Investigation of selected Controlling Instruments

by Torben Bartram
Doctoral thesis
Date of Examination:2024-10-18
Date of issue:2024-11-14
Advisor:Prof. Dr. Claudia Keser
Referee:Prof. Dr. Claudia Keser
Referee:Prof. Dr. Holger Rau
Referee:Prof. Dr. Michael Wolff
Persistent Address: http://dx.doi.org/10.53846/goediss-10865

 

 

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Abstract

English

In the dissertation, three controlling instruments were examined: methods for determining individual risk attitudes, remuneration systems and behaviour-oriented controls, which play important roles in a corporate context. The first two were analysed by means of a laboratory experiment and the latter by means of a model-theoretical analysis. To determine the individual risk attitude of a decision-maker with regard to a produc-tion decision, I created the new Confectioner One Shot Game, which was used for the first time and tested at the same time. The test person has to put himself in the role of a confectioner and decide how many cakes he wants to produce. His individual risk attitude is then derived from this decision. In order to check whether a new procedure actually tests the criterion it claims to test, it must be certified as having high parallel test reability. For this purpose, the test subjects undergo the new procedure and also old procedures that have already proved their worth. If the results of the procedures correlate, the new procedure is certified as having high parallel test reability. The Confectioner One Shot Game was carried out together with the two prominent procedures Holt and Laury Lottery and Eckel and Grosman Lottery. The respective results correlate with each other, which attests to the high parallel test reability of the Confectioner One Shot Game. In a collective remuneration system, the contents of a bonus pot are distributed equally across all team members. In a mixed remuneration system, part of the pot is distributed equally, while the other part depends on individual performance. It was analysed which remuneration system is more suitable for increasing team output in a situation where team members are reassigned to different tasks after each period. The team member who has shown the highest work effort is assigned to the most important task, the team member who has shown the second highest work effort is assigned to the second most important task and so on. It could be shown that the mixed remuneration system induces a higher team output in this decision situation than the collective one. The subject of the investigation in the last study is behavioural monitoring that can be carried out by a supervisor. A distinction was made as to whether they were car-ried out with a high or low frequency of control. The influence of the different control frequencies on the relationship between the supervisor and his employees was then derived from the literature.
Keywords: laboratory experiment; controlling instrument
 
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