, president from 1999 until 2007, that Nigeria not only progressed to a more democratic system but also proclaimed once more its assuming of leadership within ECOWAS (Hulse 2016, 16f.).

What becomes clear is that Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS is mainly determined by the one that the incumbent president envisages for the country in that RO. Interview section 18 illustrates how crucial Obasanjo was for the revised orientation of ECOWAS. Interviewees mainly described Obasanjo as being part of a new generation of African leaders who, by instigating a series of initiatives, wanted to change the self-perception of Africa—as well as the foreign image of the African continent too.

**Interview Section 18: Nigeria’s Influential Heads of State**

| It was also partly ideological because that period was a period where Abdulaye Wade, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Thabo Mbeki were talking about an African renaissance (#9). |
| And in fact, it is important to have a look at the leaders that you had in ECOWAS at that time. How they also influenced the developments on a continental level, so we had Wade of Senegal, we had Obasanjo in Nigeria, we had Mbeki in SADC. How they have inspired, how they have worked together to further this new idea or what was supposed to be a new idea of a collective security on the continent (#19). |

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81 Nigeria’s leadership could be mainly observed in the security sector, but not in trade aspects. According to Cilliers et al. (2014), Nigeria was impeded here by the corruption and government inefficacy that are characteristic of neopatrimonial regimes.

82 Next to the CSSDCA initiative of Obasanjo, South African president Thabo Mbeki launched the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) that goes back to his core idea of an African renaissance, and aims at taking responsibility oneself for the development of African countries (Meyns 2002, 64).
This new generation of leaders not only aimed at advancing Africa’s development in general but also at influencing the discourse on peace and security across the African continent too. It was particularly Obasanjo who developed and advanced the idea of how security, stability, development, and cooperation are linked with each other, and thus advocated for an African security architecture. In 1990 Obasanjo, then chairperson of the Africa Leadership Forum, initiated the earlier-mentioned CSSDCA. In November 1990, the ALF and the secretariats of both OAU and ECOWAS invited NGOs to a “brainstorming meeting” in Addis Ababa. In May 1991, 300 delegates from nearly all African countries came together to continue the discussions and they concluded with the Kampala Document—which included a detailed proposition for the foundation of the CSSDCA (Nathan 1992, 212).83

Interestingly, as noted in part I, the CSSDCA is modelled after the CSCE, which—as a forum for the US, the Soviet Union, and thirty-three Western and Eastern European countries—discussed guidelines for interstate relations regarding security, economic cooperation, and human rights (ALF 1990, 3).84 The organizers of the CSSDCA—which was operating under the leadership of Obasanjo—believed that the realization of its goals would be “a radical departure from existing practices in Africa” (ibid., 216). According to Nathan (1992), the CSSDCA characterized a turning point in Africa’s self-perception. Instead of blaming colonialism for all of the negative developments on the continent, the discussions during the conference were now defined by a high degree of self-criticism too. The CSSDCA was described by many interviewees as a genuine

83 Obasanjo, in his opening statement to this brainstorming retreat, referred to the CSSDCA as being a “New Deal” for Africa—and thereby, intentionally or not, made a nod to the New Deal of the US during the 1930s (ALF 1990, 15).

84 The CSCE gained in reputation as it, according to majority opinion, led to a more stable security situation in Europe and to improved cooperation between the involved countries—as well as a better human rights standard in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Nathan 1992, 212).
turning point in the development discourse of the African continent. Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, referred meanwhile to the “democratic winds of change blowing through Africa” that had initiated by the CSSDCA’s inception (Nathan 1992, 217).

During a brainstorming meeting in November 1990 to discuss the general idea of CSSDCA and to prepare a concrete future version of it, participants agreed that the African continent faced monumental problems that would not only require a radically new but also urgent approach (ALF 1990). As illustrated in table 15, the organizers found their role model in the Helsinki Process of Europe and tried to convince participants that an equal path—one including non-state actors in discussions—could lead to success in Africa as well. Furthermore they recognized that mechanisms of communication needed to be established to reach ordinary African people, and to generate greater comprehension and participation from among them.

Table 15: European Processes as Role Models

| In Europe, non-governmental organizations while not formally involved in the negotiation process of the Helsinki Act did have a significant impact in its subsequent implementation. In Africa, non-governmental organizations, professional and grassroot organizations must be given an enhanced role (ALF 1990, 3). |
| At any rate, it will be necessary also to mobilize and sensitize governments, NGOs, the youth and women on how such a process can be embarked upon. Presently, no mechanism of communication [exists] by which the collective decisions of African governments can reach the ordinary people. In consequence, there is little or no public opinion input into the decisions that affect the continent (ALF 1990, 4). |

This brainstorming meeting led, as mentioned, to a further one of 300 delegates from almost every African country, along with eight national heads of state, in May 1991, in Uganda. Until then the biggest such conference involving both state and non-state actors, this meeting had a crucial impact on the discourse about how peace and security are linked with development and cooperation on the African continent. The interviewees in section 19 reveal that they still evaluate the
CSSDCA process, and the discussions accompanying it, as being the initial spark for the subsequent institutionalization of the peace and security ambitions of African ROs. The CSSDCA marked a first phase of crucial civil society involvement in the peace and security discourse gradually unfolding on the African continent.

**Interview Section 19: Importance of CSSDCA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>And I would refer you to the whole process of the Conference on Security, Stability and Development in Africa. [...] It was a non-governmental initiative that influenced and contributed significantly to the establishment of the APSA. [...] And, in fact, it is important to have a look at the leaders that you had in ECOWAS at that time of the establishment of the APSA. [...] How they inspired, how they worked together to further this new idea [...] of a collective security on the continent (#19).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This non-governmental initiative began to gain political momentum following the election of Obasanjo and [...] the processes within this Conference on Security and Stability fed into deliberations that led to the establishment of the AU and of course, subsequently, the APSA (#19).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However attempts to anchor the impetus behind the CSSDCA into concrete politics were not successful, and it would fall into oblivion for the time being. It was only when Obasanjo became president of Nigeria in 1999 that the CSSDCA was reinvigorated, by him (Meyns 2002, 64). By then, Obasanjo not only tried to resurrect the discourse surround the CSSDCA but also supported it with financial contributions (table 16). In the early 2000s Nigeria donated some US$ 500,000 to the OAU in order to initiate and support the work of the CSSDCA within it.

**Table 16: Financial Contributions of Nigeria to CSSDCA**

| COMMENDS Nigeria and South Africa for their generous contribution of five hundred thousand dollars (US$ 500,000) each for the operationalization of the CSSDCA and CALLS upon OAU member states, the United Nations and all |

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85 It has been discussed how the CSSDCA was not successful for the time being, as decision-makers in Africa found it difficult to investigate problems within their very own governments. As a result the OAU founded its own Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Meyns 2002, 65).
This example illustrates not only how important the CSSDCA process was for Obasanjo himself but also, once again, how interlinked ECOWAS and the AU are. The CSSDCA process, originally started as a project by the civil society forum ALF under the leadership of Obasanjo, was transferred to the OAU—wherein, almost ten years later, it is still a crucial component of the discourse underpinning and influencing the APSA. This interpretation was also shared among interviewees, who argued that Nigeria is not only a key player inside ECOWAS but also of enormous importance for the security structures of the AU too (interview section 20).

**Interview Section 20: Influence of Nigeria**

What Nigeria thinks about the AU peace and security agenda is enormously important, and has huge influence. Nigeria is also a massive player [...] inside ECOWAS (#8).

According to Kabia (2009, 189), the realization of the ECOWAS “Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” would not have been possible without the explicit consent and involvement of Nigeria. Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 78f.) name three aspects outlining the key importance of Nigeria in the process leading to the 1999 protocol. First, Obasanjo managed to achieve the acceptance of the idea of democratic institutions among Nigeria’s military forces; this was crucial as, up until 1998, the country had been a military dictatorship. Second, Obasanjo urged ECOWAS member states not only to realize radical reforms in general but also to significantly revise the RO’s security mechanism specifically. Third, the broader democratization processes
within West African countries\textsuperscript{86} that eventually led to the election of Obasanjo—who, for the reasons already outlined, was crucial to these developments, and so had the ability to convince member states to agree to wide-ranging reforms. Nigeria’s president Obasanjo was thus not only crucial for energizing the CSSDCA and the related discourse unfolding on the African continent but was also significant for ECOWAS’ own evolution too—as many of his Nigerian peers noted (interview section 21).

\textbf{Interview Section 21: Influential Nigerians in ECOWAS and AU}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It was also because Nigeria, certain Nigerian policy advisors and academics took it upon themselves. People like Margaret Vogt and some ambassadors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nigeria’s foreign minister and certain military officers took it upon themselves (#9).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of course, the AU had a number of West Africans and the head of the Peace and Security Department was a Nigerian, Ben Kioko. There was always the sense then, at least on paper, ECOWAS was more developed that any other region, and so borrowing from their example […] was very important (#29).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Margaret Vogt’s earlier career stages, she worked, as mentioned earlier, for the NIIA, where she not only oversaw the establishment of a Strategic Studies Unit but also took on an influential role as an academic who initiated discourses—as well as gained a strong reputation as an expert on peace and security issues. The NIIA was also identified among respondents (interview section 22) as a think tank that was very influential in shaping the discourse regarding African peace and security policies. ECOWAS actively tries, as many other regional and international organizations also do, to integrate such civil society actors and their ideas into its considerations—as the core criticism of this RO has always been the non-integration of ordinary West Africans into its decision-making processes.

\textsuperscript{86} After the end of the Cold War, a rising number of ECOWAS member states became democratic. Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 78f.) use Polity IV data to group these states. Benin, Cape Verde, and Mali were therefore among the early democratizers of the 1990s, followed by Ghana and Nigeria with their own democratization phases in the late 1990s. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal had their democratic transition right after the ECOWAS protocol was signed in 1999. Prior to the ratification of this protocol, the majority of ECOWAS member states—for the first time ever since the RO’s foundation—had thus become democracies.
Interview Section 22: Nigeria’s Think Tanks

At that point of time, Nigeria had an institute called Nigerian Institute for International Affairs which was really very influential (#9).

Steps are taken under the new ECOWAS Strategic Vision to transform the region from an ‘ECOWAS of States’ into an ‘ECOWAS of the Peoples’ [...]. Consequently, civil society shall play an increasingly critical role alongside member states in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security (ECOWAS 2008, 9).

It was reported by the interviewees that it was WANEP, a Nigerian think tank, that was really “inside” ECOWAS—meaning that advisors and consultants from this body had very close relationships with the various decision-makers within ECOWAS. WANEP is not only an interesting case due to its particularly close cooperation with ECOWAS but also, as reported in interview (#23) below, because of its potential influence on a whole continent. As noted WANEP had tremendous influence on ECOWAS’ peace and security structures and, as argued in this thesis, that RO had for its part a huge effect on AU’s APSA. This can be seen as another example underlining just how interdependent regional politics are, including their respective stakeholders, and how this affects institutional-design choices.

Interview Section 23: Think Tanks in ECOWAS

Again, to fall back on ECOWAS, I think the role of civil networks like WANEP is very important for an organization like ECOWAS (#8).

ECOWAS is your best model where they actually got WANEP, West African Network for Peacebuilding to exist inside ECOWAS as technical advisors on the development of the Early Warning System. [...] They have influenced ECOWAS’ thinking. And ECOWAS has then influenced AU’s thinking [...]. The civil society influence in ECOWAS is quite strong (#23).

The Nigerian Defence College, [...] African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes [...], the Institute for Security Studies—which is a civil-society institution—and other such institutions (#21).
7.4. Consolidation: Learning in ECOWAS

Diffusion theory argues that learning mechanisms are characterized by processes in which stakeholders “use the experience of other countries to estimate the likely consequences of policy change” (Gilardi 2013, 463), before themselves introducing a new policy. After having shown how ECOWAS is interlinked with AU and the UN, and how important individuals helped to establish and maintain these connections, Nigeria’s influence—as a crucial stakeholder in ECOWAS—was elaborated on. The following subchapter consolidates these descriptions, and illustrates how learning processes have influenced the lead-up to the revision of ECOWAS’ security structures. Those learning processes are embedded in two factors that sit at the heart of the following chapter: first, the intervention experiences of ECOWAS against the backdrop of not having legal authorization for them from the UNSC and, second, the ambitions of ECOWAS’ hegemon Nigeria vis-à-vis gaining international legitimacy.

7.4.1. Experiences based on Previous Interventions

As already described in chapter 6, the events in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau had a strong influence on the initiated process to think about how security institutions in general, as well as intervention mechanisms in particular, could be improved. It is necessary to go back once more to search for the drivers here, in order to be able to better explain the eventual institutional outcomes witnessed. The revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993 can be seen as a first step toward an institutionalized security mechanism, as Article 58 obligated member states to “co-operate with the community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts” (ECOWAS 1993). The treaty not only referred to economic and fiscal aspects regarding globalization challenges but also linked together as one security, conflict resolution, and conflict management (Kabia 2011, 4). The

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87 Further important declarations by ECOWAS on the road toward a more sophisticated peace and security approach were the “Declaration of Political Principles” in 1991 and the “Moratorium on Small Arms” in 1998 (Kabia 2011, 5).
intervention in Sierra Leone in May 1997 ultimately led to the agreement of member states to institutionalize ECOWAS’ security ambitions, and thus to sign the protocol for the ECOWAS security mechanism in December 1999. The subsequent “Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” of 2001 complemented the 1999 one “by providing a more explicit framework of reference for appropriate governance standards within member states” (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 68). In West Africa, a region with fragile states and a history of coups d’état, both protocols not only represented an important step toward democracy but also established a specific mandate for ECOWAS “to defend these principles by force if necessary” (ibid., 68).

