The Political Economy of Electoral Reforms
A Tale of two Countries
Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana
Kumulative Dissertation
Angenommen am:
2016-07-14
Erschienen:
2016-07-27
Betreuer:
Baskaran, Thushyanthan Dr.
Gutachter:
Baskaran, Thushyanthan Dr.
Gutachter:
Schwager, Robert Prof. Dr.
Zum Verlinken/Zitieren: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-1735-0000-0028-87DB-A
Dateien
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main.pdf
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Beschreibung:
Thesis
Zusammenfassung
Englisch
This dissertation contributes to the emerging literature on endogenous political institutions and the causal relationship between institutions and the political and economic environment. For the purpose, all chapters rely on electoral reforms used as natural experiments that induce exogenous variation on the institutional context and incentives coming therefrom, allowing for the identification of causal treatment effects. In particular, the identification strategies rely at least partially on one of the two following electoral reforms: the Hessian Kommunalwahlreform from 1999 and the recent introduction of term limits in Portuguese municipalities. By combining these institutional reforms and state of the art quasi-experimental methodologies, it is possible to measure the causal impact of political institutions not only on electoral but also economic outcomes. Additionally, in the last chapter, the exogenous variation induced by the electoral reform in Portugal is used to disentangle two important determinants of voting behavior.
Keywords: institutions; natural experiment; voting; incentives
