GOD HELP THE GIRL: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND PROSTITUTION POLICY DEBATES IN POLAND AND THE PHILIPPINES

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God Help the Girl: The Catholic Church and Prostitution Policy Debates in Poland and the Philippines

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to determine the policy stances of the Catholic Churches in Poland and the Philippines regarding the issue of prostitution. It endeavors to explain why these stances diverge, despite the two Churches ostensibly having the same core theology, and similar levels of sexual conservatism. I argue that the difference can be best explained by treating both Churches as interest groups, which are subject to interest-based moral panics in the right circumstances. As such, both Churches have a vested interest in maintaining their positions as putative national guardians. This position is the source of their moral authority, which they channel into political influence that preserves their power in a secularizing world. Engaging in issues that touch greater national anxieties is a way to maintain moral authority as a national Church.

I argue that the Philippine Church's position is increasingly abolitionist. As time passes, prostitution is

ever more conflated with human trafficking, and virtually all prostitutes are considered to be victims of sexual and economic exploitation. An abolitionist position serves the Church's political interest because, in the Philippines, prostitution has become a metonym for the exploitation of the nation by foreign powers. Prostitution of women and children is strongly associated with sex tourism, or prostitution in the service of the American military: it is a reminder of the Philippines' perceived status as a poor country and a neo-colony. Hence, to address prostitution is to defend the Filipino nation against abstract foreign threats, which are given concrete form in the person of the sex tourist.

The Polish Catholic Church, however, has not developed a coherent policy stance. It occasionally denounces foreign prostitutes, but also treats prostitutes of both Polish and foreign nationality as victims of human trafficking. More frequently, prostitutes are seen as victims of individual and familial dysfunction, whose rehabilitation and healing take place largely outside the sphere of the state and its policy instruments. This incoherent approach, too, can be explained with recourse

to moral panic theory: the Polish context operates in such a way that a prostitution- related moral panic is *not* in the Polish Catholic Church's organizational interest. Prostitution is *not* a metonym for national exploitation, and foreign prostitutes are not seen as major threats to the nation, either. There is also little incentive to portray prostitution as a large, systemic problem, as doing so would return Poland to the status of poor, post-communist country, which it seeks to transcend. A more individualistic problem narrative allows the Church to present itself as the defender of vulnerable women, without introducing narratives that might interfere dangerously with other advocacies.

As such, this thesis joins the body of literature that examines Churches as interest groups, arguing for more political and sociological explanations to explain policy positions.

Gott helfe dem Mädchen: Die katholische Kirche und die politische Debatte um die Prostitution in Polen und den Philippinen

Diese Dissertation zielt darauf ab, die politischen Positionen der katholischen Kirche in Polen und auf den Philippinen in Bezug auf das Thema Prostitution zu bestimmen. Sie unternimmt den Versuch zu erklären, warum diese Positionen divergieren, obwohl die beiden Kirchen augenscheinlich die gleiche Kerntheologie und einen ähnlichen Grad an sexuellem Konservatismus vertreten. Ich vertrete die These, dass diese Divergenz am besten erklärt werden kann, indem beide Kirchen als Interessengruppen behandelt werden, welche unter den richtigen Umständen interessenbasierter moralischer Panik unterliegen. Als solche haben beide Kirchen ein ausdrückliches Interesse daran, ihre Position als mutmaßliche Bewahrerinnen der Nation aufrechtzuerhalten. Die aus dieser Position resultierende moralische Autorität nutzen sie zur Legitimierung ihres politischen Einflusses, um ihre Macht in einer säkularisierten Welt zu erhalten. Sich in Fragen zu engagieren, die größere nationale Ängste ansprechen, ist

eine Möglichkeit, die moralische Autorität als nationale Kirche zu erhalten.

Ich lege dar, dass die Position der philippinischen Kirche zunehmend abolitionistisch ist. Im Laufe der Zeit wird Prostitution immer mehr mit Menschenhandel verknüpft, und praktisch alle Prostituierten werden als Opfer sexueller und wirtschaftlicher Ausbeutung betrachtet. Eine abolitionistische Position dient dem politischen Interesse der Kirche, weil Prostitution auf den Philippinen zu einem Metonym für die Ausbeutung der Nation durch ausländische Mächte geworden ist. Die Prostitution von Frauen und Kindern wird stark mit dem Sextourismus oder der Prostitution unter dem Dienst des amerikanischen Militärs in Verbindung gebracht: Sie erinnert an den wahrgenommenen Status der Philippinen als ein armes Land und als Neo-Kolonie. Sich mit der Prostitution zu befassen, bedeutet daher, die philippinische Nation gegen abstrakte ausländische Bedrohungen zu verteidigen, die in der Person des Sextouristen konkrete Gestalt annehmen.

Die polnische katholische Kirche hingegen vertritt keine einheitliche politische Haltung. Gelegentlich

verurteilt sie ausländische Prostituierte, gleichfalls behandelt sie aber sowohl polnische Prostituierte als auch die ausländischer Nationalität als Opfer des Menschenhandels. Häufiger werden Prostituierte als Opfer von individuellen und familiären Dysfunktionalitäten gesehen, deren Rehabilitation und Heilung weitgehend außerhalb der Sphäre des Staates und seiner politischen Instrumente stattfindet. Auch dieser inkohärente Umgang lässt sich mit Rückgriff auf die Moralische Paniktheorie erklären: Der polnische Kontext funktioniert so, dass eine prostitutionsbedingte moralische Panik nicht im organisatorischen Interesse der polnischen katholischen Kirche liegt. Prostitution ist kein Metonym für nationale Ausbeutung, und auch ausländische Prostituierte werden nicht als große Bedrohung für die Nation angesehen. Hier ist Prostitution *kein* Inbegriff der nationalen Ausbeutung, und ausländische Prostituierte werden auch nicht als große Bedrohung für das Wohl der Nation wahrgenommen. Ebenso gibt es wenig Anreiz Prostitution als großes systembedingtes Problem zu bezeichnen, da diese Darstellung Polen zum vorherigen Status eines armen,

post-kommunistischen Landes zurückführen würde, welchen es zu überwinden sucht. Ein mehr individualistisches Narrativ gestattet der Kirche hingegen sich als Verteidiger wehrloser Frauen hinzustellen ohne durch diese Betrachtungsweise andere Interessengebiete zu beeinträchtigen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund reiht sich diese Doktorarbeit in den literarischen Diskurs ein, welcher Kirchen als Interessengruppen untersucht und auf Basis politischer und soziologischer Erklärungsmodelle politische Positionen aufzeigt.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

A. Preface

The topic of this thesis has very long roots in my academic experience, as well as observations of my own cultural context. Growing up in Metro Manila means breathing Catholicism in along with the car exhaust. Indeed, driving down EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue), one of the city's main thoroughfares, displays very well the prominence of religion, and specifically Catholicism, in national life. EDSA, perennial site of mass demonstrations and perpetual site of mass traffic jams, is watched over by a shrine to Mary, Queen of Peace. This monument is topped by a massive bronze sculpture of Our Lady of EDSA, smiling serenely, two metal birds perched on her arms. One might notice—that is, if the eye has not learned to ignore it through years of habit—that a significant proportion of the vehicles passing below Our Lady have rosaries hanging on their windshields. If one boards a bus or jeepney, one may also see several fellow passengers crossing themselves as the driver starts the engine. In such a setting, it is often easy

to take Catholicism for granted as part of both private belief and public life.

Then again, as someone who spent her childhood attending international schools (the first Episcopalian, the second non-denominational), I perhaps grew up one or two steps removed from mainline Filipino Catholicism. Many of my closest friends were Hindu or Muslim, and my classmates and I had many opportunities to learn about other religious traditions. The combination of immersion and distance regarding Catholicism in my upbringing may have helped me find my way to the academic exploration of Catholicism's socio-political role. Also, perhaps this familiarity with other options for spirituality is one reason I, during a period of disappointment with (Filipino) Catholicism, did not find it too difficult to think about converting to another Christian denomination. It was only during university, in the course of my theology classes, that I experienced how one could be critical of various doctrines, customs, and institutional practices, and yet still have a space within the billion-strong community of the global Church. There is room for criticism, questioning, and even doubt, as one becomes more sensitive to the

ambiguities within a spiritual belief system.

One incident stands out in my mind as exemplifying how Catholicism and its stance on socio-political issues is far from self-evident. It happened during one of my required theology classes at the Ateneo de Manila University. This class was called "Marriage, Family Life, and Human Sexuality," and covered the official Vatican stance on sex and relationships, while examining how such teachings are applicable to life in the Philippines. During one particular lecture, a group of my classmates were giving a presentation on a topic of their choice, using the Filipino indie film *Live* Show, set in the world of underground sex performances, as a lens to discuss distinctions between art and pornography, and also to comment the (im)morality of prostitution. They ended their presentation by stating that, while poverty pressured some people into prostitution, it was still possible to choose other work, which made prostitution an immoral choice of livelihood. Watching them, I did get the feeling that they said this in a rather understandable attempt to please the professor. However, the professor in question, Dr. Asis, surprised us by politely disagreeing:

he stated that many people in the sex trade have no other viable livelihood options. If anyone is to be blamed, it is the pimps and customers who take advantage of their desperation.

As a licensed Catholic theologian, Dr. Asis would have been propagating the stance of the Vatican, or at least not deviating very far from it. Even so, my classmates had somehow absorbed the idea that mainline Catholicism would condemn prostitutes for selling sex, without counting poverty as a mitigating circumstance.

This class discussion has remained in my mind over the years. I have been fascinated about how such starkly opposing views about the morality of prostitution can both be supported with recourse to religious, and specifically Catholic, beliefs. Indeed, what exactly is "the" Catholic or "the" Church position on any social, political or legislative issue, and how can one find this out, describe it, and explain it?

Such considerations stayed with me when I eventually researched my first master thesis, regarding the construction of the figure of the adult prostitute in Philippine law. At the time, this project did not focus on

the role of the Church, which was studied as just one of the many actors helping to implement, discuss, and evaluate these laws. However, I found that links to Catholic sexual morality could be found throughout the interpretation and practice of both national and local policies regarding prostitution. This intersection between religion and law was a topic I hoped to explore more later.

This was also around the time that the debates around reproductive health legislation in the Philippines reached a fever pitch. The Church hierarchy, or at least, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), seemed to be focusing a great deal of their energy on obstructing the bill's passage. Critics lambasted the CBCP and its allies for disrespecting Church- state separation and insensitive to the plight of poor families who were most likely to be affected by unplanned childbearing, maternal death, etc. The controversy led to larger discussions about the proper role of religion in Philippine politics and national identity.

Academic responses to the debate also exposed differences in the way various Church actors handled the issue. The Dominican-run University of Santo Tomas

publicly threatened to fire all faculty who openly expressed support for this bill. On the other hand, the Ateneo, which is run by Jesuits, officially hewed to the CBCP's anti-bill stance while emphasizing the academic freedom of its faculty to speak out in favor of the bill if they so wished. Newspapers circulated a slowly-growing list of Ateneo faculty—who of course claimed to be supporting the bill as individual academics rather than representing the institution itself—expressing their support for the proposed law. On a personal note, I did attempt to have my name added to the list, but was unable to contact its compilers in time due to already having traveled to Germany for further studies.

The RH bill became one of the most controversial topics in Philippine politics until its eventual passage into law in December 2012. The law faced further obstacles, as when its constitutionality was formally questioned by the CBCP before the Supreme Court, and later when conservative legislators quietly defunded some of its core initiatives. Statistically, however, the vast majority of people on both sides of the debate were certainly Catholic, and many quite devoutly so. Even then, their private and

political understanding of faith in action differed greatly. So, if there is such a thing as mainstream Filipino Catholicism, how many different currents fit into this stream, and in what ways do they flow with and against each other?

My reflection on such questions benefited from new experiences in Europe. The Master program that I began in Germany—Erasmus Mundus Euroculture—takes the issue of evolving European identity as one of its core concerns. Religion and its proper role in politics are at the heart of this discussion. Indeed, it seems that the more some of Europe's governments try to keep too much religion out of the public sphere, the more they need to have public discussions about it. Euroculture also sent its students to Krakow for a program-wide conference in our second semester. Krakow proved to be an eye-opening experience. Of course, we knew that Poland was close by, but it was still a surprise to experience how a deeply religious society was to be found just across the border from predominantly secular and, immigrant communities excepted, increasingly atheist Germany.

Following this, I began to research Poland's

culture and history out of personal interest, and found marked similarities with the Philippines. Through keeping up with European news, I found out that Poland was also undergoing heated policy debates regarding reproductive health, especially the question of abortion. In addition, European integration as well as the effects of Europe's steep economic downturn precipitated a loss of confidence in the government and fear about the country's future.

This is a time when questions about Polish national identity are being thrown into sharp relief. Discussing Church-State relations regarding a topic like prostitution might be a way to approach these questions—and the way may not be as roundabout as some people might assume. I prefer to close this preface with a note about the thesis' title. It was suggested by *God Help the Girl*, a 2014 indie musical film directed by Stuart Murdoch and starring Emily Browning. The movie is about an institutionalized anorexic who regularly escapes her mental health center and starts a music career. It has nothing to do with Poland, the Philippines, prostitution, or Catholicism. Its marginal religious

content, given the Glasgow setting, is probably more to do with Presbyterianism than the Roman Church.

While humming along to the songs, I began to think about the different ways in which the phrase "God help the girl" is or can be used in everyday language. This phrase, I realized, could express a variety of attitudes towards prostitution, depending upon the tone with which it is used. It might be said with sarcastic condemnation, pragmatic resignation, or as an earnest prayer for divine aid to a helpless victim of circumstance. The reference to a "girl" is also a nod to the highly gendered language used to discuss prostitution spiritually, legally, academically, etc. Clearly, there are also male prostitutes, and those who identify as trans or some other gender. However, much discussion around prostitution tends to assume that the prostitutes are female, and the way we talk about prostitution shapes and is shaped by our views regarding girlhood and womanhood. It is hoped that this study will contribute to a better understanding of what is really meant when influential actors talk about prostitution.

B. Introduction to the Research Question

How does a religious institution develop its stance on a policy issue? Researchers often look for theological explanations, pointing to scriptures or the teachings of important contemporary religious leaders. There is also much research into political religion that simply takes a policy stance for granted: the researcher's goal is to explicate *how* a religious body pursues its policy goals, and not *why*. (Dillon 1996; Bautista 2010; Uitz 2012)

The research project compares the Catholic Church in Poland and the Philippines, examining their attempts to influence prostitution and sex trafficking discourse in the post- Communist and post-martial law eras respectively. It determines the policy stance of each Church, and attempts to explain why the Churches have such different stances, despite being from the same religion and actually having surprisingly similar roles in national politics and identity-formation. Please note that this thesis focuses on Church *attempts* or *efforts* to influence policy. It does not try to explain the *actual* impact or success rate of Church influence on the end result of policy processes, as such a project would involve

too many variables/factors. The project pays special attention to the internal dynamics of each Church, and the divisions or factions within them. It also focuses on how each national Church may tend to reinforce the notion of national boundaries and national identities separating Us and Them, despite claims to inclusivity. I am also focusing on the time period following EDSA I and Solidarity, which counts as the start of the contemporary era of Church influence in each country.

The research questions might be phrased as follows:

1. *What are the policy stances of the Philippine and Polish Churches regarding prostitution?*
2. *Why do the Polish and Philippine Churches have such different policy stances regarding prostitution, despite being so institutionally, historically, and doctrinally similar?*

Theology explains policy advocacies of Churches to some extent. The impact of centralized, theologically-driven approaches to social or policy issues is especially clear in global Catholicism—currently the world's second-largest single religious denomination. Directives come from the Holy See, and national and local Churches presumably obey, according less influence to local

ideological debates or social circumstances. Indeed, the large gap between Vatican-mandated teaching and the needs of local parishioners drives some of the liveliest critiques against the global Church's approach to pressing issues like HIV/AIDS (Behren 2007) and family planning (Heinen and Portet 2010; Austria 2004).

The influence of top-down theological doctrine can vary greatly from issue to issue. Anna Grzymała-Busse identifies five issues that comprise the global Catholic Church's core policy concerns: "education, divorce, abortion, stem cell research, and same-sex marriage." (Grzymała- Busse 2015, 19) National Catholic Churches have relatively little freedom in deciding their stance on the issue and the degree of precedence it should take on their agenda. (Ibid) It is easy to see why Church advocacy—or interference, depending on one's perspective—on these issues is a favorite topic of researchers. Churches tend to be very vocal and sometimes quite influential on these core issues, making data gathering fairly easy. There may also be a great deal of public and academic interest in these advocacies because of their visibility. Finally, the presence of these

issues in the agendas of virtually all national Catholic Churches allows for easy cross-country comparisons. Grzymała-Busse herself used these issues to compare how different national Churches engage with government/state actors, particularly political parties, in order to pursue their policy goals. (Ibid)

However, a Catholic Church might be doing a great deal of its politico-legislative work outside the well-worn themes of abortion, divorce, and so on. We should not neglect to study the issues whose priority status within the global Church or national Churches is more ambiguous. These issues might not be as high-profile as those listed by Grzymała-Busse, but there are good reasons to suppose that a church could, if it wished, develop a detailed stance and advocacy regarding these problems. The local Church may have prioritized these issues in the recent past, or a body of teaching regarding them might already exist, even if it is somewhat small and incoherent. Advocates might also be able to connect these problems to the highest-priority issues without too much difficulty. These issues' ambiguous status means that some national Churches will become strongly

engaged in them, and others will not. We may also see significant ideological variation among the Churches that *do* become strongly involved in these issues. Such issues offer useful case studies for understanding how national Churches develop their own policy approaches.

Prostitution is just such an ambiguously important issue. It does not command the attention of problems like homosexual marriage or abortion. There are no encyclical letters devoted to prostitution. There are few modern theologians, and virtually none of international influence, attempting to extrapolate or develop a Catholic approach to this social question.

On the other hand, there is substantial basis for the Catholic Church to put prostitution on its policy agenda, as some modern national Churches have already done. Prostitution appears in some form in both Old (Carson 2015, 66-67) and New Testaments (Rosner 1998), so Church actors may extrapolate a coherent stance based at least partly on Biblical exegesis. There is also historical evidence that early Christian leaders took an active role in prostitution law debates. Harper argues that the early Church fathers greatly influenced the prostitution policy

of imperial Rome in late antiquity, culminating in the passage of abolitionist legislation during the reign of Theodosius in the 5th century C.E. (2013, 8)

Furthermore, prostitution impacts on the Church's core concerns surrounding marriage and family planning. Rampant prostitution arguably threatens the institution of marriage by offering convenient access to pre-marital sex. Additionally, if a significant proportion of commercial sex is done without reliable contraception, many female prostitutes are likely to fall pregnant, which can increase the demand for abortion. Of course, the Church might also object strongly if prostitutes and their clients *do* consistently use contraception, as this obstructs the procreative function traditionally attributed to sexual intercourse.

So, a country's prostitution laws *can* be a matter of great importance for its Church. But what policy approach should the Church promote? Which of the three main policy models— penalization, legalization, or abolition—is the most compatible with Catholic teaching? As I discuss in the historical background section, there are Scriptural, theological, and historical precedents for the

Church's pursuit of all these approaches. Thus, a national Church has a great deal of flexibility to develop its own policy approach to prostitution, leading to significant cross- country variation. Strong ideological variation has even appeared *within* national Catholic Churches, as happened in Germany around the turn of the millennium, when the government was preparing to legalize the country's sex trade. Caritas Deutschland was grudgingly in favor of the proposal, because it would allow prostitutes access to health and other services. ("Kościół. w Świecie" 1999e) The country's Episcopate, however, looked at the issue from the perspective of national morals. They objected to the government proposal, saying that it would legitimize the commercialized sexual abuse of women. (Ibid)

It is not enough to say that Churches in different countries will make different choices. Surprising divergences can exist between rather similar Churches, as well. The Catholic Churches of Poland and the Philippines occupy a similar place in their country's political and social lives. (Grzymała-Busse and Slater, 2015) They have both demonstrated similarly sexually-

conservative approaches. However, their approach to prostitution as a social or policy issue diverges greatly.

The Philippine Catholic Church has elevated prostitution to the agenda of its most powerful body, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), with two CBCP Commissions taking it on as a core issue. The Polish Church's engagement is much narrower, clustered around the work of an individual nun, Katowice-based Sis. Anna Bałchan of the Religious of Mary Immaculate.

The two Churches' policy goals appear to differ significantly, as well. The Philippine Church's advocacy is (mostly) abolitionist, aiming to strengthen and broaden anti-trafficking legislation. The approach of the Polish Church is much more scattered. On the one hand Sis. Bałchan's outreach work to trafficking victims and prostitutes is widely acclaimed, and she now operates with regular financial support from the Polish state. On the other hand, Poland's Episkopat asked the government to summarily deport Poland's foreign street prostitutes, treating the women as undesirable outsiders and violators of immigration law. The Church hierarchy has also avoided or failed in developing opposition to Polish law's

toleration of freelance prostitution. Plainly, one Church sees prostitutes as victims and hopes for the national laws to do the same, while the other Church has both weak engagement and an incoherent policy stance. The combination of a generally similar socio-political position, similarly conservative leanings, but great divergence on a specific policy issue allows for the construction of a Most Similar Systems comparative study.

Through this comparison, I hope to discover: whence this divergence? Why does each Church have its current approach to prostitution policy? Is there an explanation that works for both cases? I aim to demonstrate here that a productive avenue of research for such questions is to treat the Church as an interest group.

The search for a political explanation steers us beyond superficial rationalizations, such as differences in the scale of the problem from one country to another. As researchers might know from studying other morally-charged social problems, the empirical scale of an issue does not necessarily explain the scale of an actor's response to it. A statistically small problem may elicit a

large-scale and highly emotional response (Radkowska-Walkowicz 2012), while a large problem may be downplayed, or even fail to be framed as a problem (Behren 2007). Resorts to simplistic cultural explanations—i.e. the Polish Church acts the way it does because it is European/Slavic, and the Philippine Church behaves as it does because it is Asian/Malay—are, by definition, superficial and reductive.

If we are, as Warner says, to take churches "seriously" as interest groups (2000, 27), researchers can learn a great deal by devoting more attention to Church policy engagement beyond its most visible advocacies. My dissertation is a hopeful foray in this direction.

C. Brief Overview of Arguments

I now give a brief overview of the arguments I use to answer my research questions. Prostitution tends to be a very morally-charged issue, and some types of prostitution, such as coerced prostitution or child prostitution, tend to provoke even stronger reactions. Prostitution is prone to elicit the pattern of responses that Cohen (2002), Jenkins (1998), and other scholars have come to call a moral panic. This is when several influential actors, led by so-called moral entrepreneurs, converge on a highly-charged problem narrative. This heightened, often very emotional response can ignite and then fade without clear explanation. However, closer examination often reveals that the object of panic was a metonym or symbol for existential anxieties about community survival. (Jenkins 1998, 17) Moral panics may appear irrational or superficial, but they can leave behind very real and very problematic policy legacies, as laws are passed under great public pressure to address the problem immediately. (Ibid, 85) The laws can remain in force long after the panic itself has passed. (Ibid)

Moral panic narratives tend to pin blame on "folk

devils." (Cohen 2002) The folk devil might be a figure that is located *geographically* outside one's community, i.e. a foreigner. It might also be a deviant that originated from within one's community, but whose supposed monstrousness makes it fundamentally Other, such as a sexual deviant or member of a violent youth subculture (Cohen 2002, 2). There are also instances where these two kinds of outsider status fuse, as when the deviant next door is believed to have absorbed his/her monstrousness from foreign influence. In any case, the folk devil is a constructed Other that threatens the community or its future. The most frightening folk devils are those who remain hidden, or are first welcomed as friends. The folk devil can have a basis in reality, but is prone to accruing myths that can cloud efforts to address the original social problem. (Ibid, 202) As a moral panic spreads, the figure of the folk devil tends to become both clearer and more exaggerated. (Ibid)

Jenkins states that actors are far more likely to participate in a moral panic when the relevant problem narrative is compatible with their ideological *and* organizational interests. (1998, 7) Ideological interests

refer to the actors' stated goals and principles, and organizational interests refer to actors' need to maintain the necessary power and resources to survive in a competitive field. (Ibid) Catholic groups have highly malleable ideological interests regarding prostitution, because the Catholic Church lacks a clear doctrine on the issue. (Harper 2013, 140-42) Organizational interests might be more of a deciding factor, so I have focused on them as a source of my explanation.

The powerful Polish and Philippine Churches' organizational interest is to maintain their standing, which they have achieved in large part by positioning themselves as protectors of their respective nations. (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 15) However, a church's perceived role as national guardian can erode over time. (Ibid, 12) One way to counteract this process, I argue, is to take a role in addressing issues that are seen as threats to the nation in some way.

I show that, in the Philippines, prostitution is just such an issue. I nuance the issue further, showing how certain types of prostitution are seen as bigger threats to the nation than others. These are usually the sectors that are

perceived to serve foreign customers, because then prostitution becomes a metonym for the exploitation of the entire Filipino nation by Western imperial powers or global capitalism. Church involvement and advocacy is especially strong in precisely these sectors of the sex trade. The Philippine Church's strong reaction to the problem of prostitution is based on its understanding of the problem as a threat to the Filipino nation. This response aligns itself with existing frameworks that paint prostitution as a product of imperialism and its twenty-first century offspring, global capitalism. If the Church positions itself as a protector of sexually exploited Filipino women and children, it bolters its status as national guardian that deserves to hold on to its power. Consequently, Church actors wield their influence to broaden and strengthen abolitionist prostitution laws in the Philippines.

I had initially hypothesized that the Polish Church's prostitution problem narrative was the reverse of that in the Philippines: instead of foreign men exploiting local women, Polish actors assumed that prostitution was a question of foreign women corrupting local men. As I

explain in the data analysis sections, the Polish data refuted my hypothesis. Prostitution is *not* seen as a major threat to the nation. Though prostitutes are often assumed to be foreign women, their presence is not perceived as a major moral or medical threat to the Polish nation.

Prostitution is definitely perceived as a social ill, but there are too many competing understandings of its origin, nature, and extent. In other words, there is little agreement about who or what causes prostitution and who or what is affected/harmed by it. Prostitution is not strongly associated with exploitation by foreign powers. Furthermore, the Polish Church divides its concern between Polish prostitutes, foreign prostitutes in Poland, and instances of sexual exploitation happening far away from Poland and involving no Poles at all. This is why the narrative of an "Us" being sexually exploited by "Them" has not reified in Poland to the extent that it has done in the Philippines. The Polish Church's discourse has not pinpointed a folk devil, whereas the Philippine Church appears to have identified one in the form of the international sex tourist. Broad, coordinated engagement in prostitution does not serve the Polish Catholic Church's

vested interests, and they are more likely to allocate their resources elsewhere. We can now better understand why the Catholic Church in post-communist Poland has not engaged in a critique of Poland's current policy of tolerating a semi-legal sex trade.

D. Significance of the Research Project

The primary aim of this research project is to further scholarship regarding Church-State relations, arguing for the use of moral panic theory to explain the policy approaches of Churches as religious interest groups. The place religious institutions can or should have in democratic societies forms one of the most important ideological fault-lines globally. Scholars like Huntington claim that religious traditions—which would include fundamental attitudes about the interaction between religion and politics—help to divide the world along civilizational lines. (Huntington 2011) However, it is also arguable that generalizations about large religious or ethno- religious communities may sometimes be self-fulfilling. The identity constructions promoted by influential thinkers may have real-world repercussions in global affairs. Therefore, it is even more important to treat labels with care, especially with themes as fraught as religious identity.

In this case, it might behoove us to view Churches as interest groups. (Warner 2000) While that view in itself

has its own history of controversy, it is useful for understanding Churches' political options in a secularizing world. Moreover, it can help researchers to view Churches in a more neutral way, compartmentalizing arguments about theology and morality which might not be appropriate for certain research questions.

On this basis, I develop an inquiry into unexplored aspects of Church-State relations and/or Church engagement in policy formation. As I expound on later, many studies about Church engagement in policy debates take the Church's position for granted. The research is about *how* the Church tries to pursue its policy goal, and not *why* it desires a certain policy outcome in the first place. However, a significant proportion of Church policy engagement might focus on matters for which there is no clear, official doctrine. The development of a policy stance then depends on Church responses to the current socio-political context.

Moral panic theory can be a useful lens for understanding why certain Churches pursue certain policy goals in particular places and times. It may happen that

the Churches' response to a perceived social problem has very little to do with its empirical causes, effects, and scale. Instead, Churches, like other interest groups, promote problem narratives in line with their context-driven ideological and organizational interests.

This dissertation could also contribute to more nuanced, up-to-date research regarding the place and impact of the Catholic Church in various societies. The study aims to disaggregate the Church, emphasizing that, despite its strongly hierarchical, centralized character, the Church is also composed of many heterogeneous, sometimes conflicting elements. To be sure, this is a Church that often has to struggle against its own legacy, such as when it pushes for more compassion for (some) prostitutes, even though its strict teachings regarding (female) sexuality play a large part in stigmatizing prostitutes, or pushing "impure" women into prostitution. Maza argues that while is often taken for granted in scholarship that the Catholic Church will be a monolithically conservative or patriarchal voice with regards to matters of sexual morality, gender equality, etc., a close examination of its political role in various

situations sometimes undermines this view: in Chile, for instance, the Church was an early advocate for women's suffrage. (Maza 1995) Ideological cleavages on matters of sex and gender may also manifest politically.

The study also implicitly advocates more cross-regional comparative research. It is much more common to compare countries within the same region, or to compare two regions. It is my wish to be part of scholarship that encourages researchers to pay more attention to non-obvious comparisons such as Poland and the Philippines. Prevalent discourses tend to essentialize large regions of the world and/or large swathes of its population, and prevent researchers from asking pertinent questions. The terms First, Second, and Third World are widely used for a reason, but we must not forget that all three "worlds" are still part of the same planet.

Furthermore, this project examines the Church at a time of important ideological shifts, as spearheaded by its current Pope. Francis I has called for a greater emphasis on social justice issues as opposed to a judgmental attitude regarding sexual morality (Sieracka 2017, 123-24); prostitution, combining sexuality and economics, clearly

exists at the intersection of these foci. The current Pope has already had his seat for a few years, and it would be interesting to see if this has already significantly affected the issue under study.

Finally, the study was of course made with the hope of contributing positively to the debate around prostitution. Prostitution remains a pressing issue globally, especially since there is so much disagreement about the basic terms we should use to understand it. (Chuang 2010; Doezema 2001; Raymond 2013) Researchers have an important role to play in providing data and helping to build paradigms upon which governments and other bodies can base their strategies. However, one might also argue that scholarly debate on it has stalled—the topic is being discussed, but often along very well-established lines about whether one can or should legalize sex work. My review of the literature suggests that the angle from which I am approaching prostitution—as a way for the Church to flex its authority—has not yet been deeply explored. It is my hope that this study might provide a small contribution in stimulating this important debate.

E. The Thesis as a Comparative Study

One of the distinguishing characteristics of this dissertation is its comparative approach, and its choice to compare Catholic Churches in two countries that are only rarely studied together. It is apposite to do a review of other comparative studies involving Poland or the Philippines that, in topic, approach, or both, might have some bearing on this dissertation. I aim to demonstrate that comparing these two national Catholic Churches is not only valid, but can yield insights that have not been covered by previous comparative studies. I first demonstrate that the Philippine and Polish Churches, respectively, have become unique fusions of religion and national identity in their regions. Then, I show that these two Churches have become very similar in terms of their place in national public life, setting the state for productive Most Similar Systems comparative research.

It is true that the Polish Church shares some experiences and characteristics with those of its neighbors, which have been the bases of comparative studies. Patrick Michel compares the political role of

Poland's Catholic Church to its counterparts in Austria and Czechoslovakia (Michel 1991). A 2009 collection of articles on *Gender and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe* (Adamiak et al) offers some studies that compare Poland with its neighbors, or explore the political influence of is Church in the region. Much of this literature explores the way in which the Churches of Poland and its neighbors dealt with communism and/or its aftermath. (Coleman 1991; Della Cava 1993) Communism is ideologically opposed to religion, viewing it as another means of controlling and oppressing the masses. (Michel 1992) Furthermore, regimes with totalitarian ambitions tend to be suspicious of institutions that might function as alternate sources of authority. (Ibid, 5) Hence, the Churches of the region, whether Catholic or Orthodox, share somewhat similar experiences of repression under communism. They also experienced related issues in trying to reintegrate into the global Christianity after decades of relative isolation. (Della Cava 1993)

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, several of these Churches have undergone similar developments.

Significant among these is the rise of religious monopoly, which is fundamentally a backlash against the forced, top-down secularization of communism. (Froese 2004) The majority religion builds partnerships with the government, gaining special state privileges, as well as great public authority. (Ibid) This tends to occur at the expense of minority religions. (Ibid) It is a state of affairs which Poland ironically shares with its great Other, Russia (Levintova 2010, 1341-42; Stańczyk 2013, 309), where the Russian Orthodox Church has clearly forged special status under the Putin administration (Knox 2004, 576).

That said, the Polish Catholic Church is also quite distinct from that of its geographic neighbors, or fellow former members of the Eastern Bloc. The identification of Church with Nation was far stronger in Poland than in other CEE countries. During the years of conquest and partition, the Polish Church was seen as a guardian of national culture, preserving Polish identity until the day an independent Polish state could be resurrected. (Davies 2001, 196-98) Former clerics, especially Jesuits, often became prominent academics, who also contributed to Polish cultural conservation. (Ibid, 197) The situation was

rather different in Hungary, where the Catholic Church was often seen as a servant of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Coleman 1991, 117), or in Romania and Bulgaria, where Catholic institutions were less powerful than their Orthodox counterparts. Catholicism became a marker for specifically Polish identity, despite the existence of other Catholic populations in the region.

Poland's post-war demographic makeup left it not only more homogeneous than at any other time and its history, but possessed of the largest proportional Catholic majority of the entire former Eastern Bloc. At present, approximately 95% of the national population is both Catholic and ethnic Polish. (Kerr 1995, 168) The post-war communist era also cemented the Church's status as national guardian. The Soviet-backed communist state could not restrict the Polish Church to the extent that occurred in other eastern bloc countries. (Della Cava 1993, 260) It was aware that oppression only served to increase the Polish Church's influence, and fan public hostility against communism. The Polish Church became a site of resistance, providing a venue for alternative cultural expression and sheltering underground political

movements. (Davies 2011, 411-13) The Polish Church is widely considered instrumental in the toppling of Poland's communist government. (Ibid) What followed was a region-wide chain of events culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union, ending the Cold War in the United States' favor. (Levintova 2010, 1350) The Russian press continues to paint Poland in this light, holding Poland's anti-communist movement at least partly responsible for the eventual downfall of the USSR. (Ibid) Poland's distinct status as a regional leader in democratization rests partly on the special place of the Catholic Church in Polish public life. Far from being one of several post-communist Catholic Churches in the region, the Polish Church has attained a unique type and degree of political influence that extends beyond Poland's borders. (Davies 2011, 410)

Another reason the Catholic Church stands out from those of its neighbors is the frequency with which it is compared to its Irish counterpart. Ireland was likewise a conquered nation whose Catholic Church became a very important symbol and repository of national identity. (Kerr 1995, 3) Following the overthrow of imperial or

communist authority, respectively, the Irish and Polish Churches gained special privileges, including a very powerful and direct form of legislative influence. (Ibid)

Kerr's comparative study provides a comprehensive analysis of political and socio-cultural Catholicism in both countries up to the early 1990s. (Kerr 1995) There are important historical reasons for drawing parallels between the Churches in these countries, especially with regards to their roles while Poland and Ireland were conquered or fledgling states. Both national Churches suffered suppression by colonizing forces over the nineteenth century. After the completion of the Polish partition, "In Prussian and Russian Poland, efforts were made to suppress Polish culture and to buy up Polish land. The Catholic clergy opposed these efforts." (Ibid, 156) Catholicism in the Polish areas of a newly-unified Germany was targeted by Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*. (Ibid, 156) Kerr asserts that Tsarist repression of Polish Catholicism in areas under Russian rule was even more intense, especially since some priests had supported an 1863 rebellion. (Ibid, 157) In Austrian/Austro-Hungarian territory, the Polish Church was not quite repressed, but

still faced strong efforts to replace leaders with Austrians or at least clerics who were pro-Hapsburg. (Ibid, 158)

At around the same time, the Irish Church, especially after the 1800 Act of Union with Britain, was struggling to retain control over the appointments of bishops. (Kerr 1995, 158)[1] Such parallels, however, are not necessarily limited to this pair of countries or national Churches. One might find broad similarities to the situation of other Catholic Churches. Kerry argues that some of the major Christian denominations have cross-national similarities regarding their place in a Westphalian world order:

[1] One should not assume, however, that Irish nationalist movements were unitary in their approach to Irish Catholicism. The Young Irelanders of the 1840s were wary of the increasing enmeshment of Irish nationalism and Catholicism. (Kerr 1995, 159)

> "Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Churches tended to relate differently to government and to the nation. In Orthodox countries the Church was traditionally subordinated to a central state in a type of cesaro-papism. For Protestants, generally, the idea of an elect nation, based on the Jewish concept of a covenant people, was strong. Partly for this reason and partly because of the historical origins of Protestantism, often a result of a decision by the ruling prince, as with Henry VIII in England, the resulting structure of the Church was a national one. What chiefly differentiated Catholics was that they had their spiritual centre outside the state, in Rome. The consequences were important. Were [sic] Catholics were in a non-Catholic state, the governments regarded them as disloyal." (Kerr 1995, 160)

Kerr notes cases, i.e. 19th century Poland and Ireland, when non-Catholic conquerors attempted to use the Vatican's authority to convince subject Catholic populations to obey their rulers. (Kerr 1995, 160) Thus, it is no surprise that the countries' relationship with the papacy remained complex. "Right through the 19th century the Irish Church combined intense loyalty [to the Vatican] in matters doctrinal with a remarkable independence in matters political." (Kerr 1995, 165) In the 1830's, the Russian tsar circulated papal messages supporting obedience to his rule, while at the same time downplaying papal statements that criticized harsh

treatment of Catholics. (Ibid, 160-61) In this case, many Polish Catholics, including prominent nationalists like Mickiewicz proved *not* to be ultramontane, and expressed their sense of the Vatican's betrayal. (Ibid)

Catholic nationalism nevertheless prevailed in both countries, which awarded a special position to their national Churches upon gaining independence. The newly-independent Poland as constituted after the Great War contained a sizable one-third minority of the population who were "neither Polish nor Catholic." (Kerr 1995, 166) Still, the new constitution made space for the primacy of the country's Church. (Ibid) The 1937 Irish constitution also gave official recognition to the primacy of the Catholic Church. (Kerr 1995, 167) This trend towards greater conflation of Catholicism and Polishness would be greatly pushed forward in the coming war. The aftermath of World War II saw a differently-constituted Poland that was much less diverse than its predecessor, 98% ethnic Polish and absent virtually all of its prewar Jewish population. (Kerr 1995, 168)

Literature illustrates that there are strong and illuminating parallels between the role of the Catholic

Church in Poland and Ireland. However, it must be noted that several of concern times from the mid-1990s or earlier, before revelations of contemporary and historical abuse scandals rocked the Irish Catholic Church, doing much to damage its social and political influence. (Cullingford 2010, 255). Much of the literature concentrates on the sexual abuse of children. For a collection of accounts from the perspective of those most affected, i.e. the victims, see *Stolen Childhood: Testimonies of the Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse* (O'Doherty 1998).

The following years of disclosures and investigations led to the production of two government reports. The more general report was the Ryan Report, which detailed various kinds of abuse (corporal punishment, neglect, etc.) that took place in various care institutions run by the Church. The Murphy Report so named because the preparatory commission was chaired by a Judge Yvonne Murphy or the Dublin Report investigated the handling of child sex abuse scandals in the Dublin Archdiocese. (Wirenius 2011-2012, 476) It was released in 2009. (Ibid, 477).

The reports officially confirmed the general truth of the accusations put to the Irish Church, and accused various state authorities of abetting the institutional coverup. (Wirenius 2011-2012) As such, they helped demonstrate the dangers of having a very powerful Church not subject to oversight. The anthology *The Dublin/Murphy Report: A Watershed for Irish Catholicism?* gives a broad-ranging idea of the immediate impact of the exposed scandals on the Church's position in Ireland. (Littleton and Maher, 2010)

The overall implication from this body of more recent scholarly work is that the abuse scandals and their aftermath irrevocably damaged the socio-political standing of the Irish Church, leaving it in a very different situation from its formerly similar Polish counterpart. The Polish Church did not face significant, widespread accusations of sexual abuse comparable to those confronting the Irish Church. This until quite recently, around the 2019 release of the underground documentary *Tell No One*, which includes interviews with survivors, and their confrontations with their alleged abusers. However, reaction to the film's revelations about clerical

abuse did not translate into electoral results. The ruling Law and Justice party did not suffer from its partnership with the Church, and actually *gained* more power once the votes were tallied.

Unlike the Polish Church, the Philippine Church is rarely compared to other religious institutions in the region. Small wonder, as few other majority-Christian countries exist in Asia, with the exception of recently-constituted East Timor. Instead, it is treated as a fairly unique case, or compared to countries from different regions entirely.

Buckley, for instance gives us a rather thought-provoking, ambitious comparison of the Church-State relations in Ireland, Senegal, and the Philippines. (Buckley 2016) Ireland and the Philippines' populations are mostly Roman Catholic, while Sufi Islam predominates in Senegal. (Ibid) Buckley argues that, despite their marked differences, the Church and State mutually tolerate each other in all three countries because of the set of "institutional conditions" he refers to as "benevolent secularism." (Ibid, 2) To clarify, Buckley uses benevolent secularism to refer to "an institutional

configuration that (1) maintains *differentiation* of religious and state institutions, (2) institutionalizes *cooperation* between religious and state actors in the democratic public square, and (3) establishes what Rajeev Bhargava has called a '*principled distance*' between the state and diverse religious communities."[2] (Ibid, 22)

In sum, Philippine and Polish Catholic Churches have become quite unique in their region. It is, however, somewhat different to argue that these Churches also happen to be fitting comparison cases *for one another*. I affirm this very argument in the following paragraphs.

The close parallels between the Philippine and Polish Churches are the result of centuries of evolution in Church-State relations. Anna Grzymała-Busse and Dan Slater are among the few scholars who have examined

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[2] Perhaps Buckley overstates the "benevolence" of the secularism in the sets of Church-State relations he studies. For him, benevolent secularism prevailed in Ireland even during the years of greatest systemic abuse. (Ibid, 63) Ireland is still dealing with the immediate fallout of the abuse revelations. Buckley's claims that the twin tolerations and an underlying benevolent secularism prevail in the Philippines, are questionable, as well: the country remains the only full-fledged nation-state in the world without legal divorce, and has persistent problems integrating Muslim and pagan religious minorities.

these developments in detail. They argue that these Churches have attained similarly high levels of fusion with their respective nations, but through different historical processes. (Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2018) The Polish Church reached it via "fusion through struggle" against the communist state and other hostile regimes (Ibid, 546), while the Philippine Church achieved it through "substitution" of weak or non-existent institutions under various weak states (Ibid). When the state is a hostile, alien force, the Church and the people become allies in opposition to it. (Ibid) When the state is fragile, the Church steps in to perform its functions. (Ibid) Either path is a viable means toward religious nationalism, whether or not the Church consciously chooses it. It is possible to argue that the co-authors over-state the differences between the two mechanisms. The histories of both countries include subjugation by "alien" actors and chaos under weak states, sometimes simultaneously. However, they do take these nuances into account by saying that the two national Churches mix "struggle" and "substitution" in their path towards religious nationalism, but in each country, one mechanism predominates over the other. (Ibid)

The parallels between the Polish and Philippine Churches become more obvious in light of their recent history following Church-supported pro-democracy movements in the 1970's and 1980's. Hence, there is more literature exploring the similarities between the Philippine Churches and their political engagement from the 1980's onwards. Poland's Solidarity and the Philippines' People Power are occasionally explored as examples of the same general phenomenon of non- violent pro-democracy movements. One article each on Solidarity (Smolar 2009) and People Power (Mendoza 2009) are included in the anthology *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*.

A few Polish political scientists have studied People Power and its legacy, sometimes in light of how the situation in the Philippines might illuminate circumstances in Poland, or at least be relevant to the interests of a specifically Polish audience. One example is Łaszewski's 2009 book *Cud na Filipinach: rok 1986* (Miracle in the Philippines: year 1986), a theological text that portrays EDSA as a literal miracle. As for primary

sources, Kazimier Fekecz collected various international news and magazine articles regarding the immediate legacy of People Power for an issue of *Zeszyty Dokumentacyjne* in 1986. The issue's title is *Filipiny: Marcos Odszedł, Problemy Zostały* (The Philippines: Marcos is Gone, Problems Remain). In other words, the interest of Polish academics in the Philippine 1980's pro-democracy movement is small but still present. As of this writing, however, it is very difficult to find Philippine social scientists who have returned the academic favor.

The 2016 bilingual English-Polish anthology of brief scholarly articles entitled *In Freedom, In Solidarity* (Polish title: *Solidarni w Wolności*), edited by Clarinda E. Calma, stands out in the very small body of work comparing post-communist/post-dictatorial Polish and Philippine Catholicism.

Czech's contribution begins by stating that the undemocratic circumstances in which the two movements were embedded did have some fundamental differences. For instance, the Polish communist dictatorship was closely based on the Soviet ideological and bureaucratic model, and frequently resorted to open force against

opposition. (Czech 2016, 15-16) In the Philippines, on the other hand, the Marcos dictatorship was largely centered upon Marcos himself (and to some extent his wife, Imelda), while the country's communists were one of the Philippines' most prominent resistance groups, and state violence was supplemented by local and international alliances with various economic and political elites. (Ibid, 16-17) However, both regimes resulted in political repression and crippling national deficits. (Ibid, 17) Czech also points to differences in the 'dynamism' one might find in each movement (20). While the Polish movement was gradual, the Philippine counterpart was apparently much more sporadic (20-21). The pro-democracy/anti-Marcos alliances might have caught a Polish observer by surprise: "in the early 1980's…the largest oppositionist group against Marcos was the underground Communist group. Even nuns and priests inspired by a Filipino version of the Theology of Liberation joined these groups." (Ibid) Still, Czech reminds us not to go too far in imagining cooperation between the Communists and the clergy, especially on an overall institutional level. (Ibid, 21) While the relationship

between the Church and hardline communism was friendlier in the Philippines, ideological conflicts remained, and communism was sidelined during the final stages of the People Power movement. (Ibid) Czech points to two elements which were present in both revolutions, but more critical in one than the other. These were "persistence," which predominated in Poland and "self-sacrifice," which prevailed in the Philippines. (Ibid, 23)

Ultimately, however, the strongest common element between Solidarity and People Power was each country's Catholic Church, whose place in politics "gradually evolved…from one of critical collaboration with the government to [that of] a more decisive supporter of the forces of the opposition." (Ibid, 24) For instance, Church-run radio stations helped circumvent government censorship, and Catholic universities provided space for limited academic freedom. (Ibid, 24-25). The personal role played by Pope John Paul II in both countries, especially in pushing governments to minimize oppressive tactics to avoid international censure, is also pointed out by Czech. (Ibid, 25) The (official) ending of martial law in both countries is explicitly tied to papal visits and the

attendant publicity. (Ibid) Toralba's article in the same anthology begins with the opposite approach, enumerating the fundamental similarities between Solidarity and People Power (Toralba 2016, 27-28). The role of the Church is, again, a major connecting strand, but communism played starkly different roles in the two countries. (Ibid) Toralba also states that, while People Power successfully aimed at ending martial law-style dictatorship, that same style of regime persists in Poland. (Ibid) She then goes on to explore the extent to which John Paul II's theological/philosophical concept of solidarity can be found in the words and actions of the People Power movement. (Toralba 2016)

While the works mentioned immediately above are geographically close to the topic of this thesis, there exists at least one work—if rather obscure and methodologically questionable— Cebulak and Pływaczewski's study on the views of American and Polish Catholic priests on prostitution in their respective countries. (Cebulak and Pływaczewski 2007)

This source is valuable because it makes the historical evolution of Polish prostitution law accessible to

the English-language reader. (Ibid) However, while it explores *what* Catholic priests think about prostitution, it does not try to forward explanations as to *why* these views have come to be prevalent or how these views relate to real-life policy processes. (Ibid, 2-3)

As to methodology, the Church in each country is treated in a rather unitary way. Besides limiting the 'Church' to ordained male clergy, the authors treat the pool of male priests as a single group from which to take samples. For example, the authors "randomly chose two parishes from each of the 50 states" in order to geographically represent the different parts of the entire United States. (Ibid, 68) They also "randomly selected 100 parishes" from around Poland. (Ibid) Lists of parishes from national bishops' conferences provided lists of parishes from which to sample. (Ibid) This sampling method ultimately yielded only 13 respondents from the USA and 14 from Poland—i.e. not enough to use statistical methods of analysis, even in combination. (Ibid, 77) Despite this, the authors do attempt to use statistical methods (i.e. specifying mean, median and mode) when summarizing the results of rating scale responses on their

survey. (Ibid, 79-87) It is also difficult to locate the respondents within the power structure of their respective national Churches, as there is no information given about their rank, congregation, geographic location within the country, membership in clerical associations or Catholic organizations, etc.

As to research concerns, the authors are interested in variables like the respondents' views about the scale of prostitution as a social problem, the effect of the so-called sexual revolution and post-communist transition on "moral decay," (Ibid, 69) the impact of pornography on demand for paid sex, and the enthusiasm with which the selected priests hold their views on prostitution policy (Ibid, 70). They offer and proceed to test hypothetical explanations regarding the relative strength of the priests' policy views, but offer little discussion about *why* the priests would have said views—apart from simply conforming to Church doctrine. (Ibid, 81-83)

The study does give some brief results regarding the respondents' stances on prostitution law. Twelve of the fourteen respondents from Poland were in favor of criminalization. (Ibid,104) The authors' proposed

explanation for this trend is that the obvious disjunct between existing law and Catholic teaching encourages the prevalence of strong views against existing law. This is stated in relation to the US respondents, who were more generally ambivalent in their response to existing US policy, which criminalizes prostitution except in very specific localities. (Ibid) A single Polish priest respondent did say that a low number of legal/regulated brothels contributed to the magnitude of prostitution in his country. (Ibid, 92) In addition, one respondent from Poland suggested taxing customers of prostitution. (Ibid, 101)

The writers do attempt to draw conclusions about their mini-hypotheses, but given their questionable statistical approach to a very limited number of responses, it is difficult to say the degree to which these conclusions are reliable or useful.

Based on the literature review, I have chosen the Philippine and Polish Catholic Churches for this thesis, which, broadly speaking, is a Most Similar Systems study. I summarize this my rationale below, demonstrating the multiple levels of similarity in each Church's relations with its State and national community.

The two Churches have achieved similar levels of religious nationalism, which they have channeled into institutional access that generally serves their ideological and organizational interests. Catholicism has become an integral part of national identity in both countries, albeit via different historical routes. (Grzymała-Busse and Slater, 2018) Religious nationalism has lent each national community a sense of cohesion over centuries of conquest, partition, and/or ethnic division, but tends to shut out historical ethno-religious minorities. (Porter 2001; Majul 1999)

Both Churches are fairly large and well-established within their home polities. (Grzymała- Busse and Slater, 2018) There is a great deal of space for ideological differences to coexist within the Church, in spite of the hierarchical nature of institutional Catholicism. (Youngblood 1990; Ramet 2017) The various factions within the Church may also have the resources to promote their interpretation of Christianity, not least through their educational institutions or access to public schools. Both Churches have also striven to serve the needs of a large diasporic community.

There are marked similarities in the recent history of Church-State relations, as well. Both countries experienced popular, centrist, pro-democracy movements culminating within three years of each other. (Youngblood 1987; Czech 2016) The opposition movements had been operational for years prior, but finally coalesced into a more conservative undertakings with the national Churches in leadership roles. (Czech 2016) Church participation was considered instrumental in keeping the movements moderate and non-violent. Following the Solidarity and People Power movements, the Churches in both countries were able to send representatives who played key roles in formulating the new Constitutions. Each constitution bears some hallmarks of Church doctrine, such as implicit or explicit provisions enshrining conservative family values. Catholicism's special place in public life is acknowledged, as well, alongside provisions for secularism and the rights of religious minorities. The Churches continue to have highly controversial roles in blocking changes to policies around birth control, abortion, and marriage. Since the culmination of Solidarity and EDSA I respectively, each

national Church has gone through cycles of friendlier or more hostile relations with successive national governments. Until very recently, they have escaped sustained scandals around allegations of sexual abuse.

Additionally, there are methodological reasons for choosing these national Churches. Both Poland and the Philippines are surrounded by non-Catholic and/or more secular countries. As such, it is methodologically simpler to isolate the workings of each national Church from broader regional dynamics in public religion. Contrast their circumstances to those of Latin American countries, who have similar Church-State relations and levels of social religiosity, as well as a long history of shared imperial and neo-imperial experience. (Cruz 2014) Latin American countries have experienced a great deal of cultural exchange, inter-migration, and pan-regional religious movements. (Ibid) This is why it might be quite difficult to study a single national Church from the region and attribute the observed dynamics to the circumstances of that country. The Philippine and Polish Churches present less of an issue in this regard.

There are some similarities in their doctrines on

sexuality. Both Churches are known for their sexual conservatism, reflected in their aggressive efforts to restrict legal access to abortion and subsidized birth control. (Levine and Staiger 2004; Raffin and Cornelio 2009) Their overt political advocacy—or interference—about such issues has drawn harsh criticism, including accusations that the Churches wish to create theocracies or Catholic states in their countries. (Torres-Tupas 2015; Zamoyski 2016)

However, the two national Churches diverge considerably on the issue of feminism. The Polish Church opposes feminism on principle (Fuszara 2005), whereas the Philippine Church can form tactical partnerships with feminist or women's groups to address certain policy issues. The Churches' differing approaches to feminism can, to a large extent, be collapsed into a question of religious nationalism. (Sieracka 2017) In Poland, feminism (Ibid, 131-32) and, by extension, LGBT rights (Graff 2010, 595), are both associated with the militant atheism which was communism's official approach to religion. Communism in Poland promoted women's rights to employment, and, more controversially, their

easy access to birth control and abortion. (Sieracka 2017, 131) Abortion became a matter of institutional panic for the Cold War-era Polish Church. (Radkowska-Walkowicz 2012, 31) Feminism, epitomized by pro-abortion advocacy, was seen as profoundly un-Polish. (Graff 2010, 595)

The Philippine Church has a more complex stance towards feminism. Some policy goals of women's groups—easy access to birth control, legalized divorce—are indeed portrayed as un- Catholic and un-Filipino. (Tatad 2008) Then again, certain significant elements within the Church promote feminism, albeit a conservative understanding thereof which avoids the promotion of birth control and abortion. (Roces 2012, 54) They argue that authentic Filipino culture and true Christianity *do* encourage respect and equal rights for women. (Ibid, 54-57) Their goal is to rescue Filipino Catholicism from imperialist patriarchy. (Ibid) Consequently, the debate about feminism in both countries is, to a large extent, a debate about the ideological content of religious nationalism. The same underlying logic has given rise to differing approaches to feminism and women's issues,

depending on the nation's historical memory of these ideologies.

It is true that each Church faces a sex trade shaped by a different context. The Philippines, being a lower-income country, presumably has a sex trade with a higher proportion of persons entering prostitution out of dire poverty, as well as higher numbers of child prostitutes. That said, both Churches have considerable flexibility in choosing or developing a problem narrative about prostitution. Neither Church has perfect access to data about the true scale of prostitution. In both countries, prostitution is largely an underground phenomenon, and is poorly defined. Would-be moral entrepreneurs are free to inflate or deflate statistics. In effect, *each Church has some freedom to choose the facts or truths it wants to accept*.

There is room for each national Church to develop its own policy stance, without necessarily attributing all of the Church's rationale to the supposed empirical reality of prostitution. Indeed, the role of poverty in the Philippine sex trade might influence the Church's problem narrative, but does not dictate the Church's

stance. There are other issues, such as unplanned births among low-income families, in which the Church has held fast to its teachings rather than make concessions to poverty.

All these things taken into account, the Polish Church's stance seems more typical of national Churches in the last few centuries, supporting the rescue of repentant and/or coerced prostitutes while condoning the sex trade overall. (Chauvin 1983) The Philippine Church, however, appears increasingly abolitionist. The aim of this thesis is to a) confirm the existence ofsuch a fundamental divergence, and b) test a political explanation for it, based on Churches' organizational interest.

F. Structure of the Thesis

As background to my hypothesis and argument, I present a historical overview of how each national Church has come to occupy its current place in politics and society, demonstrating the remarkable parallels between the Polish and Philippine institutions. The thesis then lays out the necessary background information on my chosen policy issue, prostitution. I start this portion with a brief discussion of the Catholic Church's shifting, heterogenous teachings on the issue. Then, I set out the ways in which each of the two countries' sex trades can or cannot easily be described as a threat to the nation.

This is followed by a theoretical background section whose key ideas have already been touched on above. However, my more detailed theoretical discussion is divided into two main sections: Church-state relations and moral panic theory. Following from the theoretical and historical literature, I state my hypothesis and explain the rationale behind it. It is at this juncture, after having surveyed the literature and articulated my hypothesis, that I discuss the significance of this research project. I believe that this dissertation might prove useful to others studying

Church-state relations, and, to a lesser extent, provide fresher angles on well-worn debates regarding prostitution law. As I elaborate on later, the thesis also seems to be of interest and potential use to some groups who are actively involved in the policy debate, especially if they are looking for a meta-analysis of their own discourse or new ways to approach their advocacy.

The next chapters present my research methodology, followed by the data and analysis. My research strategy is patterned after previous studies in the moral panic tradition. Many such research projects observe and interview the advocacy leaders known as *moral entrepreneurs*, i.e. the people who market a certain problem framing to the public and the state. (Peters 2013) They also pay special attention to journalistic discourses surrounding a certain social phenomenon, in order to trace the process by which a problem narrative is formed and later widely adopted. (Watney 1996; Winegar 2014)

In keeping with these common traits of moral panic research, I have chosen a two-pronged approach to data collection that involves key informant interviews and document analysis. I have conducted interviews with

people whom we might call the Polish and Philippine Churches' moral entrepreneurs regarding prostitution, as well as the state actors who are most likely to interact with them. I combine this data with an analysis of the coverage from major Catholic newspapers in Poland and the Philippines. These publications have been selected for their political influence.

Since the final corpus includes hundreds of articles, I looked for general trends, rather than analyzing each piece in depth. Some of these trends were derived by the simple categorization of articles into pertinent categories. Other times, I used software-based tools like Word Clouds or collocation searches in order to illustrate the prevalence of important terms and themes.

My overall research shows that, while both Churches' frameworks have evolved, the Philippine Church's framing has become more and more monolithic, while its Polish counterpart remains far more heterogenous. Also, as the Philippine Church's framework reified, it became far more compatible with the discursive framework of a classic moral panic about the state of the nation.

The conclusion of this thesis relates the data to the hypothesis. I explain why the data from both national Churches generally supports my hypothesis, but the Philippine data offers stronger evidence than the Polish data. I also briefly explore alternative explanations and demonstrate why I do not believe that they offer stronger explanations than the one on which I have built my hypothesis.

The final portion of my thesis presents potential avenues for further research. Many of my suggestions have to do with expanding our knowledge of Church-state relations in Poland and the Philippines. However, I believe that at least some of my findings might be applicable to other national contexts, so I also suggest more wide-ranging or general topics for future projects.

F. Notes on Terminology

Before the reader proceeds further, it is important to deal with some caveats and clarifications regarding sensitive terminology. This pertains mainly towards the vocabulary surrounding a) prostitution and b) nationalism.

The terms of reference around prostitution policy debates are ideologically loaded. A researcher must be aware of the generally agreed-upon connotations, and take appropriate care in her own writing. For purposes of this thesis, I primarily use the term "prostitute" to refer to people whose sexual services are sold by themselves or others, regardless of their own degree of agency in the matter. I find this term to be the most neutral (Roces 2012, 52), as many other terms have already been associated with one or another side of the debate, or have been recently invented in order to promote a certain advocacy. When discussing the views of a certain actor in the debates, I may use the terms associated with that actor's ideology. For example, "prostituted women" may be used when outlining the arguments of abolitionists. (Chuang 2010, 1665)

Another potential issue is the use of the word "nationalist." By this, I mean ideologies that promote the view of a cohesive, dignified nation, which has the right to sovereignty, territory, and a representative state that protects its interests. One might articulate this view as the underpinning of the international order of Westphalian nation-states: every true, fully-formed nation deserves its own state. Therefore, it is important for polities to prove their existence as a nation in order to claim sovereignty and independence.

I understand that the very term "nationalism" has become tainted by association with fascism and xenophobia. However, I prefer not to replace it with alternatives such as "patriotism" since those carry other connotations which would be irrelevant or confusing for readers. Indeed, the potentially negative associations of nationalism should be acknowledged and confronted, since it is certainly possible for well-meaning efforts to promote national interest to slide into xenophobia and/or authoritarianism. That is not less true of the nationalist

interests discussed in this thesis.[3] In addition, this thesis does not argue that nationalism or concern for the national interest is either right or wrong. As far as this dissertation is concerned, national interest and nationalist perspectives are simply factors in the complex dynamics between churches, states, and societies. I would also like to remind the reader that nationalism need not be confined to any one portion of the ideological spectrum—there are left-wing nationalisms. (Hilhorst 2001, 215) Nationalism also need not be a strictly political descriptor: there are cultural and religious nationalisms (Grzymała-Busse 2016), an idea which is especially relevant to this thesis.

[3] For example, nationalism-inflected fears about the prostitution of Polish women/girls in the nineteenth century sometimes possessed xenophobic, Islamophobic, or anti-Semitic overtones. (Stauter-Halsted 2015, 131; Ibid, 6)

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND

A. Review of Related Literature

My thesis touches on multiple disciplines and strands of scholarship. I give an overview of the most pertinent ones here. These are the building blocks out of which I constructed my theoretical framework.

i. National Catholic Churches: Religious Interest Groups in a Secularizing World

Scholars who study political religion will eventually have to reckon with the secularization thesis, whether or not they agree with its essential tenets. This thesis, broadly speaking, holds that as societies modernize, religion is likely to gradually disappear from the public and to some extent even the private sphere. This is because modernization tends to cause differentiation or compartmentalization of various aspects of social life, so religion will become disentangled and separated from politics as part of this process. (Habermas 2008, 17) Public organized religion is also considered likely to

hamper the development of rational debate and other factors crucial to democracy. (Ibid) Assuming that modernization leads to improved quality of life and more stable polities, individuals are also likely to feel less need for divinity-centered cosmologies in order to explain and deal with suffering. (Ibid, 18) Furthermore, the rational basis underlying scientific and technological developments that tend to accompany modernization is often, though certainly not always, incompatible with faith-based belief systems. (Ibid, 17)

Jürgen Habermas, whose ideas are especially relevant to this thesis because of his work regarding the public sphere (Habermas 2011), also had a fairly skeptical view of public religion, especially in his earlier writings. He even made particular mention of his misgivings regarding some of the religious actors affiliated with Solidarity in Poland. Habermas' view of religion would evolve over time. While never stridently in favor of a strong public role for religion, he conceded that it helps individuals deal with personal crises (Habermas 2008, 18-19), and that its philosophies underlay many key democratic values, even in highly secularized polities.

Of course, there are counter-theories and counter-evidence against this thesis. Critics of the secularization thesis often point to an inherent Eurocentrism, manifested in the assumption that the path taken by Western Europe heralds the natural and/or ideal development for all states. (Davie 2010) They may also argue that modernity is quite heterogeneous, and that there are varieties of it that can develop without secularization. (Ibid) Indeed, some societies considered quite modern— the United States comes to mind—seem to be becoming *less* secular. Such criticisms are now quite common in the academe, so that opposition to the secularization thesis can be considered a mainstream rather than marginal position.

There are also views that fall between the embrace and rejection of the secularization thesis. Habermas, once again, provides a useful example. Later in his career, Habermas, while acknowledging critiques against the secularization thesis, has outright rejected it *per se*. He does admit that its supporters often approach secularization from a Eurocentric perspective. (Habermas 2008, 18) However, he states that much of the supposed erroneousness attributed to this thesis stem from a lack of

nuance and clarity in its main concepts. (Ibid) Once these adjustments are made, one can more easily see that there is more empirical evidence in support of the thesis than some of its critics believe.

Köhrsen questions some of the basic terms used in the secularization debate, not least "religion" itself. (Köhrsen 2012) He argues that most authors have been overly broad in their understanding of religion, counting certain kinds of public engagement as such when they are not exactly based on religion or appeals to divine authority. (Ibid) Hence, the supposed post-secular resurgence of public religion might be based on false premises. (Ibid, 278) *Any* kind of public engagement by Churches or religious actors is read *as religious*, even if it appeals only to secular principles. (Ibid, 278-79) However, it does not appear that many other scholars have taken up Köhrsen's challenge to agree upon more specific definitions of basic terms.

Debate around secularization theory also focuses on why and how some societies are *not* very secular. For instance, Conrad discusses how societies are slow to secularize—and may even be sacralized—in cases where

religion becomes closely bound with national identity and independence. (Conrad 2004) Sexual morality—especially the conduct of women—tends to have a special role to play in such contexts. The gender roles and sexuality of women often become highly policed and politicized—the proper woman is both the guardian of the nation, and the symbol of the nation whose purity must be protected by its men. (Ibid) One may imagine that the national border becomes inscribed on and through the bodies of citizens—especially female ones. In practical terms, this may be one reason why the international aspects of sex trade/trafficking tend to get more attention/stronger reactions than the domestic facets. (Mariano 20120 When multiple nationalities or international borders are involved, such encounters can become micro- reenactments of narratives of conquest and invasion. (Ibid) These narratives come into play less during domestic/non-international encounters.

For his part, Alfred Stepan critiques the idea that public religions, or public roles for religion, are necessarily anathema to functioning democracy.

He reminds us that many well- established secular, liberal democracies are not quite as secular as we tend to believe. (Stepan 2000, 41) The UK's Church of England, Christian Democratic parties in Germany and Austria, and the German church tax are cited as examples. (Ibid) More secularism or a smaller public role for religion do not necessarily equate or correlate to more democracy within a polity. In addition, religious groups and churches, like other civil society groups, can a) help citizens organize themselves in order to make their voices heard in the public sphere, and b) curb the power of governments. (Ibid, 39) Stepan states some basic tenets by which governments and religious groups can functionally and respectfully coexist in a democracy:

> "Democratic institutions must be free, within the bounds of the constitution and human rights, to generate policies. Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate public policy to democratically elected governments. At the same time, individuals and religious communities, consistent with our institutional definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to worship privately. In addition, as individuals and groups, they must be able to advance their values publicly in civil society and to sponsor organizations and movements in political society,

> as long as their actions do not impinge negatively on the liberties of other citizens or violate democracy and the law. This institutional approach to democracy necessarily implies that no group in civil society—including religious groups—can *a priori* be prohibited from forming a political party. Constraints on political parties may only be imposed *after* a party, by its actions, violates democratic principles. The judgment as to whether or not a party has violated democratic principles should be decided not by parties in the government but by the courts." (Stepan 2000, 39-40)

Stepan lists four broad types of state-church relations that may exist in democratic systems, three of which are one of which is relatively less stable than the other three. The most stable patterns are termed "secular, but friendly to religion" "nonsecular, but friendly to democracy," and "sociologically spontaneous secularism." (Ibid, 42) The less stable pattern is termed "very unfriendly secularism legislated by majority, but reversible by majority," its unsteadiness stemming from its element of force. (Ibid)

Stepan's key tenets may be compared to Habermas' later ideas about the socio-political role of religion. Habermas, for his part, concedes that religion serves as a solace for individuals. His co-written book

with Cardinal Ratzinger was a surprising and interesting move in this direction. (Habermas and Ratzinger 2005) However, Stepan is still much more strident than Habermas is about the notion that political organization under a religious banner can, within certain limits, contribute to democracy. (Stepan 2000)

Stepan also takes pains to make clear that the attainment of mutual toleration does not, and should not, mean the end of evolving Church-state relations. (Ibid, 52) The currently-appropriate boundary on the influence of either actor may no longer be fitting in some future context. (Ibid) Furthermore, it may also happen that either the Church or the state/government might become too hostile, powerful, or commingled with its counterpart as time passes. (Ibid) Therefore, continuous observation and dialogue is necessary in order to maintain this balance of mutual toleration and appropriate cooperation. (Ibid)

Another way to analyze Church-State relations is drawn from the work of Michel. (Michel 1991) Michel posits three different "levels" on which religious actors can intervene in politics. (Ibid, 15-16) A Church or other religious actor may work "below" the level of

conventional political processes, informing and shaping the basic terms and symbols people use to discuss and understand politics. (Ibid, 16) Alternatively, they may work at the same level as such processes, becoming visible as another political actor that lobbies for policies, speaks for or against politicians, etc. (Ibid) Finally, religious actors may also operate "above" the level of politics, seemingly more concerned with universal principles than with power dynamics on the ground, so to speak. (Ibid, 15) Intervention at the same level as conventional politics is what people usually have in mind when they speak about Churches in politics, but intervention at other levels, especially "below," may be no less influential.

More specifically related to the topic of this dissertation, one should also discuss the relationship of Catholicism to democracy/democratization. In Europe, the Vatican has had a history of hostility towards democracy, denouncing it as a chaotic and arrogant disruption to the feudal/aristocratic order. In the twentieth century, the relationship of the Vatican as well as national Churches to various dictatorships was also uncomfortably

close, as in Franco's Spain, Mussolinni's Italy, or the Vatican's Concordat with the Third Reich. (Herzog 2009, 1293)

However, Catholicism in various post-colonial societies, especially Latin America, has also been connected to movements against dictatorship and/or for social justice. (Kirk 1985, 35) Such movements are often spiritually rooted in liberation theology, an interpretation of Catholic teaching rooted in the work of thinking like Paulo Freire and taking inspiration from the renewed commitment to worldly affairs in from the Vatican II conference. (Youngblood 1990, 66)

This movement was based on the idea that God, and by extension the Church, is concerned with people's earthly welfare and not only their salvation in the hereafter. (Ibid) Thus, special emphasis should be given to the plight of the poor and other marginalized groups/persons. (Kirk 1985, 35) However, this should go beyond individual acts of charity, and be concerned with moving broader socio-political systems in a more just, empowering direction. (Ibid) Some proponents of liberation theology considered resistance or class struggles

necessary for such social change, even to the point of armed uprising. (Ibid, 38)

Of course, there are Church-led or Church-partnered movements for broader socio-political change occurring far outside liberation theology. Such movements might not necessarily align themselves with liberation theology or any other special interpretation of Gospel. They may have a wide range of "special" emphases, from poverty to gender equality to minority rights.

These relatively peripheral but still significant movements within/linked to Catholicism serve to complicate secularization theory in interesting ways. Even so, one can argue that the emancipatory potential of religious movements shows itself best in irregular circumstances—i.e. in dictatorships, colonial regimes, and so forth—and may not function so well once democratic regimes are more established. (Mach 2000) Furthermore, the aforementioned movements tend to be disavowed by the mainstream Church, as per the eventual rejection of liberation theology by the Vatican (Kirk 1985), and the fact that congregations wishing to practice

female ordination or homosexual marriage must operate outside the aegis of the Church, however similar they may be to more mainstream forms of Catholicism regarding doctrine and ritual. Depending on the nuances one adds to the basic skeleton of the secularization thesis, such alternative groups may be considered evidence for *or* against its fundamental tenets.

One of the most productive approaches to understanding the place and function of the Church in the modern world is to look at it as an interest group. (Warner 2001) Per Habermas, this may be easiest to do in post-secularization societies, where the Church has been driven from its traditional role, has reckoned with secularization, and is able to gradually return to public life within strict parameters, often acting like a conventional political entity, or even lobby group. (Habermas 2008) However, this general approach has also been applied to understanding Churches whose socio-political environment does not quite fit the context described immediately above. The idea is that, despite their appeal to supernatural sources of doctrine and authority, Churches are still earthly entities who seek to maintain or

gain power as best they can within a given historical situation. (Graham 2001) Their alliances, compromises, and risk-taking behavior will be shaped by their own strengths and weaknesses within the broader socio-political context. (Ibid) This power may be channeled towards ideological goals, such as the passage of policies in line with current doctrines. (Grzymała-Busse 2016, 2-3) It may also be turned towards organizational interests, such as the maintenance of social relevance and access to state agencies. (Ibid)

Another productive research strategy is to investigate the ways in which ideological interests relate to organizational ones. For instance, ideological and organizational interests can certainly be linked, as in the case of "institutional panics," wherein a Church aggressively pursues ideological goals *in order* to prove and retain its socio-political power. (Raffin and Cornelio 2009) At the same time, the two types of interest may conflict, perhaps most demonstrably in institutional panics that end badly for the Church: the institution's overly aggressive pursuit of its ideological goals can damage its political position.

Hence, a Church that acts as an interest group sees the passage of favorable policies as a goal in itself, but also as a tool to maintain its position in a secularizing world. This begs the question: what is public policy, and how do interest groups get involved in public policy debates?

Firstly, a model is needed to analyze public policy and the process through which it is made. It is essential for organizing the study's findings, showing how various Church actions fall into different stages of policy development. For purposes of analysis, public policy is viewed as a cyclical process, as described by David Easton (Easton 1957) and later Charles O. Jones (Jones 1984), where the making and implementing of one piece of legislation leads to another. The cycle may be understood to have the following stages.: agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimation/approval, implementation, and evaluation. (Jones 1984)

In the agenda setting stage, a certain social phenomenon is pinpointed as an issue important enough to necessitate some kind of policy to manage it. (Ibid, 57-58) Of course, social issues or problems are to a large extent

socially constructed rather than simply existing objectively. (Ibid, 59) Therefore, to pinpoint a "problem" is also to shape interpretations about its causes, magnitude, and possible remedies. (Ibid) Discussions in this rather early stage of the cycle may already have great impact on policy outputs. As pertains to the theme of this study, prostitution may be understood as an acceptable or at least inevitable social phenomenon, in which case the "problem" is how one should properly regulate it. Yet another possible problem definition may be one of the exploitation of prostitutes by traffickers, pimps, and/or customers. In this case, the discussion is more likely to be steered in the direction of proposals to rescue, shelter, and socially re-integrate prostitutes, while punishing those who manage or patronize the sex trade.

In the policy formulation stage, proposed legislation is actually prepared and drafted, hopefully for ultimate approval in the following stage via parliamentary processes, popular referenda, and so on. (Ibid, 83-88) After approval, the policy is actually carried out (Ibid, 178) and its results evaluated (Ibid, 227-30). The evaluation of the effects of implementation can be a major

factor in setting the agenda for discussion of new policy, which starts off another round of the policy life cycle. (Ibid, 131)

It is quite possible for Church actors to have input in all stages of the public policy life cycle. They may draw attention to certain issues and help define them as urgent problems that need to be addressed by public policy. Church actors may also be consulted when bills are being prepared, and may advocate in various ways for proposed legislation to be passed or dismissed.

Church actors may become involved in implementation, as well. They may, for instance, make arrangements with the state to provide certain services, such as education and healthcare assistance. (Grzymała-Busse 2016, 1-2) Then again, their input may take a more obstructionist direction, perhaps advocating for civil disobedience regarding a certain law. (Austria 2004, 98) They may then, through sermons, statements, etc., lend their voice to the evaluation of the policy, which may then flow into agenda setting for future policies on the same or related issues. (Ibid)

Even so, one may also consider the less direct

ways a Church may impact different parts of the policy process. Church teaching and/or general religious culture may form a key part of the *habitus* of persons responsible for making, passing, and implementing laws. (Zarycki 2009, 623) Therefore, policies may reflect Church teachings and/or institutionally benefit the Church in other ways, even if Church actors did not directly advocate for such laws. One must recognize the limitations of models such as the policy life cycle, and/or adjust them to make room for such indirectly active factors.

This rather functionalist approach to public policy that has been outlined so far already shows that the terms used to refer to a problem can have a big impact on formulating proposed solutions to it. Therefore, this approach may also be interestingly supplemented with insights from scholars like Foucault, who in works such as *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1977) and *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1978) showed how language and meaning can be instruments of power. Authorities have the power to define and point out certain populations—especially deviant populations—and set out how such groups are to be treated. (Foucault 1978) This is

one of the reasons why words and knowledge should not be accepted as objective or neutral. Foucault's focus on language and power is reflected in the text-centric approach of this research project, especially with regards to how various deviant or special populations are defined. Foucault's pessimistic focus on the various malaises of modernity, however, also became moderated by his later focus on the non-monolithic aspects of power. Authority may sometimes look centralized and/or all-encompassing, but it also operates via a "capillary" (the small channels and personal interactions through which power reaches its end objects) manner and includes lacunae in its structure. (Foucault 2003, 94) These can be avenues for challenges to established meanings, and by extension, power. For purposes of this thesis, then, national legislature formally defines prostitutes, trafficking victims, traffickers, sex workers, etc., and helps shape what we think is true about such people. However, on-the-ground interactions in the service of these policies may, intentionally or not, serve to displace and destabilize established meanings/truths. Therefore, it is important to look into how Church actors insert themselves into various levels of the exercise of

meaning-power on this issue.