The MSC, the most important institution established with the 1999 protocol, consists of nine member states who by majority rule “authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions [in member states]” (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 10). Until then, the UNSC was the only entity having the right to intervene in a member state—and, until 1999, no other regional or international organization had followed in its footsteps in this regard (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 68). Among other effects—namely the already-described institutions—the protocol also provided information regarding ECOMOG. It described it as “a structure composed of several stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment” (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 21). According to Article 22 of the protocol, ECOMOG’s missions range, inter alia, from observation and monitoring, peacekeeping and restoration of peace, humanitarian interventions, to preventive deployments as well as peace-building (ibid., Art. 22).

The protocol exemplifies how ECOWAS attempted to transfer the lessons learned from past interventions into the new protocol (Coleman 2007, 110). Most notably, ECOWAS did less “to ensure the legality of future peace enforcement operations

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88 ECOWAS is the only RO that, on a regular basis, threatens its member states with intervention if they violate norms, as could be observed recently in Côte d’Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau, and Mali (both in 2012) (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 69).

89 According to Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 83), the practice on the ground has looked different since 2001, as all member states are now represented within the MSC and furthermore they decide unanimously.
launched within the ECOWAS framework” (Coleman 2007, 110). In contrast, the protocol does not provide for the UNSC approval that would be necessary for ECOWAS member states to launch a new peace-enforcement operation (ibid., 111). During the drafting phase of the protocol, this issue was one of the most discussed ones among member states and experts. In the end, member states decided against the inclusion of a legal requirement for peace-enforcement operations as they “did not want to tie their own hands. They do not trust the Security Council to decide in the interest of the region: it is too removed and too slow” (ibid., 111). This illustrates how ECOWAS positions itself concerning international stakeholders, something that becomes even more apparent if we look at the different factors that led to the establishment of the 1999 protocol in the first place.

ECOWAS’ first intervention in Liberia, following the armed rebellion of Charles Taylor, was executed as noted earlier without the mandate of the UNSC. The UN Charter explicitly determines that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” (UN 1945, Art. 53). According to Weller (1994, 67ff.), the ECOWAS’ SMC explicitly asked for financial support from the UN but did not also request a mandate for intervention. A letter from Nigeria’s minister of external affairs to the UN secretary general, two days after the operation started, stated that,

\[
\text{in view of our shared responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, we have no doubt that you will lend your considerable moral support to the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia. We are also confident that [you will] generously contribute materially towards the attainment of the stated ECOWAS objective in the Republic of Liberia (Weller 1994, 75ff.).}
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\^90\ Cited interview of Katharina Coleman with Margaret Vogt, special assistant to assistant UN secretary general, UN Department of Political Affairs in 2000 (Coleman 2007, 111).
The reasons why ECOWAS was acting without a mandate are subject to discussion. The most plausible explanation is the lengthy process to attain a UN mandate—time that ECOWAS simply did not have (Coleman 2007, 78). ECOWAS was not only violating international law hereby, but also acting against its own legal frameworks too. According to the 1981 protocol that was the legal basis for ECOWAS at that time, the Authority of ECOWAS was the body that decided on military action (ECOWAS 1981, Art. 6). However, Liberia’s President Doe directly asked the SMC for an ECOWAS intervention—and with good reason. The Authority, a body encompassing heads of state and government from all ECOWAS member states, also included Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso—who both supported the rebellion of Taylor and thus would not, as Doe had anticipated, support his request. However the SMC—a five-member-state organ that was founded by Nigeria and dominated by anglophone countries—did approve Doe’s request, which ultimately led to the creation of ECOMOG on August 7, 1990 (Coleman 2007, 79).

It has been said that Nigeria supported this course of action, as sources later revealed that Doe and Nigeria’s President Babangida had met and discussed exactly this approach of avoiding the approval of ECOWAS’ Authority. A further breach with ECOWAS’ legal frameworks took place in the composition of ECOMOG. As inscribed in the 1981 protocol, military interventions by ECOWAS were to be undertaken by the AAFC (ECOWAS 1981, Art. 13). In practice, the SMC only invited its own member states, as well as Guinea and Sierra Leone, to contribute troops to ECOMOG. Therefore, the claim that ECOMOG was an ECOWAS force is only partly correct as certain important francophone states were excluded (Coleman 2007, 80).

The push for ECOMOG by certain states, and above all Nigeria, resulted in the fear that the civil war in Liberia would embarrass sub-Saharan Africa (Babangida 1995, 12). But, at the same time, it also offered the possibility to “earn considerable prestige [...] by providing welcome proof that African could serve their own security crisis” (Coleman 2007, 91). As illustrated in table 17, ECOWAS convincingly demonstrated that West Africa as a region had successfully resolved the crisis in Liberia.
The Authority stressed that the restoration of peace to Liberia had convincingly demonstrated West African solidarity and its ability to resolve regional problems through mutual trust, tolerance, self-sacrifice and strong leadership. Heads of state and government made a strong appeal for continued support from both within and outside West Africa for re-building Liberia (ECOWAS 1997a, 10).

In fact, ECOWAS wanted to show how united member states had been in their peace operations. According to Coleman (2007, 109), ECOWAS' institutional structures set the ground for doing this. As the SMC, in its decision to deploy ECOMOG without the backing of all member states, had presented them with a fait accompli, those not supportive of the intervention had only two options: they could either tolerate the decision or destroy ECOMOG. They would go for the first.

How does this explain the institutional design of the 1999 protocol? Together with the positive experiences that were made in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS gained—both for itself and for the African continent—considerable prestige for its self-confident appearance during all three interventions (interview section 24).

### Interview Section 24: Perceptions of ECOWAS’ Capabilities

| EIWAS, definitely; but it goes more above what we feel as the proactive character of ECOWAS rather than the design per se. But I would say the proactiveness (#27). |

The very evident lack of international support, as already outlined in Chapter 6, nevertheless led to the belief among member states that—when it came to the legal framework of ECOWAS—improvements were needed, and learning processes had to be initiated. The nascent processes of democratization among ECOWAS' member states led to their increased wish for international legitimacy. In signing this 1999 protocol, member states thus aspired to greater global
standing—but, at the same time, also hoped for the protocol’s non-enforcement (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 70).

7.4.2. Nigeria’s Search for Legitimacy

Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy has been further strengthened under Obasanjo’s democratic government, with Nigeria assuming the leadership of a number of international organisations, including ECOWAS, the AU and the G–77. [...] With the assurances that it is able to tackle Africa’s problems through its enormous human and material resources, wealth and strong military, Nigeria’s role in Africa has been triggered by a genuine moral conviction and commitment, which are critical ingredients for regional hegemonic status (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016, 119).

Without any doubt, Nigeria is a key player not only in the West African region but also in ECOWAS itself.91 The following subchapter shows how Nigeria’s ambitions to not only strengthen its position as a regional hegemon but also to gain international legitimacy affected the learning processes leading to ECOWAS’ specific peace and security structures.

A first aspect is concerned with the search for legitimacy by Nigeria within the new security mechanism. Around the end of the Cold War, Nigeria was not skeptical about its role in the region or even on the continent, where it was sure to have an extraordinary one. Nigeria at that time was, however, unsure about its image in the world at large, as it felt that it would not gain the respect from international partners that it deserved. Its economic shortcomings, at least as compared to developed countries, made it “dependent on international recognition and prestige as a resource for power and influence” (Coleman 2007, 92). However its repressive domestic politics under a military regime, in the years from the start of the 1970s to the end of 1990s, heavily undermined its reputation

91 For a detailed consideration of the question of how far Nigeria can be really seen as a hegemon, see among others: Engel 2007; Hulse 2016; and, Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016).
on the international scene. To step up on the regional level would be one way to improve its own image, as the following statement reveals:

*Liberia was an opportunity to break back into the international community, to show how good Nigeria and Nigerians are, and that although we still might also be isolated by the Western powers, that we are doing good things in Liberia and Sierra Leone. I think that was part of the calculation—breaking out of the isolation of the international community* (Coleman 2007, 92).

According to observers, this plan was successful: as Coleman further notes, Nigeria received significant recognition by the West—that despite the Abacha military regime being in power at the time—because the country was perceived as one of the few willing to intervene. Its goal of becoming a kind of spokesperson for the whole African continent was further promoted by prominent Nigerians arguing for the country having a permanent seat in the UNSC (Coleman 2007; Engel 2007; Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016). According to the UN Charter, non-permanent members of the UNSC need to contribute to “the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN 1945, Art. 23). Nigeria hoped that the further appointment of permanent members in future would follow the same logic, and that as such it would receive international gratitude for its “massive involvement in areas that Western powers do not want to be involved with” (Coleman 2007, 93). This illustrates how strongly Nigeria wanted to gain international legitimacy with its respective interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau.

But the search for improved global standing was not only visible in Nigeria’s intervention practices but also in its behavior in establishing the new 1999 protocol. This provision allowed Nigeria to maintain its military capacities, so as

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to be able to intervene in (rival) neighboring states without any having institutional restrictions imposed on it in doing so (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 80). Also according to the 1999 protocol, the MSC was able to “authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions” (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 10). As such, decisions are taken in a smaller forum than that of the Authority—in which all member states are represented. Furthermore the 1999 protocol allowed ECOWAS to decide on interventions without the prior consent of the UNSC. Whereas a majority of scholars would argue that this violated international law, ECOWAS representatives countered that the decision-making process of the UNSC vis-à-vis an intervention is time-consuming and, as the case of Rwanda had proved, not even assured of success (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 83). Abass (2000, 211f.) postulates, meanwhile, that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also had a strong influence on ECOWAS’ decision to not include UNSC content in its protocol.

Thus, learning mechanisms can be observed rather more at the procedural level—as the protocol enabled Nigeria to pursue its own hegemonic ambitions through ECOWAS. As it led to increased procedural legitimacy, international support was also secured given that it involved a negotiated agreement by an RO. Additionally, the norms included in that 1999 protocol—such as promotion of democracy, the protection of human rights, and the responsibility to protect (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 2)—fit very well with the expectations of an RO aspiring to greater acknowledgment by the international community (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 81). At a point in time where not only the international community expected Africa to solve its own problems but also Africa itself did too, the 1999 protocol thus legalized ECOWAS’ intervention in conflicts in which external powers did not want to. Additionally, it gave ECOWAS the legitimacy to ask for the international (financial) support that it badly needed.

A further aspect consists of the role of specific successive heads of state of Nigeria. After the death of former president Abacha in 1998 and the installation thereafter of interim one Abdulsalami Abubakar, a democratization process got underway
in Nigeria. Under Obasanjo, the next president, Nigeria’s Polity IV score\(^94\) sharply increased from -6 in 1997 to +4 in 1999 (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 79). Nigeria’s domestic discourse regarding its role in peace and security in the West African region also significantly changed hereafter. Shifting priorities, in combination with domestic pressures, led to a Nigerian rethink of its previous ambitions in leading military interventions in the region, toward a now more preventive and mediation-oriented approach (Obi 2009, 63).\(^95\) However its leading role in the region’s peace and security realm remained fixed—not only due to the country’s economic supremacy, but also to its significant financial contributions to ECOWAS (ibid.).

A crucial role herein, as already outlined briefly in chapter 7.3, was played by Obasanjo—Nigeria’s president from 1999 till 2007. Characterized as “a kind of elder statesmen” (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 79), when he came again to power in 1999 he urged ECOWAS member states to reform the RO’s existing structures in order for it to be able to cope with the new peace and security challenges in the region more effectively. His previous engagement with the ALF and the CSSDCA, wherewith he promoted a significant change in continent-wide perceptions regarding peace, security, stability, and development in the early 1990s, was influential in the last years of that decade too. As illustrated in interview section 25, Obasanjo was part of a new generation of leaders who wanted to significantly change how the continent approached its challenges and how the world saw Africa. For Obasanjo as well as for Mbeki, it was crucial to show to the world that they were able to tackle their problems and that the African continent was not as weak and helpless as some of the Western countries believed it to be.

**Interview Section 25: Search for Legitimacy**

> You are looking at Nigeria and Obasanjo, you are looking at the new generation leaders […]. All those people were the people who wanted to take the decisions.

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\(^94\) This refers to the measure that is used by Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 79) to explain their democratic lock-in hypothesis specifically for the establishment process vis-à-vis ECOWAS’ security mechanism.

\(^95\) In 1999, for example, Nigeria quit ECOMOG (Obi 2009, 63).
I think there was a sense in which several of those African leaders wanted to make a name for themselves and they wanted to stamp Africa’s identity and legitimacy in terms of the international scene (#9).

There was a lot of introspection, and Thabo Mbeki and Obasanjo they were part of the whole dissolution of the OAU and the creation of the AU and the establishment of an Early Warning System which many scholars have already spoken about. How come that we all have been asleep [concerning Rwanda] (#14)?

The foundations on which Obasanjo would build were already there in fact. Nigeria’s various (military) engagements within the frameworks of AU, UN, and ECOWAS formed an image of the country “as a major contributor to global peace and security” (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016, 120). Its continued support of various peacekeeping missions is also visible in its contribution of commanders, which have exceeded those of any other developing country worldwide by far. By contributing over 200,000 uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions as of 2010, Nigeria is ranked fourth overall worldwide in terms of number of troop contributions to UN global missions (ibid., 121). Based on this commitment in its foreign policy, Nigeria wants to signal that it is able to play a central role in international affairs—as part of its core goal of gaining greater global legitimacy. By doing so, Nigeria has not only stationed itself prominently within the international arena but also made itself pivotal to the realization of ECOWAS’ own ambitions too.
8. Lessons Learned in the African Union

8.1. Interdependence between ROs and IOs

As diffusion theory argues that regional and international organizations do not act in isolation, this subchapter is concerned with interdependent processes between them—taking into consideration specifically the case of the OAU/AU. The establishment of the APSA, with its various components, was not realized in a vacuum. Rather, one major source of influence herein was ECOWAS. As already shown in chapter 6.1, the conflict history of West Africa and how ECOWAS reacted to the ones in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau shaped also AU’s security structures enormously—as the interviews in section 26 illustrate. They additionally show that ECOWAS was perceived as the African RO having the most advanced security institutions at that time. Based on this, the involved consultants (#14) took ECOWAS as a role model of best practice when considering the different possibilities for the revised security mechanism of the AU.

