| dc.description.abstracteng | This dissertation investigates norm enforcement in various social and economic contexts, particularly focusing on third-party reporting, public goods provision, and corporate environments. Through a series of laboratory experiments and vignette surveys, the research provides insights into how economic disparities, social ties, and individual characteristics influence the enforcement of social norms
This dissertation compromises four studies. Study 1 investigates the effects of economic inequality on cooperation and the role of punishment mechanisms in public goods provision. Using a linear three-player public goods game, the study examines how endowment heterogeneity and punishment impacts cooperation. Findings reveal that punishment stabilizes contributions and reducing economic inequality, especially when the majority is poor.
Study 2 examines the interplay between relational interests, severity of norm violations, and dispositional determinants in third-party reporting. A laboratory experiment shows that the third party’s identification with the victim significantly impacts reporting behavior when small amounts are taken. However, reporting is generally high when large amounts are taken, indicating a strong universalistic fairness norm against significant norm violations. The study highlights the role of social norms and relational interests in influencing third-party reporting behavior.
Focusing on corporate environments, study 3 investigates the propensity to report misconduct based on individual characteristics such as personality traits, economic preferences, and justice sensitivity. Using a vignette survey with hypothetical scenarios, the research finds that traits like openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, victim sensitivity, and prosociality significantly predict the likelihood of reporting misconduct. Additionally, the identity of the perpetrator and the beneficiary of the misconduct influence reporting decisions, with misconduct by supervisors and actions benefiting the individual being more likely to be reported.
Study 4 explores the interplay of gender, social ties, and negative externalities in bribery using a modified dictator game. The findings suggest that men are more likely to engage in bribery, especially when they have social ties with the briber, while women are more likely to accept bribes but not reciprocate in cases with high externalities. The study indicates that women prioritize fairness considerations, whereas men emphasize reciprocity towards the briber when social ties are involved.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to understanding the multifaceted nature of norm enforcement by examining how economic inequality, social ties, individual characteristics, and gender differences shape cooperative behavior and the enforcement of social norms across different contexts. | de |