Hence, I turn to a theory that incorporates both the functional and Foucauldian views of policy. It views policy as a dynamic process where actors can have influence at many stages. At the same time, the intersection of meaning-making and power is given its due importance, since the fundamental definitions on which policies are based can be highly politicized and emotionalized. The following section on moral panic theory helps to understand how national Churches and other moral actors take part in the policy process around highly-charged issues. Later sections expound on the evolution of moral panic theory, and illustrate how this body of scholarship can be used to understand prostitution policy debates.

II. Moral Panic Theory

This section is a review of moral panic theory. I begin with an overview of its seminal texts and essential concepts, illustrated by a few examples of how this theory has been used to analyze various issues, especially anxieties about immigration and sexual deviance. This is followed by some critiques of moral panic theory, and then a discussion of some of the more recent attempts to refine the theory. Afterwards, I review some of the literature that is most directly relevant to this thesis, i.e. that regarding moral panics about prostitution.

The phrase 'moral panic' as used in the social sciences today was coined by Stanley Cohen in his study of 1960's teen/youth violence at English seaside resorts and the attendant policy, media, and general social response. (Cohen 2011) He shows how the incidents of inter-group physical violence and property damage on Brighton establishments evolved into a narrative of 'mod' and 'rocker' gangs whose violent exploits represented general anti-social problems in British youth. (Ibid)

Cohen listed down what he considered to be the key components of a moral panic, which appear loosely chronological but do not have to follow upon one another sequentially. They are:
a) identification of a danger to the community (Ibid, xii), b) reification of the threat's image in the media (Ibid), c) the rise of public concern triggered by the media image (Ibid), d) a reaction from legislators and other political authority figures (Ibid, xx), and e) socio-political changes in response to the threat, such as new legislation (Ibid).

These concepts are used to analyze the intense reaction from the public, police, and judiciary against mod/rocker violence. Cohen says that, in the public imagination, the violent working-class youth became a sort of 'folk devil,' less an actual person than an emblem of the community's fears (Ibid, xxvi). Like a supernatural devil, the folk devil is thought to also tempt and corrupt others into anti-social behavior. (Ibid, 4)

Demonization of youth sub-cultures did not preclude a search for explanations behind their anti-social behavior. Stanley Cohen noted that many of these attempts at explanation indicated anxieties about

profound, poorly-understood changes in British society at the time. (Ibid, 68) The rise in disposable income for working-class youth resulted in more possibilities for consumption and leisure, often in places where middle-class Britons were unused to encountering such youth.

(Ibid, 67) In turn, this was interpreted as an encouragement for lazy, undisciplined, ungrateful youth to behave destructively. (Ibid)

Cohen was hardly the first scholar to examine how mass media and other key gatekeepers shaped the public's view of events, rather than being a transparent conduit of information. However, he is one of the first to have examined in such detail how public media stokes fears using certain framings of a perceived social problem. Panics may be triggered by real incidents—in this case, actual physical fights and vandalism done by youths with variant sub-cultural affiliations— but the reaction can quickly become detached from and give distorted impressions of the empirical reality of the problem. (Ibid, x) Mass media was instrumental to amplifying and reifying the basic terms of what would become the moral panic about mod-vs-rocker violence. (Ibid) Cohen

chronicles how journalists would often seek out and purposely depict the most spectacular instances of violent or destructive behavior, or might even encourage participants to enact the sort of behavior that readers had come to expect from more sensationalistic reports. (Ibid, 158) The damage done by the mods and rockers was reported in vague, all-encompassing terms that loosened limits on the public imagination and discouraged measured responses. (Ibid, 188) Indeed, the legal/police response was often disproportionate. Some arrests and trials were done for what Cohen showed to be symbolic or dramatic purposes. (Ibid, 192; 28) Any groups of young people visiting beachside resort towns could be treated as suspect. (Ibid)

Panics can also come to shape the development of the triggering empirical phenomenon. Cohen demonstrated this by analyzing the impact of the mods vs. rockers panic on holidaying youth. The alarmist response helped to form and harden the identities of some youth groups into 'mods' and 'rockers' who were inherently opposed to each other. (Ibid, 188) We see shades of Foucault's ideas about the construction of deviance,

decades prior to the publication of Foucault's actual works on the topic. Cohen asserts that, prior to the panic, many young people exhibited behaviors and cultural interests that may have been somewhat associated with these two sub- cultures, but did not necessarily identify as such, nor did they define themselves in opposition to the other group. (Ibid) These new, more rigid identity constructs made violent interactions between mods and rockers more likely. (Ibid, 199) Another effect of the reports was that holiday resorts like Brighton became known as regular spots for youth gang violence, drawing both on- lookers and young people eager to participate in fights themselves. (Ibid) The alarmist discourse thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Another key text in the tradition of moral panic studies was produced by Philip Jenkins, in the form of his 1998 study of the American discourse regarding child molestation and abuse in the USA at the close of the last century. One of the grounds for this book's significance is Jenkins' description of the politico-legal implications of a widespread moral panic, as the larger scale of the child abuse panic allows Jenkins to focus more than Cohen does

on the effect of alarmist discourse on national legislation. His work clearly shows the impact that moral panic narratives can have on agenda-setting, pressuring legislators to accord higher priority to a problem as presented by moral entrepreneurs.

As the issue of child abuse—especially sexual abuse—is so sensitive, Jenkins is careful, perhaps more so than Cohen is, to grant that the abuse panic was triggered by a very real problem. (Jenkins 1998, 5) Children can and do suffer permanent harm at the hands of abusive adults, and pedophiles or child abusers should indeed be punished. Alarm about the true scope of hidden/invisible child abuse is also at least somewhat warranted (Ibid, 12), as traditions around family privacy and parental authority may discourage children from reporting abuse or being believed by external authority figures. However, a hysterical response to the problem is ultimately counter-productive. It can result in policies that are more effective at assuaging public fears than actually protecting children. (Ibid, 85) At the micro level, over-zealous law enforcement practices can needlessly separate families, often causing more damage to children's development.

(Ibid)

Continuing the work of Cohen, Jenkins develops a strong analysis of how the ostensible object of the fear, termed the 'folk devil,' is actually also a stand-in for larger, unarticulated fears, usually existential ones about the community's survival *as itself*. (Jenkins 1998, 17) For example, threats to the child are especially prone to triggering moral panics, as the child represents the community's literal reproduction. Concerns over specifically *online* pedophilia were connected to underlying fears about then-new internet technology. (Ibid, 179) The demonic pedophile threatens us all.

As Jenkins describes it, Cohen's concept of the folk devil became quite literal during the child sex abuse panic, with fears about child molestation interweaving with Satanic panics, epitomized by tales of children being ritually abused and sacrificed during devil-worship ceremonies. (Ibid, 164-88) Children's reports of physically-impossible supernatural occurrences during these purported rituals were still believed by some sympathetic authorities. (Ibid, 171) The logic was that even though the story was *prima facie* impossible, the

child was neither lying nor brainwashed. (Ibid, 177)

Abuse narratives could appear even when child did not attest to have suffered harm. The fact that a purported child victim did not initially remember any abuse did not mean that no abuse had occurred. (Ibid, 164-69) A child might have repressed the painful memories in psychological self-defense or for some other reason. (Ibid, 188) Child psychologists and other trained professionals were then expected to extract these buried memories. (Ibid) Lawyers, counselors, and journalists came to believe testimonies from children that sounded questionable and even physically impossible (i.e. an individual female abuser lifting a car on her own to put it on top of a child) and/or had been acquired by questionable means. (Ibid, 177) Any doubt or question about these testimonies would put the inquirer on the side of the abusers. (Ibid) Understandably, this state of affairs made it difficult to have nuanced discussions about child molestation, or to point out the dangers of the ongoing panic.

Moral panics are amplified by the press, but other important figures are advocates who promote moral

causes. In this case, they might be psychologists and child protection advocates. Advocates may have their own interests in perpetuating a specific framing of a social problem. (Ibid, 7) For instance, a favored framing would draw attention and funds, be compatible with the entrepreneurs' ideology, and allow the formation of spaces for the moral entrepreneurs to have a long-term role in the debate. (Ibid) None of this should be taken to mean that such actors are deceitful or cynical. It only means that, like any advocates—or researchers, for that matter—they all have their own concerns, biases, and vested interests. These factors shape the way they view and discuss a social or political problem. When they remain unexamined, limited perspectives can become accepted as fact. (Ibid 8-9)

Of course, one must not conclude that moral actors are being cynical or dishonest in the way they portray social problems. Most child protection advocates are sincere in their concern about the welfare of minors, and their work does much good to address a very real problem. There is also a great deal of truth behind the issue of abuse that goes ignored or undiscovered due to shame, respect

for authority figures, etc.

Caveats like these are important, but Jenkins is takes pains to point out the risks of sensationalized discourses on the child abuse discussion, and, indeed, on attempts at constructive debate around any social problem. One danger of using inflated or sensationalized claims is that the entire cause may be undermined if the information is ever disproven. The social problem may be dismissed outright, and the moral entrepreneurs and victims may be branded liars. (Ibid, 34; 187) Certainly, this is detrimental to the people suffering from the social problem. Cohen stresses this as one of the most important reasons to be wary of panicked reactions to a social problem.

In sum, the pioneering work by Cohen and Jenkins shows how moral panic theory might help explain why actors may focus on a certain issue to what seems like a disproportionate or even irrational and self-destructive degree. On the other hand, it might also lend us some insights into why an issue has *not* been perceived as a major problem. It is possible that the phenomenon has not (yet) been linked to a deeper existential fear. Then again,

ignoring or downplaying an issue may also be a manifestation of existential fear, as addressing the problem might be experienced as the sacrifice of core values underpinning communal identity.

Moral panic theory, therefore, is very useful for understanding how some issues come to be constructed as major problems with a high status on the public policy agenda. It demonstrates that a high level of attention to an issue does not always (or only) appear because actors were persuaded by rational analysis, statistical evidence, and so on. Rather, it is often the case that a formulation of the problem resonates with other (supposedly) related issues, especially existential fears about community survival.

The fundamental concepts of moral panic theory described above have given rise to research on many widespread fears and anxieties.

Much of the literature followed similar approaches to Jenkins, studying various instances of panic in well-defined places and times, frequently with reference to child abuse/exploitation. Fred Powell and Margaret Scanlon co-wrote a 2015 book comparing modern child

abuse panics. (Powell and Scanlon 2015) One of the most interesting chapters deals with the global—and especially First World—public reaction to institutionalized child abuse by clerics and Church-run institutions, which came to light in the 1990's. (Ibid, 85-125) The authors do not argue that the response was wildly out of proportion, since, after all, the abuse was statistically astonishing (Ibid, 106), worldwide (Ibid, 85), and was even abetted by secular authorities (Ibid, 90). However, they do point out that the framing of the abuse scandals often absolved broader society of responsibility, as if the harm to children had not taken place within an enabling community structure. (Ibid, 120) Greer's study from the same year is written in the light of twentieth-century efforts to police the Internet against online child predators, now that lawmakers are somewhat more knowledgeable about the technology than they were in the 1990's. (Greer 2015) The interested reader might also take a glance at Niehaus' analysis of moral panic surrounding mother-son incest in the South African veldt. (2010) It is interesting because it takes place outside the First World, and takes South Africa's colonial legacy into account without making it the central

point of the article. (Ibid) Niehaus argues that the panic around this type of incest should be understood amidst the changing role of adult men in South Africa's "de-industrializing economy." (Ibid, 833) Anxiety in the disappearing primacy of the South African working man is reflected in fears about sons taking over—or being forced to take over—the father's sexual role in the household. (Ibid) Niehaus' article still fits into the classical mold of moral panic studies, however, by showing how a sex panic often has much to do with fears about demographic changes, political economy, and so forth.

Moral panic—at least, in a form we would recognize from the works of Cohen, Jenkins,
and others in their tradition—appears to be a function of modernity or post-modernity. It requires a relatively well-developed mass media apparatus, as well as means for mobilizing advocacy groups. State institutions should also have some means of detecting, participating in, and responding to the panic. However, by looking at smaller communities and being less strict in our understanding of 'media' and 'policy' responses, we can perhaps apply

moral panic concepts to a broader ranger of historical contexts.

Mark Stein takes this approach in his somewhat essayistic but thoroughly-researched and thematically coherent *American Panic: A History of What Scares Us and Why*. (Stein 2014) He uses examples of moral panics throughout American history in order to highlight their common traits. (Ibid)

One of Stein's theoretical innovations is his consistent assertion that those who participate in a panic soon exhibit the very traits and behaviors that they denounce in the folk devil. (Ibid, 105-6) He illustrates this clearly in his discussion of colonial-era witchcraft panics, of which the infamous Salem witch trials were only the most notorious among many incidents. (Ibid) Communities would condemn suspected witches for practicing black magic, but would themselves use magical rituals in order to reveal the presence of witches and/or their demonic familiars. (Ibid) More than a century later, the by-then United States experienced a peak in anti-Native American panic under the presidency of Andrew Jackson. (Ibid, 9-10) Military forces would routinely

massacre Native communities, including women and children, on the grounds that Native Americans were brutal and disrespectful of honorable rules of military conduct. (Ibid) Perhaps, a more general insight we can gain from Stein's historical comparisons is that, across different contexts, moral panics tend to ultimately be destructive, encouraging reprehensible, ineffective measures to combat folk devils.

Stein augments his analysis by looking into how and why a moral panic might fade away over time. Demographic factors may be key. (Ibid, 35-36) For instance, a panic might fade because the generation that participated in it the most is replaced by a succeeding one which, on average, is much less concerned about the panic-triggering issue. (Ibid) Another potential factor might be that the panic is superseded by another issue. (Ibid)

Like Stein, many moral panic researchers work within the tradition's orthodoxies while applying its concepts to a broader range of fear-inducing phenomena. An occurrence or trend does not have to include the physically violent and/or traumatic aspects of sexual

abuse, vandalism, or physical conflict in order to trigger moral panic. New cultural or ideological developments can also be met with a moral panic, as the supposed loss of so-called traditional values or fundamental cultural attributes is perceived as the death of communal identity. (Pijpers 2006)

A moral panic may become even more intense or long-lasting if its object represents multiple perceived threats. This is often the case with xenophobia, which has been studied by numerous moral panic researchers. (Williams 2013, 155; Pijpers 2006; Winegar 2014) Members of the native-born population might perceive immigrants as a conventional security threat, i.e. as potential terrorists, criminals, and so on. However, they may also see these newcomers as cultural threats (bringing different folkways, mores, and aesthetics) or even eugenic threats, interbreeding with local populations to produce a generation of mixed-race and/or bi-cultural offspring. (Pijpers 2006; Winegar 2014) Moral panics about immigration might highlight certain (stereotypical) aspects of the phenomenon of large numbers of foreign nationals entering a country. A fear

of immigrant crime and violence tends to establish the young, male immigrant as its folk devil, with females (both migrant and native) often being victims who need to be rescued by honorable, non- immigrant saviors. (Orr 2014) I return to the recurring gendered aspect of xenophobic panics later. Pijpers' 2006 article on older EU states' fears about mass migration from newer member stations following the 2004 enlargement is emblematic of such analyses. (Pijpers 2006) Pijpers argues that, behind the rationalistic justifications that the fear is primarily about competition for employment, many nationals of older member states fear that new immigrants will undermine national identity. (Ibid)

The post-9/11 War on Terror both fueled and was fueled by xenophobic sentiments, which resulted in much research on anti-terrorist/anti-Muslim/anti-Arab panics. Bonn's book on public- state interaction during and around the second Iraq War is a prime example of such scholarship. (Bonn 2010) The literature surrounding the War on Terror fuses an examination of media, politico-legal, and sociological dynamics with knowledge of intelligence institutions and the strategies used by terrorist

networks. A common thread in such research is the (overly?) extensive and sometimes melodramatic focus on terrorist threats and Islamist extremism in Arab and/or Muslim communities. (Ibid) Meanwhile, Arab/Muslim community members who assist law enforcement in capturing terrorists get little media attention, and terrorism outside the expected categories— that is, non-Islamic and/or homegrown—may get much less coverage than Islamist attacks. Not only does this perpetuate stereotypes about Muslims and terrorism, but it may also result in less stringent policing of non-Islamist groups that planning to engage in terror attacks.

The anti-Muslim panic has generated terror prevention measures that, while still widely practiced, have not proven constructive. Subsequent research has found that many of the tactics targeting ethnic or religious groups, such as racial profiling, are much less effective than expected in preventing terror attacks, and, by seeming to enact a West-vs.-Islam dichotomy similar to that deployed by Islamist terrorist groups, even help draw new recruits into terrorist organizations. (Kydd and Walters 2006, 56-57) Ongoing developments such as the

Trump administration's endeavors to institute a "Muslim travel ban" lends much contemporary relevance to this line of moral panic research.

Aside from generating a climate of heightened fear, moral panics may have serious politico-legal consequences. The aforementioned fear may allow for the over-hasty passage of legislation, or for a wave of wrongful convictions. Criticisms against such irregularities may be met with the assertion that they were necessitated by a state of emergency. We can see here how the development of moral panic theory often intersects with securitization theory (Maneri 2018, 56), especially in analysis of the passage of laws such as the Patriot Act in the U.S.A. (Buzan 2006) The image of malicious folk devils is at the core of moral panic theory, but Behlmer's research on Victorian-era fears about premature burial show that, at least for some theorists, moral panics do not have to identify a folk devil with ill intent. (Behlmer 2003) A well-meaning mortician or doctor could make an error about whether someone is truly dead—which perhaps made the possibility of such fatal mistakes even more disturbing.

(Ibid) This leaves open the question about whether such fears are truly 'moral' panics, since the object of the fear results more from human error than immoral actions.

Not all moral panics have a folk devil that can be embodied in a human figure. Hall's 1992 sexual historical analysis of a century of masturbation-related panic in the United Kingdom demonstrates this. This generations-long panic, which encompassed fears of both moral and physical decay, also did not have a clear Other. Understandings of masturbation as self-abuse meant that the person who committed the wrongful act was the same one who was harmed most by it. (Hall 1992)

Winegar's feature article-length description of anti-Chinese panic in Egypt incorporates several of the key concepts of orthodox moral panic theory. (Winegar 2014) The widespread anxiety around Chinese women marrying Egyptian men was contextualized amid the signing of Egypt-China trade agreements that encouraged Chinese economic migration to Egypt and set up special economic zones for Chinese factories near the Suez Canal. (Ibid, 35-37) These developments also happened during an economic depression brought on by Mubarak's

policies. (Ibid) At this time, dowry payments became prohibitively expensive, and Chinese women were promoted as a more cost-effective alternative to Egyptian women, since the former did not expect dowries. (Ibid) The presence of Chinese bodies came to symbolize economic problems and loss of economic sovereignty.

Researchers from the humanities or cultural studies disciplines have found moral panic theory valuable, as well. Given that such studies focus on fears around cultural products or processes, they tend to explore incidents of censorship or boycotting of anxiety-triggering cultural products. Rapp's historical study of early British cinema is one such project. (Rapp 2002) He chronicles the British *bourgeoisie*'s moral panic over films' contents. (Ibid, 422) The panic was fueled by film's growing visibility, as exhibition shifted from venues such as fairgrounds and curiosity shops to large cinemas, and as a large portion of its audience was found to be working-class youth with a perceived high potential for moral corruption. (Ibid) There are also more contemporary descriptions of moral panic against certain mediums and genres. Wright describes a moral panic around rock music

as a morally corrupting force against children and an incitement to youth violence in the 1990's, which included calls to hold musicians at least partly responsible for atrocities committed by boys and young men who happened to be devotees of their music. (Wright, 2000)

III. Tweaking the Panic: Critiques, Refinements, Expansions

Other scholars have worked to both refine and expand the concept of moral panic, which probably sometimes makes for a less-than-coherent research agenda. Much of this progress has occurred due to scholars pointing lacunae, logical flaws, our outdated concepts. As useful as Cohen's concepts proved to be, they still needed to be developed in order to deal with the evolving nature of moral panics.

The concept of moral panic is fairly flexible, but, taken too far, might become broad to the point of meaninglessness. (Jewkes 2011, 85) Indeed, one critique of moral panic theory is that scholars risk labeling any kind of mass hysteria or heightened group response to a social problem as a type of moral panic. Hence, there have been several attempts to refine concepts and terminology since the pioneering days of Cohen.

Some scholars argue that moral panics arise from certain historical conditions. "With the important exception of witchhunts, moral panics are a product of modernity. Preconditions for moral panics include a formally free press, a government willing to respond to

popular pressure, campaigners able and willing to organise for legal change and a more general sense that social stability depends upon the maintenance of a secular moral order." (Critcher 2015, xxvi-xxvii) In countries lacking liberal democratic features, there is little incentive to perpetuate moral panics. (Ibid) The press has limited ability to publish material beyond or against the government agenda. (Ibid) Civil society is less able to demand policy changes, so emotional responses to social problems yield few policy rewards. (Ibid) Such a perspective implies that a response can only be called moral panic if it takes place in the right time period or socio-political context. It may also partially explain why most moral panic studies focus on the latter half of the twentieth century onwards, and very few try to venture further back than the Age of Enlightenment.

It is also possible to distinguish between media panics and moral panics. (Johansson, 2000, 25) *Media* panics are fueled by, and largely remain in, the media, yielding limited political results. (Ibid) *Moral* panics involve a broader range of actors, and leave some kind of social and/or political legacy, perhaps in the form of a law.

(Ibid) Such a distinction stresses that moral entrepreneurs' primary goal, beyond their own survival and perpetuation of influence, is to effect political change on their chosen issue(s). Mainstream media outlets might have a certain political or moral agenda, but this is (supposedly) propagated in a less direct manner. Hence, a panic largely carried out by and within the mainstream media will be fundamentally different from a moral panic, as the term is usually understood by scholars. This distinction helps prevent scholars from having to study every hot-button media issue as a moral panic. Foregrounding the political aims of moral panics also reminds us to look at the power dynamics surrounding moral entrepreneurs. The researcher is led to investigate actors' efforts to change existing power structures and policies, and to improve their own position within such structures.

Jewkes, writing from the perspective of criminology, warns of the potential vagueness of the concept of morality in moral panics. (2011) What does it mean that a panic is 'moral?' How is it different from other kinds of panic that presumably have less to do with morality? (Ibid, 85) Furthermore, moral panic theorists

would do well to make a distinction between panics that manifest fears of something that is harmful or legitimately blameworthy, as opposed to panics based on the demonization of generally harmless minority groups. (Ibid) I hope to absorb Jewkes' points into my research approach, as I do believe that the targeting of traffickers, even if it is sometimes misguided or over-simplified, is based on legitimate concerns, and that those who sexually exploit others are by no means an unjustly persecuted, largely innocent group. Keeping Jewkes' critiques in mind is very important when one takes a moral panic approach to very sensitive issues like prostitution and/or sex trafficking, as it helps to minimize the risk of downplaying the trauma of people who have been harmed by these phenomena.

Other writers have argued that moral panic research is itself a type of panic, albeit a highly intellectualized one. (Hunt 1997) This anti-panic panic has an implicit classist bias, with fear directed at a section of the public viewed as relatively poor, less educated, and easy to manipulate. (Thompson and Williams, 2014) Self-identified elites may then externalize their anxieties onto

groups whom they view as irrational and dangerous. (Ibid)

Politicized use of the moral panic label is a related concern. (Critcher 2015, xxiv) Conservative groups are more likely to be accused of engaging in moral panics, while conservatives seem to be less able to turn the accusation towards liberals and the left. (Ibid) There is concern that the terminology of moral panic theory too easily becomes a means for the left to dismiss conservative arguments as fear-mongering. (Ibid) One might wonder whether moral panic theory itself is ideologically biased, and formulated in such a way that it is less likely to adhere to the actions of left-leaning groups.

Critcher argues that moral panic theory does not inherently have this ideological problem. (Ibid, xxv) The greater prevalence of accusations against conservatives might actually be because conservatives are more likely to participate in moral panics. (Ibid) This is not necessarily because conservatives are less rational than the left, but because conservative arguments are more likely to touch on the anxieties and values of mainstream society. (Ibid) It is precisely these anxieties which are most likely to spiral into a lasting moral panic, supported by the wider public.

(Ibid) Moral panics attached to the left are more likely to die out quickly, because they are more ideologically marginalized. (Ibid)

That said, moral entrepreneurs of *any* stripe can become caught up in monolithic panic narratives, no matter how well-intentioned and sincere their concerns might be. A moral panic is identified less it *what* it wants to accomplish than *how*. Many movements identified as moral panics have perfectly rational and laudable goals. However, what turns a movement into a *panic* is the exaggerated, monolithic nature of its problem narrative. (Ibid, xix) Moral entrepreneurs might advocate solutions that have little basis in the empirical reality surrounding the problem. Fair-minded moral panic scholars will try to recognize moral panic patterns among liberal or left-leaning groups, too.

In addition, moral panic theory's emphasis on the role of media makes it imperative that it be able to account for changes in media technology and practice, which have changed vastly since the seminal research of Cohen. (Critcher 2015, xxviii) Critcher warns that we should not simply transpose print-centric or television-centric

theories into contexts dominated by social or online media, since new technology has helped bring about discursive structures and dynamics that are qualitatively different. (Ibid) Hier builds on Critcher's insights into the media-centric tendencies in moral panic theory, reminding researchers to look beyond the role of media and images and to see moral panic as a key mechanism of "moral regulation" in modern liberal governments. (Hier 2011)

Another reproach against mainstream moral panic research points out its tendency towards hidden empiricist biases, as pointed out by Maneri. (Maneri 2018) A wave of moral panic distinguishes itself in the eyes of many researchers by a gulf between the empirical reality of a social problem and an exaggerated or inappropriate appreciation of its scale, which in turn leads to hysteria. (Ibid, 39-40) However, there often is no true, objective metric for social problems. (Ibid) Maneri supplements moral panic theory's classical concepts with ideas from Foucault, who reminds us of the power dynamics that produce the identity categories that we later come to accept as orthodox. (Ibid, 40-43) Maneri's insight is quite

pertinent to this study, since many of the key concepts that combine to make our idea of prostitution as a social problem—commercial sex, coerced sex, and trafficking—are highly contested.

In addition to developments brought by constructive responses to criticism, the usefulness of the concept of moral panic has inspired theoretical offshoots. Raffin and Cornelio have examined the Philippine Catholic Church's post-People Power involvement in reproductive health issues and described it as a case of institutional panic. (Raffin and Cornelio 2009) For Raffin and Cornelio, institutional panic refers to discourse and actions carried out by an institution struggling to maintain a place for itself in an insecure context. (Ibid, 778-80) The Church had defined much of its public rule up to 1986 in opposition to the repressions of the Marcos regime, and needed to justify its strong socio-political involvement once Marcos had been deposed. (Ibid) Public advocacy on RH issues proved compatible to the Philippine Church's theological concerns, especially under the body-focused papacy of Pope John Paul II. (Ibid, 781-84) They were also conducive—for a time, at least—for maintaining the

Church's public role as a defender of the national conscience. (Ibid) The Church's stance on RH and its general role in Philippine public life became so intertwined that discussions of the former would often turn into debates about the latter.

Reproductive health issues, especially abortion, have been closely tied to the Polish Church's public role for much longer (Kulczyki 1995, 474-76), which suggests that Raffin and Cornelio's analysis might also be useful in the Polish context. Debates around Poland's abortion laws were also de facto proxies for struggles over public Catholicism throughout the communist years. (Ibid) It was perhaps rather predictable that, after the triumph of Solidarność and its allies, the newly post-communist Poland, spurred by a 1991 visit from Pope John Paul II, adopted some of Europe's strictest abortion legislation in early 1993. (Ibid, 471) The new legislation was framed as a triumph for (Catholic) freedom of conscience, and a triumph for the Church as an institution. (Ibid) Debates around reproductive health and reproductive choice continue to be a flashpoint for controversies about secularism (or the lack thereof) in Poland, and even for

questions about Polish national identity itself. Poland's EU membership has added yet more layers to the issue, with more senior Western European states criticizing religiously conservative Polish policies, and the Church hierarchy and its supporters asserting their stance as the representation of genuine Polish values. (Heinen and Portet 2010)

While institutional panic is certainly an interesting concept that I would like to explore in the future, I prefer not to use in the core theoretical framework of this thesis. Reproductive health and abortion have been what we might call the flagship issues of both the Philippine and Polish Churches in the post-Marcos and post-communist eras, respectively. They have been framed as emblems of the role each national Church plays in its country's politics. The same role is not played by the prostitution debate. Instead, I hold to more 'classical' usages of the moral panic theory.

The particular subset of panic that most interests me is the nationalistic panic, based on anxieties about national survival. The object of panic might be a straightforward biological threat, but often it is a fear

about the nation losing its identity, honor, or sovereignty. Nationalistic moral panics can often manifest as sexual panics, specifically about the sexual honor of the nation's women and, in more recent decades, children. The bodies of women can often become metonyms for national territory or the national community (Enloe 2009); the protection or violation of women represents the protection or violation of national sovereignty and dignity (Mariano 2012). Raping a woman of an enemy nation becomes an act against that entire nation. On the other end of the spectrum, women who willingly have relations with soldiers of a hostile country are traitors to their nation. (Röger 2015, 37) Failure to defend or control the women of one's own nation is seen as a dereliction of one's duty as a man, or as a state. (Enloe 2009, 239)

The sexual conduct and gender performance of nationals within their own territory or community has broader national/international implications, as well. Since the concepts of sex and gender carry a high moral charge, the conduct of citizens in this regard can have consequences for national honor and/or international standing. Or, more precisely, the *perceived* conduct of

nationals regarding sex and gender can fuel certain narratives about their nation, which in turn have serious political consequences. One example is the supposedly "barbaric" culture of colonized or marginalized peoples, necessitating their conquest and/or tutelage by allegedly more civilized nations. (Steans 2013, 33)

Post-colonial or post-imperial countries frequently prove suitable contexts for the strong intertwining of religion and national identity, the former providing support where the latter is fragile or precarious. These linkages may, of course, manifest themselves in discourses and practices surrounding sexual morality. Conrad demonstrates this in her analysis of nationalism and sexual morality in newly-independent Ireland. (Conrad 2004) According to her work, conservative Catholic morality would become a significant factor in the Republic of Ireland's political development upon gaining independence from Britain. (Ibid, 1-8) One could hardly argue that the new republic fared well against its old colonizer in terms of prosperity, prestige, and institutional development, and therefore, a sense of moral-religious distinctiveness and superiority was important in

maintaining Irish national identity and pride. (Ibid) Policing moral conduct, especially sexual conduct, was an extension of protecting the Irish nation and its fledgling state. (Ibid) The young country possessed a fairly extensive infrastructure for incarcerating and reforming so-called fallen women. Such institutions were often run by the Church, which had the moral authority to take charge of the women, and the resources to house them when the state could not. These functions were so important to the maintenance of Irish nationalism and nationhood that the State tended to overlook the Catholic institutions' frequent systemic maltreatment of their residents. Through such processes, the supposedly universal Church—or any other great religion—can become bound up in Westphalian national-spatial discourses. There may be reason to expect a somewhat similar phenomenon in Poland and the Philippines: both strongly Catholic countries with an unstable sense of national identity and a history of foreign subjugation.

VI. Moral Panic Theory and Prostitution

Prostitution as a phenomenon may be an exceptionally susceptible to framing as an object of moral panic. Firstly, it is a nebulous concept whose actors, drivers, and implications are difficult to delineate. Secondly, it is often an 'underground' phenomenon due to illegality and stigma, which leads to difficulty collecting information even if all of its factors were to be outlined clearly. Taken together, these two issues facilitate various simplified narratives that both inflate and restrict our image of the sex trade.

At first glance, prostitution is easy to define: sexual acts performed in exchange for remuneration. However, both 'sexual acts' and 'remuneration' are ambiguous terms. (Green 2016) Are acts like pornography and erotic dancing prostitution? (Ibid, 184) Do financial support or room and board exchanged within a long-term sexual relationship render that bond a form of prostitution? (Ibid, 197) Also, what are prostitutes? Are they always victims, or can they be active participants in the trade of their sexual favors? (Chuang 2010, 1664-65) Who is responsible for the effects of prostitution on wider

society? (Ibid) These unresolved core questions can lead to the formation of a broad range of alarmist frameworks. The potential for statistical inflation becomes greater, as well as the generalization of the most sensationalistic cases to stand in for virtually all cases of commercial sex. Additionally, this ambiguity means that actors with widely variant ideologies can all panic about prostitution, because different aspects or emblematic personages in and around the sex trade can be framed as the folk devil *or* the threatened party. Prostitution- related panic is unlikely to fade quickly from social consciousness, as one fearful perspective can yield to another as society itself changes or different ideological regimes take control of the polity. For example, in more conservative and patriarchal times, prostitutes themselves can be depicted as agents of moral corruption or vectors of disease. (Stauter-Halsted 2015, 13) Over generations, certain types of feminist, socialist, or other pro-equality ideology may fuel the development of abolitionism in response to the rising sense that sexual exploitation is fundamentally unjust and symptomatic of broader systems of injustice. (Chuang 2010) Increasing visibility of women from one's own in-group as victims

of ‘white slavery’ abroad can also have similar effects—the respectable daughters of the community are endangered by lascivious, greedy outsiders who may also introduce ‘foreign’ genes into the next generation. (Stauter-Halsted 2015, 1) Abolitionist advocates working in these contexts might paint the prostitutes—or populations who might be targets for recruitment—as the vulnerable victims, in stark contrast to the older (but perhaps still extant) framings that condemned and stigmatized prostitutes. Thus, prostitution—or a certain interpretation of the phenomenon of commercial sex—can operate in different spaces and time periods as a nexus for different anxieties. In words, prostitution might not be alarming in the same way it used to be, but it is frightening in other ways because our views of it can accommodate shifts in the amalgamation of our fears about community purity, integrity, identity, and survival.

Current panics around sex trafficking may also be heirs to the nineteenth-century (Western) panic around so-called white slavery. (Doezema 2000) Many of the core images and themes from today’s mainstream anti-trafficking discourse can be traced back to the white

slavery panic. Some of them are:

a) The vulnerability of migrant women to sexual exploitation in faraway locations, (Stauter-Halsted 2015, 119)
b) Sexual bondage in service of a demonized cultural or racial Other, and (Roos 2010, 208)
c) The innocence and moral purity of potential victims, which makes their sexual corruption all the more spectacular. (Doezema 2000, 29)

The spatial dimension of white slavery/sex trafficking panics is to some extent a panic about girls and women leaving their traditional space in the home, where they would be embedded in social roles under the protection and supervision of fathers, husbands, and, by extension, the community of origin. (Stauter-Halsted 2015, 18) Leaving this familiar space is necessarily fraught with both physical and moral danger.

This spatial dimension[4] should indeed be considered, and

[4] I discussed the spatial dimensions of Philippine prostitution law in my first Masteral thesis entitled *Over the Borderline: Constructions of the Adult Prostitute in Philippine Law*, which was officially completed under the auspices of the Ateneo de Manila in 2013. There, I argued that the country's mixed model functions differently depending on whether the citizen is in prostitution

in some circumstances, is rightly feared. A migrant crossing into a foreign space does leave behind familiar customs, networks and institutions, and also some legal rights and protections. He or she might face discrimination or even brutalization as a foreign Other, in addition to being a more vulnerable target for deceptive recruitment tactics.

A more nuanced understanding of migration directs us away from simplistic dichotomies of safe, pleasant home spaces and dangerous foreign lands. We must remember that a migrant may have left the community of origin precisely *because* of the politico-legal system, social role, or home situation in which he or she was embedded. (Chuang 2010, 1716) That person's gender, economic situation, family background, and so forth might make them all the more vulnerable at home. (Ibid) Migration,

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abroad or on Philippine territory. Philippine territory is seen as safe, which is why it is possible for some prostitutes, especially freelance ones, to be considered perpetrators and therefor punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Philippine prostitutes abroad, however, are in spaces that the Philippine state considers automatically dangerous. Hence, they are more likely to be considered victims or, occasionally, sex workers. The threshold for proving victimhood is lower for prostitutes outside their home country's territory.

even of an irregular and dangerous sort, may be an attempt to escape to a place where such factors have a less deleterious impact on one's life chances. (Ibid)

Nationalist anxieties around prostitution may be likewise stoked when national boundaries are crossed in the other direction—i.e. when the customers travel to the prostitutes' countries. (Cheng 2011; Mariano 2012) This type of transactional sex may occur in the context of sex tourism, or incidental to international travel for other purposes, such as military service. (Cheng 2011, 488)

The foreign customer comes to represent threats to the nation, in turn symbolized by the prostitute's exploited, rudely penetrated body. As Cheng aptly puts it, "The figure of the prostitute ravaged by foreign aggressors has been an allegory of…a divided and a subjugated nation….Premised on the feminine ideal of purity, the figure invokes a strong sense of honor and dignity lost as well as virtues and propriety violated, engendering the emotional and historical weight of women's sexuality in nationalist imagination." (Ibid, 490) While foreign customers might indeed present additional dangers, such a propensity to dehumanize local women as racially Other

(Mesok 2016, 62), Cheng implicitly warns about the dangerous of this binary between dangerous foreigners and unthreatening locals (Cheng 2011, 490). Local men can be dangerous and exploitative, as well, and on a deeper level, the nation's exploitation might not be totally attributable to the actions of foreigners. I argue that this nationalist emphasis on sex tourism can constitute a moral panic. It reduces the complexity of commercial sex to one sector, and further reduces *that* to a narrative about imperialism reinscribed in sexual terms. This very (over-
)simplicity allows it to gain currency as a means for the nation to play out its anxieties about its identity and place in a world of complex power dynamics.

Some scholars, especially those who are of the view that one can distinguish between voluntary and coerced prostitution, do critique these problematic aspects of the anti-trafficking discourse. Indeed, there is extensive literature in this critical tradition , so I instead focus on work that explicitly use moral panic terminology and concepts.

One interesting example is the research of Keo,

Bouhours, Broadhurst, and Bouhours. Keo et al say that trafficking of Cambodian children into Thailand cannot be understood without some knowledge of traditional Cambodian family dynamics. (Keo et al, 2014) The writers assert that much of the migration flow which is officially labeled trafficking occurs within concepts of family structures that bind children in reciprocal relations with their families, especially their parents, and would be acting in a praiseworthy fashion if they sought work to contribute to strained family finances. (Ibid, 203) At least some children whom the Thai state considered trafficking victims took pride in having chosen to leave home to earn money for their families. (Ibid) Policies developed from Western notions of family responsibility, work, coercion, etc., might not be so easily applicable to these situations. (Ibid)

The authors of the article summon a number of convincing arguments suggesting that in Cambodia, an abolitionist moral panic dominates human trafficking policy, often to detrimental effect. Cambodia's law uses an overly comprehensive and vague definition of trafficking which, similarly to Philippine law, does not

distinguish between sex trafficking and voluntary prostitution. (Ibid, 206) Although not explicitly stated, Keo and his co-writers are of the view that one can indeed distinguish between voluntary and forced prostitution. (Ibid, 206-11) This view is controversial among scholars of trafficking studies and/or gender studies.

Unfortunately, Keo et al have decided to use victims' previous history of prostitution in their home communities as a main indicator of the credibility of claims that the person in question was trafficked, albeit a soft one that points to probability rather than fact. (Ibid, 206)

As Peach argues, it is highly problematic to question claims about trafficking by bringing up the alleged victim's prior sexual history. (Peach 2008, 241-42) It perpetuates the notion that people with a certain kind of sexual morality are more likely to be trafficked than others. (Ibid) This oversight by Keo and his co-authors demonstrates that scholars who use moral panic theory may themselves go too far in their quest to probe the excesses in the conventional narratives behind a panic.

Gould's study offers an interesting contrast to that of Keo and his co-writers. (2010) This paper explores the human trafficking panic surrounding the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. (2010) It also explores a brief, sharp panic rather than a long-range fear that led to lasting changes.

(Ibid) Gould highlights the male-dominated image of large sports events, which attracts abolitionist discourses around how male athletes and audiences will inevitably exploit women in the area. (Ibid, 42) While striving to empower and protect women, these discourses may disempower women by re-inscribing old narratives of male aggression and female vulnerability. (Ibid)

These debates about the definition of prostitution and/or sex trafficking have high real- world stakes, and, according to Jenkins' abovementioned discussion of vested interests, we can surmise how and why broad definitions and spectacular images of victimhood have become common. One may have to turn to the blurred edges of moral panic theory, or to associated traditions such as feminist theory, migration studies, and criminal anthropology in order to find discussions of concrete effects. However, such studies are a useful extension to

one's literature review.

Peters demonstrates how preponderant images of trafficking and trafficking victims have real influence on victims' treatment by the state. (Peters 2013) On the one hand, such images may encourage officials might devote more attention and resources to preventing and addressing trafficking. (Ibid, 221-22) On the other hand, simplistic images of victimhood may filter upwards to judicial and law enforcement officials, even if we might expect them to have a more nuanced understanding of the situation. (Ibid, 232-37) Persons claiming to be victims of sex trafficking may be disbelieved if they deviate from the stereotypical image and/or narrative. (Ibid, 236-37) An alleged victim who appears too calm or cheerful, or does not show signs of physical violence, might not be seen as a true victim. (Ibid) The gendered dimension of trafficking discourse has important ramifications, as well. Victims of sex trafficking, and of trafficking generally, are often expected to be female. (Ibid, 224-25) Exploited men and boys might not be recognized, or recognize themselves, as trafficking victims. (Ibid) Purported victims' sexual history, especially if that includes

prostitution prior to the period of trafficking, may also be used to undermine their claims. (Ibid, 236-37) This last misgiving has exceptionally troubling implications, such as that the dignity of trafficking victims who were sexually pure (according to socially-accepted understandings of purity) prior to trafficking is worthier of protection than that of victims with a different sexual history. (Peach 2008, 241-42) All these (mis)conceptions about trafficking can result in legal and welfare processes that re-traumatize victims and discourage them from seeking authorities' help. (Peters 2013)

Quite closely related to the topic of this thesis, if more chronologically distant, is Stauter- Halsted's book on the moral panic about prostitution in Poland during its period of partition between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. (Stauter-Halsted 2015) Stauter-Halsted concentrates on the role of medical professionals and law enforcement in spreading the prostitution panic in divided Poland. (Ibid, 1-3) She does not discuss the role of the Church deeply, but Polish Catholicism is, of course, an important background factor when discussing policy and morality. There is some mention of orders of Catholic nuns

whose main mission was to "rescue" poor urban women, presumably from prostitution, gaining visibility in the 1890's. (Ibid, 201) The Good Shepherd Sisters, established by Sister Maria Karłowska, were perhaps the most prominent, and offered alternative livelihood training in addition to shelter and pastoral care. (Ibid, 201)

Stauter-Halsted explains that panic around prostitution was intertwined with fears about the spread of syphilis, hence the prominent role of Polish doctors in spreading the panic. (Ibid, 13) This gave rise to rules from the partitioning powers, meant to keep registries of prostitutes and check the women regularly for signs of venereal disease, upon which they would be prohibited from working and sent for treatment. (Ibid, 108) The Prussian regime in Polish territory is singled out for the comprehensiveness of its apparatus for regulating prostitution. (Ibid)

Syphilis was still poorly understood at this time, and became all the more mysterious and terrifying once doctors realized that they had underestimated the effectiveness of treatment methods. It turned out that many supposedly-cured patients were still infected—and

contagious. (Ibid, 252-54) Efforts to contain the spread of venereal disease manifested as the medical policing of entire employment sectors of poor women, such as domestic servants, on the assumption that they were likely to fall into part-time prostitution. (Ibid, 17) There was an increasing sense among the Polish public, but most acutely among its medical community, that syphilis was an unstoppable scourge that a) one could never be sure was eradicated, and b) could invade respectable homes and families via domestic servants who did part-time sex work and philandering husbands who caught the disease elsewhere and transmitted it to wives and children. We may once again mention Sister Karłowska, whose views about syphilis were unusual, to say the least: she "counted herself fortunate to 'have the horrible venom' of venereal infection under her roof, believing that dying of the disease was a 'sign of holiness' and the first step in achieving saint-hood." (Ibid, 201)

Prostitution in partitioned Poland also triggered fears about the prospects of the Polish patriotic cause. The Polish people had to maintain their moral standing—by this point inseparable from "national honor"—before

Europe, to prove that they deserved to join the club of independent European station-states. (Ibid, 215) Also, a nation debilitated by disease and moral decline would not be able to fight for its freedom and (re-)build its state once that freedom hand been won. (Ibid) For these reasons, prostitution was not just a niche issue, but a matter of grave importance to the well-being of the Polish nation. University students who caught venereal diseases from prostitutes caused alarm in the early years of the twentieth century, since their ill health and moral corruption had political implications: how could these young men lead Poland to an independent, prosperous future if they were debilitated by syphilis and other diseases? (Ibid, 260)

Prostitution panics were also rooted in anxieties around increasing industrialization in the Polish territories. Concerns about urban poverty, crime, disease, and disorder rose as more and more people moved to the cities in search of work. (Ibid, 59-60) This played into deep-seated narratives pitting the rural cultural heartland against the morally corrupt city. (Ibid)

Naturally, the situation of coerced/commercial sex in Polish territories is rather more complicated than

a journey from rural purity to urban corruption. Stauter-Halsted draws our attention to the dynamics of sex and power that often existed in the Polish countryside, where the rural aristocracy could have *de facto* sexual rights to the girls and women on their land. (Ibid, 60) Many supposedly pure country maidens had probably already experienced coerced and/or transactional sex before leaving their home communities, long before they were supposedly corrupted in Poland's expanding cities. (Ibid) Rural, semi-feudal communities were what we might call the Polish heartland, and the rural aristocracy's power often harked back to its role under the venerated Commonwealth, so it was less likely for moral leaders to point to them as a location of sexual threat and corruption. (Ibid) This logic can also explain the widespread outcry in response to the discovery of syphilis among Poland's Hutsul ethnic group. (Ibid, 263) The Hutsul were thought to possess exceptional cultural purity, and so their contamination by venereal disease was felt as an even greater blow to Polish nationhood. (Ibid) If we contextualize the prostitution panic in the Polish quest for national honor and independence, we can understand why

more attention was given to certain kinds of prostitution, or to specific populations threatened by venereal disease. While Stauter-Halsted's book describes a Poland that has long since reunited as an independent country—albeit with drastically different borders and ethnic composition—she states that her book's themes can still resonate with present and future socio-political developments in Poland. European Union accession, with attendant changes in migration flows, has added more complications to Poland's already knotty national identity. (Ibid, 337-39) It would not be so extraordinary if old patterns of sexualized moral panic were to resurface. (Ibid, 338-39)

While much writing about prostitution in the Philippines exists (discussed in a separate section), it is rare to find a more meta-level study viewing prostitution or trafficking-related discourse as a moral panic. Part of this may be due to general agreement that prostitution—including forced prostitution and/or prostitution of minors—occurs in the country on a large scale, meaning that it is difficult to call the public response exaggerated or hysterical. However, the very reification of scholarly

discourse around conventional trafficking narratives invites attempts to apply moral panic theory, of which this thesis is one.

Through its decades of evolution and application to a broad range of socio-political problems, moral panic theory reminds us of important issues in public debates that lead to policy formation. Certain framings of social problems—especially alarmist ones that also embody underlying threats to community integrity and survival—can come to dominate the discourse to the extent that questioning them is unacceptable. (Jenkins 1998, 1) This can result in a multi- faceted issue being discussed in a sensationalized, simplistic way that restricts the direction of efforts towards constructive solutions. (Ibid, 2) As Jenkins says, we can understand the formative stages of moral panics as "the creation of orthodoxies." (Ibid, 1) Political and social scientists can use their critical understanding of power, institutions, and discourses to question orthodoxies about various social problems, and perhaps point out the pitfalls in some of our established ways of handling these problems. When applied to the question of prostitution, moral panic theory stimulates us

to ask important questions about our assumptions: 1) What do we know about prostitution, and how do we get this information? 2) Who, if any, are the victims, and who is to blame for harming them? 3) Are we presuming the guilt or innocence of certain groups without adequate evidence? Are we failing to investigate certain flows of money, power, and people because they would go against the grain of our concept of national or community identity?

At the same time, moral panic theory must be deployed with caution. Otherwise, it may simply become another panic that too-easily dismisses widespread fears and, intentionally or not, disrespects the very real suffering caused by socio-political problems. (Hunt 1997, 646-47) Thankfully, incremental developments in moral panic theory over five decades mean that there is a large body of work containing guidance for how to nuance this theory for application to sensitive topics.

Mindful of this quandary, moral panic scholars like Jenkins are careful to stress that many moral panics have at least some basis in reality. Moral panic around child abuse was not a groundless fear because child abuse

did occur in late-twentieth century America. Child rights advocates had legitimate concerns about severe under-reporting of child abuse, not least due to widespread tendencies to distrust/ignore children's testimonies. Attempts to aggressively root out child abuse were generally well-intentioned and may have indeed helped some victims of abuse.

Jenkins demonstrates, however, that well-intentioned, measured reactions to a problem can quickly spiral into irrational and/or counter-productive panic responses. (Jenkins 1998) Moral entrepreneurs can begin by trying to encourage open discussion of an under-reported problem like child abuse. (Jenkins 1998, 9) They may rightly highlight the lack of credibility assigned to child victims, which allows abuse to continue. (Ibid) However, these approaches can lead to the use of questionable methods to elicit testimony from children, which officials must accept uncritically lest they be accused of complicity in child abuse. (Ibid, 11-13; Ibid, 18) The subsequent judicial processes can be traumatic to children and their families, especially if they result in long-term family separation. (Ibid, 18) Aggressive pursuit

of hidden child abuse can also result in false accusations. Public exposure of these wrongful allegations can discredit the entire child protection movement, as indeed happened in the late 1990's. (Ibid)

I draw much inspiration from this aspect of Jenkins' approach to child abuse panics. (Jenkins 1998) This thesis is written from the standpoint that there *are* legitimate grounds for widespread anxiety around transnational prostitution, just as the anxiety around child abuse was also somewhat reasonable. (Ibid) I outline them here, and then proceed to explain how these justifiable concerns give rise to monolithic narratives which can obscure more nuanced, constructive approaches to the problem.

For purposes of this research project, transnational prostitution refers to commercial sex transactions taking place across national borders, or instances when one of the main parties has crossed national borders *expressly* to perform these transactions. I understand transnational prostitution as a phenomenon that can be classified into four main categories: 1) the prostitute travels to another country and sells sex there, b) the customer travels to

another country primarily to buy sex, and c) the sex tourist *and* the prostitute meet in a third country where both of them are foreign nationals, and d) online prostitution with the customer and the person performing the sex act being in different countries.

There are valid reasons to suspect that prostitutes/prostituted persons might be subject to more brutal treatment in foreign spaces or at the hands of foreign exploiters. A prostitute in a foreign country might be unfamiliar with local laws and customs, increasing his or her vulnerability. (Lehti and Aromaa 2006, 158-59) The prostitute might have limited access to legal rights and welfare mechanisms as a non-citizen. (Ibid) He/she may be additionally subject to racial discrimination or xenophobia, both from officials and the general populace. (Robinson 2006, 64) A prostitute might also have a legal or occupational status that is in conflict with local laws, limiting his or her ability to approach local authorities for help. (Lehti and Aromaa 2006, 158-59) Foreign prostitutes face the risk of being deported shortly after being brought to the attention of law enforcement. (Ibid) Indeed, traffickers often control their victims by

threatening to report them to the authorities, whether or not the trafficking victims happened to break any immigration laws. (Ibid) In addition, foreign prostitutes might be received as a threat to their host society in a way that "local" prostitutes are not. This is especially true if *the sex trade as a whole* is perceived as the province of mostly foreign-born prostitutes. (Chuang 2010, 1724) Foreign prostitutes are then easily framed as carriers of alien sexual (im)morality, undermining family and society in their host country. (Ibid)

Further complications can arise if the transnationality occurs in the other direction, i.e. with the customer journeying to other countries to buy sex. A prostitute in his/her own country might indeed be more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation if his/her customer is a foreign national. Such a customer might feel much less empathy for a prostitute of a different nationality, ethnicity, or race, and behave far worse to that person than they would to a prostitute of their own nationality or race. Attitudes of this sort manifest in the behaviors of individuals, but have systemic roots. International sex tourists tend to originate from countries with an

imperialist or neo-imperialist history. (Woan 2008, 278) This colonial legacy, which continues to be felt in popular culture, tends to exoticize non-Western lands and peoples. (Ibid) Sex tourists might absorb harmful stereotypes about the supposed hypersexuality, submissiveness, and lessened personal dignity of "native" prostitutes. (Ibid) Asian or "Oriental" women are often stereotyped as hypersexual, exotic, and submissive—ideal prostitutes, in other words. (Ibid) The specter of prostitution seems to follow Asian women migrating to the West, even if they become their partners' legal wives. Asian women marrying Western men are frequently assumed to be exploited by their husbands and/or motivated by extreme poverty at home. (Lauser 2004, 15-16) Familiar Orientalist tropes of hypersexuality and submissiveness are common stereotypes, as well. (Ibid) Polish and other Slavic women may be stereotyped as being especially attractive due to a combination of genetic advantage and putting more care into fashion and grooming. (Stehle 2015, 258)

That said, sexual stereotyping is not always done by people from the First World/Global North or ethnic

majorities against those from the Third World/Global South or ethnic minorities. A Caucasian European or American woman might be seen as a sexual trophy, whose conquest by a non-Caucasian man may be taken as evidence of his high status and/or sexual/romantic prowess. (Nemoto 2008) The man in this case would have scored a personal victory against racist dynamics that paint him as either effeminate or excessively and dangerously masculine. (Ibid) Regardless, transactional sex across national and racial boundaries tends to carry decades or even centuries of historical baggage (Meszaros 2014), leading to the assumption that such sex is perhaps more exploitative or dangerous than sex between persons of the same imagined community.

The politico-legal implications of national borders have implications for the sex industry, as well. For example, foreign sex tourists may exercise de facto impunity by fleeing the country shortly after perpetrating violent and/or illegal acts. If their home country is relatively wealthy and influential, extraditing such foreign nationals can prove very difficult, more so if no bilateral extradition treaty exists. A national of a relatively wealthy

country might also be more likely to have the means to bribe or threaten local officials to avoid pressing charges until they can flee the country. For all these reasons, it is possible for a foreign national to not only treat local prostitutes with greater brutality, but to do so with little risk of punishment.

However, it is also possible that prostitutes would have faced similar or worse levels of ill treatment in their home countries, at the hands of their compatriots. (Robinson 2006, 63) A prostitute's home country might have a policy environment that is unfriendly to prostitutes, and/or limited resources for supporting victims of sexual exploitation. (Ibid) Highly sexist or morally conservative cultural environments can also play a role in exacerbating a prostitute's exploitation, making it extremely difficult for him or her to reintegrate into the community if he/she ever leaves the sex industry. (Ibid) In such cases, a prostitute might *prefer* to carry out transactional sex abroad. (Ibid)

I argue that hyper-focusing on transnational prostitution tends to ignore such nuances. The potential policy implications are significant. Abuse of prostitutes

by local customers might be ignored or condoned. Trafficked persons might be returned to communities or families that played a major role in their exploitation, due to the mistaken assumption that a victim's welfare lies at "home." Media and information campaigns might ignore or avoid critique of indigenous norms that encourage sexual exploitation. In sum, there are good reasons to be anxious about transnational prostitution, but there are also real dangers in forgetting the role of domestic actors. Moral panics can be sincere, well-intentioned, and based in reality, but they can lead to overly- narrow understandings of a problem. This thesis joins the body of scholarship that explores the rise and consequences of such approaches.

I argue that moral panic theory is quite suitable to the investigation of prostitution policy debates because of the issue's high moral and emotional charge, fed by its implications for communal survival. Prostitution appears to threaten the reproductive order of things, encouraging sexual contact and childbirth outside the family unit. (Harmer 2014, 93) On the other hand, it has also been used to try to *preserve* the family unit, allowing persons,

usually men, to unleash their excess sexual energy on women who are already designated for the purpose. (Ibid, 43-45) Single men may have a safe outlet for their energies, and married men may fulfill sexual needs and desires that they cannot address with their wives. (Raymond 2013, 153) They are less likely to attack or seduce chaste women. (Ibid) Prostitution helps perpetuate many societies' sexual double standard, encouraging male promiscuity while allowing the continued chastity of a certain class of woman. (Ibid) On a broader scale, the sex trade may perpetuate sexism more generally, by encouraging society to reduce women to commodities. (Dempsey 2010, 1737)

Throughout history, various polities have developed ways to attempt to manage commercial sex. In the twentieth century, these approaches have hardened into recognizable policy models which nevertheless bear traces of attitudes from centuries past. Each policy model arises out of a highly emotional problem narrative, usually with an obvious folk devil figure. The modern history of prostitution policy debates is, to a large extent, the story of warring moral panics. At present, the global debate about

prostitution policy has hardened around three policy models. These are called criminalization, legalization, and abolitionism. I outline each model below.

The criminalization model might be understood as the most traditional, and perhaps the most potentially harmful to prostitutes. (Cebulak and Pływaczewski 2007, 61) This model condemns the prostitute as a sexually depraved person who ought to be punished for spreading immorality in society. (Ibid) The prostitute is this narrative's folk devil. She spreads both moral and biological contamination. She leads men and youths into sexual depravity and precipitates the breakdown of families. (Green 2016, 205-06) To the extent that society is based on the family, prostitution undermines the foundations of society itself. Prostitutes' very presence is thought to expose normal citizens to immorality, or to tarnish the community's moral reputation in the eyes of visitors. (Ibid, 206) It is one reason why prostitution is often emblematic of many other social, political, and spiritual ills. Prostitution is used as a metaphor for the degradation of sacred institutions and principles. (Grow 2004) For example, some Protestant communities have

understood the Biblical Whore of Babylon as a reference to the Catholic Church, which, in their eyes, has corrupted Christian doctrine. (Ibid) A person "putting [his or] her talents and energies to an unworthy or corrupt use for personal gain" may be called a prostitute, as well, albeit metaphorically. (Green 2016, 186)

For these reasons, prostitutions should be penalized for the damage that they do to the community. Harsh punishments may also deter girls and women from entering the sex trade, or discourage foreign prostitutes from entering the community. Criminalization is manifested in financial penalties, incarceration, and other means for punishing those who sell sex. (Green 2016, 187) Other participants, such as recruiters, pimps, and even clients might also be criminalized, but this model's distinguishing feature is its targeting of prostitutes themselves. (Ibid) The criminalization model might recognize that at least some prostitutes were forced into their trade, and thus not consider them responsible for violating the law. Still, this model is recognizable by its view of voluntary prostitutes as threats to public health and morality. This model is considered the most detrimental

to prostitutes because it: a) reinforces social stigma against them, b) can drastically decrease prostitutes' earnings, and c) discourages prostitutes from seeking the protection of law enforcement against violent or exploitative pimps and clients. (Philippine Commission on Women n.d.)

The second model is called abolitionism. (Green 2016, 188) Under this approach, prostitution is considered inherently wrong and exploitative. (Raymond 2013, 1) To abolitionists, the trafficker/white slaver is the folk devil. He forces or deceives innocent girls and women into an immoral trade that forever ruins their lives. (Yen 2008, 660) His victims might never be properly re-integrated into society (Ibid); they will not be able to perform their proper function of supporting the community's biological and socio-cultural reproduction. The violation of communal dignity is even greater when the traffickers and/or customers are outsiders: they have defiled the community's women and exposed the men's inability to defend them. (Mariano 2012, 31)

As suggested by its name, the abolitionist model equates prostitution to slavery. Like slavery, prostitution

is an ancient institution that modern, enlightened people should now recognize as inherently evil. There is no acceptable form of prostitution, just as there is no acceptable form of slavery. (Lim 1998, 14) aProstitution should never be managed or tolerated; rather, we should work towards its abolition. (Ibid) These concepts are clearly illustrated in the ideological vocabulary associated with abolitionism. Prostitutes are called "prostituted persons," "sex slaves," "trafficked persons," "sexually exploited persons," and the like. (Raymond 2013; Lehti and Aromaa 2006) Prostitution tends to be referred to as "sex trafficking," "sex slavery," or "sexual exploitation." (Ibid) An important caveat to is that these terms might also appear in pro-sex work discourses, since those lines of argument also admit that coerced sex work is an unfortunately common occurrence in the world, which should be differentiated from voluntary sex work. The main difference, however, is that abolitionists believe that *all* transactional sex is coercive and exploitative. (Raymond 2013, 12) Even when a prostitute claims to willingly sell sex, her agency is so compromised as to negate her apparent consent. (Ibid, 19) Abolitionist may

point to the fact that prostitution tends to attract people with low-income backgrounds and low educational attainment. People "choose" it only because they have no other real options.

Prostitution is often framed as part of a larger narrative about gendered oppression throughout human history: most prostitutes at all times and places have been women and girls, whose sexual services were sold to men. Even when men and boys were prostitutes, their services were also sold to wealthier men with homosexual desires. Women sometimes buy sex from men, but this is far rarer because few women have the financial and social capacity to patronize prostitutes. Prostitution emblematizes and reinforces the financial, social, and sexual power of men over women. It is, at bottom, an expression of patriarchy, and true gender equality cannot prevail so long as prostitution is permitted.

According to the abolitionist problem narrative, the only genuine solution is to ban the sex trade. Pimps, recruiters, and brothel managers must be harshly punished. In stronger abolitionist models, like the one in Sweden, the customer is also punished: his demand for

paid sex is seen as the source of the problem. Prostitutes, as the primary victims, should not be punished for their participation in the sex trade. However, the state cannot support the efforts of self-identified sex workers to attain more labor rights and improve their working conditions; such programs would show that the state still condones prostitution. Most outreach work aimed at prostitutes will encourage them to leave the sex trade, and may make support conditional upon the prostitute renouncing her old livelihood.

Another noteworthy feature of the abolitionist model is its enthusiastic adoption of anti- trafficking concepts. Human trafficking is generally understood as the deception or coercion of a migrant for the purpose of exploitation. Abolitionist discourses tend to conflate human trafficking and prostitution. (Chuang 2010, 1707) Critics such as Chuang warn that this construct leads to dangerous lacunae. (Chuang 2010) People may assume that all human trafficking is sexual, and that all prostitutes are exploited/coerced/deceived. (Ibid, 1694) Victims of trafficking into other sectors, such as agriculture, construction, and domestic labor, as well as those who

claim to be voluntary prostitutes/sex workers, are marginalized. (Ibid, 1695) Since prostitution is, with good reason, associated with the exploitation of girls and women, male victims also tend to ignored. (Ibid, 1710) The trafficking-sex work conflation is another reason why abolitionism can be compatible with conservative/patriarchal views. (Ibid, 1658) Both emphasize the dangers of migration, implying that migrants (especially women) are safer if they stay in their home communities. (Ibid) This skeptical view of migration can be found in both sending and receiving countries; in a still-Westphalian world order, abolitionism can be a highly nationalist view.

The nationalist tendencies of many anti-trafficking narratives mean that they can be employed by conservative nationalists and outright xenophobes. On the surface, such moral entrepreneurs appear to be concerned about migrants' welfare. However, instead of trying to improve conditions for foreign workers, they focus on decreasing immigration and repatriating foreigners. The underlying implication is that prospective migrants should instead remain in their home communities, and rescued

trafficking victims should ideally be repatriated. There is little concern for the unfavorable conditions in home communities that encouraged migration in the first place.

A different type of nationalist abolitionism may appear in sending countries, where panics about citizens being exploited in foreign countries and/or by foreigners are common. The risks of domestic trafficking, and the role played by co-nationals in all kinds of trafficking, are correspondingly downplayed.

A visual representation of the trafficking-prostitution conflation is included below. Please note that, as the overlap gets larger, the space for recognizing non-sexual trafficking and non- trafficked/coerced prostitution decreases.

Fig.1 Venn Diagram Showing Conceptual Conflation of Trafficking and Prostitution Under Abolitionism



Much contemporary criticism of abolitionism comes from within feminism itself. Some factions of feminism claim that abolitionism plays too comfortably into the hands of moral conservatives. Abolitionist feminists may find themselves collaborating with conservative groups due to the similarity in their problem narratives about prostitution. (Ralston and Keeble 2009) For both groups, the sex trade is evil because it violates prostitutes' basic human dignity, even in cases where prostitutes claim personal agency and are well-remunerated. (Ibid) This narrative has moralistic, conservative roots: sexuality must only take place within the context of certain relationships, and a person's dignity depends on his/her sexual experiences and behaviors. (Ibid)It does not legitimize the claims of prostitutes who declare that they have chosen sex work freely. (Peach 2008, 242) Self-identified sex workers suffer from a self-destructive ideology brought on by personal trauma and exposure to misguided values prevalent in mainstream society. (Ibid) Outreach workers should help them understand that commercial sex destroys their dignity. (Ibid) We might see some parallels here to cases in late twentieth-century America, where children who claimed

not to have been abused were believed to have repressed their memories. (Victor 1998, 545) Psychologists then took on the responsibility of helping such children recognize that they had been abused. (Ibid) In both cases, victim status was allocated to persons by external parties, regardless of the person's own initial understanding of their experience.

Monolithic ideas about prostitutes' victimhood are disseminated by international abolitionist media. There tends to be a focus on the most extreme cases, such as the sexual exploitation of very young children (Westwood 2015), or the imprisonment and physical brutalization of young women (Doezema 2001; Keo et al 2014). Abolitionists might not explicitly call such cases typical, but sheer repetition lends them pride of place in the overall problem narrative: the extreme is presented as the norm. (Doezema 2001, 17) Heightened imagery of this sort can spread damaging misconceptions about prostitution and trafficking. (Uy 2011, 204) Target audiences might expect prostituted persons to exhibit signs of physical violence or psychological trauma. (Ibid, 205) They are likely to be skeptical of a purported victim who displays no physical injuries and/or appears more calm or cheerful than

expected. (Ibid)

Another problematic aspect of abolitionist narratives is their tendency to focus on stories of corrupted innocence, wherein the tragedy of prostitution is compounded by victims' inexperience and naivete. (Ibid, 204) Of course, there is some truth to such portrayals. Sexual exploitation can be even more traumatic for persons who have no prior positive sexual experience. If prostitution comprises their formative sexual experience, they might have greater difficulties forming healthy relationships in the future. The obverse implication is that a sexually experienced persons' sexual exploitation is less tragic. Taken further, the suggestion is that a sexually experienced person's sexual and personal dignity is *less* valuable than that of a person who fulfilled cultural expectations of virginity prior to being exploited. A person's prior sexual history might also be used to argue that he/she is not a genuine victim of sex trafficking.

Prostitutes who are irregular migrants might be especially vulnerable to the misconceptions spread by abolitionism. States often make distinctions between trafficked and smuggled migrants: trafficked persons are

deceived or coerced, while smuggled persons voluntarily and knowingly arranged to have themselves illegally transported into a country. (Weitzer 2014, 8) A migrant prostitute who cannot convincingly perform victimhood might not be perceived as a true victim of trafficking, even if her actual experience contained strong elements of coercion and violence. (Ibid)

Folk devils are not constructed with the same clarity as in other models, partly because prostitution itself is not seen as evil. There is no feasible way to ban prostitution from society. Doing so would only drive prostitution underground, creating social costs that would not be worth the potential benefits of a decrease in above-ground prostitution. What regulation considers wrong or evil are the *consequences* of uncontrolled prostitution. One way of framing prostitution under this model is as a necessary evil that prevents the eruption of even worse social ills. Hence, prostitution should be tolerated, but not encouraged. Prostitutes will be allowed to carry out their trade without harassment from state agencies. However, other actors within the sex trade, such as pimps and madams, may be punished for their role as third

parties, and large sex trade establishments may be banned. The above-ground sex trade can only operate on a small scale, sometimes only in the form of freelance prostitution, wherein individuals sell their own sexual services. Commercial sex may be available for those who put in substantial effort to find it, but it
will neither be widely visible nor widely available.

A more radical view posits that prostitution is not evil, period. Prostitutes are portrayed as "sex workers"—essentially not very different from people in other labor sectors. Prostitution is an acceptable means of livelihood, if done voluntarily and with the proper rules and protections. (Peters 2013) Society only *thinks* prostitution is evil due to the influence of conservative, sexist constructions of women's purity, virtue, and agency. (Ibid) Proponents of this view see it as a corrective to millennia of panic about extramarital sexuality and female sexual agency: the abolitionist narrative is likely to be criticized as a form of moral panic. (Ibid) In a society where men and women are truly equal, and extramarital sex loses its stigma, people will understand that prostitution is the rendering of a service. (Ibid, 231) It can

be highly skilled and satisfying work, as well: prostitutes can sell companionship and artistic abilities in addition to sex. (Peters 2015, 1245-46) At the same time, pro-sex work advocates must admit that prostitution is usually not an ideal job: most sex workers would choose another means of livelihood if they had other realistic options. (Peach 2008, 243) However, this admission does not negate their advocacy: perhaps prostitution is a last resort, but many other jobs are also difficult, dangerous, and degrading. (Peters 2013, 233) Why must prostitution be different? (Ibid)

Besides de-stigmatizing prostitutes, pro-sex work advocates ask their target audience to stop demonizing customers on principle. (Weitzer 2011, 1360) Certainly, customers should not patronize trafficked prostitutes or underage sex workers. (Ibid) They must abide by strict standards when interacting with, and paying, sex workers. (Ibid) However, they should not be condemned as perverse or wicked simply for buying sex. (Ibid) Some customers turn to commercial sex because of physical disabilities or psychosocial ailments that make it difficult for them to access intimacy in socially-acceptable ways.

The majority, however, are not substantially different from the rest of the population.[5] (Ibid, 1362) They are simply buyers of a complex and morally-fraught service, whose transactions would be more beneficial for everyone involved if the sex trade were treated much like any other industry.

Many modern prostitution debates are between pro-sex work and pro-abolitionist advocates. (Davis 2015, 1195-96) Hence, the pro-sex work narrative might find an approximation of the folk devil in the hardcore abolitionist.

According to critics, especially those who support abolitionism, proponents of sex work paint an overly optimistic portrait of prostitution. (Raymond 2013, 34) The voluntary sex worker forms only a very small

[5] Research with contradictory findings exists, as well. ((Farley, Golding, Matthews, Malamuth, and Jarrett 2015) A Boston-based study of 101 prostitute clients against the same number of demographically-matched men concluded that johns may have much in common with the general population, but also share the greater aggressive and misogynistic tendencies of rapists. (Ibid) Unfortunately, the research on johns is so scarce and small-scale that one cannot find any orthodox conclusions among sociologists or psychologists who have studied the topic.

minority of all prostitutes, and in any case, the testimony of such persons might not be trustworthy. A prostitute who claims to be selling sex of her own free will often recant her statements once she is out of the sex trade.

Pro-sex work advocacy helps traffickers pass themselves off as legitimate entrepreneurs. (Raymond 2013, 6-7) Abolitionists may point to the empirical results in polities that have legalized the sex trade, with Germany and the Netherlands being frequent targets. (Chuang 2010, 1723) In those countries, the sex trade grew rapidly immediately after its legalization. (Ibid) Some studies also claim that legalization actually led to an increase in trafficking, with exploitative establishments finding ways to masquerade as above-board sex businesses. (Ibid)

Pro-sex work groups have been accused of being in thrall to radical ideologues, or to lobbyists representing sex traffickers. (Raymond 2013, 6) Sex work advocates in post-colonial polities are especially vulnerable to the accusation that they have copied Western perspectives, perhaps with the added incentive of foreign funding. (Ibid)

The international feminist debate about sex work

seems to fall largely along developing country/developed country lines. (Doezema 2001, 28) Those who favor legalized prostitution tend to come from prosperous liberal democracies, usually in the West, while abolitionist advocacy is generally stronger among feminists from the so-called Third World. (Ibid) It is fairly easy to posit some explanations for this North-South divide. Prostitutes working in the so-called West might, on average, have better working conditions and be better remunerated than their counterparts in the Third World. (Zhang and Pineda 2008, 43) In addition, First World prostitutes can more reasonably rely on legal institutions to enforce protections. (Ibid) They might also be working in a more liberal social context, and therefore be subject to less stigma. (Doezema 2001, 25)

Legalized sex work, however, might be less appropriate in Third World context. On average, prostitutes face worse working conditions, and a less hospitable social context. Police and courts are less able to enforce laws that protect prostitutes, and keep minors and adult victims of trafficking out of the sex trade. To be sure, pedophiles frequently become sex tourists in Third

World countries partly to enjoy the de facto impunity that would be unavailable to them in their homeland. The legalization of sex work in such settings might only allow more avenues for the sexual exploitation. One might argue that Third World abolitionists are being pushed to accept a problem narrative that runs counter to their values and socio-political setting.

Pro-sex work advocates have also been criticized for their seeming lack of ambition regarding socio-economic reform. (Raymond 2013, 2) Instead, their mission should be to help create a world where nobody need be a prostitute—or, indeed, take on any other kind of degrading means of earning money. (Ibid)

The highly emotional character of prostitution policy debates, infused with the characteristics of moral panic, renders dialogue very difficult. (Weitzer 2011) It is quite challenging to produce reliable empirical research. Much of the research is ideologically compromised to the point of uselessness. (Ibid) Researchers have become attached to unproductively narrow or broad conceptions of key terms like "coercion," "freedom," "work," and so forth. (Ibid) They may also outright ignore data that

refutes their chosen problem narrative, including dismissing first-hand information from prostitutes and commercial sex establishments.

Problems multiply when researchers attempt to collaborate or use one another's data: comparative or cumulative studies are hobbled by the lack of standardized definitions and methodologies. Even with all these criticisms, the abovementioned problem narratives have given rise to the various policy models employed in most countries today. The models are summarized in the table below:

Fig.2 Table Showing Characteristics of Major Prostitution Policy Models

Summary of Prostitution Policy Models			
Model	**Concept of Prostitution**	**Primary Goal**	**Signature Provisions**
Criminalization	Moral and social threat; prostitute is main offender	Ban prostitution to preserve social morality	Penalties for voluntary prostitutes
Legalization	Socially acceptable/inevitable; voluntary prostitute as worker	Prohibit forced prostitution, manage and control voluntary prostitution	Taxation, licensing, inspection, and social services for voluntary prostitutes

Abolition	Fundamentally wrong and exploitative; all prostitutes as victims	ban prostitution to prevent sexual exploitation; punish exploiters and customers; rescue and support current and former prostitutes	Banning of prostitution AND social services for current prostitutes; strict penalties for traffickers and possibly customers

It must be understood that none of these models is a completely recent invention. They have all been present in human society for centuries, and are based at least partially on ancient problem narratives. What *is* relatively new are the current policy and ideological formulations surrounding them. The reification of the debate means that each model already comes with its associated vocabulary and expected lines of argument. As churches become more involved in the issue, we can also expect them to make use of these established concepts and words in their own discourse. A national Church's adoption of the terminology associated with a certain policy model can serve as an indicator of its ideological leanings.

B. Theoretical Framework

After examining the various strands within my review of related literature, I have collected and expanded upon the most relevant points to construct my theoretical framework. It can be broadly separated into two concepts: the Church as an interest group, and moral panic. I discuss each of them below.

i. The Church as an Interest Group in Less Secular States

For purposes of this thesis, one of the most relevant researchers who looks at Churches as interest groups is Anna Grzymała-Busse. Her work was first brought to my attention by my second supervisor, Dr. Jayeel Cornelio. With Dan Slater, Grzymała-Busse compared the historical paths of the Philippine and Polish Catholic Churches. (Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2018) They argued that, over centuries, the two Churches had arrived at broadly the same socio-political situation of strong religious nationalism by different processes. (Ibid) :

> "In Poland, religious nationalism arose primarily through the church's popular struggles against a domestic state founded on avowed secularism rather than against an alien religion or actor. We call this fusion by struggle. In the Philippines, by contrast, we see a broader overall pattern of church authority replacing a succession of weak states in the provision of symbolic and material sustenance. We dub this fusion by substitution." (Ibid, 546)

I have discussed this comparative work in more detail elsewhere, in the section regarding relevant comparative studies, and prefer not to repeat it here.