**Interview Section 26: Influence of ECOWAS on APSA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOMOG in the 1990s, 1991, and 1993, combined with some of the tragic events on the continent like the Rwandan genocide, all shaped and contributed in very useful ways to the development of the APSA (#19).</th>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS became an important vector for those ideas. And this is partly what explains why you see a great deal of uniformity [between AU and ECOWAS] because it is very easy at the end of the day for people to then say, well, you know, why do you want to reinvent the wheel and then there are best practices. ECOWAS is a best practice in terms of what ECOMOG did in Liberia and Sierra Leone (#14).</td>
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Although ECOWAS can be seen as one major source of influence, and despite the interdependencies between AU and ECOWAS having been particularly strong, other RECs have also been relevant herein as well. Particularly in the creation of its CEWS, the AU heavily relied on what had been already crafted in the early
warning systems of IGAD and ECOWAS. As the interviews in section 27 illustrate, the AU was inspired by the approaches of ECOWAS and IGAD—but did also nevertheless rely extensively on its own policy documents and legal frameworks too (#17).

**Interview Section 27: Influence of RECs on APSA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back then, CEWARN was framed after 1994 and the genocide. The member states needed to establish structures. Meanwhile, the OAU did not have such an Early Warning System but IGAD and ECOWAS [did] (#25).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>When we began our Early Warning System in 2006 or 2007, the two operational Early Warning Systems then, within Africa, were ECOWAS with ECOWARN and IGAD with CEWARN. They were the only two Early Warning Systems that were operational and we did benefit a lot from those two institutions. Because they already had an established Early Warning System, at least they had all the policy documents, all the legal instruments, legal framework that they needed in place. So, that contributed as an input in the establishment of our system, also we benefited from their experience (#17).</td>
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Not only African ROs were influential in the establishment of APSA, so was the UN too. It both served as a supporter as well as a source of influence in terms of institutional design. According to an involved consultant (interview section 28, #15), how the UN manages its peace operations had a significant impact on the way that such missions were thought about in the AU. Right after the end of the Cold War, the brainstorming meeting for the CSSDCA had discussed these OAU peacekeeping missions and evaluated them to be insufficient. The report of the meeting explicitly recommended adapting the UN’s system of funding for OAU peacekeeping missions. Another interesting fact is revealed by the last interview of section 28 (#21). It divulges the decision-making process behind the OAU secretary general, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, recommending the adaption of the UNSC model to the AU. As described in diffusion theory, decisions that have already been made in other organizations (the establishment of security councils in the UN and ECOWAS) influence those still to be taken in other such organizations (the establishment of one’s own security council). It becomes obvious that decision-makers look around at what has been already realized in
other organizations, and include those observations in their own decisions about ideal future institutions.

**Interview Section 28: Influence of the UN on APSA**

| The UN was of course the primary frame of reference we had, especially in the area of peace operations (#15). |
| So far in OAU–or ECOWAS–sponsored peacekeeping operations, contributing governments have been responsible for their own administrative and logistical support and have also been exclusively responsible for providing their own financial support. This system is unsatisfactory and needs to be reviewed. [...] It is very strongly recommended that the OAU review its present systems with the view to adapting United Nations practices, which are more practical and realistic in this regard. In funding OAU peacekeeping operations, the United Nations assessment system may be worth considering for adaptation. Operations launched by Africa’s regional groups should follow a similar pattern (ALF 1990, 6f.). |
| You know, AU member states, to be frank with you, they were very sensitive with these kinds of organ. To that extent, that if you are coming with the idea telling them you want to establish a court or a council, they are very sensitive. So, what Dr. Salim did as he is the one who started this idea, was to make them feel not too threatened. He borrowed the idea of the UNSC and said we can have something like that and of course even in terms of power, peace and security issues are under the UN. Although it will have authority to deal with African conflicts but still it has permission from UN. In that way, he could convince member states to accept his idea in the first place (#21). |

As this section has illustrated, AU and ECOWAS did not act in isolation in the process of establishing their respective security mechanisms. Rather, they assembled knowledge about similar and already-existing institutions in other organizations, particularly with the help of experts—as will be shown in the following subchapters.

8.2. The Evolution of the PSC

“The OAU’s efforts to deal with African conflicts deserve credit, but much more remains to be done in order for its potential to be fulfilled” (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 33). This feeling was shared among numerous other observants of the
security policy of the OAU in the 1990s too. According to the two quoted authors, the creation of the Mechanism in 1995 improved the OAU’s peace and security management as it increased its impact and visibility. Furthermore, they argue that, via the Mechanism, African leaders now felt much more determined to play a central role in peacekeeping on the African continent. However the OAU’s growing visibility neither led to fewer conflicts on the continent nor to highly effective conflict management practices.

The OAU and its Mechanism have been criticized for not being very effective on the ground, and also for being overstrained by the multitude of conflicts on the African continent (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 33). Furthermore, the RO’s indifference to and paralysis in bureaucratic matters are noted. It was also written off as an elite club of dictators, one that was not only very far away from the daily reality of most ordinary African citizens but that also hid behind declarations incapable of ever providing adequate responses to the severe conflicts occurring on the continent (Engel and Porto 2010, 1). Especially the inviolability of the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of OAU member states and the, related to that, lack of a more robust mandate in peacekeeping operations were strongly dispraised in the early 1990s.

The OAU itself thus started to work on conceptualizing how to improve its peace and security structures in general and the Central Organ in particular—so as to make them far more effective. At a workshop on “Future Peace and Security Structures in Africa,” in 2002, Aziz Pahad, deputy minister of foreign affairs of South Africa, stated that there is an urgent need to strengthen the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in order to make it more effective (Pahad 2002, 4). During this workshop, the procedure regarding this improvement was discussed and ideas shared. Pahad also claimed that:

In addition, other issues identified in Addis Ababa require closer analysis including the mandate and scope of the new organ, membership thereof, its policies and the need for close coordination with the work done by [...] the UNSC. Indeed, the experiences of the UNSC with respect to membership etc.
should be closely looked at. While we look at other experiences, at the end, we must find African solutions to African problems (Pahad 2002, 5).

This statement by the South African deputy minister of foreign affairs illustrates four important factors. First, the admission by African decision-makers that the existing Central Organ had not—despite having only recently been established—been effective enough in the handling of conflicts on the African continent. Second, in contemplation of improvements, decision-makers had looked around at what was already there in other organizations, which once more proves the validity of the diffusion theory argument. Third, in the consideration of other organizations, the nature of the UNSC played a significant role—including via the acknowledgement of its both strengths and weaknesses. Fourth and finally, this statement reveals that—despite that casting around—African decision-makers ultimately aspired to finding their own solutions to their own specific problems.

To sum up, the 1990s were characterized by a significant struggle on the part of the OAU regarding how to deal with a number of serious complaints raised about its modi operandi and indeed very makeup.

A series of brainstorming meetings, organized by the OAU itself, led to the summit in 1995 during which member states agreed to provide contingents from within their national armies for the RO’s peacekeeping operations. Although a slight change could be observed, the OAU still maintained its rather preventive stance by attributing main peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN (Williams 2009, 605). During the severe conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, some OAU member states acted—as already elaborated in chapter 6.1—via ECOWAS and thereby took a much more active path than the OAU Charter had provided for. Similar things happened in Lesotho and the DRC with member states of the SADC too.

The latter half of the 1990s were characterized by two dominant opinions on the African continent. Whereas for some the OAU was still an important organization only needing certain institutional reforms, others called for the shutting down of it entirely due to its malfunctioning. The latter view, mainly promoted by Libyan head of state Gaddafi, slowly prevailed—then becoming concrete on September
9, 1999, in Sirte, when the OAU decided to transform into the new AU. On July 11, 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in Lomé, Togo. This transformation has been widely acknowledged as a resolute step being taken, as it not only gave the erstwhile OAU a radical new mission but also clearer defined objectives and norms (Engel and Porto 2010, 2). Alongside certain norms that had already been in place, the AU established innovative principles for the possible intervention in member states’ territory too. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act states that the AU may intervene in member states in case of “grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (OAU 2000c). The transformation of the OAU into the AU also shifted its weight firmly in the direction of peace and security issues. Right in the preamble, the Constitutive Act stated that member states are

*conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitute a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda* (ibid.).

In order to realize these ambitions, the AU decided to establish more effective peace and security structures. During its 27th ordinary session in Lusaka, the AU Assembly requested “the Secretary-General to undertake a review of the structures, procedures and working methods of the Central Organ, including the possibility of changing its name” (AU 2001a, 8(a) (iii)). There were intense discussions about the various problems that the old Organ suffered from. First, conflict parties are themselves members of such organizations and therefore often their own judges. Second, the organ was criticized for its lack of appropriate rules of procedure. Consequently meetings happened only infrequently, chairmanships were only poorly maintained, and documentation insufficient. Third, the interpretation and understanding of sovereignty among certain

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96 For a more detailed description of the (institutional) transformation of the OAU into the AU, see chapter 3 of this thesis.
member states fearful of external domination were quite difficult to overcome in
ttempts to realize the goals of the OAU (Williams 2009, 606).

Subsequently the secretary general drafted a “Background Document on the
Review Structures, Procedures and Working Methods of the Central Organ,”
drawing on experiences of the Central Organ in conflicts prevention as well as
conflict resolution, that discussed conceptual issues regarding its reorientation
(AU 2002a). The report also noted that there are not many experiences of peace
effortment or intervention on which the Central Organ could look back. This
was mainly due to the fact that the Assembly, in founding the Central Organ, had
been very clear on the preventive ethos of that body. Therefore, and based on the
failure of the UN in African conflicts as well as on the new Article 4 (h), the
secretary general “stressed the need to enlarge the mandate of the Mechanism
[...], the Mechanism should be enhanced to be able to respond more effectively to
conflict situations” (ibid., 4).

In conceptualizing the new Mechanism, as well as an improved Central Organ,
AU decision-makers particularly relied on the UN and ECOWAS—and their main
related organs for peace and security issues—as the following statements from
interviewees show.

**Interview Section 29: Evolution from Central Organ to PSC (I)**

| I would say the UN has served to some extent as a role model. [...] The PSC is modeled along the lines of the UNSC (#27). |
| You know, the whole thing came up because of the transformation from the OAU to the AU. Under the OAU, there was a Central Organ, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention of 1993. Now, when they transformed the OAU to the AU, they said, this Central Organ also needs to be transformed. And we want to have a kind of Security Council model of the UN (#12). |
| The establishment of the PSC was the evolution of the old Organ but borrowing and pasting from the UN (#23). |

97 This report is based on the results of a brainstorming retreat that was held in George, South Africa, in March 2002. Ambassadors from the Central Organ, the NEPAD Implementation Committee, and the interim AU Commission all participated in this meeting.
Whereas some interviewees said the UNSC served as a key frame of reference (interview section 29), others referred to the MSC of ECOWAS as the primary role model for the establishment of an improved AU Central Organ (interview section 30). As all the interviews illustrate, the transformation process from the Central Organ to the PSC was characterized by an evolution away from old practices—a shift in thinking that was based specifically on considerations about how to establish an institution similar to the UNSC and to the MSC of ECOWAS.

**Interview Section 30: Evolution from Central Organ to PSC (II)**

| At the time, ECOWAS was the most advanced and reference was made to that as well (#11). |
| These are the people who were really instrumental, particularly in ECOWAS because a lot of what ended up in APSA ended had been tried and tested in ECOWAS (#9). |

Originally it had been planned to incorporate a reformed Central Organ into the AU, but the RO eventually changed its mind. During the first ordinary session of the AU Assembly in Durban, on July 9, 2002, a completely new framework was presented and the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union” adopted. The PSC was conceptualized as the

*standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa* (AU 2002b, Art. 2).

Its main objectives were to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa,” “anticipate and prevent conflicts,” “undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts,” “promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities,” and to “develop a common defence policy for the Union” (ibid., Art. 3). Given the limited success of the
Central Organ, the lack of available (financial and personnel) resources, and the severity of conflicts on the continent, these objectives appeared ambitious and grandiose (Levitt 2003, 116). In order to achieve these aims, the following structures and organization were agreed on: the PSC would be a standing organ as the AU wanted it to work continuously, with members of the PSC being present at the headquarters of the AU at all times—as in the case of the UNSC; the PSC would meet at the level of permanent representatives as often as required—at the level of ministers at least twice a month, and at the level of heads of state and government at least once a year (AU 2002b, Art. 8).

As shown in chapter 3 of this thesis, membership is one of the most important aspects of the PSC. The question of which member states would be involved in it exactly was also one of the most intensely debated ones in the PSC’s creation process, as it meant finding a balance between what at that time all fifty-three of them had pictured for themselves. As everyone agreed that the inclusion of all member states would be inefficient, a solution in the form of a “smaller committee of big minds” (Williams 2009, 606) had to be sought. After some debate, it was agreed to include fifteen member states in the PSC. A committee of states was established to work on the operationalization of the debated ideas. Under the chairmanship of South Africa, and representing all five African regions, three brainstorming retreats (1998, 2002, 2004) were arranged to discuss the new APSA.

One previous proposal had envisaged a PSC comprised of seventeen members with ten permanent ones. Another suggested five permanent member states. Both proposals were supported by the five influential countries Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa who argued that those African states having the biggest military and financial capabilities should be encouraged to play a leading role in the PSC (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 62). However the other AU member states strongly rejected this idea, by referring to the Constitutive Act and its included principle of equality. Furthermore, Tanzania vehemently disagreed with the idea of permanent memberships and any potential veto powers for member states as in the UNSC (Franke 2009, 97). As the following interviews underline (interview section 31), the question regarding permanent membership for certain influential
countries was a crucial one. On the one hand, smaller states feared the dominance of bigger ones and their own consequential powerlessness. They also had concerns about the impotence of the newly established PSC if the great powers blocked all decisions contradicting their own goals. On the other, the bigger states themselves feared their own waning influence as well as indifference on the part of smaller states regarding the work of the PSC.

