Essays on International Trade, Trade Barriers, and Oligopolistic Competition

von Jonas Fabian Rudsinske
Kumulative Dissertation
Datum der mündl. Prüfung:2022-06-01
Erschienen:2022-06-14
Betreuer:Prof. Dr. Udo Kreickemeier
Gutachter:Prof. Dr. Udo Kreickemeier
Gutachter:Prof. Dr. Robert Schwager
Gutachter:Prof. Dr. Krisztina Kis-Katos
Zum Verlinken/Zitieren: http://dx.doi.org/10.53846/goediss-9291

 

 

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Zusammenfassung

Englisch

Empirical evidence suggests both that market power increased considerably since 1980 (e.g. De Loecker et al., 2020) and that firms differ in destination-specific trade barriers (e.g. Munch and Nguyen, 2014). Motivated by these insights, this thesis develops a trade model that allows to analyze the effects of asymmetric policies in general oligopolistic equilibrium, uses this framework to study corporate taxation, tax-motivated transfer pricing and trade policy, and provides evidence that personal characteristics of top managers like nationality and gender can give rise to firm heterogeneity in destination-specific trade barriers. The first chapter develops a trade model with segmented markets that allows to analyze oligopolistic behavior across asymmetric countries. Firms' oligopolistic behavior has macro-level effects when countries are asymmetric. This can induce deviations from the law of one price, which gives rise to terms-of-trade based international shifts in consumption and welfare. Corporate taxation and tax-motivated transfer pricing are incorporated into this model in the second chapter. Without transfer pricing, a higher profit tax rate shifts welfare towards the taxing country. Tax-motivated transfer pricing introduces an additional incentive for all firms to export and, consequently, to expand production, such that real wages rise in both countries. As tax income shifts, consumption is relocated from the high- to the low-tax country. Import tariffs in this setting are studied in the third chapter. Their anti-competitive effect reduces labor demand as firms want to shorten supply. Unilaterally raising the import tariff increases domestic welfare at the foreign country's expense, but also favors profit incomes relative to labor incomes, as real wages fall. The fourth chapter shows a destination-specific pro-trade effect of top managers' nationality. The effect is especially pronounced for institutionally distant destinations, which can be seen as bridging the gap between institutionally dissimilar countries. Likewise, the effect is more pronounced for destinations with less developed institutions, which indicates that manager connections help overcoming trade barriers created by low institutional quality. Finally, the fifth chapter uncovers trade-reducing effects of institutional discrimination against female managers in destination markets. This barrier exists for firm internationalization on the micro and international trade on the macro level. Importantly, it might give rise to disadvantages for female managers even in non-discriminatory countries.
Keywords: factor income distribution; gender discrimination; general oligopolistic equilibrium; globalization; gravity; institutions; international policy transmission; international trade; labor share; oligopoly; profit shifting; strategic trade; trade barriers; trade policy; transfer pricing
 
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