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dc.contributor.advisor Hitz, Jörg-Markus Prof. Dr.
dc.contributor.author Müller-Bloch, Stephanie
dc.date.accessioned 2016-11-10T10:22:55Z
dc.date.available 2016-11-10T10:22:55Z
dc.date.issued 2016-11-10
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-1735-0000-002B-7C9F-0
dc.language.iso eng de
dc.relation.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject.ddc 330 de
dc.title Regulation of Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Investigation of Economic Consequences de
dc.type doctoralThesis de
dc.contributor.referee Hitz, Jörg-Markus Prof. Dr.
dc.date.examination 2016-09-22
dc.description.abstracteng The level of regulation of disclosure and corporate governance on the national and supranational level has increased substantially in the last decade. With that in mind, and in the light of the demand for evidence-based financial reporting and disclosure regulation (Buijink, 2006; Gassen and Günther, 2014; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), this dissertation aims at investigating economic consequences of such regulation. In particular, this dissertation attempts to provide empirical evidence that helps regulators to assess intended and unintended economic consequences of regulating disclosure and corporate governance. The dissertation comprises three studies that relate to the economic evaluation of intended and unintended consequences of specific regulatory measures in the field of the regulation of disclosure and corporate governance. The first study investigates the market perception of the regulation of corporate. The study aims to infer whether investors perceive the regulation of executive compensation contracts as value enhancing. The second study aims to investigate whether investors value the bonding to the extensive disclosure requirements in the EU-regulated market or whether investors welcome being able to opt out of the EU-regulated market due to an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff. The third study of this thesis examines determinants and consequences of firms’ downlisting decisions to infer whether costs of disclosure, namely IFRS compliance and enforcement, drive firms away from the EU-regulated market. Overall, main findings from this thesis emphasize that in the German continental European setting (1) regulation of disclosure and corporate governance does not increase, or may even decrease, shareholder welfare and that (2) regulation potentially drives firms away from high levels of disclosure. Consequently, evidence indicates that regulation fails to meet objectives intended by regulators. In the first study, unlike intended by regulators, regulation of executive compensation contracts decreased shareholder welfare. This finding indicates that private compensation contracts absent regulation were sufficient from a shareholder perspective. Also unlike argued by regulators (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015), evidence on investor perceptions of reduced requirements for leaving the EU-regulated market indicates that, in some cases, investors welcome reduced securities markets regulation (second study). By contrast, increased regulation of opt out requirements does not seem to matter from an investor perspective. Therefore, the regulatory measure likely misses the objective of increased investor protection as it does not increase shareholder wealth. Moreover, regulation of disclosure and enforcement can also lead to unintended consequences (third study). Findings indicate that costs of IFRS compliance and enforcement seem to have driven firms away from the EU-regulated market, and thus the IFRS mandate and the enforcement mechanism. de
dc.contributor.coReferee Wolff, Michael Prof. Dr.
dc.contributor.thirdReferee Dierkes, Stefan Prof. Dr.
dc.subject.eng Regulation de
dc.subject.eng Disclosure de
dc.subject.eng Corporate Governance de
dc.subject.eng Executive Compensation de
dc.subject.eng IFRS de
dc.subject.eng Enforcement de
dc.subject.eng Downlisting de
dc.identifier.urn urn:nbn:de:gbv:7-11858/00-1735-0000-002B-7C9F-0-5
dc.affiliation.institute Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät de
dc.subject.gokfull Wirtschaftswissenschaften (PPN621567140) de
dc.identifier.ppn 872311848

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