Further reading into Grzymała-Busse's work showed that she had produced much more research that proved to be relevant to my thesis, especially in the development of my theoretical framework. Grzymała-Busse sets out to prove how churches, by accumulating sufficient moral authority as defenders of a nation, gain institutional access to a state and thereby achieve an arrangement of church-state relations that consistently furthers their interests over long periods of time, often in spite of later political and societal changes. ("Grzymała-Busse 2016)

Grzymała-Busse's data is certainly relevant to the

national contexts I study, but one should be cautious about applying her insights elsewhere. Of the 29 countries with statistical data in her analyses, 24 are European. (Grzymała-Busse 2016, 5) Grzymała-Busse also confines her analysis to predominantly Christian countries, both in her detailed two-country comparisons and in her general analyses of tabulated statistical data. (Ibid) She does not rationalize this selection in her analyses. It is possible that the necessary international survey data was only available for predominantly Christian countries, but a brief mention of this fact from Grzymała-Busse would have clarified matters greatly.

A necessary caveat is that Grzymała-Busse's emphasis on European cases does necessitate some adjustment when applying her ideas outside this regional context. For example, she places emphasis on "political parties" as critical partners of a politically active church. (Ibid, 2) However, in some countries, party systems are weak, and it might be more productive to focus on political dynasties, individual personalities, and contingent personal alliances. Grzymała-Busse did not mention this point in her brief, auxiliary discussions of the

Philippine situation, even though the country's political dynamics are highly dynastic and personalistic.

Furthermore, Grzymała-Busse works with a somewhat narrow, monolithic concept of a "church," which focuses on the highest ranks of a religious institution's formal hierarchy. Her approach downplays the possibility that a church may be highly factionalized, or may include various groups or individuals who exert much political influence despite having a low or marginal position in the official hierarchy. (Ibid, 2-6) Grzymała-Busse's relatively monolithic, hierarchical slant is perhaps most compatible with Catholic institutions, but as I later elaborate, one might sometimes be better served with a broader, more heterogenous concept of a national Catholic Church.

All these caveats aside, however, Grzymała-Busse's analysis of churches as interest groups who channel hard-won moral authority into political influence via institutional access is a core part of this dissertation's theoretical framework. I apply these ideas as a way to explain the prostitution policy stances of the two strong national Churches in Poland and the Philippines.

Grzymała-Busse's approach is driven by historical and statistical data. She compiles statistical data on the church's policy influence, disapproval rating regarding policy influence, and "level or religious nationalism/fusion." (Grzymała-Busse 2016, 5) The first variable appears to have been the most complicated to measure. Grzymała-Busse composed an index based on the church's ability to shape discussion on five issues: "abortion, divorce, education, same-sex marriage, and stem cell technology." (Ibid, 4) Each issue yielded a maximum of two points one for influencing discourse and another for shaping the actual policy outputs, and 10 is the highest possible value. (Ibid, 5-7) The Philippines and Poland, at 9 and 7 respectively, are accorded two of the highest values of any predominantly Catholic countries on Grzymała-Busse's table. (Ibid, 5) Indeed, the Philippines has the very highest value for this variable. (Ibid) Ireland and Chile are accorded a value of 8, and Austria and the United States tie with Poland at 7. (Ibid)

The second variable, which is societal disapproval of a church's policy influence, is expressed as the percentage of the population, as recorded in World Values

Survey data, who do not want the church to have significant sway in government. (Ibid, 4-6) Poland has the fourth- highest value, at 81, and the Philippines the eighth-highest at 76. (Ibid, 5) The last variable, which is the "level of religious nationalism," is also measured with the help of survey data, in this case from the 2003 output of the International Social Survey Programme. (Ibid) It is expressed as the percentage of respondents who stated that affiliation with the country's predominant faith was critical to possessing true membership in that national community. (Ibid, 4-6) The Philippines and Poland have the two highest values of all the countries researched, at 84 and 75 respectively. (Ibid, 5)

Grzymała-Busse is interested in examining how various churches can enjoy similar levels of social religiosity, but diverge greatly in their ability to obtain political benefits from states. (Ibid, 8-9) Grzymała-Busse argues that a Church's institutional access is critical to its political power. A church with institutional access can see many of its doctrinal priorities reflected in national policy. It may receive state support in accumulating more power and influence. A state might even take a Church's power

for granted, to the point of shaping its policies to preemptively avoid clerics' disapproval and opposition. This can explain why some legislators advocate policies that do not actually match the Church's current policy stance; they aim to please the Church leaders, but have misunderstood what the Church leaders actually want to see in state policy.

At the same time, the laity does not want to see its Church acting *too* much like a political party or other conventional political actor. Being less transparent about their use of influence tends to increase legitimacy, while open exertion of power lowers public standing. International survey data suggests that opposition to church influence in politics is actually strongest in highly religious societies, and Grzymała-Busse makes much of this correlation. (Ibid, 4-6) In such countries, the public has grown to expect much from its Church, but does not want to see the Church jostling in the political arena along with other partisan groups. Too much "overt" politicking makes a church appear biased and overly concerned with its own wealth and power. (Ibid, 2-3) As such, it can no longer uphold its prestige as the nation's guardian. (Ibid

Churches that have achieved a strong overlap between national and religious identity in their country build "moral authority," a resource that can be channeled into "institutional access." (Ibid, 2) Concrete examples of institutional access are: "the ability to propose and vet policy directly through joint church-parliamentary commissions, informal legislative proposals, extensive parliamentary and ministerial consultation, the vetting of state officials, and even control of state sectors such as welfare, health, and education." (Ibid) These processes may take place some distance away from the public eye, but they are not totally invisible or confidential either, making the fertile ground for the researcher who is willing to do some investigation despite lacking high levels of security clearance or political networking.

Institutional access is both "direct" and "covert," and its effectiveness relies to a large extent on these two traits. (Ibid) Direct influence, by definition, allows a church to bypass other actors that might dilute its intentions or force (additional) compromise. (Ibid) Additionally, the covert nature of this influence protects a church from seeming egocentric or politically biased.

(Ibid) The church will be better able to maintain its image as a national guardian whose values and goals rise above dirty power plays.

Grzymała-Busse recognizes that not all churches are able to marshal this level of moral authority. Weaker churches, which are not sufficiently fused with national identity and interest, must pursue benefits through coalitions with friendly political parties. (Ibid, 4) This position is much more precarious than those of churches with privileged institutional access. (Ibid) Firstly, a coalition-oriented church's political allies may rise and fall in power. (Ibid, 2-3) Secondly, the exertion of power through these channels always carries the risk of public backlash: practically every policy gain carries some manner of political loss. (Ibid) Clearly, a Church's degree of moral authority can have huge implications for its overall political standing.

Despite her deep study of Church-State relations, Grzymała-Busse makes no explicit normative judgments about the ideal state of such relations, or the implications of various relational types on the health of a country's democracy. This is not necessarily a criticism, but may

disappoint readers who were hoping for normative prescriptions. Still, one may derive some implicit judgments about how Churches operate with or against a liberal democratic state. When sharing sovereignty with the state, a Church exerts much of its power covertly, as transparent use of its influence would undermine the very basis of its power. (Ibid, 2) The long-term exertion of such influence arguably undermines the integrity of the arena which Habermas calls a public sphere, where open exchange of ideas under widely accepted rules of fair play supports the functioning of an open, vibrant (if sometimes chaotic) democracy. Churches can and sometimes do act to protect democracies; indeed, this is can be the source of much of their moral authority. However, the methods by which Churches exert their power can be undemocratic.

Once consolidated, a church's relationship with the state tends to maintain itself. A relatively weak church which is forced to participate in conventional political coalitions cannot easily rise to the role of non-partisan defender of the nation. (Ibid, 4) At the same time, a church which has already consolidated its position as a national guardian and provider of state-like functions cannot be

quickly detached from its self-reinforcing power sources. (Ibid, 13)

Since moral authority is such an important resource, the researcher should spare some thoughts as to how it is obtained. How does a church gain—or fail to gain—sufficient moral authority to leverage towards institutional access, even to the extent of sharing sovereignty with the state?

Grzymała-Busse argues that a church's moral authority in a country arises primarily from its "fusion of national and religious identities." (Ibid, 13) In this situation, it is taken largely for granted that one should support the Church and adhere to its teachings in order to be a legitimate or typical member of one's national community. To oppose Church teaching or interests is to alienate oneself from the nation.

At the peak state of moral authority, the Church manages to almost completely fuse its identity and interests to those of the nation. Grzymała-Busse describes this as the achievement of "religious nationalism." (Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2016, 1) What concrete decisions or developments can facilitate the growth of

religious nationalism? Grzymała-Busse helpfully provides us some examples. For one, Churches may shelter opposition to an unpopular or controversial regime, as happened in Poland (Grzymała-Busse 2016 "Weaopns," 13) and, as Claudio illustrates, the Philippines (Claudio 2013, 28-29). They may also support movements against invaders or imperialists. (Grzymała-Busse 2016 "Weaopns," 13) In such circumstances, they will have proved their credentials as protectors of the nation against a state that does not represent its interests properly.

On the other hand, what choices or circumstances promote divergence between national and religious identities, thus hindering a church's accumulation of moral authority?

Churches can lose, or fail to gain, moral authority if they work against national independence/unification movements, as happened in Italy in the nineteenth century. (Ibid, 21) In what is now the Czech Republic, the Catholic Church was seen as consistently siding with Hapsburg imperial rule. (Ibid, 20) Therefore, the church presently exerts relatively little moral authority, despite the presence

of many observant Catholics among Czechs. (Ibid) Churches might also ally themselves with regimes that bring defeat, destruction, repression, or shame to the nation. For instance, the national churches' privileged relationships with twentieth-century dictators stigmatized them in Spain and Italy. In other cases, a Church may simply not get the chance to prove its mettle as a national guardian—at least, not within sufficiently recent memory.

Grzymała-Busse, however, cautions against drawing over-determined links between widespread religiosity in society, moral authority, and institutional access. (Grzymała-Busse 2016, 14-16) A society may have a high proportion of deeply religious people who observe rituals and obey many of the church's doctrines. (Ibid, 14-15) However, it does not necessarily follow that these adherents will also grant the church a great deal of moral authority that it can use for political gain. (Ibid) In other words, adherence to a religious tradition does not mean allegiance towards that religion's earthly leaders, especially when those leaders attempt to blatantly exert political power. Also, even if a Church *does* build up a substantial amount of moral authority, the state may not

accord it much institutional access or policy influence, because the state may be in such a strong position that it does not need Church support. (Ibid, 15-16) Hence, the channeling of moral authority into institutional access is more likely to happen in countries where the state is somewhat insecure of its position, and cannot afford to ignore the Church. (Ibid) A state is more likely to resort to sharing sovereignty with a church during periods of weakness or transition, such as regime change. (Ibid) Churches with sufficient resources may maximize these historical junctures. (Ibid) Also, a church may facilitate a new regime's rise to power, and after this change, can also help to stabilize society, discourage political violence, and provide social services while the new state is in its infancy. (Ibid) Intervening factors can be enormously important. The researcher should have a holistic approach to Church-State relations, and not assume that one aspect or variable is synonymous with the appearance of another.

One possible critique about Grzymała-Busse's work is that she tends to treat a church's historical role as given, or as a narrative that is objectively true. She takes little account of actors' ability to reconstruct or even

outright fabricate a national past. For example, past church leaders may have done much to hinder national interests, but their successors might be able to construct narratives which downplay these decisions. Conversely, a church may have contributed a great deal to the pursuit of national interest and defense of the nation, but these benefits may be forgotten, downplayed, or reframed in a negative light. (Schumacher 1981) Her insights can be augmented by a more constructivist understanding of a Church's role in national history. Churches and other actors can sometimes reshape national memory in a way that works for or against a Church's political interest.

Overall, Grzymała-Busse's ideas have the potential to be very useful in understanding Churches' socio-political roles, especially in combination with older theories about religion and politics.

In my own research, I make most use of Grzymała-Busse's idea that Churches must obtain and maintain a role as national protector, which in turn fuels the moral authority that is channeled into institutional access and political influence. (Grzymała-Busse 2016, 2) While it does not have the same struggles as a weaker church that

relies on coalitions (Ibid), a stronger Church must still constantly work to maintain both its moral authority and its institutional access. Otherwise, its moral authority can erode along with the historical memory of its guardianship role. Overspending its stores of moral authority can also leave a once-powerful Church vulnerable, especially if it fails to carefully replenish its stores of public goodwill. Per Raffin and Cornelio, this is what has happened to the Philippine Church following its zealous opposition to the Reproductive Health Bill. (Raffin and Cornelio 2009) The Church's stance on the issue, as well as its chosen political methods, had alienated many Filipinos and undermined its legitimacy. (Ibid, 788-90) Its strict opposition to sexual education and most forms of contraception made it appear inconsiderate of the exacerbating effect of large family sizes on poverty. (Ibid, 799) In short, it seemed all too willing to put dogma ahead of national interest. Secondly, some Church leaders' overt politicking against proponents of this legislation made the Catholic Church appear biased and corrupt. (Lopez 2016) The Church's failure to block the election of anti-clerical, authoritarian, anti-human rights candidate Rodrigo Duterte to the Presidency in

2016 makes a great deal of sense in this context. (Ibid)

Grave scandals can also do much damage to a Church's standing, as the various abuse scandals and state-aided cover-ups thereof have done to the Irish Catholic Church's position. (Grzymała-Busse 2016, 20) The high proportion of children among the Irish Church's alleged victims doubtless facilitated its loss of moral authority: the Church was literally endangering the safety of the next generation of Irish people. (Ibid) It had become a grave threat to the very nation it had claimed to protect. The Polish Church has not escaped recent threats to its own standing either, largely arising from the actions of its own clergy. The current heated discussion of abuse scandals in the Polish Church, starting from 2018, is drawing speculation about the implications for its political standing. (Agence France Presse in Warsaw 2019) However, it must be admitted that the Polish Church has avoided sex abuse scandals far longer than other European countries with large Catholic communities, and it is possible that the potential for damage to the Church's standing has been overestimated.

I attempt to steer Grzymała-Busse's insights

further down a less path-dependent direction. I contend that a Church cannot simply wait for the next historical opportunity to renew its place as national guardian in times of existential crisis. Dictatorships, revolutions, invasions, and the like cannot simply occur at a Church's convenience. I argue that a Church can maintain or increase its stores of moral authority by taking an active role in policy issues which touch on national security, national identity, or national pride. Granted, this kind of policy engagement might have more incentive for Churches that already hold a high degree of moral authority. While Grzymała-Busse tries to understand Churches' capacity to promote their desired policies, I use her ideas to investigate how Churches construct their policy stances in the first place.

A Church might *try* to frame a certain policy issue as one of strong national concern. However, building a nationalist framing where none exists can cost too much time and energy, and success is not guaranteed. I argue that it is more efficient to engage in an issue that the public is already primed to view as a threat to the nation. Engagement then has a higher chance of a political payoff

in the form of an increase in the national Church's moral authority. Churches will construct their policy approaches accordingly.

Church actors might not necessarily be making such choices consciously, or simply out of a cynical desire to gain political influence. Per Jenkins, moral entrepreneurs can be sincerely committed to their ideological goals, but at the same time promote problem narratives that happen to serve their vested interests. Churches will promote problem narratives with heightened nationalist dimensions, which pit a native Us against a foreign Them. Such narratives are also more likely to envision a fairly large role for the Church in addressing the issue. The problem is likely to be attributed to deeper issues that the Church is uniquely able to address.

Grzymała-Busse names five policy issues which are of prime importance to Catholic Churches the world over: "education, divorce, abortion, stem cell research, and same-sex marriage." (Grzymała-Busse "Nations" 2016: 19) National Catholic Churches have little flexibility regarding their stance and level of engagement

in these five issues. (Ibid) Prostitution is not one of the five problems listed, but it can be easily framed as relevant to one or more of these key concerns. Transactional sex undermines the ideals of chastity and marital fidelity, potentially leading to divorce, and offspring produced by transactional encounters might be aborted. Therefore, it is quite feasible for a country's Catholic Church to take on the issue of prostitution as one of its key concerns, and extrapolate a set of teachings on the matter from existing doctrines. However, some Churches do this, and some do not. Why is this so? This is one way to articulate the second research question of this dissertation, with the Polish and Philippine Churches as selected "most similar systems" cases. I argue that, in the Philippines, prostitution comes with a pre-constructed nationalist problem narrative which can benefit the Church's organizational interests. In Poland, this framing has long faded from public consciousness, meaning that the Church has less vested interest in engaging with the issue. In this case, it is the power dynamics of interest groups that help explain the difference in Churches' doctrine and engagement regarding a policy issue.

II. National Churches and Moral Panic

Grzymała-Busse's work effectively bridges ideas from political religion scholarship to the next part of my theoretical framework, which is moral panic theory. Moral panic theory can help explain and describe how actors become engaged in certain emotionally-charged policy issues. In this case, the actors are national Catholic Churches, and the issue is prostitution. Moral panic theory has many strands, but I concentrate on the one that treats its actors as interest groups with organizational and ideological interests. The actors will then adopt, shape, and promote problem narratives that are compatible with these interests.

The framework of moral panic might be especially useful for understanding the policy engagement of Churches since, as religious institutions whose power is fueled by moral authority, they are well-positioned to be moral entrepreneurs. The reader has likely noticed some of the conceptual language of moral panic theory in the previous section about the Church as an interest group. One might even make the argument that a Church's socio-political influence can be measured in its ability to be a

successful moral entrepreneur.

Churches will engage in moral panics according to their ideological and organizational interests. This does not conflict with a sincere concern about a given social problem and its victims. However, there will always be factors and considerations that encourage actors to promote certain problem narratives, whether or not they consciously realize it.

The concept of organizational (Bellin 2008, 321) and ideological interests (Sieracka 2017, 135) comes from the broader literature on rational actors and/or rational choice: actors make decisions in ways that attempt to maximize both these types of interest, while minimizing costs. Religious actors/institutions, insofar as they are viewed as interest groups (Warner 2000), have been some of the objects of such research, especially in more recent years. (Bellin 2008, 321) I prefer to use the term "organizational interest" rather than "vested interest" in order to differentiate the church from scientific or technocratic bodies who often make pretense to a type of objective expertise. Religious actors make no claim to such neutrality; their primary purpose *is* to promulgate

moral, spiritual, and ideological claims. Hence, religious actors have somewhat different relationships to ideological and organizational interests than many of their secular counterparts.

Interest-based behavior suggests that there is method in the seeming madness of moral panics. Moral entrepreneurs' behavior might seem overly emotional and detached from empirical realities, but it is driven by moral and practical motivations that can be teased out by careful analysis. It would be a mistake to attribute moral panics to mere dogma and hysteria.

Ideological interests manifest when actors promote a political platform, policy position, religious teaching, etc. Organizational interests can be understood as a broad analogue for how Jenkins uses the term "vested interest," i.e. the prospect of deriving practical benefits from the promotion of ideological claims. (Jenkins 1998, 183) Moral entrepreneurs will demonstrate the strongest attachment to problem narratives when they touch on *both* ideological and organizational interests. (Ibid, 184)

As far as ideological interest goes, Churches will promote problem framings that are consistent with its

doctrines about the social problem at hand. If there is no clear teaching to cite, it will at least avoid framings that conflict with its teachings in other, less ambiguous matters. For example, problem narratives that advocate birth control or legal homosexual marriage might be avoided; the Church will promote a different solution to the problem. Hence, Churches need not approach a social problem with a ready-made problem narrative; they may develop and change their stance as they participate in a moral panic over time.

As for organizational interest, Churches are more likely to promote problem narratives that consolidate or increase their moral authority and/or institutional access. I derive this argument from Jenkins, who said that social workers and child therapists' claims about the large scale of hidden or repressed child abuse in America accorded them a larger role in public debate and public action on the problem. If most child abuse is hidden behind closed doors, or even repressed in the memories of traumatized children, social workers and experts on child psychology naturally play an important role in treating and detecting it. (Ibid)

A similar dynamic might be observed in the Church's suggested solutions for the problem of prostitution. For instance, the Church may promote an approach that makes much use of values education or the reinforcement of marriage. Such tactics make use of functions or institutions that are already associated with the Church, buttressing the notion that the Church ought to retain a large role in public life, in spite of calls for greater secularization.

If a Church's moral authority rests on its role as national guardian, it benefits most from joining moral panics about issues that threaten the nation. Such issues give the Church more opportunities to consolidate its desired role. The resulting increase in moral authority can then be directed towards institutional access for ideological and organizational gains.

Not all issues are of equal relevance to a Church's organizational interest. A Church might find various social issues that are *already* framed as threats to the nation. These require the least effort to turn to the Church's political benefit, especially if there is no conflict with current religious doctrine.

In some cases, the Church might adjust the problem narrative around an issue in order to frame it as a clear threat to the nation. This has happened to the issue of legalized homosexual marriage in some countries, where marriage between two men or two women is framed as an imposition on national sovereignty and/or disrespect for the nation's values. (Sieracka 2017, 125) Western countries are accused of universalizing their own views about homosexual marriage, and condemning other countries as backward and unjust if they do not comply. (Ibid) As such, conservative religious actors can package their opposition to homosexual marriage as a defense of the traditional family and/or national values, rather than a means of marginalizing sexual minorities. (Ibid) LGBT rights advocates then have to contend with accusations that they are undermining society's bedrock institutions. (Ibid) People who do not bear any special fear, opprobrium, or loathing for homosexual relationships might side against homosexual marriage in attempt to protect the nation and family— or, at least, *their* notions of the nation and family.

However, there may come a point where

attempting to re-frame an issue is no longer worthwhile: constructing an advantageous narrative is too difficult, and the potential political reward too small. In such cases, the Church will turn its attention to more productive questions. From my readings into moral panics and gendered approaches to IR, I formulated a concept for social issues that have been framed as threats to the nation, or, as I put it, matters of national concern. I describe it below.

Let me begin by outlining what such issues are *not.* An issue of national concern is *not* the same as the concept like 'national interest' articulated by realist IR theorists like Morgenthau (Morgenthau 2006) or Waltz (Waltz 2010). It is far less objective and monolithic, and is not confined to generic geopolitical concerns or so-called high politics. It would be difficult to come

up with a list of 'national concerns' that is valid for all times and places. Empirical circumstances can affect what the majority of citizens see as a national concern. Furthermore, framings by powerful moral actors and politico-cultural gatekeepers can affect whether the same issue enters or leaves the national agenda over time.

Indeed, the framing of a problem can be more decisive than its initial empirical reality and scope. I re-articulate this question thusly: how is a problem framed so that it becomes an issue of national concern?

Firstly and perhaps self-evidently, the issue should be perceived to affect the nation as a whole. Otherwise, it is seen as a niche concern that can be easily ignored. " 'Women's issues,' " including prostitution, have historically been framed as niche concerns. (Steans 2013, 15) The very name given to these problems suggests that their impact is confined to only one gender—and a marginalized gender, at that. (Ibid) Issues of gender equality can and have been bypassed in favor of issues that are supposedly more important to the nation. (Ibid) This is often the case in nationalist struggles, where women's rights advocates are often asked to defer their concerns to a time when the nation has already consolidated itself. However, contexts can evolve to the point that a niche concern eventually becomes framed as a national concern. Women's issues can again serve as a useful example, as there are times and places where threats to the safety, honor, and/or equality of women give rise to panic on a

national scale. This tends to happen when women are framed as metonyms for the nation itself: their violation is the violation of the whole nation. (Conrad 2004, 11) One case would be the discourse around Syrian refugees in Germany following the infamous Silvesternacht assaults in Cologne. The men who carried out the attacks were not only targeting a conveniently vulnerable group of women, but German women, German society, and German values in general.

Secondly, the issue should be framed as an existential threat to the nation. The concept of 'threat' is rather flexible. It might manifest as a conventional threat to the biological safety of a national group—military invasions are a good example. However, a threat might also be cultural. (Winegar 2014) The absorption of 'foreign' values through popular culture, regional integration, or mass immigration can be perceived as a threat, if members of the community feel that their core values are in danger of disappearing within the next few generations. (Levine and Staiger 2004, 223-34) The broadening and deepening of European integration has made the issue of national identity and cultural survival

especially fraught in Europe. (Ibid; Holc 2004, 756) A post-colonial legacy might also make a community less secure of its national identity, and exceptionally sensitive to threats to cultural cohesion, national honor, and so forth. (Conrad 2004)

A third trait of such issues is that they are framed as of being of particular relevance to the nation in question, as opposed to a concern for supranational community or humanity as a whole. Actors who engage in the latter type of issue are protectors of a civilization, continent, racial group, or humankind; they are not guardians of a specific nation. An actor like UNICEF or Save the Children protects children's rights, but cannot claim to be the long-standing protector of any specific nation.

It must be emphasized, however, that the nation-specificity of an issue is not set in stone. Actors can frame a general issue as a more particular one, sometimes unintentionally. (Nubla 2009) For example, instead of being concerned with the human rights of all human children, an actor can engage with the rights of the children of a particular nation. (Ibid) The actor's rhetoric will

mainly reference the children of that nation, and highlight types of child abuse or exploitation that are unique to that nation, or especially prevalent in it. Their concrete projects will also be largely confined to aiding children of the nation in question.

Finally, a problem is more easily framed as a national concern when its origin is located outside the national group. (Pijpers 2006) If one group within the country preys on another, it is the marginalized group, and not the nation, which is threatened. The exception to this might be cases when internecine conflict is so dire that it constitutes an existential threat to the nation as described earlier. (Aderinto 2015) If the primary perpetrators of this threat are indubitably members of the nation, they can be portrayed as folk devils whose own monstrous, immoral conduct places them outside the *real* national in-group. The nation itself is portrayed as a fairly unitary entity which faces this threat.

In short, an issue framed as a national concern is presented to the public as having some combination of the following characteristics:

1. It affects the nation as a whole;

2. It presents an existential threat to the nation, either biological/physical or cultural;
3. It is specific to the nation in question, as opposed to concerning a continent, 'civilization,' humankind, etc.;
4. Its origin is external to the nation, even though its ground-level mechanisms are carried out by members of the nation in question.

The more of the abovementioned traits an issue has, the more easily it can be framed as a matter of national concern. I hope to demonstrate that, in the present Philippine context, the issue of prostitution can be and has been framed as an issue of national concern showing all of the abovementioned framings. This is why it is in the Philippine Church's interest to be deeply engaged in the issue, and to emphasize abolitionist policy approaches that are compatible with nationalism. In Poland, these aspects are *not* sustainably present in the narrative around prostitution, so it does not make sense for the national Church to engage with it as strongly, much less in an abolitionist direction.

Historical Background

Since this thesis views national Churches as entities pursuing their interests in historical contexts, I now give a detailed historical outline of the Church's official views on prostitution, followed by a history of religious nationalism in the Philippines and Poland, respectively. These are followed by sections examining the discursive and policy links between prostitution and the Filipino and Polish nation.

I. View from the Top: The Church's Official Stance(s) on Prostitution

This section of the thesis discusses the official Catholic position on prostitution, as described by central authorities such as popes/the Vatican and widely-respected canon lawyers and theologians. It shows how this view evolved over time, and how various elements of Catholic tradition and theology may lend themselves to diverse interpretations. There is room in Catholicism—and certainly a sufficiently diverse body of theological writing—to support a range of policy approaches to prostitution. However, different strands of this long

tradition may come to the fore at different times and places. Hence, national Churches have a great deal of flexibility when developing their own approaches to the issue, while still being able to cite supporting doctrines and traditions in Biblical exegesis.

One might begin to parse the Church's complicated stance on prostitution by examining its teaching on the figure of Mary Magdalene—perhaps Catholicism's emblematic redeemed whore.[6] Mary Magdalene is widely known in Catholic tradition as a prostitute who was absolved of her sexual immorality by Christ himself, admonished to refrain from further sexual sin, and became one of his most loyal followers. (Foskolou 271) Certain legends and traditions surrounding Mary Magdalene carry the concept of her penitence even further, depicting her

[6] Certainly, Mary Magdalene is not the only scriptural figure one may use to look at the phenomenon of prostitution through a Catholic lens. Guider makes a case for the figure of Rahab, the Old Testament Canaanite prostitute and brothel owner who sheltered Israelite spies, and asked the Hebrews to spare her and her house once they conquered Canaan. (Guider 1995) Guider asserts that Rahab is a strong woman whose conduct exemplifies faith and courage. (Ibid) Still, it is perhaps no coincidence that her narrative is far overshadowed by that of the Magdalene.

living for many years as a hermit ascetic after the events of the Gospels.[7] Centuries of artistic tradition have reinforced the view of Mary as sexual sinner, with well-known images of the Magdalene depicting her in a highly sexualized manner.

However, strict (re)reading of Scriptures does not support this interpretation. Rather, it was institutionalized by Pope Gregory the Great, who was Pontiff from 490-504 AD. (Thompson 2006, 5) Gregory cited verses stating that Christ cast seven devils out of Mary Magdalene. (Ibid) Gregory took the seven demons to represent the seven deadly sins. (Ibid) Gregory's view also fits within a hagiographic genre popular at the time—tales of a courtesan, prostitute, or actress who meets a Christian holy man and is moved to amend her ways. (Harper 2013, 218-219) Such narratives gave ordinary Christians hope that even the gravest sins could be transcended through honest repentance. (Ibid, 219-220) Conveniently, they also endorsed the salvific power of the Church and its holy

[7] An emblematic example is housed in Florence's Museo dell'Opera del Duomo, where one can visit Donatello's sculpture of her as a naked, emaciated penitent covered in her own long, unkempt hair.

men, whose mere presence could supposedly turn sinful women into good Christians. (Ibid, 220) Magdalene's story was turned into the epitome of such narratives. (Ibid)

Through Gregory's interpretation, the figure of Mary Magdalene became combined with that of Mary the sister of Lazarus, who washed Christ's feet with her hair, and that of an unnamed sinful woman who was publicly forgiven by Jesus. (Foskolou 271) Foskolou refers to the resulting figure as a "composite saint." (271-72) "This composite identity of the Magdalene appears in Latin theological writings from as early as the late sixth century." (Foskolou 271) This interpretation of the Magdalene became popular in the medieval era, but attained special prominence in thirteenth- century Italy. (Foskolou 272)

However, this interpretation of Mary Magdalene's history seems to have been a phenomenon particular to the Western Church. Foskolou reminds us that the Magdalene-as- prostitute narrative had virtually no adherents in the Byzantine tradition. (272) Byzantine Christians preferred to portray Mary Magdalene as a teacher and leader, and even as someone who was

interested in rabbinic scholarship as a young girl, years before she would eventually meet Jesus. (Foskolou 281-85) This suggests that the idea of Mary Magdalene as sexually immoral correlates negatively with acceptance of her role as a religious leader.

The interpretation of Mary Magdalene as the penitent prostitute is said to have fed misogynistic strands in the Western Christian tradition and undermined women potential as religious leaders. (Thompson 2006, 7-8) However, it may also be viewed more optimistically: through sincere repentance and divine mercy, a sinner may not only be forgiven but even come to play a key religious role. (Foskolou 281-84)

Nearly 1500 years later, in the wake of the Vatican II conference, the tradition of the harlot Mary was quietly but crucially revised. The scriptural reading associated with Mary Magdalene's feast day was changed in 1969. (Hayes 2012, 148) Formerly, it was a passage concerning the repentant harlot who washed Christ's feet with her hair, but now concerns Mary Magdalene's witnessing of the Resurrection. (Ibid) Still, the narrative of Mary Magdalene as repentant harlot dies hard, and still forms

the core of her popular narrative to this day. It is still perpetuated by many theologians and religious leaders. (Ibid)

The figure of the whore has also—at the very least as far back as John of Patmos' revelations, been used as a symbol or allegory for overall moral decline. Exactly who or what might be represented by the Whore of Babylon, however, is a matter of debate. Some Protestants came to believe that the Whore of Babylon actually represented the Roman Catholic Church, which, in their eyes, had debased the essence of Christianity. (Grow 143) This equation of the Church with the emblematic whore figure became widespread during the Reformation, and had cultural echoes down through the centuries. (Ibid) For example, accounts claiming to expose secret prostitution and other forms of sexual misconduct in convents were popular in Protestant areas of Europe during the nineteenth century. (Ibid, 143-45)

Even as stories about redeemed, converted prostitutes or evil, metaphorical prostitutes proliferated, the early Christian Church struggled with the handling of real-life prostitutes within its community. While the

Church held a strong attraction for slaves and the poor, these were precisely the people who were least able to protect their sexual honor within the strictures of Roman society. (Harper 2013, 26-29) Church leaders faced the predicament of having to denounce sexual impurity, without alienating groups that were a key source of new members. (Ibid) I argue that the Church still struggles to reconcile its embrace of the marginalized with its condemnation of sexual impurity.

The Church's doctrinal wrestling with sexual morality should be contextualized within the history of the Roman Empire, and would profoundly influence the Empire's policy on sexuality. Kyle Harper examines this process in his thoroughgoing historical study *From Shame to Sin: The Christian Transformation of Sexual Morality in Late Antiquity*. (Harper 2013) Harper does not idealize the pre-Christian sexual economy, but is critical of the results of Christian influence, which ultimately led to "the haze of ruin and violent puritanism that characterized the reign of Justinian." (Ibid, 1)

As a marginal, often persecuted apocalyptic religion, Christianity could more clearly repudiate

sexuality and reproduction. Chastity, and, even better, celibacy, made more sense when Christians expected the imminent Second Coming. (Ibid, 5) The Church's rejection of biological reproduction and mainstream sexuality can be understood as a metonym for its rejection of mainstream Roman society altogether. (Ibid, 5-7) However, after the Empire adopted Christianity as its official religion, the Church had to reconcile with its place as moral authority for mainstream society. (Ibid, 132) The Church had to bond with mainstream society without becoming devoured by it, and losing the core of Christian teaching. (Ibid, 162-84) The Church's struggle with sexual morality in general and prostitution in particular would take up a good portion of its theological effort for the next few centuries. (Ibid, 165-86)

The Church attempted to enforce its teaching on chastity, while recognizing the realities of slavery and other forms of inequality in the Empire. It relied on a "Christian discourse of coercion and consent." (Ibid, 185) Christian leaders distinguished between willing and unwilling prostitutes, considering the latter group to be victims of pimps and recruiters. (Ibid) "In AD 428 the

Christian emperor Theodosius II enacted a law banning the use of coercion in the sex industry….The law advertised the will to prevent 'the necessity of sinning.' The language of sexual sin is totally alien to Roman law and symbolizes the diffusion of a new pattern of moral reasoning." (Ibid, 8) In 439 AD, the government of Constantinople made *all* pimping illegal, whether or not the prostitute was coerced. (Ibid, 186) These developments do not negate the influence of what we might term the Augustinian view, which, in any case, was largely inherited from pre-Christian eras. (Brundage 1976) At times, the Christian-influenced Empire's policy was that of "forbidding adulteries, [while] building brothels. Prostitution was not simply tolerated—it was viewed as a way of protecting the honor of decent women." (Ibid, 165) In sum, the Church's view on prostitution was profoundly ambivalent, and led to the passage of ambivalent, contradictory policies. As I aim to demonstrate in this thesis, the Church is still wrestling with some of the same themes, such as voluntary vs. coerced prostitution, which plagued its debates on sexual morality in the days of the Roman Empire.

Roman-era debates continued to be influential: Brundage shows that medieval canon law used a mix of Catholic moralism and inherited Roman legal tradition. (1976) However, the themes and debates he outlines are quite different from those analyzed by Harper. On the canonists' basic concept of prostitution, Brundage says, that "the fundamental definition which they employed was coined by Saint Jerome (ca. 342-420): "A whore is one who is available for the lust of many men." (Ibid, 827) Elaborating on this, "one of the most prominent thirteenth-century canonists, Cardinal Hostiensis (d. 1271) stressed the element of notoriety: "a prostitute was not only sexually promiscuous, she was openly and publicly promiscuous." (Ibid) Brundage asserts that the canon medieval canon lawyers also attempted to account for the emotional interaction between prostitutes and their clients, especially the question of feigned love. "Both Hostiensis and an equally renowned canonistic writer of the next generation, Joannes Andrea (ca. 1270-1348), agreed that an element of deception is also involved in prostitution: the harlot systematically deceives those whom she serves." (Ibid, 827-28)

Brundage notes that canonists tended to distinguish between prostitutes and concubines. Since the latter supposedly had more long-term relationships with much fewer or even just one partner, the relationship of a concubine to her client/patron was considered qualitatively different from typical prostitute-client interactions. (Ibid, 828-89)

Canon lawyers of the time did usually believe that prostitutes were sexually immoral, and that, while poverty was a mitigating factor, falling into prostitution was a result of laziness. (Ibid) However, medieval sexual double standards actually resulted in relatively less culpability allocated to prostitutes. (Ibid) Contrary to twenty-first-century views of the sexual double standard, the predominant medieval belief was that women were *less* able to resist sexual temptation. (Ibid) Men were perceived to have more control and thus more culpability in the commission of sexual sin. (Ibid) At the same time, the state was usually rather paternalistic towards prostitutes: as in Roman times, medieval prostitutes might be awarded fewer legal rights, for instance not being allowed to testify in courts on their own, similarly to insane people. (Ibid,

839) Ultimately, “the medieval canonists' treatment of prostitution was strangely ambivalent. Although they disapproved of it in principle and thought that it should be prohibited, still in practice they were prepared to tolerate prostitution and to justify its toleration in a Christian society.” (Ibid, 830)

Current Vatican doctrine is that most prostitutes are victims of both abuse by individuals and marginalization by society. (Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of the Migrants and Itinerant People, n.d.) If there are any truly immoral people in this scenario, they would be pimps, brothel owners, and other persons profiting from commercial sex acts done to the prostitutes. (Ibid) Customers, while also being immoral and exploitative, do not err as much as those who are seen to run the sex trade. (Ibid) Their culpability is tempered by weakness and spiritual or psychological pathology. (Ibid)

Even so, the idea that prostitutes—or at least some prostitutes—are immoral persons responsible for promoting loose sexual conduct in society may still be found among Catholics. (Chauvin 1983, 23) Perhaps, it is not only a matter of laypeople catching up with

adjustments in doctrine, also of officialdom doing more to propagate these changes. The confusion is exacerbated by the lack of thoroughgoing theological analysis of prostitution. The work of Francophone theologian Charles Chauvin is an exception. (Chauvin 1983) He concludes that prostitution is unchristian, largely because of its exploitation of prostitutes. (Ibid, 118) However, he admits that twentieth-century Catholicism has been conducive to the institutionalization of policies that tolerate prostitution, evincing the lingering influence of Augustinian thought. (Ibid, 60) He calls on the Church to re-examine its views on prostitution, to reconcile them with its fundamental teachings on love and human dignity. (Ibid)

All of these doctrinal developments must also be appreciated in terms of the Church's current institutional context. The Church must confront the loss of a significant proportion of its authority in the face of global secularization. Survey data implies that the majority of Catholics do not follow its doctrines regarding contraception and/or abortion. Furthermore, the Church lost both prestige and adherents due to a sexual abuse

scandal that is now known to be both global and systemic. It is much more difficult for this institution to make credible pronouncements on sexual issues when grave sexual misconduct was condoned and allowed to continue in the interests of preserving the reputation of individual clergymen and the Church as a whole.

This time of flux within the Church—what some have termed a real institutional crisis—is mirrored by big shifts at the very top of its hierarchy. Benedict XIV—the former Cardinal Ratzinger—was known as a hardline conservative whose influence as the head of the Office for the Doctrine of the Faith reinforced John Paul II's own traditionalist tendencies. His eventual abdication of the papacy was the first such incident over six centuries, and it is perhaps fitting that he was succeeded by another Pontiff whose term so far has been marked by major changes and outright "firsts."

Francis I is the first Jesuit Pope, and the first "non-European Pope since the eighth century." (H. 2013) His selection is frequently interpreted as the Vatican's acknowledgment of the growing importance and vibrancy of Catholic communities in the Third World. His

beginnings in the Jesuit Order are also significant because, in its contemporary form, the Society of Jesus is perceived as one of the more liberal and worldly clerical orders.[8](Ibid)

The ascent of Francis I to the papacy may be considered a landmark event in the general history of the global Church. However, it also has special implications for the Vatican's official stance on matters of sexual morality. Francis has stated that Catholics can sometimes be too preoccupied with sexual morality, to the extent of becoming judgmental and self-righteous. (Yardley and

[8] The thematic and ideological foci of his papacy are also considered quite different from those of his immediate predecessors. As leader of the Argentinian Jesuits in the 1970's, then-Cardinal Bergoglio was actually known as a strict conservative who staunchly opposed liberation theology. (O'Connell 2016) However, after various leadership changes and a two-year stint in Córdoba, Bergoglio apparently underwent a deep change not only ideologically but also in terms of his manner of leading. (Ibid) He began to be known for espousing social justice, and for a warmer, less rigid leadership style (Sławek 2016; O'Connell 2016), though the extent to which this is wishful thinking and/or a result of media exaggeration are open to question (McElwee 2015). Indeed, his emphasis on the plight of the marginalized and criticism of unjust social systems is sometimes framed as a late-career embrace of some of the tenets of the very strand of theology he had once worked to stamp out. (Sławek 2016, 75-79)

Povoledo 2013) Such attitudes may also lead to the neglect of graver problems.

While not outright contradicting the teachings of his predecessors on sexuality, family, and gender (McElwee 2015), Francis has shifted the emphasis towards the social systems within which individual people make their moral choices. Some critics of this approach say that the Pontiff has not gone far and deep enough in his reform efforts. (Odone 2016) On the other hand, there are also those on the more conservative end of the spectrum who find him too radical. (Allen 2016) According to these conservatives, Francis' relative leniency sexual morality to be eclipsed by social justice issues could be a Trojan Horse through which such deviant conduct is normalized within the global Catholic community. (Ibid) Francis' very socially conscious approach may indeed impact Church approaches to prostitution, with greater emphasis on the various types of marginalization that lead persons into prostitution.

More directly related to the topic of this thesis, Francis was indeed called upon to make a statement about the morality surrounding prostitution. This occurred

during his January 2015 official visit to the Philippines. (Khan 2015) A young girl tearfully asked the Pontiff why God permitted children to be prostituted. (Ibid) Francis responded by embracing the girl, and telling the crowd that she had asked a question which he could not answer. (Tufft 2015) His reply, though of course more focused on emotional response rather than theological elaboration, is nevertheless noteworthy: when it comes to a phenomenon as fraught and complex as prostitution (especially of children), the Church is forced to admit that are no obvious or simple answers.

II. The Church and the Filipino Nation

Here, I explain the historical evolution of Catholic religious nationalism in the Philippines. I describe the process by which Catholicism came to be perceived as a core component of Filipino national identity, as well as the implications for the continuing process of nation-building and democratic consolidation.

Catholicism and Colonial Rule

The history of Catholicism in the Philippines begins with contact with Spanish exploratory and conquering forces in the sixteenth century. At that time, the Philippines was not united as a single country, kingdom, empire, or other polity. Rather, it existed as various small kingdoms and sultanates, many of which had trade ties to China and, in the south, dynastic links to Bornean and/or Bugis kingdoms. Its largest organized religion was Islam. Islanders' first contact with religion may have begun as early as the ninth century, with Muslim traders who stopped in the Philippines on the way

to China. (Houben 2003, 161) There are no detailed records of this contact and early conversions, but historians, extrapolating from old oral traditions regarding the first Muslim religious teachers as well as from contemporary Muslim practice in the southern Philippines, suppose that Filipino Islam is primarily rooted in the Sufi branch of that religion. (Ibid, 157) Otherwise, various animistic traditions were prevalent, some knowledge of which still survives, and which is still practiced in some forms by indigenous minorities. (Bautista 2010, 31) Various elements of this tradition have also found their way into what some call folk Catholicism, about which more later. (Ibid, 31-33)

The coming of Catholicism to the islands in a way coincides with the invention of the Philippines itself. The islands were not named as a group until the Ruy López de Villalobos expedition named some of the islands after Spain's then-current monarch, Philip II. (Larousse 2001, 49) Even the Spanish themselves, who would officially name the Philippines and designate it as a political entity (albeit a non-independent one) would only gradually come to unite the islands under a single label. (Ibid)

Indeed, the indigenous inhabitants would only slowly come to identify as one national group known as the Filipinos. Nationalist narratives often belie tribal and other allegiances that long predate the nation. One example would be the popular narrative surrounding Lapu-Lapu, the Mactan chieftain whose forces battled killed Magellan. (Bautista 2010 "Rethinking", 32) He is known as one of the first national heroes in the Philippine pantheon, one among a list dominated by independence fighters, but Lapu-Lapu was not defending a nation against foreign invaders or colonizers. Rather, Magellan had entered into a conflict between local chieftains, since he had become allied with the chief who happened to be Lapu-Lapu's opponent in this struggle. (Ibid)

The coming of Spanish rule formally united the islands as a single, if non-independent, political entity, while isolating it from its neighbors in Asia. However, once again, this did not quickly facilitate a sense of united national identity among the islands' inhabitants. Tribal identities remained strong. This was even reflected in sporadic movements against Spanish rule. Uprisings tended to be quite localized, mounted by and in the name

of a certain tribe rather than the inhabitants of the whole archipelago. (Thomas, 79-81) They were also often put down using fighters hired from another tribe—perhaps the most pragmatic approach, given the limited numbers of Spaniards on the islands. (Ibid, 79-83) Even the Katipunan revolution, which would become a nation-wide independence movement that would all but succeed in pushing out Spanish forces until the islands were handed over to the U.S.A. in 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War, began as a movement to liberate the Tagalogs (Aguilar 2005, 608)

In other words, there was a Philippines designated by colonial rule, but it did not follow that the people of the islands were Filipinos. Indeed, the term "Filipino" was long reserved for persons of unmixed Spanish descent who were born on the islands, rather than in Spain itself. (Aguilar 2005, 610) The Malay and indigenous inhabitants were instead referred to as *indios* by Spaniards. (Ibid) The eventual claiming of the term "Filipino" for its "native" inhabitants represents an important milestone in the nationalist imaginary. This important development is attributed to Dr. Jose Rizal

(Tadiar 2004, 198), the physician, polymath, and writer who was executed by Spanish authorities in 1896 for instigating an armed uprising (Bautista 2006, 295), though Rizal himself was never directly involved in the rebellion, and is widely regarded to have actively discouraged it (Quibuyen 1999).

From such origins, Filipino-ness became closely entwined with Catholicism. Even when the label of "Filipino" was claimed by the so-called *indios* or natives, Catholicism was not repudiated by mainstream nationalism. Indeed, as will be seen in succeeding sections, Catholicism would have a strong role to play in burgeoning independence movements, even if the Spanish clerics themselves would be seen as opponents.

The Philippines' great distance from Spain effectively prevented large-scale arrival of royal or state authorities or settlers from the mother country. (Youngblood 1990, 1) The Spanish clergy came to comprise the most powerful Spanish presence in the Philippines, as few others were willing and able to make the voyage. It became extremely difficult to make any distinction between Church and State in the colonial

Philippines. (Ibid) The Crown and its representatives could have quite limited authority in practice, especially in places far away from Manila. In some remote areas, the priest was the only actual representative of Spanish colonial authority present, and, in addition to his religious duties, also became in charge of all kinds of infrastructural or state- related tasks. (Ibid, 1-2)

In addition, the rather short terms of office given to governor-generals also meant that they were unlikely to establish a power base that could truly rival that of the entrenched clerical orders. Indeed, rivalries involving the power of the governor-general and that of the friars could become quite heated. One of the most extreme incidents involved Governor-General Fernando Manuel de Bustillo Bustamante y Rueda, who held his post from 1717-19. (Ocampo 2010) Bustamante had introduced major changes, such as refurbishing and making operational the old fortress of Zamboanga, an important stronghold against Moro raiders. (Ibid) However, he also clashed with friars numerous times in investigations over corruption. (Ibid) When some high-ranking clerics were arrested and jailed, some friars decided that Bustamante

had to be eliminated. He was ultimately killed by a friar-led mob, along with his sons. (Ibid)

As bearers of as much or often more power than Crown authorities, Spanish Catholic clerics could be considered the *de facto* representatives of Spanish rule in the Philippines. (Youngblood 1990, 1-3) The historical meaning of clerical power during the Spanish era thus carries a great deal of ideological weight in Filipino nation-building. After all, many of the figures of the official pantheon of national heroes were known for writing, speaking, and fighting against the friars and their allies. (Lahiri 2007) Friar rule—or frailocracy, as coined by Marcelo H. del Pilar—is often painted as exploitative, oppressive, corrupt, and obscurantist. (Ibid, 250) Some revisionist writers, however, such as Nick Joaquin (not a trained historian, but still a prominent figure in Philippine letters and official National Artist for Literature) argue that official or popular views of the Spanish era tend to excessively denigrate or even outright demonize Catholic friars and the Spanish Catholic cultural influence more generally. (Pablo 1955) Schumacher claims that Catholic priests, especially non-Spaniards aided the revolution

against Spain, and, later, resistance to American conquest. (Schumacher 1981) However, as Schumacher was a member of the Jesuit Order which played a part in colonization, but educated many young men who would become nationalist or revolutionary leaders, his potential biases must be kept in mind. In any case, such efforts bred friendlier ties between Spanish clergy and the islands' native inhabitants. They would have increased the moral authority of priests at the grass roots level, despite having been largely forgotten by official/nationalist historians like Agoncillo.

Filipinized Catholicism?

As described above, Catholicism in the Philippines was intrinsically bound up with colonial, if not necessarily Crown, rule. How, then, did Catholicism relate to pre-existing Filipino religions?

The consolidation of Catholic dominance was not a straightforward matter of Spain forcibly stamping out pre-Hispanic traditions. Armed genocidal violence on the

scale of that perpetrated in the Americas could not have occurred in the Philippines, if only because the Spaniards arrived in small numbers. A foreign religion was not simply forced on a subjugated population through arms, nor can one say that the inhabitants of the islands accepted Catholicism because of the relative weakness or unattractiveness of their former religious beliefs. (Ileto 1979) The establishment of Catholicism on the Philippine Islands did not comprise a passive absorption of Catholic belief by the native population. (Ibid) As the people who would become the Filipinos were converted to Catholicism, so was Catholicism to various degrees Filipinized. (Ibid)

Language is a useful starting point for understanding this process. Many Spanish clerics learned local languages. (Bautista 2010 "Rethinking", 33) This led to Filipino languages being better preserved in comparison to other Spanish colonies.

Also, certain strands of the Christological narrative and Catholic teaching and custom generally resonated with some aspects of pre-Hispanic Filipino culture(s). For example, versions of the resurrection story

were often well-received, since many pre-Hispanic narrative traditions already possessed the tradition of a hero who dies or suffers defeat, only to resurrect or recover and then claim ultimate victory. (Ileto 1979, 49-55) The special importance placed on the figure of the Virgin Mary was compatible with strong matriarchal elements in pre-Hispanic culture, which helps to explain the strong Marian tradition in Filipino. (Ibid, 134-60) Also, the practice of physical penitence associated with Good Friday was brought to the Philippines around the sixteenth century, and, resonating with local traditions that sacralized suffering, eventually resurfaced in the 1960's as the controversial Penitensya tradition—ritual penitence that includes self-flagellation and sometimes crucifixion.[9] (Tiatco and Bonifacio-Ramolete 2008, 60-63) As in Poland, much Catholic practice in the Philippines also involves strong pagan or pre-Christian elements. Devotion to God does not necessarily prevent one from also believing in nature spirits, buying *anting-*

[9] This ritual, though denounced by the Philippines' bishops and considered extreme by many or even most Filipinos, continues to draw visitors and news coverage both nationally and internationally.

anting or amulets for luck, or to going to either a faith healer or an *arbularyo* (witch doctor) for help with serious illnesses or demonic possession. (Ileto 1979, 22-28)

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, various reformist, anti-imperialist, and social justice movements gradually coalesced into a nationalist movement that drew in most sectors of the Hispanized areas of the islands. One might, perhaps, expect Catholicism itself to have been framed as a foreign belief system, and rejected in favor of a return to Islam and/or animism. Why, then, was Catholicism itself not significantly displaced as a national faith during independence struggles and other efforts at conscious nation-building? Making sense of these questions largely depends on understanding how Filipinos of the time made a distinction between the religion and certain foreign clerics who abused their power. Much of the proposed religious reform in the late colonial era still envisioned its objectives within the bounds of Catholicism: this did not mean changing the religion, but rather opening its power structures to non-Spaniards. (Ibid, 39-40)

It is argued that Catholicism itself—or certain versions of

it—also helped to conceptualize and inspire revolutionary movements. (Ileto 1979) The Enlightenment-style anticlericalism of the independence movement was mostly confined to the middle classes and elites. (Ibid) Mass interpretations of Catholicism were often quite different in their foci also often contained a strong social justice component. (Ibid) The revolution would bring about the coming of Christ's kingdom, which would abolish distinctions based on family, wealth, and education. (Ibid, 317) People would experience freedom, material well-being, and treat each other with genuine "brotherhood." (Ibid, 318) The development of a shared vocabulary and iconography had the additional benefit of promoting shared national identity at a time when the very notion was in its infancy. (Bautista 2006, 295) The symbolic vocabulary of Filipinized Catholicism also helped fighters to endure the suffering, insecurity, and often death that came with their struggle. For example, the necessity of leaving behind one's family and home in order to wander the countryside preaching a revolutionary message mirrored narratives of Christ's itinerant ministry. (Ileto 1979, 262) A calm acceptance of one's own

sacrificial death helped fighters face the dangers of battle against better- armed enemies, or of execution upon capture. (Ibid, 265) One can of course argue that this sacrificial logic also encouraged revolutionaries to die needlessly, as the prospect of winning battles became almost beside the point (Ibid): sacrifice was virtually a goal in itself.

The result was a Catholicism that could be harnessed for Filipino identity and liberation. Some fighters, such as Felipe Salvador, a Katipunan member who became head of the Santa Iglesia Church, grew to be religious leaders or preachers in their own right. (Ibid, 264) Such alternative religious groupings—if they managed to survive in the long term—might detach from mainstream Catholicism altogether and/or be disavowed by the Church hierarchy. (Ileto 1979, 86) However, their legacy persists: the stance and actions of persons practicing some version of Catholicism can only be with much caution equated with those of the official Church. Catholicism may be considered the religion of most Filipinos, but Filipinos do not have a uniform approach to Catholicism.

The work of Ileto and his intellectual descendants shows that Filipino Catholicism is plural, and has had a vibrant life outside formal clerical structures. This means that Catholicism, or at least some version of it, can accumulate a significant store of moral authority *even when the clerical hierarchy is discredited*. Increasing numbers of native clergy within the hierarchy following the withdrawal of Spanish colonial authority reinforced the notion that the Catholic Church in the Philippines could become a *Filipino* Church. In this way, the Church survived decolonization with much of its moral authority intact.

The supposed rootedness of Filipino identity in Catholicism has further complications given the Philippines' history as a post-colonial, multi-ethnic state. Like many other recently decolonized states, the Philippines is quite clearly still in the midst of the project of constructing and maintaining its construct of the nation. (Yamamoto 2007) Efforts at constructing national unity often involve silencing and minoritization of other identities. An example of this is the reference to the national language as Filipino, and referring (in popular

practice, and formerly in official practice, as well) to all other local languages as dialects of Filipino. Many modern philologists and social scientists now assert that the Philippines is home to a multitude of distinct languages—at least 100, according to Yamamoto. (Yamamoto 2007, 204)

Indeed, one can identify many sources of stratification and disunity. Many Filipinos identify more strongly with their province or town than their nation. (Ibid) Philippine society is also often informally divided along hierarchical racial lines that echo old Spanish-era categories: part-Caucasian, Chinese and/or part-Chinese, Malay, and Negrito.[10] (Aguilar 2005, 605-07) A persistent and yawning wealth gap, with a small and insecure middle class hanging between the wealthy and the masses of poor, may also present a source of class-based division. In sum, several sources of cleavage undermine Filipino national unity. The Roman Catholic religion is an important instrument for cementing a sense of common Filipino-ness. Small wonder that threats to Catholic moral values

[10] Please note that these very terms are contested, and the last one is potentially offensive.

are often framed as threats to Filipino culture.

Identity politics thus become a factor for groups aiming to push Philippine norms in a different direction. Tellingly, some advocates for women's and LGBT rights appeal to international human rights standards and supposedly universal norms over and against national customs and traditions.[11]

On the other hand, advocates might use a different strategy. Instead of emphasizing international norms, they focus on an alternative construction of Filipino identity which distances it from conservative Catholic notions of gender and sexuality. A prominent LGBT students' association in the national university has adopted the name *Babaylan*. (Garcia 2009, 226) A *babaylan* was a type of pre-colonial shaman that was often required to be either a woman, or a male who dressed and behaved as a woman. (Ibid 166; 174) The organization clearly invoked this figure to highlight the former status women and

[11] A manifestation of such norm constructions is the Philippines' CEDAW Watch, which, like its counterparts in other countries, aims to evaluate the degree to which the Philippines is adhering to its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

queer/trans men, a significant gesture in a context wherein contemporary Catholic religious morality tends to reinforce the marginalization of these groups. (Ibid, 226)

Such discourses make claims about Filipino identity, but towards rather different purposes from those often used by conservative Catholics. In these narratives, the earlier, un-Hispanized version of Filipino culture—in short, the supposedly more authentic version—is one that not only respected but exalted queerness. (Ibid, *xviii-xiv*) It is the conservative Catholic view, which condemns non-heteronormative expressions of gender and desire, that is the foreign aberration. (Ibid) Garcia nevertheless cautions us against blaming all present-day Filipino homophobia or transphobia on colonial Catholicism. (Ibid, *xxiv*) Overly binary constructions of foreign-native or Catholic-pagan lead to a distorted understanding of the Church's impact on the status of sexual minorities. I argue that this tendency to blame foreigners and/or colonialism for sexual oppression, at the expense of constructive nuance, is very much present in public dialogue about prostitution in the Philippines.

A researcher may also look to Filipino feminist

groups in order to find similar alternative identity constructions. I specifically refer to the Gabriela Women's Party, a women's rights political group concerned with issues like domestic violence, reproductive health, and human trafficking. The name selected for the party, GABRIELA, stands for General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action. (Hilhorst 2001, 30) Then again, the name "Gabriela" is, to many Filipinos, more than a memorable acronym. It is also a reference to Gabriela Silang, famous eighteenth-century *generala* of anti-colonial forces who took on the leadership of her husband's army after his assassination. (Añonuevo 2013) Besides being reference to a female figure whose biography reflects conventional notions of leadership and strength, the name of the GABRIELA Women's Party is clearly a reference to Filipino patriotism and anti-imperialism. It implies that feminism not a Western ideological intrusion, but can express a specifically Filipino form of liberation.

Certainly, organizations do not necessarily choose only one approach (appeals to international norms and

standards) over the other approach (appeals to alternate formulations of Filipino identity). Strategies may be alternated and blended according to the situation at hand. The main point is that the Filipino-Catholic identity complex is a difficult one to disentangle, and it is even arguable about whether a separation of these two concepts—rather than an adjustment of their relationship—is ultimately productive or even possible. This has implications not only for those who wish to change norms regarding gender and sexuality, but, as detailed in the following section, for Filipinos living their lives outside the Church's aegis.

Filipino Catholicism, Nation-Building, and Religious Minorities

Portrayals of the Philippines as a Catholic nation are, of course, complicated by the presence of religious minorities. It is true that the Philippines is, even from a purely statistical standpoint, overwhelmingly Catholic, with 80-85% of the population professing that faith. The Philippine Statistics Authority's 2010 numbers peg

80.58% of Filipinos recorded as Catholic, and 5.57% as Muslim. (Philippine Statistics Authority 2015, 56) "A 2012 estimate by the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF), however, states that there are 10.7 million Muslims, which is approximately 11 percent of the total population." (United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2014) Most of the remaining Filipinos are generally agreed upon to belong to some sort of non-Catholic Christian denomination, some churches of which have actually been founded in the Philippines, such as the Aglipayan Church or Iglesia ni Cristo. (Ibid) Religious minorities must deal with Catholicism's enshrinement at the heart of Filipino national identity. A necessary implication is that non-Catholics or non-Christians are often considered less Filipino, or un-Filipino. These principles are well illustrated in the case of the Philippines' Muslim population. Once again, though Muslims were an influential group on the archipelago, their status quickly changed after they encountered the Spanish, who were only a few decades past their Reconquista. The help of Spanish forces against raids by Muslim tribes around the

time of the Europeans' first arrival helped to cement Spanish power and drew converts to Catholicism. (Ileto 1979, 71) This was the start of a process of Othering the islands' Muslim population. Spanish authorities built a fortress near Zamboanga in order to deal with periodic
Moro uprisings. (Houben 2003, 161)

The Mindanao island group in the south was where Islam first arrived in the Philippines, and where inhabitants proved to be most resistant to Catholic conversion. (Majul 1988, 897) Thus, the persistence of Islam in this part of the Philippines also became linked with the notion of a Moro nation that was not subjugated by Spain as its northern neighbors were. (Ibid) A result of this is that one of the formative events in the national narrative—the independence movement against Spanish rule—is often considered less relevant to Filipino Muslims. (Ibid) The Muslim experience of American rule also seems to have been markedly different from that of many Filipino Catholics. The Moros " desired to remain under US tutelage until preparations could be completed for their independence as a Muslim state. They explicitly

stated that they did not want to be ruled by Christian Filipinos. In fact, they did not consider themselves Filipinos, this was a term which they had usually reserved for the Christians." (Ibid, 899)

Arguably, this tension between Christianized, Hispanized populations and those who adhered to Islam was never resolved. In fact, historian Cesar Abdul Majul makes a convincing argument for considering the current Mindanao or Bangsamoro conflict to be the contemporary iteration of the centuries-long Moro Wars, with the current national government taking a role similar to that of the old Spanish colonial authorities. (Majul 1999)

Aside from identity constructions that paint non-Catholics as Other, the permeation of Catholicism through various social institutions may present strong disadvantages for non- Catholics and non-Christians. One can see this in the Philippines' education system. ("Rendering 2019) Three of the "Big Four" universities are Catholic institutions, the sole exception being the University of the Philippines, the non-sectarian national university. Even public schools and universities, which are nominally non-sectarian, often invoke Catholic

morality, imagery, and ritual. This pervasiveness of Catholicism in education can marginalize non-Catholic students. Muslim families were and sometimes still are wary of sending their children to Catholic or Protestant schools for fear that their children will convert out of Islam. (Milligan 2005, 45-84) Given that many of the most respected schools and universities in the Philippines are affiliated with the Church or one of its orders, this state of affairs narrows Muslims' options for educational and professional advancement.

However, perhaps the most egregious instance of ethno-religious divides overlapping with socio-economic inequality involves land rights. (Tuazon 2008) Throughout the twentieth century, national governments encouraged Christian Filipinos from the northern and central islands to settle on land in Mindanao that was supposedly free for the claiming. (Ibid) Unfortunately, many Muslim and Lumad (non-Muslim indigenous people) communities had ancestral claims to this land that, for lack of formal acknowledgment, were difficult to enforce against waves of state-encouraged migration from the north. (Ibid) This is why the ethno-religious conflict in

the southern Philippines is in many ways as much about land rights as it is about community identity. These factors, however, were not sufficient to lead to a large-scale armed struggle in the Mindanao area without an immediate *causus belli*. This was to come in 1968, in the form of the Jabidah Massacre. (Curaming and Aljunied 2012, 90)

The Jabidah Massacre is considered a seminal event in the history of modern Muslim uprisings. The Marcos government, which was pursuing territorial claims on the island of Sabah against Malaysia, had planned to train some Muslims as agents to create trouble on Sabah. (Borer, Everton, and Nayve 2009, 189) The number of troops trained for the Sabah operation is not exactly known, though 28 is sometimes used as a conservative estimate. (Kaufman 2011, 943; Quimpo 2001, 275) However, this plan was cancelled, perhaps due to a mutiny by the Moro fighters, and the agents all ordered killed in order to preserve the operation's secret. (Borer, Everton, and Nayve 2009, 189) One agent survived the massacre, and his story was a decisive factor in convincing many Filipino Muslims to join an armed

movement against the national government.

The first of these was founded by Dr. Nur Misuari, a former Political Science Professor at the national university. (Curaming and Aljunied 2012, 93) His organization was called the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). (Ibid) It was able to win key concessions from the government. These included special laws for Muslims, such as provisions for polygamy and divorce. Perhaps most importantly, the government established an autonomous region for Moros in 1976 and again in 1989. (Quimpo 2001, 276) However, many critics argue that Moro autonomy is limited both legally and geographically. (Tuazon 2008) Moros should rather have more laws that specifically respect their customs. (Ibid) Also, the autonomous region should include not only the areas that remain majority Muslim, but also those ancestral lands that were given to/grabbed by northern settlers. (Ibid) The MNLF-controlled autonomous region was plagued by chaos, corruption, and accusations of bad leadership. (Quimpo 2001, 279)

Mindanao has become a byword for terrorism, rebellion, and warlordism. The general chaos is worsened

by the MNLF's splintering into various groups. One of these is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which places greater emphasis on the role of religion and Sharia Law. (Borer, Everton, and Nayve 2011, 189)

Though smaller and less successful than Moro uprisings, armed rebellions by mainly pagan religious groups have also become a factor in Filipino politics. The Cordillera People's Liberation Army claimed to represent the rights of mountain tribes of the central Philippines. (Holden, Nadeau, and Jacobson 2011, 155) However, such movements are often overshadowed by Moro uprisings. For instance, the Lumad people—"non-Muslim indigenous people" of Mindanao (Quimpo 2001, 276)—are often ignored in debates, though some are reportedly recruited into Moro battalions.

In sum, the Church may not actively condemn non-Christians or encourage discrimination against them. However, its consistent linking of Catholicism to Filipino national identity arguably helps frame non-Catholics, especially non-Christians, as less or insufficiently Filipino. It is no accident that some of the most marginalized ethno-religious groups—i.e. Moros and

indigenous groups with pagan religious traditions—are non-Christians.

Before closing this section on religious minorities, one must also briefly discuss the political impact of non-Catholic Christian groups that have emerged over the last century. American rule appeared to clear the way for the development not only of local branches of Protestant communities, but also of indigenous Filipino Churches, such as the Aglipayan Church (which was founded within a year of the end of the Philippine-American War) and Iglesia ni Cristo. Iglesia ni Cristo, or the INC, has become an important force in Philippine politics. Though its followers number a comparatively small three million, it is known for its practice of bloc voting, which it uses to lobby politicians and call for appointments favorable to its own interests. (Buckley 2016, 137) For purposes of this thesis, it is noteworthy that the INC has often voiced political goals that are different from or even in opposition to those put forth by the CBCP. Examples include support for political candidates that the CBCP has opposed, as well as public endorsement of the RH Bill, about which more later.

EDSA People Power: A Tangled Legacy

The current status of Filipino Church-State relations, like so much of socio-political life in the Philippines, may be traced to the Marcos regime (1965-86) and its aftermath. The mainstream view in Filipino academia is that Marcos rule, however well it may have begun, was ultimately detrimental to the country, not least because successive administrations have inherited that regime's staggering government debt. (Manapat 1991) These issues were compounded by the declaration of martial law (1972-81), which was officially instituted in response to threats like Maoist and Moro rebellions.

In his comprehensive account of Church-State relations during the Marcos years, one of Youngblood's recurring themes is a broad three-way ideological split within the Philippine Church. He divides clergy and organizations thereof along a general continuum from least to most progressive. He makes distinctions according to clerical organizations, and also points out the ideological leanings of key individuals. "Among the major

organizations of the Roman Catholic Church are the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), numbering ninety-four active bishops in 1983, and AMRSP [Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines] and the PPI [Philippine Priests Incorporated]. " (Youngblood 1990, 72) The CBCP is supposedly the most "conservative" of these overall, but also includes much ideological diversity. (ibid) "According to 1979 data, the conservatives numbered forty-six bishops (58 percent of the CBCP)." (Ibid) They were "conservative" in the sense of a) overall refraining from opposing the Marcos regime, b) being cautious at best about general Church interference in socio-political affairs, and
c) taking a strict stance on issues regarding marriage and sexuality. (Ibid, 72-73) "The moderates in the CBCP, eighteen bishops in all (23 percent), also criticized government programs that threated vital church interests, but, in contrast to the conservatives, they reserved the right to criticize specific injustice, while not going to the extent of attacking the legitimacy of the regime." (Ibid, 73) Jaime Cardinal Sin's strategy of "critical collaboration"—basically cooperating with the Marcos regime when its

projects were in line with Church interests/teaching, and criticizing it when it went against Catholic principles—proved influential. (Ibid, 73)

Nuns and clergy associated with farmers' and workers' groups, as well as associations such as the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) tended to be vocal advocates of liberation theology, as well as leftist and even communist political aims and means. (Ibid, 77-82) However, some of the more progressive/leftist clergy preferred social democracy to Marxism, and worked to promote this ideology in the Philippines. (Ibid, 82) Some of the fruits of this period—such as the Nagkakaisang Partido Demokratikong Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (NPDSP, United Democratic Socialist Party of the Philippines) remain part of the Philippine political landscape to this day (Ibid, 82)—though it was not included as an option on the party-list portion of the 2016 elections. The NPDSP was connected to the Jesuit order via the involvement of Fr./Dr. med. Romeo Integnan, but was not "sanctioned officially" by any order or high-ranking cleric. (Ibid, 82) A National Socialist movement—which was less conciliatory and more likely to support Marxist/Maoist

armed rebellion—also grew up at around the same time, and even became larger than the Social Democratic movement—"both within the clergy and society generally." (Ibid, 83) Integnan was arrested in 1978 and had to go into hiding. (Ibid)

The latter years of martial law saw a greater unity coalescing between various ideologically-disparate elements of the Church. (Ibid, 111) This process was hastened by the regime's increased targeting of clergy and laypersons for supposed rebellious activities. (Ibid) However, as in Poland, the united voice of the Church took on a generally conservative bent. There were louder calls for the administration to have greater respect for political rights, but appeals for social justice, land reform, etc., were minimized. (Ibid, 80-81)

In 1983, opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. returned to the Philippines, despite reports of a threat to his life. (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 33) He was assassinated upon landing in Manila—the Marcos camp was of course implicated, but the actual masterminds behind the killing have never been found. (Ibid) Leadership of the opposition was passed to his wife,

Corazon Aquino, who stood against Marcos in the snap elections called in 1985. (Ibid) The elections were plagued by reports of corruption, ballot tampering, and threats of violence, and Marcos' claimed victory had difficulty gaining legitimacy. (Ibid)

The immediate precipitating cause of the EDSA I mass demonstration was a coup carried out by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Lt. General Fidel V. Ramos. (Stephan and Chenoweth, 33) The two generals alleged that the snap elections were massively fraudulent, and that Corazon Aquino was the true winner. (Ibid) They appealed to both the U.S. Embassy and Cardinal Sin for support. (Ibid) Corazon Aquino remained in the country, despite offers form the U.S. government to protect her if she left, but did seek sanctuary in a convent. That evening, Cardinal Sin went on Radio Veritas to appeal to the public to hit the streets in support of the generals. (Ibid, 33-34) The next morning, February 23rd, thousands did indeed respond to Sin's call, stationing themselves around the camps of soldiers involved in the coup in order to act as a human shield. (Ibid) Later that day, Marcos gave a public statement

announcing his inauguration in the coming days, and also threatening force on the protestors. Enrile then moved his men to the relatively more secure premises of Camp Crame. (Ibid)

Government forces attempting to follow and capture Enrile were met by protestors. (Ibid) This demonstration had by then taken on strong religious overtones, since the demonstrators sang and prayed, and included nuns among their number—prominently positioned at the front line directly in front of the tanks. (Bautista 2006, 298-302) The soldiers turned back without shooting protestors—displaying the importance of Catholic iconography in the *habitus* of members of the armed forces, which made the use of violence on the protestors ultimately unthinkable. Meanwhile, Aquino returned to Manila. (Ibid)

February 24th saw both domestic and international support for the Marcos regime quickly deteriorating, including Reagan's endorsement of Aquino's presidency. (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 34) The morning same day saw the so-called "miracle" at EDSA. (Youngblood 1987) It is claimed that divine intervention took place in

the form of a miraculous wind that blew tear gas away from the demonstrators. (Ibid, 1241-42) The Our Lady of EDSA monument commemorates the alleged miracle, and continues to be the site of mass political demonstrations. (Claudio 2013, 27) The mass rally precipitated the U.S.-sponsored airlift of the Marcos family out of Manila and the start of Corazon Aquino's presidency.

One of the most pressing issues on the agenda of the new government was the writing of a new constitution. The drafting of the 1987 Constitution (still in use today) included Church figures in its commission. "These included Bishop Bacani and Fr. Joaquin Bernas; [and] Christine Tan, a progressive nun known for her work with the poor." (Tate 1990, 156) Bacani would become one of the most vocal individual clerics in the opposition to reproductive health legislation. (Bacani 1992) Indeed, one can trace the influence of conservative interpretations of Catholic morality in various sections of the resulting document. These tend to be in the sections regarding marriage and family, but are also found elsewhere. Below, I analyze some constitutional provisions with implications for Church-State relations, based on the copy

of the 1987 Constitution published on Constitute.org.

Firstly, one may find reference (however partly veiled) to religion as part of the foundation for Filipino neighborhood in the rather brief preamble, which reads in full:

> "We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
>
> equality, and peace, do ordain and
>
> promulgate this Constitution."

At the same time, however, the Constitution provides for measures separating the Church and the State/government. Section 5 of the Bill of Rights (Article III) reads:

> "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free

> exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

Section 5.2 on Article VI (Legislative Department) establishes a portion (20%) of legislative seats for party-list candidates, but forbids religious parties from running for such seats. Section 28.3 of the same article grants tax exemptions for religious organizations and their property, which, notably, are not only confined to the assets of the Catholic Church. Section 29.2 further specifies that:

> "No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."

Also, Article IX on Constitutional Commissions has a section (Section C) on the Commission on Elections. This section contains a sub-section (Section 2) regarding that commission's powers. Concerning the Commission on Elections powers to register "political parties, organizations, or coalitions," Section 2.5 states that, "Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."

Key laws regarding the place of religion in the education of youth are found in "Article XIV: Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports." Firstly, section 3.3 provides for religious education in schools:

> "At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong,
>
> without additional cost to the Government."

Formal precepts in the constitution do help to set a carefully-delineated space for the Church, and other religions, in the country's public and cultural life. However, such articles are not the only texts in the constitution giving information about the Church's political role. Article XV, regarding the family, does not make much direct mention religion, God, or the Church directly, but is a rich source of data about how Catholicism has influenced the understanding of this most basic of social institutions in the Philippine context—especially if one also takes into consideration the manner in which these portions of the constitution have been interpreted. Sections 1 and 2 of this article, reproduced below, are often cited as the legislative foundation of the Philippines' still-extant ban on divorce.

> Section 1
>
> "The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."
>
> Section 2
>
> "Marriage, as an inviolable social

> institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."

This wording may be considered a base for the Philippines' notoriously strict marriage laws. Divorce remains illegal for most Filipinos—with a special provision for Muslims under a set of civil laws that also provides for polygamy. Options for couples wishing to end their union are limited mostly to annulment or legal separation. Annulment is a procedure to prove the marriage invalid. Rather than dissolving the union, it seeks to prove that the grounds for the union were fundamentally flawed from the beginning, rendering the entire marriage void—this supposedly successful result may have various undesired effects, such as rendering the couple's children illegitimate and perhaps necessitating a formal adoption of one's actual biological offspring. Also, it is unfortunately not a feasible process for many Filipinos, being very expensive and likely to take a year or two to finalize. In addition, spending a great deal of time and money on annulment does not necessarily guarantee success. Family law provides a list of possible grounds for annulment, and the burden is on the couple to prove that

their marriage fits at least one of these grounds. The other option, legal separation, is generally easier to procure, but does not allow the separated couple to subsequently marry other people. As of 2011, after a referendum in Malta, the Philippines is now the only state in the world that does not provide legal mechanisms for divorce. Many estranged Filipino couples simply choose to live separately, without formalizing this through state processes.

The influence of conservative Catholic teaching on the whole of the constitution becomes clearer when these provisions are kept in mind as one reads the following:

Article II, Section 12

> "The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the young for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."

The Philippines' rather strict abortion policies (i.e. only permitting the termination of pregnancy in cases that

endanger the mother's life, making no exception for rape or incest) are taken to have their constitutional basis here. This is likely one of the reasons why advocates for reproductive health legislation, while pushing for information dissemination regarding birth control and the state-sponsored provision of contraceptives, tended to balk at demanding legal abortion. Indeed, when reproductive health legislation was finally passed in 2012, it did so under the short title of "The Responsible Parenthood Act." Persons familiar with the constitution may interpret it as a reference to Section 3 of Article IV, which supports "The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."

