Zur Kurzanzeige

Regulation of Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Investigation of Economic Consequences

dc.contributor.advisorHitz, Jörg-Markus Prof. Dr.
dc.contributor.authorMüller-Bloch, Stephanie
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-10T10:22:55Z
dc.date.available2016-11-10T10:22:55Z
dc.date.issued2016-11-10
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-1735-0000-002B-7C9F-0
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.53846/goediss-5975
dc.language.isoengde
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject.ddc330de
dc.titleRegulation of Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Investigation of Economic Consequencesde
dc.typedoctoralThesisde
dc.contributor.refereeHitz, Jörg-Markus Prof. Dr.
dc.date.examination2016-09-22
dc.description.abstractengThe level of regulation of disclosure and corporate governance on the national and supranational level has increased substantially in the last decade. With that in mind, and in the light of the demand for evidence-based financial reporting and disclosure regulation (Buijink, 2006; Gassen and Günther, 2014; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), this dissertation aims at investigating economic consequences of such regulation. In particular, this dissertation attempts to provide empirical evidence that helps regulators to assess intended and unintended economic consequences of regulating disclosure and corporate governance. The dissertation comprises three studies that relate to the economic evaluation of intended and unintended consequences of specific regulatory measures in the field of the regulation of disclosure and corporate governance. The first study investigates the market perception of the regulation of corporate. The study aims to infer whether investors perceive the regulation of executive compensation contracts as value enhancing. The second study aims to investigate whether investors value the bonding to the extensive disclosure requirements in the EU-regulated market or whether investors welcome being able to opt out of the EU-regulated market due to an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff. The third study of this thesis examines determinants and consequences of firms’ downlisting decisions to infer whether costs of disclosure, namely IFRS compliance and enforcement, drive firms away from the EU-regulated market. Overall, main findings from this thesis emphasize that in the German continental European setting (1) regulation of disclosure and corporate governance does not increase, or may even decrease, shareholder welfare and that (2) regulation potentially drives firms away from high levels of disclosure. Consequently, evidence indicates that regulation fails to meet objectives intended by regulators. In the first study, unlike intended by regulators, regulation of executive compensation contracts decreased shareholder welfare. This finding indicates that private compensation contracts absent regulation were sufficient from a shareholder perspective. Also unlike argued by regulators (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015), evidence on investor perceptions of reduced requirements for leaving the EU-regulated market indicates that, in some cases, investors welcome reduced securities markets regulation (second study). By contrast, increased regulation of opt out requirements does not seem to matter from an investor perspective. Therefore, the regulatory measure likely misses the objective of increased investor protection as it does not increase shareholder wealth. Moreover, regulation of disclosure and enforcement can also lead to unintended consequences (third study). Findings indicate that costs of IFRS compliance and enforcement seem to have driven firms away from the EU-regulated market, and thus the IFRS mandate and the enforcement mechanism.de
dc.contributor.coRefereeWolff, Michael Prof. Dr.
dc.contributor.thirdRefereeDierkes, Stefan Prof. Dr.
dc.subject.engRegulationde
dc.subject.engDisclosurede
dc.subject.engCorporate Governancede
dc.subject.engExecutive Compensationde
dc.subject.engIFRSde
dc.subject.engEnforcementde
dc.subject.engDownlistingde
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:gbv:7-11858/00-1735-0000-002B-7C9F-0-5
dc.affiliation.instituteWirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultätde
dc.subject.gokfullWirtschaftswissenschaften (PPN621567140)de
dc.identifier.ppn872311848


Dateien

Thumbnail

Das Dokument erscheint in:

Zur Kurzanzeige