**Interview Section 31: Permanent Membership of PSC**

The idea of creating a non-permanent member of the Security Council was driven by the idea that once you create a permanent member, this makes it really difficult for the institution to reform and for the member states to change. But at the same time, they also did not want to go back to the situation where every country was equal and would not take the work of the council very seriously, and that the work of the council would be undermined which was the problem of the League of Nations (#11).

Two years where everyone is equal were proposed and three years were proposed, and the idea was that the big countries would always compete for the three-year term. That was how they learned from it. So, yes, the UNSC was a model in terms of that it provides, it was a good foundation but it also limited what you could imagine for the African continent. So, if the African PSC is not as creative as you can be, part of it has to do with the ideational setting that the Security Council has provided (#11).

When the AU was established they said, “There should be the ideal model on the Security Council.” Even before the AU was established, it was an idea that came through Sierra Leone’s president who said: “We should have a Security Council of our own in order to deal with our own problems etc.” Some member states said: “No, if that is the case then there will be only a few member states that will become permanent members” (#24).

These statements illustrate that the membership question mainly turned around whether certain states should be permanent members and how long member states in general should be part of the PSC. Prior to the Durban summit, three options regarding the composition of the PSC were discussed: a council with fifteen members elected for two years; a council with fifteen members of which five were permanent ones, and ten elected for two years; and, a council with fifteen members of whom ten are elected for two years and five are elected for
three years (Franke 2009, 97). Interview section 32 underlines again how strongly the AU has relied on the provisions of the UNSC in terms of membership, but also how AU decision-makers have also critically evaluated the UNSC—and thereby avoided making the same mistakes that the UN did in the setting up of its main body for peace and security issues.

**Interview Section 32: Length of Membership of the PSC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If you have a look at the PSC, five regions, fifteen members, three years, two years, no veto—that is virtually New York and adopted for the African context, and avoiding the veto provisions which makes life very difficult (#23).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Then the idea of fifteen member states came, so that five regions were represented [...]. Then that way the Peace and Security Council started operating (#24).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Council with fifteen member states with equal voting rights was the final compromise on which member states would eventually agree. The PSC protocol states that ten member states are elected for two years, whereas five are elected for three years “in order to ensure continuity” (AU 2002b, Art. 5). In doing this, the AU follows the ECOWAS model rather than the UN one: the MSC comprises nine member states of which seven are elected by the Authority; the other two are the current chairman and the immediately preceding chairman of the Authority, each of them is elected for a renewable two-year term (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 8).

As would become obvious, the conceptualization phase of the PSC was highly complicated. According to the literature, increasing complexity in international relations leads to a greater need among decision-makers for knowledge that often is limited to specific groups of experts (Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992b). Transnational expert networks are one important provider hereof, and thereby exert essential influence on such decision-makers (Jetschke and Lenz 2011, 458). According to Haas, networks of knowledge-based experts are crucial for

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98 Members are elected on the basis of regional representation. Each of the five African regions—Central Africa, East, North, Southern, and West—choose member states as candidates. Based on their different geographical sizes, Central Africa, East, and Southern elect three PSC members each—whereas West Africa elects four, and North Africa only two (AU 2002b, Art. 5).
“articulating the cause-and-effect relationship of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identify salient point for negotiation” (Haas 1992b, 2). Networks are consulted in order to obtain new ideas, and information that is not already available to individuals from within their own institution. As the interviews reveal (interview section 33), decision-makers in OAU/AU also consulted (external) experts so as to gain the necessary information for constructing their new peace and security structures.

**Interview Section 33: Existence of Policy Networks**

There is a group of people who are obviously working, writing, thinking, and trying to fit in to influence, consult, and affect the way that peace and security is interpreted and implemented (#8).

There was a need to then create a successful institutional mechanism, and that is where policy networks played a very fundamental role (#11).

The mere existence of expert networks is not very surprising, as it is widely researched how decision-makers often use knowledge from external consultants when the required insights are not available inside their organization already (Adler and Haas 1992). What is particularly interesting, however, is the development of these expert networks. In them, such individuals not only work together but also strengthen their ties to one another—and thus knowledge is repeatedly exchanged. In the AU context, another important phenomenon is the movement of peoples between organizations too. As illustrated in interview section 34, numerous people start in one organization but move to different ones during the course of their career. In this context, such movement can be observed between regional and international organizations as well as to think tanks too.

**Interview Section 34: Movement of Knowledge**

These are people who are sometimes inside the secretariat, sometimes out in a think tank now working for the government, now out of the government, maybe in a UN peacekeeping mission, now back in Addis. In the same way, you see those dynamics taking place in other ROs [...]. The existence of those people is
very important for the institutional memory, and for essentially constituting the collective brain of an organization (#8).

Most of the individuals connected with B. who worked with B., a lot of them ended up transitioning into the AU process and then working for the AU (#11).

Interview #8 of section 34 illustrates a crucial dimension of experts and their knowledge. It not only underlines the dynamics within ROs and IOs resulting from the movement of individuals, but also stresses the fundamental importance of those experts. By referring to them as “constituting the collective brain” of an organization, the interviewee highlights the latter’s interdependent nature. As Adler and Haas (1992, 373) note, the ideas and innovations of expert networks diffuse on the national, transnational, and international level and thereby may change numerous such organizations. With this growing interdependence, organizations transmit their innovations; with networks helping to share ideas too, international relations are hence restructured hereby. Additionally, as in the present case, policies become similar too as well—as experts spread their ideas not only in one organization but in others too.

One important aspect of expertise coming from outside an organization is its actual impact. Experts and their networks can only exert influence when they are actually heard by the respective decision-makers. According to Keck and Sikkink, new ideas “are more likely to be influential if they fit well with existing ideas and ideologies” (2008, 504). As networks act as a type of idea carrier, they also have to find ways to frame the latter in order to make them opportune for the larger belief system(s) in which decision-makers act. In the OAU/AU, expert networks have successfully found ways to build confidential relationships with respective decision-makers—as is apparent in interview section 35. On the one hand, it is described how both experts and decision-makers have not only been educated in similar institutions and/or had analogous career paths but also share a passion for the continent as part of their desire to improve the living situation of billions of ordinary Africans (#9). On the other, it is described how curious and open-minded El-Ghassim Wane, one of the most important decision-makers for the new APSA within the AU, was toward new ideas and vis-à-vis the open and
fruitful discussions that would form the basis for successful consultancies with these expert networks.

**Interview Section 35: Networks of Decision-Makers—Policy Networks**

The other logic that also moderates what the intelligentsia does is that relationship to the political decision-makers. [...] Some of them were advisors to the government, some of them were people in universities, some of them were consultants. A lot of the people who eventually became consultants were people who have been in universities, either within or outside Africa. Both had the passion for Africa, or were African citizens who had found themselves in other parts of the world (#9).

It was El-Ghassim Wane. Generally, he is a very curious individual and he does not care where he gets his ideas from; if you can help him, he will let you. But just at the beginning, he struck up a relationship with B. and almost all the documents and almost everything to B., so B.’s team was the one which prepared most of the earlier draft documents and consultancy reports that have been created in the establishment of the APSA (#11).

Two influential individuals in the OAU at that time were the aforementioned El-Ghassim Wane and also Said Djinnit. El Ghassim Wane—now chief of staff as well as chief advisor of the chairperson of the AU Commission—has also moved between organizations. Between 1994 and 2009, he held numerous senior positions relating to peace and security in the OAU/AU before becoming director of the Peace and Security Department in the AU Commission and assistant secretary general for peacekeeping operations at the UN. Said Djinnit, meanwhile, is special envoy of the UN secretary general for the Great Lakes region. Previous to that, he was special representative for West Africa. In the OAU/AU, he would hold numerous senior positions—including those of OAU assistant secretary general for political affairs and commissioner for peace and security.

Just how close those networks can be is illustrated with the example of Margaret Vogt. Margaret, as already described in detail, was not only a very influential scholar for ECOWAS but also moved later to various important positions in AU and UN. As the following statements show (interview section 36), Margaret was
considered to be a crucial stakeholder in drafting not only the ECOWAS Mechanism but also in later bringing those related ideas to the AU too.

**Interview Section 36: Margaret Vogt (II)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margaret Vogt was very very instrumental and was [...] closer to the head of the Conflict Management Division of the OAU at that time who happened to be a Nigerian. That played a very important role in terms of the development of the first conceptual ideas for the APSA and this transition (#11).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Margaret Vogt was central to a lot of that before she then moved on to the UN (#9).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By moving between numerous organizations, Margaret built an excellent and widely spread network for herself during her long, illustrious career. According to the interviewees, Margaret brought knowledge from all of her previous posts to each new one, particularly when it came to the conceptualization of the peace and security structures of both ECOWAS and AU. 99

**Interview Section 37: Network of Margaret Vogt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>You remember that Margaret Vogt and her co-author happen to be individuals from the ECOWAS system. Margaret at that time worked for the Nigerian government and was aware of the ECOWAS Conflict Management and Prevention Division and wanted to some extent to draw on that and wanted to inform the AU [...]. Later, she worked for the UN system and she was moving between UN as well as civil society (#11).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

What Wane and Djinnit have in common with Margaret Vogt is their excellent personal networks. As visible in Figure 9, all three not only moved between the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN but also either worked directly within civil society and academic organizations or at least closely together with them. All three individuals were, between them, additionally crucial to the process of establishing

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peace and security structures in ECOWAS (Margaret Vogt) and in the OAU/AU (Wane, Djinnit and Vogt), by bringing with them knowledge from a variety of posts previously held in other organizations. This observed interdependence is exactly what Adler and Haas (1992, 373) described in diffusion theory when referring to the increased interdependence between experts and organizations—and how this leads to the diffusion of innovation on a number of different levels.

**Figure 9: Network of Decision-Makers of AU and ECOWAS**

![Network of Decision-Makers](image)

Source: Author’s own compilation, based on the interviews.

Another crucial actor group is constituted by the (external) experts who consulted with AU decision-makers in the conceptualization phase of that RO’s security mechanism. As interview section 38 shows, interviewees described the influence of consultants as tremendous and fundamental—that for two core reasons. First, they identified these individuals as knowledge-holders who share their insights. As most of these consultants have already worked for other organizations as well, they are able to divulge what best practices already exist and furthermore how they can be adapted for the particular circumstances of the AU (#17 and #18). The UN and ECOWAS have been frequently used by consultants to illustrate such best practices.

Second, the work relationship that exists—which is characterized by the discussion and evaluation of what has already been done elsewhere. According to the interviewees, consultants induce dialogue about previous policies or erstwhile institutions and how they can be improved on. At best, consultants succeed in creating open and honest communication with the RO as well as in bringing key innovations into its decision-making processes (#13).
Interview Section 38: Importance of Policy Networks

Policy networks and consultants have had such a tremendous impact when it comes to implementation (#11).

I would say that policy networks carry a role, in the sense of allowing us to reflect and assess from an intellectual perspective what we have done (#13).

The consultants were the ones helping us, develop some of the best practices from the different organizations. So, they would give us an insight [...] how similar institutions also developed similar mechanisms, and we could learn from their experience what to take and what not to take, how do we customize those types of systems, and how to use them internally. So, the consultants also helped us in terms of conducting best practices and lessons learned. Consultants are knowledge-holders, also knowledge-sharers (#17).

The influence of those experts is fundamental. I would say that none of the work that the Panel has done [...] would have been possible without these critical consultations and exchanges. I think it is fundamental whenever you are aiming to develop or to craft a new policy, because that is what that is all about, that you get the best brains on the matter because there is nothing really new under the sun. [...] It has been fundamental, they not only have been the drafters, there were more than influential, there have been the crafters, they have been inputing, bringing their ideas, bringing their innovative thinking, and supporting the work throughout (#18).

Unquestionably, a major concern regarding consultants is their deployment. The question of from which organization or country they have been appointed plays a central role in what the consultants promote or how they advise the respective organization. In the case of AU, consultants are appointed by the UN and EU as well as other by smaller organizations such as the GIZ, a German development agency. As the interviews reveal in section 39, these consultants are seen as technical experts who often work with the respective organizations on a long-term basis. Although they are ultimately paid by large organizations such as AU and the UN, consultants often are affiliated with think tanks. Accordingly, consultants have their work origins in such think tanks as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of

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100 This list is obviously not exhaustive, and just an illustrative sample of those that interviewees mentioned.
Disputes (ACCORD), and in the earlier-mentioned WANEP—as well as in other African and international ones too, as will be shown in the course of this chapter.

### Interview Section 39: Appointment of Consultants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There is this distinction, they would not only come from civil society but they would also come from the UN, from international consulting firms, international companies. X. runs a company, he is an academic and runs his own company [...]. Technical experts have influence because they are writing it down but they are appointed by the OAU/AU (#23).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some of them were consultants that were actually paid by GIZ and the Norwegians and they were able to make important inputs. Even X. and Y., all of them, particularly when it comes to the Early Warning System. X., Y., and a lot of them were involved on a long-term basis (#9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants are usually commissioned by the AU. A typical process of this, given the intergovernmental nature of the AU and the highly political nature of it, means that there would be an invitation sent to every country as a member state to send an expat either from the Ministry of Justice or Defence, or both [...]. They would have commissioned consultants who are technical experts in the domain (#14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some consultants have been payed by the UN, some by the EU, some by AU, some, for example X. and Y., mostly by the GIZ. Z. was UN (#12).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the interviewees, there are certain consultants who influenced the security structures of the AU in a fundamental way. These individuals are important for two reasons. First, they have worked with the OAU/AU repeatedly over a long period of time and they have been able to build confidence and trust during their working relations with decision-makers. Second, they are able to work closely with the decision-makers in the Peace and Security Departments—vital so as to be heard. As in the case of consultant B., who serves as an example for the following arguments, he had a longstanding and confidential relationship with El-Ghassim Wane who, at that time, was head of the Peace and Security Department of the OAU/AU. As illustrated in interview section 40, the respective decision-makers trusted him insofar as he was not only the originator of ideas that later became crucial components of the respective security structures but also because it was he who drafted the relevant documents for the OAU/AU.
Interview Section 40: Influential Consultants

He (B.) was actually typing the documents for the OAU. In peace and security, he is the one that stands out. He was rapporteur and all of that (#23).