This section of the constitution is often cited as one of the legal reasons why abortion is also illegal, except in cases where the pregnancy presents physical danger to the mother's life. Besides the legal ban on the termination of pregnancies, stigma against abortion is so strong and widespread that even advocates for reproductive health legislation and state-sponsored birth control (about which

more later) such as the women's rights-focused GABRIELA party balk at the prospect of supporting legalized abortion. Nevertheless, the Guttmacher Institute estimates that approximately 500,000 illegal abortions take place in the Philippines annually. (Juarez et al 2005, 146) The impact of strict abortion laws has strong class dimensions, as well. Interviews with abortionists suggest that the most common profile of a pregnant person seeking an abortion is a middle-aged, married

woman of limited means who already has several children, and is concerned about being able to provide for more offspring. (Ibid, 145-46; Uberoi and de Bruyn 2013, 166) The criminalization of abortion, in combination with the prospect of maltreatment by hospital staff who view abortion as sinful, also unfortunately discourages many women experiencing post-abortion complications from seeking medical help. (Ibid) "In the Philippines, in 2008 alone, the criminal abortion law was estimated to have resulted in the deaths of at least 1000 women and complications for 90,000 more." (Uberoi and de Bruyn 2013, 166)

The 1987 constitution is not the only contested

component of EDSA's legacy. As much as the aftermath of People Power was hailed as a return to democracy, the stability, inclusivity, and depth of this democracy is open to question. (Dressel 2011) Critics argue, for example, that the post-EDSA order was largely a return to the oligarchic arrangement of the past (with old landowners replacing Marcos cronies). Dressel cites cases of pro-democracy measures that often served to further entrench elites. For example, the party-list portion of the elections was intended to facilitate the entry of smaller, more ideologically-oriented or sector-oriented parties to enter the legislature. (Ibid, 534) However, this often had the effect of providing established politicians or political dynasties the opportunity to gain more seats. (Ibid) Insofar as the Church is acknowledged to have a major role in People Power, it is also held responsible for helping to prop up this power structure. (Claudio 2013, 11)

For its part, the Philippine left fragmented shortly after EDSA I. The Catholic Church, however, maintained a position as an important political actor, largely cooperating with elites in keeping the status quo. Along with elites, "the middle class, and intellectuals," the

Church shaped a "patchwork" "People Power narrative" that painted the People Power coalition as saviors of Filipino democracy. (Ibid, 6) The narrative was then channeled for "hegemonic ends." (Ibid, 20) As Lisandro Claudio argues, post-EDSA governments found that they required the Church's "imprimatur" in order to retain power, so iron-clad was the Church's moral authority. (Ibid, 29) An interesting facet of this narrative, which is rarely analyzed but is clearly relevant to this dissertation, is that "the Church's interpretation…explicitly links the event to the global collapse of communism." (Ibid, 41) In other words, the key contemporary historical events underpinning the moral authority of the Philippine and Polish Catholic Churches are intertwined.

It is true that Corazon Aquino was followed by a Protestant President, Fidel V. Ramos, who was famously in favor of promoting birth control. However, Ramos' regime did not necessarily rattle Church influence significantly. Comprehensive state-sponsored birth control and divorce still remained largely off the legislative table. In any case, Ramos still owed much to the Church despite not being a Catholic—he had been one

of the two generals in whose support the Church had rallied followers to EDSA in the first place. (Tadiar 2004, 189)

Ramos was in turn succeeded by his former Vice President, Joseph "Erap" Estrada. Estrada would hold the Presidency for less than three years. (Tadiar 2009, 186) Estrada was put on impeachment trial due to massive corruption charges, but the controversial proceedings interrupted by a mass rally—EDSA II—in January 2001, propelling his Vice President, Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo, into the Presidency. (Ibid)

EDSA II (said as "EDSA Two" or "EDSA Dos") was, as one might surmise, partly an attempt at replicating the narrative of the first EDSA mass rally. (Davie 2010, 122-23) EDSA II did have some unique features, such as the use of SMS messaging in order to gather and organize attendants—considered the world's first SMS-based mass demonstration on such a scale. (Ibid, 123) However, it also did have marked similarities to its predecessor, Church involvement not being least among them. (Davie 2010, 123) Estrada's relationship with the Church hierarchy had deteriorated in part due to

public knowledge of his numerous mistresses and illegitimate children. The deposition of Estrada was answered a few months later by EDSA 3, a gathering of Estrada supporters who marched to the same location (as the previous EDSA rallies) in order to demand Estrada's return to the Presidency. (Ibid, 28) Besides being unsuccessful, the mass rally also suffered strongly negative portrayals, not least because some of the attendees had physically attacked journalists. (Ibid) It was also alleged that a large portion of the participants of EDSA 3 had been bribed into attending. (Ibid) The protesters were also accused of behavior such as urinating on the premises. (Ibid) Ultimately, the participants were accused not just of misunderstanding or misusing the EDSA legacy, but of "desecrating" the location of the previous rallies—their supposed misdeeds were framed as religious as well as political offenses. (Ibid) The use of Catholic-inflected to disown EDSA 3 can be interpreted as another demonstration of the Church's moral authority, and, to use the schema of Michel, specifically to shape the underlying vocabulary and iconography of politics. (Michel 1994, 16)

The EDSA 3 demonstration had been disavowed by the Philippine Catholic hierarchy, but, interestingly, strongly supported by Iglesia ni Cristo. It may also be argued EDSA 3 and the backlash against it reflected contemporary Filipino class divisions, and perhaps illuminated some of the class dimensions of the previous mass demonstrations at EDSA. (Claudio 2013, 27- 28) Long before EDSA 3, Estrada supporters already tended to be painted as ignorant, poor, and uneducated persons blinded by his celebrity status as a former actor, as well as his consciously populist rhetoric. (Ibid) EDSA 3 had many disadvantages, including the more marginalized social position of most of its members. Claudio seems to argue that a deciding factor in its failure was its lack of the Church's imprimatur, in contrast to its more successful predecessors.

Controversy involving the Church continued, as Arroyo proved to be an unpopular leader, despite presiding over marked improvements in economic macroindicators. Aside from its role in putting her into power, the Church hierarchy was also criticized for its perceived silence regarding the failings of the Arroyo

regime, which included persistent poverty (in spite of the improvement in the Philippines' economic macro-indicators), apparent vote and legislative manipulation (it is widely believed that Arroyo "stole" her election from Ferdinand Poe, Jr.), and grave human rights abuses. (Abinales 2011, 163-64; Dressel 2011, 529) The implication was that an arrangement had been made between the Church and the Presidency: in exchange for the government's support regarding RH legislation and other matters of high priority to the Catholic hierarchy (Austria 2004, 97), the bishops would in turn refrain from strong public protests against the regime's actions (Estrada-Claudio 2012).

In 2009, Corazon Aquino passed away from cancer. Her death was followed by an outpouring of sympathy for her and her family, upon which her son, Benigno Aquino III, was encouraged to run for President. (Abinales 2011, 164) Aquino won the presidential race of 2010, in spite of a relatively thin legislative record. As with his mother, his initial rise to power was supported by many in the Church hierarchy.

The new President Aquino was expected to

maintain close relations with the Church hierarchy. After all, his mother had gained the Presidency with the backing of the Church, and he had gotten elected partly based on this family connection. By extension, Aquino arguably owed his own political ascension at least partly to the Church. It therefore came as a surprise to some observers as he appeared to distance his government from the Catholic hierarchy. For example, the office of Presidential Adviser on Ecclesiastial Affairs, established under his predecessor, was abolished relatively early during Aquino's term.

Relations between the Church and the Presidency became more strained in the lead-up to the final debate on the Reproductive Health Bill—later called the Responsible Parenthood Bill. (Esmaquel 2012) It was considered quite controversial in the Philippine context due to its call for sexual education, the provision of artificial contraception and information about such in government health centers, and similar measures contravening official Church teaching on sexuality and fertility. Not only did Aquino vocally support the passage of an RH law, but he also officially made it a priority task

of his administration, moving it to the top of legislative debate agendas and pushing for shorter interpellation periods in order to move the bill into final debate stages more quickly. (Cheng 2012)

Various news sources stated in 2010 that Tandag Bishop Nereo Odchimar, who was then President of the CBCP, termed excommunication a "possibility" for Aquino. (ABS-CBN 2010) This was later stated to be an exaggeration, misunderstanding, or misquotation due to erroneous transcripts. (Ibid) However, journalists and academics continued to make reference to a supposed excommunication threat even after the statement was qualified/denied. (Biliran 2011; De Leon 2011; Abinales 2011, 171)

As a result of such incidents, the CBCP was portrayed as patriarchal, obscurantist, arrogant, and willing to sacrifice the earthly welfare of its poorest followers for the sake of dogma. (Esposo 2011) Critics also argued that the Church was overstepping the bounds of proper Church-state relations, to the point of promoting theocracy. (De Leon 2011; Torres-Tupas 2015)

The bill was eventually passed in late 2012.

Attorneys James and Lovely-Ann Imbong filed a petition contesting its constitutionality, but the Supreme Court approved the law, with the exception of passages disallowing objections (on the part of parents and state employees) based on freedom of conscience. (Torres-Tupas 2014) The CBCP appears to have accepted this development, as per statements from the whole Conference and from individual bishops that Filipinos opposing the bill concede its passage and transfer attention to other concerns. (Santos 2014) However, conservative legislators took away much of the law's funding, stymying its practical implementation. (Sy 2016) They are *not* acting in the name of the Church hierarchy, which has officially urged acceptance of the law. Thus, debates over the enactment of this law continue, as of this writing.

Political debates surrounding the Responsible Parenthood Act may also be analyzed within the larger context of attitudinal changes in Philippine society. The Philippines appears to be going through a liberalization of attitudes regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, in part linked to international and legal developments

in this direction. One such development was the legalization of homosexual marriage in many U.S. states, culminating in a landmark Supreme Court decision declaring the banning or non-recognition of such marriages unconstitutional. This was considered very important for the Philippine context, not only due to the history of strong American cultural influence, but also because U.S. legal decisions may be cited as precedents in Philippine courts.

Another important factor is the Vatican's apparent decreased emphasis on sexually conservative teachings. The current Pope, Francis I, while not outright countervening Church doctrine on gender and sexuality, has stated that the Church would do well to instead focus more attention on matters such as poverty, social justice, and environmental conservation. Francis is extremely popular in the Philippines, as demonstrated by the reaction to his 2015 visit, which included a mass attended by six million people, the largest papal crowd in recorded history. It is no surprise that statements from him are expected to carry weight in the Philippine context.

Then again, it must be remembered that some of

the Pope's statements made directly to Filipino Catholics do uphold traditional norms about gender and sexuality, particularly his warnings about giving in to "ideological colonization." (David 2015) Once again, certain traditional Catholic values are framed as part of traditional Filipino culture, while challenges to such norms are framed as foreign (Western liberal) imposition. (Ibid) Given the timing of the Pope's comments, they can be construed as pertaining to a variety of developments, such as the recent wave of legalization of gay marriage in various countries, or the passage of reproductive health legislation in the Philippines. (Ibid)

The Aquino administration, though beginning auspiciously and lauded by international observers for improved economics, combating corruption, and other accomplishments, ended with far less popularity due to (among other things) disappointing responses to various natural and political catastrophes. Due to the RH Bill affair, the Church was itself in a position of drastically diminished moral authority. It had over-taxed the goodwill of the public, and inadvertently proven that it could not ensure its desired policy outcomes, even when drawing

on vast resources and direct institutional access. This made room for some rather unpredictable election results in 2016. The 2016 elections were also significant for occurring exactly thirty years after EDSA I, leading to much discussion about the People Power legacy. (Corrales 2016) This discussion gained much relevance due to the list of candidates who were actually running for Presidential and Vice Presidential positions. (Ibid) Late presidential entrant and eventual winner Mayor Rodrigo Duterte was known for infrastructural improvements (especially regarding health) and starkly lower crime rates. However, his alleged support of death squads and encouragement of forceful/deadly tactics by police reminded some observers uncomfortably of martial law. His running mate—who ultimately did not win, but placed a close second in the final voting tally—was Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos, Jr.,, the ex-President's son and Senator. (Romero 2016) These results of course became entwined with a debate about historical memory in the Philippines. (Ibid) They may also be evidence of the weakening hold of the Church and the EDSA narrative on Philippine politics.

President Duterte is also regarded as a both divisive and confusing figure with regards to policy, not least with regards to matters of gender, sexuality, and marriage. (Adel 2016; Campbell 2016) On the one hand, Duterte made international news with a joke about the gang rape and murder of a missionary in his home city of Davao. (Campbell 2016) He is also known for numerous extramarital affairs and verbal and even physical harassment of female journalists and supporters during public events. (Adel 2016) On the other hand, he has a history of supporting policies that may be seen as progressive on the gender front. ('Gabriela Rep' 2016) These include encouragement for the passing of reproductive health and LGBT rights legislation. (Ibid) Closer to the topic of this thesis, he instructed the policemen in Davao not to arrest prostitutes—in effect, not to enforce RPC 202.

In the last weeks before the elections, the CBCP released a statement cautioning voters to choose wisely, avoiding candidates with questionable moral conduct and a demonstrable disrespect for liberal democracy. While not mentioning Duterte by name, this statement may also

be interpreted as an implied criticism of his candidacy. The allusion to questionable moral conduct may be at least partly a reference to Duterte's public acknowledgment of his numerous marital infidelities (ABS-CBN 2015), possession of a common-law wife (Ibid), various misogynistic comments, including making light of the rape-murder of an Australian nun who died in the Philippines in the late 1980s (Ibid), and using profane language to express frustration at the traffic brought about by the Pope's January 2015 visit to the Philippines. (Esmaquel 2015). Tellingly, and perhaps fitting a familiar pattern, Duterte's candidacy was endorsed by the INC.

According to Michel's typology, this may be an instance of the Church relating to politics from "below," as the Church appears to be attempting to set the tone of the election by encouraging the use of an explicitly moralizing vocabulary. (Michel 1994, 16) When one probes into likely implicit meanings, however, the CBCP was apparently operating at the same level as mainstream political processes, engaging them directly.

Hostilities between the Church and the current President continue, with clerics vociferously opposing

Duterte's Drug War and criticizing his approach towards democratic institutions and political enemies. Duterte retaliates with anti-clerical comments and allegations of having been sexually abused by a Jesuit priest in his youth—though, tellingly, he experienced backlash after calling God "stupid." ("Rendering" 2016) Public reaction illustrates that many Filipinos retain their attachment to Christianity, despite having lost a considerable amount of goodwill towards the clergy. (Ibid) At the same time, political opponents of Duterte often partner with the Church, despite misgivings about the institution's stance on issues like divorce and reproductive health. (Ibid) The Church may be on the cusp of a new era in its relations to state and society in the Philippines, but continues to cling to the somewhat-discredited iconography that bolstered much of its moral authority in the recent past. The next few years may be critical to determining whether the institution is able to construct alternative ways to maintain its moral authority.

III. Prostitution and the Filipino Nation

In the following section, I examine the manner and extent to which prostitution has been framed as a national issue in the popular and legislative discourse of each country. How do the media, academics, and moral entrepreneurs connect prostitution to the national community? What kind of problem narrative runs through laws and the debates surrounding them? Answering these questions gives insight into the dominant problem narrative(s). It can bring some alternate or critical understandings of the issue to light, as well.

In keeping with Grzymała-Busse's emphasis on history, the general organization of my discussion are chronological. However, there are some occasions when a few developments will be discussed out of chronological order for the sake of thematic clarity.

Selling Sex, Building Empires

Prostitution, in the eyes of some scholars, arrived on the Philippine islands around the same time as Spanish

rule and Catholicism did. (Bonnet 2017, 42) It is part of the Philippines' colonial legacy. (Ibid) According to Dery, prostitution as transactional sex *per se* only arrived on the islands with European conquest. (Dery 2001, 135-36) He also asserts that policy regarding prostitution fluctuated between regulation and penalization throughout the Spanish colonial period, with measures ranging from rehabilitation in STD clinics to imprisonment and exile. (Ibid) It must be noted that, much like other writers on the topic, Dery works from a strongly abolitionist perspective. One indication of this is his statement that a Filipina woman who voluntarily enters the sex trade must be insane. (Ibid, 152) The sexualized abuse of power is a core part of the Filipino historical memory regarding Spanish colonization.

On the other hand, there is documentation that pre-colonial tribal leaders sometimes offered guests sexual access to women in their retinue. (Bonnet 2017, 42) Such arrangements did not take the form of sex in exchange for money, but they still comprise the granting of sexual access to women by powerful third parties. (Ibid, 43) It might not be immediately recognizable as prostitution in

the twenty-first-century sense, but can be called a form of proto-prostitution. (Ibid) If one argues that the tribal leaders were offering sexual access to women in exchange for favors and prestige, however, this practice is *certainly* recognizable as prostitution. Dery's assertion that prostitution was completely non-existent in the pre-colonial Philippines does not stand up to scrutiny.

The conceptual intertwining of prostitution and empire continued into the American period, with a strictly regulated sex trade instituted to maintain the morale of U.S. occupation forces. (Bonnet 2017, 46) Women were even sorted into categories serving men of different military ranks. (Ibid) For example, some women served only commissioned officers, while others served only non-commissioned officers. (Ibid) The systematic sexual exploitation of Filipina women was a pillar of colonial subjugation to the United States. We must remember, however, that not all prostitutes in the Philippines at this time were Filipino women. There were some foreign prostitutes, as well. Their countries of origin included (but were not limited to) Russia, Austria, the USA, and above all, Japan. (Ibid, 45)

The most traumatic iteration of prostitution under conquest may be the period of Japanese occupation in the Second World War (1942-45). The Philippines was one of several conquered countries wherein the Japanese military established "comfort centers." Besides subjecting comfort women to brutal rape, time in a comfort center could often ruin a woman's social and marriage prospects—the conservative mores of the time often meant that she would be stigmatized as sexually impure.

Debates over official acknowledgment of sexual atrocities and restitution to the victims has soured relationships between the Philippines and Japan. (Shoji 2018) Filipino activists continue to demand that the Japanese government officially apologize for the comfort women system, include information about it in history classes, and pay compensation to surviving comfort women. (Ibid) (Chinkin 2001) The Japanese government has variously claimed that some or all of these gestures have taken places. (Shoji 2018) Critics, especially women's groups, counter-argue that official acknowledgments were downplayed or ambiguous, and that offers of compensation actually came from private

Japanese sources rather than the government. (Soh 2003) For concerned activists, these continued denials of responsibility perpetuate degradation and national humiliation, decades after the closure of the last comfort centers.[12] (Chinkin 2001, 336) Though the Philippines has been a formally-independent country since 1946, advocacy and scholarly discourse still connects present-day prostitution with imperialism. This is not without reason. Two of the Filipino cities most famous for having large red light districts are Angeles and Olongapo (Enloe

[12] The comfort women question is not unique to the Philippines. Other countries such as South Korea, China, and even Australia have similar issues with Japan. (Chinkin 2001) Asian women's groups joined "an important transnational Comfort Women movement by the late 1990s." (Cheng 2011, 490) Filipino activists have even cooperated with their counterparts in neighboring countries, organizing large projects to demand restitution and maintain international interest in the issue. (Chinkin 2001) The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, conducted in 2000, was one such project. (Ibid) However, this has not stopped activists from framing the comfort women question as a specifically nationalist issue. (Cheng 2011, 490; Soh 2003, 214) In each national group of participants in the movement, "alignment of the nation's fate with that of women in sexual servitude to foreign aggressors creates a milieu in which 'fallen women' can be con- sidered victims, albeit largely as a symbol of the nation's victimhood." (Chen 2011, 490) The movement has become both transnational *and* nationalist.

2011, 76), the sites of American military bases until 1991 (Park 2011, 273). By the time of Clark Air Base's closure, Angeles City had become the country's second most-populated urban area. (Bonnet 2017, 48) About a third of this population was concentrated in the city's red light district. (Ibid) As Enloe puts it, the prostitutes of Angeles and Olongapo "were made a symbol of national humiliation by the anti-bases campaign" (Enloe 2000, 76). However, this activism had its limitations and blind spots. Enloe outlines some prostitutes' criticism that the same activists who protested military prostitution often neglected to obtain their input, especially regarding the women's livelihood prospects once the bases were successfully shut down. (Ibid) The neglect of some prostitutes' point of view shows how moral entrepreneurs' success in promoting a problem narrative can come at the cost of excluding the very people they claim to defend.

Popular views linking prostitution to American imperialism did not disappear with the bases' closure. Firstly, the shutdown of the bases did not mean the end of American military presence and its resulting controversy. American soldiers still come to the Philippines under the

Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), renting facilities from the Philippine state. (Lutz 2006, 600) Since the ratification of its first version in 1999, the VFA allows for U.S. personnel accused of crimes to be placed under the charge of the military, instead of being tried in a normal Philippine court and detained in a local jail. (Park 2011, 280) Park simply terms this arrangement the granting of "immunity" to U.S. servicemen. (Ibid) Recurring accusations of violent crime perpetrated by

U.S. military personnel on the local populace have severely tested the VFA over the years. "Violent crimes against women and girls" tend to generate special anxiety. (Lutz 2006, 603) Two of the more recent scandals are the 2005 Subic rape case (Capino 2010, 35) and the 2014 killing of Jennifer Laude. Both cases became highly politicized, with nationalist moral entrepreneurs demanding that the state stand firm against American pressure. (Capino 2010, 35-56) It also happens that both these cases involved crimes against women who were alleged sex workers. ("Feminist Lawyer Speaks" Internet; Schager Internet) The discussion surrounding them re-invoked the historically intertwined themes of American

military presence, imperialist power, and subjugated nationhood, and prostituted Filipino women. Advocacy surrounding such cases tends to gather a diverse group of moral entrepreneurs, since the anti-bases movement is a broad coalition "including human-rights groups, worker's organizations, anti-WTO efforts, women's- rights groups and parties, and self-help disaster relief and prevention organization." (Lutz 2006, 602)

It must be stated that the VFA provisions placing U.S. army personnel largely outside Philippine legal jurisdiction are not unique to the U.S.-Philippine relationship. Similar provisions exist in bilateral treaties between the U.S.A. and other countries. However, it has been stated that scandals and controversies seem to occur frequently around U.S. military presence in non-Western, or more specifically, Asian, countries. (Mesok 2016, 62) In other words, the same rules are in place, but American soldiers seem to commit crimes against the local populace more often when in "exotic" locations. There are many possible explanations for this, including racism against non- Caucasians, the larger size of military facilities in certain locations, or under-reporting of crimes in Western

countries. However, these lie far beyond the scope of my dissertation. Suffice it to say that American soldiers' crimes against locals in the Philippines carry the weight of colonial history and resonate with national anxieties, much as similar instances do in places such as South Korea (Park 2011) and Okinawa (Mesok 2016, 62).

Secondly, the commercial sex apparatus that had grown up around the base sites remained even after the bases themselves closed. Angeles and Olongapo remain popular destinations for international sex tourists, in addition to their traditional clientele of American soldiers. (Hughes 1996, 73) The two cities continue to be associated with international sex tourism in the Filipino popular imagination. (Enloe 2011, 76) The flourishing international sex tourism sector can be contextualized within broader global dynamics of visitors from the Global North seeking sexual adventure in "exotic" lands. "Often, prostitution thrives on provision of paid sex across racialised boundaries. This is seen in the importation of 'exotic' Third World sex workers into first world brothels, in the international trade in 'mail-order brides' and in sex tourism." (Pettman 1997, 97) Reality is, of course, more

complicated. Some sectors of the Angeles/Olongapo sex trade cater predominantly to local men. (Ralston and Keeble 2009, 125)

The sex industries of Angeles and Olongapo are at the heart of the narrative linking prostitution to the beleaguered nation: military prostitution and sex tourism promote the sexual exploitation of Filipino women, and the VFA allows American soldiers to brutalize prostitutes and other locals with impunity. (Mariano 2012, 31-32) The Philippine state is failing its basic duties to the nation, which are to maintain national sovereignty and protect citizens on its own territory. (Ibid) Instead, it gives preferential treatment or "special rights" to the military personnel of a former colonizer, and to profit from the degradation of the nation's women. (Ibid, 31)

Managing Prostitution?: Notes on Current Policy

In this section, I expound on the provisions of current Philippine prostitution law. The explanation is a development of the analysis I did of this body of law for the fourth chapter of my first Masteral thesis. However, I

stopped doing research for that thesis in mid-2012, so policy developments after that period were not included. The newest policies, i.e. the Expanded Anti- trafficking Law of 2013 (RA 10364), and RA 10951's amendments to the Revised Penal Code, naturally appear only in this dissertation.

In its current state as an independent nation, the Philippines boasts a complex policy regime. The earliest still-active legislation regarding prostitution is enshrined in the Revised Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code of 1930 is a collection of legislation inherited—though often amended—from the period of the Philippine membership in the U.S. Commonwealth. However, some of its articles can also be traced even earlier, to the Spanish colonial era, which ended in 1898. It remains, with periodic amendments, the core of Philippine penal law. The portion dealing most directly with prostitution is Article 202, here reproduced in full in the form it held until late 2012:

> **Article 202.** *Vagrants and prostitutes; Penalty.* - The following are vagrants:
> 1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
> 2. Any person found loitering about public or

> semi-public buildings or places or trampling or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
> 3. Any idle or dissolute person who ledges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
> 4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
> 5. Prostitutes.
> For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
>
> Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by *arresto menor* or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by *arresto mayor* in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The reader has probably noted that this article identifies prostitutes as women who carry out certain acts. Male prostitutes certainly exist and have existed in the Philippines, but they are not covered under this portion of the article. However, one might conceivably arrest them on more general vagrancy charges.

In addition to the assumption that all prostitutes

are women, one might also note the relatively lenient financial penalty imposed by this law. This amount has not been adjusted for inflation since 1930. At the time of this writing, PhP200 is equivalent to approximately US$4.18, and the minimum daily wage for non-agricultural workers in the National Capital Region is PhP 444-481, and ranges from PhP210-352 in other regions. In other words, PhP200 is likely to be a significant amount of money only for the very poor. However, with the passing of the Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act in 2003 (about which more later), this law has become only applicable to a specific category of prostitutes, i.e. adult female "street" or "freelance" prostitutes unaffiliated with an establishment, pimp, etc. In short, this law does penalize prostitutes, but in an increasingly limited and lenient manner over time. The law's wording indicates that prostitutes are classed along with other undesirables as a threat to social order. It is in the national interest to punish prostitutes for carrying out their trade.

This law would eventually be revised due to mounting criticism against its anti-vagrancy measures. For instance, it was argued that this law in effect

criminalized poverty (providing a reason for punishing beggars with detention or fines, or threatening them with such), or, since the definition of a vagrant was so vague and broad, provided means for harassing "undesirable" persons. Given the notoriously corrupt reputation of the Philippine National Police, Article 202 was seen a means for officers to demand bribes from civilians on pain of arrest. Interestingly, women were considered particularly vulnerable to such schemes, reflecting a conceptual overlap between the categories of prostitute and vagrant: a woman found "loitering" alone at night was supposedly an easy target of accusations that she was a prostitute, and would then have to prove that she was not selling sex. The presence of condoms among her belongings would often be considered "evidence" of prostitution.

The bulk of Article 202 was repealed in 2012, when vagrancy was officially decriminalized. Thus, Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is now titled only "Prostitutes," and reads as follows:

> "Article 202. *Prostitutes; Penalty.* – For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
> "Any person found guilty of any of the offenses

> covered by this article shall be punished by*arresto menor* or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by *arresto mayor* in its medium period to *prision correctional* in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court."

Of course, this begs the question of why vagrants were decriminalized, while prostitutes were not. The outcome of this revision implies that even though the broad range of individuals formerly categorized as "vagrants" is no longer to be penalized, prostitutes appear to have been considered a special case. The continuing presence of Article 202 in the Revised Penal Code suggests that the law mainly provides a performative or symbolic function. It shows that the Philippines remains a country where prostitution is officially prohibited, and where prostitutes, unless shown to be coerced, recruited, or exploited by another party, are punished—however lightly—for corrupting the morals of society at large. Someone, somewhere, determined that it was in the national interest to continue punishing prostitutes, or at least to *be seen* as a nation that continues to ban prostitution.

RPC 202 is nevertheless not the only portion of the

Revised Penal Code that deals with prostitution. There is also an article regarding white slave trade. The current version of this article reads as follows: "Art. 341. *White slave trade*. – The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who, in any manner, or under any pretext, shall engage in the business or shall profit by prostitution or shall enlist the services of any other for the purpose of prostitution (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 186.)"

This law conflicts with Article 202, since there is no clear distinction between prostitutes and victims of white slave trade. Should a prostitute be arrested under Article 202, or rescued under Article 341? The use of the term "white slavery" to refer to prostitution suggests that the prostitute is the victim in this circumstance—or one of the victims, with damage to society's morals arguably also considered a consequence of the crime of white slavery. However, the persistent inclusion punishments prescribed for prostitutes in Article 202 make this conclusion very difficult to uphold.

What's in a Name?: Pragmatism in the Face of Euphemisms

Prostitution in the Philippines is officially prohibited, but some observers and researchers argue that a de facto regulatory regime is in already place. The current version of such legislation is part of the 1992 Sanitation Code. However, modern toleration of prostitution in the Philippines dates back much farther, and was reportedly encouraged during the Marcos era in order to make international tourism to the Philippines more profitable. Indeed, Marcos had made a 1980 attempt to create a regulated sex trade. (Bonnet 2017, 46) After this initiative was blocked, he attempted to police the sex market through more covert means.

With prostitution remaining illegal, a person would not be allowed to officially list his or her occupation as "prostitute" or "sex worker." However, sex work may be engaged in by persons officially employed in different sectors. (Mariano 2012, 40) Many women working in clubs and bars in the Philippines, who are officially listed as hostesses, dancers, entertainers, and guest relations officers, may indeed be engaging in paid

sex with customers. (Ibid)

The Sanitation Code specifically targets women in these occupations and provides for requirements for the retention of their work permits. Relevant provisions cluster in the following sections:

> Chapter XI: Dancing Schools, Dance Halls, and Night Clubs; Chapter XII: Tonsorial and Beauty Establishments;
>
> Chapter XIII: Massage Clinics and Sauna Bath Establishments.

Staff from such establishments who have the most direct physical contact with customers (i.e. masseuses, hostesses, dancers, and spa attendants) must procure health certificates from local government agencies in order to work legally. The Sanitation Code does not specify the types of health checks required to obtain the certificates; this appears left to the discretion of local government units. However, international health observers have shed some important light on the matter. A 2015 report by the World Health Organization stated that health checks can include training about sexually-transmitted infections, as well as screenings for aliments like syphilis and HIV. Health monitoring of prostitutes

tends to be highly gendered, focusing on women; male and transgender prostitutes/suspected prostitutes more likely to be ignored. There are, however, local ordinances calling for such measures which predate the Sanitation Code by decades. Lisa Law found that Cebu City had local ordinances to this effect dating back to the 1930's. (Law 1998, 61)

This euphemistic attitude to the sex trade has, over several decades, given rise to its own special terminology. The term "GRO" or "guest relations officer" is often taken to mean a prostitute—specifically the type attached to a bar, who entertains and interacts with customers but may be taken out for sex in exchange for payment to the establishment. Testing and licensing is carried out at the local/municipal level. One might note that the list of sexually-transmitted diseases to be tested for does *not* include HIV, in compliance with international norms discouraging the use of HIV status to determine hiring.

Such provisions appear based on the assumptions that a) working as a masseuse, hostess, etc. may include commercial sex or even be little more than a cover or euphemism for prostitution, and b) such commercial sex

is so prevalent in these lines of work that one may as well test all persons who list them as their livelihood for sexually-transmitted diseases.

For purposes of this thesis, one may say that this law may be taken as a tacit admission that a fairly lively (illegal?) sex trade exists under the cover of euphemistic job titles and seemingly legitimate establishments. Given the difficulties behind authorizing the closing of establishments on the suspicion that they *may* be selling sex, blanket STD testing may seem like an oddly more workable approach to some.

The existence of this regulatory system is not well known or understood by the Filipino public. Sex-selling establishments are often fairly visible and known to local residents, but the policy framework under which they are allowed to operate is not. The relation of the regulatory provisions to other facets of Philippine prostitution law is even more poorly understood.

Migration, Sex Tourism, and Prostitution

The Philippines' labor export program, begun under the Marcos regime, added new dimensions to the

threat of Filipino sexual exploitation. There was the danger that Filipino migrant workers would, willingly or unwillingly, enter the sex trade abroad. The Philippine state sometimes appeared to be condoning this development. The 'entertainer visa,' officially intended to sponsor Filipino singers and dancers abroad, came to be viewed as a cover for Filipino prostitutes entering Japan. (Bonnett 2017, 51) The number of such visas issued increased from 9,125 in 1982 to near 70,000 by 2001. (Ibid)

Anti Mail-Order Bridge Legislation

The Philippines passed an Anti Mail-Order Bride law in 1995. While not being related to prostitution per se, this law might be regarded as a narrower precursor to more comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation. This law views the arrangement of marriages of Filipinas to foreigners as a crime. However, in keeping with an abolitionist perspective, it views those facilitating the marriage, rather than the (prospective) bride herself, as the offending party. The law also does not attempt to punish the (prospective) foreign spouses of the mail-order brides.

In addition, the use of brute force—such as abduction, drugging, or threats of bodily harm towards the prospective bride—is not necessary in order to prove the guilt of the party arranging the marriage. The law's scope can be rather vague since it does not attempt to make clear distinctions between sham marriages and legitimate ones. In the law's revised version, the pool of possible victims has been expanded to male spouses.

Prostitution: An Overview of the Trade

Since much of the Philippine sex trade operates underground, statistics are often given in the form of estimates. From the 1990's, it was fairly common to peg the number of prostitutes in the country between 200,000 and 500,000. (Lim 1998, 7) Today, the Philippine Commission on Women tends to deploy statistics in a somewhat questionable manner. In a policy brief, it states that, " In the 1998 study by the International Labor Organization (ILO), it was estimated that there were at least half a million prostituted persons in the Philippines. In 2004, the number of those exploited in prostitution

alone reached 600,000 which ballooned to 800,000 in in 2005." (Philippine Commission on Women, n.d.) The Commission does not ask how the number of prostitutes in the country apparently increased by 200,000 in the space of a year. Later in the same document, it quotes a "2009 study" that agrees with the estimate of 800,000 prostitutes on Philippine territory. A glance at the brief's list of citations, however, reveals that the "study" is in fact a *Deutsche Welle* news article that likely lacks the methodological rigor of a full-length study. Where do these statistics come from? The very high estimates may indeed reflect the situation of a black market sex industry in a developing nation. However, the large numbers may also be rooted in the tendency of laws such as the Sanitation Code to brand workers in sizable portions of the service sector as probable prostitutes. Obviously, not everyone who holds a "pink card" is necessarily a prostitute. Many persons may indeed work as masseuses, spa attendants, dancers, and the like without providing any paid sexual services. Accordingly, reliance on the Sanitation Code's instruments may result in the erroneous inclusion of numerous individuals who have

nothing to do with the sex trade.

The high numbers may also be taken within the Philippines' regional context. Vietnam is estimated to have 200,000 prostitutes (Luong 2016), for example. Perhaps such high numbers are reflective of factors, such as the growth of sex tourism, or the legacy of the Vietnam War, which pervade all of Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, one must ask whether these high estimates are partly a consequence of moral entrepreneurs' vested interests. Claims of astronomically high numbers of prostitutes can draw the attention of donors, lawmakers, and the wider public. The high numbers also imply that the problem is rooted in systemic issues, rather than the behavior of a few deviant individuals. Addressing the problem will require comprehensive policy change.

The unquestioning propagation of high estimates is a well-documented symptom of moral panic. There are other reasons to characterize much of the advocacy surrounding the sex trade as a moral panic. For example, prostitution is often discussed in a sensationalistic, homogeneous way which does not account for variation

within the sex industry. Such lack of nuance can be a major problem, since the sex trade in the Philippines demonstrates wide structural variation. Expensive agencies for call girls and escorts may also offer sexual services unofficially, so to speak. Besides so-called "freelance" or "street" prostitution—most prostitutes are affiliated with some form of management or establishment. This ranges from a single pimp to virtual ownership by a brothel, which might virtually imprison prostitutes on the premises. (Ralston and Keeble 2009) Other types of establishment may include massage parlors, spas, and bars which may be covers for the sex trade. (Mariano 2012, 40) Different settings can give rise to different power dynamics and degrees of exploitation. An undifferentiated view of prostitution can lead to the development of policies which are incapable of handling prostitutes' varied needs.

Prostitution varies greatly across different locations in the Philippines, as well. Certain parts of the country are known hubs for sex tourism, such as the former U.S. base sites Angeles and Olongapo. Pagsanjan, a tourist town known for its nearby waterfall, is notorious

for child prostitution under a variety of arrangements, from single transactions with many customers to a long-term patronage with one or a few customers. (Aquino 1987) UNICEF estimates that 60,000- 100,000 of the Philippines' prostitutes are children.

Child Prostitution in the Philippines

The issue of child prostitution in the Philippines deserves special analysis in this study not only because of the large numbers of children involved and the resulting international notoriety, but because of the heightened public and/or political response that it tends to elicit. Popular books on child prostitution, such as Majgull Axelsson's *Rosario is Dead* (Axelsson 1997) or Emilio R. Aquino's *Tourism and Child Prostitution in Pagsanjan (Philippines)* (Aquino 1987) are written in a sustained tone of moral outrage. Anti-trafficking legislation automatically considers all underage prostitutes to be victims of trafficking, regardless of any consent given by them. Indeed, the presence of children or minors in a sex/entertainment establishment is often the deciding factor for the authorization of a police raid.

In other words, the sector of the sex trade which offers children and is therefore likely to generate the most public outrage is once again associated with transnationality. More relevant to the topic of this study, this tendency appears in the policy output of some Church actors: the Olongapo City ordinance spearheaded by Fr. Shay Cullen forbids foreign nationals from spending time alone with local minors, and thus explicitly highlights the threat posed by foreign customers. Such developments both reflect and contribute to a widely-held perception that the most vulnerable victims of the Philippine sex trade are primarily victims of foreigners.

There are legitimate reasons for associating child prostitution with sex tourism. Sex tourists might feel less discomfort in sexually exploiting children of a race or nationality other than their own, claiming that such exploitation is normalized in the child's home " 'culture.'" (Pettman 1997, 97) Sex tourists may also avoid certain practical difficulties by going abroad. For instance, other countries might have laxer law enforcement, meaning that a sex tourist has a lower likelihood of being punished for buying sex with children. (Aquino1985, 3-5) Economic

hardship prevalent in developing countries also tends to produce more children who are either willing to sell their own sexual services, or who come under the control of persons who sell sexual access to them. (Ibid, 2-3)

Despite this widespread emphasis on the foreign buyer, a 2001 International Labour Organisation report on child prostitution in the Philippines contends that "there are conspicuous indications that local customers represent the majority of the users. These are Filipinos coming from all classes and occupations in the society." (Arcilla 2001, 41) The 'indications' comprise interview data from cities such as Caloocan, Cebu, and Daet (Camarines Norte) (Ibid, 41-42)— sites distant from well-known locations for international child prostitution sex tourism such as Pagsanjan. (Ibid) This suggests the presence of an under-studied but possibly significant local demand for child prostitution that operates somewhat parallel to the sex trade sector catering to international child sex tourism.

Even when child prostitution is driven by foreign demand, the sex trade still tends to require the participation of locals: local recruiters, pimps, brothel, parents and guardians often play a role in instigating or orchestrating

the sexual exploitation of a child. This has long been the case in the town of Pagsanjan, a popular sex tourist destination in the Philippines. (Aquino 1987) Many of the town's child prostitutes are pimped by their parents. (Ibid) One can argue that a parent will be a slightly less abusive or exploitative pimp than a non-related person. The parent might also put more effort into lowering a child's exposure to STI infection or especially brutal sex acts. Still, the fact remains that a child was sexually exploited to supplement the income of not only a co-national, but a close relative. Clearly, one cannot externalize all the blame for child prostitution onto foreign Others.

Anti-Trafficking Legislation

In 2003, the Philippines passed RA 9208, providing a framework for comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation. The law was passed with virtually no protest. One of the few genuine complications to its passage is recorded in its legal deliberations, when one legislator asked about the difference between non-

trafficked and trafficked prostitutes. (See Appendix) This distinction had quite important implications, as the then-bill provided for the possibility of punishing the customers of trafficked prostitutes. The reply was that *all* prostitutes were to be considered potential or actual trafficking victims. The best course of action was to avoid buying sex with prostitutes altogether.

The primary focus of RA 9208 is on Filipino female or child victims of sex trafficking, arguably reflecting globally widespread tendencies to treat trafficking and prostitution as strongly overlapping phenomena. It aims to support and shelter victims of trafficking (with measures such as rescue, accommodation, counseling, livelihood coaching, and social reintegration support), whether or not they take part in trials and investigations. Since the law does not make clear distinctions between trafficked and non-trafficked prostitutes, it may also be used to prosecute clients of "voluntary" prostitutes. However, the law does state explicitly that any minor in the sex trade is automatically considered a victim of trafficking.

Philippine anti-trafficking law focuses its penal

capacities on those who profit most financially from prostitution and other forms of labor trafficking. Punishment for customers is a possibility, as well, but the law stops short of mandating a so-called "Swedish model."

This law was revised in late 2012, and many of the changes have the effect of broadening the scope for an abolitionist approach to prostitution. One of the key additions to the law is:

> "SEC. 17-B. *Irrelevance of Past Sexual Behavior, Opinion Thereof or Reputation of Victims and of Consent of Victims in Cases of Deception, Coercion and Other Prohibited Means.* – The past sexual behavior or the sexual predisposition of a trafficked person shall be considered inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of proving consent of the victim to engage in sexual behavior, or to prove the predisposition, sexual or otherwise, of a trafficked person. Furthermore, the consent of a victim of trafficking to the

> intended exploitation shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in Section 3(a) of this Act has been used."

The "means" referred to in Section 3(a) are, "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation." The phrase "taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person" may further be interpreted to include poverty and other forms of marginalization as coercive mechanisms that lessen or remove someone's personal responsibility for entering the sex trade.

Such revisions are suggestive of the process of learning from the implementation of anti- trafficking legislation thus far. One may guess that such references to a person's "past sexual behavior or…predisposition" had been used in some trials/hearings, and that the revision was intended to ensure that this would not happen again. This revision is also meant to encourage trafficking victims to come forward without fear—or at least with less

fear—of inquiries into their past which may be degrading, traumatic, and/or used to argue that they are voluntary prostitutes rather than victims of exploitation.

The attention paid—or possibly *not* paid—to the international dimensions of trafficking in this law also offers interesting analysis. It is perhaps telling that neither the original Anti- Trafficking Law nor its revised version makes much reference to provisions for non-Filipino victims found on Philippine territory. This may be because foreign trafficking victims are very few in number—or at least are rarely encountered by government and NGO workers. Still, one may point to the focus on repatriating rather than supporting foreign victims as further evidence that the law was made with Filipino victims in mind.

More recent attempts to change prostitution law in the Philippines often reflect a drive towards stronger abolitionist approaches. There have been numerous attempts to repeal the last remnants of Revised Penal Code Article 202, which would remove any reason for punishing prostitutes. The Philippine Commission on Women itself has supported the deletion of Article

202. Feminist-led coalitions have also attempted to pass an anti-prostitution law that would punish customers, along the lines of the Swedish model. Existing anti-trafficking law makes provisions for punishing customers, but these are brief, ambiguous, and rarely enforced. The passage of the anti-prostitution law would intensify the abolitionist elements of Philippine prostitution policy by attempting to shut down the demand side of the sex trade. Such a law would confirm that the entire sex trade, not only the sectors which carry out sex trafficking, is seen as a social scourge. However, it would complicate the existing narrative that prostitution is a type of exploitation that caters to foreigners. Most versions of the anti-prostitution bill make little reference to migration, trafficking, sex tourism, or other transnational aspects of the sex trade. They seem to target Filipino customers at least as much as foreign ones—a reason why some commentators believe the bill has not passed.

In sum, prostitution is seen as the legacy of imperialism and other types of foreign domination. The very origin of transactional sex in the Philippines has been traced to the arrival of Europeans. Filipino women have

historically been painted as the sexual victims of foreign clerics and soldiers. More recently, this anxiety has been augmented by understandable outrage about the sexual exploitation of children, also by foreigners. The role of Filipino actors and culture has been downplayed, aside from accusations against state officials and private parties who collude with exploitative foreigners. Prostitution is an easy metonym for the exploitation and subjugation of the Filipino nation as a whole by foreign Others. The public and the state are already primed to see prostitution as a threat to the nation. Actors hoping to bolster their position as defenders of the nation would be hard-pressed to find an advocacy issue better suited to their needs.

IV. The Church and the Polish Nation

In this section of the thesis, I examine the historical development of Polish Catholic nationalism. I make some gestures towards comparison with the same process in the Philippine Church.

The Church in a Besieged Nation

The institutionalization of Catholicism in Poland coincided with its historical beginning as a kingdom recognized by its European neighbors. One of the foundational events of this historical narrative is the baptism of King Mieszko I of the Piast dynasty—Poland's first king—in 966 AD. (Porter 2001, 291; Davies 2001, 249) Through centuries of conquest, partition, invasion, and communist control, it has been viewed as a preserver of true Polish national identity and a support in resistance efforts against foreign powers. (Davies 300) Davies argues that conflict and subjugation were integral to the building of Polish religious nationalism, not only by strengthening the Church's moral authority, but through shifting Poland's borders and demographic profile around ethnic Poles who were also Roman Catholic. (Ibid, 300-

301) He traces the relative growth of Poland's Catholic majority through the country's history: just over half in 1793, right before the second partition; 65% in 1931, and 95% after the Second World War. (Ibid, 300)

However, scholars both inside and outside Poland recognize that Polish history is of course much more complex and diverse. (Porter 2001) The view of a Catholic Poland carries much ideological weight and has served various political purposes over time. (Orla-Bukowska 2009; Stańczyk 2013) Such scholarship often asks us to remember the silences and exclusions inherent in such views of national history.

1569 saw the formalization of union between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland. (Kenney 2007, 138) This began what was most likely the era of Poland's greatest ethno-religious diversity, with the population including Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, and Muslim groups. (Porter 2001) Nationalists who look back on the Commonwealth as Poland's Golden Age conveniently forget that this is when the country's population was *least* dominated by Catholic Poles. (Ibid)

Such diversity appears to have been downplayed

or even forgotten by the national imaginary. (Kenney 2007) Four and a half centuries later, Catholicism is frequently portrayed as an essential and timeless part of Polish identity. (Ibid, 136) National narratives of Polish history often paint the Polish nation as the defender of Europe's Catholic tradition, and indeed as having

a sacred, evangelizing mission in Europe. The epithet "Christ of Nations" encapsulates this construction. (Jakubowska 1990, 72) However, it also presages what one may call a Passion-based understanding of Polish history: partitions and invasions are understood as the death of the Messianic nation, while instances of resurgence, such as the Solidarity movement, herald Polish resurrection. (Ibid) One might cautiously draw parallels to Ileto's analysis of the Passion narrative in Philippine revolutionary movements, though the actual ideological content of these national or nationalist Passion narratives differs starkly. Official, nationalist views of Polish history strongly reinforce the understanding of Poland as guardian of Europe's Christian heritage. One example is the official iconography surrounding the 1683 Battle of Vienna. Jan III Sobieski, then King of Poland and Grand Duke of

Lithuania, broke the siege at the head of an army of winged hussars. Sobieski is credited not only as a hero of his own Commonwealth and savior of the city of Vienna, but as a leader who all but singlehandedly turned the tide of Ottoman conquest. (Hanson 1985, 345)

This not to say that the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of Poland through the ages has been ignored. Research on ethnic and religious diversity is by no means a rarity in Polish historiography. (Kugelmass 1995; Kenney 2007) However, the very manner in which such aspects of history were discussed also seems to reflect a desire to ultimately assert the inextricable links between Polish identity and Catholicism. (Porter 2001) Non-Catholics in Poland are not to be considered Poles, but rather tolerated outsiders—they may have lived within Poland, but do not actually belong to it. (Ibid, 292) Also, if religious devotion appeared to decline among Catholic Poles, they would return to the fold soon enough because that was what normal Poles would eventually do, so close was their fundamental tie to the Church (Ibid, 290-91)—not because the Polish state took positive measures to preserve Catholic dominance and block the development

of other religious communities on Polish territory, such as by restricting the property and political rights of non-Catholics. (Ibid, 292-93) In short, official narratives suggest that Polish identity and Catholic identity are mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing.

Efforts to preserve Polish culture became more conscious and concerted in the late eighteenth century, because of a combination of the threat of conquest and contemporary European intellectual trends. (Galbraith 57)The drive towards cultural conservation has roots in the Enlightenment and especially Romantic discourses regarding national identity and self- determination. According to these ideals, groups of people with strong cultural and historical ties would have a natural right to their own sovereign polity. Preserving the Polish linguistic and religious traditions, therefore, would help to prove that the Polish nation existed, and, by extension, that the Poles had a legitimate right to an independent nation-state. Indeed, the last Polish king, Stanisław II August of the Poniatowski dynasty, pushed for the creation of a National Commission on Education, considered the first such institution in Europe, as a condition for acquiescing

to his country's first partition in 1772. (Davies 2001, 271) Clergy came to play a significant part in the educational institutions of partitioned Poland, and universities in particular were a hospitable employment context for former Jesuits after the temporary dissolution of their order. (Ibid, 298) Davies insists that current and former priests played a considerable role in Poland's general "intellectual life" during this period, which contributes to the Church's persistent hold on moral authority, and prevents Polish historical memory from opposing Church influence too diametrically against modernism. (Ibid)

When Poland finally was partitioned in 1795, cultural factors such as religion became even more important in maintaining the identity of the now-stateless nation. Interestingly, the Austrians are/were Catholic, but they were also thought to be the most lenient of the partitioning powers. (Galbraith 56) It is further argued that Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, which looked on the Catholic Church as a primary target, helped to cement a tradition of Polish Catholicism as an emblem of Polish identity that was persecuted by oppressive alien regimes. (Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2018, 551)

The Church's role as a promoter or preserver of national identity during partition must not be over-simplified, however. There were moments when the Polish Church appeared to work *against* nationalist aspirations: both the Vatican and the Polish episcopate withheld support for uprisings against the Russian tsar. (Kenney 2007, 144) There were also "powerful traditions of both popular and intellectual anticlericalism," which would be neglected by later historians and swept away by the turbulence of the twentieth century. (Ibid)

As is widely known, Poland would finally gain brief independence in the aftermath of the Great War. It was a somewhat more homogeneous country than formerly, since it no longer included Lithuania. The new state may have had fewer issues (and also fewer benefits) stemming from ethno-religious diversity, but it also had to face difficult questions regarding its ideology, national identity, and international relations.

This period was dominated by a mainly two-sided debate that showed Poland torn between two geopolitical and ideological orientations. Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski are said to be two of the most influential figures

in the development of Polish nationalism and national identity following reunification. (Davies 2001, 124-25) Of the two, it was Dmowski who was enthusiastic about using Catholicism as a pillar for building Polish nationhood. (Ibid, 124) Such a construction was, understandably, less compatible with the left-leaning vision of Piłsudski. (Ibid, 125-26) Dmowski, whose ideology might broadly be called right-wing, preferred to align Poland *against* Nazi Germany. (Ibid) This may sound somewhat contradictory, but the reasoning can be largely explained by the notion that, as a right-leaning political thinker, Dmowski was better able to appreciate Germany's rising strength, and thus strongly urged Poland to act to protect herself from a threat originating from that direction. (Ibid) Piłsudski, for his part, voiced corresponding fears about the USSR. (Ibid, 126) Leaning towards the left, he was more inclined to appreciate and fear the power of the Soviet Union. (Ibid) The echoes of such tensions continue to resonate in contemporary Polish politics.

Resolution to this tension was forestalled by the fact that Poland would be literally torn between these powers in the Second World War. Following the conflict,

national boundaries and populations would be shifted yet again. With the extent of national territory even less certain than before, the basis for whom exactly belonged in this new Poland became more urgently a matter of culture, descent, language, and religion—very much an ethnic view of nationalism, which of course is a key part of the backdrop for the next section, about Poland's religious minorities.

The Polish Church and Religious Minorities: Jews *in* Poland or Jews *of* Poland?

The subtitle of this section reflects the key threads, according to Porter, regarding one of Poland's most important religious minorities. (Porter 2001) To what degree have Jews been considered as belonging to the Polish nation? What can be said about the relationship of this community to the rest of the population?

Poland's Jewish community has a long and distinctive history. King Casimir the Great invited Jews to make their home in Poland in the mid-fourteenth century. (Abadi 2005, 863) In 1492, over a hundred years

later, Jews were expelled from Spain, and following this, Poland became a "cultural center" of Jews in Europe. (Abadi 2005, 864) It became known as a safe haven for Jews who were persecuted in or expelled from surrounding countries. (Ibid)

However, anti-Semitism would also come to be a persistent current in Jewish-Catholic relations. Hagen compares the "political antisemitism" of pre-WWII Poland to that of Germany. (Hagen 1996) While the German situation was undoubtedly more virulent, he argues that both were linked to similar structural factors, especially the rising middle class of the local ethno-religious majority. (Ibid) Modras writes as well that, during the same period, the Polish Catholic press would often imply or state outright that Poland's Jewish community was promoting or at least benefitting from secularism at the expense of Polish identity. (Modras 1996) Frequently, the Jews of Poland were said to be bound up with secret Masonic societies in such efforts. (Ibid) Thus, even while Poland had a large Jewish community and a long history of tolerance towards it, the fearful Othering of Jews was also part of Polish culture.

Poland was to become the scene of some of the worst atrocities of the Holocaust—and not necessarily because of any especially virulent anti-Semitism among Poles. Actually, Poland's legacy of tolerating and welcoming Jews meant that, at the start of the Holocaust, its Jewish population was so much larger than that of other European countries that it was often more logistically feasible to move Jews from abroad into Poland than to collect them elsewhere for liquidation.

Some of the atrocities attributed to Germans or considered to be led/forced by Germans are claimed to have been carried out on the initiative of Poles. Pogroms or massacres such as that of Jedwabne are also a matter of heated political and academic debate. (Kenney 2007, 145) What does it mean that such violence seems to have taken place after the territory in question was no longer under German control? How many Jews actually perished in these incidents, and to what extent were their fellow Poles involved in killing them? Such matters have yet to be resolved.

Of course, this concentration of Holocaust and post-Holocaust activity in Poland also means that Poles

are also over-represented on lists of those who are honored for hiding or saving Jews. The country of Poland as a whole is also honored in Israel is one of the key international partners supporting its establishment in the old Hebrew Promised Land. (Abadi 2005, 864)

The role of Poles in the Holocaust is very much a matter of controversy until the present. One of the most recent incidents in this debate is the Polish government's effort to strip Professor Jan Tomasz Gross of his Order of Merit, largely because of his claims that Polish forces actually killed more Jews during WWII than they did Germans. (Smith 2016, "Polish Move") The incident took on international dimensions as members of the global community of historians vocally defended Gross and his work. (Ibid) A broader related development would be Law and Justice's plan to ban the term "Polish death camp" to refer to facilities such as Auschwitz. Violations of this ban would entail a five-year jail sentence. (Lewis 2016) There are also disputes about whether Poles could have done more to rescue Jews or ameliorate their suffering. (Smith 2016, "Polish Move") However, it is not difficult to argue that Nazi and Soviet repression on Polish territory

was so severe as to preclude any larger efforts to aid Jews. For instance, approximately 20% of Poland's Catholic priests were killed during this period. (Kenney 2007, 144) The Church and its nation were so necessarily preoccupied with survival that they could not move to save a minority that the Nazis were so bent on wiping out.

Though anti-Semitism and controversies surrounding the Holocaust are still relevant issues in Poland, the country also has to manage the integration of another ethno-religious Other: Muslims. Grodź mentions that, as of 2010, Muslims comprised just "0.04-0.08%" of the country's population. (Grodź 2010, 272) This small community was ethnically split, more or less evenly, between Tatar Muslims with roots in Poland stretching back over six centuries, and recently- immigrated Muslims, mainly from the Maghreb. (Ibid, 275-81) Even with such a small Muslim population, that year also saw a major controversy regarding plans to build a mosque in the Polish capital. (Ibid, 272) Grodź asserts that, while Islam remained a very small and peripheral aspect of Polish national life, interactions between Muslims and Christians were generally peaceful through the twentieth century

onwards. (Ibid) Efforts at inter-religious dialogue were not urgent, but Grodź also notes that Muslims tended to play a key role in initiating and maintaining them. (Ibid, 282-83)

Integration of the Muslim community becomes more and more pressing in the face of general migration from the Maghreb to Europe in the past decades, and is even more pressing due to the drastic influx of refugees from the Syrian and other conflicts. Indeed, religious and cultural differences have formed the core of the Polish government's justification for refusing to take in large numbers of Syrian refugees. (Ojewska 2015) Therefore, Poland's Muslim population is a growing issue in its political debates, even if the number of actual Muslims does not increase proportionally.

Europe's so-called refugee crisis has also sparked strong reactions in Poland. Though right-wing Polish parties and their supporters claim allegiance to Catholicism, this does not mean that they have followed the recent papal injunction to all prospective host countries to give shelter to the refugees of current conflicts. (Scislowska 2015) Refugees have become the

targets of right- wing rhetoric both in the Polish and European Parliaments. (Ibid) Xenophobia targeted at Arabs/Muslims seems to be more virulent than that pointed at immigrants from Eastern Europe, since the latter are usually Orthodox Slavs seen as less racially and culturally different. (Scislowska 2015) Commentators have also noted that Ukrainian refugees appear to be met with far less hostility because of less visible ethnic difference, and due to sympathy regarding Russian military involvement/invasion. (Buckley and Huber 2017)

Such xenophobic behavior and rhetoric in Poland is sometimes discussed in the context of similar and more virulent behavior in countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, or even states further East. (Kunovich 2009) This can be linked with research dating back further than the current refugee crisis: Poland is often grouped with Eastern European countries whose nationalism tends to be more rooted in ethnicity, while countries to the West supposedly lean more towards civic nationalism. (Ibid, 575) This is not simply rooted in "culture" or "religion." Indeed, Kunovich argues that tendencies towards civic or ethnic ideas of nationalism may be studied in terms of the

perceived interests of affluent or less affluent social classes/societies/countries, with the less affluent tending towards ethnic nationalism in order to stop foreigners from accessing resources. (Ibid) At the same time, scholars may also have to be careful about making essentializing statements about xenophobia, religious politics, ethnic nationalism, or political backwardness in "the East." After all, similar behavior has been and is still found in the supposedly more affluent, educated, and progressive West.

Unfortunately, the Polish Church has also come to be tied—however indirectly—to xenophobic ideologies. Some Polish Church actors are working to address this predicament. The mid-2000's saw the resurgence of movements within the Church seeking to prove that the Church, as an institution, was not xenophobic. Much of this indirect association with anti-immigration or anti-EU thinking is via its connection to right-wing parties. As Millard argues, the overall Polish party system can be considered weak, especially in comparison to Western European neighbors. (Millard 2006, 1008-09) The original Solidarity parties no longer exist, despite the strong

influence that movement and its leaders continue to have on Polish politics. (Burke 2009) It may be useful to contrast Polish party politics with systems in countries such as Germany, where persons with political aspirations, or at least strong interest in political participation, may have the option to join a party's youth wing and remain with it for most of their lives. This type of party membership appears less likely in Poland, where parties collapse or are formed with relative ease, and when it is far from a rarity for deputies to switch to other parties. However, it is still very relevant to speak in terms of a certain party—such as Law and Justice—gaining seats and signaling the rising prominence of a certain ideology (in this case, the far right). The strength and coherence of Poland's party systems is sufficient that the Church, by allying with PiS over certain issues, may also come to be tainted by this party's anti-Semitic and xenophobic strands.

As the Church grapples with its role in Polish politics within the context of international pressure to secularize, it must also work through an uneasy connection to racism and xenophobia.

Solidarity

Here, the dissertation now sets out Poland's post-war political context and how this culminated in the Solidarity movement that now forms the core of the Polish Church's contemporary legacy. (Ost 2005) The first official post-war elections took place under coercive conditions, leaving Poland under the control of national and local-level soviet-style councils. This could be and indeed often was understood as yet another conquest. Once again, the
Polish Church took up its old role as the guardian and guide of Polish national identity against the historical Russian enemy. Indeed, the ideological lines were perhaps even starker because the Soviet Union and Poland's own communist government, as per their official ideology, was essentially opposed to religion, especially public religion.

One of the most influential incidents in the contentious Church-state relations of the post- war era was the 1984 assassination of Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko. (Evans 1922, 757) Popiełuszko was kidnapped, strangled,

and his remains dumped in a reservoir. (Davies 2001, 411) Official narratives of the time blamed the murder on staff of the national security bureau, with no significant involvement from their superiors or outside authorities. (Ibid) However, investigations under the auspices of the Institute of National Remembrance in the 2000's now posit the likelihood of extensive KGB involvement. Popiełuszko was a popular and outspoken critic of the regime, and his funeral was attended by roughly a quarter of a million people. Whoever ultimately planned or ordered the assassination, it appears that Popiełuszko's death served to fuel opposition to the regime, and to cement the opposition's ties to the Polish Church. (Byrnes 2006, 104-05) In other words, his death helped to consolidate a Polish Catholic nationalism that stood in stark opposition to Soviet-backed communism.

Michel argues that, perhaps paradoxically, the state's efforts to suppress the Polish Church gave it more political power by granting it more moral authority in the eyes of the people. (Michel 1991, 52-53) The state's support of certain more conciliatory groups—such as the clerical organization known as Pax—actually tended to

delegitimize those groups. (Ibid, 78) One may detect similarities to the Church's situation under *Kulturkampf* – state suppression led to greater legitimacy in the eyes of the nation/populace. At the same time, the state dared not suppress the Church excessively or threaten to crush it completely, as it could in Austria and Czechoslovakia, because the institution was simply too powerful in Poland and such a move would have been too politically costly. (Ibid, 77-80)

Resistance efforts were often sporadic, small-scale, and/or fairly localized. For example, there might be a strike at a certain factory that would be suppressed or resolved before spreading far into surrounding areas. However, eventually resistance efforts would coalesce into a national movement. The famous Solidarity movement had its roots in large 1980 strikes in the shipyards of Gdansk. (Ash 2002, 41-43) Lech Wałesa, who had once been a shipyard electrician (Mishtal 2012, 157), climbed over the wall to join the strikes, and eventually took a leadership role in them. The movement gained the name Solidarność due to the strikers' unwillingness (unlike members of many other strikes) to

end their activities once their employers offered concessions. Rather, they would show solidarity with other laborers in Poland and not cease their strikes and demonstrations until broad-ranging reforms for other workers were instated.

Solidarity began as a movement with a broad ideological spectrum, but gradually become more cohesive and right-leaning. During "the early stages of the Solidarity movement, its left wing mounted powerful attack against Walesa's leadership since he was perceived as tilting the movement too much toward the right-wing, nationalistic and Christian-democratic *mileiux*. The failed coup against Walesa that was led by the most fiery leaders of the left, including Michnik, Kuron, Modzelewski and Litynski." (Zubek 1994, 802) History proved this attempt unsuccessful, of course.

The fact that Solidarity had to go underground after the communist government outlawed it also facilitated the rise of cultural and religious conservatism within its ranks, since the movement then needed the support and shelter of the Church more than ever. (Michel 1994, 43)The result was a highly sacralized movement

that, besides directly advocating for doctrine- friendly policies, also increasingly expressed itself in terms of Catholic ceremony and iconography. (Ibid) As a result, many people expressed support for the Church and took part in Catholic traditions, despite not agreeing with official religious teaching in some key respects, as a way to show opposition to the communist regime. (Ibid, 43-44)

To be sure, both Solidarity and the government attempted to appropriate (and, as we shall see, literally capture) symbols of national identity—not least totems of Polish Catholicism—but Michel argues that the opposition was ultimately more successful on this point. (Michel 1991, 82) The traditions and struggles surrounding one of Poland's most famous Marian images show the politicization of the sacred and the sacralization of politics at this time. (Johnston 1989, 499) Since the importance of present-day icons generally depends on their history, a short account of the legends surrounding the Black Madonna of Jasna Góra is in order.

The cult surrounding the Black Madonna/Our Lady of Częstochowa illustrates the strong link that had

developed between Catholicism and Polish identity/freedom. (Ibid) A watershed incident in this narrative is likely the battle with the Swedish army in 1655. (Ibid) The Swedish forces swept through Poland until they were finally repulsed during the long siege of Jasna Góra. (Ibid) Since then, the icon has been attributed both major political significance and miraculous powers, and the incident cemented the Virgin Mary's status as "Queen of Poland." (Ibid)

In addition, the Black Madonna's very appearance makes it conducive to legends the reinforce a heroic national identity. The icon's face bears two longer scratches and one shorter scratch. These signs of damage actually have an associated legend. During the 1430 Hussite sack of Jasna Góra, the icon was supposedly loaded onto a cart as part of an invader's spoils. (Jakubowska 1990, 12) The story goes that the horses miraculously refused to move the cart, and the angry warrior began to strike the icon with his sword. (Ibid) He had just begun to slash at the icon for the third time when he was struck dead. (Ibid) The scars on the icon's face are emblematic of a) the resilience of the Polish nation, and

b) the Madonna's sympathy for and co-experience of Polish suffering. (Ibid) It is no surprise that Pope John Paul II once remarked on the status of Częstochowa, where the Black Madonna is enshrined, as a perpetual bastion of Polish freedom. (Michel 1994, 115)

The politicization of this icon duly continued into the communist era. In 1996, the communist government prohibited its public exhibition outside its church building on the occasion of the anniversary of Poland's thousand years as a Catholic country. (Michel 115) It feared that the combination of potent nationalist iconography on that particular day would prove too volatile. (Ibid) Michel details how, in the latter days of the Solidarity movement, the government recognized the painting as a symbol of resistance and sought to capture it in order to demoralize the opposition. The icon was therefore hidden in various locations in order to protect it from the authorities, until it was briefly arrested. (Ibid, 183) One might say that this granted the icon not only political significance but a kind of personhood, since it was captured and detained like a flesh- and-blood resistance leader. Wałesa and many of his supporters began to wear lapel bins bearing her image;

the icon had become an indication of political allegiance. (Johnston 1989, 499)

This sacralization of politics meant that The Polish Church (along with Solidarity and the communist government) was one of the three main participants of the famous Round Table talks of 1989. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland n.d.) After a brief transitional period, Wałesa was elected as Poland's first full-term post-communist President the following year.

As in the section detailing the Philippines' historical background, I now analyze the most relevant section of Poland's present constitution, focusing on the sections regarding Church-state relations/religious politics and sexuality/gender. Contrary to the Philippine case, wherein a new constitution was adopted shortly after political change, the Polish Constitution emerged in 1997, with various amendments until 2009. This lengthy period of discussion and revision until the emergence of the first version of the constitution may be partly due to the fact that it heralded a social revolution as well as a political one. Below, I analyze certain provisions of the Polish Constitution that are relevant to post-communist Church-

State relations. The English translation is copied from Constitute.org.

Similarly to the Philippine constitution, and indeed many others, the Polish document does invoke religion/divinity in its preamble:

> "We, the Polish Nation - all citizens
>
> of the Republic,
> Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources,
> Equal in rights and obligations
> towards the common good - Poland,
> Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values,…
>
> Recognizing our responsibility
> before God or our own consciences,"

Here, Christian/Catholic religion and morality are considered a source of foundational principles, and, if not the only option for personal political ethics, apparently the primary and expected choice.

Much of the official policy regarding Church-State relations is found in Article 25, here quoted in full:

> **1.** Churches and other religious organizations shall have equal rights.
> **2.** Public authorities in the Republic of Poland shall be impartial in matters of personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life, and shall ensure their freedom of expression within public life.
> **3.** The relationship between the State and churches and other religious organizations shall be based on the principle of respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own sphere, as well as on the principle of cooperation for the individual and the common good.
> **4.** The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute.
> **5.** The relations between the Republic of Poland and other churches and religious organizations shall be determined by statutes adopted pursuant to agreements concluded between their appropriate representatives and the Council of Ministers.

Article 35, again quoted in full:

> **1.** The Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture.
> **2.** National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to establish educational and cultural institutions, institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolution of matters connected with their cultural identity.

Article 53 provides additional information regarding Poland's official stance on freedom of religion:

> **1.** Freedom of faith and religion shall be ensured to everyone.
> **2.** Freedom of religion shall include the freedom to profess or to accept a religion by personal choice as well as to manifest such religion, either individually or collectively, publicly or privately, by worshipping, praying, participating in ceremonies, performing of rites or teaching. Freedom of religion shall also include possession of sanctuaries and other places of worship for the satisfaction of the needs of believers as well as the right of individuals, wherever they may be, to benefit from religious services.
> **3.** Parents shall have the right to ensure their children a moral and religious upbringing and teaching in accordance with their convictions. The provisions of
>
> Article 48, para. 1 shall apply as appropriate.

> **4.** The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom of religion and conscience shall not be infringed thereby.
> **5.** The freedom to publicly express religion may be limited only by means of statute and only where this is necessary for the defence of State security, public order, health, morals or the freedoms and rights of others.
> **6.** No one shall be compelled to participate or not participate in religious practices.
> **7.** No one may be compelled by organs of public authority to disclose his philosophy of life, religious convictions or belief.

Article 191, Section 5 allows for the Church to serve as a formal check against government/state power, saying that "churches and religious organizations" are permitted to "make application to the Constitutional Tribunal regarding matters specified in Article 188" regarding the constitutionality of various policies and international accords conducted by the Polish government.

As to women's issues and feminism, the constitution has Article 33, which lays the foundations for the protection of gender equality:

> **1.** Men and women shall have equal rights in family, political, social and economic life in the Republic of Poland.

> **2.** Men and women shall have equal rights, in particular, regarding education, employment and promotion, and shall have the right to equal compensation for work of similar value, to social security, to hold offices, and to receive public honours and decorations.

This is bolstered by an excerpt from Article 233, which prohibits religious and other forms of discrimination: "Limitation of the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens only by reason of race, gender, language, faith or lack of it, social origin, ancestry or property shall be prohibited."

The 1997 constitution also has several provisions regarding the family. Individually, they are not markedly conservative *or* progressive, but are rather significant for revealing the importance of the family as a foundational unit of the nation. For example, Article 71 outlines mechanisms of positive support for the family:

> The State, in its social and economic policy, shall take into account the good of the family. Families, finding themselves in difficult material and social circumstances particularly those with many children or a single parent - shall have the right to special assistance from public authorities.

> **2.** A mother, before and after birth, shall have the right to special assistance from public authorities, to the extent specified by statute.

On a more specifically religious note, the constitution has Article 48 Section 1, protecting parents' rights with regards to bringing their children up in a certain faith: "Parents shall have the right to rear their children in accordance with their own convictions. Such upbringing shall respect the degree of maturity of a child as well as his freedom of conscience and belief and also his convictions."

One of the few articles in the document that can be more clearly put to a sexually conservative purpose is Article 18, defining marriage as, being a union of a man and a woman, as well as the family, motherhood and parenthood." Given this wording, the introduction of homosexual marriage or civil unions would likely necessitate a change to the Polish constitution. The heterosexual assumption regarding marriage is by no means unique to the Polish constitution, but in combination with the strong social stigma, this provision spells significant obstacles to homosexual marriage.

Polish Catholicism and "in-Between-ness"

This section examines the post-communist, post-Solidarity context within which Polish politics and national identity must navigate. While Polish identity is often framed in opposition to Slavic (Orthodox) peoples—particularly Russia—the Slavic component of Polish identity can come to fore in certain discursive circumstances. Narratives surrounding the end of the Cold War also tend to reinforce the idea of Poland as a *political* leader/vanguard of Slavs. The fall of communism in Poland is said to have presaged similar developments elsewhere in the former Eastern Bloc. (Zubek 801) The figure of Pope John Paul II emblematizes this narrative quite nicely. (Byrnes 2006, 103-105) While famous for his strong Polish roots (Ibid, 103), his papacy was also known for its focus on the whole of the Slav peoples and their role in the history of Catholicism, as written in his 1985 encyclical on the subject. (*Apostoli Slavorum*) In this way, the Church's perceived contribution to Poland's regional leadership

role adds to its moral authority.

Poland (along with nine other countries from Central and Eastern Europe) became a member of the European Union in 2004, six years after beginning talks to join the union in 1998. (Nowicka 2011, 120) It would eventually become one of the most prosperous and politically-stable countries of the former Eastern Bloc. (Garztecki 2015) Its accession into the Schengen Area may be viewed as a sign of acceptance into/by Europe.

However, Western Europe/the EU is also constructed as an Other for Poland, especially with regards to what have been termed Poland's conservative Catholic values regarding sex and gender. Though communist governments tended to discriminate against homosexuals, there remains a strong taboo against homosexuality in post-communist Poland. (Graff 2006) LGBT rights became a lightning-rod issue in the 2001 elections, facilitating the rise of the Civic Platform and Law and Justice parties as defenders of Polish tradition/identity against excessive EU intrusions. (Keinz 2011, 96) Poland's post-Cold War identity, therefore, seems to echo the Dmowski-Piłsudski tug-of-war between

the East and West, with a Catholic-versus-cosmopolitan duality once again a central thread.

Poland is also seen as being "between" East and West in terms of its prosperity and socio- political development. It may have cause to envy the West, but is better off than its Eastern neighbors. (Galbraith 2004, 62) Such views manifest in narratives about migration flows. Poles may desire to emigrate West, but Russians and other CEE nationals hope to emigrate to Poland. (Ibid) This view of migration to and from Poland comes up again later, as the backdrop to debates about transnational prostitution and sex trafficking.

This sense of being caught—or having flexibility—between two options is not only part of Poland's corporate identity, so to speak. It may also be a key component of the individual identity of many Poles. Galbraith's micro-level, somewhat ethnographically-oriented study of young Poles in Krakow posits the metaphor of "between-ness" as central to the way in which these individuals look at their country and themselves. (Galbraith 2004) She notes that this particular identity configuration, rather than resting largely on a series of

dichotomies, is conducive to " 'nested loyalties,' where attachment to region, nation, and Europe do not compete, but rather are important to varying degrees in different contexts." (Ibid, 55) Thus, as much as some generalizations about Polish identity may be useful, the significance of individual identities and interactions should not be underestimated, either.

The Nation and the Post-Communist Church

Given factors such as the legacy of the Solidarity movement, it is not unexpected that Catholicism remains a distinguishing feature of Poland and informs the way it relates to its neighbors. (Nowicka 1998, 21; Porter 2001, 289) The assertion of an explicitly Catholic national identity has also been a way to distinguish Poland from its eastern neighbors and the stigma associated with being an Eastern European country. The Cold War may be three decades in the past, but discourse around European identity still tends to locate power, prosperity, enlightenment, and "core" European-ness in the West. (Galbraith 2004, 62) To dissociate Poland from the East means to bring Poland closer to these positive/aspirational

identity constructions. At the same time, however, insofar as Western European identity is constructed as Protestant, secular, or even atheist, the "West" can also be seen as an Other for a Catholic Poland. (Stańczyk 2013, 291-92) The adoption of policies that appear based on secular or left-leaning Western values can be interpreted as a loss of Church influence, and by extension, an erosion of Polish national identity. As for domestic affairs, the Catholic Church entered the post-communist era with a privileged position in Poland's public life. Some scholars, such as Mach, argue that this religious institution is having trouble adjusting to the existence of an actual democratic system where it is one of many different socio-political actors. (Mach 2000) For example, the Church has become too used to a dichotomizing approach that sees/paints opposition to its teachings as attacks on the Polish nation. (Ibid, 114-15) Groups whose goals opposed some of the Church's teachings—such as feminists—could be accused of undermining Polish identity and democracy, or at the very least being a throwback to communism. (Bystydzienski 2001, 502) It must be remembered, however, that the Polish Church's historic

opposition to communism has not necessarily translated into a wholehearted embrace of capitalism. (Bilefski 2010; Byrnes 2006, 108) Some Polish bishops have warned that the current capitalist order has also facilitated rampant materialism, hedonism, and a general decline in values. (Ibid) This was also understood to have been the stance of the late Pope
John Paul II. (Burns 167)

This is not to say that every Catholic Pole is likely to be an anti-communist, and that support for certain aspects of communist rule have been totally expunged from Polish socio-political life. Indeed, as much as communism was placed as an undemocratic, alien regime, it was not long— until 1993, to be exact—before former communists became part of a government coalition.

