The Development of Recursive Meta-Representational Theory of Mind
Doctoral thesis
Date of Examination:2023-05-10
Date of issue:2023-06-02
Advisor:Prof. Dr. Hannes Rakoczy
Referee:Prof. Dr. Hannes Rakoczy
Referee:Prof. Dr. Julia Fischer
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Abstract
English
Domain-general theories of Theory of Mind development assume that the ability to understand mental states (representations) as such is based on a fundamental understanding of representa-tions as representations (meta-representations) (Perner, 1991). Accordingly, Theory of Mind develops in the course of a cognitive revolution to meta-representational thinking at the age of about four years (Perner, 1991; Wellman et al., 2001). In subsequent development, more com-plex forms of metarepresentational Theory of Mind develop by recursive embedding of multiple mental representations, which additionally requires the ability of recursive operations (“A thinks that B thinks that C thinks … that p”). However, little is known about the developmental trajec-tories of this prolonged development of complex, recursive Theory of Mind. Moreover, recent research has cast doubt on the assumption that meta-representational Theory of Mind develops by age four (e.g., Fabricius et al., 2010; 2021). Therefore, the projects of this dissertation aim to investigate the emergence and development of meta-representational ToM from a domain-general perspective by addressing four questions: (Ia) When does meta-representational Theory of Mind emerge, (Ib) How does recursive meta-representational Theory of Mind develop throughout childhood, and what are developmental relations of ToM to (IIa) a general understanding of representations and (IIb) to the ability of recursive thinking? These research questions were addressed in three projects. Due to the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic, data collection for most of the studies of the dissertation had to be con-ducted remotely. Therefore, a preliminary study (N= 188, 3-4 years) established the new meth-od of online data collection as a valid alternative to classical in-person test settings. The first main project addressed the emergence of Theory of Mind in comparison to children’s general understanding of representations (N = 88, 3-6 years). The results showed parallel and correlated performance in meta-representational thought providing evidence for a unified emer-gence of meta-representational thought around age four. Building on the results of a unified onset, the second project investigated the subsequent devel-opment of more complex forms of recursive meta-representational thinking. In three studies (N = 232), six-to ten-year-old children were tested in first-to fifth-order Theory of Mind tasks. The results revealed major developmental progress in higher-order Theory of Mind and substantial correlations to general recursive embedding abilities. This provides evidence for the relatedness of complex Theory of Mind and higher-order recursive thinking. To shed light on further cognitive correlates or foundations, the third project compared this de-velopmental progress in higher-order Theory of Mind with children’s Mental Time Travel abili-ties. Mental Time Travel refers to the ability to reason about past and future events. It has been argued that sophisticated Mental Time Travel requires the representation of how past or future events relate to the present state and is thus based on some form of meta-representation. Children’s first-, second-, and third-order Theory of Mind and Mental Time Traveling abilities were compared (N = 120, 3-8 years). The results showed parallel, stepwise developmental pro-gress from first to third-order Theory of Mind and first-to third-order Mental Time Travel. The developmental trajectories were, however, only partly associated. In summary, the results show a consistent onset of meta-representational thought around age four and major developmental progress in higher-order Theory of Mind in children between six and ten years. Emergence and subsequent development in Theory of Mind was (partly) related to development in general recursive thinking abilities and meta-representational thought in other domains. These findings are compatible with domain-general theories of Theory of Mind devel-opment: To a certain extent, the emergence of first-order Theory of Mind and developmental progress in higher-order Theory of Mind base on shared abilities as meta-representational thought and recursive reasoning. This evidence contributes to a more comprehensive under-standing of ontogenetic Theory of Mind emergence and subsequent development in Theory of Mind and related abilities.
Keywords: Theory of Mind; False Belief; Meta-representation; Recursion; Mental Time Travel; Cognitive Development