The conflict management and conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms were turned into the APSA. But that transition process, in terms of turning it from the mechanisms into the APSA, the early ideas, you can credit B. [who] was at that time head of ideas of the OAU and the transition process (#11).

As becomes clear, the network component—meaning how closely a consultant can work together with both decision-makers and other consultants—is crucial for a successful liaison process. As these individuals not only carry the relevant knowledge but also share it among decision-makers and other relevant consultants or advisors too, then a good network is essential. As visible in the network map (figure 10), relations between the different stakeholders in the peace and security field for both AU and ECOWAS not only exist but are, indeed, numerous. We can observe strands between both ROs, but also between consultants and think tanks as well as donor organizations. Consultants are, as noted, partly paid by the UN, EU, or GIZ but are employed at think tanks and advisors to the EU and ECOWAS (and partly to other African ROs). Consultants know each other and work together in the respective organizations, and exchange their views (and knowledge) in meetings.
African think tanks have played an important role in the establishment process of the APSA. The OAU—as ECOWAS did earlier—recognized that its civil society involvement had been insufficient in the post–Cold war era, and thus included the need for strengthened cooperation between itself and civil society in its official documents. As visible in table 18, the OAU tried to frame this civil society inclusion along the lines of the greater involvement of the “African people” and a shift toward open and solidary organizations wherein all parts of society could find their place.

**Table 18: Need for the Involvement of Civil Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUIDED by our common vision of a united and strong Africa and by the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among our peoples (OAU 2000c, preamble).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The symmetric relation that must exist between the Union and the African people, calls for increased popular participation in its edification. As such, we must break with the prevailing logic, whereby everything is dictated from the top. As articulated by you the leaders, the African Union should be the collective and undivided property of all Africans, but especially the women, the young and the not—so young (Essy 2002, 4).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The earlier-mentioned ISS, ACCORD, and WANEP have all, according to the interviewees, been quite influential vis-à-vis the AU (interview section 41). They have had a particular impact as a result of having seconded key consultants and written the background papers that these individuals would then bring into the decision-making processes of the RO. Among all of the think tanks that were eventually mentioned by interviewees (prominent herein too were, inter alia, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre), ISS, ACCORD, and WANEP were identified by all of those asked to name the policy institutes that had been key players in the conceptualization of the APSA.

**Interview Section 41: Think Tanks in AU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since then, we have been working with some of them, we have a Memorandum of Understanding that we have signed with WANEP, with ISS, with ACCORD and a couple of them (#17).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Through the Norwegian Training for Peace Programme, organizations like ACCORD, ISS, and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs have been working at many different levels in providing support for the AU to develop policies, to develop guidelines and policies, to provide training, and so forth (#15).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think ACCORD played a role and the Pearson Centre in Canada played a role (#22).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it can be argued that think tanks were quite influential in this conceptualization process, this view is not without its critics. As interviewees describe in section 42, they sometimes felt they had been consulted, on the one hand, only to appease civil society’s quest to finally become more involved. On the other, the AU needed to show the general public that it really did care about what “the African people” think. According to the interviewees, some think tank representatives felt that the AU thus only wanted to improve its public image vis-à-vis its earlier promise of greater civil society involvement.
Interview Section 42: Critical Evaluation of Civil Society Involvement

Basically, they only needed the civil society to say “ok” or at least to make the civil society feel consulted. Which is not really the case. They would finalize it how they want to finalize it (#23).

All you can say is that we were consulted and the extent to which civil society views filter into institutional thinking is difficult to demonstrate [...]. Actually, it was crucial that the AU reached out to the civil society. It could not have done it without the civil society at all, 100 percent, so I think it was important that this happened and second, it is important that civil society got the possibility to share its views. But what the intergovernmental organization does after that with the information, it is up to them (#23).

To sum up, African as well as select international think tanks have not only been consulted by the AU but also have been heard by them—as they are represented by influential consultants. According to the interviewees, particular organizations such as ISS, ACCORD, and WANEP have had both close relationships to the RO as a whole and also to the respective persons in charge. The collaboration between ROs and specialist think tanks is as tight-knit as it is due to its network character (interview section 43). It seems that specific organizations have worked with the OAU/AU for many years, and that—due to this intense and longstanding cooperation—close working relationships have developed—ones that have furthermore laid the foundations for trustworthy collaboration between ROs and specific civil-society organizations.

Interview Section 43: Network of Think Tanks and ROs

And then, at the third level, there is the African civil society institutional networks. And there, again, I think there has been an important evolution which has been a much-improved engagement to what previously existed between African civil society and the leadership and the management of the AU (#14).

It is quite a network [...] the ISS was working extensively with the OAU, and we were probably the largest partner that the OAU had as external partner (#29).
8.3. ECOWAS’ Influence on the CEWS and ASF

The PSC protocol not only established that body but also provided, moreover, for the creation of a series of new institutions within the framework of the APSA: the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, an African Standby Force, and a Peace Fund (AU 2002b, Arts. 11–13, 21). As outlined in chapter 3, ECOWAS was the first of these ROs to establish a peace and security architecture comprised of, inter alia, the MSC, Council of Elders, ECOWAS Early Warning System, ECOMOG, and a Peace Fund. The following table shows the comparison of ECOWAS structures with their equivalents in the AU, and makes clear that the latter has a very similar institutional structure to the former—given that ECOWAS set up its peace and security architecture prior to the AU doing so.

Table 19: Peace and Security Structure of AU and ECOWAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision-Making Body on Peace and Security</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation and Security Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council of Prominent Personalities for Mediation</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council of Elders</td>
<td></td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioner/Directorate</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS)/Directorate for PAPS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner for Peace and Security/Directorate for Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Committee</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence and Security Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Support/Standby Force</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG—ESF</td>
<td></td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early Warning</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Early Warning (ECOWARN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Mechanism</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary Oversight</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Community Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Pan–African Parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elowson and MacDermott 2010, 27f.
These similar structures did not, of course, simply evolve randomly. As already argued in chapter 8.1, they are the outcome of interdependent decision-making processes. That these learning processes diffusing from ECOWAS to the AU could be observed in the establishment of APSA is strongly supported by the following statements. Interview section 44 reveals that ECOWAS not only served as a role model but also as a sort of trial balloon, in the sense that AU decision-makers could evaluate what had already been realized in ECOWAS—and thereby increase their reliability of expectations.

**Interview Section 44: Diffusion Processes ECOWAS–AU (I)**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Statement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot of what ended up in APSA had been tried and tested in ECOWAS (#9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS was the other example that we borrowed on and drew upon in the design (#29).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, AU decision-makers were not only influenced by the institutional structures of the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS however. They were also affected by the manner in which ECOWAS handled the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone (interview section 45, #9). As already outlined in chapter 6, these crises were not only far-reaching for ECOWAS and its self-perception but also affected the AU too. The proactive manner in which ECOWAS reacted in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau impressed observers and also decision-makers in the AU. ECOWAS was praised for proactively intervening—and that without a mandate from the UNSC—in Liberia, where—according to the prevailing opinion—its mission was a resounding success.

**Interview Section 45: Diffusion Processes ECOWAS–AU (II)**

<table>
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<th>Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS, definitely but it goes more above what we feel as the proactive character of ECOWAS rather than the design per se (#18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS in its sense was ahead in terms of the Constitutive Act. ECOWAS had been able to justify humanitarian interventions without the UNSC. There was a sense in which ECOWAS was more sophisticated than the AU (#9).</td>
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</table>
ECOWAS had the advantage of being the first to actually go out of their way to build a peace and security architecture. And that was dictated by the events which took place in Liberia and in Sierra Leone (#9).

A further important aspect of the newly established APSA is its continental character. According to the Constitutive Act, “the Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union” (AU 2002b, Art. 16). The REC’s are not only embedded in the new APSA but they were also, partly, influential in its design too. As the following statements show (interview section 46), while ECOWAS was the most important role model for the APSA it was not the only one; other RECs in general were too. In particular, those already having peace and security structures; IGAD with its early warning system, CEWARN, and SADC are to be mentioned here.

Interview Section 46: ECOWAS and RECs as Role Models

We did not have the APSA overnight, we did not have the protocols for the standby force, or early warning, or whatever, you can mention any. It evolves through [...] the regional economic communities. The different mechanisms came also up in the RECs because they also started having their own peace and security architecture, and mechanisms that deal with conflicts (#24).

I would say, ECOWAS was influential to a large extent, but other regional economic communities as well […]. As you know, the RECs were not necessarily focused on peace and security. It was only after the establishment of APSA that the AU began to embrace a peace and security focus. Organizations like SADC were not focused on security, but ECOWAS was because of its particular history of crises and that partly contributed to the process of establishing the APSA (#19).

After illustrating that there have been strong bonds between AU and ECOWAS in general, the following sections will now show how this influence has translated into specific institutional design features in the CEWS and the ASF. For the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund, there was not enough data—meaning policy documents and expert knowledge obtained from interviews—available to be able to trace and explain the processes leading to the special institutional design of these two remaining pillars of APSA.
8.3.1. Continental Early Warning System

One of the crucial elements of APSA is its early warning system. This was first established in the PSC protocol “in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (AU 2002b, Art. 12). It consists of an “observation and monitoring centre” (ibid., Art. 12) that is directly linked with the observation and monitoring units of the RECs. It supplies the Commission with information “to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa” (ibid., Art. 12).

The following statements show, again, how the genocide in Rwanda shaped the discourse on the African continent, and how the experiences made during and after it not only built the groundwork for the establishment of security structures but also clearly demonstrated just how badly an improved conflict-prevention mechanism was needed within the OAU/AU.

**Interview Section 47: Background of CEWS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The early warning system was connected [...] to the discussions postgenocide. How come that we were all asleep? When such a horrendous crime was going on. [...] How to understand the Rwandan genocide? [...] I mean, between being completely stunned by what was happening and confused about what could have been done, it was a slow reaction [by the OAU] (#14).</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>In this regard, we noted with satisfaction the remarkable progress made in the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), both at the level of the AU and the Regional Mechanisms [...]. The operationalization of the CEWS is all the more important in view of the fact that conflict prevention is at the core of the mandates of our respective organizations (AU 2008, 6f.).</td>
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During the Maputo Summit in 2003, the Commission was mandated with the establishment of the CEWS (AU 2003a). Anticipated to enter into force in late 2003, the Commission organized an expert workshop in Addis Ababa in October of that year “to brainstorm on the practical modalities and steps, drawing lessons from existing regional and international experiences on the establishment and
functioning of an early warning system” (AU 2003d). As is very apparent, the conceptualization of CEWS was heavily influenced by the experiences that other regional and international organizations had previously made with their own early warning systems. The following interviews (section 48) support this view too.

**Interview Section 48: General Influence on CEWS**

| Other regional and international organizations have definitely served as role models. When we began our early warning system in 2006 or 2007, the two operational ones then, within Africa, were ECOWAS with ECOWARN and IGAD with CEWARN. They were the only two early warning systems that were operational and we did benefit a lot from those two institutions. Because they already had an established early warning system, at least they had all the policy documents, all the legal instruments, legal framework that they needed in place. So, that contributed as an input in the establishment of our system, also we benefited from their experience (#17).

For the CEWS, the RECs became quite involved in helping to design it. ECOWAS is your best model where they actually get, they got WANEP, West African Network for Peacebuilding, to exist inside ECOWAS as technical advisors on the development of the early warning system (#23).

As visible in section 48, the interviewees—both of them involved in the design of the CEWS—reported that the already-existing early warning systems of ECOWAS and IGAD had served not only as institutional role models but also when it came legal frameworks too. Alongside the already-mentioned expert workshop in October 2003, the Commission also organized a series of activities aimed at institutionalizing the CEWS. These took the form of workshops, with officials attending from the RECs, the UN and its agencies, civil society, academic institutions, IOs, and African think tanks (Wane et al. 2010, 95). In July 2005 recommendations from these workshops were incorporated into a draft “Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS” with “the purpose of developing an operational, cost-effective structure and [to] determine the key

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101 According to Cilliers, this workshop came up with a number of pertinent recommendations that were, however, never implemented—and so “early warning in the AU remained limited to the small staff in the situation room” (2005, 8).
steps and requirements necessary for the implementation of the early warning system” (Wane et al. 2010, 95). In June 2006 the PSC requested that the Commission accelerate the operationalization of the CEWS, leading to an intensification of efforts on the part of the Commission. From December 17 to 19, 2006, another meeting of experts from AU member states as well as from the RECs was realized. In Kempton Park, South Africa, this gathering of representatives from African research centers, academic institutions, and NGOs, as well as from IOs, urged the Commission and the RECs once more to implement the recommendations made in the draft roadmap within three years—thereby ensuring that the CEWS would be fully operational by 2009 (AUC 2007, 1). The participants of the meeting also urged member states and AU partners to provide the necessary financial and technical assistance for the implementation of CEWS in the near future.