The legacy of the Solidarity movement is not completely untouchable, either, and the tides of public opinion can turn. Wałesa and his ideological successors were defeated in 1995 in Aleksandr Kwaśniewski. Kwaśniewski, as a prominent ex-communist who continued to lean ideologically left (Stańczyk 2013, 309), faced strong criticism from the Polish Church over his

candidacy and eventual presidency (Ibid, 309-310). However, many voters were drawn to him by memories of more secure employment during communist times, and also due to his West-aligned, pro-EU integration policy. Kwaśniewski also appeared to be striving for a more cosmopolitan, liberal Polish political culture, as in his statements against anti-Semitism. (Ibid) His electoral victory, followed by his consistent criticisms of the Church's political interference, seemed to imply that the Church had lost much of its Solidarity-era moral authority. (Ibid)

Unfortunately, his regime proved to be a disappointment for many Poles, given its succession of scandals (Grabowska 2017, 253) and, in the view of some, over-accommodation with Western Europe and the European Union (Burns 167). The so-called Rywin Affair[13] or "Rywin-gate" was especially damaging. (Grabowska 2017, 253) Member of Parliament Adam

[13] Put simply, the Rywin Affair was a corruption scandal involving government officials using a well-known media personality named Lew Rywin to work to change laws limiting print media companies' ability to purchase or influence radio and television companies. (Zarycki 2009, 628-29)

Michnik, who had a personal financial stake in a planned media company purchase, would have benefited enormously from Rywin's successful lobbying. (Ibid) However, documentation of the planned legislative change was publicly exposed, precipitating massive public outcry and Rywin's legal trial. (Ibid, 629) Such scandals did much to damage the post-communist left-leaning government's ability to question the Church's moral authority and deny it institutional access.

The brief resurgence of the Polish left under Kwaśniewski was followed by a dramatic shift towards more conservative politics, with Kwaśniewski's party swept aside by the Civic Platform. (Zarycki 2009, 626) Civic Platform and Law and Justice (or PiS) are perhaps the two most important Polish political parties of the past decade. Both are right-leaning, with strong Euroskeptic leanings and a concern with preserving traditional/Catholic values. However, one might argue that Law and Justice leans further to the right, especially on social and cultural issues such as the place of homosexuals in a Catholic Poland.

The initial plan for the period following the 2005 elections had

been for Law and Justice to partner with Civic Platform—a party which has been variously categorized as right-wing (but less so than Law and Justice) or centrist. However, over the course of the elections, PiS became allied with the more "radical" right-wing parties Self-Defense and the League of Polish Families, instead. (Graff 2006, 436) It is likely that this partnership helped to slide Law and Justice itself rightwards on socio-cultural matters. (Ibid) Indeed, the names of the two parties are indicative of their emphasis on the protection of the nation and conservative family values. (Ibid) The 2010 plane crash on the way back from Russia that killed most of Poland's top national leadership— including then-President Lech Kaczyński who is the twin brother of former Prime Minister and current Law and Justice party chairman Jarosław Kaczyński—also helped push Law and Justice and Polish politics generally in a more fearful, right-leaning direction. (Stańczyk 2013, 315-16) The surviving Kaczyński brother remains an important figure in Polish politics, and continues to voice the idea that the crash was a Russian conspiracy, despite investigation results concluding that it was an accident. (Ibid)

While often labeled as right-wing, conservative, etc., Law and Justice does not always fit comfortably into

ideological categories—at least Western European ones—of left versus right- wing. On the one hand, PiS takes a strong stance against communism and Russian imperial ambitions. Its socio-cultural policies are quite conservative, especially regarding sexual morality. (Sierecka 2017, 131) For instance, the early months of its administration saw the blockage of trans rights legislation, the cancellation of state-funded in vitro fertilization, and plans to drastically reduce sex education in state schools. (Ibid) It is generally Euroskeptic and anti-immigration, especially pertaining to immigrants from the Maghreb. (Cienski 2015; Dudek 2016) These approaches are woven together in a discourse centered on the protection of the Polish nation and its culture. On the other hand, Law and Justice's ideology regarding trade, public spending, and employment is often compatible with what one might call socialism. Campaign platforms pushing higher salaries, lower retirement ages, and a looser fiscal policy are some concrete examples. (Ramet 2017, 2) The party is also considered rather leery of broad-scale privatization and close relationships with large firms and banks. (Ibid)

Commentators have noted a cooperation between

the Polish clergy and PiS. Some priests—most famously Fr. Rydzyk of *Radio Maryja* fame—publicly support PiS from the pulpit, and PiS proposes doctrine-friendly policies such as a further tightening of Poland's famously restrictive abortion laws. Should such initiatives succeed, abortion will be totally banned in Poland, except in cases where the mother's life is endangered. (Reych 2016)

Despite the appearance of indicators such as the recent election results, support for PiS is far from universal in Poland. (Dudek 2016) There is fear that Law and Justice's past and current legislative proposals supposedly often threaten Poland's democratic institutions. (Garztecki 2015)There are also concerns that PiS' policies are undermining Poland's international relations and reputation. (Dudek 2016)

While the Law and Justice party is at least provisionally cooperating with the country's Church, it has less friendly relations with other Solidarity icons. Some of the staunchest critics of Law and Justice are veterans of the struggle against communism. PiS appears to be attempting to discredit Wałęsa by propagating claims that he was a paid communist informant prior to

the foundation of Solidarity. (Goclowski 2016) Wałesa has claimed that the evidence against him is fabricated. (Foy 2016) However, the accusations must be taken into context. Firstly, many prominent anti-communist personages have also been accused of being informers, but this was often under strong duress, in the context of arrests for anti-communist activities, or simply showing that the person had been considered a potential informant. (Tamkin 2016) In addition, the charges might be part of deliberate attempts to damage Wałesa's reputation—a tactic not uncommon in post-communist polities. (Ibid) This view is supported by the fact that the charges were brought up around the time Wałesa began to strongly criticize the current government as a threat to Polish democracy.

On a related note, the Church must negotiate its ties—some at least partially accidental— to groups even further to the right than Law and Justice. In April 2016, Bialystok clergy had to issue an official apology for a Eucharist said for the National-Radical Camp on its premises. (Stur 2016) As the Church in Poland becomes more closely intertwined with some of its most

controversial political actors, so too does it become more important to ask how one can determine and define the Church's stance on political issues, and assess its responsibility for actions taken in its name.

Polish Catholicism and 'Gender Ideology'

Post-communist Polish politics also has a complicated relationship with feminism, much of which has roots in the communist era. (Bystydzienski 2001) Measures promoting equal working/earning rights for both genders became associated with communist labor policies. (Grabowska 2012, 390) The long-standing conflict over abortion laws, which served as a proxy debate over secularization, also helped paint women's rights advocacy as foreign and even hostile

to Catholic Polish identity. (Holc 2004, 756) Baldez describes another source of the resistance's antipathy to feminism, i.e. that many of the people who would have encountered Western feminist ideas on their journeys abroad would actually have been high officials and their families. (Baldez 2003, 266) This was yet another reason to relate feminism with the unpopular communist regime. This Othering of feminism and associated ideologies continues into the contemporary Polish political scene. Some conservative actors—including clergy—often use the term "gender ideology" as shorthand for movements or advocacy that challenge traditional patriarchal norms. (Holc 20004, 9; Odrowąż-Coates 2015). Hence, women and sexual minorities often have to stand against the Church's moral authority when campaigning for more progressive policies.

Feminism's traditionally pro-choice stance regarding abortion also reinforces its position as an ideologically suspect, supposedly foreign movement that may have ties with communism. Abortion may seem a rather specific issue, but researchers have noted its implications for broader Polish politics. "The intensely

contested issue of abortion came to symbolize a wider dispute about the role of the Church in public life and the character of the future Polish state." (Kulczyki 472- 73) Indeed, the Church and state had disputes about abortion policy throughout the communist era, precisely because this clash was also understood as a struggle over Poland's spiritual direction. (Ibid, 470-72) Therefore, ongoing debates about Polish abortion law may also be read as symptomatic of the country's continued wrestling with ideas about secularism and national religion.

As was and is the case in the Republic of Ireland, many Polish women have been able to cross the border into other countries where legal abortions may be more easily obtained. However, there is a strong demand for legal abortions to be more readily available within Poland, as well as widespread concern about proposals to tighten restrictions on abortion. The famous "coathanger protests"—referring to a notoriously dangerous method of self-induced abortion—as well as loud, unauthorized pronouncements by pro-choice feminists during Mass—have become some of the most visible signs of this. (Vinograd and Gallica 2016) Indeed, the latter form of

protest emphasizes the persistent salience of Church involvement in abortion law.

Less traditional attitudes towards family planning and gender roles are also framed as biological threats to the Polish nation. (Mishtal 2012) When couples bear fewer children, or when women appear to prioritize career over child-rearing, there may be fewer young people to carry on the Polish bloodline—according to conservatives and/or nationalists, at least. (Ibid) This prospect may be especially disquieting in the face of mass emigration to Germany, the United Kingdom, and other countries. It still does not mean that conservative/Catholic attitudes towards family straightforwardly promote national fertility. (Radkowska-Walkowicz, 2012) The Polish Catholic hierarchy has also opposed vitro fertilization, in keeping with the official Vatican line. (Ibid) Radkowska-Walkowicz argues that the Church's opposition to in vitro fertilization reveals that its true underlying goal is to control the sexuality of Poles, especially Polish *women*. (Ibid) If their true goal was to ensure the biological reproduction of the nation, they would not be so opposed to a fairly effective means of promoting pregnancy for

infertile couples. (Ibid) The role of the Church and Catholic values—however one defines those terms—will continue to be vital in shaping Poland's future socio-political direction.

V. Prostitution and the Polish Nation

Prostitution in Poland does not fall as neatly into a post-colonial narrative as the same social issue does in the Philippines. Hence, this section is structured somewhat differently than the previous one on prostitution in the Philippines.

This section addresses the following main question:

To what extent can prostitution be framed as a matter of national concern in Poland?

Since transactional sex can take many forms, we should also ask:

Are certain kinds of transactional sex more likely to be perceived as threats or urgent concerns than others, in the Polish setting?

I can then establish whether engagement in the issue of prostitution, either as a whole or in part, is compatible with the Polish Church's organizational interest in maintaining its status as a national guardian.

The section is written chronologically, starting from the era of partition and ending with Poland's present state as a European Union (EU) member, tracing the historical roots of national concern (or lack thereof) with the issue of prostitution.

Prostitution, Morality, and Disease in Partitioned Poland

During the era of partition from 1795 to1918, prostitution was indeed seen as an issue of pressing national concern. (Stauter-Halsted 2017) The presence of a large and overt sex trade threatened nationalist ambitions to liberate and re-unite Poland. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, widespread prostitution undermined efforts to construct the Polish nation as possessing a unique, Catholic-inflected culture which, according to nineteenth-century formulations of nationalism, entitled it to an independent nation-state. (Ibid 214-215) Secondly, prostitution helped to spread debilitating diseases, in particular syphilis, which jeopardized Poles' physical and mental ability to carry out a nationalist struggle. (Stauter-Halsted 2017, 2) The highly-noticeable nature of late-stage syphilis symptoms rendered them an additional threat to Polish national

honor: How authentic or respectable could Polish Catholic culture be if signs of sexual immorality were clearly visible among its population? (Ibid, 200)

It is true that the great powers of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia partitioned Polish territory and also promoted the policing of prostitutes. Prussia/Germany, in particular, is noted for concerted efforts to regulate the sex trade via registration and regular health checks. (Ibid, 29) However, Stauter-Halsted argues that local doctors, who were usually Polish themselves, and law enforcement officials attacked the problem with a zeal that could not simply be explained by obedience. (Ibid, 7-15) Rather, they worked assiduously not only to comply with the policies of conquering powers, but to preserve hope for a reconstituted Poland. (Ibid)

The backbone of this strategy was the policing of women, especially those who were known and registered prostitutes. (Ibid, 28-32) However, health surveillance approaches would extend to virtually all poor women, who were considered likely to fall into part-time prostitution in order to supplement their incomes. (Ibid, 59) The reader might note how this policy mirrors the

present-day blanket policing of Filipino women in some occupations under the "pink card" system. Narratives about the trajectory of women into prostitution located immorality in Poland's growing and industrializing cities. (Ibid, 58-59) Urban centers were contrasted with a rural heartland that was thought to be the repository of authentic and traditional Polish values. (Ibid, 63) This view helped to preserve a sense of national dignity and morality: prostitution happened in places which were less truly Polish. Stauter-Halsted points out how these popular narratives conveniently ignored types of prostitution that occurred in the Polish countryside, where many members of the nobility maintained pools of girls and women for their own sexual use and that of guests. (Ibid, 60-61) The mechanisms were not exactly the same as those in the cities, but they were also founded on economic transactions and gendered imbalances of power. Stauter-Halsted argues that Poles *had* to ignore this form of prostitution because it took place in the cultural heartland. (Ibid) Moreover, it would have impugned the sexual morality of the aristocracy who had been the foundation of Polish politics since at least the age of the old

aristocratic Parliament. (Ibid, 63) The public outcry upon the discovery of widespread venereal disease among the Hutsul people, who were "idealized for their craftsmanship, folk culture, and unique music," also arose from anxieties about finding signs of sexual corruption in a cultural heartland. (Ibid, 263)

National anxiety around prostitution waned after Poland regained its independence following the Great War. (Ibid, 344) By this time, Europe-wide hysteria over syphilis had faded. (Ibid) Also, Poles were more secure in their national identity, making questions of sexual morality less charged. (Ibid, 344-45)

The nexus of conquest and stigmatized sexual relations re-emerged in a radically different formulation during the Second World War, upon Nazi Germany's 1939 invasion of a briefly- independent Poland. Maren Röger details this dynamic in her book *Kriegsbeziehungen: Intimität, Gewalt und Prostitution im Besetzten Polen 1939 bis 1945*. (2015) Röger examines various types of sexual/romantic interaction such as:

1. coerced prostitution (Ibid, 27-74);
2. voluntary or at least *sufficiently* voluntary prostitution

(Ibid); and

3. voluntary liaisons that, while taking place outside the conventional framework of prostitution, still involved power disparities and some form of transaction. (Ibid, 75-168)

She shows how the regulation of sexual relations promoted Nazi racial doctrines and reinforced German dominance over conquered Poland. (Ibid, 27-34) At the same time, bending or even breaking of the regulations especially with regards to relations between German men and Polish women became somewhat institutionalized. (Ibid, 29-37) This state of affairs was a regularized irregularity that marked Poland out as a wild frontier territory, a space fundamentally different from core German territories. (Ibid) These "war relations" would be one of the most controversial legacies of the war, leading to heated debates about the extent to which such relations were treasonous to the Polish nation. (Ibid, 210-11)

Taboo Topics in Communist Poland

Following the Second World War, Poland

nominally regained its independence but was promptly converted into a communist satellite state of the USSR. Prostitution was a taboo subject during this time because it offended both Catholic and pro-communist sensibilities. (Sørenssen 2012, 188) Civil actors who had been involved in sheltering and rehabilitating prostitutes were often forced to cease their activities. (Ibid) The Sisters of Mary Immaculate were one such group. They were only able to resume organized and large-scale ministration to prostitutes after the downfall of socialism. (Ibid)

Still, one could find dissident actors wishing to draw attention to the issue. In 1957, Włodzimierz Borowik released his short film *Paragraf Zero* (Article Zero) on the topic of prostitution. (Sørenssen 2012, 188) It featured re-enactments, footage of pimps and prostitutes, and interviews with prostitutes. (Ibid) The film's title is a reference to the fact that the Penal Code of the time had no provisions regarding prostitution: Article Zero is a phantom law. (Ibid) The Soviet-backed communist state in Poland refrained from legislating about prostitution because to do so would acknowledge it as a significant social issue. (Ibid) Poland was supposed

to be a socialist utopia where class distinctions and gender inequality did not exist. (Ibid) Prostitution, which is to a great extent shaped by these two forms of inequality, exposes the ineffectuality of communism to shape a perfect society. (Ibid) Borowik's film aimed to show that, regardless of state propaganda and social taboos, the problem of prostitution existed and was even fairly common. (Ibid, 189) The film's voice-over bluntly urged authorities to admit to the existence of prostitution and formulate policies to deal with the issue. (Ibid) In addition to its anti-communist leanings, *Paragraf Zero* implied a Catholic-inflected conservatism on the part of its filmmaker. (Mazierska 2012, 139) The voice-over narration referred to the prostitutes themselves in "quasi-religious language" as fallen women who needed to be saved and rehabilitated. (Ibid) As interesting as *Paragraf Zero* is, one must remember that Borowik's film was an exception, and that neither the communist state nor oppositional voices were strongly invested in considering prostitution as a national problem.

Military Prostitution in Post-Cold War Poland ?

The topic of post-Cold War military prostitution is not extensively covered in the literature, but I explore it here because it proved so significant in the Philippine context. In the Philippines, the red light districts that sprung up around American military bases became symbols of national exploitation and degradation in the context of neo-colonialism. The controversy surrounding them inevitably consolidated around nationalist advocacy. Has something similar occurred in Poland? Poland joined NATO in 1999, after which it became a host to American troops. ("Poland Welcomes 'Historic' " 2017) There are no permanent American bases on Polish territory, but the Polish government is seeking to negotiate the establishment of such facilities in cooperation with the Trump administration. (Zerka 2018) Instead, American troops in Poland are present on a temporary/rotational basis. (Ibid) This less institutionalized form of deployment has not been conducive to the establishment of large local red-light districts to serve demand from American troops. One cannot point to Polish equivalents of the red light districts of Angeles and Olongapo, whose very existence turns prostitution into a metaphor for the

exploitation of the nation by a foreign power. In addition, the prospect of greater American military presence seems to be popular among ordinary Polish people, in no small part due to increased fears about Russian aggression. (Ibid) I attempted to find evidence such as news articles, scholarly literature, or statements from civil society groups that would show that more American soldiers would facilitate the growth of a large sex industry in Poland but did not locate any.

To be fair, the lack of permanent facilities alone does not explain why American military presence in Poland is: 1) less controversial in Poland, and 2) not served by a large red light district. Other reasons might be that many Poles perceive Russia as an acute threat, and the USA as a bulwark against this danger (Ibid)—especially given the downsizing of Poland's own military, which no longer makes extensive use of conscript troops. (Day 2008) Compounded with Poland's lack of colonial history with the USA, American troops are more likely to be perceived as a blessing than a source of trouble and shame. Furthermore, it appears that American troops stationed in non-Western (read: Asian) countries are more

likely to commit misdeeds, particularly of a sexual nature, against the local population. (Woan 2008, 278-89) Hence, the greater controversy surrounding American military presence in Asian than in European postings. Other countries might also be more likely to publicize misdeeds (especially rapes) by American military staff, out of what we might simplify as post-coloninal *ressentiment*. Perhaps abusive or criminal behavior by American troops in Europe is actually *under*-reported. However, that is a topic deserving of its own research project, and to speak further about it here would be little more than speculation.

Prostitution, Sports, and Social Trends in Twenty-first-Century Poland

In present-day, post-socialist Poland, there has not been a significant and sustained level of concern about military prostitution or any other kind of institutionalized transactional sex. However, certain types of prostitution have been framed as national threats or matters of national interest at specific points in Poland's recent (i.e. post-socialist) history, only for the concern to fade away after an initial wave of anxiety. One instance was the 2012 UEFA, a Europe-wide football tournament that was, at the

time, co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine. (Schuster, Sülzle, and Zimowska, 2010) The event was hailed as an indication of Poland's growing prosperity and attractiveness as a tourist destination. (Ibid, 2-5) On the negative side, there were also concerns about problems arising from the presence of massive numbers of football fans. (Ibid) These visitors could engage in disorderly, violent, or indecent behavior—and might also incite the short-term incursion of foreign prostitutes. (Ibid) Was the Polish government being all too willing to barter order and morality in exchange for tourist dollars and a potential increase in international prestige? Regardless, concerns about the impact of the World Cup quickly faded once the actual tournament was over.

Another notable instance of prostitution-related panic arose around the phenomenon of *galerianki*, or 'mall girls'. These teenage girls were usually found in the local *galleria,* i.e. shopping mall, browsing shops and scouting for prospective customers. (Swader et al 2013, 600) They would exchange sexual favors for gifts, such as luxury clothes and accessories, in addition to money. (Witold 2016, 66) This type of prostitution is rather

atypical because it is not a means of livelihood: the *galerianki* usually lived with and were supported by their parents and did not need to engage in prostitution to pay for their needs or education or those of family members. Transactional sex was carried out in order to acquire consumer goods that would increase their cachet among peers. (Swader et al 2013, 600) This phenomenon received greater national and international attention upon the release of Katarzyna Rosłaniec's 2010 film *Galerianki*. (Bilefski 2010)

Conservative actors allocated a significant portion of the blame for the *galerianki* phenomenon to a breakdown of the traditional family. (Ibid) Parents—especially working mothers—were not spending enough time and effort on their children. (Ibid) The children, lacking moral guidance and feeling emotionally neglected, would of course seek fulfillment in the sexual attention of strangers and the acquisition of fashionable goods. (Ibid) Concern about the *galerianki* was also fueled by fears about the effects of capitalism/consumerism on the national Polish character. (Ibid) While many Poles would scoff at the idea of a return to communism, there

are also fears that the relatively sudden introduction of capitalism and access to consumer goods in Poland has led to excessive materialism. In broader terms, the *galerianki* debate was fueled by fears about Poland's place as a rapidly-Westernizing country, whose people and systems were not able to healthily absorb the rapid introduction of Western values and goods. (Ibid) Many of the social factors that were supposedly driving the *galerianki* phenomenon are long-term trends in Polish society. However, concern about the *galerianki* issue itself was not sustained. Much of the academic literature and journalistic discussion around the topic referenced the film and/or was published shortly after its release. The quantity of output declined steeply shortly thereafter.

Another trend in the Polish sex trade is the so-called *sponsoring* phenomenon, where young people—often female university students—exchange sexual favors with one person on a long-term basis. (Gardian-Miałkowska 2012) Financial support from the client is, ideally, sufficient to allow a young woman to live comfortably while having enough time and energy to concentrate on her studies. (Ibid, 393-95) Popular discourse tends to treat

this as a type of prostitution, but, according

to my contacts in the Ministry of the Interior, the Polish state itself does not have a clear stance on sponsoring. Whether or not it is prostitution, it is legal, as long as all participants are of age. The more alarmist end of Polish media discourse claims that 20% of female university students in Poland have entered some kind of sponsoring arrangement. (Skiba 2018) Curiously, this large estimate does not seem to have provoked sustained, widespread public alarm about the moral vulnerability of young Polish women. This manifestation of moral panic-style discourse was not part of a larger panic on the issue.

One may argue that these periods of concern and panic around prostitution are quite transient, and in response to particular events such as the World Cup or other social trends that die down after a few years. In modern Poland, prostitution cannot be easily framed as a national problem. I argue that it is more commonly seen as a niche issue, or a social problem that is easily eclipsed by much more pressing issues. It carries little legitimacy as an emblem for national security, national morality, or national interest.

Prostitution and Party Politics

Prostitutes figured in one of the most shocking political scandals of the past decade. The affair involved Krzystof Piesiewicz, formerly a leading Civic Platform representative in the Sejm. (Day 2009) He first rose to prominence in the communist era, as a staunch ally of Solidarność who used his legal skills to support the anti-communist opposition. ("Court Convicts 3" internet)[14] Piesiewicz's status in Poland's national life, as well as his moralistic policy on issues like marijuana consumption, rendered his 2009 sex scandal all the more shocking. (Kwaśniewski 2013) In that year, a videotape surfaced of Piesiewicz in the company of two prostitutes. (Ibid) He was not videotaped engaging in sex acts, but was shown wearing a dress and inhaling what appeared to be cocaine.

[14] His prosecution of the killers of Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko drew much praise, but pro-communist vigilantes assassinated Piesiewicz's mother in revenge. ("Court Convicts 3" internet) He joined the legislature following the fall of communism. (Ibid) Piesiewicz is a major figure in Poland's film industry, as well, having written many scripts for renowned director Krzystof Kieslowski. (Kwaśniewski 2013)

(Day 2009) Piesiewicz was brought to court on drug charges. (Ibid) However, he insisted that he had not taken cocaine, and accused the two prostitutes of drugging him in order to make the video, and later blackmailing him with the footage. (Ibid) Piesiewicz was acquitted of drug charges in 2018, but his political career never recovered from the scandal. (Siałkowski 2018)

Piesiewicz's scandal likely undermined the fortunes of his entire political party, especially after the leadership of Law and Justice capitalized on the issue of Piesiewicz's legal immunity. (Ibid)

What is most relevant for this thesis is the framing of the prostitutes. Few details about the women themselves are found in the press; not even their real names were made public. Since no foreign nationality or minor age status is indicated for either woman, the reader can assume that both were adult Polish women. In any case, Piesiewicz would have likely faced charges of sexual abuse or exploitation had either of them been minors. By their own confession, the women initially targeted Piesiewicz out of revenge, because he had failed to deliver on a promise to find them jobs. The abovementioned

framing pattern indicates that Polish media did not portray the two prostitutes as victims. The Polish public at large did not condemn Piesiewicz as a sexual exploiter or abuser. Rather, the combination of paid, extramarital sex, cross-dressing, and drug abuse scandalized many Poles. The entire affair suggested that Piesiewicz, who had portrayed himself as a devout Catholic of strict morals, was an untrustworthy hypocrite. (Kwaśniewski 2013) Polish media appears to have framed the prostitutes themselves as agents of immorality. At the very least, they encouraged Piesiewicz's immoral conduct and profited from it later. If one believed that the incident was planned to ruin Piesiewicz's career, the prostitutes appear downright predatory: They used their sexuality to extort money from him and eventually publicly humiliate him. "Many Poles perceive[d] Piesiewicz as a victim in the case, though there is a perception that he was exceptionally naive for allowing himself to fall into a trap set by the blackmailers." ("Court Convicts 3" internet) Even law enforcement officers commenting publicly on the case seemed to somewhat share this view. (Day 2009) The public

reaction seemed to indicate the view that prostitutes are not victims, and are more likely to be willing accomplices to crimes against respectable men.

The Piesiewicz scandal is remarkable for how little it finally revolved around prostitution. It did not lead to major debates about prostitution policy. The prostitutes themselves were ultimately tied to external agents attempting to undermine Piesiewicz. ("Court Convicts 3" internet) Journalistic discussion revolved around the political consequences for Piesiewicz and his party, as well as the impact on the then-rising Law and Justice Party. (Ibid) Even when prostitution enters high-level political debate in Poland, it remains a marginal topic. It is not an issue in itself, but only adds another layer of complication or titillation to larger partisan conflicts.

Transnational Prostitution in Post-Communist Poland

So far, this section has concentrated primarily on the non-transnational forms of prostitution. However, nearly thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, and fifteen years after EU accession, Poland has transformed into a source, transit, and destination country for

trafficking—including, of course, sex trafficking. International advocacy and policy-making clustered around the so-called Palermo Protocols have further cemented the place of transnational prostitution on the global policy agenda. We might roughly divide transnational prostitution with regards to Poland into two forms: a) the prostitution of Poles in other countries, and b) prostitution in Polish territory involving non-nationals in some major facet of the trade as prostitutes, pimps/managers/recruiters, or customers. Have either of these forms of transnational prostitution become pressing issues of national concern in post-socialist Poland?

The trope of a young Polish woman being a prostitute abroad is somewhat common in Western European films. The characters are accorded varying degrees of agency in the process. Marco Kreutzpainter's 2007 film *Trade*, whose multi-stranded storyline comprises narratives about victims from several countries, includes a USA-bound Polish woman named Veronica who is deceived into sex slavery. (Siegel 2015, 91) She is then abducted, raped, beaten, and physically restrained. (Ibid) The safety of her family in Poland is also

threatened, and her son trafficked as well. (*Trade* 2007) Veronika's cinematic narrative represents the furthest extreme of coercion in human trafficking. Ultimately, the only way she can exert her agency is to take her own life. (Ibid) The film is blatantly abolitionist; its DVD even comes with information about how to donate money to anti-trafficking organizations. (Ibid) A 2005 Luxembourgish film called *Masz na Imię Justine* (Your Name is Justine*)* has, as its protagonist, a young Polish woman who is deceived into sex work in Germany. (Hartwich 2005) The director, Franco de la Peña, was spurred to make the film by unattributed statistics claiming that, "Of the two million people who are sold every year in the world, 200,000 are women, 15,000 of which are Polish." (Hartwich 2005) De la Peña's film likewise emphasizes the brutalization of its protagonist, Mariola. These films paint the prostitution of Polish women abroad as an issue of human trafficking. They duly emphasize the women's deceptive enticement into good jobs abroad, as well as their physical and sexual brutalization. They are also very clearly advocacy films, contextualizing their stories within a wider problem of

global sex trafficking.

At the other extreme are the young women depicted in the 2011 film *Elles*. Its director, Małgoska Szumowska, is Polish, but the film itself is considered a French-German-Polish co- production. (Marshall 2012) The prostitutes in this film, one of whom is Polish, are young women studying at university in France. (Ibid) They insist that they voluntarily exchange sex and companionship with one man at a time for enough financial support. (Pulver 2012) The money is used not only to pay for their studies, but to have luxury accommodations and consumer goods. (Ibid) The only major qualm voiced by the Polish student is that she is becoming addicted to her luxurious lifestyle. (Collinn 2012, Interet)

In short, the figure of the Polish prostitute is familiar in Western Europe. This figure can be adapted into many types of narratives, and may or may not have much basis in the lived experience of Polish prostitutes. However, is such a figure prominent in the *Polish* national imagination? To some extent, yes. There have been campaigns by civil society and state agencies to educate

Poles about the risk of trafficking, including, of course, sex trafficking. The Polish Ministry of Interior and Administration the Polish office of the International Organization of Migration have been active in this regard in the years following Polish accession to the EU.

At the same time, some Poles are troubled at the prospect of their country becoming a destination for foreign prostitutes, whether or not such persons would be considered victims of sex trafficking. There have been some concerns that liberalization of travel and immigration from Eastern Europe and Russia might bring (among other social ills) a greater influx of prostitutes into Poland. This matter entered legislative debates regarding the prospect of liberalizing visa requirements for Russian nationals. By 2006, an estimated 50,000 persons were being trafficked through Poland for various purposes. (Lehti and Aromaa 2006, 195) The country had, according to some estimates, become the base for 30,000-35,000 prostitutes, the majority of whom were non- Poles. (Ibid)

Polish media also takes note of the existence of prostitutes and pimps from nations such as Bulgaria (PAP/RIRM 2017), Romania, and Moldova. Pimps tend

to be portrayed as criminals or exploiters, while the portrayal of Eastern European prostitutes is much more mixed. They may be depicted as victims, but are also (along with the pimps) cited as threats to Polish public order and morality. Media attention to prostitutes or sex trafficking victims from these countries is matched by data from the Ministry of Interior, which cites them as top sending countries for trafficking victims detected in Poland.

Ukrainian prostitutes in Poland are a special case, due to the large numbers of Ukrainian refugees and immigrants entering Poland after the Russian-backed conflicts leading to Moscow's accession of the Crimea inevitably bring up the question of Ukrainian prostitutes in Polish territory. Have there been noticeably more Ukrainian prostitutes in Poland since the start of the conflict? If so, how have they been framed in relation to the Polish nation?

As to the first question, I did not locate any conclusive data about a sudden rise in the number of Ukrainian prostitutes. The second question on the framing of Ukrainian prostitutes, leads us back to how

Ukraine and Ukrainian immigrants are generally viewed in Poland. Twenty- first century Poland is one of Europe's most religiously and ethnically homogeneous states, and has acquired a reputation for being plagued by xenophobia. However, xenophobia is not directed at all foreigners equally. At the moment, the Polish public appears to be most afraid of Muslim migrants from the Middle East and North Africa: Poland has received much criticism from the European Union for refusing to house Syrian refugees. ("Poland Abandons Promise" 2015, Internet) Survey data about public views on immigration indicates that perceptions can fluctuate significantly. The Migration Policy Institute notes that, generally, Poles were some of the most pro-immigration people in Europe in the decade from 2002-2012. (Bachman 2016, Internet) However, a sharp rise in anti-immigration sentiment was noted in 2014. (Ibid) A corresponding shift in government policy followed soon after, with the Law and Justice party winning a majority in 2015. (Ibid) The new government promptly repudiated the refugee intake agreement that the previous Civic Platform administration had signed as a member of the EU. s. ("Poland Abandons Promise" 2015,

Internet)

In stark contrast to its treatment of Syrian refugees, Poland is, or at least claims to be, one of the most welcoming recipients of Ukrainian refugees. (White, Grabowska, Kaczmarczyk, and Slany 2018, 10-11) Ukrainians are seen as easier to assimilate due to centuries of shared historical and cultural heritage. (Ibid) This heritage includes linguistic similarities (which of course facilitate social and professional integration), and a shared enemy in the form of Russia. (Buckley and Huber 2017, Internet) Ukrainians, therefore, are not Othered as much as refugees from other lands, such as Syria, and their influx has been generally harmonious.

Returning to the main questions, can the prostitution of Ukrainian women be conceptualized as a national concern for Poland? Not easily. Ukrainian women are not Polish women, and so their sexual exploitation is less readily constructed as a metonym for the victimization of the Polish nation. Neither can they be readily portrayed as alien threats to Polish morality. Ukrainian women come from a nation with strong historical and cultural ties to Poland, including a

shared enemy in Russia. This means that they are unlikely to be as Othered as prostitutes from countries considered to be more culturally or racially distant. If the Polish public views Ukrainian women as instigators of sexual immorality, their selling of sexual services is still relatively less likely to be seen as a threat from a foreign Other to the extent that one might expect if they were non-Slavic or non-Christian. Whether Ukrainian prostitutes are seen as victims or perpetrators, their commercial sex activities are not easily framed as threats to the Polish nation.

Besides concern about the influx of foreign prostitutes into Polish territory, there has also been some measure of anxiety about the entry of non-Polish customers—that is, sex tourism. Discussion about sex tourism to Poland peaked around the release of a feature film titled *Świnki* (Piggies), directed by Robert Gliński. (Zarębski 2011, Internet) The film is about a fifteen-year-old boy called Tomek who lives in a small Polish town near the German border. (Ibid) Pressed for funds due to his family's strained finances and the presence of a new girlfriend, he joins other youths from his town in selling

sex—under the management of an adult pimp—to adult German men briefly crossing the border by car. (Ibid) Thus, the film examines, through the intimate perspective of Tomek's own life and choices, what we might call a type of short-term sex tourism, with each trip lasting a few hours before the customer quickly returns a child prostitute and then drives back to Germany. (Ibid) Tomek's portrayal is considered by some commentators to be relatively nuanced, since he has at least some agency despite his youth. (Ibid) Also, his financial motivations for selling sex are a combination of family necessity and personal desire. The film avoids simple dichotomies between good Poles and wicked foreigners, or innocent children versus evil exploiters. Tomek is exploited by pimps who are also Polish. (Ibid) Finally, *Świnki* climaxes with Tomek killing one of the German customers. (Kazecki 2013, 189) It is arguable that abuse drove Tomek to this deed, but regardless of how much or little responsibility he bears for the killing, he is no longer a pure innocent.

Gliński stated that the film's story takes place in a context wherein moral and national boundaries are

simultaneously breaking down. (Zarębski 2011, Internet) Whether or not Gliński intends it, this view has clear conservative or nationalist implications, with its concern about the preservation of traditional values and its concern about the dangers of porous national borders. The director also wished to comment on the state of Poland's national Church, which he saw as out of touch and unable to provide the necessary support and guidance for parishioners navigating unstable circumstances. (Ibid)

Gliński's film began to circulate through film festivals or special exhibitions in 2009, the same year as *Galerianki* did. (Ibid) The two films together appear to have triggered larger discussions about the state of Poland's youth in a rapidly shifting social landscape. They make similar points about how Poland's sudden introduction to neo-liberal capitalism and the lack of credible, effective social supports encourages Polish youth to enter the sex trade. It is *Świnki* which has the more explicitly transnational view of child/adolescent prostitution.

However interesting its perspective, *Świnki* did not signal a sustained wave of discussion or controversy

around the issue of prostitution. This is notable because there *are* reasons for Poles to be anxious about a sex tourism industry that is either developing, or established but hidden. Poland, with its growing tourist industry and proximity to established sex trafficking routes, could serve as an attractive destination for sex tourists.[15] Have these foreign partygoers fueled the growth of a tourist-targeted sex trade in Krakow and other major cities?

This does not appear to be the case. While attractive Polish women are a draw for foreign male tourists, relations between them are generally not viewed as transactional. During field work, I encountered little discussion of sex tourism as a major problem, even when I pressed Polish church, state, and academic contacts about the issue. Though neighboring states like Romania are viewed as popular destinations for sex tourists, not many Poles appear to be concerned that their own nation is or might become such a destination in the near future.

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[15] Companies such as Ryanair provide cheap flights to Poland, meaning that visitors from non-contiguous countries can come to Poland more affordably. In particular, Krakow is seen as a popular destination for partygoers, with its energetic nightlife and lower-priced alcohol.

Discursive Disentanglement: Distinguishing Between Trafficking and Prostitution in Poland

Growing awareness of the transnationality of prostitution, coupled with Poland's rights and responsibilities as a member of the Schengen area, mean that discourse around prostitution is now often articulated in terms of (transnational) trafficking. The researcher must therefore re-examine fundamental concepts in this present context. What is prostitution? What or who is a prostitute? When is prostitution trafficking? How are these terms understood in Poland?

According to the Ministry of Interior informants, about who more later, the fact that prostitution is legal in Poland means that the contemporary Polish state never had to define prostitution *per se*. The Polish state *does* delineate a certain type of permissible prostitution. Voluntary, "freelance" prostitution is legal in Poland: the state itself does not attempt to "rescue" such prostitutes, though various civil society organizations (not least Church groups) may attempt to convince prostitutes to leave the sex trade. This type of livelihood is not socially acceptable or encouraged, but it is

not a form of slavery or coercion, either. However, prostitution is not clearly defined beyond this freelance sex trade, and it is difficult to say whether the *galerianki* or sponsoring phenomena should be treated as prostitution. Without a clear official definition, it is extremely difficult to construct methodologically-sound research into the extent and nature of the phenomenon in Poland. Individual researchers might construct their own definition or derive one from their preferred sources, but the resulting studies would be difficult to compare or collate. I argue that this helps to perpetuate the status of prostitution as a relatively low-priority issue for the Polish state.

I now discuss how this nebulous concept of prostitution relates to trafficking in contemporary Polish discourse. Freelance prostitution by adults is officially treated as voluntary. It is different from trafficking, which is by definition coercive. Other types of prostitution are more likely to be considered some form of trafficking and/or sexual exploitation, since prostitutes under the management of a pimp or commercial sex establishment are victims of a crime. In Poland, one finds a widespread recognition in academic and policy circles that trafficking

and prostitution are overlapping but distinct phenomena. This makes Poland somewhat exceptional in international anti-trafficking discourse, which often conflates prostitution with trafficking.

Indeed, Polish law enforcement agencies are significantly invested in reminding the public that trafficking and prostitution are not identical: not all forms of prostitution are trafficking, and not all forms of trafficking are prostitution. People can be trafficked into farm labor, domestic labor, construction work, and many other sectors. The goal of these agencies is to dispel dangerous misconceptions, since lack of attention to non-sexual forms of trafficking can hinder state efforts to prevent and detect labor exploitation. My Ministry of Interior contacts took pains to emphasize this distinction during the group interview.

Locally-targeted law enforcement projects can also reflect an emphasis on the distinction between prostitution and trafficking. The West Pomeranian Police managed the project "Not Every Train Goes to Hollywood" from 2008 to 2010. Its goal was to prevent the trafficking of Polish youth by educating them about

the nature of twenty-first-century trafficking and how to avoid entrapment. Pilot research conducted by the project managers found that misconceptions were rife among the target population. The first and most widely-held misconception (adhered to by 60% of respondents) mentioned was that virtually all trafficking is targeted towards prostitution. It was therefore a goal of this project to educate Pomeranian youth about non-sexual forms of trafficking, for which they might also be at risk.

Trafficking: A National Problem for Poland?

Despite the efforts of the abovementioned agencies, the notion that trafficking almost automatically equals prostitution is still widespread in Polish society. This begs the question: if policy elites respond to this concept, could prostitution become a national concern once it becomes conflated with trafficking? I argue that it would not, because trafficking is itself not a national concern for Poland.

Since at least 2007, the Polish state has attempted to use the best available information to form its trafficking policy. It enlisted the expertise of the Human Trafficking

Studies Centre, which is a sub-office under the Chair of Criminology and Criminal Police at the University of Warsaw. The Centre was instrumental in conducting research preparatory to the passage of Poland's present anti-trafficking legislation. The Centre still works with the Ministry of Interior and the Border Guard in order to improve the implementation of this legislation. They also take at least partial credit for instilling in law enforcement agencies the knowledge that prostitution, sex trafficking, and human trafficking are not interchangeable concepts.

The U.S. State Department has consistently awarded Poland a Tier 1 rating—the highest possible evaluation—in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report. This indicates that, at least by U.S. State Department metrics, Poland demonstrates exemplary commitment to the core elements of anti-trafficking policy. Obokata, however, was far more critical of Polish anti-trafficking policy in his 2006 study. (Obokata 2006) He stated that Poland was still treating trafficking primarily as a border security issue, with an emphasis on quickly detecting and deporting non-Polish victims of trafficking. (Ibid, 63-66) The Polish state is strongly engaged in studying and

addressing the issue of trafficking, even if some researchers or evaluators might disagree with their approach or level of progress. (Ibid) To be fair, this study was undertaken some years before Poland instituted a comprehensive anti-trafficking policy. However, one can gather that Poland does *not* have a long history of victim-centric approaches to trafficking. Its current Tier 1 evaluation, the highest possible ranking for dedication to anti-trafficking efforts according to the U.S. State Department, is all the more striking.

Human trafficking is taken seriously by the Polish state. However, this does not necessarily translate into either trafficking being articulated as a matter of national concern. The Ministry of Interior's anti-trafficking reports emphasize efforts to find and support trafficking victims within Poland, and to prevent the trafficking of persons from Poland to other countries. There is little elaboration of how the Ministry cooperates with other states to address the situation of already- trafficked Poles who have been detected or rescued abroad. There appears to be an unspoken assumption that trafficking victims are primarily the 'problem' of their receiving country.

The Polish state also uses the *opposite* of alarmist discourse: the Ministry of Interior propagates information that, intentionally or not, drastically downplays the scale of trafficking. In contrast to Philippine state agencies and Non-Government Organization(NGO)'s, which circulate large estimates extrapolated through questionable, non-transparent means, the Polish Ministry of Interior propagates small, precise statistics compiled from the number of trafficking victims the Polish state processes in a given year. The Philippine approach is more indicative of a moral panic, but both countries' approaches to trafficking statistics can be misleading. The Philippine approach yields a view of trafficking that is probably exaggerated and certainly lacking in nuance. The Polish approach, however, drastically downplays the scale of the problem, since the Ministry of Interior presents its statistics as the true number of trafficked persons in Poland, instead of making it clear that their numbers only refer to victims which have been processed by the state. Trafficking victims who escape the notice of state agencies are not included or even alluded to. This implies that human trafficking is a statistically small problem in

Poland (which may or may not be true), and that the state is aware of all cases (certainly not true). The Philippine and Polish cases, respectively, show the dangers of two extremes: a) using highly questionable estimates and b) using no estimates at all.

Finally, we must ask: in whose interest is Poland's border protected from illegal crossings? Border security ostensibly supports Poland's own national interest. However, the EU has long seen Poland as a key eastern bulwark, having placed the head offices of Frontex in Warsaw since 2005. (Frontex 2017) The Warsaw office grants Frontex significant organizational capability, allowing it to easily switch focus from the EU's southern border to its eastern border, depending on shifts in the flow of migrants and refugees. (Ibid) Frontex's presence in Poland was further consolidated in 2017, by an agreement with the Polish government that rendered their Warsaw headquarters permanent. (Ibid) This development occurred two years after this dissertation's 2015 cutoff point, but it indicates that Poland had already been moving towards a role as key guardian of Europe's eastern border. To a large extent, Poland carries out anti-

trafficking efforts because of its obligations to the EU, not necessarily because trafficking is seen as a major issue or threat for Poland itself.

In Poland, trafficking is treated as an important issue, which for geopolitical reasons could become more pressing in the near future. However, it is not a matter of national concern or a threat specific to the Polish nation. Attention is dispersed between Polish and non-Polish victims, in contrast to the Philippines, where virtually all the focus is on Filipino trafficking victims. Moreover, official statistics downplay the scale of trafficking. In short, trafficking is framed less as *a Polish issue* and more as *an issue in which Poland happens to be involved*. As such, the issue of trafficking is not readily available for framing as a threat to Polish nationhood. Only certain types of prostitution are presented as an imminent danger to the Polish nation, and these happen to be the sectors most strongly associated with foreign women.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND MATERIALS

This chapter is where I state my hypothesis, and outline the methods I used in order to find and analyze data that will either refute or support it. In addition, I give an overview of the selected materials, describing their origin and composition.

A. Hypothesis

In this section, I state my hypothesis. Then, I explain the logic behind this hypothesis, and how I plan to go about assessing my data for evidence supporting or refuting this hypothesis.

I claimed that the primary stance of the Catholic Church in the Philippines will be abolitionism. In the Philippine context, this would serve its organizational interest in maintaining its role as national guardian. Protecting or rescuing prostituted women and children is a metonym for protecting the nation. For its part, the Polish Church's level of interest in prostitution would be much weaker, but when it did engage, it would be primarily in favor of

criminalization/penalization. This manner of engagement in prostitution policy is due to its portrayal of prostitutes as foreigners who endanger the Polish nation's physical and moral health. Now, I explain the logic behind my hypothesis, based on the theoretical framework described earlier. I expected that the strong abolitionist advocacy of the Philippine Church would arise from the Church's organizational interest in projecting itself as a protector of the nation. The maintenance of this role bolsters its moral authority, which helps it to keep its policy influence and institutional access in the face of secularizing forces. Public discussion around prostitution already comes with a strong anti-imperialist slant, built around protecting Filipino women and children from exploitation by foreigners. The supposedly massive scale of the problem helps to frame prostitution as a national issue. However, the regular use of the image of the prostituted woman or child as a metonym for the exploited, subjugated nation probably helps even more.

In Poland, however, the prostituted woman or child does *not* serve as an easy metonym for the threatened, humiliated Polish nation. In fact, prostitutes are assumed

to be foreign women, so it is easier to frame prostitution as a matter of depraved, non-Polish women entering Polish national territory and corrupting national morals. Polish prostitutes' presence is certainly known and noted, but is not seen as a threat to the nation. A Church aiming to project itself as a national guardian is more likely to advocate a prostitution policy that focuses on policing or outright criminalizing foreign prostitutes, in order to protect Poland from them. This is why some of the Polish hierarchy's most direct policy engagement on the issue demands the expulsion of foreign prostitutes. Even then, the association of foreign women with the immorality of prostitution is weak and sporadic, because they are often portrayed as somehow kin to Poles, particularly if they share Slavic heritage.

How did I determine whether the data supports my hypothesis? I now explain the patterns I looked for in the data from each national Church.

I was guided by the expectation that the stance of the Philippine Church was not simply abolitionism, but *nationalist* abolitionism. According to this view, prostitutes were ultimately victims of neo-imperialism,

and their victimization was that of the Filipino nation itself. Abolitionist advocacy of this kind would be accompanied by implicit or explicit nationalist framing. The victims would be not just women and children, but *Filipino* women and children. The data would display a heightened awareness of the nationality they share with the Church's presumed Filipino audience. I also expected a nationalist slant to the Church's view of the global context in which prostitution of Filipinos takes place. There would be references to the Filipino- ness of victims and the foreign-ness of perpetrators, as well as nods to the effects of neo- imperialism, globalization, violated sovereignty, and inequality between countries. The consistent appearance of such references in the data would support my hypothesis.

The Philippine Church's anti-trafficking/anti-prostitution response has grown into a sustained, coordinated, large-scale movement with partnerships among secular NGO's, state agencies, and Protestant Christian denominations. The Polish Church's words and actions against foreign prostitutes are far smaller in scale. High-level members of the Episkopat personally

attempted to clear the motorways around Poland's border of prostitutes, which led to a short-term decrease in the number of roadside prostitutes. However, this action did not have any noticeable sustained impact beyond the year 2000. The Episkopat and/or large Church organizations have not taken the advocacy up again, and Roadside prostitution remains both notorious and legal in Poland. In other words, the Philippine Church is more anxious about protecting the Philippines from foreign sex tourists than the Polish Church is about saving its own nation from immoral foreign women.

It is possible that foreign sex tourists are perceived to arrive in large numbers, while the Polish public believes that there are fairly few foreign prostitutes on Polish territory. However, the degree of perceived threat also has to do with the way in which the prospective folk devil is Othered. I argue that the Philippine Church is more likely to make a folk devil out of the sex tourist than the Polish Church is to do the same with foreign prostitutes, because the former is more Othered than the latter. A large proportion of sex tourists originate from countries with which the Philippines has a fraught history,

such as the United States and Japan. These visitors also tend to be seen as racially and culturally Other, and representative of rather dark periods in Philippine history. The same cannot quite be said of Eastern European prostitutes in Poland. As Romanians, Bulgarians, Moldovans, and so forth, they share a common Slavic and post- communist heritage with the Polish nation. They are seen as less Other, and therefore less threatening. Russian prostitutes might be an exception, given Russia's antagonistic role in Polish historical memory. However, Russian prostitutes form just one group out of several national communities of Eastern European prostitutes in Polish territory. In general, Eastern European prostitutes belong to an Other that is also familiar. Their presence may be intepreted as cause for anxiety, but not for outright panic.

How would the data refute my hypothesis? Such a refutation might take the form of consistent framing of prostitution as a matter of individual morality, without reference to larger threats to the nation, or any indication that prostituted persons represent the nation. An even stronger refutation would be a pattern of locating

culpability within the nation itself. For instance, the Church might emphasize Filipinos' victimization of one other, or might make indictments against Filipino culture itself.

With regards to the Polish Church, my hypothesis would be supported by a narrative built on the assumption that prostitutes are foreign women. The prevalent problem narrative would portray them as moral or medical threats to the Polish nation. It would not be Poland's responsibility to rescue such women, and the best solution would be to keep them out of the country entirely. There might be sporadic coverage of prostitution involving Poles, but the main narrative would be that of foreign women threatening the Catholic Polish nation.

Patterns would refute my hypothesis by breaking the association between foreign prostitutes and threats to the nation. My hypothesis would be refuted by a narrative that assumes most prostitutes to be Polish. A stronger refutation would be a pattern of seeing prostitutes seen as victims, and representatives of the Polish nation. It would be quite unexpected if the Polish Church portrayed prostitutes this way, and yet failed to promote policies to

protect them. Such a finding would undermine the entire theoretical logic of my hypothesis, and be exciting in its own way.

Putting various forms of interview and textual data together to find each national Church's main problem narrative about prostitution. Making conclusions depends on whether the expected narrative patterns emerge. Here, I have set out the patters I expect to see, and given some examples of patterns that would clearly refute my expectations. The concrete manifestations of these patterns—in other words, the indicators supporting or refuting my hypothesis—are described more concretely and specifically in the methodology section.

B. Methodology

Here, I explain how I plan to determine the policy stance of the Philippine and Polish Catholic Churches on prostitution, and investigate whether these stances can be explained as manifestations of nationalist moral panics.

If we are to discuss the Church's stance on an issue, we must clarify what we mean by "Church," which may be rather more than just nuns and ordained priests. This question is especially complicated in the case of the two countries chosen. Poland and the Philippines are *not* highly secularized societies, which means that it is difficult to make a distinction between the Church and other aspects of society and culture. A too-broad concept risks unmanageability and incoherence, while an overly narrow one would be simplistic and lead to too much data loss. Therefore, I conceptualize a national church as a single but non-unitary actor with a center and various adjacent and peripheral elements. For the purposes of this study, a useful concept of the Church must also take into account internal divisions/distinctions and power

dynamics. Different actors within the Church have varying functions, stances, and capabilities. Their interactions may contain varying mixes of cooperation, competition, and hierarchy. The analysis must have at least a general consciousness of these, as well. A detailed diagram of this concept is included for clarification.

The 'church' in its broadest concept refers to the entire Christian or Catholic community. (*Lumen Fidei* 2013, 25) Of course, in countries where 85% or 95% of the population identify as Catholic, such a concept would be nonsensical with regards to the research question. While ordained clergy have the highest authority and prestige, much of the propagation of doctrine, carrying out of ritual, and implementation of projects is actually done by various lay personnel, staff of educational institutions, etc. A national Church, then, for the purposes of this study, may be understood as the individuals and corporate bodies whose primary occupational purposes is the propagation of the Vatican-centered Catholic faith within a certain country. This conception includes key bodies that carry out much of the Church's doctrinal work, social projects, and public advocacy. The key element in the

definition—that of the primacy of religious purpose—also filters out the many actors who work with the clergy and associated organizations on a contingent basis,

and prevent the definition of "Church" from engulfing virtually every aspect of a highly sacralized society.

The emphasis on the Vatican as the global center of the Church is deliberate, as well. It is meant to exclude excommunicated leaders or those positing "alternative" forms of Catholicism. An example might be the Filipino Order of St. Aelred, which performs same-sex marriages and in other ways contravenes Church policy regarding LGBT issues. The order perhaps chose its name well; Aelred was a twelfth-century English abbot and probable homosexual who, while revered, was never officially canonized by the Roman Church. Such communities might be quite similar to mainstream Catholicism with regards to most aspects of ritual and doctrine, but still operating outside and even against the power structures of the Church.

However, the concept of the Church delineated above must also be internally differentiated. News sources may refer to statements or actions coming from "the

Church" when they are in fact from the national bishops' conference and do not necessarily reflect the stance and approach of the Chruch as a whole. This association of a country's very highest-ranking clergy may be located at the very top or center of a national Church's power structure. However, there are also other entities such as clerical orders, Catholic educational institutions, etc., that are often bound to follow the position of bishops, but have different functions and capabilities. Such bodies may also follow the general stance of the highest Church authorities with varying degrees of vehemence and manners of interpretation. There may also be various priests, parishes, and dioceses, that, while still considered part of the Church, are distanced from centers of power due to geographic location, official hierarchy, or deviation from the doctrine propagated by clergy with the most power. These considerations are taken into account in the diagram (shown below) which visually outlines a disaggregated view of a Church.

Fig. 3 Conceptual Diagram of a National Catholic Church



i. Scope and Limitations

First, I explain how I selected the chronological scope of my thesis. I begin from the immediate post-communist or post-dictatorship period, which means 1989 in Poland and 1986 in the Philippines. These years signal what one might call the start of the current era of politics, especially with regards to Church-State relations, in each country. I prefer not to begin my comparisons from the same year in both countries. Such a strategy might function as a so-called Procrustean bed for the data, forcing it into an unsuitable structure. Artificially restricting the start date for the research period to, say, 1989, when both countries had already begun their latest attempts at liberal democracy, may require the discarding of important data, i.e. the first three years of the Philippine post-Marcos arrangement. If one considers Church-State relations to be somewhat path-dependent, these initial years are quite crucial, and ought to be included in the research scope. A number of the comparative studies cited in my review of related literature allow their chronological scope to be dictated by historical events rather than a

somewhat artificial start date that ill-suits one or both of the national contexts. (Kerr 1995; Buckley 2016)

Upon the guidance of my supervisors, I selected 2015 as the end date for the research period. 2015 can signal a transformation point or possibly an end to the post 1980's liberal democratic status quo in both countries. Poland elected a majority right-wing government at the end of 2015. Law and Justice, the ruling party, has been accused of xenophobia, homophobia, misogyny, and tampering with basic constitutional safeguards. (Garztecki 2015; Sieracka 2017, 131) It has had a controversially close partnership with the Polish Catholic Church, granting policy concessions even as clerics explicitly urge the public to support the party. (Dudek 2016) This arrangement may change again due to the ripple effects of the recent clerical sex abuse scandal (Agence France Presse in Warsaw 2019), but it is too soon to make pronouncements as of this writing.

2015 makes an appropriate end date for data from the Philippine Church, as well. 2015 seems to be the final year in which the Church was able to reliably invoke its role in the People Power movement that ended in the

ouster of Ferdinand Marcos. Rodrigo Duterte would be elected as president the following year. He has overtly allied himself with the Marcos political dynasty and its legacy (Corrales 2016), and has consistently voiced anti-clerical sentiments ("Rendering" 2019). His popularity understandably gave rise to much agonized speculation about the implications for the post-EDSA socio-political order. (Sison 2015; Doronila 2016) Had Filipinos given up on liberal democracy? Just how much moral authority had the Church lost? Was this loss recoverable, and if so, how? The salience of these questions indicates that an era of Philippine public religion might be conclusively over.

I use a similar logic when choosing the chronological scope of the Catholic press sources analyzed in the thesis. The KAI archive begins in 1995, and the *CBCP Monitor*, in its current format, published its first issue in 1997. Once again, I prefer to capture the discursive starting points of each source, rather than artificially restricting my scope to the same year for both sources. The analysis of articles from both sources ends in 2015, in order to match the overall chronological scope of this research project.

Aside from chronological scope, I delineate the *conceptual* scope of this research project, starting with the concept of the national Church.

In societies that are not strongly secularized, it can be difficult to tell the difference between what is and is not part of the Church. An overly narrow concept may fail to capture all of the Church's relevant engagement, and may make the institution look more passive or restricted than it actually is. On the other hand, and overly broad definition may lose meaning, and threaten to encapsulate virtually all aspects of public life. Hence, delineating what one means by "Church" is a rather sensitive conceptual task.

In keeping with my concept of what constitutes a "Church," I expand my scope far outside the output of national bishops' organizations. Such organizations might have the highest official position, but their output does not capture the heterogeneity of policy engagement on various issues. Certain groups, institutions, or individuals may wield a great deal of moral authority and take part in policy implementation, despite being ideologically marginalized and/or holding lower official

positions. Hence, the reader should expect an examination of output from various actors within each national Church, as suggested by the diagram I presented earlier. I include not only bishops' organizations, but major orders of priests and nuns, universities, and, in some cases, individual nuns and priests who have become prominent moral entrepreneurs on the issue of prostitution.

Another ambiguous concept that might be delineated for methodological reasons is "prostitution." Prostitution might be theoretically understood as sex in exchange for payment, but it is not always clear whether a certain, concrete sex act or transaction should be considered an instance of prostitution. This is why the basic understanding of prostitution might be elaborated on for the purposes of laws, regulations, therapy manuals, and the like.

Some definitions might exclude various types of sexualized or romantic behavior (dancing, dating/companionship, etc.) as not *sex*, per se. (Green 2016, 184) Otherwise, they might rule out various types of reward (school/university tuition, luxury gifts, room and

board, career promotions, etc.) as not being payment in the strict sense of the term. (Ibid, 197) A definition might also be gradational: certain acts might be considered prostitution, while others are more like quasi- prostitution.

The definition of "prostitution" implicitly carries with it an understanding of the term "prostitute." Who or what are prostitutes? Is a single act of transactional sex enough to render someone a prostitute? Or, as in the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, must acts of transactional sex be carried out with some degree of regularity? How often or how regularly should someone carry out acts of prostitution in order to be considered a prostitute? Also, does the term "prostitute" refer only to persons who carry out transactional sex willingly, and if so, how can they be differentiated from other persons in the sex trade? (Ibid, 212) Is the prostitute the main actor in prostitution, or is prostitution an act that is perpetrated against him/her? (Chuang 2010, 1664)

Keeping all of these questions in mind, I have chosen a constructivist approach towards prostitution in this thesis. I work from the assumption that the process of defining and delimiting prostitution is a core part of the

policy debate. This dissertation needed to interrogate the ways in which the actors under study come up with their own understanding of "prostitution." An *a priori* operational definition of prostitution was inappropriate. For purposes of this study, an act is called prostitution when the advocates or moral entrepreneurs under study call it so.

Finally, I must define what is meant by engagement in policy debates. What sorts of outputs am I observing in order to understand and explain the national Churches' policy positions on prostitution?

Engagement in prostitution policy must comprise a wide range of activities, not only those that most obviously impact the letter of the law. Overt engagement in policy formulation, such as aggressive lobbying or the writing of draft bills, might be counter-productive because it tends to undermine moral authority. Much of the Church's policy engagement takes place via other activities. Michel's three-level scheme of classifying public engagement by religious actors is quite useful here. (Michel 1991, 15-16) Of course, I am interested in how Churches engage with prostitution *at the same level*

as partisan actors. However, engagement with the *underlying* symbols and narratives is interesting, as well. Engagement *above* the issue is by definition irrelevant, since it tends to manifest as quietism on socio-political issues.

I am interested in Church contributions to all stages of the public policy life cycle as per Easton. (Easton 1957) However, in keeping with this thesis' stronger orientation towards moral panic theory, I shall mainly be phrasing my findings in terms of contributions to certain problem narratives.

I also recognize that policy engagement might not take the form of explicit support for, or opposition to, particular laws about prostitution. This is because different actors have varying policy competence, i.e. understanding of terminology, and awareness of existing policies and international standards. Some actors might have been involved in addressing prostitution long before the state turned its attention to the problem. These actors might have become accustomed to dealing with prostitution without the vocabulary and structures of state institutions. On the other end of the spectrum, there might

be actors who have become accustomed to working within the structures of state partnerships and policies. They may have learned it over time, or entered the field relatively late, and worked in a policy-centric manner from the beginning. Certain actors might have very little familiarity with the law, but may still have great influence on the development of prostitution policy debates. A hypothetical example might be a bishop who knows little about prostitution law, and might not even know whether prostitution is legal in his country, but who frequently admonishes society to address the problem of sex trafficking. It is my hope to develop a research approach that is flexible enough to account for these different types of engagement.

II. Dealing With Language Constraints

This thesis involved sources in multiple languages. I was able to understand sources in English, Tagalog, and German, but had to rely on translations for Polish-language sources. Key texts, as defined later in this methodology section, were translated or summarized by paid translators. I used multiple translators in the interests of time, and because different people had different competencies depending on their academic background and competence in teaching or translating languages. For the journalistic corpus, I used the DeepL online translation service, which is a paid subscription service. Since my analysis of this part of the corpus was less detailed, I felt comfortable relying on DeepL, a service that was brought to my attention by far more senior researchers at a conference in Bielefeld. However, the fact that I was working with DeepL translations and not Polish originals or translations done by humans precluded me from going with my original plan of hand-coding the KAI articles. I felt that I would be delving too far into the linguistic properties or detailed themes of the articles, when I did not

have command of the original Polish.

The language barrier occasionally came into play in Poland, as some of my informants were fluent in neither English nor German. In most cases, someone from their organization accompanied them to the interview to serve as an interpreter. No in-house interpreter was available for the interview with Sis. Bałchan, so I hired a professional interpreter based in Katowice.

III. Ethics and Confidentiality

A thesis that depends partly on interviews regarding sensitive subjects clearly brings up some ethical concerns. The researcher should not endanger or re-traumatize her informants.

To that end, I submitted my main questionnaires to my primary advisor for approval, and also prepared consent forms for the informants. The consent forms were offered to informants, but the informants were not required to sign them. Nevertheless, most informants chose to avail of the consent forms. The consent forms allowed informants to give permission for various acts that might compromise their safety or privacy, such as the use of real names and the inclusion of transcripts in the thesis.

I also consulted a psychologist through the University's Psychosocial Counseling Office (PSB), to get advice about how to avoid offending or re-traumatizing current or former prostitutes whom I might get a chance to interview. There was once instance where I interviewed a minor who had been rescued from sex

trafficking. The interview took place in the presence of a social worker provided by the religious order sheltering the minor.

The use of assistants and translators involved the question of remuneration. The fee was negotiated with each person, since all were doing different tasks and working in different countries with varying rates of exchange and purchasing power. If the assistant was found through a University office, the office's rules for remuneration were followed. One brief but complicated document (legislative records from the Polish Sejm) was translated by a professional translating company; the regular fee was paid.

IV. Interviews

Here, I explain how I found my informants and designed their questionnaires. The questionnaires were submitted to my primary advisor for prior approval. Each category of informant had a generic questionnaire designed for it, but once the field research was underway, I usually adjusted questionnaires for individual informants. Each questionnaire starts with basic questions about the organization or actor's involvement, whether or not this was already public information. I was interested in how actors described their organization's basic mission.

A. Selecting Informants

I interviewed various Church actors (clergy, theologians, nuns, lay brothers, officers of Legion of Mary and other organizations, etc.) and government actors (in offices of health, immigration, women's affairs, child protection, legislature, law enforcement, and judiciary). The final group of actors were non-Church civil society

groups such as feminist NGO's who might have varying degrees and kinds of interaction with the Church regarding the issue of prostitution. This last group of interviews have the special role of helping to confirm if the stated stances of Church actors are perceived and felt as such by those who would most closely witness them. Lists of interview contacts and interview guide questions are provided either in the actual methodology chapters or as an appendix at the end of the thesis. Another important source of information, linked to interviews, was the opportunity to observe the relevant organizations at work, which may or may not support findings from organizations' official texts.

I also hoped to interview prostitutes/sex workers, but the issue of sampling presents some difficulties, especially given my rather limited time in each country. There did not seem much point in interviewing a small number of prostitutes, when the information is unlikely to be considered credible due to lack of representativeness in terms of age, regional background, and so on. In addition, the underground nature of much or even most prostitution in both countries means that my seeking contacts might

actually cause trouble for interviewees, which of course is not excusable in the ethical sense. Therefore, my proposed method was to go through the organizations in each country dealing with prostitution and ask to be connected to prostitutes/sex workers. Of course, this introduces some biases; organizations are likely to be in contact with prostitutes who share their ideology. However, it also means that the interviewees are likely to already have a support network, and are unlikely to get into trouble because of agreeing to do an interview. Given these restrictions, I planned to sample prostitute/sex worker interviewees according to two variables: national origin (from the Philippines/Poland or from another country), and view regarding the legalization of prostitution. Questions focused on their interaction with clergy and Church organizations (if any) and how the context of widespread attitudes based on Catholic teaching affects the practice of their work/trade. Of course, the appropriate caveats are stated in the course of data analysis.

Ultimately, the following persons became my informants:

List of Philippine Informants

Dr. Michael Demetrius H. Asis – theologian
[redacted]
"X" : child prostitution survivor
Archbishop Broderick Pabillo - Auxiliary Archbishop of Manila
[redacted]
Sis. Cecil Espenilla – Dominican Sisters; Regional Coordinator of Talitha Kum
Fenny Tatad – Talitha Kum; CBCP Office on Women
[redacted]
Dr. Aurora Javate de Dios – Women and Gender Institute (WAGI); Coalition Against Trafficking in Women – Asia-Pacific (CATW-AP)
[redacted]
Rosemarie Gondranios-Duquez – POEA, Director of Anti Illegal Recruitment Branch
Ms. Cecilia Flores-Oebanda – Visayan Forum, Founder
Eugenio M. Gonzales – Gerry Roxas Foundation
[redacted]

List of Polish Informants

Sis. Anna Bałchan – Religious of Mary Immaculate; PoMOC
Rev. Prof. Jarosław Kupczak, OP – theologian, John Paul II University
[redacted]

[redacted]

Dr. Lukasz Wieczorek – Centre for Research Against Trafficking of the University of Warsaw Institute of Criminology

Adam Gliksman – Solidarność

Ministry of Interior and Administration – Focus Group Discussion

[redacted]

The following are general interview question guidelines for the various informants contacted in both countries. Where necessary, they were translated into Tagalog, Polish, or Russian.

B. Questions

Questions for Church Actors (Priests, Nuns, Lay Workers, Religious Foundations, Church- Affiliated Organizations, Catholic schools)

1. What is your order/organization's teaching regarding prostitution? Who, if anyone, is to blame for it? Who or what is damaged by it? What is needed to address it? What can and should the Church do?
2. Is your order/organization/etc. involved in concrete projects to address prostitution? Do you partner with government agencies or other groups for such projects?
3. What is your stance on the current laws regarding prostitution? Are you concerned with

any current proposals to change this legislation?

4. Have you worked with other priests/groups/orders/dioceses/etc. on this issue, or at least discussed it with them? Would you say that your stances are very similar?
5. Prostitution is a very international business, with sex tourism and migration and trafficking related to prostitution. What do you think of this international component?
6. Do you believe it makes a big difference if someone becomes a prostitute abroad as opposed to within his or her own country? What about when people travel to other countries in order to buy sex?

Questions for NGO's and Government Agencies (i.e. departments regarding social services, gender issues, health, etc.)

1. In what capacity is your organization involved in addressing prostitution and/or trafficking?

2. What is your stance on the issue? What can and should the country do in order to improve the situation?
3. Do you believe that foreign customers present different problems/issues as opposed to those from this country? What about foreign prostitutes versus those from this country?
4. Generally, in what capacity have you interacted with Catholic clergy and religious groups? How have you interacted with them regarding prostitution and/or human trafficking in particular?
5. How would you describe these interactions?
6. Did you feel that the stance of these groups on the issue was very similar to yours? If not, how did you deal with the differences?
7. Do you think it is appropriate for the Church to be addressing prostitution in this manner? If not, what should the Church do instead?
8. Did the groups seem to make a distinction between foreign prostitutes and those from this

country? What about distinctions based on the nationality of the customers?

9. If you have worked with various Catholic groups, did you see any very significant difference in their approaches regarding this issue?

Questions for Legislators and Political Parties

1. Are you satisfied with the current laws regarding prostitution? If not, how should they be improved?
2. Have you interacted with Church groups on this issue, or at least seen such actors being involved in legislative consultation? Do you believe it is appropriate for the Church to be involved in law-making processes in this manner? Why or why not?
3. Have you noticed certain Church groups being more active than others? How about differences in stance or approach?
4. Aside from helping to write laws and advising legislators, do you think that Church teaching

has an effect on the way people approach prostitution in this country? What do you think of it?

5. Would you say that your own approach to prostitution law has any link to your Catholic faith? (This last question is perhaps one of the more sensitive ones, but may be appropriate if sufficient rapport is established with the informant. In addition, it must be remembered that in both Poland and the Philippines, it is not so uncommon to explain and justify policies in religious terms, or to discuss one's policies in terms of one's personal religious beliefs.)

Questions for Prostitutes and former Prostitutes

1. Where are you from? What is your religion, if any?
2. Did you interact with anyone involved in the Church (priests, nuns, layworkers, Catholic organizations) while you were in the trade, or after? What was it like?
3. If you interacted with many different clergy and Catholic groups, were you able to notice any major differences between them? What did they

think of the trade? Did they treat you in different ways?

4. Do you think these clergy and Catholic groups would have treated you differently if you had another nationality?
5. Do you think Catholic teaching affects the way people see your trade? Do you think it has any impact on the current laws regarding prostitution in this country? How does your own religion affect the way you see prostitution?
6. If it were up to you, would you change the current laws? How?

These questions were adjusted in case of prostitute informants who are also part of NGO's, sex worker unions, etc. In most cases, interviews were conducted in English or Tagalog. In cases where the interviewee(s) could only communicate in Polish, an interpreter was used. These were usually provided by the interviewee's organization, which I judged to be better, because a colleague would most likely be able to understand the ideological nuances of the interviewee's responses and translate accordingly. In one case, that of Sis. Bałchan, I hired the services of an

interpreter who was briefed at length prior to the interview.

I had initial plans to conduct statistical analysis on the interviews, but discarded them because of the very obvious quantitative imbalance between the data taken from the two countries. Field work in the Philippines yielded a much larger number of informants, simply because more actors are engaged in the issue, and state anti-trafficking policy makes official provision for the involvement of more state agencies and civil society groups. In the end, I took the following steps for presenting and analyzing the interview data:

1. Presenting notes or transcriptions in an appendix;
2. Summarizing the content of each interview, with the summary to be included the main body of the thesis;
3. Summarizing and analyzing the aggregate interview data gathered for each country;
4. Comparing the data from the two countries, based on the analysis from Step 3.

My analysis of the interview data was structured around the following themes:

1. What is/are the problem narrative(s) regarding prostitution? Which of the main prostitution policy models do(es) the narrative(s) match most closely?
2. How policy-oriented are the Church informants' views? That is, how ready are the Church actors to turn to policy reform and recourse to state agencies in order to address the issue of prostitution? How much knowledge do they have about their country's prostitution policy, and the finer points of the international prostitution policy debate?
3. How do their prospective partners and/or ideological competitors view their engagement? Does their evaluation of the Church match the Church's own narrative?

The first two themes pertain to my first reserach question, which is about the Churches' aggregate policy stance. The third theme helps me to answer the second research question, which aims to explain these stances in terms of nationalist moral panic.

V. Textual Analysis

Here, I describe my methods for analyzing the selected corpus. To reiterate, I carry out two types of textual analysis: in-depth analysis of key texts, and broader, software-aided analysis of general trends in the Catholic journalistic corpus of the two countries. I describe both methods below.

A. Key Texts

First, I enumerate what I consider to be key texts:

1. Official documents such as pastoral letters or guidelines released by a high-ranking organization such as the CBCP or the Polish Episkopat;
2. Mission statements or guidelines from Church organizations that prioritize prostitution- related advocacy;
3. Research reports or detailed personal accounts published by Church groups working directly on prostitution.

I. Philippine Texts

1. Catechism for Filipino Catholics (1997)
2. CBCP Pastoral Letter on the Exploitation of Children (January 1998)
3. Bishop Arguelles' Message on the Missionary Potential of Filipino Migrants (March 2000)
4. AMRSP Mission Partners' Statement (June 2007)
5. NASSA Statement – Respect Human Dignity, Stop Human Trafficking (May 2012)
6. A Press Statement of CBCP-NASSA: Respect Human Dignity, Stop Human Trafficking (September 2013)
7. PIMAHT Declaration of Solidarity Against Human Trafficking (October 2013)
8. PIMAHT's Statement on Campaign Against Human Trafficking (December 2013)
9. CBCP Pastoral Letter on Human Trafficking (December 2014)
10. Advocacy videos produced by the Religious of the Good Shepherd (2015)
11. *I Have a Voice*, a full-length research report published by the Religious of the Good Shepherd (2015)

12. *Passion and Power: An Irish Missionary's Fight Against Child Sex Slavery* – an autobiography by Fr. Shay Cullen (2006)

The documents can be divided roughly into two clusters. The first comprises the documents coming from the CBCP, its sub-offices, and organizations of which the CBCP is a member—in other words, documents attributed to the CBCP, NASSA, and PIMAHT. I prefer not to sub-divide the CBCP cluster into yet smaller groups; as far as trafficking is concerned, the CBCP, NASSA, ECMI, and PIMAHT are all closely aligned. NASSA and ECMI are two of the main offices tasked with implementing the CBCP's anti-trafficking projects. PIMAHT is the ecumenical organization the CBCP has helped to form in order to promote inter-religious cooperation against modern slavery. Consequently, their textual output on this issue can be analyzed as a single narrative strand.

The Catechism for Filipino Catholics is one of the most authoritative texts produced by the Philippine Church. Promulgated in 1997, the CFC was written in order to formulate teachings that are more relevant to the Philippine context, taking into account factors such as

cultural traits and social problems particular to Filipino society. It is meant to be used alongside the Universal Catechism, presumably with the latter taking precedence due to its origins in the Holy See. The CFC can be understood as a rather overt attempt by the Philippine Church hierarchy to further the centuries-long process of Philippine Catholic inculturation, wherein religion takes the form that is best suited to the local context while, ideally, retaining its core spirit and teachings.

The second document in the CBCP cluster is a 1998 Pastoral Letter on the Exploitation of Children, signed by Oscar V. Cruz, Bishop of Lingayen-Dagupan and then-CBCP President. Cruz writes about child prostitution and child trafficking as types of abuse and exploitation inflicted on children. He presents a detailed problem narrative that comprises the roots of child sexual abuse, the extent and nature of the problem, the results beyond the immediate consequences, and recommendations for solutions.

The next document is a 2012 press statement from CBCP-NASSA, entitled "Respect Human Dignity, Stop Human Trafficking." It articulates the CBCP's position

on human trafficking as a violation of human rights. While it ostensibly pertains to human trafficking in general, it focuses most of ist attention on sex trafficking.

Next in the list of key documents is the September 2013 Declaration of Solidarity Against Human Traffficking, signed by various religious and civil society leaders during an anti-trafficking networking even called the Freedom Forum, the precursor to PIMAHT.

The final and most recent document in this portion of the corpus is CBCP Pastoral Letter on Human Trafficking, dated to December 2014. The letter acknowledges that trafficking is a fairly diverse phenomenon. Victims of trafficking can be "sold as slaves, prostitutes, organ- donors, and pawns in criminal enterprise, armed activities and conflicts." That said, sex trafficking receives more attention within the text as compared to other forms of trafficking. The letter ends by "invoking the intercession of St. Josephine Bakhita, the patron saint of the victims of human trafficking." Given that St. Bakhita is renowned as a survivor of sex slavery/sex trafficking, the CBCP's image of emblematic trafficking victim is a survivor of sex trafficking.

The second cluster encompasses documents produced by the Religious of the Good Shepherd (RGS). I separate their output from that of the CBCP for several reasons. Firstly, the RGS are a religious order, not a clerical organization like the CBCP, or a Catholic charity like Caritas. The RGS' perspective on prostitution is also likely to be quite different from that of the CBCP. RGS nuns have publicly criticized the sexism and general moral rigidity of the Philippine Church's male hierarchy for decades. They have played leadership roles in the AMRSP, a clerical organization of male and female religious superiors which is generally more progressive and social justice-oriented than the mainline Catholicism represented by the CBCP. The empowerment of abused and exploited women is a central pillar of RGS activity; the same issue is one among many issues addressed by the CBCP's projects. For all these reasons, the RGS should be understood as both organizationally and ideologically distinct from the CBCP, and their texts should be separated out accordingly.

