The Making-Of: Innovation. Understanding and Designing the Environment for Non-R&D Innovation
by Elaine Horstmann
Date of Examination:2022-02-12
Date of issue:2022-02-28
Advisor:Prof. Dr. Kilian Bizer
Referee:Prof. Dr. Kilian Bizer
Referee:Prof. Dr. Margarete Boos
Referee:Prof. Dr. Holger A. Rau
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Abstract
English
This thesis aims to highlight non-R&D innovation and contribute to a broader and more profound appreciation of learning and knowledge creation processes crucial for employee and individual-driven innovation attainment. Across multiple articles, it shows that low-threshold changes in the organizational design can help compensate a lack of explicit, formalized R&D resources by encouraging employees to unfold their innovative potential. The thesis shows, setting a learning goal motivates people to search for patterns and structures to organize their input resources more efficiently by increasing the visibility of innovative capabilities. However, organizations should consider tangible and clearly defined targets that allow people to measure their progress, as they create higher potential to achieve innovative solutions. Besides, in DUI-like routine tasks, people accumulate experiential knowledge, making them more susceptible for choosing low-risk, low-reward options instead of high-risk, high-reward options (often a necessary pre-requisite for innovation). This is particularly important when experienced rewards are rare and occur relatively late in the search process. Thus, setting a specific, challenging learning goal can help people to overcome comparably bad experiences and endure the difficult and rocky search for innovations. Other tools, such as monetary incentives and delegating the compensation decision process, should be carefully embedded into given social structures. First, depending on the level of group identity and cohesion, proportional or performance-based compensations that conflicts a group target or interfere with the cooperative structure of a task can have a hampering effect. Thus, effective incentives schemes should consider social structures and multi-level conflicts that emerge from teamwork. Second, delegating the compensation decision should fit the task environment. When the subsequent task is ambiguous, as it is the case for innovation, people prefer a low-risk, performance independent payment. This preference for sure and fixed payments should be considered as a basis for (innovative) performance, but could be complemented with pay-for-performance elements for certain sub-tasks, as monetary incentives do not crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and subsequently innovation, per se. Finally, the learning and knowledge creation processes examined in this thesis are especially crucial for non-R&D output, but not exclusively so. Learning from experience, by conducting a task or using tools, or learning by searching and interacting, are universal behavioral patterns. Thus, tools discussed and tested in the specific framework of learning by "doing-using-interacting" can be transferred, implemented and tested within R&D-structures, particularly as they illustrate low-threshold interventions.
Keywords: innovation economics; behavioral and experimental economics; learning by doing, using, interacting; goal setting theory; monetary incentives and delegation of wage decision; choice bracketing and learning from descriptions and experience; group identity and prize sharing rules