As a consequence, the “Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System”—including the request for sufficient supporting financial and technical resources from member states and partners—was backed by the AU Executive Council. Finally, during the 8th ordinary session of the AU on January 29–30, 2007, in Addis Ababa, the implementation of the CEWS was realized at last (ibid., 97). How this whole process had been characterized by diffusion processes, ones wherein decision-makers and the involved staff looked around at what had also been created in other organizations previously, is illustrated in interview section 49. A staff member of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division of the AU described a process that was not only characterized by several phases of looking around for and evaluating possibilities, but also—and mainly—by learning from the success and failure of the already-existing early warning systems of other RECs.

**Interview Section 49: Operationalization Process of CEWS**

| It started when we tried to establish the early warning system, we said, so what do we need to put in place? So, first, the main task was to get the contribution from member states. So, in that case, we organized a first meeting called “expert meeting of member states” where representatives from all the member states attended. It was in 2006; the document that was endorsed during that meeting |
was called “Framework for Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System.” So that is our blueprint document (#17).

In those expert meetings, we always made sure that RECs were involved in the development and establishment of our early warning system. So, they contributed a lot in the development of our policy documents. But we also had the experience of learning from some of the institutions on how they tried to establish an early warning system. We did visit some institutions (#17).

We were trying to identify [them], actually the consultants were the ones helping us in developing some of the best practices from the different organizations. So, they would give us an insight into how DFID developed its early warning system, how similar institutions also developed similar mechanisms, OECD and others, and we could learn from their experience what to take and what not to take, how do we customize those types of systems and how to use them internally. So, the consultants also helped us in terms of conducting best practices and lessons learned (#17).

The statements in section 49 show not only how important member states were during the early warning system’s establishment process but also, as described above, how many different meetings were convened with the various stakeholders to discuss the institutionalization of the CEWS. According to the interviewees, consultants were crucial in assembling information on how similar institutions function within other organizations, and in monitoring what elements to adopt and which ones not to. Interviews with several consultants revealed that they develop expertise over time, and exercise it not only in one RO but in several different ones in fact. As visible in figure 11, consultant C.—an expert on early warning systems—has previously advised AU, SADC, IGAD, as well as ECOWAS. Similarly, consultant Y.—who is extremely knowledgeable regarding the Panel of the Wise—has consulted not only in AU and ECOWAS but also SADC and IGAD, who have similar systems. While this fact cannot be seen as a causal argument for why certain design features are similar between different ROs, it is nonetheless still symbolic of how consultant knowledge is shared among those ROs.
The CEWS is the APSA pillar in which think tanks have played a particularly important role (interview section 50). For the CEWS, it was especially useful to gain external input as the required knowledge is of a very technical nature. Experts, ones working for African think tanks, advised the AU in three main areas: data collection, the engagement with decision-makers, as well as collaboration with civil-society organizations. According to the interviewees, a group of experts worked together to conceptualize the exact framework in which the CEWS would operate. Also reported was the fact that, for the CEWS, civil-society organizations both from Africa and from abroad were involved.

**Interview Section 50: Think Tanks in CEWS**

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<th>The meeting agreed that the CEWS should focus on three main priorities, data collection, the engagement with decision-makers, and coordination and collaboration—particularly with the early warning system of the RECs, but also with civil society organizations, IOs, and others. But in the development of those documents, it was done with a consortium of organizations and experts, civil society organizations were involved in the final development of the framework. We also had experts, international experts (#17).</th>
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<tr>
<td>The three mainly have been our experts or our consultants. There have been with us now for a while. So, we had those three experts, but we had also invited civil society organizations (#17).</td>
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Another influential actor group consists of staff from AU (and ECOWAS) who were seconded from other organizations such as the UN and EU. According to the UN’s own definition hereof, secondment means the “movement of a staff member from one organization to another for a fixed period, normally not exceeding two years, during which the staff member will normally be paid” (UN 2012, 2). As the interviews show (section 51), secondment of staff happens regularly in both AU and ECOWAS.

**Interview Section 51: Exchange of Staff in General**

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<td>There is a lot of personnel fluctuation between the organizations. People often remain in the foreign services of their country and are seconded to one organization, later to another organization (#4).</td>
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Interviewees cited that the UN is “physically inside the system” (#23), and has advised both AU and ECOWAS in the conceptualizing and implementing of new policies and institutions (interview section 52). According to interview #12, this secondment is not a one-way street—as AU staff are seconded to the UN, and UN staff to the AU. In both cases, knowledge from other organizations is transferred to the respective “new” one.

**Interview Section 52: Secondment of Staff**

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<td>Security organs from the UN or ECOWAS have absolutely served as a role model. Representatives from both organizations would be embedded, they are physically inside the AU system as advisers or technical support. Seconded. And some of them are still there [...]. When R. came in, R. came from the UN Political Affairs Department, Security Department for the Operationalization of the Secretariat of the Panel of the Wise. Which means that the UN was/is completely inside of the system (#23).</td>
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<tr>
<td>There is a lot of mobility of these people between [...] those institutions. [...] They become important vectors for ideas around these issues. And I think this is probably the best way to understand it (#14).</td>
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<tr>
<td>There was an agreement under this AU-UN cooperation to have some staff from the AU seconded to the UN, and some from the UN to come here (#12).</td>
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The early warning system of the AU heavily benefited from this knowledge transfer. As described in the interviews in section 53, a colleague from IGAD—where, as noted, an early warning system had already earlier been established—came to the AU and brought their previous experiences to that RO (#17). As reported, they used their knowledge about the conceptualization and implementation of CEWARN, as well as the prior cooperation with RECs, to help install the CEWS at the AU. The interviews reveal again how important processes of learning from the experiences of other organizations have been for AU, and how crucial certain stakeholders—meaning the ones that possess the relevant knowledge—were for the RO in the installation and improvement of its security mechanism.

**Interview Section 53: Exchange of Staff**

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<th>The other thing was that some of the staff that we recruited at the AU already had the experience with working with established mechanisms. For example, my colleague H. came from IGAD, CEWARN. So, we had some individuals who were more experienced in terms of dealing with subregional organizations doing early warning. So, they had also contributed to the establishment of the early warning system. There were also some of the tools that were used by these institutions. But we also acquired those tools, we did not reinvent the wheel but some of the tools that were already used by these institutions that were tested and used and we know from experience that they were of good quality. So, we also customized that and acquired it (#17).</th>
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<tr>
<td>I was involved in the establishment of the APSA from 2006 onward, I was working on the CEWS. From 2002 to 2006, I worked for CEWARN at IGAD. [...] CEWARN was framed after 1994, and the genocide. The member states needed to establish structures. Meanwhile, the OAU did not have such an early warning system but IGAD and ECOWAS did (#25).</td>
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To sum up, consultants were one crucial provider of knowledge in the establishment process of the CEWS. They have been characterized as knowledge-holders who share their expert insights in the field of political institutions, and how to structure them. They are often working for one organization, either on a long-term basis or recurrently, so that close collaboration is possible. Due to this tight-knit cooperation, networks between consultants and decision-makers, as
well as between IOs (by whom they are paid) and think tanks (with which they are affiliated), develop. Consultants are also often educated to believe in institutions and in regionalism, and as some of them have already worked in IOs or ROs then they can bring best practices and lessons learned into the “new” organizations. As consultants often do not only advise one African RO, they share knowledge between several different ones—this cannot be seen as a causal mechanism explaining similarities, but it can be seen as one more piece of the puzzle regarding the whole phenomenon of diffusion processes (interview section 54). The secondment and exchange of staff between organizations is a further important channel of such knowledge transfer. The interviews illustrate how intense the exchange of staff between the UN and AU (and ECOWAS) has been, and how seconded staff bring knowledge from their parent organization to the new one—and how fruitful the accompanying learning processes can be for all sides.

**Interview Section 54: Policy Networks**

<table>
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<th>There is another group called the expert group [...]. Those are the people with content knowledge and how to shape institutions and processes. Legal and political analysts, conflict resolution specialists, transitional justice experts (#23).</th>
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<tr>
<td>What you call the intelligentsia or the technocrats, part of the thing you need to understand is that those people who actually drafted the documents, [...] most of them get their PhDs or their master degrees from countries like the United States, France, Britain, Canada [...]. Not only were they Western-trained, a lot of them were people who were trained to believe in regionalism. A lot of them were trained to mainstream peace and security studies and so ideologically, they had gone through Western education even if they had the sense that as Africans they had to stamp an African identity. They were institutionalists, people who believed in the capacity of institutions to influence international relations. So, what institutions did they have to look up to? Existing institutions, of course, they knew, and they had studied in school and had interacted with either as diplomats or as practitioners (#9).</td>
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8.3.2. African Standby Force

The ASF is the most critical element of the PSC framework, one that aims at enabling the AU to keep its promise of protecting the African people in grave circumstances and to be able to respond in a timely and effective manner to conflicts breaking out on the African continent (Dersso 2010, 6). The idea of a continent-wide military force goes back to the early days of the OAU, when President Nkrumah had suggested the creation of an AHC so as to be able to respond to African crises without being dependent therein on international support. Interview section 55 not only illustrates the historical roots that the ASF is built upon, but also shows how, again, the experienced violence on the African continent contributed in a significant way to the discourse about the need for a continent-wide force behind which all African countries could unite. The interviews also show that the introduction of Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act, as well as the increasing agency of the newly established AU, were crucial factors in the institutionalization of the ASF.

**Interview Section 55: Historical Roots of ASF**

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<th>The ASF is, I would say [...], is an accumulation of efforts which date back to the OAU when President Nkrumah had suggested the establishment of an AHC [...] and his suggestions came from the fact that when the crisis broke out in the newly independent state of Congo, it was difficult to get an international response (#21).</th>
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<td>This is where the idea started coming up with this standby force, African standby force; at least United States of Africa was one of the ideas that were there, the ultimate pan-African idea. And then also a pan-African army, which can intervene on standby whenever they should be able to intervene (#24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You remember the holy due of the establishment of the ASF. You cannot separate that with the [...] transition from old AU to AU itself. [...] The paradigm shift in the thinking that we can no longer sit on the fence. You know, this principle of indifference (#22).</td>
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102 For further details on this, see again chapter 3.1 of this thesis.
Thinking about an AFC had also been discussed in the Kampala Document that, already in 1991, explicitly referred to the urgent need for the African continent to establish conflict resolution mechanisms within the framework of the OAU (table 20).

**Table 20: Discourse of a Future Continent-Wide African Force**

There is, indeed, the urgent requirement to prevent conflicts and disputes from escalating into armed hostilities. This calls for the strengthening of conflict resolution mechanisms for negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration at the governmental, political and diplomatic levels, within the framework of intervention. Africa under CSSDCA should revitalise the operational effectiveness of the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. In conformity with African tradition, the emphasis should be put on timely mediation and reconciliation (ALF 1991, 3).

According to Article 13 of the PSC protocol, the intention behind the ASF was to enable “the Peace and Security Council to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace-support missions and intervention pursuant to Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act” (AU 2002b). The ASF is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, including both civilian as well as military components, in their countries of origin—ones that furthermore should be ready for rapid deployment at the appropriate moment’s notice (ibid.). To able to do this, every member state is asked to “establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention authorized by the Assembly” (ibid., Art. 13).

Furthermore, the “strength and type of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location shall be determined in accordance with established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations” (ibid., Art. 13). The ASF’s mandate includes: observation and monitoring missions; other types of peace-support mission; intervention in a member state’s territory if necessary; preventive-deployment missions; peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; and, humanitarian assistance. Close cooperation with the UN and other relevant
regional and international organizations as well as NGOs is also ascribed to the ASF. A special representative of the chairman of the Commission heads the missions, whereas a force commander coordinates and directs operations and reports to the special representative. Furthermore, a Military Staff Committee was established in order “to advise and assist the Peace and Security Council in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa” (AU 2002b, Art. 13); it is composed of senior military officers from the members of the PSC.

After adopting the PSC protocol, African chiefs of defence and security then crafted, in May 2003, “The Policy Framework Document on the Establishment of the African Standby Force and of the Military Staff Committee.”103 Not long after, African ministers of foreign affairs made recommendations for consolidated proposals to be contained within the ASF framework. After another important meeting of African chiefs of defence and security in January 2004, African heads of state and government finally adopted an amended framework document in July 2004 (Cilliers 2008; Cilliers and Malan 2005; Kasumba and Debrah 2010). This framework scheduled the establishment of the ASF in two phases: phase I was planned to be implemented by June 30, 2005 (but was actually delayed until 2008), whereas phase II was originally envisaged to have been realized by June 2010 meanwhile.104 Furthermore, it was agreed that the ASF would consist of standby brigades from each of the five African regions105—as well as to incorporate a police force and a civilian dimension as well (Cilliers and Malan

103 The framework outlined a number of typical conflicts that the ASF is likely to face, and will potentially need to respond to: 1) AU/regional military advice to a political mission; 2) AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission; 3) stand-alone AU/regional observer mission; 4) AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI enforcement and preventive-deployment missions; 5) AU peacekeeping force for complex, multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts); 6) AU intervention—for example situation of genocide where the international community does not react promptly (AU 2003c, 3).

104 For a detailed overview of the contents of both phases I and II, see AU 2003c).

105 A previous concept, one that was presented to the AU in 2003, contained the proposal of a single standby high readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG) arrangement at the AU level, and the subsequent development of standby brigades in the RECs too. By having agreed to five regional standby brigades, African heads of state and government returned to a concept of African peacekeeping that had first been discussed in meetings of African chiefs of defence in July 1996 and October 1997 (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 2).
2005). Figure 12 illustrates the allocation of regions (Central Africa, East, North, Southern, and West) for the ASF.