The Philippine Chapter of the Religious of the Good Shepherd includes the plight of abused or exploited

women and girls among its key concerns. In consequence, it has produced advocacy videos and a report on the situation of sex trafficked Filipinos. The report is in English, while the videos are in Tagalog with English subtitles. I begin this section by analyzing the videos, as they represent the most accessible branch of RGS public advocacy on the matter. The videos are:

1. *Buhay na Ganap* (A Full Life)
2. *Pagpapagaling* (Healing)
3. *Kapayapaan at Hustisya* (Peace and Justice)

All three videos give background information about the problems the RGS are attempting to address. These segments are very important for understanding the RGS' problem narrative. For instance, the videos include statistics about global human trafficking, before segueing into Philippine human trafficking and migration data. This implies that the situation of Filipino girls and women is the local manifestation of global gender inequality. While the videos have common ideological roots, their emphases are somewhat different, as described in the analyses of the individual clips.

The video *Buhay na Ganap* (A Full Life) is about

the RGS' work to help former prostitutes recover from their trauma. The second video, *Pagpapagaling* (Healing), details how RGS addresses various forms of abuse against women and girls, of which sexual exploitation is one. *Pagpapagaling* concentrates more on the individual victimization and eventual rehabilitation of RGS shelter residents, but still contextualizes RGS ministry within broader transnational power dynamics.

The final key text I examine from the Philippine Catholic Church is an outlier, originating neither from the CBCP nor the Religious of the Good Shepherd. It was produced by a fairly controversial actor who is formally a member of the Church as an ordained priest, but who has come into conflict with his colleagues and the mainline hierarchy several times over his career. The text is *Passion and Power: An Irish Missionary's Fight Against Child Sex Slavery* is the autobiography of Fr. Shay Cullen. (2006) Cullen's international acclaim is clearly the book's selling point: its front cover announces that, as of its 2006 publishing, Cullen had already been thrice nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The book is roughly chronological, beginning with Cullen's ordination in Ireland, proceeding

through his initial mission to the Philippines and increasing commitment to the fight against sexual exploitation in the Philippines, especially exploitation of children by foreign pedophiles. (Cullen 2006) The book carries the significant degree of personal bias inherent to the autobiographical genre. In this case, however, such blatant partialities are a benefit to the researcher, allowing a direct understanding of how Cullen wishes others to see him and his advocacy.

As for the Polish Catholic Church, it has produced few documents that fit my definition of "key texts" on the issue of prostitution. A search of the Episkopat archives did not official documents on the level of pastoral letters and the like, which have prostitution as the main theme. There were no books on the topic of either prostitution or human trafficking in the library of the Krakow Curia. Inquiries in religious bookstores in central Krakow also produced no books on this theme. In the end, I may analyze only two documents as main sources:

1. A page-length letter from the Praesidium of the Polish Episkopat, dated June 15 2000, asking Marek Bernacki, the then-Minister of Interior and

Administration, to address the problem of roadside prostitution;

2. Sis. Anna Bałchan's book *Kobiet Nie Jest Grzechem* (Woman is Not a Sin), from 2006.

Despite its brevity and lack of detail, the Praesidium's letter is a very significant text because it represents an attempt by the Polish Church's highest-ranking body to directly influence state policy on prostitution. The letter is signed by Cardinal Joseph Glemp, Archbishop Archbishop Józef Michalik, and Piotr Libera: the Chairman, Vice-President, and Secretary-General of the Episkopat, respectively. (Glemp, Michalik, and Libera 2000)

The sole full-length text suitable for analysis in this section is a book attributed to Sis. Anna Bałchan, though the book's format is a series of in-depth interviews with her. Sis. Anna Bałchan's book *Kobiety Nie Jest Grzechem* (Woman is Not a Sin), released by Catholic publisher Znak, is about her experiences working with prostitutes in Katowice. (Bałchan 2006) The book can be divided into two parts. The first portion lays out Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative regarding prostitution. The second part details her experiences founding and managing her

outreach program for prostitutes.

The reader has certainly noted that one Church yielded far more key texts than the other. Despite the marked disparity in volume, these two parts of the corpuses turn out to be somewhat similar: both contain an autobiographical or quasi-autobiographical account of a consecrated individual activist (Fr. Cullen from the Philippine Church and Sis. Bałchan from the Polish Church), plus statements from each national Church's highest authoritative body (the CBCP and the Episkopat). However, the Polish side of the corpus does not have equivalents to the Philippine Church's texts from the Order of the Religious of the Good Shepherd.

My strategy for analyzing key texts closely mirrored my approach to drafting interview questionnaires. The goal was to investigate actors' framing of prostitution in terms of a so-called problem narrative. I aimed to understand the writers' views of who or what was to blame for the social problem of prostitution, and who or what was harmed by it. Fortunately, the documents tended to explicitly name "culprits," "causes" and so forth. The documents were

equally as explicit in naming victims.

The terminology used in key texts can also be quite revealing. International debates about prostitution and/or human trafficking have become quite reified, so policy approaches have become associated with an established vocabulary. Persistent use of a certain type of vocabulary in reference to prostitution can reveal a text author's policy position, even if the text itself has little explicit policy advocacy. Hence, a criminalization approach is manifested not only in the desire to punish prostitutes, but also in the use of derogatory language such as "women of loose morals" to refer to prostitutes themselves. Prostitutes' conduct might also be described as immoral or sinful.

Pro-legalization approaches make themselves known via provisions to regulate sex work as a socially-acceptable business. One can expect consistent use of the vocabulary of "sex work," with prostitutes themselves called "sex workers." Concepts one usually finds in relation to the mainstream job market, just as employment benefits and unionization, will be applied to commercial sex. There may be references to forced prostitution or

trafficking, but these will be clearly distinguished from consensual sex work.

Abolitionism treats prostitution as an inherently-evil industry that victimizes prostitutes: there is no such thing as a prostitute who truly chooses the sex trade. Pimps and other third parties are the targets of punishment, which may be extended to customers, as well. Prostitutes are referred to as "victims," "slaves," "prostituted persons," and the like. Prostitution is framed as something that is *done to* prostitutes: a person will have been "prostituted," instead of having "done prostitution."

The key texts are also checked for the degree to which they display the characteristics of a classic moral panic narrative. Such a narrative may lack nuance and internal differentiation. It may also uncritically accept the usage of large statistics and sensationalistic descriptions. The identification of a clear folk devil is yet another trait of a moral panic narrative.

Another important component of my analysis is to see how nationalism, nationality, and/or national identity played a role in the actors' framing of prostitution. How and to what extent is prostitution seen as a transnational

problem, or a purely domestic problem?

Much of my argument rests on the way Church actors frame prostitution along nationalist lines. In addition to understanding how the actors' narratives around prostitution, I ask: To what extent do these problem narratives challenge *or* re-inscribe national boundaries?

Commercial sex is often a transnational market. Prostitutes can be recruited or transported across national borders. Customers can engage in what is now called sex tourism, travelling for the express purpose of procuring commercial sex in other countries. (Pettman 1997) In other cases, transactional sex is incidental—the foreigner is present in the country for some other purpose, and engages the services of a local prostitute during his/her stay.

Transnational commercial sex can be highly fraught for various reasons. The foreign prostitute or customer's very presence can create jurisdictional problems (Mariano 2012, 31), or introduce the problem of immigration law (Chuang 2010, 1660). Other complications can arise beyond law. Once national boundaries or identities are involved, the prostitute and

the customer are no longer two individuals, or a man and a woman. They each represent their own national community, and transactional sex between them symbolizes and comments on the history of relations between their communities. (Mariano 2012) Commercial sex in these circumstances becomes a story of the crossing—or the violation—of national and ethno-racial boundaries. (Ibid) At first glance, transnational prostitution appears to undermine traditional nationalisms.

Source, transit, and destination countries can cooperate to manage or restrict transnational prostitution. Cooperation may promote countries' awareness of shared problems that know no borders.

On the other hand, transnational prostitution feeds nationalist or downright xenophobic anxieties. The playing-out of such anxieties can reinforce the unity of a fragmented, unstable national community. (Cheng 2011) Foreign prostitutes, customers, or traffickers often serve as the nation's common enemy. Foreigners' involvement in the sex trade serves a more abstract function by facilitating the portrayal of prostitution as problem originating

outside the nation. (Ibid) If foreigners drive the sex trade, the national community need not re-examine the role its own values play in the matter. Narratives about a cohesive, praiseworthy set of national values can be more easily propagated.

Some grounds for anxiety about foreign customers might be that:

1. Foreigners do not share Filipino/Polish cultural values or religious beliefs;
2. Foreigners do not have sympathy for Filipino/Polish victims of prostitution, or may brutalize victims more severely out of a sense of racial superiority;
3. Foreigners, or at least foreigners from certain countries, are likely to be wealthier, increasing their capacity to exploit poor Filipinos or Poles and/or bribe local officials;
4. Foreigners can easily escape justice by returning to their home countries;
5. Culpable foreigners might be protected by their governments, especially if their home country is much wealthier or more powerful than the Philippines/Poland.

Alternatively, problem narratives may portray foreign

prostitutes as dangerous for the following reasons:

1. Foreign prostitutes do not share the values and traditions of Poles/Filipinos;
2. The very presence of these women is a bad influence on Poles/Filipinos, who come to see prostitution as normal;
3. Foreign prostitutes tempt Polish/Filipino men into extra-marital intercourse that de- stabilizes marriage and family ties;
4. Foreign prostitutes might influence their Polish/Filipino men to sexually abuse and degrade Polish/Filipino women and children;
5. Foreign prostitutes might bring sexually-transmitted infections that, via their customers, may spread through the local population;
6. The influx of non-Polish/non-Filipino prostitutes will prove to be long-term, and will lead to the construction of a permanent sex trade infrastructure in Polish/Filipino communities.

The externalization of blame might not necessarily take the form of pointing the finger at exploitative or dangerous foreigners. Church actors may blame factors or power dynamics with foreign origins, such as:

1. Globalization;
2. International/global capitalism;
3. Global economic inequality;
4. Demand for Filipino or Polish migrant workers;
5. Western-style secularization, consumerism, sexual permissiveness, or other "foreign" values invading the Polish or Filipino national culture.

Such formulations of the problem narrative reinforce nationalism. They imply that the nation should reassert its traditions and boundaries all the more intensely in order to combat prostitution. The Church's vested interests can also be served to the extent that religious nationalism is still a viable socio-political force: turning back to national traditions would mean turning back to the Church.

Conversely, some texts might reflect writers' resistance to or avoidance of narratives that externalize blame and advise the reinforcement of national identity. Since a nation's values and traditions are often thought to be the foundation of its identity (Bautista 2010, 30), self-criticism often sits uneasily with nationalism. In other

words, Filipinos or Poles should be critical of the role that conventional Filipino-ness or Polish-ness plays in encouraging the sex trade. Signs of a more critical approach to nationalism include:

1. Self-criticism of national values or social mores that encourage commercial sex or sexual exploitation;
2. Self-criticism of the Church's own role in exacerbating the plight of prostitutes, or worsening the negative consequences of prostitution in society;
3. Acknowledgement that Filipinos or Poles can victimize each other, including reminders that sex trafficking happens domestically as well as internationally.

Of course, criticizing the norms and mores of one's own national group need not equate to self-loathing or hatred for the nation. Critical discourses about the nation can be rooted in a type of patriotism, but one which recognizes the negative consequences arising from excessive or uncritical applications of cultural values. For example, self-righteous tendencies within the national

culture might worsen prostitutes' suffering and present additional obstacles to their exit from the sex trade. (Peach 2008, 244) Prevalent sexual double standards stigmatize prostitutes while condoning the sexual indiscretions of male customers. (Ibid, 236) Insofar as the national culture is identified as Catholic, Church doctrines may be critiqued as well. For instance, certain (mis)interpretations of Catholic doctrine might be used to stigmatize prostitutes, while ignoring the political, social, and psychological factors that constrained their moral choices.

The Filipino or Polish family—the unit so often at the heart of emotionally-charged nationalist discourses—can itself be the starting point for sexual exploitation. Sexual violence at the hands of a relative or family friend, in combination with patriarchal and moralistic social norms, might have precipitated a woman or child's entry into the sex trade. In the Philippines especially, some girls and young women have entered prostitution expressly to fulfill expectations that they contribute to family resources.

Additionally, Filipinos and Poles should remember that their compatriots can victimize them as much as foreigners can. Like foreigners, compatriots can be customers, and they, too, may pay to have violent, degrading, or pedophilic intercourse. Compatriots also tend to function as recruiters, pimps, brothel managers, or traffickers in *both* the domestic and the transnational sex market. However, such possibilities might be marginalized when nationalist discourses prefer to deflect blame outside the nation.

B. Analysis of Journalistic Texts

The second part of my textual analysis involves a search for broad trends within the Catholic journalistic output of each national Church. I believe that, while the abovementioned "key texts" are important, it is also crucial to check the degree to which the key texts' ideas are mainstreamed within journalistic output. The regular publication of new newspaper or magazine issues also allows a researcher to observe the gradual evolution of coverage about a certain issue over time.

Selecting Catholic News Outlets

The statistically-oriented portion of my textual analysis uses texts culled from Catholic news sources. I chose one Catholic news source from each country. Since my goal was to find the extent to which prostitution-related policy and social engagement had been mainstreamed in each national Church, I attempted to select the Catholic outlet that could best represent the views of the mainline Church.

The choice was fairly simple for the Philippine Church. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), which is the most authoritative clerical organization in the country, has an official periodical of record, the *CBCP Monitor*. The hierarchical, fairly centralized nature of Catholicism means that the views of cardinals or bishops tend to take precedence over other entities within the Church, and can claim to represent the Church as a whole. Various Catholic orders, Catholic universities, or major dioceses had their own periodicals, but these cannot easily claim to represent the official views of the country's highest clerics *or* the whole national Church.

Selecting a periodical to represent the mainline Polish Church's news output was more challenging. Polish Catholic media is both prolific and ideologically diverse, with several prominent outlets operating on a national scale. (Krotofil and Potak 2018, 93-94) My task, therefore, was to select the outlet which provided the best comparison to the *CBCP Monitor*, in line with the theoretical structure underpinning this dissertation.

This being a broadly Most Similar Systems

comparative study, I had to choose the outlet which best matched the *CBCP Monitor* in terms of institutional affiliation and socio-political role. The *CBCP Monitor* is the official organ of the Philippines' highest clerical organization. It thus has a strong claim towards representing the stance of the mainline institutional Church. However, this publication is not widely distributed or even known in the Philippines. Instead, it is used as a guide for lower-ranking clerics or Church organizations, or as source material for journalists and researchers concerned with Church affairs.

The *CBCP Monitor* is the official publication of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines. Its current format of a twice-monthly magazine with occasional special issues first came out in 1997. The average number of pages has varied over time; at the time of this writing, the typical issue is about twenty-five pages in length. It does not have broad circulation, but exerts considerable influence as a distillation of the views of the Philippine Church's highest-ranking organization. Several of the *Monitor*'s writers are priests (Castro 2008) and nuns (Catabian 2009). That said, the *Monitor* has a

history of including voices that, while part of the Church, are not CBCP members or staff, and may be critical of the CBCP on several issues. Some examples may be the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines, an organization that has historically criticized the bishops' over-emphasis on moral doctrine or political quietism at the expense of mercy and social justice. (Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines, 2007) Overall, the *CBCP Monitor* presents a view of the Church that is mainline, institutional, and fairly conservative, and secure enough in its own power to include a level of ideological diversity. There is no other Catholic news organ of comparable stature and political influence in the Philippines.

At the same time, it is possible that many researchers and journalists have over-stated the degree to which the CBCP and its *Monitor* represent the entire Philippine Church. The CBCP may act as a sort of steering committee, but there are other factions or clerical organizations within the Philippine Church that have a markedly different approach to social issues. The CBCP may also have less influence in marginal or far-flung

communities. Hence, in other parts of this thesis, I include input from sources with little or no affiliation with the CBCP and the *Monitor*.

The *CBCP Monitor*'s content reflects the Philippine Church's significant, contested role in Philippine public life. Many *CBCP Monitor* articles pertain to what mainline secularists view as matters proper to the Church: Biblical exegesis (Belizar 2011), the proper observation of Filipino Catholic rituals and customs ("Adoration and Mass," 2012), and so forth. The *Monitor* likewise spills a great deal of ink on what we would call ecclesial matters: readers find news items about the building of new churches or chapels (Lagarde 2009), the deaths of Church personnel (Sorra and Tatad, 2012), or the assignment of bishops to certain seats (Lagarde 2007). The magazine also regularly publishes homily guides for use by priests in preparation of their sermons. (Coronel 2005)

Other articles, however, venture far beyond these areas of concern. Critics of the Church's intervention in Philippine public life will likely see their views confirmed within the *Monitor*'s pages. *Monitor* articles from the last

view years include extensive coverage of controversial issues like the Reproductive Health Bill debate (Lagarde 2010), and, more recently, President Duterte's War on Drugs (Cardenas 2017).

Despite the *Monitor*'s coverage of general interest topics, it is not widely distributed in bookstores or newsstands. The *CBCP News* website does not offer an easy-access, automated mechanism for obtaining a subscription. Obtaining the loyalty of casual website visitors does not appear to be a priority. It is, in short, a niche publication, albeit one whose target audience is very influential.

The periodical's target audience of priests and conservative Catholics appears to have strongly colored its journalistic tone. The *Monitor*'s writers have a tendency towards overt proselytization. (Cardenas 2017) Advocacy can become extremely explicit, as writers tend not only to expound their views, but urge readers to take direct action. For example, readers are asked to write to legislators (Cullen 2009, "The Anti-Child Pornography Law) or donate to campaigns (Acuna 2006).

For purposes of this thesis, is it is important to note the *Monitor*'s strong domestic focus,

i.e. Philippine-centrism. Having perused all volumes of the *Monitor* dating back to 1997, I rarely found any articles that were not about the Philippines/Filipinos, or the Holy See/Pope. The *Monitor*'s relatively strained resources might provide at least a partial explanation: there are no sufficient funds for the maintenance of a large corps of foreign correspondents or subscription/rights to the use of international news sources. Nevertheless, the *Monitor*'s staff could have compensated by making use of freely-available international news sources. Since new issues are published every two weeks, staff would have enough time to do this research. There is no real financial or logistical barrier preventing the *Monitor* from including more international coverage, so Philippine-centrism must be a matter of choice rather than money. For whatever reason, the *Monitor* has decided that its readership does not need the Bishops' perspective on international events.

The Polish context presents some difficulties because the Episkopat, the counterpart to the CBCP, has no official newspaper or magazine. There are, however, several well-established Catholic or Catholic-leaning

news outlets in Poland, which are widely recognized for their socio- political influence.

The periodical *Tygodnik Powszechny*, which might be translated as the 'General Weekly,' was founded in 1945. (Zmijewski 1991, 83) Adam Sapieha, Archbishop of Krakow, financed the periodical in its earliest years. (Mackewicz 2009, 119) In 1946-47, some writers and thinkers linked to *Tygodnik Powszecnhy* founded the magazine *Znak* (Sign) (Zmijewski 1991, 84), and also an eponymous Catholic lay organization which became the only such body tolerated under the communist regime.[16] *Tygodnik Powszechny*'s socio-political position shifted again following the fall of communism. Zmijewski stated of *Tygodnik Powszcechny* in 1991 that, "as well as being the most popular 'lay' periodical, it is also the one closest to the Hierarchy." Making this statement would be more difficult today: the outlet remains popular, but its current status as the alleged voice of liberal Polish

[16] *Tygodnik Powzechny* was thus placed in a delicate position as an organ of the religiously-inflected resistance and, simultaneously, as an avenue for dialogue with and even participation in communist-era party politics. During this period, it accumulated prestige as an important organizing force in religiously-based resistance to communist rule.

Catholicism (Stańczyk 2013, 294) alienates some of the clerical hierarchy.

Tygodnik Powszechny's "Catholic" nature needs careful explanation. The publication is not affiliated with any clerical order, archdiocese, or episcopal office. Its co-founder and first editor, Jerzy Turowicz, was not a cleric. The current chief editor, who succeeded Turowicz in 1999, is a Marian priest called Adam Boniecki.[17] The Polish public justifiably tends to see him as an intellectual leader in his own right, rather than as a representative of the Catholic hierarchy or the Marian Order. *Tygodnik Powszechny*'s subject matter also complicates our understanding of it as a "Catholic" publication. The magazine often includes a many political and cultural pieces that make no explicit reference to theology, Church institutions, or core policy concerns of the Polish Church.[18] Hence, *Tygodnik Powszechny* is best grasped

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[17] Fr. Boniecki's presence on the editorial board does not entail the magazine's allegiance to the Marian Order, either, because Boniecki occasionally pursues his own public agenda against the wishes of his order's leaders.

[18] Issues often contain reviews of gallery shows, books, and films. Readers might find interviews with prominent Polish and international cultural figures in the magazine's pages, as well.

as a general-interest publication with a strong, self-formulated Catholic perspective on current issues.

Radio Maryja is another important, albeit much younger, force in Polish Catholic media. *Radio Maryja* was founded by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk in 1991.[19] (Nelsen and Guth 2015) It is variously labeled conservative Catholic, or radical/fundamentalist Catholic, in outlook. (Krotofil and Potak 2018, 94) The website of Radio Maryja is also used to disseminate news and official documents from the Vatican, such as by publishing Polish translations of papal encyclicals. Father Rydzyk manages *Radio Maryja* until the present day, which lends the station's content a degree of consistency over time. Rydzyk's media empire espouses a highly controversial brand of Polish Catholic nationalism. (Krotofil and Potak 2018, 94) Rydzyk promoted Euroskeptic attitudes, mainly on cultural and spiritual grounds, in the run-up to Polish accession. (Nelsen and Guth 2015, 292) Besides a fairly hardline stance on issues of sexual morality, *Radio Maryja*

[19] Rydzyk also founded the College of Social and Media Culture in 2001 (Gera 2016), so Radio Maryja can be said to be training its own crop of media professionals.

is also accused of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. (Schneider 2013, 259)[20]

Some international news outlets might mischaracterize Radio Maryja as an outlet for mainstream or official Polish Catholicism. (Elsing 2004) This is an exaggeration because Radio Maryja has no official connection to the Episkopat, and its small audience (about 2% of Polish radio listeners) skews overwhelmingly rural[21], elderly, and female. Its listener base is declining statistically, having decreased from five to three million listeners between the late 1990's and late 2000's. (Jakelić 2016, 108) This may to some extent be attributed to Poland's declining national population, as well as the advanced age of many listeners. Still, it is believed to have an extraordinarily strong hold over its following, and cannot be discounted as an organizing force for the most

[20] Schneider notes, however, that most of the anti-Semitic rhetoric on Radio Maryja's airwaves comes from callers rather than hosts, though the hosts themselves rarely contradict these views and might even seem to tacitly agree. (Ibid)This means that while the station might not always directly voice extreme views, it does appear to help legitimize harmful ideas such as partial or total Holocaust denial. (Puhl 2006)

[21] Rural dominance might be partly due to sheer lack of competition: "in some remote locations [Radio Maryja] has the FM band to itself." (Smith 2015)

conservative sectors of Poland's Catholic population, especially leading up to elections. Some commentators consider it to have been instrumental in the Law and Justice Party's landslide electoral victory of 2015. Lay supporters of Radio Maryja, often organized in Catholic congregations, support the station through donations, as they have since the outlet's inception. (Puhl 2006)

Another major Catholic news outlet is *Gość Niedzielny*, or, in English, "the Sunday Guest," a weekly magazine published every Sunday. *Gość Niedzielny*'s ideological position is usually located somewhere between the poles of *Radio Maryja* and *Tygodnik Powszechny*. It is often distributed outside Polish churches, for parishioners to take home after Sunday Mass. However, its attachment to the Archdiocese of Katowice renders it problematic as an object for discursive analysis in this thesis. Katowice happens to be the location of Sis. Anna Bałchan's shelter and outreach programs for prostituted women. Therefore, any Katowice-based Catholic media outlet might have a geographical bias towards reporting on her work, and be more susceptible to ideological influence from her

advocacy. Thus, this newspaper cannot represent the general position of the Polish hierarchy on the issue of prostitution.

All three of these media outlets wield influence on a national scale. However, none precisely represents the mainline or institutional Church. The two most famous outlets also happen to be the most polarizing. The only possible option was to analyze two or even three major Catholic news outlets and somehow derive an aggregate discourse from them. While this might have addressed the issue of (somewhat) representing the ideological diversity and polarization within the Polish Church, it still presents serious research difficulties. Firstly, there is the inescapable fact that I would be using one news source from the Philippine Church, versus at least two from Poland. It is also inconsistent with the main thrust of my research, which starts from the Church's attempts to influence Polish society and politics, rather than from the influence it has already achieved. Finally, all of these sources exert their influence in a different way as compared to the *CBCP Monitor*. As mass communication outlets, they aim for direct and broad access to the public.

The *Monitor*, however, has a highly specialized readership which then indirectly disseminates the *Monitor*'s point of view to the Filipino laity.

Conventional media outlets presented too many theoretical and methodological problems, so I turned my attention towards more obscure news-producing entities. It turns out that the Episkopat has had its own news agency since 1995. It is called the Katolicka *Agencja* Informacyjna (*KAI*), or the Catholic Information Agency. KAI is cited in social science literature as a source of information or historical background (Graff 2010, 590), but is rarely studied as convergence point of discursive power in itself, Krotofil and Motak's study being an exception (Krotofil and Motak 2018). KAI claims to be the genuine news outlet for the mainline Polish Church. One of its stated goals is to counteract stereotypes about the Church's position on various matters. Though, according to an email from its Head of Marketing, it has 80 corporate media clients, it is largely unknown to the Polish populace. However, if one is interested in the Church's *attempts* to influence Polish policy, KAI's output is invaluable as the outlet with the

closest ties to Poland's bishops.

Arguably, KAI's low visibility actually contributes to its influence. Most readers who view KAI content do not trace it to the Episkopat, and thus will not dismiss it as Church propaganda. Respected mainstream broadsheets also lend their own credibility to the KAI articles that they choose to publish, even if this public prestige is not passed on to KAI itself. Recent social science literature supports this understanding of KAI's place in Polish politics and society. According to Grzymała-Busse's theories about churches' moral authority and political power, a strong national Church like the one in Poland can most effectively assert its influence behind the scenes. (Grzymała-Busse 2016) Excessively overt machinations weaken the Church's moral authority in the eyes of the public, and ultimately undermine its political position. (Ibid)

Hence, KAI provides an effective, low-risk avenue for the Episkopat to exert ideological influence. Through KAI, the Episkopat can disseminate its point of view in national news media without the Polish public being aware that it is doing so. Readers might see the

"KAI" citation in KAI content that is printed in Polish news outlets, but most of them are not aware of what it represents, and thus will not trace the content back to the Polish Episkopat. This lowered visibility is helpful to the Polish Church, which, in post-communist times, is often criticized for excessive interference in the Polish public sphere. Publication of its own large-scale newspaper would likely draw exactly those types of criticisms. A news agency is, therefore, a better investment of the Episkopat's considerable resources. A conventional newspaper would likely have been perceived as Church propaganda.

KAI, with its formal ties to the national Church hierarchy, is the closest organizational analog to the *CBCP Monitor*. These two outlets represent the institutional Church's organized attempts to exert influence on various issues, for the moment regardless of how successful these attempts turn out to be. In addition, KAI, like the *CBCP Monitor*, has strong influence but low visibility.

However, a researcher must account for the fact that KAI is a news agency as opposed to a newspaper or

radio station, which makes it different from the *CBCP Monitor*. KAI's own staff and editors would understand that their output is unlikely to reach their readers directly. Poles more frequently encounter KAI's content via the news outlets that cite or copy-paste its articles. It follows that KAI's approach to its own content and publishing strategy is far different from that of a newspaper. Therefore, I have taken extra care not to overstate the differences between the *CBCP Monitor*'s content and that of KAI. For example, the *CBCP Monitor* might be more assertive in explicating its stance and issuing instructions to its readers. After all, the readers are reading a specialized Catholic newspaper, and may self-select to be more receptive to such pronouncements. For its part, KAI might be less overt in asking readers to take direct action to further Church goals, since such exhortations would be confusing and out of place in the mainstream outlets that actually distribute KAI's content to Polish readers. I do note when the *CBCP Monitor*'s writers ask their readers to take direct action. However, I do not take this as an indication of greater aggressiveness or ideological commitment on the part of this CBCP.

In light of all the above-mentioned considerations, I have chosen KAI as my source for the Polish Catholic journalistic corpus. However, material from *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Radio Maryja* has proved useful as well, as a source of background information. Articles from these and other Polish Catholic sources were cited occasionally to supplement or contrast with information from KAI.

Founded in 1993, KAI is owned by the Episkopat, but largely managed and staffed by laypersons. (Mandes 2015) As of 2015, it was Europe's second-largest religiously-affiliated news aency. (Ibid, 122) It promotes itself as the mouthpiece of mainline Polish Catholicism. (Ibid) While its content mostly comprises brief news reports, it also publishes longer opinion pieces and interviews on matters important to the Church hierarchy. Its offices are located within the Episkopat's headquarters in Warsaw. The Episkopat appears to have invested significantly in its management, employing 50 foreign correspondents. Many of its articles can be found through its public website, *eKAI*. Its electronic archive, *kair.ekai.pl* makes selected articles available for free,

dating back to at least 2001. However, the agency's complete electronic archives, which date back to 1995 and contain approximately 100,000 articles, are available on a subscription basis. Subscribers can pay for the password to this more extensive archive. They can also pay for KAI staff to search the archives for information on a certain topic, with the fee varying according to the volume of output yielded. According to a May 9, 2019 email from KAI's Director of Marketing and Sales, the majority of KAI's archive is available exclusively for its subscribers, 80 of which fall into the "commercial" category: newspapers, TV stations, and so forth. KAI also has a publishing arm, whose books are usually found in Catholic bookstores such as *Logos* in Krakow.

KAI maintains a relatively low public profile. It does not aggressively market itself to the Polish laity, many of whom are not even aware of its existence. However, KAI is quite influential, as demonstrated by its large number of commercial subscribers, some of which are major players in Poland's media landscape. *Radio Maryja*'s website frequently uses KAI content. Leading mainstream publications like *Gazeta Wyborcza* use

information from KAI, as well. Sometimes, its content is even lifted wholesale and printed on the pages of mainstream Polish news outlets. In other words, KAI is actually quite influential and widely read, even if it is not widely *known*.

At the same time, KAI's status as a news agency rather than its own newspaper informs and arguably constrains its ideological content. Since readers are likely to see KAI content in secular, mainstream news outlets, KAI's writers cannot be expected to exhort readers to make donations, write to legislators, or join organizations. That said, KAI can still be fairly explicit about its ideological leanings.

I chose to use KAI's full archive, since it offers better access to older articles—a search of the limited, cost-free archive did not yield any articles older than 2001. It allowed me the same access to KAI's information as its commercial subscribers, who, in turn, pass KAI's information on to the wider Polish public. Full access[22]

[22] KAI staff kindly gave me a month's free access to the complete archive, which was more than enough time to collect the necessary content.

also removes any questions about how KAI "selected" the articles that it makes available to non-paying site visitors.

Once I gained access to the full archive, I used my two main search terms—*prostytucja* and *handel ludźmi*[23]—to find my first, largest collection of articles. After gathering the search results and arranging them in chronological order, I eliminated any articles more recent than 2015 and older than 1997. This is to keep the corpus compatible with the selected timeline, as well as comparable to the *CBCP Monitor* corpus, which only dates back to 1997. After this, I narrowed down the corpus to articles which substantively discussed prostitution or human trafficking. My criteria for substantive discussion have been described in an earlier section on "Selecting the Corpus."

The statistical imbalance between the KAI and *Monitor* corpuses presented a methodological problem, as did the fact that the latter outlet tends to report only on Filipino

[23] KAI's internal search engine has been made compatible with Polish grammar, meaning that inputting the nominative form of a noun automatically yields search results containing all of that noun's declinations.

news, with occasional coverage of the Vatican. I decided that a more appropriate approach would be to compare the domestically-focused *CBCP Monitor* articles with their KAI counterparts. The question becomes: How does each Catholic news outlet talk about prostitution, when that prostitution involves its own nation? For this step, I concentrated only on comparing articles dealing with prostitution from the source's own nation, setting all other articles aside. This provided the added benefit of yielding a comparable volume of coverage: 70 articles from the *Monitor* and 126 from KAI.

Statistical Analysis with NVivo and Antconc

The aggregate study of each outlet's articles was aided by text analysis software. The main program used was NVivo 12, with supplementary utilization of Antconc.

I. NVIVO analysis for the *CBCP Monitor* and KAI

My approach to the NVivo-aided[24] portion of the textual analysis was dictated by: a) the nature of the corpus, and b) the role this part of the analysis plays in my overall research methodology. Word Frequency queries formed the core of my NVivo-aided analysis, in the form of word clouds and word frequency tables. The vocabulary of the global prostitution policy debate has become so reified that a few choice words are often enough to reveal

[24] NVivo, like many other programs of its type, is created with an English-language alphabet and grammar in mind. It has some trouble recognizing Polish special characters and noun declinations. This is perhaps why some previous researchers working with Polish-language texts have chosen to pre-translate the documents into a language like English or German before feeding them into NVivo. I have decided to follow in these researchers' footsteps and have the Polish-language corpus auto-translated via DeepL in order to keep the research project within a reasonable time frame and budget.

actors' ideological position. For example, frequent use of the words "exploited," "abused," "prostituted," "trafficked," and the like, can suggest that the speaker/writer leans closer to abolitionism. I also checked how often the texts used words that referred to their own nation. This gives an indication of how closely each corpus seems to view prostitution/sex trafficking as a problem that threatens/affects their national community.

Word Clouds give a readily-comprehensible visual representation of the most frequent words in a corpus. They are useful for quick overviews of a text. Word frequency tables present the same data in a more precise statistical form, including the word's percentage in relation to all words in the corpus. It is important to note not only *which* words appear most frequently, but also *how high* their frequency percentages are. Higher frequency percentages mean that a given word is more dominant within the given corpus. When thematically-compatible or narratively- connected words appear together with high frequencies, this indicates that the corpus is characterized by a fairly cohesive problem narrative.

The *CBCP Monitor* yielded 107 articles, 79

(73.83%) of which are about the Philippines or Filipinos.[25] KAI yielded 418 articles, roughly quadruple the number of *CBCP Monitor* articles, only 126 (30.14%) of which are about prostitution in Poland or of Polish citizens. Such a disparity is noteworthy, but the researcher should not draw unwarranted conclusions from it. The vastly higher proportion of non-domestic articles in the KAI corpus vis-à-vis the *CBCP Monitor* corpus may be largely due to the former's stronger international orientation *overall*. On its own, it reveals nothing about how KAI treats prostitution *as an issue in itself*. Indeed, a cursory perusal of *CBCP Monitor* issues over the years shows that the vast majority of articles are about the Philippines or the Filipino diaspora. Most of the remaining articles are about the Pope or Holy See. This, too, is reflected in the subject breakdown of the *CBCP Monitor* corpus across all topics.

Articles were grouped chronologically and by nationality of subject matter, and saved into corresponding

[25] This tally, like all other article counts in this thesis, is correct as of August 10, 2019.

Word Documents. They were then fed into NVivo for Word Frequency Query analysis, yielding word clouds and word frequency summaries. I set the Word Frequency Query function to display only the 100 most common words, which appears to be fairly standard, according to NViVo's own information materials, and also creates Word Clouds that are sufficiently informative without being too cluttered. The nationality categories differed between the two journalistic sources. *Monitor* articles fell into two categories: Philippines/Filipino, global, and clearly non-Filipino. The number of articles about prostitution/trafficking pertaining to countries besides the Philippines was so small that there was no need to sub-categorize them further. In contrast, the majority of the KAI corpus was about countries other than Poland. These were sub-divided according to region, though regions were defined by KAI's own construction of the world into different zones, rather than actual geographic proximity.

Such countries were often mentioned in the same article, or in different articles but with fundamental similarities in their prostitution problem narrative. They were bound together by common history, or by playing a similar role

along certain migration routes. These categories are not necessarily theoretically up-to-date or politically correct, but they reflect popular views about the level of prosperity and socio-political development in different parts of the world.

The countries of Western Europe and the global North were grouped together because they tended to be portrayed as the wealthiest and most developed, and as common destination countries for victims of trafficking/foreign prostitutes. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries shared a post-communist context, and were often source countries for prostitutes/sex trafficking victims. Finally, there were the countries of the so-called Third World or developing world. Such countries were seen as the poorest and least stable. They were source countries for victims of trafficking, and/or destination countries for sex tourists. Teasing out these regional categories and the problem narratives attached to them proved to be useful, as they threw the light of comparison onto KAI's narrative about prostitution and the Polish nation.

I subjected the different article groupings to word

frequency queries in order to get a statistical view of their internal discursive patterns. After each initial word frequency query, I went through the resulting word lists and selected so-called Stop Words.[26] The high volume of KAI articles about prostitution outside of Poland allow for a comparative analysis that is not possible with the *CBCP Monitor* corpus. I was able to compare how KAI articles frame prostitution in different parts of the world. The goal was to determine whether KAI tended to portray prostitution in Poland as somehow distinct from prostitution elsewhere: was there something special about prostitution involving the nation? Viewing the different word clouds gave me a fairly clear view of the similarities and differences in KAI's coverage about prostitution from different regions.

I. Antconc Analysis for the *CBCP Monitor* and KAI

[26] Stop Words are common words that appear on the query, but ultimately clutter and distort word clouds. Examples include "also" or "one." They can be removed from word clouds in order to create more conceptual clarity. Stop Words are not removed from the word lists, so their erasure from word clouds does not distort percentages and other statistics.

Most of my software-aided textual analysis was done using NVivo. However, NVivo, at least in its 11th and 12th versions, did not readily produce usable statistics for lexical co-occurrence of key terms. For this function, I turned to a program called Antconc. Antconc is a text analysis/text mining program available for free download, created by linguistics specialist Dr. Laurence Anthony. He developed it because existing text analysis/text mining software did not meet his needs, and/or was unnecessarily complicated.

Using Antconc, I tested the degree to which certain key words appear closely together— within five words of one another—in various segments of the corpus. A distance of five words was the Antconc default setting, and has also been used in many other studies using collocation analysis. One source might use a key word more times than another one, so I prefer to compare collocation as expressed in percentages or frequency rankings, rather than absolute numbers.[27]

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[27] The tables generated by AntConc are cut short after the 100th word on the list, in keeping with the NVivo data. Since Antconc does not automatically delete articles, prepositions, and other data "noise" from its word lists, I made my own list of stop words, which is

Of special interest is the co-occurrence of "prostitution" and "trafficking," which, as I have already explained, can be conflated in problematic ways. I ran a collocation test for each term, and noted the number of collocations for the other term and its associated words. A high degree of co-occurrence suggests a considerable amount of conceptual overlap, perhaps to the point of outright conflation. As such, I expect the degree of prostitution-trafficking collocation to be higher in the *CBCP Monitor* corpus, as a higher degree of conflation between the two concepts is associated with abolitionist discourse. Both the terms "prostitution" and "trafficking" are expected to have a higher incidence of collocation with words associated with victimhood, such as "abuse," "victim," "slavery," etc. In keeping with this thesis' focus on the uses of nationalist discourse, I also looked for important collocates of the words "Philippines/Poland" and "Filipino/Polish." Once again, I expect a higher

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included in the appendix of Antconc outputs. Since the stop words continued to appear on the list of collocates, I manually deleted them, and present the remainder as the list of most common collocates, stopping at Word No. 100.

amount of victimization-associated collocates among *CBCP Monitor* articles, as a cursory view of article titles suggests that prostituted women and children have come to serve as metonyms for the victimized/exploited nation. My background literature review supports this expectation, as well: the conjunction of military prostitution and sex tourism has turned prostitution into a symbol of national subjugation throughout Filipino journalistic and popular discourse.

As with earlier sections of this thesis, my textual analysis of this group of documents can be divided into two parts: 1) meanings attached to prostitution and/or trafficking, with special focus on policy advocacy, and 2) how this advocacy links to the nation and the Church's self- constructed role as said nation's guardian. For purposes of easier comparability, I compared each national Church's articles about prostitution and trafficking that discuss these problems in relation to the Church's own nation. Once again, KAI's considerable output on prostitution that does *not* involve Poles or Poland is likely more a reflection of its more cosmopolitan outlook on *all* issues, rather than indicative of a more

international view of prostitution specifically. These articles were therefore excluded from the section comparing KAI and *Monitor* coverage, since the *Monitor* had no substantial corresponding corpus about prostitution abroad.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHURCH

In this chapter, I present the data narratively, in keeping with moral panic theory's focus on problem narratives and archetypal figures. Since the Philippine Catholic Church has a rather coherent panic narrative regarding prostitution, the data is presented and analyzed as such, with its key story elements arranged in chronological order to illustrate the single overarching storyline. The reader should expect the following structure:

1. Origins: Where does prostitution come from? Who or what should be held responsible for this social problem?
2. Victims: Who or what is harmed by the actions or processes responsible for prostitution? What is the nature and scale of the harm done?
3. Resolution: What sorts of solutions does the Church present for addressing the problem of prostitution?
4. The turn towards abolitionism: How has the policy orientation of this problem narrative changed over

three decades? What are the implications of the re-articulation of the same core problem narrative in abolitionist terms?

5. Exceptions to the Dominant Narrative: What are alternative problem narratives present in the data? How do they relate to the dominant narrative? Do they present any viable challenges or critiques to it?

I demonstrate that every phase of the dominant narrative contains elements of a nationalist moral panic. There are no viable rival narratives coming from within the Church. A competing narrative is found in the Philippines' small pro-sex work movement, but its impact is severely limited by the intertwined influence of Catholic teaching and abolitionist ideology.

A. Origins: Foreign Folk Devils and Complicit Elites

In this section, I examine Philippine Catholic Church's narrative surrounding the source of the social problem of prostitution. How does prostitution arise, and who is responsible for the harm and immorality surrounding it? I show that the dominant problem

narrative traces the direct causes of prostitution to foreign devils and complicit elites. These actors victimize prostitutes against a backdrop of systemic injustice, largely shaped by the historical legacy of colonialism. The Universal Catechism is a useful point of departure because it sets the standards for Catholic doctrine all over the world. Filipino priests and academic theologians whom I spoke with tended to consult or cite the Universal Catechism at the outset, especially if they were not directly involved in any anti-prostitution projects, or simply had not given the matter much thought. It is important to explore how the Philippine Catholic Church uses, develops, and in some cases, departs from, this teaching.

According to the Universal Catechism, the prostitute and her client both share the blame for their act of sexual immorality. Poverty and coercion might mitigate the prostitute's culpability, but her participation in an act of commercial or extramarital sex is still inherently immoral. This teaching might seem clear and concise, but in practice, leaves a great deal of room for flexibility. Interpretations can vary in their emphasis of the customer's culpability vis-à-vis that of the prostitute.

They may also differ in the degree to which they consider other circumstances and actors that influence a sexual transaction; some actors have a more systemic approach, while others confine their analysis largely to individual morality.

Some elements within the Catholic Church take a more judgmental, patriarchal approach that mainly blames prostitutes for the immorality surrounding commercial sex. There are concerns not only about the actions of real-life prostitutes, but also about the way prostitutes are depicted in media. Documentary examples of this approach occasionally appear in the *CBCP Monitor*, as in an article from the third issue of the first volume in 1997. The writer, a Dominican priest, expresses his alarm about the release of the film called *Ligaya ang Itawag Mo sa Akin* (Call me Joy), in which the protagonist is a prostitute. (Ignacio 1997) The writer says that, while the lead actress and director are not evil per se, they were instruments of Satan in this case. He does not expound on what exactly about the movie is evil, however. (Ibid) Its main character is a prostitute, but does that automatically render the film's message Satanic? (Ibid) There is no concern expressed for

the welfare of prostitutes—either fictional or real-life women. (Ibid) His main worry is about the corrupting effect the film may have on public morals. (Ibid) This more morally conservative attitude appears, albeit with increasing rarity, for the next several years. A homily guide is based on a priest's interaction with "The Bar Girls of Ermita," whom he encourages parishioners to treat with compassion and forgiveness. (Coronel 2005) It is implied that the bar girls are sinners; if they do not sin, why do they need to be forgiven? (Ibid) Their culpability may be mitigated by economic desperation and other pressures, but they are still at least partially responsible for earning money though immoral means. (Ibid)

These texts are isolated, brief, and lack theological elaboration or a clear policy perspective. They are easily superseded by the larger body of evidence that emphasizes the culpability of *other* parties to the sex trade, instead.

One such text is the Catechism for Filipino Catholics, one of the most doctrinally authoritative documents issued by the Philippine Church. Prostitution is mentioned in Article 1058, as one of many acts that

violates the Fifth Commandment against killing. Prostitution might not kill a person's physical body, but it violates the prostitute's personhood so severely that the effects are comparable to those of murder/homicide.

It appears again in Article 1115: along with pornography, it is a sin against "the virtue of chastity," presumably as enshrined in the Commandment against adultery. Here, we see a marked difference between the CFC's view and that of the Universal Catechism. As elaborated upon earlier, the Universal Catechism censures prostitution as a sin committed by both the seller and the buyer of sex. It only briefly mentions the ameliorating effect of poverty on the prostitute's moral culpability. However, the CFC foregrounds macro-level factors like socio-economic inequality, asserting that both prostitution and its close cousin, pornography, are "too often simply the consequences of dire poverty and destitution." They are "foisted on the poor by the affluent." There is no mention of the prostitute sinning against herself and/or her client. Therefore, the Philippines' sex industry grows out of widespread economic desperation. Prostitution is based on wealthier Filipinos' financial and sexual exploitation

of their poorer compatriots. The transnational angle need not be introduced yet at this stage, but the narrative already includes the theme of the rich and powerful exploiting the poor.

The CFC might appear to implicitly contradict the Universal Catechism in this regard, but it is possible to reconcile the two documents—albeit with some difficulty. Both documents share at least a few core doctrines regarding prostitution. They agree that prostitution is sinful, though the CFC foregrounds prostitutes' status as victims rather than perpetrators of this sin. Furthermore, they agree that the moral responsibility of *some* prostitutes is *somewhat* mitigated due to poverty and other factors. However, they diverge significantly regarding the *degree* to which sinfulness is mitigated, and the *extent* to which forced or coerced prostitution is common in the sex industry. The Universal Catechism emphasizes individual sexual morality, while making concessions for poverty and other constraints on the prostitute's free will. The CFC does the reverse, seizing on structural violence, while conceding that individual sexual morality also plays a role. In the CFC, prostitutes' moral responsibility

appears to be almost totally erased, Poverty and other types of structural violence are the norm, rather than the exception. In spite of this, the CFC can still be judged compatible with the Universal Catechism: it is merely accounting for the (apparent) greater prevalence of coercion and sheer economic desperation in the Filipino sex market.

The CFC's concentration on systemic factors facilitates its recognition of prostitution as a type of "social sin," as explicated in Article 1206. Social sin refers to "situations or structures which cause or support evil, or fail through complicity or indifference to redress evils when it is possible." CFC's examples of social sin are: "prostitution, pornography, consumerism and militarism." Clearly, prostitution figures prominently in the CFC's view of social sin. It is the first item on the list of common social sins in the Philippines, and closely related to the second item, pornography. To the extent that prostitution is understood as a side effect of militarism, it features in the last item, as well. It is part of a "network that oppresses and enslaves." (Art. 365) Along with pornography, it is the manifestation of highly

gendered forms of power imbalance. (Art 1065) In stark contrast, the Universal Catechism frames prostitution as a matter of individual moral failing, with only a brief nod to socio-economic circumstances.

The perspective outlined in the CFC has immediate nationalist implications, because the CFC was expressly written to address *Filipino* problems that might not have been given adequate attention in the more one-size-fits-all Universal Catechism. The fact that prostitution appears numerous times throughout the CFC indicates that the CFC's authors see prostitution as a pressing national concern. As far as the CFC is concerned, prostitution is especially rife in Filipino society, and the vast majority of this prostitution takes place under economic and other pressures whose configuration is particular to the Filipino context. (Art 365) The Filipino sex trade arises from gross economic inequality, which often leaves the poor with limited options for procuring their survival. (Art. 1065) They are forced to obtain money through prostitution or other degrading means.

Interestingly, the CFC's Catholic nationalist discourse avoids pinpointing any concrete foreign Other

as an object of fear or blame. Those who sexually exploit the poor are wealthy individuals who take advantage of others' desperation. However, there is no clear indication that most or even some of these wealthy exploiters are foreigners. A reader who peruses the CFC without the context of American military prostitution and international sex tourism might easily assume that the rich, powerful exploiters of poor Filipino women are actually fellow Filipinos. Inter-class dynamics are strongly present in the CFC's view of prostitution, but international or transnational dynamics are strangely absent. Prostitution, at least as described in the CFC, is a situation wherein Filipinos are betrayed by compatriots who take advantage of spiraling social inequality. The nation is under threat, but at least some of those threats come from within.

The Religious of the Good Shepherd also treat prostitution as an issue of social (in)justice, but link class inequality to neo-imperialism. In their advocacy video *Kapayapaan at Hustisya* (Peace and Justice), they claim that one of the Philippine's most severe social problems is its wealth gap. The poor are more likely to suffer in the

event of social unrest, violent conflict, or natural disasters. Ecological problems are exacerbated and sometimes even caused by the greed of large corporations and/or rich countries seeking to profit from the Philippines' natural bounty. In combination, these various types of oppression push poorer Filipinos to migrate, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking, including sex trafficking. *Kapayapaan at Hustisya*'s problem narrative reinforces the concept of prostitution as a manifestation of the Filipino nation's victimization by Western-led neo-imperalism and capitalism.

One type of perpetrator receives special attention: the international sex tourist. I argue that this figure has become a folk devil to actors within the Philippine Catholic Church because it represents various threats to the nation that manifest in the transnational sex trade. As explained earlier, some formulations of the Church's narrative emphasize the systemic drivers behind prostitution. These include global capitalism, neo-imperalism, and geopolitics: the sex tourist functions well as a folk devil because he effectively embodies these larger forces. International sex tourism is the result of

systemic drivers, such as the presence of American military bases, the prevalence of racist attitudes that sexualize Asian women and children, and a state that cannot or will not enforce proper protection of citizens. The legacy of imperialism means that the sex tourist is likely to originate from a country that has historically colonized other countries, and to possess enough wealth to circumvent the laws and norms of the neo-colony he visits. He and others like him also tend to visit certain locations in the Philippines that were once the site of large American military facilities, binding sexual exploitation with a heritage of security dependence and diluted sovereignty.

In the Church's official discourse, American military presence continues to be associated with the growth of the Philippines' sex industry, despite permanent bases' closure in the 1990's. For example, Bishop Quiambao warned of a possible uptick in prostitution in response to the arrival of American troops supporting their Philippine counterparts against Islamic terrorism in the southern Philippines. (CBCP News 2009, "Bishops Strongly Oppose") Globalization and neo- imperialism

are both incorporated in to the *Monitor*'s narrative of exploited Filipinos and a threatened Philippines.

Overall, Church actors' punitive impetus is stronger when directed at *foreign* sexual exploiters. One of the Church's most prominent opponents of sex tourism is Fr. Shay Cullen, an Irish Columban priest based in Angeles City. Fr. Cullen may be a rank-and-file priest from a minor order, but he has accumulated considerable personal influence over the years, displaying that, even in a hierarchical institution like the Church, other factors may trump one's formal institutional position. As stated earlier in the Methods and Materials chapter, his work as founder and leader of PREDA has received international acclaim, and he now writes regularly for the *CBCP Monitor*. Cullen has left a legal legacy in Angeles City, having helped to pass a local ordinance forbidding foreigners from having unsupervised time with Filipino children. (Cullen and Hermoso, 2008) The hope is that this ordinance will *prevent* abuse from happening, rather than risking the sexual exploitation of a child before police can make an arrest. On the one hand, the law reflects Angeles City's special situation as an attractive destination for

international sex tourists: there is indeed a strong possibility that minors are in sexual danger when in the presence of foreigners. Then again, Cullen's ordinance feeds into the assumption that foreign tourists are the primary drivers of child prostitution in the area. It downplays the possibility that Filipinos might buy sex with minors, as well, or that foreigners may have perfectly benign reasons for spending unsupervised time with local children. The presumption that children are most vulnerable when alone with foreigners also fails to address cases wherein the supervising relative or third party is complicit or even actively involved in the sexual abuse of a child. Cullen's policy advocacy clearly highlights the crimes of foreign pedophiles, as opposed to Filipinos who might commit the same offenses against children. Foreigners face punishment for even being in a situation where they *might* molest a child in Angeles City, whether or not any sexual contact has yet taken place. The same is not done to Filipino adults.

The pursuit of harsher punishments against foreign sex tourists is a key part of Cullen's advocacy, beyond his involvement in passing a key ordinance.

Largely thanks to Cullen's writings, "justice" is the ninth most common word in the *Monitor* corpus regarding prostitution and trafficking as pertains to the Filipino nation. "Justice" harks back to the interview data from [redacted] in which he contrasted PREDA's position with that of more traditional elements in the Church. In his view, traditionalists too often ask that exploiters be treated with "mercy." [redacted] stated that his organization is somewhat different from other Catholic bodies, because it demands that perpetrators be punished in accordance with the law. PREDA finds an emphasis on forgiveness to be inappropriate in this case, because victims of sex trafficking cannot be properly protected if their exploiters escape justice. The state's punitive measures must be harnessed in order to protect victims of trafficking. The presence of the word "justice" supports my assessment that PREDA's ideology has made some inroads into the discourse of the *CBCP Monitor*—and into the mainline Church, to the extent that the *Monitor* can be said to represent mainstream Philippine Catholicism.

Cullen also indicts Filipino society, for providing

foreign sex tourists with an all-too- hospitable environment. (Cullen 2009, "Trafficking the Enslaved") Foreign pedophiles from the weakening of the nation's dignity and traditional values: parents and guardians allow sex tourists access to their children, because they are no longer able to draw on spiritual sources of strength against poverty. (Ibid) Widespread adulation of Western culture and people might encourage Filipinos to be more accommodating of foreigners' demands for paid sex. (Cullen 2010, "No Justice") Sex tourists, therefore, also benefit from Filipinos' lack of lack of national pride.

Tourists, foreign soldiers, and wealthy Filipinos are not the only individuals held responsible for driving sexual exploitation. They abetted by a diverse group of local actors— pimps, recruiters, brothel managers, corrupt officials, and so forth—who help customers gain sexual access to vulnerable Filipino women and children. (Cullen 2013, "Saving the Trafficked"; Catabian 2009) In later documents, some of these third parties are often called "traffickers," about which more later. (Ibid) The Philippines' weak, corrupt institutions are to blame, as well. Law enforcement is often lax, which is especially

attractive to sex tourists or foreign users of cyberpornography, who feel confident that they can patronize the Philippine sex industry with impunity. (Cullen 2015)

Local authorities attain an even larger role in the problem narrative when their interactions with Church personnel become hostile. Cullen's autobiography posits the Gordon family, Olongapo's local political dynasty, as his nemesis in his efforts to stop sexual exploitation in the area. (Cullen 2006) His book is filled with incidents in which the Gordons and their allies attempt to have his organization evicted, arrested, or slandered in news media. (Ibid) This narrative construction is to be expected, as Cullen's solution to the problem runs directly counter to the interests of these authorities: Cullen hoped to rid the Philippines of American military bases and the attendant sex trade. (Ibid, 301-02) The Gordons, however, owed much of their power to channeling the American presence into economic growth in the Subic/Olongapo area. (Ibid, 302)

The narrative takes on additional layers when one tries to consider who is responsible for the sexual

exploitation of *children*, as opposed to adult women. On the surface, child prostitution is far simpler to account for than the prostitution of adults. Underage prostitutes are automatically considered victims, at least according to the letter of Philippine law. The definition of prostitution in the Revised Penal code, which punishes prostitutes, only pertains to adults. Church actors need to do very little work to convince the public that children are *not* culpable for their involvement in commercial sex. Since children possess diminished personal responsibility by default, accountability falls to their parents or guardians. How does the Church portray the responsibilities of adults who have allowed children under their care to be sexually exploited?

There are several ways in which the actions of parents and guardians can lead to child prostitution. Parents can be quite directly involved in the sexual exploitation of their children. They might act as pimps, or put their children under the management of external recruiters. Church actors are certainly aware of this phenomenon. [redacted], in particular, finds the sexual exploitation of children by their own parents especially

appalling. Otherwise, parents' involvement might be more subsidiary, lying in the creation of a toxic home environment. (Reed and Latonio 2015) Abuse in the home, including corporal punishment and sexual abuse, is a major factor driving youth into commercial sex. (Ibid, 7) The child might leave his or her home, and eventually fall under the control of recruiters. (Ibid) Alternatively, the child might remain at home, but become so damaged by various forms of abuse that he/she becomes vulnerable to recruitment into prostitution. (Ibid) Abused, neglected children might see sexual intercourse as a way to feel wanted and loved. (Ibid) Financial and other forms of remuneration can serve as an additional, albeit unhealthy, balm for the child's wounded sense of self-worth. (Ibid, 7-8) A broken self- esteem can also prevent a child from leaving the sex trade, by convincing him/her that he/she *deserves* to be sexually exploited. (Ibid)

Another important document is the Pastoral Letter on Child Exploitation, from 1998, officially authored by Bishop Oscar V. Cruz. From the start of the pastoral letter, Bishop Cruz

frames the problem of child exploitation in nationalist terms. He asserts that, "The love for children has always been a part of Filipino culture and traditions." Mistreatment of children is anathema to genuine Filipino values, in other words. Substantial damage to national morals must have occurred in order for child abuse to become rampant. Cruz's framing might have some validity, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it also precludes critical analysis of aspects of Filipino culture that might facilitate child abuse.

In spite of the supposedly child-loving, family-oriented nature of mainstream Filipino culture, "child labor or sexual abuse" are both prevalent, and Filipino children are treated as "commodities for labor and sexual gratification." In Cruz's view, sexual abuse/exploitation is one of the most severe forms of child abuse. It does deep, lasting damage. Even if a child manages to escape sexual abuse or exploitation, survivors "are vulnerable to more abusive behavior and relationships later on in life." Cruz presents sexual abuse as an urgent, large-scale problem. Cruz alleges that up to 60,000 children are sexually trafficked in the Philippines. The problem of child sexual

abuse extends beyond the commercial setting, involving the home and other spheres. Three quarters of all abuse cases from the year 1996 were sexual abuse cases, 60% of which involved incestuous abuse.

How can the prevalence of child sexual abuse and exploitation be explained? Cruz believes that, "As a social phenomenon, the exploitation of children in the Philippine context can be traced mainly to poverty…. This condition of poverty has emboldened unprincipled employers and moneyed foreign pedophiles to use children." Here, Cruz's problem narrative neatly mitigates the moral responsibility of Filipinos and Filipino-ness for child abuse. According to his rationale, the problem lies with objective poverty, not with the power dynamics within Filipino families. Additionally, his narrative makes use of a nationalist Us-vs.-Them binary, wherein the rich, depraved foreigner is directly contrasted with the poor but morally-upright Filipino, whose culture reliably advocates the good treatment of children.

Cruz suggests several ways to address the general problem of child abuse and exploitation—sexual and otherwise. He first suggests that low-income families

strengthen their moral fiber. They might not be able to lift themselves out of poverty right away, but they can try to resist the lure of money from the exploitation of their children. The solution to child sex abuse and other forms of maltreatment lies not in critiquing Filipino family values, but reinforcing these even more against financial and social pressures. Schools and Churches can channel their authority towards informing the public about child abuse, and inculcating values conducive to child welfare. Churches can also use their resources to extend emotional, social, and material support to survivors of abuse. Secondly, Cruz tries to bridge the gap between low-income families and support organizations. He asks NGO's and state agencies to give assistance to families, and encourages families to avail of organizations' resources. Cruz also believes that addressing child abuse requires not only rescuing and supporting child victims, but punishing abusers. The state should enforce its laws against the mistreatment of children.

Cruz's problem narrative appears, at first glance, to be fairly straightforward. Child abuse and exploitation are contrary to authentic Filipino values. Child

exploitation of all kinds usually occurs when low-income families buckle under economic pressure: "As a social phenomenon, the exploitation of children in the Philippine context can be traced mainly to poverty." Parents, too, are victims of poverty and injustice, albeit not to the same extent that their children are. The moral responsibility of parents and relatives is usually downplayed in the Church's public advocacy regarding child prostitution.

The sexual exploitation of children is related to poverty; foreign pedophiles' relative wealth buys them sexual access to the children of financially-desperate families. Therefore, Filipino families should reinforce their traditional values so as to endure financial pressure without resorting to child exploitation. State agencies and NGO's should give families material support, which safeguards children against exploitation.

The prevalence of sexual abuse within Filipino families and communities, however, complicates this narrative. The statistics cited by Cruz suggest that incest is, if not necessarily common, a fairly significant phenomenon that comprises a large portion of severe cases of child abuse. Of course, it is possible that incest

reported more frequently because it is a more shocking offense, thus skewing the overall abuse statistics. But for purposes of this thesis, the pertinent point is that Cruz *presents* incest as being fairly common. If child abuse is anathema to Filipino values, how do we account for the existence of incest? Incest cannot be blamed on financial need; incest by definition occurs within the family, and generally away from settings that generate income. If incest is not so rare in Filipino society, it cannot be easily ascribed to the perversity of a few deviant individuals. Filipinos may have to reckon with the question of whether incest is at least partly attributable to Filipino cultural tendencies.

Incest might also be investigated as a precipitating factor of a child's entry into the sex trade. According to Cruz's own narrative, sexual abuse in childhood can lead the victim into a long-term pattern of abusive relationships. Insofar as prostitution itself is an abusive relationship with one's pimp and/or customers, incest can easily lead to child prostitution. The sexual exploitation of child might not only a matter of satisfying foreign pedophiles' desires and poor Filipinos' financial needs,

but also of some child prostitutes processing the trauma of incestuous abuse.

Cruz, however, fails to address these implications. The prevalence of incestuous abuse is mentioned, but not incorporated into the main problem narrative. He also fails to resolve the ambiguous moral responsibility of Filipino families in the abuse and exploitation of their children. Cruz insists that child abusers deserve strict punishment. However, what about abuse and exploitation of children that happens within more financially comfortable families, where severe economic pressure does *not* mitigate parents' culpability? Such questions are simply left out of his narrative.

The Philippine Catholic Church's main problem narrative presents two groups of perpetrators: foreigners, plus local elites and corrupt officials. These two narratives need not conflict with each other. Indeed, they are highly compatible and can easily fit into a single over-arching narrative that blames foreigners/globalization and complicit local elites for the exploitation of ordinary Filipinos. (Dressel 2011, 830-31) Lower-income Filipinos who facilitate sexual exploitation bear a lighter burden of

responsibility, especially in the case of parents and guardians who obtain money from the prostitution of children/wards.

The damage done by local actors and institutions should not be treated as a separate narrative from that perpetrated by foreign/global/colonial/neo-imperialist persons and drivers. According to conventional Filipino post-colonial narratives, some of which were adopted by the Church, Philippine political and socio-economic institutions were fundamentally distorted by imperialism. (Dressel 2011, 830) Local elites cooperated with foreign powers in exchange for the maintenance of their power under the new regime. (Ibid) Elites became entrenched in their positions of power, which perpetuated their rent-seeking behavior. (Ibid) This manifested in systemic corruption, resistance to land reform, nepotism, and so forth. (Ibid)

Another view holds that Spanish and American rule virtually *created* the Philippine elites in their present form. Prior to colonization, most land ownership was communal. (May 2004, 358-89; Yengoyan 2006, 353) The Spaniards introduced the concept of private land

ownership, allowing elites to seize control of agricultural production. (May 2004) The islands' political systems became less egalitarian and more feudal. (Ibid) It eventually reified into the constellation of immensely powerfully political dynasties known today. (Ibid) Dynastic privilege and systemic corruption would not exist in their present form without the intervention of foreign colonizers. (May 2004) Local elites also collaborated with American colonizers, consolidating their economic control and participating in American institutions (Constantino 1970, 34), while pretending to espouse nationalism (Ileto 1979, 219). Elite families are served by a highly Westernized private education sector, which further undermines Filipino nationalism and inculcates excessive admiration for Western institutions and norms. (Constantino 1970, 34) Hence, local elites are more aligned with Western power structures and cultural values. (Ibid)

These are two of the main narratives linking exploitation by foreigners to oppression by local elites. Either way, both groups are to blame for the exploitation of ordinary Filipinos. The Church does not have to choose

between blaming foreigners *or* local elites for the problem of prostitution. Narratives may emphasize the role of one group over another, but they can easily co- exist as part of an overarching post-colonial story. (Teehankee 2016, 77-79) The CFC's emphasis on elite-driven social inequality, and the RGS's focus on exploitative global capitalism, can easily be combined into one narrative of joint exploitation of the Filipino nation. Together, these groups undermine the integrity of the Filipino nation, as embodied by the well-being of its average-income or lower-income citizens. Such views are especially common among groups influenced by Marxist thinking (Teehankee 2016, 82), which, of course, includes Catholic Church actors who have absorbed ideas from liberation theology (Nadeau 2002).

Fr. Shay Cullen, a well-known advocate against trafficking and sex tourism, provides a fairly direct, forceful combination of this combined narrative throughout his autobiography. He says that foreign exploiters are "aided and abetted by the ruling elite," (Cullen 2006, 10) and even claims that, ""The dynastic families that make up oligarchy are not true Filipinos."

(Cullen 2006, 10) He explains that many of the country's wealthiest people prefer to keep their money in offshore bank accounts, instead of investing it in their own country. (Ibid) Their political and cultural allegiances lie in the West. (Ibid) Some have even given up their most formal ties to the country by giving up their Filipino citizenship. (Ibid) Hostility between rich and poor Filipinos is not a civil conflict, but rather a struggle between foreign-owned elites and authentic Filipinos. One can infer that sex trafficking is the playing out of this conflict in sexual and commercial terms. Cullen brings the question to the level of what is traditionally known as high politics, implicating international geopolitics and diplomatic relations.

I argue that the Philippine Catholic Church is able to draw on these interpretations of post- colonial theory to support a problem narrative that ties domestic and foreign factors in a single account of the causes of prostitution. Narratives such as these are deeply nationalist. Threats to the nation are claimed to originate from outside it. Filipinos who harm their compatriots are portrayed as less devoted to the Filipino nation, and more attached to

foreign values and interests. It is a panic narrative that reinforces the idea of the nation by highlighting transgressions of national sovereignty and dignity.

In the following section, I discuss the next stage in the narrative, i.e. the effects of the perpetrators' actions on the vulnerable Filipino nation.

B. Victims: Poor Women and Vulnerable Children

Since the identities of the perpetrators are firmly established, I now examine the Church's view of the damage done by prostitution. How big or severe is the problem, in the eyes of the Church? Who or what are the victims of the sex trade, and what is the nature of the abuse done to them?

The view among Church respondents directly involved in the issue—the Religious of the Good Shepherd, PIMAHT officers, PREDA—is that prostitution is a statistically large and still growing phenomenon. To make use of moral panic principles, Church actors displayed yet another sign of moral panic by

promulgating questionable accounts of a problem's scale. (Critcher 2015, *xxi*) They were quite willing to accept the large estimates promulgated by Philippine state agencies and NGO's, but did not give substantive explanations for why they accepted the estimates. Indeed, they even claimed that such statistics underestimated the current scale of the problem, given the growth of online pornography or virtual prostitution. [redacted], finds the statistics dubious, but preferred not to offer her own alternative estimates.

It is unclear exactly where these widely-promulgated statistics came from, but [redacted] This was his individual point of view, and should not have been presented as the result of authoritative research. (Ibid) Nevertheless, this and other similarly high estimates—running up to 800,000, for example—have been taken up by official bodies such as the Philippine Commission on Women, which have been

instrumental their legitimization. (Philippine Commission on Women, n.d.) Such are the dynamics of moral panics: different actors start to adapt the same problem narrative, not only in terms of its general arc, but also key details, like statistics. (Critcher 2015, *xx-xxi*)

Per moral panic theory once again, large statistical estimates serve a key discursive purpose. Firstly, they are more likely to capture the public's interest, quite important in a crowded field of social problems competing for attention and funding. (Ibid, *xxi*) A problem that victimizes hundreds of thousands of Filipinos can easily be presented as an urgent matter. On a deeper level, the problem may be presented as a *systemic* one, a symptom that something has gone fundamentally awry in the state of the Filipino nation.

The CBCP's 2014 *Pastoral Letter on Human Trafficking* sets the Philippines' trafficking problem in the context of an equally large global trafficking issue:

> "Every year about 800,000 children, women and men are trafficked across international borders around the world. Some 30 million people are presently enslaved. About 150,000 of these are said to be Filipinos, most of them children who

> are physically exploited and sexually abused. Every year, many Filipino men and women who migrate abroad for work end up in conditions of involuntary servitude. Happily, this does not characterize the general condition of the Filipino diaspora, which now counts some ten million Filipinos in various parts of the world."

Immediately after these statements, however, the letter goes on to claim, "But one Filipino victim of human trafficking alone is one victim too many for us as a Christian nation. We should have zero tolerance for this evil." This manner of treating statistics is quite typical of moral panics. (Maneri 2018, 42) The statistics are highlighted, and shortly thereafter deemed irrelevant. What truly matters are the symbolic, moral implications of commercial sex, regardless of the industry's statistical scale. The problem narrative is thereby protected from criticism, regardless of whether the statistic is accepted in the relevant debate circles. Moral entrepreneurs can continue to claim that the problem is a pressing one, even if the statistical

situation changes over time, or empirical evidence refutes the initial estimate. Human trafficking represents deeper socio-economic and moral failings; to ignore prostitution is to ignore those deeper problems, too. The reader may also note that the CBCP refers to the Philippines as a "Christian nation," invoking the concept of Catholic religious nationalism, and setting it against the problem of human trafficking.

Another way to measure the CBCP's increasing focus on the prostitution problem is to count the number of *CBCP Monitor* articles that substantively discuss it each year, as shown in the graph below. Coverage clearly spikes sharply in recent years.

Fig.4 Line graph showing number of *CBCP Monitor* articles on prostitution and trafficking per year



A problem of such scale and severity naturally creates large numbers of victims. What does the Church have to say about this? Who exactly are these victims, and what sort of harm is inflicted upon them?

According to the Universal Catechism, *both* prostitutes and customers are harmed in the course of transactional sex. Clients might hold most of the power in the transaction, but their sexual misdeeds arise from a spiritual brokenness. Buying sex does not cure the malaise, but only worsens it. Customers need forgiveness and healing, just as prostitutes do. As stated earlier, this view is fairly prevalent among Church leaders and Catholic theologians in the Philippines, especially those who are not directly involved in the Church's anti-trafficking programs. One example is eminent theologian Dr. Asis, whose view of the question draws almost entirely from the Universal Catechism. Asis holds that both prostitute and client commit wrongdoing, but the nature and degree of immorality can vary greatly according to circumstance. That said, the ideal

choice is still to avoid selling sex, even in the most desperate circumstances, including threat of death or starvation. Choosing death over survival sex would not be considered suicide, but an act of heroism: the person would be upholding the virtue of chastity, even at the cost of his or her life. An act of this nature would be laudable, but not expected of the average person; it would be quite understandable for people to commit sexual sin under such dire circumstances.

The Catechism for Filipino Catholics (CFC) deviates somewhat from this teaching, without directly opposing it. The CFC accords much more prominence to the victimhood of prostitutes. (Art. 1115, Art. 1137) There is hardly mention of any suffering on the part of customers. The CFC repeatedly presents prostitution as a sinful act against the prostitute herself, even when there are no customers or third parties exerting overt forms of coercion. Dire poverty might itself be considered a type of coercion; impoverished Filipinos turn to prostitution out of desperation. (Art. 1137)

The Religious of the Good Shepherd can be said to have a view of sexual victimhood that is quite similar to

that of the CFC, put perhaps pushed even further in the direction of social justice and a version of conservative Third World feminism. The Good Shepherd nuns' own particular problem narrative situates prostitution as an issue area that is interwoven with *all* of the order's fundamental social concerns. According to their advocacy video *Pagpapagaling*, key areas of RGS activity are:

"1. Migration
2. Trafficking
3. Prostitution
4. Economic Justice
5. Ecological justice
6. Girl Child."

All of these issues are easily bound together in a single problem narrative. Violence, injustice, and environmental degradation can push vulnerable people to migrate. Migration carries the risk of trafficking, which usually takes the form of prostitution. All of these factors can mitigate the moral responsibility of prostituted persons. The RGS' broad idea of victimhood allows it to target

prostitutes who do not fit conventional, often sensationalistic images of sexual victimhood. Imprisoned or physically battered sex slaves exist, but they represent the most extreme end of a varied spectrum of exploitation. Often, prostituted women exert at least some degree of agency when they remain in the sex trade; therefore, they must be *persuaded* to leave it. A program of outreach work is constructed in order to reach such women. If the outreach work succeeds in piquing the interest of prostituted women, they can then approach the RGS through their drop-in centers, after which they can enter the nuns' network of shelters. Later, they can avail of livelihood training programs, which can help them find other means of earning money and thus prevent re- entry into the sex trade.

Altogether, the Church implies that victims of sex trafficking are not different from the average Filipino. Indeed, the presumed audience for the Church's advocacy is encouraged to identify closely with trafficking victims. As per Cruz's 2014 pastoral letter, "We must never for a moment forget that we are each our brother's keepers, and that a part of ourselves is trafficked every time a brother

or sister of ours is."

That said, certain Filipinos are more likely than others to be presented as victims of human trafficking: namely, impoverished women and children. Such persons comprise what is known in trafficking or prostitution law studies as the "perfect victim." (Uy 2011, 208) Advocates themselves do not use the term; it is an analytical tool mostly deployed by critics of the abolitionist movement. (Ibid) The principle is not specific to the Philippines, and can be found in many sectors of the global anti-trafficking movement. However, the strong American influence and general moral conservatism of anti-trafficking groups in the Philippines make them, I argue, especially susceptible to the use of this trope.

The perfect victim is an archetypal figure used in advocacy materials, and often invoked in mainstream media coverage of trafficking. (Ibid, 211) "The idea of saving this victim is 'uncontroversial' and in many ways accords with Judeo-Christian ideologies as well as feminist views on power and control." (Uy 2011, 218) Real-life survivors might also be expected to perform the appearances and behaviors of this figure, in order to be

recognized as genuine victims. (Balmgamwalla 2016, 14) Survivors who enter the care of ideologically-committed organizations might face formal and informal pressures to conform to these idealized images. (Ibid) Performing perfect victimhood can also lead to success in the courtroom, as judges and juries are not immune to absorbing stereotypes about trafficking. (Ibid)

What does a perfect trafficking victim look like? The image is remarkably similar across the worldwide anti-trafficking movement. The image's core features contribute towards the same conceptual goal, which is to render the victim's status *as* victim unambiguous. She—the perfect victim is usually female (Uy 2011, 205)—should demonstrate as little personal agency as possible (Ibid, 206). She must have exerted little choice in entering the sex trade, having been forced into it through physical coercion, imprisonment, threat of death or serious harm, or desperate poverty. (Ibid) Such a victim is ideally "a 'third world,' if not primarily Asian, woman or a child in deplorable conditions, being brought across borders, and being forced into commercial sex acts." (Ibid, 205) Clearly, this version of the archetypal victim is compatible

with pre-existing images of impoverished Filipino women and children pushed into the sex trade.

Among morally conservative actors, of which the Philippine Catholic Church is one, there may be an additional expectation of heteronormativity. (Chuang 2010, 1665) Trafficking victims who do not match this image—men (Uy 2011, 214), LGBT's (Chuang 2010, 1665), people with a perceived history of promiscuity or sexual deviance (Balgamwalla 2016, 15), or prostitutes who appear to have chosen the sex trade willingly (Doezema 2001, 33)—are less likely to be recognized as such. Indeed, the absence of such imperfect victims is notable in the Philippine Church's discourse.

The perfect victim's past prior to trafficking is also expected to conform to a certain pattern. Sexual purity prior to entry into the sex trade is ideal. (Ibid) That way, there is no question about whether she is/was predisposed to sexual promiscuity or deviance. Very young child victims, therefore, have the highest probability of conforming to the perfect victim image. (Westwood 2015) I argue that this is one factor contributing to the Philippine Church's notable emphasis on the victimhood of sexually

exploited children. The emphasis on child prostitution fuels nationalist moral panic, as well, given the strong association of pedophilic prostitution with foreign sex tourists. Additionally, the figure of the child represents the future of the community. Threats to the child are consciously or unconsciously read as existential threats to the community's survival— essential for the sustenance of a long-term moral panic. I further argue that the foreign sex tourist derives much of his force as a folk devil figure from his association with child prostitution. His desires are pathological, and target the most vulnerable, morally pure members of society.

The figure of the perfect victim can best be illustrated via an in-depth analysis of emblematic cases. In 1987, PREDA became involved in the case of Rosario Baluyot, a severely- injured prostitute of uncertain age, but likely younger than twelve, who was found severely injured and delirious after a customer left broken-off pieces of a sex toy in her vaginal canal. (Cullen 2006, 312-13) Baluyot was brought to a hospital and underwent surgery in order to remove the foreign object, but did not survive the process. (Ibid) Her case became part of the

anti-bases movement's iconography for years to come. (Axelsson 1997; Cullen 2006, 313) "Rosario Baluyot came to symbolize all that was wrong and evil about the prostitution of children and the system that covered it up." (Cullen 2006, 313)

The use of a fairly extreme case like Rosario Baluyot's, while understandable and likely done with the best of intentions, is emblematic of moral panic discourse, wherein the most severe cases tend to get the bulk of moral entrepreneurs' attention and advocacy. (Westwood 2015, 86) The implication, perhaps unintentional, is that these extreme cases are typical: the public should believe that most cases of child abuse or sexual exploitation are as severe as Baluyot's. Baluyot's case can enlighten the public as to the worst potentialities in the Philippine child sex trade. However, there may be some disadvantages to the use of Baluyot's case as representative of the whole phenomenon of pedophilic sex tourism in the Philippines. Other victims might not be as young, overtly vulnerable, or severely abused as Baluyot was. There is a possibility that their plight might not be recognized, because it does not match the established iconography.

Articles about the prostitution of Filipino children become more dominant from about 2000 onwards. The overall preoccupation with child sexual exploitation in the Philippines is illustrated in the word cloud below, and shown with more statistical precision in the word frequency table immediately following.

Fig.5 NVivo-Generated Word Cloud for *CBCP Monitor* articles about prostitution and human trafficking in the Philippines



Fig.6 Ten Most Frequent Words in *CBCP Monitor* Coverage of Prostitution and Human Trafficking in the Philippines/of Filipinos

Rank	Word	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)
1	children	355	1.14
2	trafficking	333	1.07
3	human	307	0.98
4	sex	194	0.62
5	women	160	0.51
6	child	159	0.51
7	people	146	0.47
8	justice	127	0.41

9	victims	121	0.39
10	Philippines	120	0.38

"Children" is clearly the single most common word, and would be even more lexically dominant if combined with occurrences of the word "child." It is followed closely by "human" and "trafficking." The word "sex" comes immediately after, suggesting that the corpus is mainly concerned with sexual exploitation, as opposed to other types of trafficking. The eighth most common word is "justice," indicating that the *Monitor* urges action on behalf of the victims.

The focus on children cannot be separated from the corpus' frequent use of the term "trafficking." In the *CBCP Monitor*'s domestic coverage of the prostitution issue, the term "human trafficking" is much more prominent than "prostitution." The sexual exploitation of children is featured much more often than that of women. The preoccupation with child prostitution is noteworthy because it does not reflect the perceived empirical scale of the problem. Statistics cited by Church actors themselves suggest that children comprise a clear minority of sex trafficking/forced prostitution victims, comprising an estimated 80,000 out of hundreds of thousands of prostituted Filipinos. (Cullen 2009, "Sex Tourism and

Abortion") However unreliable these numbers may be, the point is that the Church itself uses them, but deliberately focuses on the group which supposedly comprises the statistical minority. Therefore, the overwhelming focus on child trafficking is probably rooted in factors other than empirical scale, such as the greater vulnerability and innocence of underage victims, as compared to adults. The appearance of other words referring to words such as "abuse," "exploitation," and "victims," and "slavery" underline the corpus' focus on Filipinos' victimization, whether in reference to minors or to adult victims.

In a less direct manner, the entire Filipino nation is itself a victim of the sex trade. This is partly because the archetypal victims of prostitution function so well as symbols of the nation. Women, especially sexually violated women, are often symbols for a nation that has been invaded or conquered. (Enloe 2000) Children, as the embodiment of the community's biological and social reproduction, can represent the nation's future. The textual data encourages readers to make these connections. Over and over, Church discourse highlights the Filipino

nationality of victims of sexual exploitation—a nationality shared by the presumed readership of its advocacy.

To address sexual exploitation is to contribute to the salvation of the victimized nation. In the next section, I set out the Philippine Church's rationale for how this should be done.

C. Resolution: Solutions to the Problem of Sexual Exploitation

According to the Philippine Church's dominant problem narrative, prostitution is a matter of foreigners and complicit locals exploiting vulnerable women and children, and, by extension,

victimizing the entire Filipino nation. This exploitation is embedded in a context of systemic social injustice with its roots in colonial history. Church actors offer a set of potential solutions, which follow quite logically from this narrative.

Since prostitution is seen as a systemic problem, any proposed solution must involve wide- ranging policy changes, as well as social transformation. The Philippine

state should work towards building a more just, equitable society, where vulnerable Filipinos do not feel pressured to engage in prostitution or other degrading means of obtaining money. It should enforce laws that prohibit sexual exploitation, offering rescue and post-traumatic support to victims.

Furthermore, it should cease perpetuating a national environment that is conducive to sex tourism, especially pedophilic sex tourism. Obviously, the state cannot change the Philippines' history of colonialism and unequal agreements with foreign powers, but it *can* avoid signing new agreements that invite a larger American military presence. Certain actors within the Church, especially Fr. Cullen and his PREDA organization, place emphasis on ending de facto impunity for traffickers and pedophilic customers.

The Church increasingly partners with the state to address human trafficking. The state frequently places trafficking victims in shelters run or co-run by religious orders. Indeed, the Religious of the Good Shepherd, due to their decades of experience in the matter, have advised state officials on how to set up and run their own facilities

for these victims. Local parishes disseminate state agencies' information about illegal recruitment, so as to prevent their parishioners from being trafficked. ([redacted])

One may ascertain an overarching pattern in the Church's proposed solutions to the prostitution problem: they lie in strengthening the Philippine nation-state. The state must uphold its sovereignty by enforcing laws and maintaining an equal, dignified relationship with other states. Filipino society, for its part, should delve deeper into its authentic values, and reassert its sense of national pride. Since the nation is identified with the Church, strengthening national culture and pride also requires the strengthening of Catholic moral and social teaching: a greater public role for the church is inevitable. Overall, the prostitution issue becomes an opportunity for the Church to cement its status as guardian of the Filipino nation. The Church's problem narrative can be said to serve its organizational interests rather well, regardless of Church actors' conscious intentions. Moral panic theory helps us to understand the nature and functions of this problem narrative. However, moral panic theory also examines

the silences and absences in dominant narratives. (Greer 2015, 140) It is informative to analyze the avenues that were pointedly *excluded* from the Church's problem narrative. What can one learn from the possible solutions to prostitution that the Philippine Church ignored?

At core, there is a notable, if expected, dearth of critique about the intertwined concepts of Filipino values and Filipino Catholicism. Filipino values are implied to be both unitary and objectively real. There is little sense that they are comprised of hybrid influences, or socially constructed. In addition, Church advocacy rarely considers that certain Filipino values might need to be questioned or abandoned altogether.

Dominant Church discourse lacks a well-developed critique of Filipino family values in relation to prostitution. Such a critique could have significant impact, as there are many aspects of the archetypal, traditional Filipino family that can facilitate sexual exploitation. For example, the expectation that offspring contribute to family expenses might spur young people to enter the sex trade, with or without their parents' overt encouragement. The intensely hierarchical nature of

Filipino family structures can encourage adults in the family to believe that it is their prerogative to sexually exploit and abuse children in their care, if they so wish. Moreover, a strong bias in favor of family cohesion means that other adults in the family might disbelieve or deny children's claims of sexual abuse. Women and children might also be extremely reluctant to cooperate in legal cases against family members who have sexually trafficked them, in order to avoid family shame or separation. Such cases receive very little attention in the Church's discourse.

Also, as in many moral panic narratives, the moral entrepreneur in question offers few instances of critical self-reflection. There is little examination of the Church's own potential role in weakening the nation, or, more pertinently, leading to the sexual exploitation of vulnerable Filipinos.

Regardless of the intention behind them, several Church doctrines and advocacies have likely facilitated the growth of the Philippine sex trade. One blatant example is the Church's opposition to contraception and sex education. This primarily affects the poor, since

contraception and access to secular sex education are expensive, but not illegal. The Church does not take responsibility for the results of its opposition to reproductive health legislation, which has encouraged large numbers of unplanned pregnancies, especially among poor families. Arguably, the combination of poverty and large numbers of offspring has pressured poor people to enter the sex trade, or to push their children into commercial sex. The Church's strongly natalist doctrine has therefore led to the growth of the country's sex trade. Of course, the Church is unlikely to promote a problem narrative that runs counter to one of its core advocacies. Instead, it advises poor families to turn to religion as a means of addressing the pressures of poverty.

Admittedly, the Church's opposition to contraception is not uniform. Certain actors are willing to make exceptions, especially, as I explain, with regards to the situation of prostitutes. One interesting example is show in *Buhay na Ganap*, one of the aforementioned advocacy videos published by the Religious of the Good Shepherd. *Buhay na Ganap* features one of RGS lay outreach workers, herself a survivor of sex trafficking,

talking about distributing condoms to current prostitutes, and informing them on how to avoid STI's and unplanned pregnancies. Despite the Church hierarchy's general objection to birth control, the RGS supports these measures in order to lower prostitutes' risk of contracting HIV and other serious STI's.

One might argue that the RGS's quiet condom distribution project has the support of the Holy See, namely in Pope Benedict XVI"s controversial comment about condoning the use of condoms by prostitutes, so as to prevent the spread of HIV. (Kington and Quinn 2010) However, the RGS and Pope Benedict condone condom distribution for very different reasons. While Benedict saw prostitutes' condom use as helping to prevent the spread of HIV among the general population (Ibid), the RGS are more concerned about protecting prostitutes themselves from contracting HIV from customers. Benedict foregrounds' prostitutes' capacity to spread disease, while the Philippine RGS are anxious about HIV compounding the various hardships that prostituted women must face. The RGS' distribution of condoms has a second motive, which is overtly stated in the video: to

help prostitutes prevent pregnancy. Assisting prostitutes' efforts at birth control has nothing to do with Benedict's comment, and demonstrates a great deal of theological initiative on the nuns' part. Then again, one must be careful not to exaggerate the nuns' doctrinal independence. The RGS are not directly challenging the hierarchy's opposition to contraceptives. Given the prominent role of at least some RGS nuns in pro-life advocacy, it is more likely that prostitutes' condom use is condoned due to their extreme circumstances. The promotion of condom use in the sex trade does not mean that the RGS supports birth control among the general Filipino population. Instead, it underscores the RGS' view of prostitutes as victims whose situation is so extreme that core Church doctrines can be waived in order to help them. In short, this limited measure is not a genuine critique of the Church's overall opposition to contraceptives.

Opposition to reproductive health is not the only doctrine the Church might account for in a wide-ranging self-critique. Church teaching likely had a part in instituting the judgmental, sexist approach to prostitution

that abolitionist elements within the Church are now working to dismantle. True, Church actors were not *unaware* of the effects of stigma. Nuns and other women informants were most likely to implicate widespread sexist attitudes in Filipino society for obstructing prostitutes' long-term social reintegration. However, admission that the Church has/had a part in creating the problem is largely absent.

Here, one can see how moral entrepreneurs shape their problem narrative to exclude elements that conflict with their ideological priorities, or might jeopardize their organizational interests. In the next section, I examine how this problem narrative has adjusted upon the Philippine Catholic Church's adoption of concepts from the global anti-trafficking movement.

D. Turn to Abolitionism

The Philippine Church's core narrative of internationally-driven sexual exploitation has not changed much over time. It has, however, been re-articulated in terms of sex trafficking. The Church's abolitionist views still show their anti-colonial, pro-poor roots, but have

been adjusted to make use of current options available to modern moral entrepreneurs.

Twenty-first-century anti-trafficking concepts can be partially traced to the Palermo Protocols to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organizational Crime. The Protocols provided internationally-accepted definitions of human smuggling and human trafficking, both of which became the bases of legislation against irregular migration around the world. The core conceptual components of human trafficking are deception and/or coercion. In contrast, human smuggling takes place with the smuggled person's informed consent.

The Palermo Protocols do not expressly prioritize sex trafficking over other kinds of exploitation, but, since their propagation, global anti-trafficking discourse has evolved to give the bulk of its attention to sexual exploitation. This tends to occur at the expense of interest in the problem of labor trafficking. Trafficking is assumed to refer to sexual forms of exploitation, and prostitution is assumed to be something forced onto unwilling prostitutes.

American anti-trafficking advocacy, especially as

promulgated by the U.S. State Department, has been instrumental in shaping this development. Its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, which rates various countries' efforts to address human trafficking, has effectively pressured countries, not least the Philippines, to set up or strengthen anti-trafficking policies. The extent to which this is a positive development is, of course, a matter of debate. The State Department has additionally had great impact in the shaping of the global understanding of trafficking. In 2003, the George W. Bush administration mandated that no international aid would be given to anti-trafficking organizations that supported legalized prostitution, thus promulgating a sharp dichotomy between the pro-sex work movement and the anti-trafficking movement. (Uy 2011, 207) Even if the United States does not monopolize the finances of the global anti-trafficking movement, this stark binary became a core part of the trafficking policy debate around the world.

The Philippine Catholic Church is no exemption to this influence, especially since at least some Catholic groups in the country accept funding from the U.S. State

Department. The Church and its partners are extremely unlikely to work with groups that favor the legalization of sex work. This is not to say that abolitionists and pro-sex work groups can *never* have cordial relations. Visayan Forum, a technically secular but Church-allied abolitionist group, has some informal ties to the Philippine Sex Work Collective: Sharmila Parmanand, a researcher who has investigated the Collective for some years and occasionally speaks on their behalf, was formerly employed by Visayan Forum. The Visayan Forum's leadership maintains contact with her, and thereby learns more about the Collective's approach to Sex Work. The two organizations have not collaborated on any large projects, but they have at least established the beginnings of a rapport.

I argue that abolitionist approaches to commercial sex have made the Philippine Church's problem narrative more policy-oriented. If prostitution is a type of human trafficking, sustainable solutions to the problem lie in the successful implementation of well-thought out anti-trafficking law. Hence, policy knowledge among concerned Church actors tends to converge on anti-

trafficking legislation. Awareness of the Revised Penal Code provisions that fine and imprison prostitutes is limited. Knowledge sanitation provisions that attempt to control venereal disease is even rarer. In other words, the Church increasingly sees prostitution in terms of sex trafficking, often at the expense of other policy perspectives. This helps to explain the limited amount of Church advocacy calling for the repeal of prostitution-related legislation that conflicts with anti- trafficking law. Policy advocacy overwhelmingly concentrates on strengthening existing anti- trafficking legislation.

An exception to this tendency might the stance of Fr. Cullen, who advocates strongly in favor of legislation obligation restrict access to child pornography. One of his most precise pieces of advice is for the Philippines to make more frequent use of "R.A.7610—the child protection law." (Cullen 2015) He believes this is a superior alternative to the existing anti-trafficking law, because "lawmakers, some critics claim, wrote the law as if they themselves would benefit from them,[sic] it is riddled with loopholes to enable the child sex abusers to escape justice." (Ibid) Cullen is correct that R.A. 7610

might be more effective: framing prostitution as a matter of child protection can more easily preclude allegations that the child sold sex voluntarily. He is quite wrong, however, about the legislative history of the anti-trafficking law. Firstly, the law was mostly drafted by feminist and anti-trafficking advocates. Secondly, the existence of large "loopholes" around sex trafficking is debatable. As I explained earlier, the definition of trafficking is deliberately broad and can potentially include the cases of all prostitutes. The list of offences surrounding trafficking is also quite long, especially after the law's expansion. Sexual exploiters of children escape punishment largely because of the law's faulty implementation.

He has called for the passage of an anti-pornography law, to address the online sexual exploitation of children. (Cullen 2009, "The Anti-Child Pornography Law") Cullen also has no qualms about asking his readers to take direct action on prostitution policy. He exhorts readers to write to their legislators, encouraging them to pass an anti-child pornography law. (Ibid)

Cullen believes that existing anti-trafficking legislation is

best suited to addressing more old- fashioned types of sexual exploitation, which require physical contact between the customer and the trafficked person. (Ibid) New laws must be passed in order to deal with sexual exploitation that happens over the Internet. That said, the anti-pornography law, which was ultimately passed in 2009, was not fundamentally different from anti-trafficking laws that view commercial sex primarily as a type of exploitation. It can be understood as an extension of current anti-trafficking policies, not a competing policy approach.

Anti-trafficking policies have also provided a clear framework within which the Church can partner with the state to prevent sexual and other forms of exploitation. The CBCP's 2014 Pastoral Letter asserts that, "utmost cooperation is needed between Church and State, between the citizens and the instrumentalities of government." The Bishops' call for greater cooperation with the state is more than mere rhetoric, the Church often turns to state organs for partnerships. From the perspective of state actors like the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration, the Church is an eager and useful partner in the state's endeavors to prevent human trafficking. According to my informants in these agencies, the Church has the networks and infrastructure needed to disseminate information about the dangers of trafficking, as well as the necessary credibility to persuade Filipinos to be careful of seemingly-attractive offers of work abroad. State actors noted Church actors' increasing engagement in the prevention of human trafficking. Moreover, the Church was seen as a homogenous institution. Representatives of state agencies could not easily point out any actors who were especially enthusiastic, or outline any ideological differences between different Church actors with regards to the prostitution issue. This may indicate that Church actors have converged on a single general problem narrative. On the other hand, it may suggest that state agencies lack a deep, nuanced knowledge of Church engagement on the issue. Abolitionism is the predominant policy approach among Church actors, secular NGO's, and state agencies addressing prostitution. However, this does not mean that all Church actors and all abolitionists will have cordial

relations, as demonstrated by the input of CATW-AP. CATW-AP is the Asian branch of the Coalition of Against Trafficking in Women, a prominent worldwide network of abolitionist feminists. My main informant was [redacted]. CATW-AP's perspective adheres to mainline abolitionist ideology. It claims that all prostitution is inherently exploitative and abusive. Sexuality is intertwined with a person's dignity, and commodifying it is a violation of said dignity. Prostitution cannot be equated to the sale of any normal services. Prostitutes who claim to carry out their trade willingly have no other viable options, or perhaps suffer from psychological traumas that prevent them from appreciating the harm that prostitution does to them. Just because prostitution has existed in human culture for millennia does not mean it is acceptable or natural. Other grave ills, such as slavery, have a long history, but are today recognized as wrong.

Since the sex trade is inherently wrong, prostitutes' customers must be pathological, as well. They fail to see prostitutes as human beings with equal dignity. Their demand for paid sex should not be legitimized. Sex

trade apologists are wrong for arguing that prostitution serves a genuine social need. CATW-AP, like some of the Church informants, is favors the passage of legislation that would strictly punish the clients of prostitutes. The idea is that the sex trade would not exist without demand, and customers, having the privilege of wealth and masculine gender, have the moral responsibility to *not* buy sex. Besides punishing individual exploiters, such a law would have enormous symbolic value, showing that the Philippines does not tolerate the sale of sex.

What is more, CATW-AP's abolitionism has a distinctly post-colonial/anti-imperialist slant. Many of its members formerly sold sex to American military personnel, so they can draw direct and personal links between prostitution and Empire. Its view of prostitution as being, in part, the legacy of imperialism is another reason why its ideas are compatible with those of some actors within the Church.

It is all the more fascinating, then, that CATW-AP has an often contentious relationships with the Church. CATW-AP has criticized Church actors for promulgating condemnatory attitudes towards prostitutes. Church

representatives have accused CATW-AP members of sexual immorality, rather than recognizing them as survivors of a terrible ordeal. My interviewees claimed that nuns and priests have denounced them as "immoral."

The Philippine Catholic Church supports abolitionist policies, but appears to have a hostile relationship with one of the country's leading abolitionist groups. Multiple explanations exist for this phenomenon. Firstly, Church actors might not recognize the similarity between their views and those of CATW-AP. They may misinterpret CATW-AP's advocacy to the extent of considering it worthy of condemnation. The fact that many CATW-AP members are themselves former prostitutes might increase the hostility of conservative representatives of the Church. Secondly, CATW-AP members may have encountered individual nuns and priests who disagree with, or unaware of, the increasingly abolitionist tendencies of the mainline Church. This may be a sign that a nationalist moral panic about prostitution has not *completely* permeated the Church— yet.

Statistical evidence from the *CBCP Monitor* corpus shows how the concept of human trafficking is

displacing prostitution in the discourse of the mainline Philippine Catholic Church. The most common collocates for "Philippines" are words derived from the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP): "conference," "bishops," etc. However, the seventh most common collocate is "children," followed by "trafficking." "Prostitution" is a notably rarer collocate, appearing at the 30th place on the list. These collocation patterns suggest that the exploitation of children—particularly the *sexual* exploitation thereof—is framed as a major problem for the Philippines in the *CBCP Monitor*. A similar preoccupation with child welfare appears when one changes the main keyword to "Filipino." The most common collocate is "overseas," indicating anxieties about the welfare of Overseas Filipino Workers, but the third most common is "children." "Women" is the fifth most common. The *CBCP Monitor*'s abolitionist discourse is not just about saving prostitutes, but about rescuing *Filipino* women and children. The corpus' view is not only abolitionist, but explicitly nationalist.

I argue that the shift from "prostitution" to

"trafficking" facilitates the heightening of nationalist sentiment in the Philippine Church's abolitionist moral panic. As explained earlier, human trafficking is often a highly Westphalian concept, emphasizing the dangers of transnational movement.[28] It allows an abolitionist panic to become even *more* nationalist, without showing any overt increase in negatively-assessed nationalist traits such as nativism or xenophobia. Trafficking typically involves being taken or enticed across the border exposes the victim to the dangers of a foreign system, climate, and culture. Indeed, part of the reason traffickers might take their victim far from their community of origin is to be able to control and exploit him/her more easily. It is bound up with highly emotionalized discourses about the Philippines' large diaspora, and is another way of highlighting the vulnerability of Filipinos abroad. I argue that the overlap between migration and prostitution, via the concept of trafficking, allows some of the established good

[28] It can be understood as a panic about the phenomenon of modern migration, which downplays the historical role of migration in the Philippines. Lauser demonstrates that mobility has been a part of Filipino life for centuries, even though it was amplified, transnationalized, and institutionalized under the Marcos regime. (Lauser 2004, 66-67)

will and sympathy towards migrants to be passed on to prostitutes.

There may, however, be some conceptual confusions arising out of a combination of indecision and lack of expertise, as in the CBCP-NASSA's press statement entitled "Respect Human Digity, Stop Human Trafficking." (CBCP-NASSA 2012) According to NASSA, trafficking comprises "forced and bonded labor, forced/commercial prostitution and sexual exploitation." NASSA's phrasing brings up a few definitional questions. If forced or commercial prostitution constitutes trafficking, does this mean that voluntary or non-commercial prostitution are *not* trafficking? Additionally, the phrasing implies that there is such a thing as non-forced or non-commercial prostitution—if so, how does one distinguish between forced and non-forced prostitution? Admittedly, these questions might have been better addressed in a document that took prostitution as its main theme. They are beyond the scope of a document that only mentions prostitution in relation to trafficking.

Ambiguities aside, the document indicates that CBCP-

NASSA's approach has become fairly policy-centric. Its recommendations revolve around then-current anti-trafficking legislation, which, at the time of the document's publication in 2012, would have been the original, as-yet-unexpanded 2003 law. This is clearest in its appeal to the organizations in charge of implementing the 2003 law: "CBCP-NASSA strongly supports the advocacy of the Commission on Filipino Overseas (CFO), current Chair of the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT) Advocacy and Communications Committee (ADVOCOM), and organizations that espouse similar campaigns to end this evil and inhuman act."

Another important factor in the Philippine Church's prostitution problem narrative is the degree to which it overlaps prostitution with trafficking. Abolitionist perspectives encourage a large overlap or even outright conflation of the two terms. Will this same pattern be found in the *Monitor*'s discourse?

According to collocation analysis, "prostitution" appears 85 times, "trafficking" appears 333 times, and there are ten instances of these terms appearing within five words of one another. Stated differently, this means that

12.76% of all appearances of the word "prostitution" occur within five words of the word "trafficking." 3% of all instances of the word "trafficking" appear within five words of the term "prostitution."

Since the instances of the word "trafficking" vastly outnumber those of the word "prostitution," the question arises whether the *Monitor* uses its space to substantively discuss types of trafficking that do not involve commercial sex. Answers may be found by examining the *other* common collocates of "trafficking." How often are they related to sex or sexual exploitation, and how often do they refer to other types of trafficking, such as bonded labor? The term "trafficking" frequently appears without unambiguous collocates indicating the type of exploitation occurring at the time. However, terms having to do with sex or sexual exploitation are common collocates of "trafficking," while those clearly referring to non-sexual forms of exploitation are rarer. The fifth and eleventh most common collocates are "sex" and "sexual," respectively. "Labor" is only the 31st most common collocate.

This analysis leads us to the question of why

"trafficking" is much more dominant in the *Monitor* corpus than the more traditional term "prostitution." "Trafficking" appears nearly four times as often as "prostitution": 333 and 85 times, respectively. The nature of the relationship between the two terms becomes clearer if one combines the Antconc collocation search results with the chronological word frequency search results from NVivo. "Trafficking" and its related terms become much more common over time, while "prostitution" becomes less dominant. Reading through the corpus also allows one to see that in the later *CBCP Monitor* articles,

"prostitution" or "prostitutes" might be mentioned only once or a few times, while "trafficking," "trafficking victims," and the like appear much more often. However, most of the time, trafficking usually refers to sexual exploitation, i.e. forced prostitution. Non-sexual forms of trafficking remain marginal to the discussion. As such, "trafficking" is better understood as the successor term to "prostitution," but with a greater emphasis on violence and exploitation. The trend in *CBCP Monitor* articles is less about conflation or thematic change than lexical replacement, with "trafficking" now being the more

commonly-used word to refer to commercial sex. The statistical data suggests that abolitionist policy advocacy has well and truly come to dominate the *CBCP Monitor*'s coverage on prostitution.

The Philippine Church's abolitionist advocacy has a fairly strong policy orientation, as well. It is often directed towards changing the law, or maximizing the use of existing law. Even when the law itself is not referenced, Church actors tend to frame prostitution as just the sort of systemic problem that is best addressed through policy instruments. Prostitution is a function of systemic inequality, unregulated emigration, institutional corruption, or colonial legacy, for example.

Cullen is also notably policy-oriented in his search for solutions to the problem of child exploitation. He is clearly very aware of relevant Philippine legislation, and gives his opinion on how it ought to be revised or implemented in order to combat child prostitution. Of course, this does not preclude a researcher from questioning the accuracy and validity of his recommendations. One of his most precise pieces of advice is for the Philippines to make more frequent use of

"R.A.7610—the child protection law." (Cullen 2015) He believes this is a superior alternative to the existing anti-trafficking law, because "lawmakers, some critics claim, wrote the law as if they themselves would benefit from them,[sic] it is riddled with loopholes to enable the child sex abusers to escape justice." (Ibid) Cullen is correct that R.A. 7610 might be more effective: framing prostitution as a matter of child protection can more easily preclude allegations that the child sold sex voluntarily. He is quite wrong, however, about the legislative history of the anti-trafficking law. Firstly, the law was mostly drafted by feminist and anti-trafficking advocates. Secondly, the existence of large "loopholes" around sex trafficking is debatable. As I explained earlier, the definition of trafficking is deliberately broad and can potentially include the cases of all prostitutes. The list of offences surrounding trafficking is also quite long, especially after the law's expansion. Sexual exploiters of children escape punishment largely because of the law's faulty implementation. Cullen also has no qualms about asking his readers to take direct action on prostitution policy. In one article, he exhorts readers to write to their legislators,

encouraging them to pass an anti-child pornography law. (Cullen 2009, "The Anti-Child Pornography Law")

One more notable characteristic of Cullen's prostitution problem narrative is its resemblance to an archetypal nationalistic moral panic, most clearly so in its use of externalized folk devils. Cullen puts the blame for Filipinos' sexual exploitation squarely on the shoulders of foreign sex tourists. (Cullen 2010, "No Justice") Cullen does admit in one article that most customers of prostitutes in the Philippines are Filipinos themselves. (Cullen 2009, "Sex Tourism and Abortion") However, this idea is not reflected in his overall body of writing in the *Monitor*, where he usually stresses the culpability of foreign sex tourists. Cullen's body of writing provides numerous grounds for why sexual exploitation by foreigners can especially difficult to address. Foreign tourists have enough money to bribe officials. (Cullen 2013, "Saving the Victims") They can also quickly return to their home countries—far away from the reach of Philippine national sovereignty—to escape punishment. (Cullen 2010, "No Justice") As such, the impunity of pedophilic sex tourists is intimately related to their foreign

nationality. Cullen's tendency to dramatically frame prostitution as a national threat has only grown more blatant with time. In 2014 and 2015, he published articles whose titles make this framing extremely obvious: "The Capture of the Children and the Nation" and "Heinous Sex Crimes Against Filipino Babies." In one article, Cullen argues that sex tourism's negative effects are not confined to destination countries. He rationalizes that sex tourists, after having developed a taste for sex with children in countries like the Philippines, might return to their home countries and abuse children in their own communities. (Cullen 2008)

Support for abolitionism is usually accompanied by strong opposition to regulated sex work; the Philippine Catholic Church is no exception in this regard. Legalized prostitution is condemned. For instance, Bishop Pabillo criticizes the United Nations' view that member states should seriously consider legalizing their sex trade. (CBCP News 2012, "Bishop Hits UN") Pabillo claims that legalization tends to worsen abuse in the sex trade, and furthermore undermines public morality by legitimizing sexual exploitation. (Ibid) The *CBCP Monitor*'s writers

acknowledge that prostitution has existed throughout human history, and that controlling prostitution is extremely difficult in the Philippine context. (Ibid) However, neither of these circumstances are legitimate reasons to tolerate prostitution or permit the development of a legalized sex trade. (Ibid) Prostitution must remain banned in the Philippines. (Tatad 2008) Feasibility is largely irrelevant. The point is to show that the sexual exploitation of women and children, and/or the moral corruption of society are unacceptable. Tolerating prostitution would constitute an admission of moral defeat.

The Church's strong commitment to abolitionism excludes the possibility of partnership with pro-sex work groups, such as the Philippine Sex Workers' Collective, which is a loose, grass- roots network of self-identified sex workers seeking to legalize commercial sex in the Philippines. According to [redacted], the Collective has a rather hostile relationship with the Church. At best, the Collective is seen as misguided and in thrall to influence from Western pro-sex work groups. At worst, it is denounced as immoral.

Clearly, the implication is that advocacy in favor of sex work is un-Filipino.

The Collective sees the Church and its abolitionist allies as having monopolized the policy discussion around prostitution. Groups like the Philippine Sex Workers' Collective can be severely marginalized in policy debates; [redacted] laments that the Collective is rarely consulted aside from questions about HIV/AIDS. As in the heyday of the "pink card" system, regulated sex work is only associated with the containment of venereal disease.

Theoretical knowledge of the different policy models was lacking as well, sometimes with serious consequences. For example, a recent attempt to decriminalize prostitution appears to have failed partially because the Church and other religious groups misunderstood the implications of Philippine penal law. In the early 2010's, there were multiple attempts to repeal Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code, which institutes fines and brief imprisonment for prostitutes. The Church was told that repealing this article would lead to the legalization of prostitution, similar to what has occurred in the Netherlands or Germany, per a misconception that

decriminalization and legalization are the same. However, they refer to quite different policy models. Decriminalization means that prostitutes will no longer be penalized for the mere fact of selling sex. Legalization, however, refers to provisions for a regulated sex trade, including taxation and health checks. Legalization tends to lead to rapid growth in a country's sex market, while decriminalization need not have the same effect, especially if other parties to the sex trade may be punished. The Church, unsurprisingly, opposed the attempt to repeal RPC 202, not realizing that removing this provision was actually compatible with their goals of removing punishment and stigma against the sexually exploited.

In short, the Philippine Catholic Church is in the midst of a growing abolitionist moral panic about prostitution. Church actors' problem narratives are becoming more coherent, and this increasingly monolithic narrative permeates the institutional Church at multiple levels. The informants' input also shows that this panic is nationalistic, articulating prostitution in terms of the foreign Other violating the dignity and integrity of the nation. Transnationality was a core component of the

problem narrative promulgated by the Church and its partners, though informants did not fit transnationality into their advocacy in quite the same way. Foreign clients were implied or outright stated to present more complicated problems. They might have a perverse desire for sex with children, or act as the driving force behind the Philippines' sex trade. Other informants did not put foreigners' culpability above that of Filipino clients or traffickers, but suggested that foreigners could more confidently expect to commit crimes with impunity. Complications could also arise if Filipinos crossed borders into other countries. Sexual exploitation abroad would be compounded by the hardship of dealing with foreign laws and customs. For the Philippine Church, prostitution is not only about helping individual women and children. It is also about protecting the Filipino nation from a multi-pronged threat that manifests itself as transnational sexual exploitation.

E. Alternate Narratives?: Subtle Critiques and Marginalized Competition

The Philippine Church's narrative about prostitution is increasingly, but not absolutely,

monolithic. What critical or competing narrative strands can be found within the Church? I explore them here, as well as the extent to which they might prove to be viable rival narratives to the dominant discourse.

Texts displaying a more condemnatory view of prostitutes appear rarely, and only fairly early in the research period. There is no sustained discourse denouncing prostitutes or calling for harsher punishments against them. Individual priests might speak or write in a way that condemns prostitutes, but they would not be reflecting the stance of the mainline Church.

The mainstreaming of prostitution/sex trafficking as a social issue on the CBCP's agenda only becomes more powerful and consistent over time. Filipinos, especially women and children, are seen as the victims of intertwined forms of structural inequality. Besides being human beings with rights in and of themselves, they function as living symbols of the Filipino nation's exploitation. As such, it is imperative that prostituted persons be offered rescue and healing. Some actors within the Church, however, may be more concerned than others about punishing the customers, pimps, recruiters,

and corrupt officials who are directly responsible for sexual exploitation. The result is a nationalist abolitionist narrative of noteworthy power and coherence. However, this does not mean that nuances, contradictions, and critiques are entirely absent.

Some of them are collected in Reed and Latonio's book *I Have A Voice*, produced in partnership with the Philippine Good Shepherd Sisters. (Reed and Latonio 2015) The book promotes a broadly abolitionist narrative, following the Philippine Church's general inclination to paint prostitutes as victims. (Ibid, 1) It is, however, also an exception to the Church's tendency to externalize blame onto foreign Others, and to uphold Filipino culture/Filipino values as an antidote to prostitution.

Reed and Latonio argue that the practice of some Filipino cultural norms can *increase* poor women and girls' risk of falling into the sex trade. For example, traditional attitudes denouncing sex and reproduction outside marriage may lead to the stigmatization of children who were illegitimate or born into blended families. (Ibid, 39-40) In combination with the pressures of poverty, this undermined their sense of personal dignity

and made them more vulnerable to traffickers. (Ibid) Judgmental tendencies in broader Filipino society help push already-vulnerable women in to degrading circumstances, and these should be addressed by any serious attempt to prevent trafficking. (Ibid)

Internal family dynamics can facilitate a person's entry into the sex trade, as well. Widespread cultural expectations of filial piety and mutual support may pressure young people— especially if they are the eldest siblings—into the sex trade. (Ibid, 40) Menial jobs outside the sex trade might not meet these financial obligations. (Ibid) Prostitution may provide the only option for persons of lower educational attainment to support themselves *and* their relatives. (Ibid)

In addition, many of the women interviewed grew up in households with absent mothers— a factor to which they at least partially attribute their adolescent delinquency and eventual entry into the sex trade. (Ibid, 13) The writers gently critique this reasoning. Reed and Latonio do not blame absent mothers for their children's delinquency, or insist that mothers are obligated to stay with their husbands or biological children. Instead, they

say that Filipino mothers' absence tends to be more acutely felt because of "widespread societal gender biases that act to influence judgements about maternal capabilities and responsibilities." (Ibid, 13) In other words, child- rearing is thought to be women's work, and a mother's presence is regarded as irreplaceable. Fathers or other family members are not strongly encouraged to take over this role when the biological mother is absent for whatever reason. (Ibid) Even if another family or community member attempts to take on the mothering role, the children or others in the home or community will consider this as necessarily inferior to the child-rearing that a biological mother can provide. (Ibid) Such attitudes are not absent in other societies, but Reed and Latonio seem to imply that they are especially strong in the Philippines—indeed, strong to a fault.

Reed and Latonio's text bears some of the hallmarks of a conventional moral panic narrative. It renders victims' stories into a monolithic narrative, with little space for varying degrees of agency or different framings. Its dramatic language and use of discussion questions are also clearly meant to elicit a strong

emotional response in the reader. However, it questions many of the stereotypes surrounding prostitution, particularly those that frame the problem in terms of the Filipino nation being threatened by foreign Others. It suggests that certain Filipino cultural tendencies contribute to the growth of the sex trade. Consequently, a genuine solution to the problem involves critiquing, instead of unquestioningly reinforcing, traditional norms. What is more, sexual exploitation of Filipinos often happens at the hands of their compatriots, and may be worse than exploitation or abuse carried out by foreigners. *I Have a Voice* is, overall, a noteworthy rejoinder to the more monolithic, nationalistic narrative epitomized by the RGS advocacy videos, and most other prostitution-related texts produced by the Philippine Catholic Church.

That said, *I Have a Voice* cannot be categorically summed up as a critique of the Church's monolithic narrative, *coming from within the Church*. The book's authorship renders it somehow marginal to the Philippine Church: neither of the writers quite belong to the institution. Reed is an Australian nun from the order of the Sisters of Mercy. Latonio is a registered social worker

in the Philippines: she worked with the Good Shepherd Sisters, but is not of their order, and is technically a secular actor. It is quite telling that these two authors, neither of whom are affiliated with the Philippine Church, produced a work which subtly but consistently criticizes the role traditional Filipino norms and values play in facilitating sexual exploitation.

In addition, the book's critique should not be overstated as some sort of rival narrative to the Church's dominant approach. Reed and Latonio are still working well within the frame of abolitionism, though they question some of the dominant narrative's nationalist elements. The book reminds readers not to become overly attached to stereotypical narratives, lest this come at the expense of prostitutes whose lives proceeded differently.

F. Summary: A Monolithic Panic Narrative

The Philippine Catholic Church's problem narrative around prostitution takes on more of the classic characteristics of moral panic over time. Other problem narratives, which blame prostitutes for commercial sex, drop away to leave the narrative which sees prostitutes only as victims. The narrative adopts large statistical estimates with no question, and does not distinguish between different sub-sectors within the Philippines' sex market.

In addition, it increasingly externalizes blame outside the nation. Some of these are indirect, abstract forces such as globalization or neo-liberal capitalism. However, culpability finds its most concrete form in the person of the international sex tourist, who is increasingly presented as a folk devil. The culpability of local actors, values, and traditions is downplayed.

A reassertion of the nation—its boundaries, sovereignty, family values, and Catholic nationalism—is presented as the solution to the problem of prostitution. This problem narrative *relies on* the externalization of blame to foreign Others. It also allows the Church to

bolster its image as national guardian, as it provides concrete help through charitable programs and claims the ability to help restore national moral fiber.

The Church's problem narrative builds on an older understanding of prostitution as a manifestation of colonial dependence. However, the narrative has adapted to changes in the local sex market, as well as the growing influence of international abolitionist discourse. Adopting the language of the anti-trafficking movement allows the Church to access the movement's resources. In addition, the Westphalian nature of much abolitionist discourse supports the Church's framing of prostitution as an attack on the nation, and of itself as a defender of that nation.

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA FROM THE POLISH CHURCH

The data from the Polish Church presents a starkly different picture vis-à-vis its Philippine counterpart. Instead of an increasingly coherent problem formulation regarding prostitution, reveals many narratives that arise at different points in Poland's history. This is not a linear progression, in which one narrative drops away to be neatly replaced by the next one. Instead, the stories become increasingly tangled over time, as more narrative threads arise in order to attempt to make sense of prostitution in Poland.

A. Out of the Past: From Post-Communism to Ascendant Regional Power

Like many other aspects of Polish life, the Polish Church's prostitution problem narratives are profoundly marked by the country's post-communist experience. One of the ways to understand the evolution of Poland's sex trade is as a marker for its apparent progress from a relatively unstable, poor nation in the aftermath of the Cold War to a rising regional power that is now attracting

more foreign nationals, including some who enter the country's sex trade.

The earliest problem narrative situates Poland as one of several former Eastern Bloc countries dealing with issues of sex tourism and sex trafficking. In the 1990's, Poland was known a destination for pedophiles, due to its relative underdevelopment, instability, and proximity to wealthier Western European countries, especially Germany.

Over time, however, Poland is increasingly differentiated from its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe. It is not just a sending country for trafficking victims, but a transit and destination country, as well. The Church began to appeal to the state to help foreigners trafficked to Poland, evidence for which can be found in the KAI corpus. However, there are no calls for the state to address the issue of Poland's place as a transit country along Europe's human trafficking routes. This lack of attention to the transit issue reflects wider trends in politics and academia, wherein actors note that the phenomenon is under-researched, but do not carry out direct action to close the knowledge gap.

As Poland's pace of post-communist development accelerated, it also became a receiving country for foreign prostitutes and/or trafficking victims. Many are from Poland's immediate Eastern neighbors, such as Ukraine, but in recent years, Poland is seeing more trafficking victims from further afield, such as Vietnam, though such persons are usually involved in non-sexual forms of trafficking. However, women from Eastern European countries are still presumed to comprise a large proportion of foreign prostitutes in Poland.

In addition to ambiguity about the nature of prostitution, there were stark disagreements about the scale of the problem and its proper place on the Church's agenda. Certain interviewees, like [redacted], reckoned that published statistics only represented a fraction of the problem, while others, like [redacted], did not believe that prostitution warranted a high position on the Church's agenda—Poland and its Church currently have other, bigger problems.

The Ministry of Interior and Administration is not shedding light on the question. Its official reports and statistics might play a major role in shaping the national

discussion on the issue. It can also have an indirect connection to Church engagement through its support of Sis. Bałchan. However, it only publishes statistics on the trafficking victims who pass through state institutions. Unfortunately, the Ministry presents its statistics as the *actual number* of trafficking victims in Poland for that year, which might mislead readers into drastically under-estimating trafficking as an issue in Poland. The Ministry does not collect statistics on prostitution *per se*, since prostitution is a legally-tolerated act. It lies outside the Ministry's purview unless some form of legally-defined sexual exploitation or trafficking is involved. That said, the topic of prostitution seems to be growing slightly in prominence on the agenda of the Polish Episcopate, as seen by the line graph below, showing the number of articles on the topics of prostitution and trafficking appearing per year over time.

Fig.10 Line graph showing number of relevant KAI articles per year



As is clear from the graph, coverage is scant in the 1990's, rising in the 2000's in the lead- up to Poland's accession to the European Union. Coverage rises again in the mid-2000's, largely a combination of positive coverage of the activities of Sis. Anna Bałchan, as well as increased overall coverage of the issue of human trafficking. The drastic increase in coverage starting in 2013 suggests that the Polish Church, like its Philippine counterpart, is responding to Pope Francis' promotion of the rights of migrants and refugees, which, of course, include the right to not be sexually exploited. One should be careful, however, not to make too much of the "Francis effect" because KAI may be reporting on the Pope's advocacy largely out of obligation: papal pronouncements are certainly newsworthy subjects for a Catholic news source, regardless of the editors' opinion of them. Coverage does not necessarily equal endorsement in this case. Indeed, much of the papal coverage from 2014 onwards is mere reportage, with little or no additional positive commentary. It corroborates the evidence from the interview data, in which respondents rarely cited Pope Francis as an influence on the Polish Church's

engagement in the issues of prostitution and trafficking. Francis' advocacy, therefore, has been noted, but does not appear to have been deeply absorbed into the Polish Church's social engagement strategy.

Interestingly, the quantitative pattern appears to be similar to that of the *CBCP Monitor*, showing spikes at 2008/2009 and 2013. However, as I show throughout my data analysis, quantitative similarity does not automatically equate to *thematic* similarity. While the *CBCP Monitor* data and the other information from the Philippine Church show the increasing amplification of a monolithic narrative over time, the Polish Church data displays the proliferation of increasingly diverse narratives as the years pass.

B. Dangers from the East

Another key narrative thread is related to the regional geopolitics of the previous section: that is, the view that Poland is becoming a popular transit and/or destination country for prostitutes and/or trafficking victims from further east. In the very earliest KAI articles referring to prostitution and trafficking, Poland was

portrayed as one of several CEE countries who shared a sex trafficking problem. I argue that, as Poland distinguishes itself from its neighbors via its greater prosperity, stability, and regional influence, countries like Romania or Ukraine are seen as Other. It follows that Eastern nationals who become prostitutes in Poland are accordingly Othered, too.

While there is some sympathy for nationals from Poland's Eastern neighbors who end up sexually exploited on Polish territory, prostitutes are considered a moral and medical danger to Polish society. The emblematic figure is the roadside prostitute, who is usually assumed to be a foreigner. The most formal embodiment of this narrative is the letter the Episkopat sent to the Minister of Interior and Administration in 2000, asking him to clear Poland's motorways of roadside prostitutes.

Not only was it produced by Poland's highest-ranking Church body, but a copy is also preserved in the archives of KAI, where it can be accessed by journalists and researchers. (Glemp, Michalik, and Libera 2000) The document's presence in this particular database suggests

that the Episkopat *wanted* it to be seen by news outlets, and to become public knowledge.

In the bishops' view, the prostitutes constitute a moral threat to Poles, especially young people, who might encounter them on the country's motorways. (Ibid) The bishops' language also frames the moral threat of prostitution in explicitly nationalist terms. (Ibid) Firstly, the bishops state that most roadside prostitutes are non-Poles, i.e. Others to the Nation. (Ibid) Secondly, the Polish landscape where the prostitutes ply their trade is described as "swojski," which might be translated as "familiar." (Ibid) This word, as per my translator's explanation, connotes something between the German terms of *völkisch* and *ländlich*: that of the abstract Nation encountered through the concrete experience of familiar rural folkways. It suggests that the Polish countryside offers not only natural beauty, but a way to commune with the spirit of Polish nationhood. Roadside prostitution, in the bishops' view, constitutes not only an offense to public morals but a grave scandal against the Polish nation itself. The Episkopat is claiming to protect the Polish nation from this serious threat, which is embodied in the

prostitutes themselves. The women are called ”Kobiet[y o] lekkich obyczaj[ach]”—women of easy virtue, implying that the women’s own weak morals are at the root of their prostitution. (Ibid) There is no allusion to any mitigated culpability due to poverty, coercion, and so forth. The threat to Polish national honor is exacerbated by the occasion of the Jubilee Year, an event expected to draw large numbers of foreign pilgrims. (Ibid) The sight of lewd women on the roads leading to Poland’s various holy sites would ruin the country’s reputation in the eyes of the Catholic world. (Ibid)

The bishops’ proposed solution proceeds organically from their nationalistic problem narrative: they suggest that the Minister summarily deport the foreign prostitutes back to their home countries. (Ibid) The bishops are aware that not all roadside prostitutes are foreign, but offer no concrete recommendations for dealing with prostitutes who were Polish citizens. (Ibid) The bishops advise the state to likewise deport roadside prostitutes’ pimps, but their focus remains on the prostitutes themselves. (Ibid)

The bishops’ stance on roadside prostitution

clearly falls under the penalization/criminalization policy model. As described in the section on prostitution policy models, proponents of criminalization view prostitution as a threat to social order and morality. This model considers most prostitutes to be morally responsible for selling sex; they are punished for this mis-use of their agency, along with their pimps. In its letter, the Episkopat *is* advocating for a type of punishment. Summary deportation often has a punitive character, even if this is not its intended goal. Deportees are usually left with troublesome stains on their immigration records. They may be repatriated to a situation of physical danger or extreme poverty—unfortunately, quite likely in the case of roadside prostitutes. So, even if the deportation of roadside prostitutes' is primarily intended to protect Poland, it manifests as the *de facto* punishment of foreign women.

That said, the Polish bishops had fairly limited policy goals. They did not ask for the passage of a law that would criminalize prostitution. The goal is not necessarily to change Poland into a country that no longer accepts prostitution, but to take measures to protect Poland's moral reputation on the occasion of the Jubliee

Year.

Since there is no law criminalizing prostitution, nor an explicit desire to pass such a law, the only body of law the bishops are able to appeal to is Poland's regime of border protection, which would allow for the deportation of foreign prostitutes, especially those without proper entry papers. It would be disingenuous, however, to suggest that the Bishops were simply protesting against irregular migration; they did not object to the presence of other foreigners who happened to be in Poland illegally, but were not involved in prostitution. The main point was to eradicate roadside prostitution, and to have recourse to border protection laws as an effective tool for the purpose.

The bishops appear to have been quite invested in the policy outcome of their letter, as the Episkopat's official press agency released multiple articles on the matter over the following weeks. ("MSWiA: Prostytucja 2000; "Biskupi Polscy Apelują" 2000) Fr. Adam Schulz, a spokesman for the Episkopat, also sent an open letter that, along with other letters on the subject of prostitution, was published by the magazine *Tygodnik Przegląd*. (Tumiłowicz 2000)

These supplementary news updates and commentaries complicate the bishops' initial policy stance. The Episcopate cites the Universal Catechism's provisions on prostitution, which says that both the seller and the buyer of sex sin against themselves and one another, but that a prostitute's culpability can be mitigated by poverty and other pressures. Hence, a prostitute is a sinner, but she might be a victim to some extent, as well. The bishops' supplemental comments on the issue are in line with this doctrine. ("Biskupi Polscy Apelują" 2000) They claim that curtailing roadside prostitution has the added benefit of rescuing women from sexual exploitation. (Ibid) Another news update about subsequent police actions against prostitution details the arrest of a Bulgarian sex trafficking gang; in this story, the prostitutes are victims rather than criminals. ("Kom The. Matwiej" 2000) Catechism allows actors to construct prostitutes as sinners *and* victims without necessarily contradicting themselves, but the Bishops' problem narrative has clearly shifted from its initial storyline. The Bishops' original letter only evinced a desire to protect the morals and reputation of the Polish nation; there was no

reference to the welfare and safety of prostitutes themselves, or to any possibility that they might be victims of poverty or violence. Schulz's letter to *Tygodnik Przegląd* (Tumiłowicz 2000) is mostly similar to the original letter, viewing roadside prostitutes as threats to national morality. However, unlike the original letter, his piece states that the Border Guard should ultimately decide how to deal with prostitutes. Any clear recommendation to deport prostitutes is absent.

The bishops focus on a highly visible, foreign-dominated sector of the country's sex market. They are chiefly anxious about roadside prostitution's implications for national honor and morals, though they eventually express concern for prostitutes' well-being. They are extremely state-oriented and law enforcement-oriented in their search for solutions. It follows that they tend to evaluate policy outcomes in a statistically-oriented manner, tallying the number of prostitutes and pimps arrested or deported over time.

The Polish state seems to have reacted to the Bishops' concerns with alacrity. Bishop Libera, one of the letter's signatories, secured a meeting with Minister

Biernacki. ("Spotkanie bp. Libery" 2000) During a press conference, Biernacki committed to announcing his strategy within two weeks. ("Kom. Matwiej" 2000) The Episkopat claims that their efforts encouraged the Border Guard to handle the issue more aggressively, which led to a 20% drop in roadside prostitution. ("Kom The. Matwiej" 2000) At the same time, the Episkopat indicates that the Border Guard was was *already* working to control roadside prostitution. . ("Biskupi Polscy Apelują" 2000) In other words, the Church did not pressure Polish law enforcement down an ill-suited policy route; it only encouraged the Border Guard to pursue a path that it was already on. The Church portrays itself as having key role to play in protecting the nation, yet careful not to overstep this role. It monitors threats to the nation, but does not dictate the priorities of national law enforcement. These mixed messages may appear confusing, but they can be understood as an instance of the delicate balancing act elaborated upon by Grzymała-Busse. The Church should demonstrate its status as national guardian, but also take care not to appear too aggressive or partisan in its exercise of political power. Successful maintenance of this balance

is instrumental in a powerful national church's preservation of its authority.

The Episkopat's statements and actions surrounding the June 15, 2000 letter indicate multiple levels of political maneuvering. The most obvious level is that of promoting its desired policy. It presents a problem and a proposed solution, even meeting with a Minister to discuss strategies. At the same time, the Episkopat does what we might call meta-lobbying, attempting to legitimize its political interventions: it lobbies in order to be allowed to lobby. It claims that its political lobbying is done in the name of national/public interest. It refutes accusations of trespassing onto state prerogatives. Later, it moderates and nuances its stance to appear less judgmental against prostitutes. In the course of defending its moral authority, the Episkopat sends conflicting messages about both its stance on prostitution, and its role in producing policy outcomes. As such, the affair of the roadside prostitutes bears only some of the hallmarks of a classic moral panic. On the one hand, moral entrepreneurs used an emotionally-heightened problem narrative to frame the problem as a threat to the

national community. However, instead of reifiying over time, the narrative does the reverse, becoming more ambiguous and multifarious. To date, the letter represents perhaps the Polish Church's most direct, and most hierarchically exalted attempt at influencing prostitution policy.

Further analysis of the KAI corpus shows that the Episkopat has retained at least a mild interest in the issue of roadside prostitution. However, later articles reveal a much different narrative than that of the immoral foreign women tempting potential customers along Poland's motorways. This time, KAI underscores the role of Bulgarian-Polish gangs who coerce women into prostitution. ("Kom. Matwiej" 2000) The Polish state is encouraged to target these trafficking rings, for the good of Polish society and vulnerable foreign women. (Ibid) KAI also covers the state's response to the Episkopat's comments. It reports that the Ministry of Interior has prioritized the issue of roadside prostitution, and later, that the work of Polish law enforcement—encouraged by the Episkopat, of course—has resulted in a 20% drop in roadside sex trafficking. ("MSWiA: Prostytucja 2000)

The same article reminds readers that, according to the Universal Catechism, the buying of prostitutes' services is a sin. (Ibid)

The KAI archive does not record any further attempts by the bishops to directly lobby against roadside prostitution, and the Episkopat's punitive animus appears to have faded quickly, as well. However, roadside prostitution prostitution continues to recur occasionally throughout the KAI corpus, albeit minus calls for summary deportation. "Roadside" appears 36 times, and in all but two instances, within five words of the term "prostitution." It is the third most common collocate of the word "prostitution," right after "forced" and "women." To a lesser degree, roadside prostitution appears to be framed as a national problem for Poland: "roads" is the 14th most common collocate of the word "Poland." Since roadside prostitutes are assumed to be foreign, the sex trade in Poland is, to a considerable extent, still framed as a problem of foreign women plying immoral transactions on Polish territory. Their perceived presence occasionally generates anxieties about the Polish nation's moral character and international reputation.

However, as we shall see later, the letter can no longer be said to represent the mainline Polish Church's stance on the issue. At most, it represents one key strand in an increasingly self- contradictory set of narratives.

C. Prostitution But Not Trafficking

The Polish Church clearly appreciates that Poland plays an important, but also very complex and ambiguous, role in trans-European sex trafficking/transnational prostitution. The topic appears again and again in the discourse and advocacy of the Church, but has not coalesced into one narrative. I argue, however, that this apparent tangle of meanings has its own internal logic. The slippery nature of Poland's place in its region, as a country caught between East and West, is a partial explanation. Another way to unravel these tangled narratives is to try to dissect the manner and extent to which the Polish Church allows its understandings of prostitution and human trafficking to overlap.

Twenty-first-century policy stances on prostitution are often presented in terms of favor or opposition to abolitionism. One inevitably has to examine the manner and extent to which a problem narrative about prostitution frames the issue as a type of human trafficking. I argued earlier that the Philippine Church's current habit of conflating trafficking with prostitution has aided in the development of its monolithic problem narrative.

However, the Polish Church tends to distinguish between the two concepts: not all prostitution is trafficking, and not all trafficking is prostitution.

There are definitely some instances where the Polish Church views prostitution as distinct from trafficking, especially in cases where prostitutes are blamed for selling sex. (Tumiłowicz 2000) Prostitutes who choose prostitution or are not coerced by pimps and other third parties are, by definition, not trafficked. At the same time, some prostitutes are seen as victims, even though they are not portrayed as trafficking victims. I speak here of girls and women that are seen as victims of psychospiritual trauma or declining national morality. ("Zakonnica od Prostytutek" 2002) They are injured parties, even when no trafficker appears in the narrative. This narrative finds its most prominent advocate in Sis. Anna Bałchan, about whom more later. (Ibid)

The language of trafficking is likely to appear in the Polish Church's problem narratives whenever prostitution is discussed on a large scale. In 2001, we see some of the earliest KAI coverage of large-scale Church mobilization against prostitution, namely a strategy

development meeting held by Caritas Polska, Poland's largest Catholic charity. ("Caritas Polska" 2001) The article cites Polish police's estimate of the scale of prostitution: about 5,500 in all of Poland, approximately 20% of whom are non-Poles. (Ibid) KAI notes the Polish Church's increasing interest in outreach to prostitutes, especially among female religious. By this time, the organization was also trying to address prostitution as a transnational problem, hoping to develop partnerships with German organizations that help trafficked women from Central and Eastern Europe. In 2002, Poland was the site of gatherings for the Renovabis project, a set of cooperations between the German Catholic Church and its counterparts in the Central and Eastern European countries. ("Konferencja 'Renovabis'" 2002) The protection of women in prostitution was a key agenda item. (Ibid) Caritas and Renovabis make recurring appearances throughout the corpus.

Sis. Bałchan, the most prominent figure in the Church's efforts to address prostitution, works in close partnership with antit-trafficking organization La Strada, suggesting that her work is seen as some kind of anti-

trafficking project, at least to an extent (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006, 13).

KAI cites information from the Polish Ministry of Interior and Administration, which asserts that Poland has at least 13,000 prostitutes, excluding roadside prostitutes, and that approximately 1/10 of Poles have patronized prostitutes. (“ ‘Bezsilni Wobec Prostytucji?’” 2009) The number of prostitutes is not large, but the proportion of Poles who have patronized them is. However, KAI does not spend much time exploring the culpability of customers or looking for ways to decrease demand. The allegedly large-scale problem is not met with a commensurate response. Such a disparity might not necessarily indicate the presence or absence of a moral panic, but it shows how moral panics can find fertile ground in supposedly fairly well-educated and modern societies. Empirical data does not always meet the response one would expect from

In 2014, KAI correspondent Anna Maleck interviewed Piotr Mierecki, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Migration Policy. (“Warszawa: Współczesne” 2014) The interview’s main

theme was human trafficking into, from, and through Poland. (Ibid) Since KAI presents Mierecki as an expert in his field, it is safe to assume that readers are encouraged to agree with his opinions. KAI is not directly endorsing a state policy, but the very existence of the interview indicates the agency's interest in the issue of human trafficking.

Mierecki explains how, immediately after the fall of communism, Poland's main trafficking problem comprised the sexual exploitation of its women and girls in Western Europe. (Ibid) However, as Poland became more prosperous and stable, its place in the trafficking market shifted: non-sexual labor exploitation of foreigners in Polish territory is becoming a more pressing problem. (Ibid) He warns readers not to conflate trafficking with prostitution; trafficking can comprise many other types of explanation outside the sex trade. (Ibid) Mierecki ends the interview by promoting the Ministry's upcoming public information campaign, implicitly encouraging readers to avail of the state's expertise on the matter. (Ibid)

Trafficking and prostitution are understood as related *but not identical* forms of exploitation. However,

prostitution is a socio-cultural problem, while trafficking has stronger economic and legal dimensions. The earliest KAI articles on trafficking painted Poland as almost exclusively sending country for trafficking victims. By 2002, Poland had become a transit zone for trafficking victims. ("Kościół w Mołdawii" 2002) Due to its growing prosperity, Poland is now transforming into a destination country for victims of trafficking, which of course includes sex trafficking. ("Uwaga! Handel Ludźmi" 2008) KAI includes input from various human trafficking experts who remind readers that human trafficking also includes labor exploitation, forced begging, and other types of abuse. (Ibid) True, these non-sexual types of trafficking are not often discussed in detail or independently from sex trafficking, but the point is that prostitution and trafficking are carefully *not* conflated in the articles of KAI.

Word frequency and word collocation searches can help the researcher better understand the ambiguous relationship between prostitution and trafficking in Polish Catholic Church journalistic discourse. I explored the corpus' overall concept of trafficking by running word

frequency and collocation searches for "prostitution" and "trafficking" for *all* articles, no matter the countries or nationalities involved in the news covered.

"Prostitution" appears 304 times, "trafficking" appears 266 times, and there are 23 instances of the two terms appearing within five words of each other. 7.57% of all instances of the word "prostitution" appear within five words of the term "trafficking," and 8.65% of all appearances of the term "trafficking" appear within a distance of five words from the word "prostitution." The higher occurrence of collocation, especially before one accounts for percentages, might make it appear that there is a higher degree of conceptual overlap in the KAI corpus as opposed to the *CBCP Monitor* articles. However, the KAI corpus simply includes many more mentions of the word "prostitution" (304 to the *Monitor*'s 85), which allows more opportunities for collocation to occur in the first place.

The fourth and fifth most common collocates of the word "trafficking" are "women" and "prostitution." Trafficking of women is assumed to entail sexual exploitation. Clear references to non-sexual forms of

trafficking appear to be relatively scarce; "labour"—as in labor trafficking— appears much further down the results list, as the 78th most common collocate.

Trafficking and prostitution possess considerable conceptual overlap, but not to the same extent as in the *CBCP Monitor* corpus, nor with the same intense abolitionist fervor. Not all prostitution is trafficking. Not all prostitutes are victims; some are themselves considered to be dangerous or immoral outsiders. Most trafficking is a type of forced prostitution, but there is acknowledgment of non-sexual forms of trafficking.

KAI also covers some state attempts to address the issue of prostitution. KAI reports on the beginning of a massive, multi-sectoral project to create a network of anti-trafficking experts in Poland. Dr. Zbigniew Lasocik, who would come to play a key role in the formulation and implementation of Poland's anti-trafficking legislation a few years later, headed the project. ("Handel Ludźmi" 2004) The inaugural conference covered a broad range of types of trafficking, but acknowledged that a large portion of the victims came from Central and Eastern Europe, and/or were channeled towards the international sex

market. (Ibid) The article is rich in criminological detail; perhaps because Lasocik's criminological expertise is reflected in his leadership of the training program. (Ibid) It mentions that Poland has become a transit country for prostitutes headed for Western Europe, especially Germany, with heavy involvement from Bulgarian gangs. (Ibid) In Germany itself, however, traffickers with a Turkish migrant background are disproportionately involved in the sex trafficking of women. (Ibid)

This ideological context suggests that Church actors will not automatically see prostitution as trafficking, nor turn to anti-trafficking policy in order to address prostitution. The official Polish discourse on the matter militates against equating prostitution and trafficking. The Ministry of Interior and Administration, in cooperation with the University of Warsaw's Centre for Anti-Trafficking Research, have done much to reduce the popular conflation between prostitution and human trafficking. (Wieczorek 2017, pers. comm.) They frequently remind the public that trafficking can comprise various other kinds of exploitation beyond the sexual. (Ibid) The abolitionist conflation of prostitution and

trafficking exists in Poland, but is not predominant among the concerned state and civil society actors. Anti-trafficking discourse of this kind is fairly unique, in that it decouples prostitution from trafficking, and tends to downplay the scale of the problem. The secular Polish actors I interviewed appear to be somewhat detached from international anti-trafficking movements, as they did not realize how exceptional their discourse was.

None of the Church actors voiced a desire to legally ban prostitution, either to protect society or save prostitutes. Indeed, there was hardly any desire at all to change existing policies. The exception was Sis. Bałchan, who wanted the state to offer material support to prostitutes hoping to establish livelihoods outside the sex trade.

Sis. Bałchan's somewhat vague policy stance contrasts sharply with that of one of the most prominent secular actors in the Polish prostitution debate: Sex Work Polska. Sex Work Polska advocates for the legalization of sex work in Poland. This should allow voluntary, adult prostitutes to avail of state protections and services and help to de-stigmatize their profession. Sex Work Polska

has the potential to be a pivotal voice in the Polish prostitution law debate, to the extent that such a debate exists. It is composed by and for sex workers, and some of its leaders have experience in both social outreach and the academe. The organization, therefore, combines practical experience and theoretical rigor. At the same time, the representatives themselves were wary of bringing prostitution to the attention of the Church *or* the State, fearing that doing so would result in the passage of more restrictive legislation. They considered it more prudent to wait until the rise of a more liberal/progressive government in Poland, which would be more likely to pass legislation in line with their ideology. This tactical decision lowers the likelihood of their making a significant policy impact in the foreseeable future.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

D. A Nun's Manifesto

The Polish Church provides few persons or groups who are actively engaged in the prostitution question. The foremost figure is indisputably Sis. Anna Bałchan, who runs the PoMOC Center in cooperation with La Strada, and with financial support from the Ministry of Interior and Administration. I discuss her and her work in more detail here because her problem narrative has come to dominate the contemporary Polish Church's public discussion around prostitution. Sis. Anna did not invent this problem narrative. It is rooted in Sis. Bałchan's own training under Fr. Adrian Kowalski, who previously worked with troubled youth in Katowice. (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006, 9), She is, however, one of the leading figures in the narrative's propagation and development in Poland.

The facility Sis. Bałchan runs, PoMOC, gives long-term shelter and rehabilitation to a small number of prostitutes (about 30 between 2009 and 2015), and works to prevent the trafficking of Poles abroad. Sis. Bałchan's work initially focused on the situation of prostitutes in her city of Katowice, the capital of the historically

marginalized, underdeveloped province of Silesia, but she now takes in girls and women from all over Poland. She is a frequent guest on radio and television programs, and has been a policy advisor to the Polish legislature (Bałchan 2017, pers. comm.). My contacts in the secular anti-trafficking organization La Strada, Sis. Bałchan's partner organization in the running of her center for former prostitutes, also directed me to speak with her instead. This suggests that her views are compatible with those of La Strada to the extent of the organization frequently allowing her to speak for them.

Sis. Bałchan explains her problem narrative at length in the book *Kobieta Nie Jest Grzechem* (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006), which can be rendered into English as "Woman is not a Sin." The core of Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative in signposted in her title. According to her book, prostitution is better understood as a stage in a person's life, rather than a manifestation of her fundamental nature. (Ibid, 5) There is no such thing as a personality type which is most likely to enter or remain in the sex industry. (Ibid) Spending time in the sex trade does not undermine a person's fundamental human dignity.

(Ibid) Society should support prostitutes in their process of healing, rather than continuing to stigmatize them as sinners. (Ibid, 5-6)

That said, healing tends to be a complicated process because most prostitutes' spiritual ailments are so deep-rooted. (Ibid) Sis. Bałchan stresses the importance of childhood experiences and family dynamics in the development of most women who fall into the sex trade. (Ibid, 6-7) She states that the women she usually attends to may have some emotional traumas from their youth, but do not come from stereotypically dysfunctional backgrounds. (Ibid, 18) An inquiry into their parents' lifestyles is not likely to turn up histories of addiction, crime, atheism, etc. (Ibid) Women from what Polish society would consider sufficiently stable, morally upstanding families can end up as prostitutes. (Ibid) In other words, family dysfunction plays a role, but it is often of a more subtle sort that can go unnoticed by external observers.

Furthermore, the sort of childhood trauma that facilitates later entry into the sex trade can be hard to define. (Ibid) It does not always take the form of

recognizable physical or sexual abuse. (Ibid) It may have manifested as emotional neglect, a chaotic home environment, or the separation of the girl's parents. (Ibid, 18-19) Women raised in such families are more likely than others to seek validation in sexual relationships and consumer goods. (Ibid) At the same time, they have been taught to devalue their personal dignity and to view themselves as commodities. (Ibid; Ibid 39-40) This combination of attitudes makes them very vulnerable to recruitment or quasi-voluntary entry into the sex trade. Still, Sis. Bałchan refrains from outright condemning the parents for their imperfect child-rearing. She never suggests that they be systematically punished for mistakes that are easily made, but difficult to detect or define.

Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative clearly focuses on familial and individual factors. To be fair, there are some implicit critiques of Polish culture, especially regarding its consumerism and lack of support for families. (Ibid, 18-21) Polish society also tends to be judgmental of women who have spent time in the sex trade. (Ibid, 3) Social stigma exacerbates the women's problems and complicates their process of social

reintegration. (Ibid)

What is markedly absent is a clear policy advocacy. In contrast to the fairly policy-centric documents produced by the Philippine Church, Sis. Bałchan's book is fairly detached from policy. Policy, in her book, does not play a role as either a source or a solution for the problem of prostitution. She does not suggest that the Polish government change its prostitution policy model, nor its manner of implementing the current model. She even states that there is no ideal policy model. (Ibid, 181) The best role for the state is to ensure that prostitutes are not in the sex trade against their will, and that voluntary prostitutes have support mechanisms to ensure safety and welfare. (Ibid) This may sound like support for the Dutch model, but Sis. Bałchan criticizes that approach, as well, saying that it often leads to a rise in coerced prostitution. (Ibid) It is very difficult to classify her stance under an established policy model.

The relative lack of macro-level focus helps explain why the concept of Polish nationality or nationhood plays only a small role in Sis. Bałchan's narrative on prostitution. She concedes that poverty is a

contributing factor to the growth of prostitution in Katowice and the surrounding Silesia region only because the interviewer prompts her to do so. (Ibid, 39-40) Even then, she insists that prostitutes' emotional and spiritual wounds play a larger role than material poverty. (Ibid) The sexual degradation of prostitutes is not presented as a symbol of national poverty, underdevelopment, or inequality between different regions of Poland.

The question of nationality is further marginalized by the shared citizenship of the parties involved: most of the women Sis. Bałchan works with are Poles, as are their pimps and customers. The majority also appear to have sold sex within Polish territory. The lone exception is one Polish woman who was a prostitute abroad, and then returned to Poland, where she eventually became a resident of Sis. Bałchan's center. (Ibid, 79) Hence, one cannot expect Sis. Bałchan to argue that the Polish sex trade is a matter of Poles being exploited by or sold to non-Poles. There is no lengthy discussion of foreign prostitutes coming to or through Polish territory.

The micro-level focus of the first part of the book is maintained in the latter portion, about Sis. Bałchan's

own outreach work. Despite her project's connections to local and later national government, Sis. Bałchan's narration of her experience as an outreach project manager focuses almost entirely on her experiences with individual women.

She briefly explains that a local judge in Katowice approached the Mother Superior of Katowice's Religious of Mary Imamaculate (RMI) community, asking that a nun be appointed to do outreach work with the town's prostitutes. (Ibid, 9) Sis. Bałchan was assigned to this task, and given relatively free rein, though she received much guidance from Adrian Kowalski of the famous House of the Guardian Angels for Katowice's street youth. (Ibid, 9-10) She then spends the bulk of the remaining chapters describing her interactions with various prostitutes, not all of whom were successfully persuaded to participate in her full program. Sis. Bałchan admits that her Church affiliation may have dissuaded some women, who feared her moral judgment, even as it might have made her seem more trustworthy to others. (Ibid, 12) Should the women wish to participate in the program, they will enter what is hopefully a home-like atmosphere which will promote

spiritual healing (Ibid, 71), while teaching self-discipline and other life skills (Ibid, 85-86). However, Sis. Bałchan believes that a relatively short program will not be sufficient to address deep damage stretching back to childhood. This is why Sis. Bałchan's facility houses women for up to a year (Ibid, 92) after they finish the program proper. During this time, the women can study, work, get training, and make other preparations for eventual social re-integration. (Ibid, 85-86)

As Sis. Bałchan's operations expanded, she searched through the Polish government and civil society for organizational partners, with the anti-trafficking organization La Strada emerging as the sole viable option. (Ibid, 13) Local and national governments have been helpful but somewhat disappointing, especially with respect to financial contributions. (Ibid, 77) As a result, PoMOC, her shelter/help center, is perpetually underfunded, and staff must spend the bulk of their time fund-raising instead of attending to prostituted women. (Ibid)

Another important aspect of Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative is its incompatibility with policy

advocacy. It attributes the problem of prostitution to subjective factors, like consumer culture or lack of love, that state policies cannot address. (Ibid, 3) The state can enforce laws to ensure that parents refrain from abusing their children and neglecting their basic needs, but it cannot enforce the presence of a certain quantity and quality of love in the home. Laws might regulate media and advertising, but, even if it were to assume complete control of mass communications, the state would not be able to control citizen's thoughts about sex and consumption. To the extent that Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative is mainstreamed within the Polish Church, the Church is unlikely to engage in organized policy advocacy regarding prostitution. Personal interaction with Sis. Bałchan during the interview supported this analysis. [redacted].

Her book gives a more detailed explanation about her skepticism of policy as a core instrument for dealing

with prostitution. Firstly, La Strada, which is was then and still remains her main organizational partner in the management of her help center, has no clear stance on whether prostitution ought to be legalized. . (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006, 181) Secondly, her observation of the Dutch model led her to conclude that such policies yield a net negative outcome. (Ibid) It appears to have facilitated the trafficking of non-EU women in to the Netherlands. (Ibid) She believes that there is no ideal policy solution to the prostitution problem—or rather, policy without spiritual and cultural transformation is doomed to failure. (Ibid, 192)

Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative gives accords significance to culture and values as macro- level-drivers. While she attributes the entry of many women and girls to family dysfunction or individual trauma, this dysfunction, in turn, can be partially traced to Poland's exposure to Western-style consumer capitalism, Much conservative Polish discourse sets capitalism against the family (Della Cava 1993, 270; Byrnes 2006, 106): people who are only valued as workers and consumers will have little time or emotional energy for raising children.

Neglected children can eventually grow up into adolescents or young adults who are willing to sexually degrade themselves in order to feel personally appreciated, and to buy luxury goods. Sis. Bałchan's view is not an exception to this wider discursive tendency. Prostitution, therefore, is embedded in a conflict between Polish family values and Western capitalist values. Sis. Bałchan does not usually draw the connection between dysfunctional families and Western values in her own articles, but the link is made often enough in Polish popular discourse, including that of the mainstream Church. (Byrnes 2006, 106) Readers are likely to be familiar with it, or to have absorbed it unconsciously. They can draw the connection themselves, even if Sis. Bałchan does not do so explicitly. One should not, however, rush to assert that Sis. Bałchan and her partners have implicitly elevated prostitution to a matter of national concern. Sis. Bałchan still tends to root her problem narrative in individual or family pathology. Commentary on macro-level cultural factors, such as widespread consumerism, happens less often.

Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative, at least in her

book, is not compatible with the coalescence of a moral panic. She frames prostitution as a problem of individual persons and their families, rather than a manifestation of greater threats to the Polish community. Her view is victim- centric, perhaps to a fault: she encourages the healing and rehabilitation of prostitutes, but says virtually nothing about addressing the possible spiritual maladies of pimps and customers. Neither are pimps and customers portrayed as villains or perverts. Her narrative has clear victims, but no correspondingly obvious folk devils. Sis. Bałchan's views might generate sympathy for prostitutes, but are less easily traced to existential fears about Polish nationhood.

Obviously, Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative is a major departure from the approach presented by the bishops six years prior in their letter to the Minister of Interior and Administration. ("MSWiA: Prostytucja 2000) The bishops focused on a highly visible, foreign-dominated sector of the country's sex market. (Ibid) They were chiefly anxious about roadside prostitution's implications for national honor and morals (Ibid), though they eventually expressed concern for prostitutes' well-

being ("Biskupi Polscy Apelują" 2000). Their approach was extremely state- oriented and law enforcement-oriented.

Sis. Bałchan, in contrast, directs her attention to *Polish* women operating in the domestic sex market. She does not frame prostitution as an external threat to the Polish nation. Her approach is far more individually-oriented, finding the roots of prostitution in family dysfunction. To her, the only genuine solution lies in slowly and thoroughly rehabilitating a small number of prostitutes, each of whom has her own unique problems. She may cooperate with large organizations and local law enforcement, but her approach is far from statist. She maintains her emphasis on micro- level factors, even when prompted to consider the significance of meso-level or macro-level influences, such as the Silesian region's history of relative poverty.

Data from KAI was used to determine the extent to which Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative has become mainstreamed within the Polish Church. KAI's frequent coverage about her tends to fall into one of the following types:

1. Interviews with Sis. Bałchan ("Zakonnica od Prostytutek" 2002);
2. Reports of her projects ("Katowice: Komu" 2005);
3. Reports about her winning of awards ("Kraków: Ogłoszono" 2008).