**Figure 12: Allocation of ASF regions**

![Map of Africa showing regions allocated for the ASF](image)

Source: Cilliers 2008, 2

The various heads of state also approved the establishment of a specialized technical committee, comprised of ministers of defence, to work closely with the PSC, to follow up on the founding of the ASF. Originally aiming to have made substantial progress by mid-2004, several factors led to an eventual setback in this timeframe. Thus the approval of the policy framework was delayed, key follow-up consultations failed to materialize, and the level of information exchange between AU and RECs was far from optimal. The difficult
transformation process within the AU Commission additionally slowed down the establishment of the ASF too (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 2).106

In March 2005 a “Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force” was adopted at an expert meeting in Addis Ababa. This roadmap contained details regarding the “installation of an appropriate Africa-wide, integrated and inter-operable command, control, communication and information system (C3IS) infrastructure, that would link deployed units with mission headquarters, as well as the AU, planning elements (PLANELMs) and regions” (Cilliers 2008, 2). Later that year, the AU hosted another expert meeting in Addis Ababa, in November/December 2005, to conceptualize a series of workshops aimed at developing concepts relating to the doctrine of the ASF, standard operating procedures, guidelines on C3IS, logistics, as well as to training and evaluation (ibid., 4f.). An internal roadmap document of the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) was developed in November 2006, but this writ did not have a formal status (ibid., 2). As the close cooperation of the AU Commission and RECs is one of the most crucial elements of the ASF, a MoU was signed in 2008. Aiming at facilitating cooperation on peace and security issues between the Commission and RECs, the MoU stipulated details regarding regular meetings and exchanges of information, as well as concerning liaison officers (Kasumba and Debrah 2010, 14).

In the process of operationalizing the ASF, decision-makers relied on already-existing institutional role models. As the interviews in section 56 show, it was particularly ECOWAS, and its standby force ESF, that influenced decision-makers within the AU in this context. Interviewees’ statements underline the exemplary function of ECOWAS on the African continent, as outlined in chapter 6. Based on its self-confident interventions in the early 1990s and a security architecture that had been institutionalized prior to the AU’s, ECOWAS thus served as a role model not only for APSA in general but for the establishment of the ASF in particular. An excerpt from the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention

106 Indeed RECs such as ECOWAS and IGAD furthered their own arrangements, not all of which were in accordance with what the AU had originally planned (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 2).
Framework, cited in the last row of section 56, illustrates that ECOWAS perceives itself as the model upon which other RECs build their own standby forces.

**Interview Section 56: ECOWAS as a Role Model for the ASF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOMOG in the 1990s, [in] 1991 and 1993, combined with some of the tragic events on the continent like the Rwandan genocide, all shaped and contributed in very useful ways to the development of the APSA (#19).</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, reference for example was made to NATO, including in some of the ASF policy documents you will find references, also to security architecture on the continent. At the time, ECOWAS was the most advanced and reference was made to that as well (#21).</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS has developed a comparative advantage in the area of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and has become a model for the continent. Under the aegis of the African Union, a Pan-African Stand-by Force (ASF) is in the process of being established. [...] ECOWAS is well placed to be the first REC to deliver its brigade and it is the lead organization in the development of the ASF Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) (ECOWAS 2008, Art. 25).</td>
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</table>

Despite the elevated position of ECOWAS in the creation process of the ASF, other RECs as well as member states have also been crucial herein too though. Table 57 shows just how intensively member states have been involved in the various creation processes during the past thirteen years or so, ones that have been characterized by the very strong cooperation and collaboration between individual member states and the AU hierarchy. Furthermore the second statement (#21) makes clear once again quite how important the other RECs, further to ECOWAS, are—as they are the fundamental basis for a functioning ASF.

**Interview Section 57: Importance of RECs and Member States for ASF**

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<th>In order to operationalize the ASF, we have been going through a number of processes toward this full operationalization in the last thirteen years or so. That has been realized based on regular consultations and meetings and regular updates with the member states in order for them to track the</th>
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implementation of the decisions they have made and to consider ways on how we can enhance our efforts (#19).

You know, the ASF and its existence is upon the RECs—so everything that has been done toward its development, had been done with the RECs. Because without them, you will not have a standby force (#21).

The conceptualization phase of the ASF was also characterized by the key influence therein of expert consultants. As interviewees who liaised with the AU regarding the ASF reported (interview section 58), numerous such individuals were involved with this founding process. The interviews reveal that the elaboration of the civilian component of the ASF was a process in which much consultation took place. It was explained how the original design was mainly a military one, and consultants were invited to discuss the current state of the art hereon. As the involved consultants reported, a series of meetings occurred; in the end, civilian components would also be included based on the expert input of non-state actors.

A further example of how external advisors have shaped RO policies is shown in interview #21 specifically. It reveals how consultants managed to change the classification of stakeholders by the ASF. Originally the AU, for financial reasons, had planned to treat women and children as like-for-like stakeholders. Invited consultants managed to convince the AU, however, to ultimately treat these two demographics as separate ones—thereby meeting international standards as well.

### Interview Section 58: Consultants in ASF

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<th>We [consultants] were particularly involved in the development of the civilian dimension of the ASF. [...] So, the result was that the first design of the ASF was basically 90 percent a military design with only a little bit of civilian elements in it. [...] We then organized a meeting and drafted the first policy framework and so forth, and then how to implement it in the coming years (#15).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-state actors have been influential. It was not easy [...] but yes, we did manage to influence [the AU]. I still remember very well in 2006, one of the big meetings on the civilian standby force and something that has stuck with me was the notion that, because the AU has no money, we should take women and</td>
</tr>
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</table>
children together. And it took us about thirty minutes to discuss and to say, sorry, but women are not children and children are not women and we need to separate those two. And if you do not have money, well, go find it. So, back and forth but in the end, it had been separated (#21).

The ASF, the African Standby Force, was driven by consultancy reports often written by Sarjoh Bah with strong support from A. A. used to work for ISS (#11).

8.4. Consolidation: Social Learning in the AU

As already outlined, diffusion theories argue that regional and international organizations can learn from the examples of more successful peers. In learning—a process wherein a change occurs in one’s own beliefs—stakeholders adopt a given institutional design based on the assumed effectiveness of it, as they have observed already in other institutions, and founded on the hope of being able to translate the same success to their own organization too (Lee and Strang 2006; Meseguer 2009; Sommerer 2011). According to the literature, such processes are particularly intense if stakeholders learn from close peers (Hall 1993).

In the case of the establishment of the APSA, learning processes can be observed in both the OAU and in its successor the AU. However the interviews reveal that the initial impulse for the creation of new institutions was based on two aspects in this particular context. First, the violent conflicts of the 1990s—and the circumstances accompanying them, both during and after—made clear that existing security institutions were insufficient to resolve current conflicts on the continent. The experienced impotence vis-à-vis those conflicts paired with the inefficiency of existing structures changed the thinking of African decision-makers.

The second observation is built on the first one, namely the existing but inefficient peace and security structures of the OAU/AU. The interviews in section 59 illustrate just how intimately decision-makers learned from their very own experiences. Interviews #15 and #27 reveal that the experiences with the OAU
mechanism and the Central Organ in the 1990s fed into the creation of the new security structures.

Interview Section 59: Lessons Learned from Own Experiences

And what we then later had as the Peace and Security Division and other parts of the AU were partly developed out of the lessons learned from the first days of the Conflict Management Division (#15).

I think it was really driven by what we learned from our own experience, from what we learned from our own experience regarding working with the Central Organ and also made by the ideals of the moment (#27).

It was not for lack of manpower or resources, for example, that Africa stood in apparent haplessness when a band of armed mercenaries took over Comoros last year! What is at the heart of the problem is the lack of political consensus on the kind of response Africa should have to such situations. It is, therefore, important to begin from a thorough examination of the political problems that have hamstrung effective action on the continent. This is important in order to understand how a new plan can be elaborated building upon the experiences of the past (ALF 1990, 28).

That this procedure is nothing new is divulged in the last row of section 59, where the report from a brainstorming meeting for the CSSDCA illustrates that, already in 1990, a similar procedure could also be observed. This demonstrates that, in the case of the OAU, a first starting point for the creation of new structures was the recollection of its own past achievements and subsequent deep discussion about how successful existing structures—institutions as well as policies—had actually been.

The OAU did not only learn from its own inability to react to those conflicts, however, but also from the disinterest of the international community. As visible in interview section 60, interviewees underlined that the initial spark for reform also arose out of this indifference overseas to the violent conflicts currently occurring on the African continent. As illustrated, African decision-makers not only felt abandoned and neglected by those abroad but also left to deal with these severe conflicts alone. As a consequence, a strong belief in the fundamental necessity of one’s own agency, and ownership of presenting problems, developed
on the continent. The ambition now was to show to the world that Africa was not only capable of handling its own problems but also that, as such, it should be respected and treated as an equal partner in international negotiations henceforth.

**Interview Section 60: Signal of Own Strength**

What happened in Rwanda, what happened earlier in Liberia, actually led some of the African leaders to believe that they had been marginalized and that they had been abandoned. And that the world was more interested in what has happening in the Balkans. It was a time for Africa to begin to own its own problems and begin to own its own solutions, and to demonstrate the capacity that if the world does not care, Africa will step up to the plate. And I think this was how some of these scholars or academics were actually able to win these leaders to their side, because that kind of argument will be good for any kind of political leader. Because politicians want to look good (#9).

Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations (OAU 2000c, Art. 3 (i)).

The challenge of the leadership in Africa is to create an Africa which is noticed for its strength and not for its misery and weakness. A strong Africa must be one which is economically integrated, financially stable, politically united, and with a distinct culture and set of values (ALF 1990, 2).

Following these considerations, there was a very strong belief and wish on the continent to take greater ownership of African issues. By thinking about new institutions, decision-makers thus aimed at bringing about a revision in how the AU handled peace and security issues and, at the same time, at showing that Africa was able to deal with its own afflictions. Interview section 61 illustrates that the OAU/AU did not aim to isolating itself in peacekeeping efforts but rather to be an equal partner—next to the UN—in the handling of peace and security matters. Africa’s leadership being on equal standing with international partners is, according to the interviewees, the goal of the AU.
Interview Section 61: “African Solutions to African Problems”

It is more a question of Africa taking responsibility for its own problems, and African leadership, so that others do not come and make peace on the continent; they can help us, but the primary responsibility must be an African responsibility. And that is really what African solutions to African problems means. It is sometimes reflected as, then, we want to deal with our problems in isolation. It is not the case because it is not possible, and I think all thinking Africans know that Africa needs the UNSC, and the UN system more than any other region globally. [...] What we have seen over the last twenty to thirty years is much greater African leadership efforts and engagement, and that has all been quite positive (#29).

It was the felt renewal of Africa taking charge of its own destiny and then playing a leading role or key role in addressing the peace and security challenges of the continent (#27).

All African states, by virtue of their membership of the African Union, recognize that unity is strength. We recognize also that it is only through the consolidation of our unity, that our continent will move from the periphery to a position where Africa will become an equal and effective participant in the world economic, political and social order (Essy 2002, 2).

This connotation of change and a new beginning is also reflected in the interviews of section 62. The ability to create something new and innovative had already been reflected in the Constitutive Act and its Article 4 (h). Based on that, African decision-makers orientated themselves toward existing security councils—but also keenly tried to establish something altogether new and more effective for the African continent itself.

Interview Section 62: Change in African Peace and Security Ambitions

People were believing while it would be really that we will start a new beginning, and therefore possibilities were open, new frontiers could be reached. So all that contributed to this giving birth. I mean, the protocol, which in my view even today, it remains one of the most advanced documents of this guide. When you look at the protocol, you would see very advanced in terms of progression and trying to prohibit as much as possible push back by a number
of days, extremely advanced with its council including how and where I refer to progression including the progression of genocide (#27).

We made sure that the UNSC, its global responsibilities, be acknowledged in the PSC protocol, and that therefore if you find that the slight dissonance between the AU’s constitution, which is really not that the UN does not feature that prominently, but within the piece of Security Council protocol there is a clear establishment of a hierarchy between the UNSC and the PSC. But that is because of the very strong belief and hope in the importance of the Security Council for Africa, and that continues to this day (#29).

Interviewees underline diffusion arguments by stating that, once this turning point of creating new institutions had been reached, existing organizations then served as role models therein. In the case of APSA the latter were, as already outlined, the UN and ECOWAS. But both of these bodies have not only served as role models but above all as organizations from which the OAU/AU has continued to keenly learn. The AU has learned also from their flaws, trying itself to improve on them (interview section 63). Consultants and decision-makers have played a central role in these learning processes, being individuals who have worked for and in all three of those organizations—acquiring and bringing new knowledge with them each time.

**Interview Section 63: Role Models for the APSA: UN and ECOWAS**

You can say that, to some extent, the UN was an inspiration as well as a lessons-learned for them in two ways. One was an inspiration, as some structures of it were created. But they were much more interested in learning from the flaws of the Security Council and trying to improve upon it. That is not necessarily driven by member states, but was driven by the consultants who worked on it. You remember that Margaret Vogt and her co-author happen to be individuals from the ECOWAS system. Margaret at that time worked for the Nigerian government and was aware of the ECOWAS Conflict Management and Prevention Division, and wanted to some extent draw on that and wanted it to inform the AU (#11).

In answering the question of which of the two organizations, ECOWAS or the UN, was the ultimate role model for APSA, answers were divergent. Whereas some interviewees stated that it was clearly ECOWAS that had paved the way for OAU
and AU with its own previous peace and security ambitions (section 64), others posited that the UNSC was, indeed, the most important such role model (interview section 65).