All KAI coverage of Sis. Bałchan's work is positive. She is interviewed numerous times about her outreach work to current and former prostitutes. Sis. Bałchan's reception of the prestigious Tischner Award was also reported in KAI. ("Kraków: Ogłoszono" 2008) An article even gives readers suggestions on how to allocate the 1% of their tax money which, by law, they can earmark for a charity of their choice. ("Katowice: Komu" 2005) The writer recommends that they send this money to Sis. Bałchan's center for victims of sexual violence in Katowice. (Ibid) If KAI is the mouthpiece of mainline Polish Catholicism, its coverage of Sis. Bałchan's work represents the mainstreaming of her advocacy and its legitimization by the hierarchy.

Extensive positive coverage gives Sis. Bałchan more space to circulate her problem narrative regarding prostitution. She believes that women entering the sex trade—at least in Poland—tend to have emotionally-

troubled family backgrounds. ("Zakonnica od Prostytutek" 2002) Early experiences of emotional neglect, a turbulent home life, or outright abuse can shape a woman's attitudes so that she becomes more vulnerable to recruitment into prostitution. (Ibid) This narrative also applies to women who appear to have entered the sex trade on their own initiative,
i.e. self-recruited. (Ibid)

Sis. Bałchan, as she is portrayed in KAI's articles, does not give lengthy consideration to the transnational aspects of the sex trade. There is little discussion of any additional complications that accompany the presence of non-Polish prostitutes. KAI also contains little coverage of her participation as the Polish representative to the international Talitha Kum network of Catholic nuns against sex trafficking. Coverage is largely confined to her work within Polish territory. Though Sis. Bałchan warns readers of Poland's increasing role as a destination country for prostitutes (Ibid, 184), she does not distinguish between the situation of Polish vis-à-vis non-Polish prostitutes she encounters. This is a significant omission, as non-Polish prostitutes can experience deportation, plus

the resulting stain on their visa records.

In spite of the praise heaped upon her work, Sis. Bałchan's main project is, empirically speaking, rather small. Her outreach center took in only 30 client-residents between 2004 and 2008. ("Kościół Konsekwentnie" 2013) Since then, she has taken on other tasks, such as co-running an anti-trafficking information center, as well as expanding her public advocacy against prostitution and human trafficking. However, she is still best known for her highly-personalized outreach work with prostitutes. One might suppose that her work is being rewarded because of its symbolic value, not because it makes a big statistical impact. What, then, is the symbolic value that the Church seeks to celebrate?

I argue that the answer might be found in Sis. Bałchan's gender-conscious yet morally conservative view of prostitution. I have discussed her perspective in more detail in my analysis of her book *Woman is Not a Sin*. (Wiśniewska and Bałchan 2009) Her advocacy can play a special role within the context of the Polish Church's own struggles with the concept of gender. Poland, perhaps more than many other national Catholic

Churches, has had to address accusations of sexism. (Coyle 2003; Sieracka 2017) Its anti-feminist and anti-abortion attitudes have polarized Catholic Poles. (Ibid) It is therefore within the Church's political interest to show that, despite its opposition to feminist ideology, it is not, in fact, anti-woman. Evading accusations of outright misogyny can lower its risk of alienating its flock. There are KAI articles explicitly arguing that the Polish Church, and one of its idols, Pope John Paul II, are advocates for the welfare of women. ("Jan Paweł II" 2005) It is important to prove that the Church respects women; otherwise, it represents only half the nation—i.e. men. At the same time, the Polish Church prefers not to make too many concessions to feminist ideology, at the risk of seeming to have conceded too much symbolic ground against one of its core ideological opponents. In other words, the Church has to appear pro-woman, but not pro-feminist. Outreach work towards prostituted women and girls is an efficient means of doing this. It can be presented as charitable work towards victims of gendered oppression. As a matter of fact, Sis. Bałchan's work has been presented in KAI within the context of

wider reportage on the Polish Church's purported pro-woman advocacy. ("Kościół Konsekwentnie" 2013) The article even begins by preemptively defending the Church against accusations of sexism, explaining that that the Polish Church's ideological objection to feminism does not stop it from supporting gender equality. (Ibid) At the same time, Sis. Bałchan's work may function as an implied rebuke to feminism, especially elements within feminism that promote legalized sex work. The Church can then pit Sis. Anna's view of prostitution as inherently harmful and exploitative against that of pro-sex work feminism, which recognizes voluntary prostitution as a legitimate livelihood option for women. Promoting and rewarding Sis. Anna Bałchan's outreach is in the Church's interest, part of its attempts to defend itself from persistent accusations of ideological backwardness.[29]

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[29] The KAI database shows clear evidence of the Polish Church trying to defend itself against broad-ranging accusations of misogyny. Pope John Paul II, a toweringly influential figure in Polish Catholicism, is cited as having inaugurated a specifically Catholic form of feminism, which promotes a notion of gender equality while still upholding traditional binaries and family structures. As expounded upon in his 1988 encyclical letter *Mulieris Dignitatem*, John Paul believed that men and women performed equal but complementary roles, and that society ought to support

Interview data from other Polish Church informants showed compatibility between their views and those of Sis. Bałchan. In this context—Polish girls and women carrying out commercial sex transactions within Poland—Church actors tended to view prostitutes as victims, albeit not necessarily blameless ones. According to [redacted], it may not be appropriate to draw black-and-white distinctions between sinners and victims in the sex trade. Prostitutes can quite easily be both. Catholic theology tends to view sinful persons as victims of their own wrongful actions. Sin is inherently damaging to sinners because it distances them from God. Sinners suffer spiritually, regardless of whether their wrongdoing has earthly consequences. Hence, even prostitutes who claim the highest degree of individual agency damage their own psycho-spiritual core: they undermine their own human dignity and ability to form

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them in fulfilling these roles to the best of their ability. Critics of John Paul II's views on gender claim, not without reason, that his brand of purported feminism only perpetuates women's submissive, largely domestic role. (Szwed and Zielińska 2017, 121)

healthy relationships.

Prostitutes bear some, albeit very limited, responsibility for their own sexual immorality. They need to be rehabilitated and to some extent re-educated in order to integrate back into mainstream society. The onus is partially on the prostitute to learn acceptable habits and life skills. This implicit view is far less prevalent in the Philippine Church, where much of the psycho-spiritual work with prostitutes emphasizes helping the woman to understand that she was not at fault for her sexual exploitation.

Teenage prostitutes were portrayed as a combination of tragic victim and delinquent youth. They were sometimes brought to Church-run shelters in order to be rehabilitated—implying that they needed to be cured of destructive attitudes and behaviors. ([redacted].) The insinuation is that they still bear some responsibility, however mitigated, for selling sex. The prostitution of small children for the profit of adults was not discussed; prostitutes were assumed to be adults or older teenagers.

While informants dissected prostitutes'

pathologies, traumas, and degree of culpability-vs.-victimhood, they did not have a strong impulse to pathologize and condemn customers. They *did* sometimes accuse pimps and traffickers of sexual exploitation, but more attention was still paid to the question of prostitutes' moral rehabilitation. Blame was ambiguously distributed among many parties, including, in a way, the victims themselves. Such problem framings preclude the construction of a clear folk devil. When *both* the victims and the folk devils are ambiguous, a problem narrative is highly unlikely to evolve into a moral panic. It is a stark contrast to the dominant discourse of the Philippine Church, where customers as much discussed—of course, so long as they are foreigners.

The Polish Church's problem narrative is also highly individualistic, in the sense of emphasizing the pain, pathology, and responsibility of individual persons. Systemic factors are marginalized. This tendency is accompanied by the widespread view that many prostitutes in Poland have not been forced into the sex trade. They are not coerced by pimps or brothel managers, nor must they engage in survival sex out of economic

desperation. They might experience some financial pressure, but this can be overcome by a combination of hard work and simple living.

The cultural tendencies that facilitate prostitution might be traced to foreign influence, especially from Western Europe. Informants did not make these connections explicitly, but a researcher familiar with current Polish nationalist discourses might make the association. For example, Western-style consumerism encourages Poles to buy unnecessary luxuries (Byrnes 2006, 106):—in this case, even if they must sell sex in order to do so. Hypersexualization encourages people, especially girls and women, to measure their worth in terms of their sexuality or sexual attractiveness (Herzog 2009, 1296), which means that prostitution becomes not only the pursuit of money, but of spurious forms of love and self-esteem. Prostitution, in other words, is made possible by a gradual weakening of Poland's traditional values in the face of Western cultural influence.

This is not to say that Sis. Bałchan gives absolute approval to traditional attitudes. Sis. Bałchan seems to criticize at least some of Poland's sexually conservative

traditions, namely those which stigmatize prostitutes and fail to recognize their victimhood. (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006) She points to widespread sexism in Polish society, which encourages girls and women to value themselves in terms of their sexual desirability, while viewing their supposed sexual immorality in a manner devoid of compassion. Additionally, she notes that Polish Catholicism can unfortunately manifest as a sense of self-righteousness, wherein Poles denounce others' conduct in order to display their own moral rectitude. Prostitutes are easy targets for this kind of stigmatization. (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006, 208-09)

This problem narrative gives rise to a certain set of solutions, based on the concepts of spiritual malaise and psychological trauma. Women seeking to leave the sex trade should look to spirituality and community engagement, instead of consumerism and meaningless sexual relations. A return to Catholic values is presented as the solution. However, these values are not overtly presented in terms of religious nationalism; Sis. Bałchan does not explicitly state recovering prostitutes should get in touch with their *Polish* values.

Sis. Bałchan's approach to spiritual healing can appear rather self-contradictory. On the one hand, she insists that one should not try to force women to change themselves. Then again, women who become residents at the PoMOC Center usually undergo various programs that are aimed at changing their attitudes and behavior.

Besides extensive counseling, they may need (re-)training in basic life skills such as time management, budgeting, and housework. Some women may still be involved in problematic romantic relationships, which are especially difficult if the partner happens to have been involved in the woman's sexual exploitation. All this should occur in a warm, home-like setting, which can help them recover from deep emotional wounds reaching back into childhood.

Additionally, formerly-prostituted women should be helped towards alternative employment opportunities. (Ibid, 192) Once again, this solution is to be applied on a mainly individual basis. (Ibid) She does not ask the state to implement broader reforms on issues of labor, education, poverty, and so on. (Ibid) The goal is to facilitate individual vulnerable women's entry into the

mainstream job market, instead of mainstreaming prostitution itself.

A focus on individual attributes means Sis. Anna Bałchan's problem narrative often sidesteps systemic solutions. Poverty or political instability are not seen as major driving factors. Instead, she points to moral and cultural decline, but mingles this reasoning with a consistent if somewhat narrow critique of certain sexist attitudes. (Ibid, 18-21) She also presents that bastion of binary gender normativity, the stable nuclear family, as the best preventative to prostitution later in life. (Ibid, 9) It is a fairly conservative approach to gender that can claim to be pro-woman, while being staunchly anti-feminist.

While the bulk of her direct engagement reflects her individualistic problem narrative, Sis. Bałchan's view of prostitution also encompasses the need for a cultural transformation in Poland. Since prostitutes' victimization takes place against a backdrop of perceived consumerism, hyper- sexuality, and family breakdown (Herzog 2009, 1295-96), these social issues need to be addressed as important root causes of sexual exploitation.

Sis. Bałchan's belief in the need for cultural change is reflected in her frequent appearances in public fora. (Dudała 2017) During these events, she informs the public about the issue of prostitution, and dispel what she sees as harmful stereotypes about girls and women in the sex trade. (Ibid) She also hopes to propagate values that might prevent vulnerable girls and women from entering the sex trade.

That said, there is a role for the state and its agencies in Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative, though her proposed solutions do not fit neatly into an established policy model. For example, Sis. Bałchan is wary of policies seeking to jail, fine, or shame clients of adult prostitutes. (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006, 181-82) An exception is the case of *underage* prostitution, which is illegal in Poland: Sis. Bałchan has helped the authorities to press charges against clients who bought sex from minors. (Ibid 185-86)

She does not suggest any blanket changes to prostitution law, such as the punishment of all clients or the legalization of commercial sex. However, she believes that the state should be available for individual

prostitutes who seek help in leaving the sex trade. Her suggestions include improved mechanisms for prostitutes to approach law enforcement for help in case of abuse or coercion. (Ibid, 180) There should also be viable witness protection programs for trafficking victims who wish to testify against their exploiters. (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006, 184-85)

However, it is her stance on brothels that most clearly shows that her views cannot be easily classified under a single policy model. It appears at first glance that she wishes to expand Poland's traditional policy of toleration, to include brothels as well as freelance prostitution. She is against the outright banning of brothels, as it might lead to the proliferation of underground commercial sex, which can put prostitutes in even more danger. (Ibid, 192) Ideally, police should be able to inspect brothels to ensure that prostitutes are not being abused or coerced. (Ibid, 181) Inspecting brothels and holding them up to certain employment standards sounds very much like legalization—but Sis. Bałchan finds the very suggestion of legalization an affront. Sis. Bałchan's approach to commercial sex establishments is

neither ban brothels nor to regulate them, and yet somehow to hold them to clear standards. Clearly, these objectives are contradictory, and cannot be made to fit into one policy approach.

Sis. Bałchan's position has evolved over her years in activism. In more recent years, she sometimes refers to systemic factors and solutions in her prostitution problem narrative. ("Godziwa Zapłata" 2014) She acknowledges poverty, unemployment, and unfair labor conditions in the mainstream job market as drivers for prostitution, as well as familial and psychological issues. (Ibid) Sustainable solutions to prostitution, therefore, require economic justice measures. (Ibid) Some examples would be broader access to insurance, or a higher minimum wage. (Ibid)[30] Clearly, Sis. Bałchan's skepticism towards socio-economic explanations and policy- oriented solutions has ameliorated over time,

[30] Sis. Bałchan traces her views of a living wage to the teaching of John Paul II, who propagated the principle of *godziwa zapłata*, or "fair play" in employment relations. By citing the views of this revered Pontiff, Sis. Bałchan roots her ideas in Polish Catholic tradition, avoiding the risk of seeming to have adopted socialist views. ("Godziwa Zapłata" 2014)

especially after she found viable partnerships with both the La Strada organization and Poland's Ministry of Interior and Administration. She now helps to propagate the Ministry's anti-trafficking advocacy, spreading awareness about risks associated with working abroad. Her message tends to mirror that of the Ministry, in its insistence on the need to attend to labor trafficking as well as sexual exploitation.

However, a curious bifurcation seems to have emerged in her advocacy: Sis. Bałchan tends to adhere to individualistic explanations when speaking about prostitution (Bałchan and Wiśniewska 2006), and systemic ones when discussing trafficking. There is considerable conceptual distance between her individualistic problem narrative about prostitution, and her more systemically-driven view of human trafficking. This distance is widened by her practice of distinguishing between prostitution on the one hand, and trafficking as an umbrella term for many kinds of exploitation on the other. Her adoption of the Ministry's trafficking discourse might muddle her earlier prostitution problem narrative slightly, but ultimately does not elide it. She is also primarily

known for helping prostitutes rather than trafficking victims, which helps to ensure that her earlier, more individualistic narrative eclipses her more recent forays into a different advocacy perspective. Her book of interviews remains strongly associated with her public reputation, and she continues to cite its key phrases and ideas, such as the phrase that prostitution and other forms of self-degrading sin are alien to a human being's true nature.

In closing, Sis. Bałchan's problem narrative yields a profoundly ambivalent policy stance. Her approach appears to operate on a case-by-case basis, instead of trying to formulate or select a model to address Poland's entire sex trade. Her problem narrative is also unlikely to lead to a sustained moral panic, especially of a nationalist kind. An individualistic focus turns attention away from national anxieties, and implies that the problem is small-scale, only an issue for a few unfortunate girls and women. Prostitution, understood in this manner, cannot represent existential threats to the national community, and cannot serve as a means for exorcising deeper fears. To the extent that her approach is mainstreamed with in the Polish

Catholic Church, the Church is unlikely to rally behind any strong, clear position in discussions of the prostitution issue in Poland.

E. Discursive Trends: *Galerianki*, *Sponsoring*, and Football Prostitution

The Polish commercial sex market is quite diverse, and yields several different sub-types of prostitution at different points in Poland's recent history. The textual evidence suggests that the Polish Church has taken note of these trends, but not responded to them in a sustained manner: they appear briefly in the KAI corpus, only to fade into obscurity soon after. Three major, but transient, phenomena feature significantly in the data from the Polish Church: a) *galerianki*; b)*sponsoring*; and c) prostitution catering to the demand of fans attending international football tournaments.

The *galerianki* phenomenon was a source of national controversy, especially around the time of the release of Rosłaniec's 2009 film. (Bilefski 2010) The idea of teenage girls from supposedly proper Polish families exchanging sex for non-essential consumer goods touched on broader social anxieties about consumerism, Western influence, and the decline of traditional family or gender roles. (ibid) A *New York Times* article from 2010 suggests that the Polish Church devoted a significant amount of

attention to *galerianki* at the time. (Ibid)

KAI's own coverage of the *galerianki* problem, like the broader national discussion of the topic, appears to have been spurred by the appearance of Rosłaniec's 2010 film. ("Bp Dajczak" 2010) It is noteworthy that KAI's reportage places far more emphasis on the social rehabilitation of teen prostitutes than the moral rehabilitation or penalization of their (presumably adult) clients. (Ibid) These portrayals starkly contrast with the *CBCP Monitor*'s coverage of child/teen prostitution, which is strongly condemnatory of customers and exhorts authorities to be more aggressive in detecting and punishing them. Customers of child and teen prostitutes do feature in KAI's coverage of the issue, but they have not been turned into folk devils—at least, not yet. Coverage surrounding the release of the *Galerianki* film tends to emphasize the negative influence of family dysfunction and rampant consumerism on Poland's youth. ("Bp Dajczak" 2010) There is little effort to search for political or economic factors driving Poland's sex trade. The state is not asked to take concerted policy action addressing either type of prostitution.

There also appears to be no clear folk devil. KAI's problem narrative primarily blames national moral decline, in combination with consumerism, for the proliferation of *galerianki*. The Church has not found or constructed a figure can easily serve as the personification of these fears. The *galerianki* clearly cannot serve this function: they may behave immorally and be a national embarrassment, but they are also victims of Poland's damaged culture. *Galerianki* often operate without pimps, meaning that there is rarely someone to blame for recruiting girls into mall prostitution and profiting from their exploitation. Neglectful parents and guardians cannot be folk devils, either. They may possess more agency and responsibility than their wayward daughters, but they, too, might be victims of a national context that over-emphasizes wealth and conspicuous consumption. Besides, the Church believes that the best way to solve the *galerianki* problem is to support traditional family structures—a folk devil that can be rehabilitated and turned into a cure for the problem is not very effective. (Ibid) The customers of the *galerianki*, quite tellingly, have *not* been denounced for buying sex with

emotionally-damaged teenagers.

The Polish Church may become directly involved in rehabilitating *galerianki* and other teenage prostitutes, in the broader context of their institutionalized role in resocializing delinquent youth. Polish courts often rule that delinquent teenagers be placed with civil society or religious groups: the Church's involvement in this regard is sanctioned by the State. [redacted] At the same time, the Church sees teen prostitution as not so much an issue in itself, but as one of many ways in which Polish youth may become anti-social or troubled. A concrete example of this mentality is the Sisters of Divine Mercy's practice of placing prostituted teens in the same facility as other troubled or delinquent girls under their care, [redacted].

Another transient topic in KAI's prostitution-related coverage is *sponsoring*, in which a young woman offers romantic companionship and sexual intercourse to one client in exchange for gifts, money, or other remuneration. (Fuszara 2018) It may be understood as the practice of maintaining a paid mistress. Interestingly, it is

not understood as a solely Polish problem: a similar phenomenon is supposedly taking place in Hong Kong. ("Hongkong: Międzyreligijne") *Sponsoring* is strongly associated with Poland's female university students; it is even asserted that a full fifth of this population might be involved in a *sponsoring* arrangement. (Fuszara 2018) Ideally, sponsees are able to finance their studies without having to take on low-paying but arduous jobs, live a spartan lifestyle, or cut down on the time and energy they can devote to academics.

There is some controversy within Polish academia and wider society about whether and to what extent *sponsoring* is a type of prostitution. (Fuszara 2018) Certainly, some self-identified sponsees prefer not to call themselves prostitutes, though this may arise mainly from a wish to avoid the stigma and shame associated with conventional sex work. (Ibid, 1174-75)

Such questions aside, researchers have noted that *sponsoring* is quite different from other types of transactional sex. Sponsees tend to form exclusive, if temporary, relationships with their clients. (Ibid, 1173-74) They often provide more companionship than sex, though

the same can admittedly be said for some cases of conventional prostitution. More to the point, a *sponsoring* arrangement often mirrors the more traditional position of the kept mistress. Fuszara even posits that *sponsoring* has some parallels to the so-called "trial marriages" of the early twentieth century. (Ibid, 1176) More broadly, *sponsoring* harks back to older types of heterosexual relationship, based on a stark split between the man's financial support and the woman's "emotional labor." (Ibid, 1175) *Sponsoring* takes this old dichotomy and makes it more explicitly transactional. Unfortunately, this blurs the line between a *sponsoring* arrangement and a "normal" heterosexual relationship where there happens to be a wealth or power imbalance between partners. Theoretically, any woman whose male partner is older and more affluent, and who gives her financial support, might be seen as a sponsee, especially if she is a university student. However, Church discourse tends to adamantly claim that *sponsoring* is indeed a type of prostitution.

According to the interview data from Polish Church contacts, the discourse usually portrays sponsored women as possessing considerable personal agency, partly due to

the nature of their transactions. They tend to operate independently, and without pimps, and, unlike *galerianki*, can be more selective with their clients. Church leaders may also believe that sponsored women have other financial options beyond prostitution; a university student should be able to support himself/herself without sex work, assuming he/she is willing to live simply and work hard. Dr. Kupczak, for example, suggested that students under financial pressure take seasonal jobs in Western Europe, and cut down on luxuries.

That said, the typical *sponsoring* relationship militates against seeing a sponsee as a victim. An archetypal sponsoring relationship involves an adult man and an adult woman, with the former giving money, gifts, and other material support in exchange for romantic and sexual companionship. A sponsored girl is expected to be fairly well-educated and confident, since the arrangement usually demands that she provide intellectually stimulating company and be able to accompany her sponsor to a wide variety of events. (Fuszara 2018) Her status is a far cry from that of the archetypal trafficking victim, which hinges on helplessness and ignorance.

Nonetheless, sponsored women are not presented as folk devils. They suffer emotional and spiritual damage, albeit of a self-inflicted kind. Their pain dilutes their capacity to serve as symbols of wickedness or social anxiety. One is also hard-pressed to find any textual evidence indicating that sponsored women are considered a danger to society at large.

Sponsors are even less likely than clients of *galerianki* to become convenient folk devils. Sponsors purchase sex with adult women, not young teenagers. The circumstances of a sponsoring arrangement might also appear more dignified, or at least, less degrading than a typical *galerianki*'s sexual transactions.

The clients are not presented as convincing folk devils, either. They are not thought to coerce women into sponsoring arrangements, nor to seriously maltreat them.

As with the *galerianki* issue, there are no sustained calls for sponsors to be punished *or* rehabilitated. The Church also fails to exploit the folk devil potential in third parties to *sponsoring,* such as the managers of

sponsoring websites, who help young women to get in touch with prospective clients.

The Church's problem narrative about *sponsoring*—to the extent that it can be said to have a problem narrative at all—concentrates on rehabilitating the women. University students should improve their sexual morals, self-respect, and willingness to work hard. There is less onus on the sponsors to turn away from *sponsoring* arrangements. Systemic solutions appear to be sidelined in the Church's discourse, as well. For example, it is difficult to find calls to reform the higher education system, so that students have more options for financial support, or have an easier time balancing their studies with part-time work.

The Church's problem narratives about these two types of prostitution have some basic similarities. Both of them mingle blame and pity for prostitutes, and call for their moral rehabilitation while sidelining clients' roles in the transaction. Gestures are made towards addressing a broader cultural malaise, but solutions remain individualistic.

A third transient problem narrative in the Church's

discourse is the question of prostitution surrounding large international football tournaments. This narrative peaked in 2012, during the UEFA tournament co-hosted by Poland. ("Przed Euro 2012" 2011) There were concerns that large numbers of foreign prostitutes would briefly enter Poland to serve the demand of visiting football fans. (Ibid) Football tournament prostitution is partly viewed as a type of sex trafficking. (Ibid) At the same time, Poland itself is victimized by becoming the site of this immoral trade. For this brief period, football prostitution was framed as a threat to the Polish nation that should be addressed through established anti-trafficking instruments. However, it faded from Church discourse shortly after UEFA.

F. Prostitution Abroad

A major difference between the Polish Church data and that from the Philippine Church is that the former includes a substantial journalistic corpus about prostitution in other countries. Prostitution in other countries did not feature heavily in the key texts or the interview data, but it forms the bulk of the journalistic corpus gathered from KAI. Such reports tend to fall into the following categories: a) descriptions of the causes, scale/severity, and/or mechanisms of sexual exploitation—essentially summing up problem narratives; b) reports on Church efforts to stop sexual exploitation in other countries; c) reports on prostitution law debates, which may or may not include information about the national Church's role in the discussion.

KAI's depiction of prostitution abroad is worth considering because it throws its framing of *Polish* prostitution into sharper relief: it turns out that KAI's framing of prostitution in Poland is very different from its view of the sex trade in other countries. This journalistic discourse can be understood as an implicit narrative about the distinctiveness of the Polish nation.

Given that framework, KAI's coverage does not simply set Poland against a nebulous, monolithic "abroad." I argue that KAI's discussion of prostitution outside of varies considerably, depending on the country or countries in question. Discussing the news articles pertaining to each individual country would lead to an extremely messy analysis, so I grouped articles together according to the following commonalities:

1. The manner in which the countries in question were portrayed, especially pertaining to their degree of political and economic development;
2. The countries' perceived role as sending, transit, or receiving countries for prostitutes/trafficking victims
3. The portrayal of the prostitutes/prostituted persons in question, especially the terminology used and the degree of personal agency they were thought to possess

Based on these considerations, the articles were sorted into different categories that also happened to overlap broadly with stereotypical constructions of world

regions.[31] These are:

1. First World/Western countries: the most developed and politically stable, primarily receiving countries for prostitutes and trafficking victims;
2. Central and Eastern Europe: seen as poorer and less stable than the first world, and often functioning as sending or transit countries for trafficking victims/prostitutes;
3. Third World countries: seen as poor and politically unstable, primarily sending countries, notable for producing many child victims; certain countries such as Brazil, the Philippines and India seem to feature more frequently, but this may be partly due to the sorts of international contacts available to KAI, which may be concentrated in countries with large Catholic communities;

[31] Where articles seemed to include content from more than one regional category, I sorted them into either a broader category (global/CEE) or used my judgement to decide the primary focus of the article. For example, an article about CEE prostitution that only briefly mentions Poland would be sorted into the CEE category.

4. Poland: distinguished from the CEE category by referring to Poland *alone*, excluding its regional neighbors; tends to attribute prostitution to individual or familial factors, with national cultural deterioration as a less direct factor;
5. Global: articles that discuss the sex trade generally without referring to any specific national or regional context; many, especially from 2013 onwards, are used for giving

The bar graph below shows the number of articles for each category:

Fig.8 Bar Graph Showing Breakdown of KAI Articles by Region



The concepts of First, Second, and Third World are now widely considered outdated and/or politically incorrect, but they continue to inform popular and journalistic discourses the world over. The KAI corpus is no exception. Each of these regions seems to come with its own dominant problem narrative, as implied by the brief descriptions above. For example, trafficking and prostitution in the First World countries happen when a place is a prosperous and attractive destination, but is not able to protect migrants from various forms of exploitation, degradation, and abuse. In some cases, the receiving countries seem to be actively encouraging such maltreatment, passing laws that legalize prostitution and other types of dangerous commercial activity. The legalization of prostitution in countries such as Germany is treated as a negative development that should never be emulated in Poland. ("Niemcy: Władze" 2005) The implied solution is to repeal the problematic laws and institute more protections for exploited migrants. These countries may have to undergo a cultural/spiritual change, as well, to remove deep-seated tendencies towards economic exploitation or sexual immorality. The Central and Eastern European countries remain profoundly influenced by their post-

communist history. They are still sending and transit countries for prostitutes and/or trafficking victims. Systemic political and socio-economic problems in these countries must be addressed in order to decrease trafficking and sexual exploitation in the long term.

Central and Eastern European women are also strongly associated with roadside prostitution, an especially visible and notorious sector of Poland's commercial sex market. Roadside prostitutes are seen as victims of exploitation, but they are also somewhat blamed for undermining the morality and reputation of the Polish nation, should they cross into Polish territory. The reader likely recalls the Polish bishops' efforts in the year 2000 to have Polish motorways cleared of prostitutes, many of whom were assumed to come from the CEE countries. Besides the issue of culpability, the KAI corpus is ambivalent about the extent to which Central and Eastern European prostitutes are truly "Other." On the one hand, Poland is presented as distinct from its neighbors: CEE women are foreign women. On the other hand, Poland *is* often treated as a member of this region, one among several countries with a shared history

and common regional problems, sex trafficking being one of them.

A key example is KAI's coverage of the Renovabis Project. ("Konferencja 'Renovabis' 2000) The Renovabis Project originated in and is led by the German Church. ("Akcja Renovabis" 2002) Its membership is largely comprised of nuns from orders across Germany and the CEE countries, and its goal is to address human trafficking, especially sex trafficking of CEE women. (Ibid) Renovabis tends to receive favorable coverage as a project that addresses the needs of vulnerable women. ("Konferencja 'Renovabis' 2000) Polish nuns count among Renovabis's members, and Poland has played host to Renovabis events. (Ibid) KAI seems to tacitly accept a view of Poland as one of many CEE source/transit countries of sex trafficking victims. There are no protestations that Poland is a special case, or wrongfully included as a Renovabis beneficiary.

KAI's overall portrayal of CEE prostitutes is fundamentally ambivalent. They are victims, but also at fault; foreign, but familiar. The variations KAI's portrayal of CEE prostitutues cannot be accounted for as a matter

of conceptual evolution. The idea of CEE prostitutes as trafficking victims does not replace the view of them as moral threats to Poland; the older view of CEE prostitutes as moral danger continues to prop up periodically, even as more recent articles present them as victims of exploitation. The two contradictory narratives coexist, and dilute one another's impact.

A mixed portrayal like this one is not likely to be the basis for a coherent problem narrative, especially when it reflects an ambivalence about the Polish nation. Poland's degree of identification with other CEE nations fluctuates, along with the desire to join the club of Western European nations, while at the same time painting the West as a decadent Other. (Stańczyk 2013) Moral panic narratives may obscure or defuse internal ambiguities in a community's identity, usually by providing a sense of clarity and simplicity separating Us from a dangerous Them. However, a moral panic narrative that is fundamentally ambivalent about who We are is unlikely to perform its socio-political function effectively. To reiterate a key point from classical moral panic theory, folk devils are important components of

moral panics. Folk devils serve as embodiments and foci for collective anxieties, and therefore lend coherence to problem narratives. A narrative without a folk devil is less likely to become coherent and sustainable in the long term. As long as the Polish Church Others CEE prostitutes while *simultaneously* participating in projects like Renovabis, it will not be able to reconcile this part of its prostitution problem narrative.

As interesting and rich as the corpus on CEE prostitutes, it does not comprise the largest portion of KAI's coverage of prostitution in other countries, or involving foreign nationals. KAI's coverage of prostitution outside of Poland is dominated by articles about developing countries, i.e. locations that are stereotypically associated with the Third World. Examples include the Philippines ("Filipiny: Siostry" 1996) and Pakistan ("Pakistan: Caritas" 2009). Special focus is given to the sexual exploitation of children ("Filipiny: Siostry" 1996), migrants, and refugees. Writers assume that such prostitutes are pushed into the sex trade by war, natural disasters, or economic necessity ("Filipiny: Siostry" 1996). There is an even stronger

emphasis on systemic push factors than in articles about Central and Eastern Europe. The psychological or cultural factors that feature so prominently in articles about Polish prostitutes are largely absent. Third World prostitutes, then, are victims who have even less agency than Polish prostitutes, since their oppression is rooted in objective factors. Third World prostitutes also have to contend with types of sexual exploitation that are largely absent in Poland. One of these is sex tourism, particularly that which caters to pedophiles. ("Kambodża: SIGNIS" 2003) Only a single article about sex tourism to Poland was found, and this was published in 1996. ("Z Prasy" 1996) As far as KAI is concerned, pedophilic sex tourism is largely absent from Polish territory. The following word cloud, based on what we might call KAI's Third World prostitution/trafficking corpus, illustrates these thematic points:

Fig.9 NVivo-Generated Word Cloud for KAI articles about prostitution and human trafficking in "Third Wo rld" countries

It shows the dominance of the theme of child sexual exploitation, with "children" roughly tying with "people" as the most common word. Words having to do with coercion and abuse, such as "slavery" and "exploitation," feature significantly, as well. The reader may also note the presence of terms describing a difficult national/social situation: "poverty," "need," and "aid."

Such words suggest that an exploitative, often pedophilic sex trade is rooted in the difficult economic situation of Third World countries. The problem is systemic, and not a result of deviant families or decadent cultural tendencies. On the whole, such coverage is in line with prevalent tendencies in the global anti-trafficking discourse, which portray Third World women and children as the most likely and convincing victims of exploitation—a reoccurrence of the "perfect victim" trope.[32] This portrayal rests on such persons' perceived lack of agency, due to their poverty, ignorance/inexperience, and origin in developing countries. It contrasts sharply with the portrayal of Polish prostitutes, which places more emphasis on the prostitutes' individual culpability and deviance. I argue

that the tropes of absolute victimhood and systemic coercion are inextricably bound up with the concept of the Third World in the Polish Church's discourse. As one might expect, this section of the Polish Church's prostitution-related discourse is closest to the Philippine Church's *overall* view of prostitution in its own country. Concepts of Third World prostitution can be remarkably similar, no matter whether the Third World is home (for the Philippine Church) or "over there" (in the eyes of the Polish Church).

For the sake of comparison, I also show the word clouds for newspaper articles about prostitution of Poles.

[32] Lauser argues that a similar victim narrative is, to a lesser extent, imposed on virtually all Third World women in the West, even if they migrated voluntarily. (Lauser 2004, 26)

Fig. NVivo-Generated Word Cloud for KAI articles about prostitution and human trafficking in Poland

As one can see, the word cloud for articles about Polish prostitution focus more on the sexual exploitation of adult women, rather than young children. Human trafficking features, as well, but the word "victims" is somewhat smaller than in the corpus related to the Third World. Other words denoting poverty and exploitation are small or absent—there is a lesser emphasis on coercion.

> In short, the KAI corpus's archetypal trafficking victim originates from the "third world." (Uy 2011, 205) To say that many Poles become victims of human trafficking is to imply that Poland is a third world country. Doing so might be compatible with a narrative portraying Poland as the perennial sacrificial victim of Europe (Rosenfeld 2013, 245), but it would certainly counter many nationalists' attempts to portray Poland as a rising regional power worthy of respect from the West: Poland should no longer be seen as the sort of place that is primarily a sending country for victims of human trafficking ("Uwaga! Handel Ludźmi" 2008). Narratives about foreigners being trafficked *into* Poland ("Warszawa: Współczesne" 2014) would be much more compatible with current configurations of Polish

nationalism.

The Polish Church is not wrong to frame prostitution differently, depending on the context in which it occurs. One may certainly question the accuracy of these framings, but such questions are not the main focus of this dissertation. The main goal is to understand what such framings might tell us about the Polish Church's view of the sex trade and the Polish nation.

The Polish Church frames prostitution in its own country as caused by a combination of individual pathology and cultural malaise. Systemic factors and the work of criminal networks are important as well, but these variables are subordinate to the highly individualized narrative propounded by actors like Sis. Anna Bałchan. These framings become clearer when the picture of the Polish sex trade is contrasted with the portrayals of prostitution as pertaining to other nations or regions. Conventional trafficking narratives are located in the Third World. First World countries are primarily receiving countries for victims of trafficking, but also morally-decadent societies whose policies have exacerbated sexual exploitation. This constellation of

regional problem narratives makes it difficult for the Polish Church to settle on a moral panic framing of its own, because doing so raises untenable risks to Polish national identity and honor. Greatest among these is the danger of identifying Poland as a poor, backward Third World or Eastern European country, marked as such by a large-scale sex trafficking problem. The Polish Church, as self-identified national guardian, would be loath to take such risks in its advocacy. Hence, an individualized, ambiguous narrative about the Polish sex trade is perpetuated in Polish Catholic Church discourse. The Polish Church's view of prostitution "abroad" cannot be divorced from its narrative(s) about prostitution involving the Polish nation. The former helps us to better understand the latter. From a broader perspective, this analysis shows how prostitution-related problem narratives can channel anxieties about Poland's ambiguous position in the world.

G. Summary: No Panic, Many Narratives

While the Philippine Church's problem narrative is increasingly monolithic, its counterpart in the Polish Church becomes more and more heterogenous, even self-contradictory. This narrative heterogeneity arises partly out of changing self-understandings of Poland's role vis-à-vis major trafficking routes in Europe. Poland starts out as a sending country for trafficking victims, as well as a destination country for sex tourists. However, as the country becomes more stable and prosperous, it supposedly starts to function as a transit and eventually destination country for victims of various kinds of trafficking. At the same time, Poland's old role as a sending country for trafficking victims and/or prostitutes does not completely disappear: concerns about Poles being victimized abroad persist in the discourse. The mixture of these narratives rests on a deeper ambivalence about Poland's role in the region: to what extent is it a rising regional power and attractive destination for migrants, and to what extent does it remain a struggling post-communist country that produces trafficking

victims? These deep-seated anxieties complicate efforts to make sense of the varying narratives. For example, to inquire too deeply into Poland's own human trafficking/sexual exploitation problems is to suggest that it has not progressed very far as a country, after all. The most exploitative forms of prostitution, such as sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation, are most associated with the Third World, and Poland is not supposed to belong to this category of countries. To choose a problem narrative is also to comment on Poland's proper place in the First, Second, or Third World. So long as this place remains ambiguous, one cannot expect relevant nationalist actors, not least the Polish Catholic Church, to present a single, consolidated problem narrative.

When coherent narratives do emerge, they are rarely conducive to the creation of a sustained moral panic. For example, the narratives lack a clearly-designated folk devil. Traffickers, pimps, customers, or sex tourists are often absent from the discussion. *Victims* abound, but they are often imperfect victims who are somehow complicit in their own sexual degradation.

Their situation tends to be presented through individualistic problem narratives that are fairly detached from systemic explanations. It is not easily presented as a metonym for the situation of the Polish nation.

This is not to say that prostitution has *no* implications for Polish national identity, security, and honor. There is some space for actors purporting to be national guardians to become engaged in the issue, but such engagement tends to be ambivalent and/or sporadic. It often reflects drastically-changing rationales over time, because, as said earlier, there is no single, coherent problem narrative. There is also little incentive to shape or select a narrative, out of the many existing possibilities. Enthusiastic claims about a large prostitution problem in Poland risk undermining the interests of an actor claiming to be a national moral guardian.

As a result, the Church imagines different and often conflicting roles for itself in addressing the problem of prostitution. Sometimes, the Church expresses its role as national moral guardian in a fairly punitive manner. It seeks to purify the Polish nation of prostitution—or at least, of certain very embarrassing forms of it, especially

if they happen to be associated with foreign women. In such cases, prostitutes constitute part of the overall moral threat posed by the international sex trade. It is the Church's job to warn Poles to avoid commercial sex, and to exhort the Polish state to punish or expel persons who sell sex.

The story is different when prostitutes are thought to be Polish women and youth. In such cases, the Church's role is to help rescue and rehabilitate individual prostitutes, and to strengthen national traditions against the encroachment of Western consumerism and hypersexuality. Such prostitutes are victims, but they are also complicit in their own victimization. As such, their suffering cannot easily be mapped onto a larger story about the suffering of the Polish nation at the hands of foreigners. Foreign value systems do not exert the same type of brute coercive force as poverty, or control by criminal groups.

Following Poland's accession to the EU, the Church's discourse has shifted to include anti- human trafficking concepts. It has absorbed the Ministry of Interior and Administration's rhetorical practice of

considering prostitution within the larger context of many forms of trafficking, including labor trafficking. However, its concrete projects tend to concentrate on forced prostitution. In this newer context, sex trafficking is seen as one of the dangers faced by over-eager Poles seeking work abroad.

However, one should not over-state the impact of anti-trafficking discourse on the Church's pre-existing prostitution problem narratives. The conceptual overlap between prostitution and trafficking has not reached the conflation stage in Poland. The existence of non-coercive prostitution is recognized and often discussed, as is the existence of non-sexual forms of trafficking. The anti-trafficking narrative is an additional strand in the Church's understanding of prostitution, and has by no means replaced older views of prostitution as a manifestation of individual and/or familial pathology. Many prostitutes in Poland are still assumed to be selling sex with a considerable degree of personal agency. Supposedly, they are under the pressure of neither pimps/traffickers, nor of desperate poverty. Hence, they do bear some moral responsibility for selling sex.

The Polish Catholic Church's policy stance on prostitution is not strictly punitive. Rather, it remains inchoate. Punitive stances are sometimes but forward, but these seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Prostitution is more often approached as a psycho-spiritual issue, largely beyond the realms of state policies and agencies. Other times, certain types of prostitution are presented as a form of sex trafficking, which should then be addressed by relevant anti-trafficking legislation and agencies. That said, sex trafficking is more strongly associated with "Third World" countries, which are less relevant for Poland and its Church.

In post-communist Poland, it simply not in the interest of the Polish Catholic Church to construct a monolithic position on prostitution. Doing so would take up valuable resources that might be better applied elsewhere. In addition, the socio-political environment encourages the Polish Church's preference for more individualistic problem narratives about prostitution. To point to systemic factors is to imply that Poland is much like a Third World country, or one of its poorer Eastern neighbors—thus undermining a national narrative of

political and economic progress. It runs counter to the Church's organizational interests in presenting itself as a guardian of national welfare, freedom, and honor. As such, the circumstances are not favorable for the emergence of a nationalistic moral panic about prostitution.

CHAPTER SIX: ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES

In this chapter, I summarize all my findings and determine their implications for my research questions. I sum up each Church's policy stance on prostitution, the reasons behind it, and how these findings support or undermine my hypothesis. I weigh these against alternate explanations before presenting my conclusions, and suggest directions for further research.

A. Summary of Data Analysis

In earlier sections, I gave an analysis of the data yielded by each of my three main sources (interviews, key texts, and Catholic news sources). However, these analyses need to be combined because the three data sources are all part of a single research project. They also need to be related to each other, to determine the degree to which the different types of data for each country tell a coherent story.

Overall, the data sources from the Philippines tell a coherent story. Prostitution is considered a large-scale,

pressing problem. Prostitutes are victims, not only of individual pimps and customers, but of an unjust system with its roots in colonialism or neo-imperialism. The worst sort of sexual exploitation is perpetrated against children, and assumed to be perpetrated by foreigners. State and society should recognize prostitutes' victimhood, and focus on supporting exploited persons rather than condemning them for so-called immorality. There is no pattern of pathologizing prostitutes who might have chosen prostitution, even under circumstances of severe trauma or problematic family backgrounds. Rather, they are coerced or deceived into prostitution by others, or enter the sex trade out of dire poverty.

Per this narrative, transnationality usually worsens sexual exploitation, whether it is the prostitutes or the customers who cross moral boundaries. Persons prostituted outside their home country experience additional vulnerability in their unfamiliar setting. Foreign sex tourists might be more brutal to prostitutes due to racism and a reasonable expectation of impunity.

Of all the three Philippine data sources, the *CBCP Monitor* is most fixated on the topic of sex trafficking.

This is directly attributable to Fr. Cullen's status as a regular writer for the publication. It does not follow, however, that Cullen's stance represents that of the whole Church. According to interview data, not least from the PREDA informant himself, Cullen and his foundation are somewhat exceptional within the Philippine Church because of their aggressive pursuit of legal cases and penalties against customers of child prostitutes. PREDA's views do not appear to have penetrated the key texts, beyond, of course, Cullen's autobiography.

The Philippine Church's concept of prostitutes as victims is very compatible with global abolitionist advocacy. Prostituted persons are seen as victims in a rather monolithic fashion, which rarely recognizes differing degrees of agency within the overall phenomenon of victimhood. The self-identification of some prostitutes as voluntary sex workers is never engaged seriously.

Some priests and nuns are promoting the strongest type of abolitionist policy, i.e. the Nordic model that punishes customers. The actors promoting this stance (Fr.

Cullen and some orders of nuns) do not have a high position in the official hierarchy, but said hierarchy *is* giving them more space in fora such as the *CBCP Monitor*. This indicates that their stance is becoming more common and acceptable within the Church, though it has not yet eclipsed the traditional emphasis on mercy and rehabilitation for prostitutes' customers. Fr. Cullen's organization, PREDA, is known for its participation in rescue-raid operations and its aggressive pursuit of legal cases against sex offenders. Hence, advocacy for the punishment of customers can be another way to demonstrate the Church's engagement as a protector of Filipino women and children.

The Philippine Church's use of anti-trafficking concepts is quite significant, as well. Prostitution is increasingly understood in terms of trafficking. Indeed, the two terms are often conflated. If trafficking is rooted in the dangers of transnationality, and prostitution is equated to trafficking, then, by the principle of transitivity, the deleterious effects of prostitution are bound up with the crossing of national borders. The violation of national and bodily boundaries becomes

implicit in the very concept of prostitution, meaning that it is now easier than ever for the Philippine Church to equate the protection of prostitutes with the protection of the nation.

The Church's implicit and explicit recommendations for addressing prostitution likewise fall into a nationalist abolitionist framework. The key texts, especially the statements and pastoral exhortations from the CBCP, posit Filipino values as the solution, not the problem. The Filipino nation must reinforce rather than critique its identity and traditions, such as its family structures, resilience, and, of course, its Catholic faith. To the extent that Filipino values are framed as Catholic values, appealing to the power of Filipino values to prevent sexual exploitation is also to invoke the Church's role as guardian.

The Church tends to avoid interrogating its own potential role in exacerbating the plight of prostituted persons. For example, the Philippine Catholic Church's overall emphasis on sexual purity and intercourse only within marriage can stigmatize prostitutes, precluding them from reintegrating into society even after they leave

the sex trade.

An exception might be orders of nuns, such as the RGS, who interact directly with prostitution survivors. They point out that mainstream Filipino Catholicism might condemn marginalized persons in the name of morality, while ignoring the socio-economic constraints on their free will. They call for Filipino Catholics to reevaluate their interpretations of Catholic moral teaching, and ask the institutional Church to be more self-critical. The RGS also supported the production of a research report that is full of implicit critiques of Filipino values, including the much-vaunted family structure. At the end of the day, however, these critiques are superseded by the overall narrative of a monolithic, *Catholic* Filipino nation threatened by foreigners and neo- imperialism. Such a nation cannot be properly protected without input from its Church.

All in all, the expected problem narrative of the nation victimized by or for the benefit of foreign Others plays out very clearly in the Philippine Church's engagement with prostitution policy debates. Several sources of data, with accompanying appropriate research

methods, were examined. These were interviews, key sources (individually analyzed), and news sources from the Church hierarchy (more broadly and statistically analyzed). The sources affiliated with the Philippine Church yielded a broadly similar abolitionist narrative that framed prostitution in nationalist terms—with the Church itself having a unique ability to address the problem. The data supports the hypothesis.

There also appears to be evidence that my conclusions might help to understand the Philippine Church's approaches to *future* developments in prostitution policy.

In 2017, President Duterte assented to the passage of RA 10951, a comprehensive overhaul of the Revised Penal Code. RA 10951 can be understood as a by-product of the general anti-crime thrust of the Duterte Presidency. RPC 202, the article criminalizing prostitution, was one of the provisions affected by the new law. The definition of prostitution and the prison terms associated with the offense remain the same, but financial penalties have been drastically increased: first-time arrestees can be fined up to PhP 20,000, and repeat offenders can be charged up to

PhP 200,000.

Clearly, the new law may have a drastic impact on the lives of prostitutes in the Philippines. Penalties are now a hundred times their previous amount, and most prostitutes—especially street prostitutes, who are most likely to be detained by police—are unlikely to be able to afford them. Prostitutes might be less likely to approach state agencies as victims of trafficking or other forms of abuse if there is a risk of a large financial penalty, should they be determined to be 'voluntary' prostitutes under the Revised Penal Code.

The very presence of the updated punishments on the RPC have significant symbolic value, even if they are not consistently implemented. The larger fine suggests that Duterte's famously law-and-order-focused now considers prostitution a serious offense—a rather grave implication, given Duterte's strong (to say the least) anti-drug stance and the frequent overlap between the sex trade and the illegal drug trade. Prostitutes may be driven further underground due to fear of harsher treatment and/or greater danger to their lives under the Duterte administration.

Despite it being outside the chronological scope of my thesis, I made inquiries with some of my contacts in the Philippine Church to ascertain the official response to the new law. I focused my follow-up inquiries on the Religious of the Good Shepherd and the CBCP representatives to PIMAHT, as their respondents had previously proven to have the greatest policy expertise among Church informants. I contacted them more than half a year after the passage of the law, to ensure that they had some time to become aware of it and formulate their stance. Based on my hypothesis and previous findings, I was expecting the respondents' knowledge of the law to be limited, and for their respective offices to be in the progress of formulating a clear stance on these recent developments. I reasoned that Philippine Church actors had become accustomed to dealing with prostitution as a human trafficking issue. The Revised Penal Code, with its criminalization framework, does not fit into this frame, so the concerned actors may have some difficulty incorporating it into their overall problem narrative. However, it turned out that my contacts were completely unaware of the new law. As far as they were concerned,

the latest word on prostitution policy in the Philippines was the Expanded Anti-Trafficking Law of 2013. The Religious of the Good Shepherd ended up formulating a *post hoc* oppositional approach to the law, and asked for some preliminary findings from my research, presumably to better understand how and why the newest legislation had escaped their notice. For better and for worse, my thesis has already affected the approach of certain critical actors within the Philippine Church, who became aware of this policy development and began to formulate their approach to it.

To be fair, the national press coverage of RA 10951 would not have been conducive to discovering the new law's impact on prostitutes. Many news articles concentrated on RA 10951's effect on overtly political crimes, such as treason or corruption. (Macas 2017) Journalists understandably emphasized the new penalties that would most directly affect the Philippine press, namely the amendment to the existing RPC article 154, on "Unlawful use of means of publication and unlwaful utterances." (Tan 2017) The wording of the article, which among other things punishes "publication of false

news," has not been substantially changed, but multiplies the financial penalties by a factor of 200. There was little explicit mention of changes to Article 202.

Still, the RGS and PIMAHT lead the Philippine Church on the issue of sex trafficking, and the RGS have even advised state employees on how to properly run a shelter for victims. It is reasonable to expect them to have means of keeping up-to-date on prostitution policy, beyond what is reported in mainstream news media. The fact that they remained unaware of RA 10951 for some time is significant. It also has implications for the broader national anti-trafficking movement. The anti-trafficking movement in the Philippines is very well-networked, so it is remarkable that none of the actors' contacts in the legislature, the state, or in NGO's alerted them to the RA 10951 and its implications.

The Philippine Church's lack of coordinated response to RA 10951 supports my point that prostitution is increasingly framed as an issue of transnational sex trafficking. Policy developments and debates that do not fit this framing are likely to slip past the Church's notice. This demonstrates some of the dangers of moral panic

narratives: adoption of increasingly monolithic problem narratives might lead moral entrepreneurs to ignore victims who do not fit the established paradigm.

The data generated by research into the Polish Church differs markedly, most obviously in terms of quantity. There were few interview contacts and key texts available. The volume of Catholic news items was much higher than the output of the selected Philippine source, but most of these articles were about prostitution that had nothing to do with Poland or Poles. Overall, the data showed that the Polish Church was far less engaged in the issue of prostitution and its attendant policy debates.

In comparison to the Philippine data, the sources from Poland yielded a far less coherent narrative. In addition, the expected anxiety about foreign prostitutes corrupting Polish morals did not materialize to the expected degree. Some early documents from KAI indicated what might be described as a rather short-lived nationalistic moral panic—but with prostitutes themselves, rather than customers, being the foreign folk devils. I refer here to the Episkopat's brief campaign to have roadside prostitutes deported. This portion of the

data was in keeping with my hypothesis, but I prefer not to rely on it too much for general conclusions about the Polish Church. This problem narrative was sustained for only a few months, and in any case, drawing conclusions from it would be tautological, since the incident gave rise to my initial hypothesis.

Indeed, most of the data from the Polish Church refutes my hypothesis. The overwhelming tendency is towards portraying prostitutes as victims. They are not seen as having the absolute victimhood accorded to prostitutes in the Philippines, but their agency and therefore culpability are viewed as limited. Family problems or a pattern of chaotic, abusive relationships tends to push such women into the sex trade. It must be noted that the problem of prostitution was viewed in an individualized, spiritualized manner: a result of the psychological and spiritual malaise of a few women/girls and their families. Curiously, this discourse appears to have been adopted by the Polish Catholic hierarchy, partly for use as a favorable representation of Catholic social engagement that is pro-women while making no real concessions to feminism.

However, this problem narrative has not been translated into a sustained abolitionist policy advocacy. This is because, as mentioned earlier, prostitution is largely attributed to the immorality and deviancy of exceptional individuals. The logical conclusion of this problem narrative is to call for individualized support for victims, rather than comprehensive policy changes.

The Polish Church is theoretically free to attempt to frame prostitution as a large-scale problem that implies that the entire Polish nation is threatened. In Poland, however, such a narrative pays no such dividends. Therefore, it does not behoove the Church to become sustainably engaged in abolitionist policy advocacy the way the Philippine Church has. Indeed, it might damage the Church's position to even bring up the possibility the Poland has a large sex industry or systemic factors facilitating the growth of a sex industry; such notions imply that Poland has not progressed very much beyond status as just another post-communist country.

Another surprising characteristic of the data from the Polish Church is the high volume of coverage about prostitution in other countries. This discussion differs

greatly from what is said about prostitution within Poland. According to Church sources, prostitutes in other countries experience much worse coercion and abuse, and the sex market itself proliferates on a much larger scale. The most outrage-inducing form of prostitution, i.e. the sexual exploitation of young children by perverts/pedophiles, is attributed to other countries. Poland's own problems with youth prostitution are discussed rather differently. Such prostitutes are assumed as teenagers rather than young children, and their customers are not pathologized. There are no sustained calls to punish or reform the customers of teenage prostitutes, nor are there larger-scale, direct indictments of a culture that condones the demand for paid sex with teenagers. Indeed, the Church focuses more on treating the pathology of teenage prostitutes as delinquent youths, rather than addressing the problem of Poles buying sex with vulnerable, underaged persons. The Polish Church seems to believe that prostitution has little impact on Poland, and is much more keenly felt in other countries. The Polish Church might view victims of sexual exploitation in countries like Brazil and Thailand with

compassion, but they have little to do with protecting the Polish nation. It is not so much that prostitutes are seen as foreigners and therefore outside the Polish sphere of responsibility, but that *prostitution itself is not considered a pressing problem for the country*.

Prostitution does not become an urgent issue even when we factor in the Church's trafficking discourse. It is true that the work of Sis. Bałchan and, to a lesser extent, that of other nuns, is recognized as anti-trafficking outreach. However, the Polish Church does not conflate trafficking with transnational prostitution to the same extent as the Philippine Church. Polish Church actors easily acknowledge that prostitution can take many forms beyond sexual exploitation. Hence, the partial classification of Sis. Bałchan's work as anti-trafficking outreach is not indicative of a nationalist, abolitionist moral panic within the Polish Church.

B. Consideration of Alternate Explanations

In the interest of due diligence, I consider the most compelling alternate explanations. Research turned up two major intervening factors: 1)the decision to accept or refuse Francis' challenge to prioritize the fight against human trafficking; and 2) the presence or absence of USAID funding. Both were examined to determine whether they could function as explanatory variables for the divergence in policy advocacy noted between the Philippine and Polish national Churches.

Francis' papacy is often reported as markedly different from that of his two predecessors. Of course, some reports warn that this difference is exaggerated, and that his approach is only superficially different. However, his papacy *can* be interpreted as having a greater focus on social justice and a more forgiving attitude to sexual morality. (Sławek 2016) One of the issues receiving greater focus under his pontificate is that of migration, with the attendant risk of migrant trafficking. (O'Connell 2016) Pope Francis calls for welcoming, compassionate treatment of migrants, and has placed added emphasis on

the plight of refugees in the wake of the Syrian conflict. (Ibid)

My research suggests that Pope Francis' influence on the Philippine Church's approach to the prostitution issue is significant. Interviews with CBCP-affiliated contacts consistently contained references to Pope Francis. His wishes appear to be one of the most important immediate drivers for the CBCP's recent increased interest in the issue of trafficking. An NVivo-based analysis of the CBCP from 2013 onwards shows: a) a marked rise in the frequency and depth of references to trafficking, and b) the high level of co-occurrence of references to prostitution/trafficking and Francis/Pope. The reader may refer back to the word cloud showing *CBCP Monitor* coverage from 2013 to 2015. Adherence to Francis' teachings is likely encouraged by the Pope's great popularity among the Filipino laity. (Pardyka 2016)

On the other hand, Francis' words urging compassion for refugees have met a relatively frosty welcome in Poland. The international press reported tension between him and the local clergy around the time of his 2016 World Youth Day visit, during which he

urged Poland to welcome Syrians fleeing conflict in their homeland. (Scislowska 2015) He is also somewhat less popular among ordained clergy in Poland, and his approach is seen as uncomfortable departure from that of Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI. (Ibid)

Could the difference in the Philippine and Polish Churches' level of engagement be explained by the 'Francis Factor?'

Francis' influence on the course of human trafficking discourse in the Philippine Church is no doubt significant. He appears to have been key in elevating the issue to the attention of the CBCP. The CBCP offices (CBCP-NASSA, ECMI, and the Commission on Women) most involved in the prostitution question all cite his influence.

Nonetheless, the present-day Philippine Church is not obliged to Pope Francis for the *content* of its anti-trafficking approach. It uses similar approaches and language to those that have already been present in Philippine anti-trafficking discourse. This includes an emphasis on the plight of Philippine OFW's that was prevalent even before the explicit adoption of abolitionist

language or even the word "trafficking" itself. As discussed at length in the data analysis section, articles in the CBCP Monitor tend to explicitly be about Filipino migrants or trafficking victims, and even the pieces which begin by discussing migration in general soon turn to the situation of Filipinos. In addition, the CBCP offices mentioned above construct projects which are of relevance to the Philippines and/or Filipinos. While the Church enthusiastically references Francis' advocacy for migrants in general, it rarely draws from his emphasis on the plight of refugees in particular. The refugee issue is not directly relevant for the Philippines. The country contains fluctuating numbers of internally displaced persons, but is not a significant source country for international refugees.

The Philippine Church has also retained its own approach to the issue of human trafficking, even as it draws from Pope Francis' renewed focus on the issue. The Pope's rhetoric about human trafficking and/or sexual exploitation is rather general, in the sense of rarely naming countries or regions for emphasis. The words in themselves appear to be a call for concern for *all* victims,

everywhere. (O'Connell 2016) An understandable exception is his special attention to the Syrian refugee crisis. (Scislowska 2015) However, the Philippine Church has not approached the same issue with the same emphases as Pope Francis. The Philippine Church has translated the Pope's injunction into a stronger emphasis on the aspects of the sex trade which are of greatest relevance to Filipino national interest. The approach of the Philippine Church is, in a manner of speaking, still inward-looking and almost entirely concerned with the problem of prostituted/trafficked Filipinos, especially those who are exploited for the benefit of foreign customers.

Francis' influence on the Philippine Church regarding migration and trafficking issues contrasts sharply with his relationship with the Polish Church. In Poland, Francis' reformist, socially-conscious approach is met with skepticism. His focus on social justice issues and de- emphasis on hardline sexual morality are also uncomfortably reminiscent of liberation theology. Liberation theology, with its strong Marxist roots, was negatively received by Pope John Paul II and continues to

be marginalized within Poland. (Kirk 1985) His exhortations to be more receptive to migrants and refugees caused tensions between himself and the Polish hierarchy. (Allen 2016)

The Polish Church's mixed-to-hostile reaction to Pope Francis also has to do with their own notions of religious nationalism. As reported by analysts, Francis discomfits the Polish Church because he appears to deviate too much from the teachings of John Paul II (Allen 2016)— the 'Polish Pope' whose renown rests on the narratives around his role in precipitating the fall of communism in Poland and, less directly, elsewhere in the former Eastern Bloc. John Paul II is emblematic of how a Polish religious leader can come to protect and even embody the nation (Klekot 2007), and Francis' perceived departure from his teachings may also be felt as a denigration of Polish religious nationalism. Furthermore, the construction of Polish national identity prevalent among Polish political/religious conservatives is that of a homogeneous nation, bound by shared Polish ethnicity and Catholic religious affiliation. (Zubrzycki 2001) A significant influx of migrants/refugees who are racially or

religiously Other would threaten this construction, which partially explains why Poland has been more welcoming to Ukrainian refugees than Syrian ones. (Macdowall 2016) However, Pope Francis himself might not have much to do with heightening reactions against foreign prostitutes and trafficking victims. The Polish Catholic hierarchy already expressed hostile attitudes towards foreign prostitutes in 2000, many years before Francis' accession to the papacy. The wariness about foreign migrants, including prostitutes or sex workers, is not a response to Francis. Its persistence is better understood as a sign that Francis' message has not penetrated deeply into the Polish Church.

I now discus the role of U.S. government funding as a factor in shaping the national Churches' approach to prostitution policy. The American government's primary aid agency is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). While active all over the world, its level of engagement in different countries is uneven, and does not necessarily align with Washington's current configuration of alliances. Both Poland and the Philippines are allies of the United States, but USAID

appears to be far more active in the Philippines. The USAID Mission Directory lists a Philippines-based mission contact, as well as a U.S.-based USAID contact responsible for liaising with Philippine partners. (USAID 2017) The Directory has no entry at all for Poland. (Ibid)

USAID is known for tying its financial support to its ideology. During George W. Bush's presidency, it famously refused to fund organizations that promoted more comprehensive forms of sex education. (Chuang 2010, 1715; Austria 2004, 99) It instead supported groups which favored abstinence-only sex education. This ideologically-rooted approach also appears in USAID's partnerships with organizations that address prostitution and/or trafficking. Local beneficiaries of USAID funding are often obliged to sign a pledge to uphold abolitionist policies. (Chuang 2014, 618) Those which promote regulated prostitution are far less likely to receive funding. A research contact in Poland informally suggested that the presence or absence of U.S. government funding might be a critical factor in steering the type and degree of engagement of church actors.

My own research shows that there is a significant

divergence in USAID's degree of financial engagement in the Philippines as compared to Poland. USAID does not have an office or mission contact in Poland. This means that Polish groups might have a harder time liaising with USAID, even if they might have a strong interest in doing so. I found out during the course of my field work that USAID has several Catholic Church partnerships in the Philippines. It was hence worthwhile to consider whether USAID funding largely explains the proliferation of abolitionist Catholic advocacy in the Philippines. However, according to my personal email correspondence with Eugenio Gonzales of the administrating Phil-Am Fund, USAID is not the main funder of any of these organizations. It facilitates some of their projects, but is not critical to the organizations' operation or survival. Philippine Church-affiliated groups dedicated to the prevention of trafficking can survive and operate without USAID support.

My conversations with Dr. Scott MacLochlainn of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Ethnic and Religious Diversity shed some light on the complex position of USAID in the crowded field of Philippine

development aid. He stated that, during his field work, he encountered many Church entities that received support from the Dutch government. He believes it is possible that Dutch funding now has a greater presence than U.S. funding within the Philippine Church. This information is merely anecdotal, but it suggests that Washington does not have a monopoly on using its funds to support anti-sex trafficking projects within the Philippine Church. My own observations while doing field work suggested the significant presence of Dutch *and* German funding. The Church, in other words, accepts a great deal of money from states which famously support legalized prostitution, but clearly, this policy position has not made its way into the advocacy of the Philippine Church.

This anecdotal and experiential evidence is supported by information from the online database of the International Aid Transparency Initiative. The database is not comprehensive, and relies on the reportage of NGO's themselves and other sources. However, a search for anti-human trafficking programs in the Philippines gives some idea of the diversity of the funding sources. The site does not have any filters or sub-filters for organizations dealing

with human trafficking or prostitution. However, a researcher may use the search function to find all the funding projects dealing with human trafficking in a given country.

USAID is a major project funder for anti-trafficking programs in the Philippines, but the Netherlands, the EU, and the United Nations are important donors, as well. Both the Netherlands and the United Nations support the legalization of sex work. The stance of the EU fluctuates over time, but several of its member states also provide for legal sex work in their own territory. If funding did dictate the ideology of Catholic and other Philippine organizations involved in the prostitution issue, the anti-prostitution perspective would be less dominant.

There would be a diverse group of organizations promoting or at least considering the prospect of legalized sex work in the Philippines. However, anti-prostitution is definitely the mainstream perspective, with the Philippine Sex Workers Collective being more or less the lone exception. The United States' advocacy-via-funding cannot explain why the abolitionist

perspective is practically the only narrative among civil society actors. It is more appropriate to say that USAID funding, rather than forming prostitution policy within the Philippine Church, amplifies an abolitionist approach which was already present.

C. Conclusions

This thesis aimed to explore political explanations for why religious institutions might or might become engaged in a particular policy issue, and if so, why this engagement takes a certain form. It used a "most similar systems" comparative design, concentrating on the Catholic Churches of Poland and the Philippines, and testing a hypothesis as to why the former church's engagement was sporadic and ideologically diverse, and the latter was sustained and increasingly abolitionist over time. Here, I expound on how my data either confirmed or refuted my hypotheses about the Philippine and Polish Churches' stances on prostitution policy, and the extent to which these could be attributed to nationalist moral panics.

It was clear early on that theology alone would not provide answers. Existing theological tradition on prostitution is both scant and self-contradictory, leaving Churches a great deal of flexibility to develop their own stance according to their own context and interests. Hence, I attempted to find an explanation that draws on

the traditions of Political Science and Sociology.

My hypothesis is based on the idea that Churches can be understood as moral entrepreneurs whose responses to policy issues sometimes take the shape of a moral panic. They promote highly emotional, monolithic framings of a given problem narrative, which are not entirely detached from empirical reality, but nevertheless present a simplistic, even misleading portrait of the phenomenon in question. Moral entrepreneurs become so attached to their problem narratives because they reflect the actors' ideological and organizational interests. Since the ideological interest (i.e. theological doctrine) of Churches is flexible regarding prostitution, I decided to concentrate on the national Churches' organizational interests as the determining factor. From a political standpoint, the organizational interest of any church involves the acquisition or maintenance of moral authority, which it can then channel into political influence. Moral authority comes from the national Church being able to successfully frame itself as the protector of the nation and its interest; the most successful Churches become indispensable pillars of national identity—or, at least, they come to be seen this

way by enough influential actors. Once achieved, high levels of moral authority need to be regularly maintained, lest the Church's influence erode over time. One way to maintain authority is to perform acts that defend or promote national interest or national identity. National Churches are more likely to invest their considerable—but not infinite—resources in issues that pay these kinds of political dividends. My hypothesis was that the Philippine Church would be increasingly abolitionist, while the Polish Church would advocate for the penalization of prostitutes. These differing policy stances would be explained in terms of moral panic responses to different national contexts. The Philippine Church's response was a nationalistic moral panic that, among other things, served its political/organizational interests, while in Poland, historical circumstances were not in favor of the adoption of prostitution as the target of such panic, though the Polish Church might sporadically target foreign prostitutes as objects of moral panic.

I contend that, in the Philippines, the issue of prostitution can pay significant political dividends, especially if understood as the exploitation of Filipino

women and children by foreigners and complicit elites. This is why abolitionist activism is increasingly foregrounded and adopted by the hierarchy. Most of the Church's proposed solutions to the problem serve its organizational interests, as well, by implicitly promoting its own unique capacity to shelter prostituted persons, shift Filipino's attitudes towards prostitutes from condemnation to compassion, and protect Filipino society against the temptation to profit from sexual exploitation. Some priests and nuns are promoting the strongest type of abolitionist policy, i.e. the Nordic model that punishes customers. The actors promoting this stance (Fr. Cullen and some orders of nuns) do not have a high position in the official hierarchy, but said hierarchy *is* giving them more space in fora such as the *CBCP Monitor*. This indicates that their stance is becoming more common and acceptable within the Church, though it has not yet eclipsed the traditional emphasis on mercy and rehabilitation for prostitutes' customers. Fr. Cullen's organization, PREDA, is known for its participation in rescue-raid operations and its aggressive pursuit of legal cases against sex offenders. Hence,

advocacy for the punishment of customers can be another way to demonstrate the Church's engagement as a protector of Filipino women and children.

Several sources of data, with accompanying appropriate research methods, were examined. These were interviews, key sources (individually analyzed), and news sources from the Church hierarchy (more broadly and statistically analyzed). The sources affiliated with the Philippine Church yielded a broadly similar abolitionist narrative that framed prostitution in nationalist terms—with the Church itself having a unique ability to address the problem.

In contrast, the Polish Church's weak, ideologically-incoherent engagement in prostitution policy debates is not explained by the expected problem narrative. The narrative of prostitutes as dangerous, foreign women threatening Poland only explains the behavior of a small, albeit influential part of the Polish Church (the Episkopat) for a limited time period (a few weeks in 2000). It is only a small portion of the Polish Church's heterogenous, fluctuating approach to prostitution. The Church has not developed a coherent

problem narrative around prostitution because there has been little incentive for it to do so. The closest thing that the Polish Church now has to a dominant narrative is that propounded by Sis. Bałchan, which, once again, is that of prostitution as the manifestation of a few vulnerable individuals' long-term spiritual malaise. Sis. Bałchan's own problem narrative is in a period of flux, because she sometimes adopts the more systemic view of the Ministry of Interior and Administration, as a key partner in its anti-trafficking projects.

Despite the data's refutation of the concrete hypothesis, it is still possible to explain the research outcome in terms of the thesis's underlying theoretical concepts. One can still approach the Church as an interest group which, in this case, acts to preserve its historical role as national guardian. It is not in the Church's interest to frame prostitution as a large-scale national problem, no matter the perceived nationality of the prostitutes. Doing so would undermine attempts to project itself as a guardian of national cohesion, morals, and honor. However, it *is* in the Church's interest to frame prostitution as a small-scale problem, which nuns and priests like Sis. Anna Bałchan

can address by attending to the spiritual rehabilitation of a few deviant individuals. In this way, the Polish Church can demonstrate concern for Polish girls and women, despite its fierce condemnation of feminism. The thesis's basic theoretical principles can still explain why the Philippine and Polish Churches have such different policy approaches, if not quite in the way expected.

I also considered the possible impact of two factors which might be better explanatory variables. However, Francis' papacy began slightly too late to fully account for the Philippine Church's pro-abolitionist response, and USAID is not sufficiently dominant to explain the virtual ideological monopoly of abolitionism. The presence of the two intervening factors does not alter my main conclusions.

Churches are 'special' actors in some ways, given their recourse to supernatural sources of authority, and their controversial place in politics, especially in countries that claim to be secular. However, it can still be illuminating to study them as very earthbound and even conventional political entities. Studying Churches' policy engagement—or lack thereof—in a many-sided,

theologically ambiguous issue such as prostitution, can shed valuable light on such processes. The right sort of policy engagement can do much to maintain a Church's precious stores of moral authority. It can prove itself as a reliable national guardian, without having to wait for history to provide a suitable existential crisis. Politico-historical dynamics can sometimes better explain the policy advocacies of religious actors than recourse to theology or cultural essentialism. The search for political explanations can be a useful tool for opening the black box where religious interests are developed.

D. Suggestions for Further Study

This study touches on many possible research agendas in Political Science and Sociology. However, it is primarily part of the body of work on Church-State relations, especially the branch which tries to understand religious institutions or Churches as interest groups.

Insights from this thesis may lead a researcher to investigate the role of other influential Churches in prostitution policy debates in other countries. Such approaches may help reinvigorate the research agenda around prostitution and prostitution policy, which has sadly become bogged down in the same debates for and against sex work. Researchers might seek to understand how religious actors involve themselves in the issue—or, conversely, end up troubling themselves about prostitution at all. This project shows that advocates concerned with the issue should not take religious leaders' and religious groups' position for granted. One should not assume that Churches will simply be morally conservative, or, worse, assume that moral conservatism will always take the same form.

Scholars who research this debate might turn more

of their attention to religious actors and institutions, who, as was shown by this thesis, may join the debate without a clear policy stance or advanced knowledge of existing policy concepts. Their involvement in this debate may create confusion, as happened when Philippine Church actors blocked the repeal of Revised Penal Code article 202, not out of true ideological objection, but because they misunderstood the terminology. They can have considerable impact on policy outcomes, even if their positions might not fit so neatly into one policy model.

In Poland, Church actors had the quite unexpected approach of acceding to official toleration of prostitution. In the Philippines, Church actors blocked the de-criminalization of prostitution not because they wanted to continue punishing prostitutes, but because they conflated de-criminalization with the very different policy model of legalization/regulation. Similar surprises might be found in other countries. Treating Churches like interest groups might help researchers explain these policy stances and outcomes.

For instance, why do some elements of the Italian Church, specifically the John XXIII Society, have a strong

abolitionist stance, with emphasis on the plight of migrant prostitutes? More generally, why does the Italian Catholic Church advocate strong pro-immigrant, pro-refugee views, to the extent of standing against rising right-wing nationalist elements in the Italian government? (Giordan and Zrinščak 2018) Is it really because their proximity to the Vatican makes them more susceptible to the influence on Pope Francis' social teachings, or are there organizational interests at work here? The fact that these advocacies predate Francis' papacy suggests that we should look to explanations other than his pontificate. Perhaps a pro-immigrant stance helps attract certain influential advocacy partners. The Italian Church might view this stance as integral to the preservation or improvement of its moral authority. Indeed, this logic might make sense for a Church that, decades on, is still trying to recover from its humiliating associations with fascism, which considerably damaged its post-War moral authority. In short, the Italian Church's current approach to social justice for migrants, including migrant prostitutes, might be due to a desire to distance itself from its pro-Mussolini past. Alienating right-wing or anti-

immigration Italians might be considered a cost worth paying in the achievement of this goal. The testing of this hypothesis might comprise an interesting research project in the coming years, especially as the Italian Church is actively involved in addressing the country's refugee crisis.

The ideas explored in this thesis can also help us better understand how churches' policy positions or policy orientations change over time. It might not be because leaders have become more liberal or more conservative, but because the Church's current organizational interests are no longer served by its former position. A particularly daring researcher might also use these ideas to understand how Church actors can be made to change their position on various socio-political issues. It might not necessarily be a matter of persuasive theological or moral argument, but of re- shaping the institute's organizational interests so as to be more compatible with a desired position. Researchers can also venture further down national and local policy processes, to try to understand how and why Churches achieve varying degrees of impact when pursuing certain policy

goals regarding prostitution. For example, why were Church actors in the Philippines successful in blocking the repeal of penalties against prostitutes, but managed to obtain only mixed success in instituting harsher punishments against the customers of prostitutes?

Of course, such studies can yield broader insights about how Church actors influence policy outcomes on issues beyond the Church's list of highest-priority issues:

divorce, abortion, birth control, etc.

There is the question of whether this thesis' approach or insights would be applicable to other, non-Catholic religious actors and institutions, which would be operating in a less hierarchical, centralized context. Religious entities with less coherent structures might not develop a sufficiently coherent set of interests to be studied in this way. However, non-Catholic Churches or religious institutions still have ideological and organizational interests which can be studied as such. Other comparative studies have examined the Church-State relations of majority Christian vs. majority Muslim countries, so one can argue that there is sufficient structural similarity to

allow the use of the same theoretical foundations. (Buckley 2016) It may also be possible to study religious communities identify as distinct groups as one Church, if they tend to cooperate for political purposes. For example, some Evangelical Churches in the USA might be treated as one political actor because of their tendency to cooperate to meet common policy ends, and to promote the careers of certain politicians. The researcher must, of course, make the necessary adjustments to account for the peculiarities of Churches that are technically religious coalitions rather than single religious institutions/communities.

However, to the extent that the present world order remains statist, religious actors who want political influence will have to maintain their leverage with the state. Even if they do not identify as a unified, national Church, religious actors with sufficiently similar interests are more likely to form coalitions a national scale, in order to pool their resources towards gaining access to the state. From this perspective, their behavior and structure can begin to very closely resemble those of a national Church. Researchers can benefit from studying them as such.

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