### Interview Section 64: Lessons Learned from ECOWAS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ECOWAS was really the frontrunner in terms of peace and security frameworks. There was not another person, not EDC, not ECCAS, not the Maghreb Union, nobody, it was just ECOWAS (#9).</th>
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<td>ECOWAS has been consequence and cause for the APSA (#19).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most of these things happened in the early 2000s and they have happened in the same footage. I do not see that we took a model from the UN, it is really reflecting the needs that were happening on the continent and also in international politics. And it was really more the focus on the regional approach. So, ROs started to be more active in the area of peace and security (#16).</td>
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What the interviews illustrate quite well is that ECOWAS was perceived as a rather positive role model based on its missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Furthermore, that West African body’s interventions painted a picture of a strong RO capable of breaking the cycle of full dependence on international support. As a consequence, the interviewees—when speaking about ECOWAS—referred only to the achievements of, but not to the potential problems in, ECOWAS’ peace and security architecture. When speaking of the UNSC, however, almost all interviewees pointed out the severe institutional problems that it faces. While commenting that the UNSC had indeed served as a certain kind of role model, all interviewees very quickly brought up their concerns about its institutional structure—and, furthermore, how strong the consensus was among decision-makers to prevent the new Peace and Security Council from making the same mistakes (interview section 65).

### Interview Section 65: Lessons Learned from the UNSC

| We obviously took our cue from the UNSC, and we were trying to look at ways to make up for the, what we saw as the deficits, within it (#29). |
To some extent, the Security Council acted as a model as well as what I consider to be an ideational setting. In a positive way, it helped to imagine what the African continent can create and then to be able to learn from the Security Council’s flaws. [...] At the same time, it limited the scope of the consultants because they have the Security Council. It made it very difficult for those consultants who were coming from those two institutions, from ECOWAS, and then knowing about ECOWAS and Nigeria’s intervention at that time in Sierra Leone and to think about how the Security Council had really helped. It limited them in terms of what they could imagine for the African continent. The limitations of the Peace and Security Council as well as its threats were driven in part by the UNSC, by wanting to learn from them (#11).

When speaking of lessons learned regarding the Security Council, interviewees often—unsurprisingly—made reference to the membership issue. According to them (interview section 66), a major problem with the UNSC lies in the permanent membership therein of certain states—a situation that can not only lead to institutional gridlock but that also exacerbates the lack of parity between member states. The latter shortfall represents, according to the interviewees, a crucial reason behind the non-adaptation within the AU itself of permanent seats or veto power for a select group of states—as equal standing among members is a determining principle of this RO.

The election of member states to the AU is based, as noted previously, on geographical distribution. Not only is it important to the AU to have the five African regions equally represented, but also to ensure a fair geographical rendering in the election process for new members of the PSC too. The interviews confirmed once more that the UNSC’s own difficulties initiated learning processes in the OAU/AU regarding the ideal design of the newly established PSC.

**Interview Section 66: Lessons Learned on Membership Questions**

Yes, we borrowed the idea from the UN but adopted it for the African circumstances because now you can see the difference here, for example, we have a principle of equal and sovereign states. So, they totally rejected the idea of veto [as in the UNSC]. There is no veto. But they accepted the idea of two rotational groups, one three years, one two years. So, it helps for the continuity and the institutional memory (#12).
And the problems of course affected these permanent seats, but at the same time [...] you wanted to acknowledge that those countries in particular that were regional powers, had to be able to be elected and reelected back to the council. And that's how the council came to consist of countries for three years and countries for two years. [...] The other factor that influenced the design is the importance within Africa on equity that every region has the same number of seats, and that the other, the non-permanent seats rotates or that countries be elected in an equitable manner. That the regions are equitably represented (#29).

Of course, there is no reason for permanent membership. [...] It was one of the options but some of the member states objected strongly and by trying to come around the issue, there is the idea with some members for three years and others for two years (#27).

However the UNSC not only triggered learning processes among decision-makers and consultants but also, according to interviewees, limited the possibilities the AU had for the establishment of its own council (interview section 67). AU decision-makers undertook intense debates about in what ways they should adopt certain useful features from the UNSC, while at the same time attempting to avoid taking on board those ones that had turned out to be problematic. Interview section 67 illustrates how certain of the choices made were so due to the negative impression of the UNSC among a number of AU decision-makers. The interviews divulge that some of these individuals would have preferred a new institution to be created that did not rely on the institutional design of one that they perceived to be ineffective (#10 and #24). According to interview #11, the UNSC acting as a primary role model prevented the relevant stakeholders from considering other institutions and their potential to offer guidance and inspiration to the AU instead—as the UNSC’s arrangements are as well-known as they are prominent.

**Interview Section 67: Limitations to Innovative Thinking**

We are already reproaching the UNSC to be something which is not acceptable to us, then we go on create something [similar] ourselves now? (#24).
The big picture is, the AU was modelled after the UN. Unfortunately, for the worst as much as the better, instead of trying to think on their own (#10).
9. Conclusion

9.1. Summary of Results

People often have no choice but to consult experts. [...] No one could acquire all of the specialized knowledge a person would need in order never to be reliant on someone else’s expertise (Code 1999, 182).

This thesis has asked why organizations resemble each other, how these similarities evolve, and what role stakeholders play in the decision-making process vis-à-vis institutional design. It has thereby situated itself within IR debates concerned with questions such as why organizations are created and why they look the way that they do. On the micro-level, this thesis has hence investigated why the security institutions of AU and ECOWAS not only resemble each other but also share similarities with the UNSC too. It has examined the pathways leading to these specific institutional design choices and has inquired after the role of stakeholders in the related diffusion processes. This qualitative study of (social) learning within diffusion processes has yielded the following core findings:

1) History Matters. The study has revealed in a very clear way that the past influences the present. The end of the Cold War marked a major turning point for the world in general but for the African continent in particular. Severe and violent conflicts have not only seen millions of people murdered on the African continent since the early 1990s but have also led to extreme poverty and famine as well as internal displacement. Whereas ECOWAS, among others, had to deal with so-called new wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, the OAU was severely challenged, meanwhile, by the genocide in Rwanda. Neither of these ROs ultimately managed to solve their respective problems in the immediate post–Cold War era. The UN, as the organization having the mandate to enforce peace and security across the whole continent, actually—along with an
increasingly disinterested international community—left Africa to its problems in the 1990s. The own sense of powerlessness and the neglect of the international community deeply influenced the subsequent discourse on peace and security on the African continent, and intensified the wish of African ROs to pursue greater self-determination. These crises and their consequences served, then, as triggers for both organizations to start thinking about creating policies and institutions that would be able to solve such stark challenges in future.

2) **Lessons are There to be Learned.** Both organizations, ECOWAS and the OAU/AU, learned enormously from their past experiences in conflict management. Whereas the OAU was almost paralyzed by its own powerlessness and unwillingness to take action in Rwanda, ECOWAS developed a greater self-confidence due to its own interventions in the late 1990s. Based on (supposed) success stories, ones in which they would not rely on international support, ECOWAS could claim itself to be a strong RO with leading ambitions on the continent. By revising its security institutions, ECOWAS aimed to gain greater status and legitimacy not only on the African continent but also in the eyes of the UN—wherein it was seeking to become a strong and credible partner when it comes to peace and security issues. By institutionalizing its own modified security structures, the OAU/AU meanwhile now wanted to signal to the international community that it was a strong organization able to find “African solutions to African problems.”

3) **Learning is not Learning is not Learning.** ECOWAS learned differently than the AU did. As the first RO on the African continent with an institutionalized security mechanism, ECOWAS particularly learned from its very own interventions in, among others, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. By taking the UNSC as a role model, it aimed at institutionalizing its frontrunner position in peace and conflict manners, as initiated specifically by the aspiring hegemon Nigeria. The AU, on the other hand, has learned enormously from ECOWAS. Being faced with the
horror in Rwanda and the complete failure to address this situation by both itself and the UN, the AU wanted to demonstrate that it would henceforth be able to cope with any own security problems on the African continent. Exemplary social-learning processes can be observed herein, based on the very close connections between these two organizations as well as the intense exchange of knowledge between them. By using the experiences of ECOWAS, and partly those of the UN too, the AU has thus strongly relied on diffusion processes.

4) Knowledge Travels. The study has shown how expert networks influence decision-making in organizations. As the latter rely on expertise that is not already internally available, they hence liaise with think tanks and consultants from whom they expect to acquire the necessary expertise for undertaking more fruitful decision-making processes. The thesis has illustrated that, in order to be successful, experts need to be well connected to the respective decision-makers, as they were in the cases of AU and ECOWAS. Due to the natural proximity between these two organizations, significant movement of expertise has taken place between AU and ECOWAS over the years. As part of this, not only have decision-makers moved between AU, ECOWAS, and the UN but so too have consultants very often worked for more than one of these organizations. Thereby networks developed, knowledge could diffuse, and learning processes have thus been facilitated.

9.2. Contributions of This Study

This thesis regards itself as a key contribution to IR research in general and diffusion debates in particular. By having conducted a qualitative study on why organizations share institutional similarities and how those similarities have evolved, this thesis contributes to the current corpus of research in both theoretical and empirical ways. As a study on learning mechanisms, it enriches the current state of the art in a number of vital directions.
First, this thesis has not only shown how influential IOs are for ROs but also how the latter significantly influence each other too. By underlining the importance of networks, this thesis has illustrated how stakeholders connect to each other across borders. It has shown how knowledge that has been used in one RO travels to another on the basis of identical expertise being used in analogous organizations. This thesis has thus taken a first step toward exemplifying the relationship between ROs existing on the same continent, and how they, on the one hand, work closely together and share staff and expertise while, on the other, also compete for legitimacy and influence on their home continent.

Second, this thesis has furthered diffusion research with the empirical foundations that it has laid. As the majority of the literature on diffusion mechanisms is conducted quantitatively, microperspectives on the actual processes involved are still heavily outnumbered. This thesis has taken an in-depth look, then, at what actual happened where, and when—and who exactly was involved. By tracing the actual learning processes occurring and by having conducted numerous interviews with the involved stakeholders on all sides—meaning the decision-makers in AU and ECOWAS as well as the experts hired as consultants to both ROs—this study offers profound insight into pivotal learning mechanisms—something that is very scarce at present in diffusion research.

Third, there is currently a vast amount of literature on diffusion mechanisms but hardly any at all on related stakeholders. By extending the perspectives, then, on the actual core of diffusion processes—who shares knowledge with whom, and under which specific conditions—this thesis has taken a first step toward combining diffusion research with the literature on key stakeholders in decision-making processes. It underlines not only how important knowledge is in a world more complex than ever, but also illustrates how powerful well-connected experts can be in determining international politics.

Fourth, the literature on diffusion is mainly concentrated on the EU as well as on such processes running from the Global North to the Global South. By conducting research on diffusion processes between ROs on the African continent, therefore, a hitherto heavily neglected research field has now been moved to the center of our interest.
Fifth, this study has shown on a micro-level how organizations are established. In contrast to the dominant rational-choice approaches that argue states design organizations according to their own preferences, this study has shown how decision-makers in ROs learn and how consultants and think tanks facilitate this in processes of establishing regional and international organizations.

### 9.3. Agenda for Future Research

Although this thesis strived to begin filling in key research gaps previously identified, not all of these shortfalls in the literature could be overcome here. On the contrary, in fact; by researching in-depth the raised scholarly questions, more research fields have been identified that need to be urgently addressed in future academic endeavors.

This thesis has revolved around the AU and ECOWAS—who are not only the two most prominent ROs on the African continent but also the most powerful African ones too. It would be helpful to now extend research not only to other African ROs but also to ones operating in Asia and the Americas too. Thereby, one could answer questions about to what extent diffusion mechanisms and stakeholders differ across world regions. As some of these other ROs already have been included in quantitative studies, more qualitative and in-depth research on them would be particularly helpful to better understand the driving forces behind their respective diffusion mechanisms and why they have opted for given institutional design choices.

As outlined, the present thesis could not find answers for all pillars of the APSA—as there is insufficient available data for the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. As both are crucial components of the APSA, it would be very interesting to find additional sources that may enable us to trace the processes leading to their eventual institutional designs.

Theoretically, this thesis has been a classic diffusion study. As diffusion theory operates with concepts such as agency and cultural entanglement, further research should integrate the debates much more closely into cultural studies and anthropological research going forward. For the questions of why organizations
look similar and how that has come about, agency is a crucial component—particularly against the backdrop of the diffusion processes from IOs to ROs that have partly been the focus of the present research. The same holds true for cultural studies, which ask similar questions—but would answer them differently.

Methodologically, (historical) process tracing has turned out to be a useful tool with which to reproduce the relevant processes. However, as networks turned out to be a crucial component of the present research field, in-depth network analysis was not only able to tell us more about the involved stakeholders but also about the ties between them—and furthermore how the relations between one another have induced flows of vital expertise. Consequently stakeholders in decision-making processes should assume center stage in future research, as they are the agents of indispensable knowledge—and, therefore key players in international relations.
10. Bibliography

10.1. Literature


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10.2. Legal Sources


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## 10.3. Interviews

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11. Assurance


4. Des Weiteren ist mir bekannt, dass Unwahrhaftigkeiten hinsichtlich der vorstehenden Erklärung die Zulassung zur Promotion ausschließen bzw. später zum Verfahrensabbruch oder zur Rücknahme des erlangten Titels berechtigen.
Appendix

Guideline Expert Interview

1. General Information
   1) Name of Interviewee
   2) Current Position of Interviewee
   3) Position with relationship to AU and/or ECOWAS

2. Information regarding Security Institutions of AU and ECOWAS
   1) To what extent is your work related to security organs of both ROs?
   2) Have you been involved in the establishment of these security organs?
   3) If yes, what was your precise tasks?
   4) How would you describe your influence in establishing the security organs of AU and ECOWAS?
   5) Please describe the discussions with regard to the institutional design of both security institutions. Related to this question, why are both security institutions institutionalized as they are?
   6) Did other security mechanisms of international or regional organizations serve as a role model?
   7) As I am researching on policy networks, how would you describe the influence of those stakeholders in establishing APSA?
   8) What stakeholders/ which countries have influenced the emergence process of the most?

3. Network of Interviewee
   1) Please name other people who you have worked with in relationship to AU and ECOWAS. Do you have any contact details?
   2) Please name other people from whom you know they were involved in establishing both security institutions. Do you have any contact details?